


A close-up photograph of two hands in a dark suit, one hand gripping the other in a deceptive manner. The background is black.

# Encyclopedia of Deception

Timothy R. Levine  
Editor

Encyclopedia of  
**D E C E P T I O N**





Encyclopedia of  
**D E C E P T I O N**

VOLUME 1

**TIMOTHY R. LEVINE**

EDITOR

Korea University

 **SAGE** reference

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi  
Singapore | Washington DC



Los Angeles | London | New Delhi  
Singapore | Washington DC

FOR INFORMATION:

SAGE Publications, Inc.  
2455 Teller Road  
Thousand Oaks, California 91320  
E-mail: [order@sagepub.com](mailto:order@sagepub.com)

SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.  
B 1/1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area  
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044  
India

SAGE Publications Ltd.  
1 Oliver's Yard  
55 City Road  
London EC1Y 1SP  
United Kingdom

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd.  
3 Church Street  
#10-04 Samsung Hub  
Singapore 049483

---

Executive Editor: Jim Brace-Thompson  
Cover Designer: Candice Harman  
Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez  
Reference Systems Coordinators: Laura Notton  
Anna Villasenor  
Marketing Manager: Carmel Schrire

---

Golson Media  
President and Editor: J. Geoffrey Golson  
Production Director: Mary Jo Scibetta  
Author Manager: Joseph Golson  
Layout Editor: Stephanie Larson  
Copyeditor: Rebecca Kuzins  
Production Editor: TLK Editing Services  
Proofreaders: Mary Le Rouge, Kathy Hix  
Indexer: J S Editorial

Copyright © 2014 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

---

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of deception / Timothy R. Levine, editor.  
volumes cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.  
ISBN 978-1-4522-5877-5 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1.  
Deception. 2. Truthfulness and falsehood. I. Levine,  
Timothy R.

BF637.D42E53 2014  
177'.3--dc23

2013045358

14 15 16 17 18 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



# Contents

---

## Volume 1

|                      |              |
|----------------------|--------------|
| List of Articles     | <i>vii</i>   |
| Reader's Guide       | <i>xiii</i>  |
| About the Editor     | <i>xviii</i> |
| List of Contributors | <i>xix</i>   |
| Introduction         | <i>xxv</i>   |
| Chronology           | <i>xxix</i>  |

### Articles

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| A | 1   |
| B | 53  |
| C | 115 |
| D | 239 |
| E | 323 |
| F | 355 |
| G | 401 |
| H | 431 |

## Volume 2

|                  |            |
|------------------|------------|
| List of Articles | <i>vii</i> |
|------------------|------------|

### Articles

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| I | 491 |
| J | 555 |
| K | 571 |
| L | 581 |
| M | 631 |
| N | 693 |
| O | 729 |
| P | 745 |
| R | 793 |
| S | 827 |
| T | 877 |
| U | 907 |
| V | 915 |
| W | 925 |

|          |     |
|----------|-----|
| Glossary | 953 |
|----------|-----|

|                |     |
|----------------|-----|
| Resource Guide | 961 |
|----------------|-----|

|                                                                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Appendix: The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies | 967 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

|       |     |
|-------|-----|
| Index | 993 |
|-------|-----|

|               |      |
|---------------|------|
| Photo Credits | 1054 |
|---------------|------|



# List of Articles

---

## **A**

Academia  
Accounting  
Adolescence, Lying in  
Advertising, Consumer Products  
African Americans  
Alibi  
Anderson, Anna (Anastasia)  
Animals  
Anthropology, Cultural  
April Fool's Day  
Aquinas, Thomas  
Aristotle  
Aroused Suspicion  
Asian Americans  
Assassin Bugs  
Attorneys  
Audience  
Authoritarian States

## **B**

Bailey, Frederick George  
Bankruptcy  
Barnum, P. T.  
Baseball  
Basketball  
Battle of Fishguard  
Battle of the Bulge  
Beatles Hoax  
Behavioral Analysis Interview

Betrayal  
Bible  
Big Lie Technique  
Birds  
Blair, Jayson  
Bluffing  
Bok, Sissela  
Bond, Charles  
Book of Mormon  
"Boy Who Cried Wolf"  
Bragging and Grandiosity  
Brain  
Brer Rabbit  
Burgoon, Judee  
Bush, George W.  
Business  
Butterflies

## **C**

Camouflage  
Cardiff Giant  
Cardinal Newman  
Carnegie, Dale  
Catholic Church  
Caveat Emptor  
Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.  
Charles II Plot  
Cheating  
Childhood, Lying in  
Children, Development of Deception in

Children's Sports Teams  
Churchill, Winston  
Civil War, U.S.  
Clausewitz, Carl von  
Clever Hans  
Clinton, Bill  
Cognitive Dissonance  
Cognitive Heuristics  
Cognitive Load  
Coherence and Correspondence  
Cold Fusion  
College Sports  
Colleges and Universities, For-Profit  
Collusion  
Colonialism  
Columbus, Christopher  
Communication  
Computer-Generated Images  
Con Man  
Concealed Information Test  
Confession  
Consciousness  
Consensual Reality  
Conspiracies  
Consumer Protection Laws  
Contagious Disease Outbreaks  
Content in Context  
Context  
Cooperation  
Corporate Fraud  
Corporations  
Cottingley Fairies  
Courtship, Deception in  
Coyote  
Credibility  
Cromwell, Oliver  
Crying

**D**

Daily Life, Lying in  
Darwin, Charles  
Deception, Attitudes Toward  
Deception, Characteristics of  
Deception, Definitions of  
Deception, Research on  
Deception and Technology  
Deception and Trust  
Deception Detection Accuracy  
Deception in Different Contexts  
Deception in Research Design

Deception Motives  
Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment  
Deniability  
Denial  
Department of Defense, U.S.  
DePaulo, Bella  
Disasters  
Disbelief, Suspension of  
Discovered Deception, Reactions to  
Dishonesty  
Disinformation  
Distrust  
Dog-Human Deception  
Dot-Com Bubble  
Dreyfus Affair  
Drug Advertising  
Drugs  
Duchenne Smile  
Duping Delight

**E**

Edwards, John  
Eisenhower, Dwight  
Ekman, Paul  
Electroencephalography  
Emotions  
Enron  
Equivocation  
Espionage and Counterespionage  
Ethnic Differences  
Evidence, Strategic Use of  
Evolution and Natural Selection  
Exaggeration  
Eye Contact

**F**

Fairy Tales  
False Advertising  
False Confessions  
False Memories  
False Signals  
Fantasy and Imagination  
Federal Trade Commission  
Feigned Retreat  
Fiction  
Financial Markets  
Fireflies  
Fish  
Football  
Forgery, Art

Frank, Mark  
Frankfurt, Harry G.  
Freud, Sigmund  
Frey, James  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

**G**

Games, Children's  
Generalized Communicative Suspicion  
Glass, Stephen  
Goffman, Erving  
Gossip  
Government, Decline of Public Trust in  
Government Propaganda  
*Great Gatsby, The*  
Greenspan, Alan  
Guilt  
Gullibility

**H**

Half-Truths  
Hartzell, Oscar  
Hearst, William Randolph  
High School Sports  
Hispanic Americans  
Historical Narratives, False  
History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations  
History of Deception: Medieval Period  
History of Deception: Renaissance  
History of Deception: 1600 to 1700  
History of Deception: 1700 to 1800  
History of Deception: 1800 to 1900  
History of Deception: 1900 to 1950  
History of Deception: 1950 to the Present  
Hitler, Adolf  
Hockey  
Honest Baseline Behaviors  
Honesty  
Humor

**I**

Iago (Shakespeare's *Othello*)  
Identity Theft  
Ideology  
Impression  
Inca Empire  
Infidelity  
Information Manipulation Theory 1  
Information Manipulation Theory 2  
Insects

Insider Trading  
Intelligence  
Internet: Chat Rooms  
Internet: E-Mail  
Internet: E-Mail Scams  
Internet: Facebook and Social  
Media Sites  
Internet: Online Dating  
Interpersonal Deception Theory  
*Invention of Lying, The*  
Investigator Bias  
Investment Fraud  
Iran-Contra Affair  
Iraq War  
Irving, Clifford  
Islam

**J**

Jackalope  
Jackson, Andrew  
Jefferson, Thomas  
Johnson, Samuel  
Judaism  
Justice

**K**

Kant, Immanuel  
Kennedy, John F.  
Knapp, Mark  
Korean War

**L**

Language  
Law and Law Enforcement  
Leakage  
Letters of Recommendation  
Libel and Slander  
Lie Acceptability  
Lie Bias  
*Lie to Me*  
Lies, Types of  
Linguistic Cues  
Lying, Accusations of  
Lying, Costs of  
Lying, Difficulty of  
Lying, Intentionality of  
Lying, Prevalence of  
Lying as Ability or Skill  
Lying as Exercise of Power  
Lying as Norm in Social Interactions

## M

Machiavelli, Niccolò  
Machiavellianism  
Madoff, Bernard  
Magic Tricks  
Malingering  
Manipulation  
Marketing, Deceptive  
McCornack, Steven  
McCornack-Parks Model  
Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry  
Memoirs  
Memory  
Men  
Mental Effort in Lying  
Meta-Analysis  
Microfacial Expressions  
Middle East  
Military Deception  
Miller, Gerald  
Mimicry  
Morals and Ethics  
Motivational Impairment Effect  
Movies, Lying in  
Myth

## N

Napoleon Bonaparte  
Narcissism  
Native Americans  
Nazi Propaganda  
Neurophysiology  
*New York Sun's* Moon Series  
News Media: Internet  
News Media: Print  
News Media: Television and Radio  
Nietzsche, Friedrich  
Nixon, Richard  
Nonverbal Cues  
Normandy, Allied Invasion of  
Nostradamus

## O

Oaths  
Operation Bodyguard  
Operation Mincemeat  
Operation Neptune  
Operation Quicksilver  
Othello Effect  
Overconfidence

## P

Paltering  
Park, Hee Sun  
Park-Levine Probability Model  
Pathological Lying  
Perjury  
Photographs, Altered  
Piltdown Man  
Pinocchio  
Plagiarism  
Plants  
Plato  
Plausibility  
Poker  
Polygraph  
Primates  
Probing Effect  
Projection  
Psychoanalysis  
Public Relations  
Puffery

## R

Racism  
Rationality  
Reaction Time  
Reality Monitoring  
Relationships: Family  
Relationships: Friends  
Relationships: Romantic  
Relationships: Sexual  
Repressed Memories  
Reputation  
Résumés  
Rose, Pete  
Rumor

## S

Saint Augustine  
Santa Claus  
Sawyer, Tom  
Scientific Content Analysis  
Secrecy  
Self-Deception  
Self-Esteem  
Self-Justification  
Sender Demeanor  
Siege of Mafeking  
Situational Familiarity  
Smoke Screen



Soccer (Football)  
Sock Puppetry  
Source Credibility  
Spanish-American Conquests  
Spin, Corporate  
Spin, Political  
Stalin, Josef  
Statement Validity Assessment  
Stewart, Martha  
Stylometry  
Sun Tzu

**T**

Tall Tales  
Terrorism  
Theory of Mind  
Thermal Imaging  
*To Tell the Truth*  
Tobacco Advertising  
Torture  
Transparent Liars  
Trojan Horse  
Truth  
Truth Bias

**U**

UFOs  
Urban Legends

**V**

Veracity Effect  
Vietnam War  
Vocal Stress Analysis  
Vrij, Aldert

**W**

*War of the Worlds*  
Ward, Lester F.  
Washington, George  
Watergate  
White House Press Secretaries  
White Lies  
Witness, False Testimony of  
Wizards of Lie Detection  
Women  
World War I  
World War II



# Reader's Guide

---

## **Advertising, Marketing, and Public Relations**

Advertising, Consumer Products  
Carnegie, Dale  
Colleges and Universities, For-Profit  
Consumer Protection Laws  
Drug Advertising  
Enron  
False Advertising  
Federal Trade Commission  
Internet: E-Mail Scams  
Marketing, Deceptive  
Public Relations  
Puffery  
Spin, Corporate  
Tobacco Advertising

## **Animals and Nature**

Animals  
Assassin Bugs  
Birds  
Butterflies  
Camouflage  
Coyote  
Dog-Human Deception  
Evolution and Natural Selection  
False Signals  
Fireflies  
Fish  
Insects

Mimicry  
Plants  
Primates

## **Communication**

Aroused Suspicion  
Bluffing  
“Boy Who Cried Wolf”  
Bragging and Grandiosity  
Burgoon, Judee  
Coherence and Correspondence  
Communication  
Content in Context  
Deception Detection Accuracy  
Discovered Deception, Reactions to  
Equivocation  
Exaggeration  
Frank, Mark  
Frankfurt, Harry G.  
Generalized Communicative Suspicion  
Goffman, Erving  
Half-Truths  
Honesty  
Infidelity  
Information Manipulation Theory 1  
Information Manipulation Theory 2  
Interpersonal Deception Theory  
Knapp, Mark  
Language  
Lie Acceptability

Lie Bias  
 Lies, Types of  
 Lying, Prevalence of  
 McCornack, Steven  
 McCornack–Parks Model  
 Miller, Gerald  
 Paltering  
 Park, Hee Sun  
 Park-Levine Probability Model  
 Plausibility  
 Probing Effect  
 Relationships: Family  
 Relationships: Friends  
 Relationships: Romantic  
 Relationships: Sexual  
 Reputation  
 Sender Demeanor  
 Sock Puppetry  
 Source Credibility  
 Tall Tales  
 Transparent Liars  
 Truth  
 Truth Bias  
 Veracity Effect  
 White Lies

### **Deception in Different Cultures**

African Americans  
 Asian Americans  
 Ethnic Differences  
 Hispanic Americans  
 Islam  
 Men  
 Middle East  
 Native Americans  
 Racism  
 Women

### **Entertainment, Media, and Sports**

Audience  
 Baseball  
 Basketball  
 Beatles Hoax  
 Blair, Jayson  
 Brer Rabbit  
 Children's Sports Teams  
 College Sports  
 Computer-Generated Images  
 Fairy Tales  
 Fantasy and Imagination

Fiction  
 Football  
 Frey, James  
 Games, Children's  
 Glass, Stephen  
 Gossip  
 High School Sports  
 Hockey  
 Humor  
 Iago (Shakespeare's *Othello*)  
 Internet: Chat Rooms  
 Internet: E-Mail  
 Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites  
 Internet: Online Dating  
*Invention of Lying, The*  
*Lie to Me*  
 Magic Tricks  
 Memoirs  
 Movies, Lying in  
 News Media: Internet  
 News Media: Print  
 News Media: Television and Radio  
 Photographs, Altered  
 Pinocchio  
 Poker  
 Rose, Pete  
 Rumor  
 Sawyer, Tom  
 Soccer (Football)  
*To Tell the Truth*  
*War of the Worlds*

### **Ethics, Morality, and Religion**

Aquinas, Thomas  
 Bible  
 Bok, Sissela  
 Book of Mormon  
 Cardinal Newman  
 Catholic Church  
 Confession  
 Ideology  
 Islam  
 Johnson, Samuel  
 Judaism  
 Kant, Immanuel  
 Morals and Ethics  
 Nietzsche, Friedrich  
 Oaths  
 Plato  
 Saint Augustine

**Law, Business, and Academia**

Academia  
Accounting  
Alibi  
Attorneys  
Bankruptcy  
Business  
Caveat Emptor  
Cold Fusion  
Collusion  
Context  
Corporate Fraud  
Corporations  
Credibility  
Dot-Com Bubble  
Financial Markets  
Forgery, Art  
Greenspan, Alan  
Identity Theft  
Insider Trading  
Investment Fraud  
Justice  
Law and Law Enforcement  
Letters of Recommendation  
Libel and Slander  
Manipulation  
Marketing, Deceptive  
Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry  
Perjury  
Plagiarism  
Résumés  
Stylometry  
Witness, False Testimony of

**Military**

Battle of Fishguard  
Battle of the Bulge  
Bush, George W.  
Camouflage  
Churchill, Winston  
Civil War, U.S.  
Clausewitz, Carl von  
Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment  
Department of Defense, U.S.  
Disinformation  
Feigned Retreat  
Iran-Contra Affair  
Iraq War  
Korean War  
Military Deception

Napoleon Bonaparte  
Nazi Propaganda  
Normandy, Allied Invasion of  
Operation Bodyguard  
Operation Mincemeat  
Operation Neptune  
Operation Quicksilver  
Siege of Mafeking  
Smoke Screen  
Sun Tzu  
Terrorism  
Torture  
Vietnam War  
World War I  
World War II

**Politics and Government**

Authoritarian States  
Big Lie Technique  
Bush, George W.  
Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.  
Clinton, Bill  
Contagious Disease Outbreaks  
Disasters  
Edwards, John  
Espionage and Counterespionage  
Government, Decline of Public Trust in  
Government Propaganda  
Iran-Contra Affair  
Kennedy, John F.  
Nazi Propaganda  
Nixon, Richard  
Secrecy  
Spin, Political  
Stalin, Josef  
Watergate  
White House Press Secretaries

**Psychology: Clinical and Developmental**

Adolescence, Lying in  
Brain  
Childhood, Lying in  
Children, Development of Deception in  
Consciousness  
Consensual Reality  
Cooperation  
Crying  
Disbelief, Suspension of  
Drugs  
Emotions

False Memories  
 Freud, Sigmund  
 Guilt  
 Impression  
 Intelligence  
 Lying, Accusations of  
 Lying, Costs of  
 Lying, Difficulty of  
 Lying, Intentionality of  
 Lying as Exercise of Power  
 Lying as Norm in Social Interactions  
 Malingering  
 Memory  
 Mental Effort in Lying  
 Narcissism  
 Neurophysiology  
 Pathological Lying  
 Projection  
 Psychoanalysis  
 Rationality  
 Repressed Memories  
 Self-Deception  
 Self-Esteem  
 Self-Justification  
 Theory of Mind  
 Ward, Lester F.

**Psychology: Social, Legal, and Forensic**

Behavioral Analysis Interview  
 Betrayal  
 Bond, Charles  
 Cheating  
 Cognitive Dissonance  
 Cognitive Heuristics  
 Cognitive Load  
 Concealed Information Test  
 Courtship, Deception in  
 Daily Life, Lying in  
 Deception, Attitudes Toward  
 Deception, Characteristics of  
 Deception, Definitions of  
 Deception, Research on  
 Deception and Technology  
 Deception and Trust  
 Deception in Different Contexts  
 Deception in Research Design  
 Deception Motives  
 Deniability  
 Denial  
 DePaulo, Bella

Dishonesty  
 Distrust  
 Duchenne Smile  
 Duping Delight  
 Ekman, Paul  
 Electroencephalography  
 Evidence, Strategic Use of  
 Eye Contact  
 False Confessions  
 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
 Guilt  
 Gullibility  
 Honest Baseline Behaviors  
 Investigator Bias  
 Leakage  
 Linguistic Cues  
 Lying as Ability or Skill  
 Machiavellianism  
 Meta-Analysis  
 Microfacial Expressions  
 Motivational Impairment Effect  
 Nonverbal Cues  
 Othello Effect  
 Overconfidence  
 Polygraph  
 Reaction Time  
 Reality Monitoring  
 Scientific Content Analysis  
 Situational Familiarity  
 Sock Puppetry  
 Statement Validity Assessment  
 Thermal Imaging  
 Vocal Stress Analysis  
 Vrij, Aldert  
 Wizards of Lie Detection

**Social History: Lies in History,  
 Famous Liars, and Hoaxes**

Anderson, Anna (Anastasia)  
 Anthropology, Cultural  
 April Fool's Day  
 Aristotle  
 Bailey, Frederick George  
 Barnum, P. T.  
 Cardiff Giant  
 Charles II Plot  
 Churchill, Winston  
 Civil War, U.S.  
 Clausewitz, Carl von  
 Clever Hans

- 
- |                                             |                                   |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Colonialism                                 | Memoirs                           |
| Columbus, Christopher                       | Myth                              |
| Con Man                                     | Napoleon Bonaparte                |
| Conspiracies                                | Native Americans                  |
| Cottingley Fairies                          | Nazi Propaganda                   |
| Cromwell, Oliver                            | <i>New York Sun's</i> Moon Series |
| Darwin, Charles                             | Newman, Cardinal                  |
| Disasters                                   | Nietzsche, Friedrich              |
| Dreyfus Affair                              | Nixon, Richard                    |
| Eisenhower, Dwight                          | Nostradamus                       |
| Freud, Sigmund                              | Normandy, Allied Invasion of      |
| <i>Great Gatsby, The</i>                    | Operation Bodyguard               |
| Hartzell, Oscar                             | Operation Mincemeat               |
| Hearst, William Randolph                    | Operation Neptune                 |
| Historical Narratives, False                | Operation Quicksilver             |
| History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations | Pitldown Man                      |
| History of Deception: Medieval Period       | Plato                             |
| History of Deception: Renaissance           | Rose, Pete                        |
| History of Deception: 1600 to 1700          | Santa Claus                       |
| History of Deception: 1700 to 1800          | Siege of Mafeking                 |
| History of Deception: 1800 to 1900          | Spanish-American Conquests        |
| History of Deception: 1900 to 1950          | Stalin, Josef                     |
| History of Deception: 1950 to the Present   | Stewart, Martha                   |
| Hitler, Adolf                               | Sun Tzu                           |
| Inca Empire                                 | Trojan Horse                      |
| Iran-Contra Affair                          | UFOs                              |
| Irving, Clifford                            | Urban Legends                     |
| Jackalope                                   | Vietnam War                       |
| Jackson, Andrew                             | <i>War of the Worlds</i>          |
| Jefferson, Thomas                           | Washington, George                |
| Kennedy, John F.                            | White House Press Secretaries     |
| Korean War                                  | World War I                       |
| Machiavelli, Niccolò                        | World War II                      |
| Madoff, Bernard                             |                                   |

# About the Editor

---

Timothy R. Levine, Ph.D., is professor of communication and media at Korea University, South Korea, where he teaches and conducts research on topics related to interpersonal communication, persuasion, social influence, and social-scientific research methods. In addition to teaching graduate and undergraduate classes, Levine conducts training for police, attorneys, and people in the intelligence and counterintelligence communities. Before Korea University, he held faculty appointments at Michigan State University, Indiana University, and the University of Hawai'i. He has published more than 100 refereed journal



articles reporting original research related to communication.

Levine is an internationally recognized leader in deception research. He is the author or coauthor of *Information Manipulation Theory*, *Truth Default Theory*, *The Veracity Effect*, *The Probing Effect*, and *The Park-Levine Probability Model*. His research on deception has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His current research focuses on what makes some people more believable than others and on effective interrogation strategies.



# List of Contributors

---

- |                                             |                                                   |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Owen Anderson                               | Kevin R. Binning                                  |
| <i>Arizona State University</i>             | <i>University of California, Santa Barbara</i>    |
| Michael A. Applegate                        | Geoff Bird                                        |
| <i>Westminster College</i>                  | <i>Birkbeck, University of London</i>             |
| Jacqueline Arnold                           | Jordan Blackhurst                                 |
| <i>Texas Tech University</i>                | <i>Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville</i> |
| Michael A. Arntfield                        | Rachel Blady                                      |
| <i>University of Western Ontario</i>        | <i>Cornell University</i>                         |
| Elliot Aronson                              | Amanda Blinebry                                   |
| <i>University of California, Santa Cruz</i> | <i>University of Missouri, St. Louis</i>          |
| Majed Ashy                                  | Charles Bond                                      |
| <i>Bay State College</i>                    | <i>Texas Christian University</i>                 |
| Randy Azzato                                | Michiel Bot                                       |
| <i>Bay State College</i>                    | <i>New York University</i>                        |
| Therese K. Bailey                           | S. Renee Botton                                   |
| <i>Cornell University</i>                   | <i>University of Nevada, Reno</i>                 |
| Alyssa N. Baker                             | William Brady                                     |
| <i>Westminster College</i>                  | <i>New York University</i>                        |
| Webster B. Baker                            | Marco Briziarelli                                 |
| <i>Saint Leo University</i>                 | <i>University of New Mexico</i>                   |
| Emily Balcetis                              | Megan C. Brown                                    |
| <i>New York University</i>                  | <i>Drake University</i>                           |
| Andrew Bass                                 | Judee K. (Kathelene) Burgoon                      |
| <i>Cornell University</i>                   | <i>University of Arizona</i>                      |
| Michael J. Beatty                           | Jason A. Cantone                                  |
| <i>University of Miami</i>                  | <i>Federal Judicial Center</i>                    |
| Valarie Bell                                | Elisabeth Carter                                  |
| <i>University of Nevada, Reno</i>           | <i>Buckinghamshire New University</i>             |
| Morgan Beller                               | Stacy L. Carter                                   |
| <i>Cornell University</i>                   | <i>Texas Tech University</i>                      |

- Sean D. Carter-Hopkins  
*Knox College*
- Rod Carveth  
*Morgan State University*
- Joseph R. Castro  
*Syracuse University*
- Zoë Chance  
*Yale University*
- Felix O. Chima  
*Prairie View A&M University*
- James J. Chriss  
*Cleveland State University*
- David E. Clementson  
*Ohio State University*
- Kevin Cochran  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Shana Cole  
*New York University*
- Tim Cole  
*DePaul University*
- Shirley M. Crawley  
*Western Connecticut State University*
- Erin Crecelius  
*California State University,  
Fullerton*
- Nicholas J. Crowe  
*Centre For Medieval & Renaissance  
Studies, Oxford*
- Madeleine T. D'Agata  
*Queen's University*
- Colin Dailey  
*Cornell University*
- Rick Dale  
*University of California, Merced*
- Douglas J. Dallier  
*University of Maryland*
- Phillip J. Dalton  
*Cornell University*
- Kimberly M. Danner  
*Oakland University*
- Daniel Cochece Davis  
*Illinois State University*
- Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Martin V. Day  
*Princeton University*
- Evelyne Debey  
*Ghent University*
- James I. Deutsch  
*Smithsonian Institution*
- Patrick J. Dillon  
*University of Memphis*
- Holly Domke  
*Cornell University*
- Shane Dunau  
*Cornell University*
- Adam Dunbar  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Norah E. Dunbar  
*University of Oklahoma*
- Nicholas D. Duran  
*University of California, Merced*
- Sonja Edwards  
*University of Southampton*
- Tiffany Edwards  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Gaven A. Ehrlich  
*Syracuse University*
- Aaron Elkins  
*University of Arizona*
- Sarah Elliot  
*Cornell University*
- Don Fallis  
*University of Arizona*
- Chantelle Farmer  
*Cornell University*
- Hannah Elizabeth Fawcett  
*Manchester Metropolitan University*
- Carey Fitzgerald  
*Oakland University*
- Brianna Fowler  
*Cornell University*
- Steven Frenda  
*University of California, Irvine*
- James Geistman  
*Ohio Northern University*
- Ashley George  
*University of Alabama*
- James I. Gerhart  
*Rush University Medical Center*
- Matthew Ghiglieri  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Tobias T. Gibson  
*Westminster College*
- Christopher Givan  
*Westminster College*
- Trangdai Glassey-Tranguyen  
*University of California, San Diego*
- Anne K. Gordon  
*Bowling Green State University*

- 
- Joseph R. Goulet  
*University of Maryland*
- Jamie Graham  
*California State University, Fullerton*
- Richard H. Gramzow  
*Syracuse University*
- Pär Anders Granhag  
*University of Gothenburg*
- Yael Granot  
*New York University*
- Danica Gredoña  
*Cornell University*
- Aiden P. Gregg  
*University of Southampton*
- Alyssa Gretak  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Rosanna E. Guadagno  
*University of Alabama*
- Corey Guenther  
*Creighton University*
- Swati Gupta  
*Institute of High Performance Computing*
- Jennifer A. Guthrie  
*University of Nevada, Las Vegas*
- Lauren M. Hamel  
*Wayne State University*
- Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*
- Dennis J. Hand  
*University of Vermont*
- Geraldine Hannon  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Ryan D. Harrison  
*Westminster College*
- Joseph Hartgerink  
*Tilburg University*
- Maria Hartwig  
*John Jay College*
- Frederick Hawley  
*Western Carolina University*
- Spencer Haze  
*Trent University Oshawa*
- Theresa Storey Hefner-Babb  
*Lamar University*
- Heather Heimbaugh  
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*
- Jason A. Helfer  
*Knox College*
- Catherine Ho  
*Cornell University*
- Michael Hoerger  
*Tulane University*
- Caitlin Homan  
*University of Portsmouth*
- Anne Hubbell  
*New Mexico State University*
- Stefan Huynh  
*New York University*
- Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen's University*
- J. Jacob Jenkins  
*California State University,  
Channel Islands*
- Jason R. Jolicoeur  
*Ivy Tech Community College*
- Aleiah Jones  
*University of Toledo*
- James Kang  
*Cornell University*
- Thomas Kelley  
*Wayne State University*
- Robert Kennedy  
*University of California,  
Santa Barbara*
- Robert Wade Kenny  
*Mount Saint Vincent University*
- Holly L. Ketterer  
*Central Michigan University*
- Jeffrey Kraus  
*Wagner College*
- Bill Kte'pi  
*Independent Scholar*
- Adrianne D. (Dennis) Kunkel  
*University of Kansas*
- Anastacia Kurylo  
*Fortified Communication Consulting*
- Brandon Kuss  
*Cerner Corporation*
- Patrice Lawless  
*Cornell University*
- Justin J. Lehmiller  
*Harvard University*
- Timothy Levine  
*Korea University*
- Amanda Levis  
*Yale University*
- Helen Lee Lin  
*University of Houston*
- Kevin Lin  
*Cornell University*

- John T. Llewellyn  
*Wake Forest University*
- Elizabeth F. Loftus  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*
- Arthur J. Lurigio  
*Loyola University Chicago*
- Joan Luxenburg  
*University of Central Oklahoma*
- Stacey L. MacKinnon  
*University of Prince Edward Island*
- Nikhila Mahadevan  
*University of Southampton*
- James Edwin Mahon  
*Washington & Lee University*
- Jaibel Makiyil  
*Nova Southeastern University*
- Kathleen Malley-Morrison  
*Boston University*
- William David Marelich  
*California State University, Fullerton*
- Kent Marett  
*Mississippi State University*
- David Markowitz  
*Cornell University*
- Tamara Marksteiner  
*University of Mannheim*
- Jaume Masip  
*University of Salamanca*
- Brian Mayer  
*Cornell University*
- Steven A. McCornack  
*Michigan State University*
- Matthew S. McGlone  
*University of Texas, Austin*
- Joseph McGlynn  
*University of Texas, Austin*
- Nicholas McLean  
*Yale University*
- Rachel Meisinger  
*Creighton University*
- Nicholas Merola  
*University of Texas, Austin*
- Robert J. Meuller III  
*Knox College*
- Michael Milburn  
*University of Massachusetts, Boston*
- Lauren S. Miller  
*Syracuse University*
- William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*
- Carol Bishop Mills  
*University of Alabama*
- Michael Minaudo  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Tayopa Mogilner  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Diane M. Monahan  
*Saint Leo University*
- Christopher Monteiro  
*University of Massachusetts, Boston*
- Rosey Morr  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Wendy L. Morris  
*McDaniel College*
- Kelly Morrison  
*Michigan State University*
- Federika Garcia Muchacho  
*Bay State College*
- Lauren Murphy  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Tony Murphy  
*Sheffield Hallam University*
- Joel T. Nadler  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Patrick J. Nebl  
*Bowling Green State University*
- Ololade Ogundimu  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Luke A. Oosterbaan  
*Knox College*
- Yok-Fong Paat  
*University of Texas at El Paso*
- Ruwan Pallegedara  
*Cornell University*
- Lawrence Patihis  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Marcus Patterson  
*University of Massachusetts, Boston*
- Melissa Pauasci  
*Cornell University*
- Lindsay Perez  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Narissra Maria Punyanunt-Carter  
*Texas Tech University*
- Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy  
*Independent Scholar*
- Marc-André Reinhard  
*University of Mannheim*

- 
- Rachel Malis Reznik  
*Elmhurst College*
- Matthew Riccio  
*Columbia University*
- Timothy D. Ritchie  
*University of Limerick*
- Beatriz Rivera-Barnes  
*Pennsylvania State University*
- Sungjong Roh  
*Cornell University*
- Rachel Romero  
*Texas State University*
- Paul Rose  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Kevin Rounding  
*Queen's University*
- Kayo Sakamoto  
*Institute of High Performance Computing*
- Ilana Sandler  
*Cornell University*
- Juan Pablo Sarmiento  
*Cornell University*
- Huda Sarraj  
*Texas Tech University*
- Antoinette W. Satterfield  
*U.S. Naval Academy*
- Juliann Scholl  
*Texas Tech University*
- Stephen T. Schroth  
*Knox College*
- Kim B. Serota  
*Oakland University*
- Sana Sherali  
*New York University*
- Jeanetta Sims  
*University of Central Oklahoma*
- Kirsten Smith  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*
- Evan Mitchell Stark  
*Message Science, Inc.*
- Susan Stearns  
*Eastern Washington University*
- Mariëlle Stel  
*Tilburg University*
- R. Weylin Sternglanz  
*Nova Southeastern University*
- Victor B. Stolberg  
*Essex County College*
- Chris Street  
*University College London*
- Jennifer Summary  
*Southeast Missouri State University*
- Barry L. Swanson  
*Knox College*
- Ian W. Tingen  
*University of California, Irvine*
- Tracy Faye Tolbert  
*California State University, Long Beach*
- Marcella Bush Trevino  
*Barry University*
- Anna Elisabeth van 't Veer  
*Tilburg University*
- Lyn Van Swol  
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*
- Karen Vanderzanden  
*Creighton University*
- Bruno Verschuere  
*University of Amsterdam*
- J. Guillermo Villalobos  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- Beth A. Visser  
*Trent University*
- Kimberly Voss  
*University of Central Florida*
- Aldert Vrij  
*University of Portsmouth*
- Courtney A. Waid-Lindberg  
*Bemidji State University*
- Andrew Jackson Waskey  
*Dalton State College*
- Susan E. Waters  
*Auburn University*
- Stan Weeber  
*McNeese State University*
- Robert Westerfelhaus  
*College of Charleston*
- Michael J. Williams  
*University of Nevada, Reno*
- V. Skye Wingate  
*Morehead State University*
- Eilene Wollslager  
*University of Texas at San Antonio*
- Sarah E. Wood  
*University of Wisconsin, Stout*
- Colin Wright  
*University of Nottingham*
- Gordon R. T. Wright  
*University of London*
- Iris Shuang Xia  
*Texas Tech University*

Michael Zeigler  
    *University of Nevada, Reno*  
Julia Zhu  
    *Cornell University*

Jordan Zurowski  
    *Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

# Introduction

---

Few topics capture people's curiosity and interest as much as deception. Deception is the stuff of soap operas, spy thrillers, multimillion-dollar frauds, and poker championships. There are the deadly serious deceptions during wartime, as well as harmless pranks such as the jackalope and April Fool's Day. (If you have not seen a jackalope, it is a jackrabbit with antelope horns.) The famous deceptions throughout history are too numerous to mention. Examples include the biblical serpent in the Garden of Eden and the scientific hoax of Piltdown Man.

Deception is not an exclusively human activity; examples of deception are also common in biology. Primates are capable of quite sophisticated deception. However, humans do not develop the cognitive capacity to fully engage in true deception until somewhere between the ages of 3 and 5.

Deception is most often defined as intentionally or knowingly misleading another individual or group, although sometimes self-deception is included as well. Deception comes in many shades and flavors such as outright lies, white lies, omission, evasion, equivocation, puffery, half truths, and so forth. People lie for all kinds of reasons. All of these variations are covered in the two volumes of this encyclopedia, which survey the wide variety of lies and deceptions in their many manifestations. Deception is examined from the vantage points of social science, history, philosophy,

and pop culture, to name a few. The *Encyclopedia of Deception* is the authoritative source on the topic.

## Popular Draw of Deception

Perhaps the best recent example of how deception captures public interest was the initial popularity of the crime drama television series *Lie to Me* on Fox Network. The main character, Dr. Cal Lightman (played by Tim Roth), is a psychologist with expertise in reading body language and facial expressions, especially brief expressions called microexpressions. Lightman and his team solve crimes through detecting lies and reading human behavior. With approximately 11 million viewers in the first season, the show initially had strong ratings and was renewed for three seasons. Besides the United States, the show was aired in Canada, Australia, South Africa, Latin America, and several countries in Europe.

The premise of *Lie to Me* is based on the ideas of real-life psychologist Paul Ekman. However, Ekman's ideas are controversial, and the show may not depict science as much as suggested by its marketing. As a skeptic, I did a little experiment that was published in the academic, peer-reviewed journal *Communication Research*. We showed research participants either an episode of *Lie to Me* or a different crime drama, *Numb3rs*. A third group viewed no show at all. Then, we had our



participants try a deception detection task. Watching *Lie to Me* did not make people any better at distinguishing truths and lies, but it did make subjects more cynical than either of the two control conditions. *Lie to Me* was more about entertaining fiction than solid science, but it exemplifies the draw of the topic.

### **Deception Detection and Deception Research**

Deception detection is also big business. Web sites such as [www.liespotting.com](http://www.liespotting.com) promise “proven techniques to detect deception.” Paul Ekman’s [EkmanInternational.com](http://EkmanInternational.com) offers “cutting edge behavioral science for real-world applications.” There are also [EyesforLies.com](http://EyesforLies.com) and [Humintell.com](http://Humintell.com). John E. Reid and Associates train thousands of people, especially law enforcement professionals, each year in the Reid Technique. The *Encyclopedia of Deception* covers the gamut of deception detection methods, from the scientifically discredited to the most promising.

In the realm of deception, things are often not what is expected or what they seem. It is a very common belief, for example, that liars will not look one in the eye while lying. However, one might be surprised just how widespread that belief is. Research by psychologist Charley Bond has found that the gaze aversion belief is widespread around in the world. He and his team surveyed people in more than 70 different countries and found that the liars-won’t-look-you-in-the-eye belief was nearly universal. But much experiential works reveal that belief to be objectively false. Gaze is unrelated to actual honesty. It has zero validity as a lie-detection clue.

There has been much research on nonverbal cues to deception dating back to the original work of Ekman and his idea of leakage. It is well documented that people use others’ nonverbal behaviors as a way to detect lies. My research and that of many others has strongly supported people’s reliance on observations of others’ nonverbal behaviors when assessing honesty. Many psychological theories also specify a link between lying and nonverbal behaviors, as portrayed on *Lie to Me*. However, social scientific research on the link between various nonverbal behaviors and the act of lying suggests that the link is typically not very strong or consistent. In my research, I have observed that the

nonverbal signals that seem to give one liar away are different than those given by a second liar. Further, people do not give away their lies the same way every time, and there are often honest people enacting those supposed lie-revealing behaviors. What’s more, the scientific evidence linking nonverbal behaviors and deception has grown weaker over time. People infer honesty based on how others nonverbally present themselves, but that has very limited utility and validity.

Research on lie detection suggests that without the aid of technology such as the polygraph, people are often poor lie detectors. In most deception detection experiments, people typically do statistically better than chance, but usually not by much. However, very recent research suggests promising new approaches, such as the strategic use of evidence and content in context. Strategic use of evidence involves withholding what one knows to see if the person contradicts that knowledge. Even with the aid of technology such as the polygraph, lie detection is not perfect. Research is progressing on other technologies such as fMRI and thermal imaging, but the polygraph in conjunction with a skilled examiner may be the best approach for now. All of these methods and many more are covered in the *Encyclopedia of Deception*.

Deception is not limited to humans; in fact, deception in nature is commonplace and varied. Perhaps you and your dog have engaged in “fake out” while playing fetch. Examples of deception in nature include camouflage and mimicry. Primatologists have also observed gorillas engaged in deception. For example, a band of gorillas is seen walking along a jungle path in single file. One gorilla, which spies a desired food in a nearby tree, stops by the side of the trail and grooms until the others are out of sight. Then, the gorilla grabs the food, quickly eats it, and hurries to join the band.

### **Historical Deceptions**

There are many famous lies and deceptions throughout history. There was P. T. Barnum, Niccolò Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, Operation Mincemeat, and the Trojan horse. As long as people have communicated, there have been honesty and deception. As long as history has been recorded, there has been a record of deception in human affairs.

Biblical examples of deception are numerous. Besides the serpent lying to Eve about the



forbidden fruit, Abraham's wife told the Egyptians that she was Abraham's sister. Jacob was deceived by his sons about the death of his favorite son, Joseph. The entry on deception in ancient civilizations describes at least eight stories of lies that are told in the book of Genesis alone.

World War II is another source of well-known deceit. Nazi propaganda was rife with deceit targeted toward internal and external audiences. However, deception was not exclusively practiced by Germany during the war. For example, the Allies caught Germany largely by surprise with the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. The successful Allied plan was to fool Germany into believing that the real invasion at Normandy was merely a diversion, and that the actual invasion would happen elsewhere. False orders and fake troop movements were created to mask actual troop buildups.

Lies happen around the world. The concepts of lies and deception are pancultural. Although every major world religion frowns on deception, people everywhere engage in it. However, culture also shapes how deception is enacted and understood. These volumes cover deception around the world, such as how the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro deceived the Inca Empire, and how deception is approached in the Arab culture in the Middle East.

### **Politics, Commerce, and Personal Life**

No encyclopedia of lies and deception could be complete without covering lies and deception in politics. When this introduction was written, it seemed that the last major national U.S. election (Obama versus Romney) was marked by an especially high prevalence of deception. However, there is never a shortage of spin on the national news networks of FOX, MSNBC, or CNN. In the past, there was Nixon's Watergate and Bill Clinton's denial of sex with "that woman." The *Encyclopedia of Deception* covers government propaganda as well as the decline in public trust

in government—a trust that is essential for a functioning democracy—and the scandals, corruption, influence peddling, and lies by public officials that undercut this trust.

Lies abound in business and commerce. There is puffery in advertising and false claims on resumes. There are Ponzi schemes and defective product coverups.

Finally, there are lies in our personal lives. For example, Notre Dame's linebacker Manti Te'o fictitious girlfriend was a recent example that captured wide media attention. One study found that as much as 61.5 percent of statements in important relationships were less than fully honest. Another study found that only about one-quarter of people thought that complete honesty was important in maintaining a romantic relationship, and that most people think that being honest depends on the situation. However, discovered lies can also harm relationships, especially when the lies are about important issues.

While one might think that one is better able to detect lies from people close to one as opposed to strangers, the opposite seems to be the case. Steven McCornack's well-known research finding was that as one develops close relationships, trust and truth bias increases, and truth bias blinds one to a partner's lies.

This two-volume *Encyclopedia of Deception* provides nearly 350 entries examining all facets of lying and deception. Philosophical and historical perspectives are offered. Examples of deception from around the world and throughout history are recounted. The new social science of deception receives compressive examination, and deception in relationships and popular culture are also covered. On behalf of the excellent contributors, we hope you find this both a valuable reference set and an entertaining and engaging reading experience.

Timothy R. Levine  
Editor



# Chronology

---

**3rd century B.C.E.:** Archimedes (ca. 287–212 B.C.E.) discovers that he can determine the purity of gold in a crown by measuring how much water it displaces. If it is made of solid gold, it will displace the same amount of water as an equal weight of pure gold, whereas if it is made of gold combined with a lighter metal, it will displace more water.

**ca. 8th century C.E.:** A forged document, the Donation of Constantine, is used to justify papal supremacy.

**ca. 13th century:** Christian crusaders in the Holy Land create forged versions of the coins used by the local population.

**1699:** The English con artist and counterfeiter William Chalone is executed; Sir Isaac Newton, master of the Royal Mint, plays a key role in his conviction.

**1702:** The British collector William Charlton claims to have found a rare yellow butterfly with an unusual pattern of black spots on its wings. It is included in the 12th edition of Carl Linnaeus's *Systema Naturae*, but is later found to be a hoax, a common Brimstone butterfly with painted spots.

**1720:** In England, the value of a share of stock in the South Sea Company rises from 128 pounds in

January to over 1,000 pounds by August, only to fall to 100 pounds by the end of the year; this is known as the “South Sea bubble.”

**1760:** *Fragments of Ancient Poetry Collected in the Highlands*, marketed as an English translation of work by the 3rd-century Gaelic poet Ossian, is published. It is later revealed to be the work of James Macpherson, a contemporary Scotsman.

**1784:** The French Academy of the Sciences investigates the works of Anton Mesmer, who claims that he can heal illness through the use of magnets. The academy concludes that Mesmer's results were from the power of suggestion.

**1836:** The European naturalist Constantine S. Rafinesque claims to have discovered the Walam Olum, a document written in the Lenape language (used by the Delaware Indians) on bark, describing how the Indians populated North America. It is believed for decades to be genuine; not until 1996 was it demonstrated to be a hoax, as an examination of Rafinesque's papers proved that he first wrote it in English, and then translated it into Lenape.

**1840:** England issues the first postage stamp, the “penny black.” Forged versions began appearing within a year.

**1841:** The Scottish author Charles Mackay publishes *Extraordinary Popular Delusion and the Madness of Crowds*, reporting on a number of historical phenomena including economic bubbles, prophecies, fortune telling, and witch hunts.

**1848:** American sisters Katherine and Margaret Fox report hearing strange rappings in their home, reportedly the result of spirit communications, and later put on public exhibitions of similar rappings. Scientist Sir William Crookes, among others, is taken in by their performance, which the sisters later reveal (in 1888) that they produced by cracking their toe joints.

**1857:** The *Boston Courier* offers a \$500 prize for anyone who can produce a spiritualistic phenomenon in the presence of Benjamin Pierce, E. N. Horsford, and Louis S. Agassiz, professors at Harvard. Several well-known mediums try and fail to produce evidence sufficient to claim the prize.

**1861:** William H. Mumler, an engraver in Boston, begins selling “spirit photographs,” portraits in which a mysterious second image appears with as that of the sitter. Mumler was exposed as a fraud in 1863 when someone recognized that the “spirits” bore a remarkable resemblance to living persons in Boston.

**1863:** The U.S. Congress passes the False Claims Act, also known as the Lincoln Law because it was passed during Abraham Lincoln’s presidency, in response to high levels of fraud perpetrated during the Civil War. The act allows people to report cases of suspected fraud against the government and collect a portion of the damages recovered.

**1864:** Samples from a meteor shower in southern France are collected and sent to various museums around Europe. In the 1960s, several researchers examined the samples in the Musée d’Histoire Naturelle in Montauban, France, and found that they had been tampered with. Fragments of plants and coal had been inserted into the meteorite fragments, and the results were coated with glue to recreate an apparent fusion layer on the outside of the fragments.

**1866:** A human skull is discovered in a mine in Calaveras County, California. It is originally accepted as authentic, and is judged to be from the Pliocene age, making it the oldest human skull discovered in America. However, in the early 20th century, it was determined to have been planted at the site as a practical joke.

**1879:** Sarah Howe establishes the Ladies’ Deposit Bank in Boston, offering returns of 8 percent monthly, and only accepting deposits from women. In 1880, a run on the bank demonstrated that the operation was a scam, and an estimated 800 women lost more than \$250,000 in the process. Howe was sentenced to three years for obtaining money on false pretenses.

**1882:** The Society for Psychical Research authenticates Douglas Blackburn and G. A. Smith as having genuine telepathic powers. In 1908, Blackburn revealed the methods they used to fool the examiners.

**1891:** In Germany, William Van Osten claims that his horse, Clever Hans, can do mathematical calculations. This skill was later shown to be the result of unconscious signaling by the owner to his horse, a type of cuing now known in psychology as the ideomotor effect, or the Clever Hans phenomenon.

**1892:** The Ouija Board, a purported method of contacting spirits, is patented in the United States.

**1893:** German psychologist Max Dessoir publishes an article, “The Psychology of Ledger-demain,” which claims that the ability of magicians to fool their audience depends on a partially inherited ability to guide the thoughts of others to a desired conclusion.

**1900:** American psychologist Joseph Jastrow publishes *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, including a chapter on “The Psychology of Deception,” which discusses the uncertainty of knowledge from sensory information and a doctrine of unconscious inference.

**1900:** American psychologist Norman Triplett writes his Ph.D. dissertation on the psychology

of conjuring deceptions, in which he argues that primitive men developed to gain control over their peers. Triplett also believed that deception was common among young children, and as part of his work collected over 300 examples of spontaneous deception by children aged 3 and younger.

**1908:** German American psychologist Hugo Münsterberg publishes *On the Witness Stand*, which includes descriptions of experiments suggesting that eyewitness memories are not infallible.

**1912:** Charles Dawson launches the Piltdown Man hoax, displaying a fossilized skull reportedly discovered in a gravel pit in East Sussex, England. The skull was accepted for several decades as that of a modern human, forming a “missing link” in the evolution from apes to modern humans. In 1953, the Piltdown Man was determined to be a forgery, made up of a modern human skull and the jawbone of an orangutan.

**1917:** U.S. President Woodrow Wilson creates the Committee on Public Information when the United States enters World War I; this government office is the first in modern history to engage in large-scale propaganda dissemination.

**1917:** Creation of the first of several Cottingley fairy photographs, purporting to capture “real” fairies on photographic film. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was among the many people fooled by these photographs; the girls who created them, Elsie Wright and Frances Griffiths, later admitted that they faked the pictures using paper cutouts from a children’s book.

**1920:** Italian immigrant Charles Ponzi is arrested in the United States for running a scheme, which coined the term *Ponzi scheme*. Ponzi claimed to produce a 50 percent return in 90 days, which was temporarily supported by the attraction of money from new investors (rather than any actual plan of investment). Ponzi was deported to Italy in 1934 after his involvement in another scam involving Florida real estate.

**1921:** John August Larson develops an early version of the lie detector, or polygraph, to aid in

determining the truth of answers given by those suspected of crimes. He automatically records a subject’s blood pressure and breathing depth as he or she is asked a series of routine questions and questions related to a specific crime.

**1923:** The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is founded in Vienna as the International Criminal Police Commission. The purpose of INTERPOL is to facilitate cooperation among police forces in different countries.

**1925–26:** Adolf Hitler publishes *Mein Kampf*, a combination of biography and political statement; it includes comments on how to successfully use propaganda.

**1926:** In an attempt to demonstrate that acquired characteristics can be inherited (Lamarckian genetics), Austrian scientist Paul Kammerer conducts a series of experiments on the midwife toad. However, his apparent success in demonstrating that these toads, if forced to mate in water, would develop the black scaly bumps typical of toads that naturally mate in water is demonstrated to be a hoax, caused by injecting ink under the frogs’ skin.

**1931:** Lloyd’s of London begins offering a discount on their insurance rates to banks that require their employees to take lie detector tests. An astonishing number (10 to 25 percent) of employees admit to stealing, usually from petty cash.

**1937:** Edward Filene establishes the Institute of Propaganda and Analysis to help educate Americans to spot techniques commonly used in propaganda and reducing the effects of such techniques.

**1937:** Frank J. Wilson, newly appointed head of the U.S. Secret Service, begins a strenuous campaign against counterfeit currency that is credited with reducing losses from counterfeiting by 93 percent.

**1940:** American linguist David W. Maurer, a specialist on the language used by members of marginal American subcultures, publishes *The Big Con*, based on interviews with hundreds of con artists and other criminals.

**1945:** Leonarde Keeler is brought in to conduct polygraph tests on German prisoners in an Arizona prisoner-of-war camp to determine which of them harbors Nazi sympathies or otherwise poses a threat to the United States.

**1946:** English author George Orwell, in his essay, “Politics and the English Language,” criticizes the way that politicians use language to mislead people and hide the truth, and charges that bad writing habits can interfere with clear thinking.

**1947:** The Dutch painter Hans van Meegeren is convicted of forgery. His most notable work was a number of paintings that he claimed were painted by Vermeer, and which had been accepted by experts as genuine.

**1947–53:** Workers at the nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, are subjected to numerous polygraph tests, partly in response to the belief that Soviet spies had infiltrated the facility.

**1953:** *Flying Saucers Have Landed*, the first of several books by George Adamski that purport to describe his experiences traveling in outer space and communicating with extraterrestrial beings, is published.

**1955:** The London Society for Psychical Research publishes a report on the Borley Rectory, a purportedly haunted house built in 1863 in England, concluding that all reported phenomena could be explained by ordinary, natural causes.

**1959:** In the United States, the National Labor Relations Board rules that polygraph tests can be required as a condition of employment.

**1968:** American magician and skeptic James Randi offers a prize of \$1,000 for anyone who can produce evidence of paranormal activity before a group of witnesses, on terms agreed upon by both parties. The value of the prize has since been increased to \$1 million, but no one has successfully claimed it.

**1968:** Erich von Däniken publishes *Chariots of the Gods? Unsolved Mysteries of the Past*, arguing that the knowledge and technology required to

produce various aspects of ancient religion and culture (e.g., Stonehenge and the pyramids of Egypt) were brought to Earth by visitors from outer space.

**1968:** The discovery of a pattern on the ocean floor near Bimini, an island in the Caribbean Sea, leads to claims that it was once a road, and the area is the location of the “lost continent” of Atlantis. In fact, the road-like features are part of a now-submerged coastline of the island.

**1970s:** Israeli performer Uri Geller frequently appears on television, demonstrating his apparent ability to exert physical effects (e.g., bending spoons) by only using the power of his mind. However, skeptic James Randi and others have since demonstrated that all of Geller’s performances could be produced using tricks known to many magicians.

**1970–75:** *The Amazing World of Kreskin*, a television program starring George Joseph Kresge (a.k.a., the stage magician The Amazing Kreskin), is produced in Canada and broadcast in Canada and the United States. A key feature of the program is Kreskin’s ability to “read” the audience to discover where his check for the evening’s performance has been hidden; he does not claim to have paranormal powers, but instead relies on interpreting voices and body language.

**1972:** Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus publishes “Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness” in *Psychology Today*, detailing how it is possible to alter a person’s memory of an event by asking leading questions or introducing other information.

**1972:** John D. Bransford and Marcia K. Johnson publish research showing that contextual information, such as providing titles to brief paragraphs to establish a context, affected encoding of the information in the paragraph. Providing such information before the subjects read the paragraph produces greater comprehension and recall than providing it after the paragraph.

**1974:** Charles Berlitz publishes *The Bermuda Triangle*, claiming that mysterious forces within an area defined by Florida, Bermuda, and Puerto



Rico pose grave dangers to ships and airplanes. The book is partially based on a 1944 incident in which five U.S. Navy planes were lost in that region.

**1974:** Dermatologist William T. Summerlin, working at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, claims to have successfully grafted skin from a black mouse to a genetically unrelated white mouse. However, this claim is later determined to be fraudulent when the “black” skin patches are determined to have been colored by a felt marker, rather than originating from a black mouse.

**1975:** John Nance publishes *The Gentle Tasaday: A Stone Age People in the Philippine Rain Forest*, describing an isolated tribe living a primitive and peaceful lifestyle in the rain forest, without corruption or conflict. The story, originally perpetuated in 1971 by Manuel Elizalde Jr., the adviser to Ferdinand Marcos on Filipino national minorities, is exposed as a hoax in the 1980s, when tribal members said they were poor and had been pressured by Elizalde to live like a Stone Age tribe in order to receive assistance and serve Elizalde’s political agenda.

**1976:** American Morris Lamar Keene publishes *The Psychic Mafia*, describing how he previously posed as a psychic, tricking thousands of people into believing that he had powers to contact spirits.

**1976:** The Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSI-COP) is founded in Buffalo, New York, to investigate claims of paranormal phenomena. CSI-COP publishes the *Skeptical Inquirer*, a journal carrying news of paranormal investigations.

**1977:** British painter Tom Keating is charged with forgery; although the charges are later dropped, he admits that he produced paintings attributed to a number of noted artists, including John Constable, J. M. W. Turner, Claude Monet, and Vincent Van Gogh.

**1977:** American psychologist Philip Zimbardo and colleagues coin the term *the illusion of personal invulnerability* to refer to the reaction of

people when they hear of someone else victimized by a hoax; it rests on the probably unwarranted assumption that the listeners would have seen through the hoax.

**1978–83:** German forger Konrad Kujau creates the “Hitler Diaries,” which are later published in the German magazine *Der Stern*. Although some experts believe them to be genuine, they are later revealed as fake.

**1979:** Crop circles, complex geometric patterns created by flattening parts of grain fields, begin to appear in the United Kingdom. Although some believe that they are evidence of visitors from outer space, in 1992, two British men admitted to creating the first crop circles.

**1979:** Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus becomes the first person in Washington State to provide expert testimony about eyewitness identification. She testifies on the behalf of the defense in a murder trial, explaining how memory distortion can influence eyewitness testimony.

**1984:** Poltergeist phenomena are reported in the Columbus *Dispatch*, a newspaper in Ohio. The story received widespread coverage, but it was later shown to be the result of tricks by a 14-year-old girl, Tina Resch.

**1985:** Psychologist Bella M. DePaulo and colleagues establish that while young children frequently attempt to lie to adults, they are seldom successful; however, by the time they are fifth graders, children can often construct lies that fool adults, including their parents.

**1986:** Dutch primatologist Frans de Waal reports that chimpanzees engage in many apparently deceptive behaviors, such as pretending to ignore the presence of hidden food when another chimp is present. However, de Waal also acknowledges that it is impossible to establish intentionality in such cases.

**1987:** D. L. Delanoy and colleagues report on the results of a teenager who claimed to have psychic abilities and took part in over 20 testing sessions at the University of Edinburgh. The teenager was able

to bend metal objects under informal conditions, but never when strict controls were in place. In the final testing sessions, a hidden camera captured evidence that the teenager was performing tricks to produce his results. Delanoy and colleagues note that they were easily fooled by the teenager, and found him convincing until the hidden camera revealed how he was achieving his results.

**1987–89:** John Jacob Cannel investigates score inflation in standardized educational tests. One result of his study is the finding that in 48 of 50 states, students report performing above the national average, a result christened the “Lake Wobegon effect,” in reference to the fictional location in which all the children are above average.

**1992:** The Innocence Project is founded at Yeshiva University with the purpose of using DNA evidence to exonerate individuals who have been wrongfully convicted. As of 2012, over 290 people have been released as a result of the Innocence Project’s work and, because the trials of many of the wrongfully convicted included eyewitness testimony, the Project also played a key role in questioning eyewitness accuracy, reinforcing similar evidence found in scientific research.

**1994:** In *Ramona v. Isabella*, Gary Ramona successfully establishes that his daughter’s psychotherapists implanted false memories in his daughter’s mind, leading to her accusations of his sexual abuse of her as a child. He is awarded \$500,000 in damages for lost wages, and the case sets a precedent because third-party negligence suits were previously rare and seldom victorious.

**1994:** Professor Linda M. Williams publishes a study supporting the contention that memories of sexual abuse are sometimes repressed. For the study, she interviewed 129 women who were known to have been sexually abused—based on hospital records of their treatment for the abuse—and found that 38 percent of them failed to mention the abuse, even when specifically questioned about it.

**1995:** Nicholas Leeson, a British broker for Barings Bank in the United Kingdom, is convicted in Singapore of forgery and other acts of fraud.

Leeson had been engaged in speculative trading since 1992, using a Barings “error account” to hide his losses, which reached over \$1 billion by 1995, and caused Barings Bank to collapse.

**1996:** Alan Sokal, a physics professor, publishes the article, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” in the journal *Social Text*. He later reveals that the article was a hoax, submitted to demonstrate the lack of intellectual rigor in the journal and in the field of cultural studies more generally.

**1998:** British physician Andrew Wakefield publishes case studies claiming to support a link between autism and the childhood measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine. This report is later determined to be based on faked data, and in 2010, Wakefield’s name is struck off the Medical Register and he is barred from practicing medicine in the United Kingdom. Many of his supporters still believe that vaccines can cause autism, and refuse to have their children injected with the vaccine.

**1998:** The journalist Stephen Glass is discovered to have falsified all or part of at least 27 stories he wrote for the *New Republic* magazine from 1995 to 1998.

**1999:** The Canadian theatrical producers Garth Drabinsky and Myron Gottlieb are indicted in New York on charges of fraud and embezzlement in connection with the Canadian production company Live Entertainment Corporation of Canada Inc. In 2009, both were convicted of fraud and forgery in Canada; they remain under fugitive arrest warrants in the United States.

**1999:** The National Geographic Society announces that a fossil discovered in China establishes the validity of the hypothesized link between dinosaurs and modern birds; it has the body of a bird and the tail of a dinosaur. However, this discovery is quickly recognized as a fraud, made up of two separate fossils. In March 2000, *National Geographic* published an admission of the error.

**1999:** In the United States, the Department of Energy resumes the use of mandatory polygraph tests for people working in nuclear weapons labs.



**2000:** The film *Boiler Room*, distributed by New Line Cinema, dramatizes a “pump and dump” operation in which a crew of young salesmen sell overvalued or worthless stock shares over the phone to customers by misleading them about the shares’ values; causing the shares to temporarily rise in price.

**2000:** Eastgate Elementary School in Columbus, Ohio, is praised by President Clinton for the improved standardized test scores of its students. However, several students from the school later come forward and say that they were given correct answers on the test by a teacher’s aide.

**2000:** The Japanese archaeologist Shinichi Fujimura admits that many of his “discoveries” were fakes, after a newspaper produces photographs showing him burying artifacts on a site in Miyagi Prefecture, where he would later “discover” them.

**2000:** Professors Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth J. Marsh publish research indicating that memories are altered by retelling events and changing the context in which they are retold because retelling involves selectively retrieving and using information.

**2000:** Jonathan Lebed, a New Jersey high school student, becomes the youngest person to face charges of stock fraud. He bought stocks and promoted them on Internet message boards using multiple aliases, then sold them after the price rose (a “pump and dump” scheme). The case was settled in 2001, when Lebed agreed to forfeit a share of his profits.

**2001:** On December 2, American energy company Enron files for bankruptcy amid widespread indications of fraud. It is the biggest bankruptcy in the United States, and Enron shares are worth less than \$1 on the day of the bankruptcy filing, as compared to a high of over \$90 per share in August 2000.

**2001:** Martha Stewart, an American publisher and media personality, is accused of engaging in insider trading by ordering her broker to sell shares of ImClone Systems immediately before

news became public that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration would not approve a new drug created by ImClone. Stewart is later convicted of obstruction of justice, and is sentenced to six months in jail. ImClone CEO Samuel Waksal, who provided her with the information, is sentenced to seven years.

**2002:** Accounting firm Arthur Anderson is found guilty of obstruction of justice over its part in destroying documents related to the Enron scandal. Although this decision was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005, the company did not resume operations because its reputation was destroyed.

**2002:** Economists Stephen Levitt and Brian Jacob examine standardized test results from the Chicago Public Schools from 1993 to 2000 and charge that cheating occurs in 4 to 5 percent of classrooms each year. Their results, which are based on the examining patterns of answers on test sheets, are supported when students in classes suspected of cheating retake the test under close supervision and score substantially lower.

**2003:** Bernie Ebbers, cofounder and chief executive officer of WorldCom, is convicted of fraud. WorldCom’s bankruptcy in 2002 was the largest in history until Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008.

**2003:** Jayson Blair, a 23-year-old reporter for the *New York Times*, is dismissed after it is revealed that he had plagiarized and/or fabricated information in numerous stories written for the *Times*. Executive Editor Howell Raines and Managing Editor Gerald Boyd also resigned from the *Times* over the scandal.

**2004:** In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announces that, since 2000, its investigations into financial fraud have resulted in over 11,000 convictions and over \$8.1 billion in restitution orders.

**2004:** In Birmingham, Alabama, the director of a general educational development (GED) program finds that 5.6 percent of the student population of one high school, Woodlawn, was forced

to withdraw before the state standardized tests were administered because they were projected to receive low scores, thus lowering the school average.

**2006:** The Brennan Center for Justice, part of the New York University School of Law, reports that voter fraud is extremely rare; for instance, it occurred about 0.0009 percent of the time in the 2004 Washington gubernatorial election.

**2006:** John Paul Lewis, Jr., is convicted of fraud for a long-running Ponzi scheme in California, and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

**2008:** American broker Bernard Madoff is revealed to be running a Ponzi scheme involving thousands of investors and over \$65 billion in investments. In 2009, he was sentenced to 150 years in federal prison.

**2008:** The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announces that it has halted a Ponzi scheme targeting the Haitian American community through a series of investment clubs.

**2008:** Lou Pearlman, well known for his work creating and promoting boy bands such as ‘N Sync and the Backstreet Boys, is convicted of conspiracy, money laundering, and other charges as part of a Ponzi scheme he operated for over 20 years.

**2009:** Marcus J. Schrenker, an investment adviser facing charges of defrauding investors, attempts to fake his own death in January through a plane crash.

**2009:** The SEC obtains a court order to halt a Ponzi scheme targeting members of the deaf community in Japan and the United States; the scheme is run by Billion Coupons Inc., a company based in Hawaii.

**2009:** Marc S. Dreier pleads guilty to investment fraud over a Ponzi scheme that stole a reported \$380 million. He also faces charges in Canada for impersonating a lawyer in connection with the sale of financial instruments to the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan.

**2010:** Harry Markopolos publishes *No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller*, detailing how he uncovered Bernard Madoff’s financial deceptions years before the scandal became public, and his difficulties in having the SEC take note of his investigations.

**2010:** *Inside Job*, a documentary directed by Charles Ferguson, examines the causes behind the global financial crisis of 2008; it wins the Oscar for Best Documentary.

**2011:** In the United States, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services begins screening Medicare fee-for-service claims through its Fraud Prevention System, a process similar to the screening technology used by credit card companies.

**2011:** In Los Angeles, the director of Crescendo charter schools is found to have ordered the principals in its six schools to literally teach to the test to raise student scores on the state standardized tests. The principals were ordered to open the seal on the state exams and teach students using the actual test questions.

**2011:** Raj Rajaratnam is convicted on fraud charges in connection with his activities with Galileo Group, one of the world’s largest hedge funds.

**2011:** Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel is suspended from his post at Bilburg University on the basis of alleged scientific misconduct, including fabricating data.

**2011:** The U.S. government announces that it has recovered over \$10.7 billion in fraudulent health care claims over the past three years, with \$4.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 alone.

**2011:** The Atlanta *Journal-Constitution* reports on a widespread cheating scandal in the Atlanta public schools, in which cheating was so commonplace in some schools that teachers organized “erasure parties” to change numerous student answers on test forms from incorrect to correct.

**2011:** The scientific journal *Nature* issues a report stating that published retractions of scientific papers has increased 10 times over the past

decade, while the number of published papers has increased only 44 percent in the same period. The most common reason cited for retraction is misconduct, including falsified data and plagiarism.

**2012:** Production of the Broadway musical *Rebecca*, based on the Alfred Hitchcock film, is delayed when about one-third of the show's financing evaporates, reportedly due to the death of an investor who was later determined to be fictional. Several individuals are under criminal investigation in the matter, and a civil lawsuit is filed against Mark Hotton, who acted as a middleman between the show's producer and the alleged investor.

**2012:** Citigroup agrees to pay over \$158 million to settle multiple cases of mortgage fraud, including its applications for FHA mortgage insurance for about 30,000 mortgages using certifications that were known to be false. About one-third of the mortgage loans in question went into default.

**2012:** About 70 students at New York City's prestigious Stuyvesant High School are placed under investigation in a cheating scandal. The students are accused of electronically sending or receiving answers (including by smartphone) to Advanced Placement exams given at the school in June.

**2012:** Rajat K. Gupta, a former director of Goldman Sachs, is convicted of passing insider information to Raj Rajaratnam, the former head of the hedge fund Galleon Group.

**2012:** As of October, 19 U.S. states have regulations (executive actions or laws) aimed at preventing voter fraud, such as requiring prospective voters to present an approved photo ID at the polling place.

**2012:** The U.S. Medicare Fraud Strike Task Force files charges in October against 91 individuals for participating in various fraudulent activities,

resulting in \$432 billion in false billing, including over \$100 million in community health care fraud, \$49 billion in ambulance fraud, and over \$230 million in home health care fraud.

**2012:** Lorraine O. Brown pleads guilty in November to charges of criminal fraud. Brown, the former president of DocX, one of the largest foreclosure-processing companies in the United States, admits to participating in the falsification of over 1 million mortgage documents, many of which were used in foreclosure proceedings.

**2012:** A cheating scandal at Harvard implicates about half the students in a 279-person undergraduate class, including a number of prominent athletes. The basis for the allegations are identical or nearly identical responses submitted as part of the class's take-home final.

**2012:** Falko Bindrich, a German chess grandmaster, is accused of cheating during a November match by using his smartphone to access a chess program during breaks. He refuses to let officials inspect his phone, and forfeits the match.

**2013:** Cycling champion Lance Armstrong admits that he engaged in an organized and long-term program of blood-doping and the use of performance-enhancing drugs, despite previously having denied the use of artificial enhancements while he was competing.

**2013:** Europol, the law enforcement agency of the European Union, announces that an 18-month investigation yielded evidence suggesting match-fixing in 680 soccer games played in 15 countries, including World Cup qualifiers and Champions League games.

Sarah Boslaugh  
Kennesaw State University





## Academia

Deception is used by students, teachers, professors, administrators, and principals within academic institutions. The use of deception has been documented within all levels of education, from elementary school through graduate education. An analysis of 46 studies on academic dishonesty revealed that there is great variety in the prevalence of cheating, which ranged from 9 to 95 percent of students, with a mean of 70.4 percent. Considerable variability was also found depending on the type of cheating that was measured: Cheating on examinations ranged from 4 to 82 percent of students, with a mean of 43.1 percent; cheating on homework ranged from 3 to 83 percent of students, with a mean of 40.9 percent. The prevalence of plagiarism ranged from 3 to 98 percent of students, with a mean of 47 percent.

Research suggests that individual characteristics can be used to predict which students are more likely to engage in deception. Deception varies by age; younger students are more likely to engage in these behaviors than older students. Additionally, research suggests that males are somewhat more likely than women to engage in deception. In terms of academic indicators, students with lower grade point averages (GPAs), who perform worse on the type of task they are engaged in, and

who tend to perform more poorly on coursework in general, are more likely to engage in academic lying and deception.

Situational factors also impact whether or not individuals engage in lying and deception. Descriptive norms (i.e., whether people believe that others in society engage in deception) has been found to predict these behaviors, such that when descriptive norms suggest that many people lie in society, people are more likely to lie. Descriptive norms are especially powerful when people believe that in-group members engage in deception. Conversely, if the environment makes morality salient (e.g., thinking of religious values or honor codes) there is a decrease in the amount of deceptive practices that people engage in.

### Deception for Personal Gain

People are generally motivated to deceive others within academia to either benefit themselves or to benefit the academic institution that they attend, or where they are employed. When people engage in these behaviors for personal gain, the main motivational component that drives people is the desire for academic advancement. Academic advancement can take multiple forms: (1) promotion to a higher level of education (e.g., graduating to a higher grade or gaining acceptance into an undergraduate or graduate institution); (2) obtaining a job within academia; or (3) inflating one's

status within academia to obtain social or material rewards.


First, when individuals engage in lying and deception as a way to increase their likelihood of promotion to a higher level of education, they may engage in a multitude of different behaviors, such as cheating on tests or lying in order to obtain more time to work on an assignment, or they may engage in plagiarism. More subversive kinds of academic deception take the form of falsifying important information about one's academic performance on college applications (e.g., including false information on one's resume or curriculum vitae). Student athletes may also engage in deception by taking drugs, such as steroids, to make it appear that they are better players and to increase their likelihood of being accepted by prestigious academic institutions later in their academic career.

Second, when individuals lie or use deception to increase their chances of obtaining a job within academia, they may also falsify information regarding their academic standing (e.g., graduate GPA), or they may include false information in cover letters, their resume, or curriculum vitae. These individuals may also exaggerate the extent of their experience or their own level of competence within areas that are relevant to the desired job.

Third, when attempting to increase one's status to obtain social or material rewards, teachers, professors, administrators, and principals may exaggerate their professional accomplishments when talking with colleagues, supervisors, and committees. Within elementary, middle, and high schools, teachers may give their students inflated grades to improve perceptions of their performance by increasing the passing rate within their classes. Additionally, professors who conduct research within academia may engage in academically fraudulent activities such as fabricating or falsifying data, engaging in inappropriate statistical techniques in order to obtain desired results, or reporting information that is not supported by the data.

### **Deception to Benefit an Academic Institution**

On the other hand, people may lie and deceive not for personal gain, but in an attempt to



*Seaman Erin Koecke takes notes during an intermediate college algebra course aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. John C. Stennis, where professors are brought onboard to teach classes, October 9, 2008. Students who attend schools with policies that enforce academic honesty report engaging in less academic dishonesty.*

obtain some benefit for their academic institution. When trying to recruit new students, universities may engage in multiple types of deception. They may exaggerate the success rates of their graduates in obtaining jobs after graduation. They may also misrepresent the academic success of students at their institution in order to gain higher status among organizations that rank colleges (e.g., *U.S. News & World Report* and the *Princeton Review*). This is done in order to make their institution appear more attractive to potential applicants.

Additionally, some universities misrepresent the prevalence of racial minorities on the college



campus in advertising materials, such as online Web sites and pamphlets. In this way, the college depicts the student body as being a more diverse environment than it actually is as a strategy for attracting minority and international students.

The most direct way in which institutions benefit from lies and deception is when teachers, administrators, and principals report inaccurate test scores that determine the amount of public funding that their institution will receive. In the past, administrators in elementary and middle schools reported the national test scores of their schools, excluding the results of low-achieving students (e.g., special education students). In this way, the administrators increased the overall scores at their institution, which increased the funding that they were given.

Institutional lying and deception also occurs within athletic departments. Teachers may misreport athletes' grades when they are low because those grades would disqualify the student from participating in important sporting events. In this way, the academically underachieving athletes continue to play, which can increase the team's performance and may result in greater funding for the athletic department.

### **Ramifications of Deception**

The consequences of engaging in deception within academia widely vary. In some circumstances, these behaviors may go unnoticed and unpunished. However, these behaviors are often revealed, and people receive a variety of penalties for their actions. Deception produces personal, institutional, and societal ramifications.

The personal ramifications of engaging in deception within academia widely vary based upon the type of deception used, as well as the status of the individual (e.g., students versus administrators). Students who engage in minor types of deception may receive mild repercussions, such as a verbal reprimand from their teacher or professor. However, if students engage in more serious indiscretions, they may fail the class they are in or may even be expelled from their school or university. Additionally, individuals with higher status positions within academia (e.g., teachers, professors, administrators, and principals) may experience a wide range of outcomes, the more extreme of which include

losing one's job, being blacklisted within their profession, and being charged with fraud if the individual received grant money from the government that they misused (e.g., a professor who fabricated data).

The institutional ramifications of lying and deception may have a large impact on institutions' reputations. If potential applicants become aware that false information has been used to inaccurately describe the institution, this may tarnish the institution's reputation and make applicants disinterested in applying to the institution. Additionally, potential donors may be less likely to invest in institutions that engage in unethical practices.

There also are societal ramifications of deception. When people engage in lying and deception in order to be promoted to higher levels of education, obtain jobs, or gain higher status, they gain access to situations to which they would not have had access if they had proceeded in a legitimate manner. In this way, students are promoted to higher grades, even though they do not have the requisite skills. Similarly, people may obtain jobs for which they are not qualified. Last, individuals may obtain social or material benefits associated with having high status in their field (e.g., becoming a tenure track professor) that they do not deserve. This creates a societal problem by decreasing the quality of education that students receive and lessening the quality of goods and services that are available within society.

### **Prevention**

There have been multiple attempts to dissuade students from engaging in deception. One method is to minimize the opportunities for lying and dishonesty. An example of this would be using teachers, professors, or proctors to monitor students and actively discourage cheating during a testing situation. Additionally, professors may use plagiarism-prevention software such as Turnitin, which compares students' papers with a large database comprised of journal articles, students' papers, and other publications in order to determine whether the student bought their term paper online or plagiarized from the existing literature. Finally, many academic institutions have instituted policies and punishments for cases of academic dishonesty.

Having teachers or professors communicate and enforce the institution's academic policies has been found to be an effective method for discouraging lying and deception within academia. Students who attend universities with policies that enforce academic honesty report engaging in fewer academically dishonest behaviors.

Lauren S. Miller  
Richard H. Gramzow  
*Syracuse University*

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Cheating; Childhood, Lying in; Deception in Research Design; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; High School Sports; Intelligence; Letters of Recommendation; Lying as Ability or Skill; Plagiarism.

### Further Readings

- Ariely, D. "Why We Think It's OK to Cheat and Steal (Sometimes)." Video. (February 2009). <http://www.thesituationist.wordpress.com/2013/06/06/dan-ariely-on-the-psychology-of-cheating> (Accessed July 2013).
- Jordan, A. E. "College Student Cheating: The Role of Motivation, Perceived Norms, Attitudes, and Knowledge of Institutional Policy." *Ethics and Behavior*, v.11/3 (2001).
- Wajda-Johnston, V. A., P. J. Handal, P. A. Brawer, and A. N. Fabricatore. "Academic Dishonesty at the Graduate Level." *Ethics and Behavior*, v.11/3 (2001).
- Whitley, B. E. "Factors Associated With Cheating Among College Students: A Review." *Research in Higher Education*, v.39/3 (1998).

## Accounting

The work of accounting is fraught with ethical considerations. Similar to physicians who must take the Hippocratic Oath, for example, accountants are bound by ethics not to reveal what they know about their clients' finances. An accountant, like a physician, knows intimate details about the lifestyle and activities of a client as expressed in their monetary habits and practices. Therefore, moral character and ethical practices

are a necessary part of the professional practice of accounting.

### History of Accounting

Accounting is a system for recording, managing, and summarizing business activities. The earliest accounting tool was likely knots tied in a string or rope to count livestock. In the ancient Middle East, some of the first accounting records were written on cuneiform tablets. Some of these surviving tablets record stores of goods, taxes, and other business activities. The Egyptians recorded their business activities on papyrus rolls.

The earliest Chinese emperors used accountants to record and manage royal property. The ancient Greeks created a commercial empire using coins, which had only recently been invented by their Lydian neighbors. Accounting used by the Greeks was further extended by the Romans. The end of the Roman Empire created a millennium in which little use was made of accounting techniques besides simple bookkeeping.

At the height of the Italian Renaissance, Luca Bartolomeo de Pacioli, a Franciscan friar, published *Summa de Arithmetica* (1494) in Venice. The book was a mathematics textbook that used Arabic numerals and described both algebra and double-entry accounting. In effect, Pacioli described the method of bookkeeping that Venice merchants were using, the double-entry system of assets and liabilities (credits and debits) used to this day. He also described balance sheets, journals, ledgers, and different kinds of accounts, such as those for receivables and inventories. The *Summa* has earned Pacioli the title of the Father of Accounting. However, Pacioli never claimed to have invented it, instead citing Benedetto Cotrugli as the originator of double-entry bookkeeping. Cotrugli had written, but had not published, a short manuscript titled *Delia Mercatura et del Mercanted Perfetto* (*Of Trading and the Perfect Trader*) in which he gave a general description of the subject. Pacioli also included a discussion of ethics and accounting.

### The Language of Business: Applied Ethics

The complicated field of accounting has been called the language of business. It often involves complex issues of business practices and tax laws. While accountants have a popular image as soulless drones, they are required by their work to



have imagination and wise judgment. Accounting plays an important role in the management of finances and business operations in public, private, and nonprofit activities.

The field of accounting ethics, which studies moral values and judgments about accounting decisions, encompasses a variety of applied ethics. It is also a type of professional ethics. Ethics and accounting can be illustrated in the parable that Jesus told about the unjust steward (Luke 16:1–13) who skimmed his master's accounts in order to curry favor with his master's debtors.

The field of accounting has received renewed and increased attention in recent years because of the wide range of new accounting services and the unethical behaviors of corporate managers and accountants, some of which caused the collapse of corporations. Both public and private organizations have developed new regulations to promote ethical behavior among accountants. This emphasis on ethics is vital to the profession because businesses and investors depend on the accuracy and honesty of financial reports prepared by accountants. Without reliable accountants and auditors, business transactions are suspect, and are therefore unreliable for making sound business or investment decisions.

Ethical knowledge is vital to accountants if they are to resolve the ethical dilemmas that they may face. Making sound, ethical business and financial decisions is vital for financial success and winning personal or public approval. These decisions will benefit not only companies, but also the general public.

### **Accounting Ethics in Academia**

In 1988, Stephen E. Loeb adapted a list of educational instructional objectives from the work of Daniel Callahan. Loeb proposed the educational goals in ethics for accounting, which were to relate accounting to moral issues, develop skill in recognizing the ethical implications of accounting issues, develop in students a sense of “moral obligation,” develop skills in ethical reasoning that would deal with ethical conflicts or dilemmas, develop skills in dealing with confusing issues in accounting practices, enable students to develop character or needed changes in ethical behavior, and develop an appreciation for the relationship of accounting ethics to the general philosophy of ethics.

In 1993, the State University of New York at Binghamton opened a center that concentrated on accounting ethics. Numerous colleges now require courses in ethics or accounting ethics for students preparing to become accountants. Practicing accountants are also likely to be required to take some continuing education in ethics. Among the practices to avoid are conflicts of interest, integrity, and confidentiality; refusal of gifts; and objectivity.

Wisdom and judgment are often necessary in order to discern what is moral and what is not. Research can provide insights, but character—which involves commitment to ethical behavior—is vital to ethics. Therefore, critics of ethics education for accountants have often denounced such education as wasteful because, as they claim, either a person has character, or they do not; in other words, if someone is lacking character, ethical education will not instill it. The educability of ethics is an issue as old as disputes that Socrates had with the Sophists.

### **Cooking the Books: Accounting Scandals**

Examples of accounting “deceit” include using bogus invoices for work that was not performed; paying fictitious employees; and using shell companies for fraudulent investments purposes. Even charities or nonprofits can be involved in accounting fraud. Many people measure the quality of a charity or other nonprofits by the ratio of its receipts to overhead costs. If the nonprofit is spending large portions of its receipts on fundraising and very little on its mission, this can cause donors to look elsewhere. However, accounting tricks have been used to make nonprofits look better than they really are by falsely interpreting overhead expenditures.

Many for-profit firms and even government organizations use “creative accounting” or “earnings management” as euphemisms for standard accounting practices that are followed to the letter, but not in spirit. Usually, these are novel ways to characterize income, assets, liabilities, or other accounting terms and practices. These practices may be employed by accountants in the service of a regular business, such as a movie company. The company may receive millions of dollars in revenues from a motion picture, but thanks to its creative accountants, it appears to fail to make a

profit, and therefore avoids taxation. Some of the most high-profile scandals that have littered the accounting landscape throughout history have involved for-profit companies.

*ProQuesta fraud.* Scott Hirsh, an executive for ProQuesta in Ann Arbor, Michigan, tried to use a simple computer trick—using the color white instead of black for certain numbers—to hide fake figures in spreadsheets. He also used hidden cells in the spreadsheet. However, when the fraud was revealed by selecting all text and changing it to black, the fraud was revealed. The SEC charged Hirsh with accounting fraud because his actions caused company profit totals to be artificially inflated.

*Crazy Eddie Company.* In the 1980s, certified public accountant Sam Antar was the chief financial officer of the Crazy Eddie Company, a retail electronics business with stores in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. It also did business through phone orders, and eventually via Internet sales. The company had 43 stores and sales of \$300 million before it was hit with fraud investigations. Antar, along with his cousin, Eddie Antar and his uncle, Sam M. Antar, were found to have recruited Sam Antar to engage in a major securities fraud that cost investors hundreds of millions of dollars. Eventually, some people lost their life savings, others lost their careers, and others suffered personally.

In 1987, the U.S. attorney for the District of New Jersey started investigating the Crazy Eddie Company. In September 1987, the SEC also initiated an investigation for alleged securities violations. The investigations led to indictments and eventually to convictions. However, before the investigations occurred, Eddie Antar sold millions of company stock and fled to Israel.

From virtually the beginning of their business, the Antars were “cooking the books” with false entries in their ledgers to reduce or eliminate taxable income, paying employees off the books, and skimming cash from store earnings. Their pilfering of the company amounted to about \$1 million per year. They deposited this in foreign banks, much of it in Israel. In order to hide their skimming, they began a deskimming program that lasted several years in an effort to make the company appear to be growing with significant

profits. While actual profits were growing at a 13 percent rate, the deskimming made the company appear to be growing at a 171 percent rate. When the company transitioned from a private company to a publicly traded company, investors were eager to jump in.

Sam Antar used a number of tactics to hide the Antar’s fraudulent operations. One tactic was called the “Panama pump.” The Antars transferred money that they had deposited in Israeli banks to banks in Panama with accounts in alias names. They then wrote payments to the Crazy Eddie Company, which inflated its sales figures.

Another trick was inventory fraud, which was used to inflate the value of company stock. When the Crazy Eddie fiscal year ended, an inventory figure would be posted. The next year, the value of the inventory would be reported at \$10 to \$15 million more. Other accounting tricks also reported false inventory figures. One of Sam Antar’s tricks was to distract the accountants. Generally, the independent accountants sent to review the Crazy Eddie Company books were single young men who were recent accounting graduates. Sam would pair the young male accountants with lovely young female employees in order to distract and blind them to the fraud that the Antars were committing. The Crazy Eddie Company ended in bankruptcy. Until the Enron scandal, it was the biggest accounting fraud in the United States.

*Enron.* Enron was an energy company based in Houston, Texas. It went bankrupt on December 2, 2001, because of fraud committed by its executives. Over 20,000 employees lost their jobs, and many lost their retirement savings. The company’s reported financial vitality had been falsely reported through systematic, organized accounting fraud. The scandal also destroyed the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen because its employees had colluded in the fraud. The Enron scandal was followed by the WorldCom and Tyco scandals in 2002, the HealthSouth scandal in 2003, and other cases in the following decade.

*KPMG Accounting.* In 2013, an executive accountant for KPMG Accounting was caught by the Federal Bureau of Investigation passing along confidential information about companies that he

had audited. One of the companies, Herbal Life, was already having difficulties.

In the United States, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been designated as the organization responsible for developing generally accepted accounting standards by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The FASB is a private, nonprofit organization created in 1973 to replace earlier organizations operated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Critics have levied hard criticism on philosophical grounds against the work of the FASB.

Most countries have laws that deal with accounting. In some countries, accounting is covered by accounting law, while in others the practice is covered by tax law or company laws. There are also standards boards in the United States and other countries.

### Incentive, Opportunity, and Rationalization

Specialists in accounting fraud have found three common elements that are involved in the activity: incentive, opportunity, and rationalization. Incentives include greed, drug use, ego issues, gambling problems, and infidelity. For example, ego trips have cost companies billions of dollars when unsupervised, egoistic traders thought they were smarter than the market. Opportunity can provide the perception that accounting fraud will not be detected. Private companies often have fewer controls than public companies, so the opportunities for accounting fraud are greater. In addition, a person committing accounting fraud often tells their conscience that the “abuse” they feel in hard times justifies them in ripping off their company or organization.

Accounting-fraud criminals point out that there is a difference between being accurate and being truthful. Financial statements may be accurate, but not truthful. In fact, perfection in accounting statements may be a sign of shady bookkeeping. The appearance of legitimacy may be falsely identified as honesty, but verification of accounting facts is paramount because that is where accounting lies can be detected.

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Academia; Bankruptcy; Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Deception and Technology; Disinformation; Enron; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Greenspan, Alan; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud; Madoff, Bernard; Marketing, Deceptive; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

- Breitner, Leslie K. and Robert N. Anthony. *Essentials of Accounting*. 11th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2012.
- Jones, Michael John, ed. *Creative Accounting, Fraud, and International Accounting Scandals*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
- Koch, Harry Walter. *Beginning Accounting and Account Clerk*. San Francisco: Ken-Books, 1987.
- Markham, Jerry W. *A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals: From Enron to Reform*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005.
- Nigrini, Mark. *Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
- Niskanen, William A. *After Enron: Lessons for Public Policy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Pavlo, Walter and Dennis Kneale. *Stolen Without a Gun: Confessions From Inside History's Biggest Accounting Fraud—The Collapse of MCI Worldcom*. Tampa, FL: Etika Books, 2007.
- Pedneault, Stephen and Michael Sheetz. *Forensic Accounting and Fraud Investigation for Non-Experts*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
- Spiceland, J. David, James Sepe, Lawrence A. Tomassini, and Mark W. Nelson. *Intermediate Accounting*. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.
- Zack, Gerard M. *Fair Value Accounting Fraud: New Global Risks and Detection Techniques*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

## Adolescence, Lying in

The consensus of considerable child development research is that during adolescence, lying and deception tend to increase. Numerous studies have concluded that the majority of adolescents lie to their

parents about such things as how they spend their money, when they started dating, what clothes they wear when away from home, the movies they see, the Web sites they view, the friends they “hang” with, their alcohol and drug use, whether the parties they attended were chaperoned, and whether they rode in cars with drunken or “stoned” drivers. One study, for example, found that 98 percent of adolescents reported lying to their parents either by commission (i.e., telling deliberate falsehoods) or by omission (i.e., withholding essential details). While young children may not fully understand what constitutes lying, adolescents are fully aware of the components of a lie: (1) the communication is factually untrue, (2) the person knows the communication is untrue, and (3) the person intends to deceive the listener.

### Means and Reasons

There is considerable evidence that the “seeds” for adolescent deception may be planted during early childhood. For example, early on, when young children observe their peers misbehaving or cheating, they immediately run to tell a parent, teacher, or other adult. While they are being completely honest, this repetitive behavior eventually becomes annoying to the adult, who eventually tells the child to stop tattling and work it out on his/her own. It doesn’t take long for the child to realize that being called a “tattler” by a peer on the playground is not a good thing. During adolescence, turning in a peer for lying means “acting like a child.” So, keeping quiet after watching peers cheat, use illegal drugs, cut classes, and shoplift is easy for most adolescents because they have been reinforced for years to do so.

Adolescent lying takes many forms. Adolescents can distort the truth with contradictory information, by offering half-truths to temper the impact of the facts, by changing the subject to divert the listener, by giving the impression that they are being open by offering only limited or partial information, and by concealing or not divulging information. Many adolescents equate diverting attention, not disclosing information, and remaining silent as not lying, but just changing the subject.

There are a variety of motives or reasons that help explain why the act of lying tends to increase during adolescence. By far, the top motive that adolescents use to justify lying behavior is to

preserve their autonomy. During adolescence, youth begin to socialize more with their peers and receive less direct monitoring and supervision from parents. Thus, parental supervision depends more on reports from young people about their activities, friends, and behavior. Parental supervision shifts from direct monitoring to trusting that young people will provide truthful reports of their commitments and activities—where they are going and who they are with. However, during adolescence, risk-taking and testing the limits are common ways of asserting independence. Away from direct parental supervision and exposed to myriad new enticements such as alcohol, drugs, and sex, the adolescent turns to more frequent lying to preserve autonomy and avoid parental disapproval and potential sanctions. Adolescents believe that, right or wrong, they have the right to make their own decisions, particularly in the areas of privacy, control over their bodies, and choice of friends.

Adolescents also lie to please their parents, teachers, peers, and siblings; to be loyal to their family and peers; for personal gain; to hide things they are ashamed of; to avoid punishment; to gain attention and status; and to feel more powerful and in control. Other motives for lying include rebelling against parents and other adults, conforming to peer expectations, as a challenge, to bond with and be accepted by their peers, to avoid punishment, and to gain a sense of control. Some adolescents realize that by lying or bragging they are able to manipulate their peers; increase their sense of self-worth; get attention, sympathy, and support; and feel more powerful.

In addition, adolescence is a difficult developmental period for many youth. Lying is sometimes seen as a way of coping with the stress of adolescence, a means of fitting in or belonging, a solution to being judged unfairly, and a way of feeling more adequate. In order to achieve one or more of these ends, adolescent lying often becomes more common and more complex.

There are also cultural differences in adolescent lying behavior. For example, in Eastern cultures, which tend to emphasize group loyalty, adolescents tend to lie to protect their peers. On the other hand, in Western cultures, which tend to emphasize the individual, adolescents are more likely to lie to protect themselves.



### Academic Dishonesty

Another common form of adolescent lying is academic dishonesty. Many adolescents have become very creative at finding ways to successfully cheat on school assignments and tests. Many adolescents copy the work of their peers, use crib sheets, use codes to communicate with peers during exams, and bribe their peers for test answers and/or pay them to complete their assignments. Some adolescents even break into teacher's classrooms and computers and steal exams and answer sheets.

Some creative adolescents roll up "cheat sheets" and slide them into the barrel of an empty pen, or write test notes on the back of a peeled-off water or pop bottle label, which they then replace and remove again during the exam. Others feign being ill and bring a box of "note marked" tissues to an exam, or take turns with friends staying home sick on exam day and then getting answers from others in the group.

Adolescents cheat in school for many reasons. They may cheat to deal with the tremendous pressure they perceive from their parents to meet high academic expectations. Many adolescents feel immense pressure from their parents to achieve at the highest level. Many parents offer their adolescent children rewards of money or the latest technology for superior grades. Adolescents may view these expectations as beyond their ability, which can create so much anxiety that adolescents tend to freeze up during exams or assignments. This pressure to achieve can also result in "cutthroat" competition in which winning at all costs becomes the norm.

Peer influence can also contribute to academic dishonesty during adolescence. In one study of adolescents recognized for high scholastic achievement, 80 percent stated that they cheated, and 95 percent of those who cheated considered themselves to be morally responsible. When asked, virtually all adolescents report that cheating is



*Two girls smoke pot during an outing in the woods near Leakey, Texas, May 1973. Dishonesty in adolescence is nothing new, and extensive child development research has shown that during adolescence, lying and deception tend to increase. Many studies have revealed that most adolescents lie to their parents about such things as when they started dating, their choices of movies and friends, their alcohol and drug use, and whether they rode in cars with drivers who were under the influence of alcohol or drugs.*

unacceptable. However, if adolescents know or perceive that most of their peers are cheating, they tend to do the same. Thus, peer cultures that reinforce cheating have developed in many schools.

There are additional factors other than parent and peer pressure and positive reinforcement that motivate dishonesty and lying related to academic issues. For example, low self-esteem can lead some adolescents to doubt themselves and their ability to perform well enough academically. Fear of failure can be strong when adolescents perceive that they are not achieving at the same high level as a “star” sibling, or that they may not qualify for admission into an elite university. Many college and university admission standards have risen, and scholarships have become more scarce. Thus, grade point average and class standing upon graduation have become even more important. Many adolescents see cheating as necessary to avoid shame or failure.

Another factor is the strong emphasis in Western culture on autonomy and individual achievement, the belief that to be worthwhile one has to be fiercely competitive and claw one’s way to the top. Thus, many adolescents have little difficulty blaming their academic dishonesty on pressure from parents, peers, and siblings; an overwhelming load of classes, assignments and exams; stringent college and university admission and scholarship requirements; and their own personal inadequacies.

### Consequences of Adolescent Lying

There are several long-term costs that adolescents pay for the short-term benefits of lying. Taking the easy way out can be expensive in the long run. Adolescent liars often become alienated and isolated from the friends and family members who they have deceived. Adolescents who lie damage the trust and intimacy with loved ones, often resulting in less frequent and less effective communication, which then leads to withholding of important experiences and often more lies.

Persistent adolescent lying may be a precursor of negative developmental outcomes such as delinquency, aggression, school failure, and bullying. In addition, as the frequency of an adolescent’s lying increases, their mental health may suffer. Persistent lying has been found to relate to psychological symptoms such as depression,

low self-esteem, debilitating guilt and shame, and even learning disabilities. There may also be undisclosed reasons for an adolescent to lie, which compounds the initial problem. For example, a youth with undiagnosed attention deficit disorder might lie about homework assignments and grades. A youth with low self-esteem may lie to bolster his status with peers. Adolescents sometimes lie to conceal poor emotional adjustment in order to avoid worrying parents or as a means of trying to handle their issues single handedly.

Some adolescents start believing their own lies and end up deceiving themselves. The lives of adolescent liars can become complicated when they try to keep track of the two versions of reality they must remember in order to avoid detection. Sooner or later, however, when their lies are detected, they often face double punishment, one for the behavior they lied about, and the second for the lying itself.

Thomas M. Kelley  
Wayne State University

**See Also:** Academia; Bluffing; Brain; Cheating; Childhood, Lying in; Children, Development of Deception in; Children’s Sports Teams; College Sports; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception Motives; Dishonesty; Drugs; Games, Children’s; High School Sports; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Lying, Costs of; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Morals and Ethics; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Secrecy; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

Cumsille, Patricio, Nancy Darling, and M. Loreto Martinez. “Shading the Truth: The Patterning of Adolescents’ Decisions to Avoid Issues, Disclose, or Lie to Parents.” *Journal of Adolescence*, v.33/2 (2009).

Darling, N. and B. Dowdy. “Monitoring, Disclosure, and Trust: Mothers’ and Adolescents’ Reports.” In *Trust and Trustworthiness During Childhood and Adolescence*, K. J. Rotenberg, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Jensen, L. A., J. J. Arnett, S. S. Feldman, and E. Cauffman. “It’s Wrong, But Everybody Does It: Academic Dishonesty Among High School and College Students.” *Contemporary Educational Psychology*, v.27 (2002).

# Advertising, Consumer Products

Consumer products are the goods that people use every day, such as toothpaste, soap, paper towels, and hair products. The United States is considered to have the largest consumer goods market in the world; in 2009, this market was estimated at \$416 billion.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority to monitor and regulate companies that use deceptive practices to advertise consumer products. The FTC was established by the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 as a regulatory agency with the mandate to monitor organizations for antitrust violations; it was to be a “watch-dog” of companies, regulating their activities to ensure fair and ethical competition among businesses. The FTC asserted that its duties included protecting consumers from deceptive advertising. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in *FTC v. Raladam Co.* (1931) determined that the FTC could only enforce activities that limited competition among companies. Seven years later, the Wheeler-Lee Amendment adopted by Congress in 1938 expanded the role of the FTC to include more direct protection of consumers by monitoring deceptive advertising of consumer products.

The FTC’s authority to publicize rules and regulations regarding deceptive advertising was added in 1975 through the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. This act allowed the FTC to file civil lawsuits in federal court in order to hold companies responsible for failing to follow commission rules. Further, the FTC could protect consumers by filing civil actions on their behalf without first issuing a cease-and-desist order to advertisers accused of deceptive practices.

## FTC Definition of Deceptive Advertising

However, making a claim and proving that an advertisement is deceptive is difficult because of how the FTC defines a deceptive message. The FTC considers a message to be deceptive under two conditions. First, it must misinform consumers who are acting reasonably with regard to a product that is advertised. The FTC considers reasonability through the perspective of the

advertisement’s target group. Children, then, should be considered differently when looking at their response to advertising than adults looking at the same advertisement. Second, the information provided in the advertisement is evaluated to determine whether it is “material,” or critical, to the decision to purchase a product; a misleading material claim would be an advertisement that influenced consumers to purchase a product that they would not have otherwise purchased. A material claim includes information about the effectiveness, value, and features of a product.

Claims made in advertisements can be either “express” or “implied.” An implied claim could be that a mouthwash kills germs that can cause illnesses. The product does not prevent sickness, but it is implied that it does. An express claim is a statistic or piece of evidence that supports the purchase of a product, such as “four out of five doctors recommend product Z.” The FTC can hold companies responsible for providing questionable evidence and statistics in express claims, and can allege that advertisements are misleading in implied claims.

In 2012, the FTC challenged claims made by Oreck vacuum cleaners, Reebok shoes, and Nivea skin cream. Each one of these products’ advertisements included claims that could not be proven: Oreck maintained that its vacuum cleaners prevented the flu, Reebok advertised that some of its shoes could tone a consumer’s body, and Nivea claimed that one of its creams reduced the body size of consumers. The FTC also monitors online advertising and files suits against Internet marketers, such as those selling acai berry supplements and claiming that they were effective in helping consumers lose weight through the use of untrue testimonials on bogus news sites. For some of these claims, the FTC can order that consumers be refunded the money that they paid for products that were dishonestly advertised. The commission can also order companies to cease and desist the continuation of untrue claims, and can ask companies to create corrective advertisements that will clear up misunderstandings among consumers.

## Puffery

“Better ingredients, better pizza” was a claim by Papa John’s Pizza Inc. It may be an example of what is called “puffery,” or what the FTC



considers acceptable distortion of information in an advertisement. Puffery is an ambiguous statement that includes a positive proclamation regarding a product. Words such as “best,” “better,” “superior,” and “unsurpassed” are examples. An advertisement that uses puffery is not considered by the FTC to be deceptive because such claims are considered obvious exaggerations to reasonable consumers, and would not influence their intention to buy a product.

Puffery is one of the most researched areas regarding deception in advertising. Some research has shown that many consumers believe puffery, but other research has shown that it is not believed by most. These mixed findings may be because in some situations, puffery is more believable than in other situations. For example, when consumers have less knowledge about a product, puffery is considered more diagnostic or helpful in their purchasing decision. When consumers have more knowledge, they are less likely to be influenced by puffery. Further, when puffery is placed in advertisements published in a popular, mass-circulation magazine, it is less likely to be believed than when it is in an advertisement in a trade or professional magazine.

Consumers may also be savvy to tricks like puffery. Research has shown that consumers have some understanding that exaggeration occurs in ads, so that moderate levels of puffery in an advertisement are more effective than higher levels of puffery. At higher levels, the claims can become more far-fetched and unbelievable, and thus are easier to distinguish as deceptive.

To better understand how the levels of puffery influence the intent to buy, some researchers have looked at how levels of puffery followed by trials of a product influence evaluation of that product. Results from these studies have shown that moderate to relatively high levels of puffery followed by the trial of a product positively influenced consumers’ intent to buy. Conversely, at extremely high levels of puffery followed by a product trial, a negative effect was found. Consumers tended to be disappointed with the product when they had high expectations and the trial failed to realize those expectations.

Some research has looked at how two-sided arguments could be presented to consumers in order to counter this decreased intent to buy.

A two-sided argument includes the puffery or inflated positive claims about the product, as well as counterarguments downplaying problems with the product. These two-sided arguments with high levels of puffery, when compared to one-sided or only positive claims in advertisements, have been found to be effective in convincing consumers to not be disappointed when they try the product, and thus have a positive impact on intent to buy.

Still other research on puffery has looked at the interpersonal effect or the direct-to-consumer salesperson’s use of puffery. One study looked at this relationship and found that the more puffery a salesperson used, the lower the trust in that person and the lower the desire to purchase a product from him or her. It may be that, in person, consumers expect to receive more truth than deception, or that they already anticipate that they will be lied to, so trust is already low before talking to the salesperson.

### **Other Forms of Deceptive Advertising**

Puffery is not the only means by which an advertiser may try to mislead a consumer. Another method involves “masked marketing,” or advertising a product in a covert manner so that consumers may not know that they are receiving a message about the product. An example of this is product placement in movies or television shows. Another example includes the messages seen on computers when searching the Web, or messages sent via e-mails.

There is also subliminal advertising or heuristic advertising, which has received much attention. When this is used, consumers receive stimuli that predisposes them to rate a product more favorably, but they are not able to identify why. One powerful heuristic is color. Case studies have shown that 60 to 80 percent of a decision regarding a product is based solely on its color. For example, blue is associated with clean, so it is often used for packaging clothes-washing products. It is often believed that red is the color of choice if companies want to get a product noticed, but this can backfire. Contact lens solutions use greens or blues, soothing colors, for packaging. Using red on these packages as a dominant color would deter consumers from purchasing the product.

Types of claims made in advertising and how they can be deceptive has also received much

research. Up to 10 types of claims have been found that could be considered deceptive in advertisements. The two claims, however, that are believed to have the strongest impact on consumers' buying behaviors are the expansion implication and the inconspicuous qualification implication. The expansion implication is an untrue exaggeration such that a product is said to be able to perform at a level to which it cannot. The inconspicuous qualification implication should prevent deception from the expansion implication, but the qualification is hidden through the use of a small font or obscure placement on the page.

In one study, advertisements in the adult section of a Las Vegas tourist magazine were analyzed. Researchers investigated three types of claims: claims that did not have a referent, claims that can be argued to be true, and specific claims. When a referent was missing, the ad would state something like, "this is legal in Nevada," leaving the "this" to be interpreted by the tourist. Thus, this claim was considered deceptive in most of the advertisements in the magazine. Specific claims listed the times when the business was open or specific services, so they were not found to be deceptive in most of the advertisements. The arguable or debatable claims were found to be relatively deceptive because they were not always about the product offered and included statements like, "oral love is a beautiful thing," which could not be proven to be untrue or deceptive.

Other methods of manipulation or deception in advertising include flattery—telling consumers they deserve the product—without providing relevant facts about the product. An example would be a car commercial that emphasizes luxury or a smooth ride, but does not provide any explanation for what that means or how it compares to other cars.

### Research on Deceptive Advertising

Proving that an advertisement is deceptive has been found to be a challenge in research because cause and effect must be found; the ad must be shown to mislead a person to purchase a product that he or she may not have bought without being given the deceptive information. One way to determine causality that has been suggested is to include two control conditions: one with no information, and one with true information.

These can be compared to misleading or expanded claims in the experimental condition to determine if the misleading advertisement causes a higher level of intent to buy a product than the control conditions. When experiments have used these methods, their findings have indicated that when advertisements that inflate the product performance of a consumer product are made, the participants reported a higher level of intent to buy the product in the deceptive ads over the no-information or true advertisements.

The theory most often referred to with regard to deceptive advertising is Fishbein's theory of belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. As deceptive advertising manipulates beliefs and attitudes, it can also lead to altering intention to buy and then buying behavior. Fishbein's theory has also been applied to corrective advertising, but does not effectively work in understanding these types of ads. Advertisers are trying to be ineffective in promoting a corrective message, and corrective advertising may actually increase positive perceptions of the company, and thus may have a positive, not a negative impact on buying intentions and behavior.

Also, previous beliefs and attitudes about a company will influence perceptions of a corrective advertisement. These were incorporated in a variation of the Fishbein model in an effort to explain why corrective advertising may increase intention to buy and actual buying behavior. The proposed model was not summative, like Fishbein's extended model, but instead included causal effects and multiple paths to allow for numerous predictions of consumer behavior. The authors of the model contend that it will better explain the influence of corrective advertising. Other research on corrective advertising has shown that corrective advertising in print media has less influence than corrective advertising on television, with television corrective advertisements the most effective at correcting false information about a product.

Deception in advertising can also be seen in the type of media chosen. Infomercials, for example, have been considered deceptive because they take on the appearance of a talk show, with famous individuals casually talking with a "host" about their experiences with the product. Infomercials also often have commercial segments that further

lend to their credibility, yet the advertisements often further promote the product discussed on the infomercial. To seem less deceptive, the sponsor of the infomercial will disclose that it is paid advertising, but a consumer may miss this disclosure and still be deceived.

The type of magazine can also influence the perspective of the potential buyer. When puffery is used in advertisements in popular mass-circulation magazines, it may not be considered true, but when it is used in professional publications, it is more likely to be considered true or factual.

### **Advertising to Children**

In the case of television, there is much research on television advertising and its effect on children, particularly on childhood obesity. As children age, they watch more television, with an average of 2.2 hours a day at 1 year of age, and up to an average of six hours per day for children ages 8 to 10. Overall, through television, children between the ages of 2 and 11 are exposed to 5,500 food commercials a year. The majority of the food commercials aimed at children are for high-calorie or junk food. The food industry attempted to regulate its advertising practices by adopting the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative. However, even after a number of years, a report issued in 2009 found that three-fourths of food commercials aimed at children were for products that lacked nutritional value.

Although these commercials may or may not distort information provided to children, they may be considered deceptive under the FTC's definition of deception. If an advertisement would entice a reasonable person who would not otherwise have been enticed to purchase the said product, then it is deception. The FTC also takes into consideration the target market of the advertisement, so if children are the target, the commission can evaluate whether the child can tell the difference between the television show and the advertisement; if the child understands that he or she is receiving an advertisement, or that someone is making an effort to persuade him or her; and whether the child can understand puffery. Because children understand on a literal or physical level until about the age of 11 or 12, it may not be possible for them to comprehend that they are receiving an exaggerated message or even that they are being persuaded.

Another area where children can be deceived through advertising is the use of "advergames." Advergames are games on Web sites where products like cereal or toys are sold. As children see advertisement headers while they play these games, they may be persuaded to want to purchase the product. Some examples include Fisher-Price online games, where children can play alphabet games and find a tab leading to pictures and names of products that they may want to purchase. Another example is Chuck E. Cheese Pizza's Web site, where children can play "Chuck E-Games" and win free tickets to use when they go to Chuck E. Cheese with their parents.

This leads to one of the most dynamic and difficult-to-monitor mediums for advertisements: the Internet. The Internet is unique in that it is interactive; there are few entry barriers; advertisers can be anonymous (e.g., post reviews of their own product); it is easy to create a professional-looking advertisement on the Internet; it is easy to take the advertisement off the Internet; and there is a spatial or temporal separation, so information can be received at any time, night or day. One method of misleading consumers on the Internet is through the use of product recommendation agents (PRAs). PRAs enable searches based on product preferences and interests, and the results of the searches are predetermined so that certain products will come up as preferred more than others when they are not actually better products.

### **Consumer Bias and Self-Deception**

Consumers have also been found to have biases that predispose them to purchasing or preferring one product over another. They employ self-deception when making purchases. Advertisements and product placement (where a product is placed on a shelf or in a store) can manipulate these biases and encourage purchase of the advertiser's product. Some of these biases include: the halo effect, cognitive dissonance, primacy effect, and information distortion. The halo effect increases self-deception in that consumers tend to believe that a product that they already like has attributes that it may not have. An example would be to believe that a certain type of bleach, Bleach A, will not damage red clothing; yet, this attribute is not true and is a distortion because the

consumer likes the product and wants to believe that it is the best product available. Another self-deception that has generated much research is how individuals can experience dissonance over a purchase, particularly an expensive purchase, and then employ rationalization to make them feel better about the purchase.

There are also primacy effects that come from persuasion literature, and with regard to self-deception and product preference, in this type of distortion a consumer prefers the product they first chose and may distort new information to maintain this preference. An example would be if Bleach A was the preferred product, and a consumer is presented with evidence that Bleach A can damage red clothing; the consumer may distort this evidence so that they may believe that Bleach A will actually enhance the color of red clothing. Finally, information distortion primarily occurs in situations in which the consumer has only vague or ambiguous information, but still has a preference for one product. Consumers may search for confirming evidence through advertising to support their preference.

Some researchers have tried to determine how to reduce the self-deception that consumers employ because of biases. In these studies, researchers introduce diagnostic information, or accurate information demonstrating that one product is superior to another, to individuals who may purchase either brand. Diagnostic information may reduce distortions, leading an individual to choose the better brand; however, the consumer may then distort new information regarding their new preference. Such research shows that these self-deceptions may be powerful and are used as tools by advertisers to encourage product preference.

Anne P. Hubbell

*New Mexico State University*

**See Also:** Cognitive Dissonance; Cognitive Heuristics; Consumer Protection Laws; Drug Advertising; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Marketing, Deceptive; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Puffery.

### Further Readings

Blythin, Evan. "Improbable Claiming." *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, v.41 (1977).

- Burgoon, Michael, Deborah A. Newton, and Thomas S. Birk. "A Theory of Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior Extended to the Domain of Corrective Advertising." *Communication Yearbook*, v.15 (1992).
- Burke, Raymond R., Wayne S. DeSarbo, Richard L. Oliver, and Thomas S. Robertson. "Deception by Implication: An Experimental Investigation." *Journal of Consumer Research*, v.14 (1988).
- Federal Trade Commission. "Advertising FAQ's: A Guide for Small Business." <http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus35-advertising-faqs-guide-small-business> (Accessed October 2012).
- Federal Trade Commission. "Challenging Deceptive Advertising and Marketing." <http://www.ftc.gov/os/highlights/2012/topics/deceptiveAdvertising.shtml> (Accessed October 2012).
- Graff, Samantha G., Dale Kunkel, and Seth E. Mermin. "Government Can Regulate Food Advertising to Children Because Cognitive Research Shows That It Is Inherently Misleading." *Health Affairs*, v.31 (2012).
- Haan, Perry and Cal Berkey. "Puffery: Its Effect on Consumer's Trust in the Sales Dyad." *Innovative Marketing*, v.2 (2006).
- Kamins, Michael A. and Lawrence J. Marks. "Advertising Puffery: The Impact of Using Two-Sided Claims on Product Attitude and Purchase Intention." *Journal of Advertising*, v.16 (1987).
- Markowitz, Eric. "How to Choose the Right Colors for Your Brand." *Inc.* <http://www.inc.com/guides/2010/10/how-to-choose-the-right-colors-for-your-brand.html> (Accessed October 2012).
- Mello, Michelle M. "Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food Advertising to Children: Possibilities for a Reinvigorated Role." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, v.35/2 (2010).
- Nkonge, Japhet H. "How Communication Medium and Message Format Affect Corrective Advertising." *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, v.12 (1984).
- Petty, Ross D. and J. Craig Andrews. "Covert Marketing Unmasked: A Legal and Regulatory Guide for Practices That Mask Marketing Messages." *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, v.27 (2008).
- Russo, J. Edward, Margaret G. Meloy, and Victoria Husted Medvec. "Predecisional Distortion of Product Information." *Journal of Marketing Research*, v.35 (1998).



Science Daily. "Consumers Have Mixed Reactions to Puffery in Advertising." <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100119121432.htm> (Accessed October 2012).

SelectUSA. "The Consumer Goods Industry in the United States." <http://www.selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/consumer-goods-industry-united-states> (Accessed October 2012).

Xiao, Bo and Izak Benbasat. "Product-Related Deception in E-commerce: A Theoretical Perspective." *MIS Quarterly*, v.35 (2011).

## African Americans

African Americans are descendants of Africans who have similar physical features, identify themselves culturally with those in the continent of Africa, and are citizens of the United States. African Americans have been victims of oppressive practices and dehumanizing treatment throughout the history of the United States. Historically, skin color and other phenotypic characteristics have been used to identify populations for oppression, violence, and unequal treatment. Africans who were captured and brought to the United States were readily recognizable because of skin color.

During the period when Africans were enslaved in the United States, they were not allowed to learn to read or write, thus facilitating lies that were used for mentally enslaving them, just as the institution of slavery physically enslaved them.

### Historical Deceptions: The Slave Trade

Among the many deceptions that were used to justify the enslavement of Africans is the lie that Africans did not have a culture and civilization in Africa prior to their capture. In reality, the people of west Africa, the origin of most enslaved Africans, had a rich and varied history and culture long before the arrival of European and other slavers. Geographically, west Africa protrudes into the Atlantic Ocean, providing ample sea transportation and merchant opportunities, as well as inland forests and tropical savannas that lie between the deserts and the ocean. The original inhabitants of this region were primarily

the present-day people of Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Mandingo, Fantin, and Ashanti. The earliest west Africans were skilled hunters and gatherers, who also had a wide variety of political arrangements including cities, states, kingdoms, and other organizations, each with individual languages and culture. Village life around 2500 B.C.E. grew into cities, eventually developing into empires and kingdoms.

The historic Songhai Empire and the kingdoms of Benin, Congo, and Mali were dominant, with monarchs leading complex political and social structures, and having governance capabilities over hundreds of thousands of subjects. Ghana was an ancient empire and a wealthy kingdom that supplied gold to north Africa and Europe between the 9th and 11th centuries. Africans were especially skilled in such subjects as medicine, mathematics, and astronomy. For centuries, west Africans traded with Europeans through merchants in north Africa. The Portuguese were the first traders to sail along the west African coast in the 15th century, and they were followed by the Dutch, British, French, and Scandinavians. Africans made fine luxury items in bronze and traded gold, ivory, spices, seeds, and tools from village to village, state to state, and continent to continent.

For several decades prior to the involvement of the Portuguese and Europeans in African exploration, the Arabs, including fierce Muslim zealots, waged religious wars against African villagers. The Muslim zealots captured many west Africans, hauling and dragging them across the Sahara Desert into Arabia. In the many years of war between the Arab Muslims and African Christians, the Africans were without modern weaponry. As a result, the empires and great kingdoms of west Africa fell to continuous Muslim attacks. Throughout this period of wars and conflicts, both Christians and Muslims captured and enslaved one another for religious reasons.

Another serious deception is that Africans sold their fellow Africans into slavery. In fact, Portuguese and European traders from their first contact kidnapped and bought African war captives from Muslim crusaders. Although war captives were viewed as slaves, during the Middle Ages, slaves in Africa had some rights and could not be abused, bought, or sold. They often had

the right to own property. While seeking gold and spreading Christianity for Portugal, Portuguese explorer Henry the Navigator in 1444 first explored the African coasts. He and his crew attacked and captured a sleeping African village and carried its people in chains against their will to Portugal. From then on, Portugal was heavily engaged in slave trafficking, transporting an average of 1,000 African slaves annually within a 10-year period.

The deception about the sale of Africans by other Africans originated to justify the human-rights abuses perpetrated against Africans. It was also used to deceive enslaved Africans into thinking that they were not wanted by their people, consequently causing distrust and division between slaves and the peoples of their homelands.

In the 17th century, transatlantic slaving became an imperious trade when plantation owners required increasingly more slave labor to meet the rising demand for sugar in Europe. The first group of Africans who arrived in the North American colonies, also referred to as the New World, were not slaves. Many arrived in the New World with European explorers long before the beginning of slavery. There are historical accounts noting that Vasco Núñez de Balboa's crew included 30 Africans in 1513, when he came upon Panama. Also, Africans were with Juan Ponce de León in Florida and Francisco Pizarro in Peru; Africans accompanied Hernán Cortés when he came to Mexico; and Africans were members of the crew engaged in French explorations of the New World, as well as Jesuit missionary expeditions into Canada. Africans also sailed with Christopher Columbus on his first, second, and third voyages to the New World. One year before the *Mayflower* landed at Plymouth Rock, 20 Africans had already come ashore in Jamestown, Virginia, in the summer of 1619. They joined the ranks of white indentured servants, because slavery did not exist in North America during this period.


Hundreds of Africans eventually came to the American colonies as indentured servants or free-men from England, Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies. As indentured servants, they were often freed from their labor obligations after a specified time of service, and were able to live legally as citizens, own property and opportunities for

education and advancement. They served alongside other Europeans who were also serving a term of indentured servitude. By contrast, the institution of slavery supported the denial of basic human rights and the extraction of human labor through physical and mental abuse. The institution of slavery brutalized and subjected African Americans to systematic violence and oppression.

The increasingly huge economic benefits from sugar plantations created a demand for more laborers. Plantation owners attempted to enslave North American Indians, but many Indians died of smallpox and other diseases transmitted by Europeans. Attempts to institutionally enslave white people failed because they could more easily escape and blend in with the larger white community. Africans were selected as an enslaved workforce because they were considered stronger than whites and Indians, could work in extreme heat for long hours without dying of heat exhaustion, and could not blend easily into the larger community if they ran away. Most important, Africa was seen to offer an inexhaustible supply of strong new laborers.

Within a few years, hundreds of thousands of slaves were crossing the Atlantic each year. Known as the Middle Passage, the voyage from Africa to the New World was one of massive, forced migration. It involved overcrowded ships, harsh conditions, disease, suicides by jumping overboard, and maimed hands and feet from the chains used to hold them. The two and a half centuries of slavery as an economic institution caused the displacement and death of over 100 million Africans, including those who died during the passage.

The involuntary removal of millions of Africans from their homeland and the horrific journey to America is one the most tragic events in the history of humankind. Slavery is considered the single most important historical event distinguishing the African American experience as uniquely distinct from any other racial and ethnic group. Additional deceptions arose in response to the dehumanizing effect of slavery, which laid the foundation for some racist theories that tended to falsely classify slaves as a subhuman species, physically and intellectually inferior to whites. This contradicted the earlier justification



*"Be On Your Guard Against All Lies" declares a broadside from the mid-1800s. The ad was meant to warn about the status of arrested fugitive slave Anthony Burns and the deceptive tactics of his kidnapper, who demanded more money after Boston citizens raised money to purchase the slave's freedom. Deception was rampant in all facets of the slave trade.*

for slavery based on the claim that Africans were stronger than whites and Indians.

Resistance to slavery continued, and by 1831, the power of the antislavery movement had intensified. African American slavery was an important factor in the U.S. Civil War, which began in 1861. On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, declaring that all slaves would be free. An estimated 5 to 20 million Africans were enslaved in the United States up to this time. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified

on December 6, 1865, slavery in the United States was officially abolished for approximately 4 million African Americans.

### Civil Rights

Reconstruction following the Civil War brought about three major pieces of legislation: the Fourteenth Amendment, providing due process in the protection of individual rights and liberties; the Fifteenth Amendment, allowing African American men the right to vote and hold political office; and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which outlawed racial discrimination toward African Americans and proffered equal access to public facilities.

These new rights were interrupted as numerous white supremacy groups formed in opposition to the new status of African Americans. Terrorist and vigilante organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camellia engaged in a campaign of violence and intimidation against African Americans. In addition to lynchings, burnings, beatings, and the promotion of lawlessness by these racist organizations, southern legislators enacted the Black Codes of conduct in support of social oppression and the era of Jim Crow segregation. The conglomeration of American racist practices toward African Americans during and after slavery culminated in the stigmatization of their status. This stigma has persisted until the present.

From the 1950s and 1960s, with the Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, African Americans have fought and endured institutional racism, discrimination, and oppression unlike any other group in the United States. They have persevered amid inhumane assaults and in the face of adversity. They have shown resilience for living through the eras of slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and racial terror. Through their struggles, they have made momentous contributions toward advancing the civil rights of all Americans and the quality of their lives against ponderous odds. Many perceive the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and his reelection for a second term in 2012 as steps forward in U.S. race relations. Although many African Americans have become successful in various professions and careers, the struggle for equity on all levels continues.



Many African Americans remain victims of negative categorizations and evaluations on the basis of skin color. They are victims of stereotypes and prejudice that persist against them in American society.

Felix O. Chima  
*Prairie View A&M University*

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Asian Americans; Civil War, U.S.; Colonialism; Columbus, Christopher; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Ethnic Differences; Hispanic Americans; Historical Narratives, False; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700; History of Deception: 1700 to 1800; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; History of Deception: 1950 to the Present; Islam; Middle East; Native Americans; Racism; Spanish-American Conquests.

### Further Readings

Dia, Jean Marie. *Arab Muslim World: Architect of Slave Trade in Africa*. Sandy, UT: Ecko House, 2013.

Dixon, B. M. and Joseleen Wilson. *Good Health for African Americans*. New York: Crown, 1994.

Leashore, B. R. *African Americans Encyclopedia of Social Work*. 19th ed. Washington, DC: NASW Press, 1995.

## Alibi

An alibi is a defense used by accused persons to deny criminal or other charges by asserting they were somewhere else at the time of the offense. As a verb, the term applies to the act of providing that defense. The word is of Latin origin; it is a combination of *alius* meaning “other” and *ubi* meaning “where.”

Alibi literally means “other where.” An alibi is the claim of the suspect to be innocent of the charge because he or she was somewhere else at the time of the crime, and thus could not have committed the crime. In a nonlegal context, alibi simply means an excuse or a defense against any sort of charge.

The connotation of the term *alibi* is slightly negative, whether in a legal or popular context. The act of providing an excuse that is labeled an alibi has a shade of disrepute about it, as though it is a poor form of proof, but is the best available to the accused. The popular presumption is that relying on an alibi is a dubious or at least unsavory action. This distaste may be rooted in the fact that, by asserting an alibi, the accused does not claim that their character or values would preclude committing the offense in question. Instead, the accused argues from defeasibility, saying, “I could not have done it.” So the alibi is offered in a mechanical way; it claims “I was unable to commit this crime.” That stance is much less noble than the assertion, “I would not have done that.” This claim says, “I am not the sort of person who does things like that, whether or not I was somewhere else at the time of the crime.” So, this stance is an assertion about who one is, rather than where one is. By raising an alibi defense, an accused person makes no mention of a defense based on character. This position means that if the prosecutor can puncture the alibi, the accused remains under consideration for the charges. In fact, showing an alibi to be false confirms that the accused is at the very least a liar, and is perhaps guilty of the initial charge.

Unlike other explanations, an alibi defense is one of innocence. Some jurisdictions require that defense attorneys disclose their intention to offer an alibi defense prior to trial to allow prosecutors time to investigate. This requirement is unusual because under normal circumstances in a criminal trial, the defense has no obligation to reveal anything prior to trial. An alibi defense is not a frivolous undertaking; if proven to be false, the alibi may subject the defendant to charges of perjury or obstruction of justice.

### Famous Alibis

In the annals of true crime, the 1882 case of Armand Peltzer of Antwerp, Belgium, stands out for presenting a perfect alibi. Pelzer was in love with another man’s wife, and wanted to do away with him so that his wife and Pelzer could marry. He enlisted his brother Leon, who owed him a large debt, to commit the murder. Leon was to come to Europe from America and kill the husband for Pelzer. Leon assumed the identity of Henry Vaughan, a wealthy magnate looking to

build a shipping line. Leon was also required to completely change his appearance and spend time and money becoming well known in several major cities. He then contacted the husband, a lawyer, about representing the fictional shipping line. When the lawyer came to Brussels, Leon took him to his room and shot him in the back of the head with a noiseless pistol. Then, both Henry Vaughan and Leon Peltzer disappeared. Pelzer, who had set all these plans in motion, was in another city; he had constructed an untraceable perfect murder and the perfect alibi.

In a similar vein, the notorious gangster Al Capone never sanctioned a murder without having an ironclad alibi in place. In his most famous crime, the 1929 St. Valentine's Day Massacre, he made it a point to be in Florida when seven of his competitors were gunned down in a Chicago garage. His murder protocol was succinct, and it was said that "the operations were quick and complete and Capone always had an alibi."

Alibis also work to protect the innocent. In 2008, two brothers from the Bronx were charged with murder in a drug-related shooting. Their defense attorney asked the New York City Transit Authority to trace the movements of one of the accused on the night in question in pursuit of an alibi. The investigation of his transit card records showed that on that night he had used both a bus and the subway, and was five miles away when the shooting happened. News accounts noted, "The man's lawyers produced his MetroCard, saying it showed that he was innocent." Federal prosecutors dropped the murder charges. The alibi was effective in promoting justice.

The concept of alibi has shown up in popular culture, including the poetry of T. S. Eliot. In his 1939 collection of poems *Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats*, he includes a poem, "Macavity—The Mystery Cat." Eliot writes of this wily feline: "He always has an alibi, and one or two to spare/ And whatever time the deed took place—MACAVITY WASN'T THERE!"

### Alibi Agency

In recent years, a new service has arisen: the alibi agency. The first of these organizations opened in Japan in the 1990s; they moved to Europe in 2004, and can now be found in the United States. Their function is straightforward: these agencies

provide cover stories for a fee. One service maintains a two-tier fee structure: Many services are priced from \$75 and up, including support that allows a client to "pretend you are anywhere." At the \$175 range, customers can purchase more refined products, such as a fabricated physician's note. Alibi Network, an American agency, conveys the breadth of services it provides on its Web site: "Whether you are interested in a doctor's excuse not to skip work, a virtual seminar to hide your discreet affair or need us to place a discreet phone call on your behalf, we'll provide the support you are looking for." Politicians have spin doctors, corporations have public relations specialists, and now "regular people" have Alibi Network.

John T. Llewellyn  
Wake Forest University

**See Also:** Dishonesty; Law and Law Enforcement; News Media: Print; Perjury.

### Further Readings

- "Alibi Network." <http://www.alibinetwork.com/index.jsp> (Accessed June 2013).
- Allison, Meredith, Kyla R. Matthews, and Stephen W. Michael. "Alibi Believability: The Impact of Salacious Alibi Activities." *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal*, v.40/4 (2012).
- Gooderson, R. N. *Alibi*. London: Heinemann Education, 1977.
- Marion, Stéphanie B. and Tara M. Burke. "False Alibi Corroboration: Witnesses Lie for Suspects Who Seem Innocent, Whether They Like Them or Not." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.37/2 (2013).

---

## Anderson, Anna (Anastasia)

Anna Anderson (1896–1984) spent a lifetime claiming to be Grand Duchess Anastasia Romanova, youngest daughter of Czar Nicholas II, the last emperor of Russia. During the night of July 16 and 17, 1918, Nicholas and the entire imperial family (the czarina, their five children, and four servants) were murdered by Bolshevik

insurgents in the basement of the Ipat'ev House in Yekaterinburg. Anastasia was 17 years old. Eyewitnesses claimed that none of the Romanovs could have survived the assassination, one of the defining moments of the civil war ensuing in the bloody wake of the Russian Revolution. However, a woman calling herself Anna Tschaikovsky (later Anna Anderson) emerged in Berlin in 1922 with the remarkable claim that she had escaped the massacre, and was in fact the daughter of Nicholas II.

Reactions were mixed. Many interested parties, including exiled Romanovs who had known the girl, and Anastasia's childhood tutor, denied her claims and responded incredulously. The czarina's brother initiated a private investigation, and the woman's real identity was the subject of numerous lawsuits over many years. A smaller number supported her story. One of Anastasia's childhood friends, the son of the czar's doctor, was an ardent supporter of Anderson's claims. Although her champions were always in the minority, their unrelenting advocacy ensured that the story continued to attract attention and controversy until her death in 1984.

Anderson's life was spent in Germany, and subsequently the United States, where she was supported by friends and sympathizers and remained the focus of intense speculation concerning her identity. Much of this time was spent in sanatoria or psychiatric facilities, although after her marriage to the historian Jack Manahan in 1968, she led a relatively peaceful domestic existence in Virginia.

Evidence to support her claims had always been scant, exclusively relying on her testimony and that of a coterie of well-wishers who refused to believe that she could be lying or deluded. As early as 1927, the investigation funded by Anastasia's uncle (the czarina's brother) determined that Anderson was in all likelihood a Polish woman named Franziska Schanzkowska, who suffered from mental problems prior to 1920. Nonetheless, her claim proved extraordinarily resilient. Amid a fog of argument and counterargument, authors Anthony Summers and Tom Mangold published *The File on the Tsar* in 1976, arguing that Anderson was not lying when she claimed to be the grand duchess. Others, for their own reasons, seemed keen to uphold her claims, although

the evidence against them steadily accumulated as the years passed.

### Forensic Evidence

There was considerable interest in definitively proving Anderson's story either false or true. Without forensic, rather than anecdotal or circumstantial evidence, the question remained open. The major breakthrough came in 1991, when researchers uncovered a mass grave at the end of a former dirt track in the forest 12 miles from Yekaterinburg. This location matched the account of the burial of the bodies later supplied by Yakov Yurovsky, who had led the assassination squad in 1918. Skeletal and dental records, facial reconstruction, and other forensic work indicated a strong possibility that the remains were those of members of the imperial family. The following year, DNA tests proved that the bodies were those of the czar, the czarina, three of their daughters, and the small domestic retinue who had been with them at the last. Exactly which of the royal daughters they were, however, could not be ascertained at that time. Furthermore, two sets of remains belonging to the imperial couple's other children, Grand Duke Alexei and one of his sisters, were not found at the site, as might have been expected.

Speculation was reignited. A number of studies, such as an investigation by James Lovell, maintained against increasingly lengthening odds that Anna Anderson was who she had claimed to be. In 2007, however, the remains of two more bodies were discovered in another forest grave close to Yekaterinburg, again conforming to statements made by Yurovsky, who had asserted that two of the victims had been separately buried. In 2008, forensic experts finally confirmed the result of mitochondrial DNA tests: the bodies were those of Alexei and a sister—either Grand Duchess Maria or Anastasia. All members of the immediate royal family now were accounted for. Samples of DNA taken from Anna Anderson during her lifetime (following a hospital operation) did not show any match with the Romanov family. Definitive evidence had at last been supplied to disprove Anderson's claim and lay her story to rest once and for all.

Anna Anderson was only one of a number of pretenders to imperial Romanov status.

Numerous claimants came forward after 1918 to identify themselves as one or another of the apparent victims of the Yekaterinburg massacre, their stories gathering varying degrees of interest. None, however, proved as enduring as that of Anna Anderson.

The alluring ingredients of her miraculous survival story, and the narratives of hope and possibility that they provoked among those who wished—and wish even now—to believe, were ultimately no defense against forensic procedures, which still lay decades in the future when her story was first presented to the world.

Nicholas J. Crowe

*Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies*

Rachel M. Reznik

*Elmhurst College*

**See Also:** Con Man; Evidence, Strategic Use of; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Identity Theft.

#### **Further Readings**

- King, Greg, and Penny Wilson. *The Resurrection of the Romanovs: Anastasia, Anna Anderson, and the World's Greatest Royal Mystery*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011.
- Klier, John, and Helen Mingay. *The Quest for Anastasia: Solving the Mystery of the Last Romanovs*. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1995.
- Kurth, Peter. *Anastasia: The Riddle of Anna Anderson*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.
- Lovell, James B. *Anastasia: The Lost Princess*. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991.
- Massie, Robert K. *The Romanovs: The Final Chapter*. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Summers, Anthony and Tom Mangold. *The File on the Tsar*. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.
- Welch, F. *A Romanov Fantasy: Life at the Court of Anna Anderson*. New York: Norton, 2007.

---

## **Animals**

Deception implies free will; in order to lie and to deceive, there must be a resolve, as well as a keen awareness of the choice between good and evil.

Furthermore, deception has a negative charge, and involves a choice.

These notions become problematic when it comes to animals because the general agreement is that animals are driven by their natural instincts; in other words, they are beyond good and evil. However, scientific and empirical observation have proven that many animals are in fact champions of deception, so much so that the human observer would be tempted to anthropomorphize an animal by lending it a will to pretend and deceive. Along with examples of animal adeptness at deception, there have been attempts to determine if in fact animals have a will, or if this aptitude is instinctual and natural—just another means for survival.

#### **Animal Examples of Deception**

In 1862, the English naturalist Henry W. Bates published in the *Transactions of the Linnean Society* the results of the research that he had conducted on butterflies from the forests of Brazil. According to German scientist Wolfgang Wickler, the conclusions drawn by Bates stimulated heated discussion for the next 100 years, not only among scientists but also among philosophers, theologians, and teachers. The reason for such interest was that Bates had in fact pointed out a particular phenomenon that would later receive the term *Batesian mimicry* in his honor. Having observed that the palatable Pierid butterflies pretended to be the unpalatable Heliconids, Bates came to the conclusion that animals could act a part. Wickler notes, “An actor is a mime, and so the representation of a false warning pattern was called mimicry.”

In another attempt to classify the varying degrees of deception, scholar Robert Mitchell proposes a hierarchy describing subsumptive levels of deception, and lists six levels of increasing complexity creating different forms of deception. While the first level involves evolution, selection, morphogenesis, and registration by the victim, the second level calls for registration of the deceiver coordinated with actions of the victim. The third level, call for learning and memory, with the fourth calling for pretense, conscious thought, and imaginative planning. More complex, the fifth level takes the other's perspective, and the sixth level recognizes the other's perspective on the self's perspective.



Several different forms and levels of complexity of deception are practiced by animals. These levels may distinguish simpler processes from more complex quasihuman behavioral patterns. The problem with this distinction is that the adjective *simple* runs the risk of diminishing the fact that any mimetic or deceptive analogy involves the origin of all species and all adaptation.

### Insects

Insects are exemplary of the first two levels of deception, although some performances on the part of insects, such as pretending to be something they are not, could very well fall under the third level of deception. Butterfly deception would fall under Mitchell's first two levels because they implicate camouflage and mimicry, but these first two levels differ when it comes to the involvement of the agent. As Mitchell states, "At the first level are simulations, produced through selection, evolution, and morphogenesis, which were selected for their resemblance, from the victim's perspective, to things that have special relevance (mimicry) to no relevance (camouflage) to the victim."

Examples of butterfly deception other than Bates's can be found in butterflies with wings that look like a head and antennae, and butterflies that have, as naturalist Adolf Portmann points out, independent patterns on forewings and hindwings that produce a deceptive symmetrical pattern. Portmann also describes the peacock butterfly, which not only disguises itself, but also performs a display on a sunny stone, as it "displays its glorious wings—it is an exhibitionist. On another occasion, when it is flying toward a wall . . . the same butterfly will suddenly fold its wings; as if by magic the colorful peacock disappears, and in its place we find a leaf." An illustration in Portmann's book, *Animal Camouflage* (1959), also shows the leaf imitation of a south American butterfly (*Draconia rusina*) with "damaged" wings and skeletonized leaf effects.

Yet another example of butterfly deception can be found in the Kallima butterfly of India. The caterpillar stage looks like the cruciferous plant on which the egg was laid: hairy green coat, fine black dots, and white lengthwise stripes. The Kallima's pupa, in turn, resembles the flower's maturing pods, and once the butterfly emerges, it displays colorful tricks either in flight or at rest.

Portmann notes, "Now, the male's conspicuousness is no quirk of nature—its markings are characteristic of all the Pieridae, a world-wide family of butterflies."

Similar to the phenomena observable in butterflies, the hindwings of the hawk moth have a frontal margin that is the color of bark, and this margin alone is exposed when the moth is at rest. These are concealing patterns that turn the attention away from the moth's contours by breaking up its outline. Because there appears to be coordination between the deceiver and the deceived, this deception would fall under Mitchell's second level of deception.

Examples of deception are innumerable in the insect world. Wickler lists insects that look like wasps and enjoy the same protection. Wickler also points out that the larvae of the praying mantis looks just like an extremely unpalatable larva of a predatory bug that is avoided by insectivores, whereas the adult mantis closely resembles a flower. Finally, Wickler demonstrates the similarities between the unpalatable leaf beetles and lady-birds, which are often mistaken for roaches that happen to be palatable to insectivores. Other insects that practice mimicry include the acid-spraying bombardier beetle that is imitated by the cricket, and the tiger beetle that is imitated by the grasshopper. The North American darkling beetle stands on its head when disturbed, and sprays a defensive secretion that is mimicked by a very similar beetle (*Megasida*) that assumes the same posture, but contains no defensive secretion.

There are also numerous ant mimics in the insect world. According to Wickler, the concept of ant mimicry is long-established because so many insects and spiders not only look like ants, but also behave like them as well, especially considering the similarity in size, color, body structure, and behavior. In an attempt to explain what effect such a resemblance could have, some naturalists have gone so far as to argue that this phenomenon is mimesis, rather than mimicry. Such a notion fits well in this approach to the animal world in terms of deception because *mimesis* is a Greek word used to denote imitation in the classical theater. In other words, the actor is viewed as mime, a pretender.

Yet another question concerns which animal is affected by the resemblance. While some insects

rely on deception by sight, either mimicking the ant's color or body structure with a false stem (the waist that joins the abdomen and the thorax) that is created by shading, other insects adopt the ant's behavior. For example, because ants have six legs and spiders have eight, many spiders run with only six legs.

Other examples of ant mimicry include tactile mimicry, in which a mime may resemble an ant by touch in the darkness of an ant's nest, and aggressive mimicry, where the ant guest simply enters the nest and devours its hosts.

### Snakes

There are countless symbolic values applied to the serpent. From the Greek *erpein*, meaning "to crawl," the serpent has come to symbolize malice, danger, damnation, pure negativity, and unworthiness, deception, and anything with a negative prefix, including Satan. A serpent lied to Eve in the Garden of Eden, and what ensued from this lie was paradise lost. A great deal of natural snake behavior lends credence to these images; for example, some snakes even produce a particularly elaborate death-feigning display, "wriggling about uncontrollably and ending with their mouth open and their tongue hanging out," as Mitchell notes.

Both poisonous and nonpoisonous snakes are argued to engage in deception. Quite a number of snakes found in the Americas have earned the title of coral snake, but they are not all poisonous; in fact, the venom of these snakes may range from deadly to nonexistent. There are both true and false coral snakes, and according to Wickler, their conspicuous color pattern represents a warning device in the case of the dangerous or true coral snakes. Consequently, there is the notion that false coral snakes are mimics or deceivers. There has, however, been debate as to which snakes are in fact the mimics, as it is possible that the dangerous or true coral snakes are in fact deceivers pretending to be harmless.

In 1956, herpetologist Robert Mertens observed both true and false coral snakes in the field, classified the various color and ring patterns, and came to the following findings:

- The coral pattern is found in 75 species belonging to 18 genera, all living

in tropical and subtropical zones of the Americas.

- Coral snakes belong to two separate families, the poisonous Elapidae and the nonpoisonous Colubridae.
- Mimicry is the likeliest explanation for these similar color patterns: While the pattern is advantageous to poisonous species as a warning effect, the harmless snake can enjoy the same protection.
- Any attempt to explain the color pattern in terms of ancestry, kinship, or environment is doomed to failure.
- The less poisonous mimics could very well be the actual models because snakes have a whole range of enemies.
- There is no evidence that snake predators can recognize a true coral snake innately—that is, without prior experience, because there is no way to gain experience from a deadly snake.

With these findings, Mertens questioned the function of the color pattern and determined that predators could only learn from experience from snakes producing a mild poison. Therefore, the moderately poisonous species are the true protective agents, and both the nonpoisonous and deadly snakes are the mimics or deceivers. Mertensian mimicry is thus defined as a form of mimicry in which the most offensive species is not the model, but is rather the mimic of a less offensive species. The serpent as deceiver can be either deadly, or harmless.

### Fish

Portmann avers that the greatest masters of disguise, by far, are fishes. Fish are capable of rapid color changes that allow them to not only adapt to their background, but also show sexual excitement, aggression, or submission. Portmann adds that chromatophore responses in fish are very complex. Wickler describes the many flatfish, such as plaice and sole, that are extremely adaptable when it comes to their coloration. Such an environmental adaptation of coloration can serve these fish both as predators and as prey.

Spots are yet another example of fish deception. Some ichthyologists believe that the small spots on the flanks of some coral fish are intended



to resemble bubbles, which help camouflage the animals in the clouds of bubbles produced by breakers on the reefs.

Other round spots on fish can resemble eyes. For example, the “eye spots” of the sunfish are used as threats, but according to Wickler, it remains to be seen whether some fish actually mimic the eye of a distinct species, and not just an eye in general. In any case, Mitchell deems some eye spots to be striking examples of second-level deception. “When these animals are attacked, they expose or make salient parts of their body which resemble eyes, thereby scaring the attacker,” he notes. “The eye spots are only revealed when the animal detects a predator or is otherwise disturbed. Sometimes this second-level deception is coordinated with first-level camouflage to avoid predation.”

There also species of fish that are almost indistinguishable from the “cleaner fish” that scour the surface of most well-known fish species, even large predatory fish. However, there are cleaning mimics that bite chunks out of their customers instead of scouring them. These mimics are almost indistinguishable from the true cleaners, and even mimic their behavior up until the moment that their subjects place their trust in them. Portmann also describes adaptive behavior common to many marine fishes that resemble seaweed and certain types of freshwater fish that float like dead leaves. It would appear that these fish are pretending to be something that they are not.

### Birds

Birds can deceive with spectacular plumage, humble disguise, or noise reproduction. Portmann



*An adult female chimpanzee plays with two babies at the Gombe Stream National Park in Tanzania, July 23, 2010. At Gombe, Jane Goodall observed chimpanzees acting out nonsocial pretenses, such as a young chimpanzee imitating her mother's ant fishing with an imaginary nest of ants. This prompted Goodall to question if the act was really pretense, or just imagination. Scholar Robert Mitchell questions whether there is any compelling evidence to distinguish among pretense, hallucination, and ritualization among animals.*

notes that although the distinction between brightness and drabness is often sexual, the roles are reversed for birds such as shorebirds, especially when the inconspicuous father sits on the eggs. There is also a variety of birds that is extremely adept at blending into their background. The beautiful plumage of nightjars, for example, is emphasized when they are held against a light background. However, when in their breeding grounds, the nightjars' markings merge into the environment, transforming them into branches, pebbles, and odd shadows. The ability to hold still is also an essential part of camouflage, and such a skill could very well be an inherited characteristic.

Similarly, the frogmouths from Sumatra blend into their environment with a combination of bark-like colors, patches, and dotted feather tips. In this case, a broken-up pattern deceives both predators and prey alike.

Yet, birds are not only masters of deception because of their plumage. Somewhere along the evolutionary process, birds began to produce noises in order to deceive other animals in their environment (their own species included). Birds can even mimic human speech, which makes observation all the more difficult because the observer runs the risk of attributing human traits and perhaps even emotions to the birds under observation.

Bird behavior, especially when it comes to the reproduction of sounds, could very well fall under the category of third-level deception, which involves learning and memory. Mitchell writes that if the *beau geste* hypothesis put forth by John Krebs in the 1970s is correct, birds that are genetically programmed to imitate the diverse repertoires of numerous avian species do so "because their expanded repertoires suggest what appears to be a crowded environment to other birds, who are thereby dissuaded from nesting nearby." Mitchell notes that while the influence of selection on learning propensities can be seen, selection can also produce organisms with learning that is much more open to environmental influences.

In other words, Mitchell is suggesting that the deceptive intention in some birds could very well be of the order of third-level deception, or learned deception, that goes beyond mimicry

and camouflage. Although the third-order deceptions require more intention and intelligence than the first two levels of deception, there is a broad spectrum of learned deceptions, from less sophisticated to more sophisticated, from functional deception to intentional deception, and all the deceptions in between.

## Mammals

Wickler writes that examples of mimicry are least common among vertebrates; he cites the unpalatable tree shrews as the most conspicuous case of mimicry in mammals. These shrews are so often mimicked by members of the palatable squirrel species that skins from the two groups cannot be distinguished without the skulls.

But mammals are more often observed practicing more sophisticated or more seemingly voluntary forms of deception. Dogs and chimpanzees are excellent examples of mammals performing at these more sophisticated levels. Primatologist Jane Goodall observed that after having gotten attention because of an injury, some chimps went so far as to feign an injury for more attention. Charles Darwin earlier noted that dogs displayed a sense of humor with sticks and objects thrown to them. A dog will carry an object away and wait until his master comes close enough to take it, then run away with the object, but stay close enough to lure the master back again before repeating the entire maneuver. In this case, dogs appear capable of deceiving their masters into believing that they will actually surrender the object.

With such numerous examples of animal deception, Mitchell asks if one must remain skeptical of any implication of planning on the part of an animal, and subsequently suggests that an animal that plans should also evidence some pretense of others' actions "because planning has an imaginal component which is concomitant with pretense of others: both involve kinesthetic-visual matching." In other words, an animal pretending to be another animal must know its own actions, and here lies the fourth level of deception: pretense and planning.

Thus far, the only nonhumans observed to engage in pretense are the rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees. At Gombe Stream National Park, Tanzania, Goodall observed chimpanzees

enacting nonsocial pretenses. For example, one chimpanzee imitated her mother's ant fishing with an imaginary nest of ants. Mitchell adds that other chimps that have interacted with humans display a surprising similarity with human pretense, citing the example of a home-raised chimp that pretended to have a pull toy; other chimps and orangutans played with dolls, and attributed psychological qualities to them.

Such behavior as the chimp imitating her mother's ant fishing prompted Goodall to ask rhetorical questions such as: How do we know that her twig was not swarming with a record, though nonexistent, catch? According to Mitchell, Goodall's questions suggest that an answer is unknowable, and in turn, asks about animals engaging in play fighting (if they imagine that they are fictionally really fighting), as well as if there is any compelling evidence to distinguish among pretense, hallucination, and ritualization.

Beatriz Rivera-Barnes  
Pennsylvania State University

**See Also:** Birds; Brer Rabbit; Butterflies; Camouflage; Darwin, Charles; Deception, Research on; Deception Motives; Dog–Human Deception; Evolution and Natural Selection; Fireflies; Fish; Insects; Jackalope; Mimicry; Nonverbal Cues; Plants; Primates.

### Further Readings

- Beolens, Bo, Michael Watkins, and Michael Grayson. *The Eponym Dictionary of Reptiles*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.
- Darwin, Charles. *On the Origin of Species*. New York: Empire Books, 2011.
- Goodall, Jane. *My Thirty Years With the Chimpanzees of Gombe*. New York: Mariner Books, 2010.
- Krebs, John R. "The Significance of Song Repertoires: The Beau Geste Hypothesis." *Animal Behaviour*, v.25 (1977).
- Lewis, Michael and Carolyn Saarni, eds. *Lying and Deception in Everyday Life*. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.
- Mitchell, Robert W. "Animals as Liars: The Nonhuman Face of Human Duplicity." In *Lying and Deception in Everyday Life*, Michael Lewis and Carolyn Saarni, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.

Portmann, Adolf. *Animal Camouflage*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959.

Wickler, Wolfgang. *Mimicry in Plants and Animals*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1968.

Wilson, Edward O. *The Diversity of Life*. New York: Norton, 1999.

## Anthropology, Cultural

Cultural anthropologists have studied deception around the world and have found that they exist in virtually all human societies in varying degrees of frequency and concern. Deception is actually a fundamental human capacity, found even in non-human primates, and societies struggle to strike a balance between it and the desire to be good, trustworthy, and honest. It is understood that in some cultures what might be regarded as lying and deception may be necessary and even desirable forms of social interaction.

Anthropology is the study of people. Archaeology, linguistics, physical anthropology, and cultural anthropology are the four major subdisciplines of anthropology. Cultural anthropology, which is sometimes referred to as social anthropology, studies variation within cultures.

### Ethnographies and Lying

One of the primary research approaches of a cultural anthropologist is to construct a detailed ethnography, which is an intensive description of a particular group of people at a particular place and time. This is usually achieved by means of an extensive period of fieldwork as a participant observer. It has been suggested by some cultural anthropologists that an ethnographic study is only possible to conduct by means of self-deception and partial truths and, in fact, it has been asserted that ethnographers must lie to complete their research.

Cultural anthropologists do not automatically assume that informants are lying during an ethnographic interview but, on the other hand, it is recognized that their perceptions and ideals may not, in fact, correspond to the actual realities of their everyday life. It is accepted that deception is not necessarily intentional, or even if it is,

that it may not be regarded as negative, and may well conform to their cultural norms.

Nevertheless, signs of deception have been identified by cultural anthropologists. These include body language signals such as avoiding eye contact, wringing of the hands, and lightly touching the face. Talking more than one usually would is another common sign of avoidance and lying. Informants selectively may also screen out information that they believe to be extraneous or embarrassing. Other areas of information may be regarded as secret, and discussion of these subjects may be restricted to select individuals within a culture. These are some of the factors related to deception that cultural anthropologists must consider in constructing an ethnographic report.

### **Lying in Cultures: Functions and Strategies**

Lying and deception can serve varied functions in respective cultures. For instance, in societies in which people live close together, there may be few actual secrets. However, cultural anthropologists have found that individuals can maintain a sense of personal integrity and privacy by means of the use of information, rather than physical space. In such contexts, deception can create ambiguity and, thus, also social distance, making the interactions of daily social life possible. Lying and deception can also be used to reveal deeper truths. For example, Raute pastoralists use rhyming proverbs (*uklan*) to both entertain and mislead as a form of accepted verbal evasion in order to deceive Nepali agriculturalists as to their true intent thereby establishing a social space to conduct their nomadic practices.

Lying can also be a rational strategy for resisting an oppressive social environment. This phenomenon has been found by cultural anthropologists in studies of patients institutionalized for substantial periods of time in psychiatric hospitals, where lying can be used to compete for attention from staff and to cope with disillusionment when there appears to be little to no hope of a cure. Lying can also be employed to ascertain the truth of a matter, such as when an individual pretended to be a devout disciple of a traveling sheikh who claimed to possess supernatural insights, but was thereby revealed to be a fake. Lies can also be seen as a legitimate

strategy to defend the interests of a kin group or other association.

Different taxonomies of lying and deception have been constructed by cultural anthropologists. For example, three types of deception based on the level of the deceiver's awareness of the deception and the subject of the deceiver's action have been identified. These include ordinary deception, in which the conscious intention is to deceive others or, at least, to hide information from others. There is also an involuntary or unconscious deception that involves a certain level of self-deception. Finally, there is illusion that involves complete self-deception, even in the absence of another individual. Similarly, there can be various types of lies about thoughts, feelings, or actions.

In some cultures, cultural anthropologists have found distinctive traditions in which lying and deception is the norm. In many east Asian cultures, for example, deceptive communication serves as a useful vehicle for the maintenance and preservation of social relationships. Cultural beliefs about deception are often reflected in folklore and local sayings. Many Native Americans in the southwestern United States, for instance, have traditions of the Trickster as a hero in their folk stories. Trickster figures, like Ananse, are similarly common in many African folklore traditions as well. Tricksters are inventive heroes in many oral traditions around the world, even though they may appear as clownish fools; their skills at trickery and deceit allow them to successfully negotiate challenges, and they are culturally respected.

Further, norms for behavior so dramatically vary that behaviors stereotypical of lying and deception also vary across cultures. For example, Jordanians consider blushing, negative statements, speech hesitations, and self-references as indicative of deception. Linguistic differences also contribute to this cross-cultural variability. It has been postulated that cross-cultural differences in lying and deception reflect differing socialization customs.

In some cultures, particularly many in the Mediterranean region, honor-status traditions can reinforce the likelihood that deception will be seen as socially acceptable if done in the service of honor. A high degree of misrepresentation and



defamation have been identified in these cultures in association with these customs.

### **Deception Research in Cultural Anthropology**

One cultural anthropologist studied the role of deception on the part of patients and psychiatric care workers in Greece, particularly with respect to the construction of a specific psychiatric disorder. In this study, some Greek mental health patients were found to use deception in order to acquire prescription drugs and/or government assistance for disorders that they did not actually have. There was a process of negotiation noted between the patients and the psychiatric care providers in making a diagnosis for a particular disorder. Symptoms to focus on, and those to ignore, were part of this negotiation process. Operating under the dynamics of suspicion, bias such as racism and other forms of discrimination was evident on the part of the providers, particularly if the patient was not a member of the predominant Greek Orthodox faith. In the context of national psychiatric reform in Greece, these suspicions of deception created pervasive problems with respect to ethical relations between patients and psychiatric care providers.

Another cultural anthropologist studied the nuances of truth and deception in China, and noted a propensity for deception in public interactions. The Chinese beliefs concerning deception are different from those of Americans, who hold to a tenet of absolute truthfulness. The Chinese use a different moral standard, and are more concerned with the consequences of lying and deception. These values have a longstanding tradition in Chinese society.

The interactions between patients and folk healers in the Caribbean have been examined as a lying game by another cultural anthropologist. From this perspective, both the patients and the healers operate within the culturally constructed limits of credibility. In clinical encounters, neither the incoherence nor the contradictions within the illness narratives of the patients, nor the apparent unrealistic if not outright whimsical prescriptions from the healers are questioned or denounced. Both parties must accept the accounts and opinions of the others for the therapeutic relationship to function within this

cultural context. Lying is accepted and understood as an instrumental way to bring certain truths to light and to enable clinical interpretations of the situation, even if it is at the expense of others. The patients and healers can blame a third party for placing a curse against the ill individual; the perpetrators of this witchcraft can be blamed, rather than the patients having to accept responsibility for their actions. It is most important for the patient and the folk healer to appear to fully comply with each other's discourse, rather than seek some objective truth. There is also a communal dimension to this interaction, as the lying game between the patient and healer works because other members of the community have had experiences with this form of health practice, and their recognition of its efficacy lends it greater credibility and legitimacy. The magical beliefs of the therapeutic potency of these supernatural practices are part of the cultural heritage of contemporary Creole societies in the Caribbean.

### **Anthropological Perspective of Deception**

Cultural anthropology reminds individuals that they should set aside their cultural values about lying and deception. These strategies can be appreciated for the distinctive roles they play in respective cultures. Cultural anthropologists justifiably do not endeavor to separate the truth from lies in the narratives of their informants. Truth is better understood in this sense to be a strategic cultural construction, as opposed to an empirically established fact. Under the precept of cultural relativism, cultural anthropologists intentionally avoid making any value judgments or moralizing, but rather attempt to gain an understanding from the intersubjective construction of reality. In cultural encounters, actors consciously and unconsciously integrate truths and lies to produce a dynamic truth that unfolds. Communication, accordingly, is a dynamic process best understood as a culturally constructed phenomenon in which deception can be incorporated.

Finally, cultural anthropology asserts that deception cannot be understood in isolation from other aspects of the cultural practices of a particular people. This is in accord with cultural anthropology's holistic perspective. There can be a social and moral good to deceptive behaviors that serve

to protect the interests of the members of a cultural group.

Victor B. Stolberg  
Essex County College

**See Also:** Ethnic Differences; Middle East; Myth; Native Americans.

### Further Readings

- Boulay, Juliette du. "Lies, Mockery and Family Integrity." In *Mediterranean Family Structures*, J. G. Peristiany, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Blum, Susan D. *Lies That Bind: Chinese Truth, Other Truths*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Fine, Gary Alan. "Ten Lies of Ethnography: Moral Dilemmas of Field Research." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, v.22/3 (1993).
- Gilsenan, Michael. "Lying, Honor, and Contradiction." In *Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior*, Bruce Kapferer, ed. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976.
- Masse, Raymond. "Gade, Deceptions and Lies Told by the Ill: The Caribbean Sociocultural Construction of Truth in Patient-Healer Encounters." *Anthropology and Medicine*, v.9/2 (2002).
- Metcalf, Peter. *They Lie, We Lie: Getting On With Anthropology*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

## April Fool's Day

April Fool's Day is an informally recognized holiday celebrated each year on the first day of April. The day is characterized by pranks, hoaxes, and/or practical jokes. The celebration of April Fool's Day can be traced as far back as the 14th century. Although it is not a nationally established holiday anywhere in the world, April Fool's Day is currently observed by numerous countries spanning six continents.

The origin of April Fool's Day is a mystery. The holiday is often attributed to a misinterpreted line

from the "Nun's Priest's Tale," one of *The Canterbury Tales* written by English poet Geoffrey Chaucer. First composed in 1392, "Nun's Priest's Tale" is a cautionary fable of hubris and flattery in which a vain rooster by the name of Chauntecleer is deceived by a predatory fox. Because of a copying error, early readers interpreted the poem's 375th line to mean "March 32," or April 1. Modern scholars, however, believe the story's actual setting was May 2, the anniversary of King Richard II's engagement to Anne of Bohemia. Additional scholars point to the 16th-century poets Eloy d'Amerval and Eduard de Dene as the first recorded mentioning of April Fool's Day. In 1508, d'Amerval wrote of a *poisson d'avril*, meaning "April fool/fish." In 1539, Dene wrote of an aristocrat who sent his servants on fool's errands on April 1.

Another prominent theory for the origin of April Fool's Day involves the reinstatement of January 1 as New Year's Day. Until the late 1500s, France celebrated the beginning of its new year on March 25, which marked the Archangel Gabriel's visit to the Virgin Mary. In 1564, France reorganized its calendar by moving the start of the year from March 25 to January 1. Other countries throughout Europe followed suit, although some waited until the 18th century to do so. Thus, those who chose not to adopt France's calendar change and continued to celebrate New Year's Day during the week between March 25th and April 1 had jokes played on them. Tricksters would secretly paste paper fish onto their backs, hence the term *poisson d'avril*. Critics of this theory point to its failure to explain the aforementioned references to April Fool's Day by 16th-century poets d'Amerval and Dene, whose writings date as early as 1508.

### April Fool's Day Celebrations

Regardless of its origin, April Fool's Day had become a well-established custom throughout much of Europe by the late 1700s. In 1686, English antiquarian John Aubrey referred to April 1 as "Fool's holy day" in one of his works, *Remains of Gentilism and Judaism*. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the "Washing of the Lions" was also a popular prank in London, England. The joke involved inviting unsuspecting citizens to view an annual washing-of-the-lions ceremony



within the Tower of London. Victims were told that they could watch lions being washed in the tower's moat, yet in actuality, there was no annual lion-washing ceremony. The first record of this prank dates back to the April 2, 1698, edition of *Dawks's News-Letter*, making it the earliest documented example of an April Fool's Day joke.

Today, April Fool's Day is celebrated around the world. Although the specific customs vary by region, the relationship between practical jokes and the first day of April is well established in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Portions of Canada, France, and Switzerland continue the April Fool's Day tradition of placing paper fish on the backs of unsuspecting victims. In Belgium, it is customary for children to lock their parents out of the house, only to let them in once they have agreed to bring the children treats. In Iran, people play jokes on one another on April 1 or 2, which corresponds with the 13th day of the Persian New Year. In Scotland, April Fool's Day is traditionally called Hunt-the-Gowk Day, and in Poland the public devotion to April Fool's Day is so strong that most serious endeavors are avoided altogether. The anti-Turkish alliance that Poland signed with Leopold I on April 1, 1683, was even backdated to March 31, in order to avoid association with the first of April.

Finally, a number of countries today celebrate a day of pranks on a date other than April 1. Countries throughout Central and South America, as well as Spain and Portugal, have a tradition of tricking others on December 28. Similarly, Denmark and Sweden have a traditional joking day on May 1. Although they do not occur on April 1, each of the customs observed in these places has comparisons to the traditions of April Fool's Day.

In conclusion, April Fool's Day is celebrated each year on the first of April, and is distinguished by people playing pranks, hoaxes, and/or practical jokes on one another. Although mention of the holiday can be traced as far back as the 14th century, its origins remain veiled in mystery. Throughout the world today, April Fool's Day

continues to grow in popularity, as evidenced by its celebration on six continents.

J. Jacob Jenkins

*California State University, Channel Islands*

**See Also:** Beatles Hoax; Clever Hans; Cottingley Fairies; Humor; *New York Sun* Moon Series; Piltown Man.

### Further Readings

Boese, Alex. "The Origin of April Fool's Day." [http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/hoax/af\\_database/permalink/origin\\_of\\_april\\_fools\\_day](http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/hoax/af_database/permalink/origin_of_april_fools_day) (Accessed December 2012).

Chaucer, Geoffrey. *The Canterbury Tales*. Seattle, WA: Amazon, 2012.

Cohen, Hennig and Tristram Potter. *The Folklore of American Holidays*. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 1998.

Martin, Denis-Constant. "Politics Behind the Mask: Studying Contemporary Carnivals in Political Perspective, Theoretical and Methodological Suggestions." *Research in Question*, v.2 (2001).

Santino, Jack. *All Around the Year: Holidays and Celebrations in American Life*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1995.

## Aquinas, Thomas

In "Question 110: Secunda Secundae Partis" of his magnum opus, the *Summa Theologica*, medieval philosopher and theologian St. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225–74) discusses lying with the kind of definitional precision and logical rigor that one expects from a Scholastic scholar. Aquinas argues that all lies by definition oppose the truth. He claims that they do so materially because what is conveyed is false in some essential way: formally, in that it is the desire of a liar's will to convey this falsehood to another; and effectively, to the extent that the liar is successful in causing another to believe true what the liar thinks is false.

Aquinas acknowledges that lies need not be verbal. The manipulation of signs with the intention to deceive constitutes lying, even in the

absence of words. Planting forensic evidence to incriminate an innocent person or hiding evidence of guilt are examples of such nonverbal manipulation. In Aquinas's view, the intention of the liar to deceive is an important component of the sin of lying. For this reason, a liar's conveying an objective truth in such a way as to create a false impression, and thus deceive another, is still defined as a lie by Aquinas. As he explains, while such communication might materially and accidentally be connected to the truth, in its intent and its effect, it remains formally and essentially a falsehood, and is therefore a lie.

As a contemporary example of this view, a student tells her mother that she stayed at The Library (a bar near campus) until 2:00 A.M. While factually true, the absence of any mention that The Library is a bar leaves the mother with a false impression of the way that her daughter spent the evening. Conversely, if a person conveys something that is objectively false, wrongly thinking it true, then he or she is not guilty of lying. Such is the case, for example, when a person reports that the solar system has nine planets, unaware that the count is now eight because scientists demoted Pluto to dwarf planet status in 2006.

According to Aquinas, all lies fall into one of three categories: officious, jocose, and mischievous. Officious lies are instrumental means of accomplishing some goal; jocose lies are told with the intent of entertaining; and mischievous lies, have as their object harm directed toward another. As a moral theologian, Aquinas is adamant that lying is always sinful. However, he is pragmatic enough to recognize that there are circumstances when it might be deemed necessary to lie in order to promote some positive good or avoid a greater evil. While Aquinas holds that lies told for such reasons are still sinful, he admits that the demands of difficult circumstances mitigate, though they do not totally negate, the sinfulness of the act.

He uses biblical examples to illustrate this point: Abraham referring to his wife Sarah as his sister while in Egypt, Jacob deceiving his father into giving him his older brother's birthright, the midwives of Egypt lying to the Pharaoh in order to save Jewish males, and Judith deceptively gaining the trust of Holofernes so that she can slay him and save her people. Like all lies, these are



*Carlo Crivelli's 1476 panel of medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas, made for the high altar of San Domenico in Ascoli Piceno in Italy, depicts the saint with a sun on his chest (a symbol of sacred learning) and holding a book and a church. Aquinas asserted that all lies by definition oppose the truth, and they do so formally, materially, and effectively.*

sinful violations of God's law, despite the positive consequences that resulted from them. They are wrong, as Aquinas explains, in much the same way that it is wrong to steal, even if one's intention is to give the ill-gotten money and goods to charity.

Similarly, Aquinas argued, good intentions—such as the desire to make a bland narrative more interesting through the use of a jocular lie—also diminish, but do not eliminate a lie's sinfulness. In contrast, when the intention of the liar is to harm another, as is the case with any mischievous lie, the severity of the sin is rendered all the greater.

Aquinas does not insist that it is always imperative to tell the truth; rather, he admits that keeping silent about the truth, when prudently necessary to do so, is a lawful evasion.

### Why His Teachings Still Matter Today

What Aquinas taught centuries ago still matters today. Among medieval theologians, none has continued to exercise greater influence within and outside the Catholic Church than Aquinas. As a theologian, Aquinas demonstrated intimate familiarity with the Judeo-Christian scriptures and church tradition. He did not, however, limit the scope of his intellectual inquiry to these sanctioned sources. His work reflects an intimate and encyclopedic knowledge of both Christian and non-Christian intellectual traditions. He cites ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle; Jewish rabbis, most notably Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon); and such Muslim scholars as Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) with the same easy familiarity as the Bible and the church fathers. His extensive use of Aristotle in particular, who he cited so often that Aquinas routinely referred to him as simply “the Philosopher,” was highly controversial during his lifetime; but in the end, Aquinas succeeded in “baptizing” Aristotelian logic, rendering it an acceptable theological tool in explaining the Catholic faith to believers and defending it against attacks from heretics, Muslims, and other external critics. This legitimization of Aristotle significantly influenced the subsequent development of philosophy, theology, and science in the Western world.

Initially, Aquinas’s bold and original synthesis of such diverse intellectual traditions was viewed with suspicion by many within the Catholic Church; so much so, in fact, that there was the serious possibility of his being charged with heresy. However, within decades of Aquinas’s death, Pope John XXII canonized him in 1323, officially recognizing him as a saint. In 1567, Pope Pius V declared Aquinas a doctor of the church, a rare and high honor, in recognition of his many and substantive contributions to the development of Catholic doctrine and theology.

In 1879, Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical, “Aeterni Patris” (Eternal Father), in which he designated the Thomistic system as the official

philosophy and theology of the Catholic Church. In later encyclicals, the same pope pointed out the relevance of Thomistic thought in addressing various contemporary concerns. Pope Leo is credited with prompting renewed interest in Aquinas, whose thought then influenced such prominent 20th-century philosophers as Yves Congar, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Josef Pieper. Pope Benedict XVI, as well as his predecessor, Pope John Paul II, both pointed to Aquinas as an example of the complementarity of faith and reason.

Because of the high esteem in which the Catholic Church holds him as a saintly scholar, Aquinas is revered as a patron saint of students and universities, and has had numerous schools and colleges on several continents named after him. Aquinas’s contributions to philosophy and theology are included in the curricula of secular and religious schools, and he continues to be taught in the seminaries that prepare Catholic priests. However, Aquinas’s significance is not limited to the academic world. He is included in the “Paradiso” of Dante’s epic poem, *Divina Commedia*, and in Raphael’s Vatican stanza masterpiece, the fresco painting *La Disputa del Sacramento*. He is also referenced in contemporary popular culture artifacts as disparate as David Fincher’s cult classic film, *Se7en*, and Umberto Eco’s best-selling novel, *The Name of the Rose*.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
College of Charleston

**See Also:** Aristotle; Catholic Church; History of Deception: Medieval Period; Morals and Ethics; Saint Augustine.

### Further Readings

- Aquinas, T. *Summa Theologica*: Part II-II (Secunda Secundae). Kindle ed. Seattle: Amazon Digital Services, 2012.
- Chesterton, G. K. *St. Thomas Aquinas*. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2009.
- Dewan, L. “St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin.” *Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*, v.61/2 (1997).
- Thiry, L. “The Ethical Theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Interpretations and Misinterpretations.” *Journal of Religion*, v.50/2 (1970).

## Aristotle

Aristotle arguably initiated the study of ethics with his examination of philosophical questions raised earlier by Socrates and Plato. In defining *ethos*, or character, Aristotle focused on individuals who possessed well-chosen habits of behavior that led to wellbeing and happiness. Deception, which adversely affects one's relationship with the surrounding world, interferes with the development of the habits required to achieve good and avoid evil. Aristotle greatly influenced Thomas Aquinas, a philosopher and theologian who is considered highly influential in the thought of the Catholic Church.

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C.E. on the Chalcidic peninsula of Macedonia. In or about 367, Aristotle joined the Academy of Plato in Athens, where he served as Plato's student and colleague. After Plato's death in 348, Aristotle left Athens, moving first to the northwestern coast of Anatolia, and later the island of Lesbos. Aristotle was involved in extensive scientific research, and he is considered a pioneer in the fields of zoology and marine biology. In 343, Aristotle was asked to serve as tutor to the 13-year-old son of Philip II of Macedonia, the future Alexander the Great. In 334, Aristotle returned to Athens, founding a school known as the Lyceum just beyond the city's boundaries.

At the Lyceum, Aristotle assembled a large library and continued his work, which built upon rather than repudiated that of his mentor Plato. Unlike the Academy of Plato, which served as a private club, the Lyceum made many of its lectures open to the public without charge. During this period of stewardship of the Lyceum, Aristotle wrote the majority of his surviving works, exploring ethics, metaphysics, physics, politics, and psychology. Although Aristotle's relationship with Alexander had considerably cooled over the years, upon Alexander's death in 323, Aristotle left Athens, because his Macedonian background caused many of the citizens there to be suspicious of his motives. Aristotle escaped to Chalcis, and died the following year.

### Truth and Deception

Aristotle explored concepts such as truth, lying, deception, and virtue in a variety of his works,

but especially in his discussions regarding the philosophy of mind, ethics, and science. Aristotle's work on the philosophy of the mind, which was expressed in his treatise *De anima* and a series of monographs, reflects his background as one interested in the sciences. Unlike Plato's conception of the soul, Aristotle believed that the soul had a relationship to an organic structure that could be found in flora and fauna in addition to humans. The soul is comprised of faculties, which have varying operations and objects. The varying operations and objects are what differentiate the various faculties. Thus, sight differs from hearing not because eyes are different than ears, but because colors are distinct from sounds. Aristotle identified certain inner senses, such as imagination and memory, which concerned the highest level of the soul, as occupied by mind and reason. Thought involves making judgments and concerns intellectual knowledge that involves universal truths, unlike sensations, which involve reactions. Lying, either to oneself or to others, thus interferes with intellectual knowledge because it impedes the making of judgments.

Aristotle's work on ethics also deals with these issues. The three surviving treatises written by Aristotle—*Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Magna Moralia*—examine moral philosophy and the roles of truth, lying, deception, and virtue. Aristotle maintained that a desire for final ends exists in nature, and this affects his approach to nature. For life to be worth living, it must be desirable for its own sake. The “good life” that individuals seek involves either the philosophical life, the political life, or the voluptuary life (i.e., the life focused on aesthetic, bodily, and intellectual pleasures). Happiness, which Aristotle uses to represent a state of wellbeing or flourishing, is an activity of the rational soul in harmony with virtue. Virtue can be either moral or intellectual in nature. Moral virtues include courage, temperance, and liberality, whereas intellectual virtues include wisdom and understanding. Wisdom that governs ethical behavior, and understanding that is expressed in scientific investigations and reflection are the two virtues concerned with truth.

As with the other Aristotelian virtues, wisdom is a subset of an individual's good qualities. Not innate, like hearing, wisdom is acquired which



practice. Moral virtue expresses itself in good purpose, and represents the individual's efforts to avoid excess and shortcomings in his or her daily actions. While lying is an action, it is not an action such as murder that must not be engaged in at all. Instead, one must balance the rightness and wrongness of lies by considering their possible consequences. Lying and deception are thus not necessarily always morally wrong, but instead must be examined in accordance with the outcome that results from statements that contain false statements.

Aristotle's interest in science also shaped his views regarding truth, lying, deception, and virtue. His interest covered most of the sciences, including biology, botany, physics, and zoology. Some of Aristotle's work in zoology remained unsurpassed until the 19th century, and his respect for the scientific process was strong. Aristotle's detailed observations of a wide variety of organisms include features that were not again observed until after the invention of the microscope in the 1600s. Understanding, one of his key virtues, is reflected in the care that Aristotle took in ensuring that his observations were accurately recorded. Aristotle posited that perfect happiness involved a combination of the pleasures of wisdom with the pleasures of understanding. To include deceptive statements in a report of a scientific investigation would be to compromise the value of that endeavor. As a result, Aristotle maintained adherence to truth in reporting his observations.

### Influence

Throughout the centuries, the study of Aristotle and his peers has often been analogous to receiving an education. From about 600 through 1100 C.E., the study of Aristotle was limited in western Europe, although he continued to be studied in the East. Aristotle markedly influenced Thomas Aquinas, who was first introduced to his work while a student at the University of Paris. As 13th-century scholars and leaders were facing the rapid transformation of their society, Aquinas sought to use Aristotelian philosophy to negotiate the chasm between traditional agrarian practices and scientific rationalism. Aquinas embraced Aristotle's belief in the primacy of intelligence, and came to view scientific advances as a means to

embrace truth. After Aquinas was ordained as a priest, he became an important theologian within the Catholic Church, and he was embroiled in a developing controversy regarding Aristotle's place in a Christian society. Aquinas worked to integrate Aristotle's philosophy into Christianity. After the Catholic Church adopted much of Aquinas's theological work, interest in Aristotle's work grew, fomenting a renaissance in the study of his writings. Later thinkers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, and others have also used Aristotelian thought to influence their work. Aristotle continues to be relevant in discussions related to a variety of issues facing individuals, organizations, and governments in the 21st century.

Stephen T. Schroth  
*Knox College*

**See Also:** Aquinas, Thomas; Catholic Church; Jefferson, Thomas; Justice; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Plato.

### Further Readings

- Adler, M. J. *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy*. New York: Touchstone Books, 1997.
- Aristotle and T. Irwin. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1999.
- Pakaluk, Michael and Giles Pearson. *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

---

## Aroused Suspicion

Suspicion is the presence of doubt regarding the veracity of an individual's statement(s), and thus the sincerity of their motives behind their actions. It is an assessment of intent, in that when a receiver is suspicious, he or she will tend to believe that the other interactant in the conversation is purposefully altering information.

Suspicion has long been believed to have an influence on individuals' ability to accurately detect deception. Because arousing suspicion among research participants or receivers has been

shown to decrease the use of biases, such as the confirmation bias, and increase more systematic processing of messages, so, too, it has been believed that it should also increase an individual's ability to accurately detect deception.

### **Research on Aroused Suspicion**

Research on how suspicion affects accuracy has shown inconsistent effects; thus, not fulfilling expectations of increasing accuracy. Some research has supported a curvilinear effect, in which moderate increases in suspicion resulted in increases in detection accuracy, but low levels and high levels of suspicion resulted in decreases in detection accuracy. This research was conducted among romantically involved couples, yet linear relationships were found when this research was replicated with strangers. Among strangers, as suspicion increased from low- to medium- to high-manipulation levels, the lie accuracy rate steadily improved, whereas the truth accuracy rate gradually decreased.

These studies that found separate effects on truth and lie accuracy came after the discovery of the veracity effect. In other words, individuals are better at detecting truths than they are at detecting lies. However, by separating out truths and lies, it may be easier to determine the differential effect of suspicion on accuracy. Because it can thwart the truth bias, but not create a lie bias, the result would be an increase in accuracy in detecting lies and a subsequent reduction in the accuracy of detecting truths.

The way that suspicion has been induced may explain the mixed findings with regard to aroused suspicion and accuracy. Some researchers have used two levels of suspicion, low or high, or the presence or absence of suspicion. Other researchers have used three levels of suspicion: no suspicion, low level of suspicion, and a high level of suspicion. Research using three levels of suspicion has tended to show either the curvilinear or linear effects of suspicion on detection accuracy. Thus, when suspicion is induced at different levels, the picture of its potential influence on accuracy becomes clearer.

Further, suspicion may lead to increased confidence or an overconfidence in the ability to detect deception. In a study examining police officers, it was found that when police officers were highly

suspicious of a potential criminal, they then began to believe that their suspicion was a certainty. With increased certainty that an individual committed a crime, it may become more likely that accused individuals will enact false confessions.

Because of the relationship between suspicion and truth bias, much of the research on suspicion has focused on whether it can reduce the truth bias, or the tendency to believe that a message is truthful, even in the presence of information that shows the information to be false. This has been the most robust and consistent effect across aroused suspicion studies. In studies with strangers, friends, and romantic partners, increased aroused suspicion has led to a reduction of the truth bias.

The lie bias has also been found to be affected by increased suspicion. Research has demonstrated an influence of increased suspicion on encouraging a lie bias among receivers. When contextual cues are used to arouse suspicion, receivers can switch to being more lie biased. However, the affect on truth bias may be stronger than on lie bias.

### **Individual-Level Variables**

Individual-level variables have also been found to influence the effect of suspicion on accuracy. Experts on a topic area, for example, have been found to have reduced deception detection accuracy when suspicion is induced, but the same has not been found for novices on the same topic area.

Another individual level variable is generalized communicative suspicion (GCS). GCS is a trait variable and has been defined as an individual's predisposition to perceive another's communication as deceptive. In tests in which GCS and state, or experimentally induced, suspicion were both assessed for their potential to create a lie bias, individuals who were already highly suspicious (high level of GCS) and received a moderate induction of suspicion demonstrated a higher-than-average ability to accurately detect deception (70 percent detection accuracy). GCS has also been found to moderate the relationship between state suspicion and lie bias.

Finally, an affect for sex differences has been found such that women who had high levels of GCS had the strongest emotional reactions to discovered deception when compared to men who



had a high level of GCS. Tests of the GCS measure have demonstrated support for dimensionality, construct validity, and some support for predictive utility of the measure.

Anne P. Hubbell  
New Mexico State University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Generalized Communicative Suspicion; Lie Bias; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

- Bond, Gary D. and Adrienne Y. Lee. "The Darkest Side of Trust: Validating the Generalized Communication Suspicion Scale With Prison Inmates." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.38/6 (2006).
- Burgoon, Judee, Amy S. Ebesu, and Patricia Rockwell. "Accuracy in Deception Detection." *Communication Monographs*, v.61/4 (1994).
- Elaad, Eitan. "Effects of Feedback on the Overestimated Capacity to Detect Lies and the Underestimated Ability to Tell Lies." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.17 (2003).
- Kim, Rachel K. and Timothy R. Levine. "The Effect of Suspicion on Deception Detection Accuracy: Optimal Level or Opposing Effects?" *Communication Reports*, v.24/2 (2011).
- Levine, Timothy R. and Steven McCornack. "The Dark Side of Trust: Conceptualizing and Measuring Types of Communicative Suspicion." *Communication Quarterly*, v.39/4 (1991).
- McCornack, Steven. A. and Timothy R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).

distinct category that typically only comprises a small percentage of participants within studies that do not specifically target this group. This makes it difficult to draw broad conclusions, but compiling findings from several smaller studies allows for conclusions to be made about Asian Americans and deceptive behavior.

In order to understand the cultural aspects that are associated with deception in the Asian American culture, it is first important to define who Asian Americans are as a cultural group. The 2010 U.S. Census data defines the category of Asian as any person with ancestors from the Far East, southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent. These countries include Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Lying and deception are almost universally considered unacceptable behaviors, yet members of most cultural groups consistently lie and engage in deceptive behaviors. The deceptive behaviors displayed by various cultural groups may be similar, but there appear to be some unique differences regarding why members of different cultural groups choose to use deceptive communication styles.

In Asian American communities, the collective cultural values that place group needs before individual needs affect how members of the community use deceptive communication styles, compared with individualistic communities that value individual needs over group needs. Some studies indicate that Asian Americans tend to use deception to maintain harmony in relations when truthful communication may result in strained relationships with others. Conversely, members of individualistic communities appear less likely to use deception to maintain significant social relationships. For example, a member of an Asian American culture may express less-than-truthful opinions with others to maintain positive relationships and ensure acceptance into a group. In the same situation, a member of a European American culture who values individualism may share his or her honest opinion with others without worrying about negative repercussions in order to make themselves stand out in a way that is unique. This type of collectivist or individualistic influence on communication may begin early in life.

## Asian Americans

The relevance of specific cultural variables related to deceptive behavior is an area that has received minimal attention in the literature. Most large studies of deception typically have a very limited representation of individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds. Asian Americans are one culturally

Some deceptive behaviors may be modeled early on in life, and become seen as effective methods for achieving certain desired outcomes. In studies of parental lying to children, researchers have examined differences in lying among different ethnic groups. Participants from different ethnic groups were asked to report if their parents had engaged in deceptive or lying behavior similar to that described in a scenario involving lying. Both Asian American participants and European American participants reported that their parents promoted honesty and truth-telling to them, but the Asian American participants indicated that their parents utilized lying more frequently than European American participants. The lying by parents of the Asian American participants was primarily targeted to promote compliant behavior from the children.

### Language and Cultural Identity

Language represents the vessel that holds the cultural, historical, and ecological experiences of a specific cultural group. In communicative language, emotional and nonverbal cues are language-specific. Researchers in the field of intercultural communication believe that children learn display rules, which are sets of subconscious emotional expressions. Later in life, humans rely on display rules to gauge the accuracy of emotional cues presented to them. Variation in interpretation of verbal and nonverbal behavioral cues is to a great degree included in language.

In certain studies, Chinese participants were asked to predict the deception patterns of hired actors speaking in their first language, and others speaking in their second language. The results indicated that participants identified truth-tellers more accurately in actors who spoke in their first language compared to those who spoke in their second language. Also, participants identified liars who spoke in their second language more accurately compared to their first language. Researchers believe that when lying in a second language, more emphasis is placed on facial expressions compared to lying in a first language. It is important to consider factors such as language and culture in judging the deception of second-language speakers.

Having a strong collective cultural identity may also influence the tendency to engage in deceptive

behaviors. Studies have shown that when compared to individuals with less collective cultural identities, people with strong collective cultural identities may have greater motivation to avoid telling the truth, in part to avoid unnecessary confrontations and social disagreements. Members of Asian cultures tend to use indirect communication styles in day-to-day communication to preserve relationships and avoid confrontation. Research has shown that when presented with hypothetical scenarios, participants who value relationships, as is common in Asian cultures, were more likely to use deception to benefit others. In comparison, when presented with the same hypothetical scenarios, participants who value individuality over relationships were more likely to use deception to benefit themselves.

Similarly, research has shown that being from an interdependent or an independent cultural background may impact a person's ability to detect lying in others. Participants from independent cultures appear more likely to rate responses that depart from the truth as highly deceptive, whereas participants who come from interdependent cultures tend to rate the same responses as not at all deceptive. The lenses through which participants view deceptive responses and make decisions about them may be greatly influenced by their cultural experiences. These lenses impact numerous aspects of life and work.

Studies that look at deception in business settings have revealed differences in deception tendencies across cultures. These differences appear to be highly influenced by either the existing collectivist culture or the individualistic culture with which the students are associated. For example, in a hypothetical business scenario that involved the potential use of bribery to ensure a successful business transaction, participants from collectivist cultures such as Hong Kong, Korea, or Japan were more likely to utilize bribery in the scenario than those from individualistic cultures such as Australia, the United States, and Germany.

Several cross-cultural differences have been noted from investigations examining the theory of reasoned action. This theory postulates that the likelihood that a person will engage in a behavior is determined by his or her attitude about the behavior, and how important normative groups view the behavior. A study focusing

on Koreans and Americans found several differences between these two groups regarding the reasoning behind their responses to a hypothetical lying scenario. First, Korean participants highlighted the importance of relationships over lying, whereas American participants emphasized the importance of telling the truth over preserving relationships. Second, American participants were less likely to use relationship-oriented excuses when explaining the reasons for lying for a friend. This phenomenon may be explained by the individualist nature of American society, compared to Korean society. Hence, these types of excuses are not considered acceptable. Third, Korean participants used normative reasons, which are related to perceived expectations of others, when explaining intentions of lying for a friend. On the other hand, American participants used normative reasons more strongly to explain intentions of telling the truth.

Both American and Korean participants' intentions were consistent with societal values common in collectivist cultures, compared to those common in individualist cultures. American participants were more likely to use societal expectations of honesty when explaining their intention to tell the truth, whereas Korean participants were more likely to use societal perceptions to explain their intention of lying for a friend. It is evident from the study that the influence of a collectivist society that values relationships over honesty in the intention of its members to participate in deception is greater than in members of an individualist society.

Reaction time is another variable that may provide some insight into lying and deceptive behaviors. Reaction time might involve measuring the speed at which a person detects lying, or it could include measuring how long it takes a person to contrive a lie. At least one study has indicated that east Asian Americans were more accurate in selecting correct statements than European Americans and Arab Americans, but they had a slower reaction time in making their selections than European Americans. The relationship between reaction time, deception, and culture appear to be in need of more extensive examination to determine what influences might exist.

Environment can also play a major role in influencing the behavior of a specific cultural

group. As part of human evolution, the survival of human beings depended on their ability to adapt to their environment. In one study, researchers examined reward and punishment behaviors associated with deception in east Asian Americans compared to European Americans. Both cultural groups were compared with east Asian participants residing in China. In the study, participants were given a hypothetical scenario in which they could lose or gain hypothetical money as a result of the deception or honesty condition presented in the scenario. Participants were asked to rate how likely they were to reward honesty and punish deception. Participants residing in the United States from both cultural groups (i.e., east Asian or European) were more likely to reward honest behavior than punish deception. On the other hand, east Asian participants residing in China were more likely to use punishment than reward.

In efforts to understand deception, cultural attributions, environmental factors, and language should be taken into consideration. When reviewed, several studies reflected significant trends in deception in Asian American culture versus European American culture, such as lying to preserve relationships and to maintain the group benefit over individual benefit. Understanding these trends can help strengthen the communication between the two cultures. To gain a better understanding, future research should focus on understanding differences in lying tendencies of Asian Americans versus Asians, and factors that influence lying tendencies.

Stacy L. Carter

Huda Sarraj

*Texas Tech University*

**See Also:** African Americans; Anthropology, Cultural; Children, Development of Deception in; Ekman, Paul; Ethnic Differences; Hispanic Americans; Islam; Judaism; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Middle East; Morals and Ethics; Native Americans; Racism.

### Further Readings

Ajzen, I. and M. Fishbein. *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980.

- Broadhurst, R. G. and K. H. W. Cheng. "The Detection of Deception: The Effects of First and Second Language on Lie Detection Ability." *Journal of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law*, v.12/1 (2005).
- Choi, H. J., H. S. Park, and J. Y. Oh. "Cultural Differences in How Individuals Explain Their Lying and Truth-Telling Tendencies." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, v.35 (2011).
- Ekman, P. "An Argument for Basic Emotions." *Cognition and Emotion*, v.6 (1992).
- Hall, E. "Cultural Models in Transcultural Communication." In *Nonverbal Behavior: Applications and Cultural Implications*, A. Wolfgang, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1979.
- Heyman, Gail, Diem H. Luu, and Kang Lee. "Parenting by Lying." *Journal of Moral Education*, v.38/3 (2009).
- Kim, M-S., K. Y. Kam, W. F. Sharkey, and T. M. Singelis. "Culture and Deception: Moral Transgression or Social Necessity?" *Communication Currents*, v.3/1 (2008).
- Triandis, Harry, et al. "Deception in Business Negotiations: A Multilevel Analysis." *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, v.1/73 (2001).
- U.S. Census Bureau. "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010." <http://www.census.gov/2010census> (Accessed February 2013).
- Wang, Cynthia and Angela Leung. "The Cultural Dynamics of Rewarding Honesty and Punishing Deception." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.36/11 (2010).

## Assassin Bugs

The "assassin bug" is the common name for predatory insects belonging to the Reduviidae family. Assassin bugs actually encompass thousands of different species, including the wheel bug (*Arilus cristatus*), the leafhopper (*Zelus renardii*), and the spined assassin bug (*Sinea diadema*). Adult assassin bugs can grow to close to two inches in length, and can be identified by their grasping front legs and beaked heads. Assassin bugs feed on other insects, and can be found on every continent with the exception of Antarctica.

### Using Deception to Lure Prey

As immature nymphs, assassin bugs employ a unique type of deception to help lure unsuspecting insects closer. Their natural colors can range from brownish-gray to bright orange, making natural camouflage nearly impossible. Instead, nymphs attempt to obfuscate their appearance by covering themselves with the husks of their previous victims and bits of plant debris. Many of the species preyed upon by assassin bugs tend to investigate the heap of debris, significantly reducing prey capturing time and providing the nymph with a better opportunity to successfully attack.

The behavior of decorating one's exterior with foreign material is known as "masking," and its use as a feeding strategy has also been observed in spider crabs and in the larvae of the insect family Chrysopidae. One particular nymph, the dust bug (*Reduvius personatus*), masks itself with a layer of sand and dust particles in order to appear to its usual prey, the bed bug, as debris carried by the wind as the bed bug maneuvers for attack. Masking has limited value for preying on insects that have no visual capacity, such as termites and army ant workers.

An additional function of masking is as protection against visually hunting predators. Assassin bug nymphs are highly vulnerable to larger predators. Birds, geckos, rodents, and some species of arachnids are potential hunters of assassin bugs, but they have been observed failing to recognize the heap of organic material covering the assassin bug as anything edible. Predators that investigate the heap have been observed failing in their attack because of the "backpack" of debris ripping off the nymph's abdomen mid-encounter, much like a lizard's tail, allowing the nymph the opportunity to escape. Thus, the obfuscating behavior of masking can provide assassin bugs with both the opportunity to lure prey into its vicinity, and the possibility of becoming prey to other animals in turn. The particle-carrying capacity of nymphs decreases as the insect grows older and less vulnerable to predation.

Assassin bugs can commonly be found in vineyards, fruit orchards, cotton and soybean fields, and other vegetative habitats. Despite their appearance and behavior, they are generally considered beneficial to row crops because they are known to





*Reduvius personatus, or the masked hunter, is an insect belonging to the assassin bug (Reduviidae) family. The name refers to the fact that its nymph camouflages itself with dust.*

feed on harmful prey such as aphids, boll weevils, and caterpillars. Because of their quick adaptation to new environments and short life cycles, assassin bugs can be deployed as biocontrol agents meant to eradicate a harmful species.

However, assassin bugs are not finicky feeders, and they will often feed on more beneficial species. Their numbers can be reduced through common pesticides. Some assassin bugs will even bite humans, preferring to bite victims (who are often sleeping) beneath the nose and around the lips, thereby earning the moniker “kissing bugs.” Some people have reported allergic reactions to the saliva of certain types of assassin bugs. Assassin bugs found in tropical areas have been linked with Chagas disease, which can be fatal in humans.

Kent Marett  
*Mississippi State University*

**See Also:** Animals; Butterflies; Camouflage; Fireflies; Insects.

### Further Readings

Ambrose, Dunston. *Assassin Bugs*. Enfield, NH: Science Publishers, 1999.

Brandt, Miriam and Dieter Mahsberg. “Bugs With a Backpack: The Function of Nymphal Camouflage in the West African Assassin Bugs *Paredocla* and *Acanthaspis* spp.” *Animal Behaviour*, v.63/2 (2002).

Catchot, Angus and Blake Layton. “Common Beneficial Arthropods Found in Field Crops.” Extension Service of Mississippi State University, 2008. <http://www.msucare.com/pubs/publications/e0020.pdf> (Accessed July 2013).

McMahan, E. A. “Bait-and-Capture Strategy of a Termite-Eating Assassin Bug.” *Insectes Sociaux*, v.29/2 (1982).

## Attorneys

Attorneys in the U.S. legal system are often targets of jokes and scorn. Surveys of the U.S. population have shown that less than 20 percent rate attorneys as high in honesty (only slightly more than those who perceive car salesmen as honest). Media, films, and television often portray attorneys as unscrupulous, greedy, and even fraudulent. Such portrayals may reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the roles and responsibilities of those who practice law. While attorneys in the various fields of law may engage in strategic misdirection and occasional omissions (unintended or otherwise), outright lies and deliberate deception are less common than popular stereotypes might suggest. The origin of the public perception of attorneys as dishonest may lie in misconceptions of the role that attorneys must play as advocates for their clients, the professional standards guiding their actions as advocates, and the ethical boundaries within which they are (and are not) expected to operate.

### Role of Advocate

The role of the attorney is to advocate, as skillfully as possible, for the best interests of a party. The party may be the state (as is the case for a prosecutor), a criminal defendant, parties to a lawsuit or family court dispute, or clients seeking representation in the formulation of contracts, wills, or other legally binding documents. The attorney is obligated to follow strict rules of ethics, evidence, and procedures, but enjoys great freedom in attempts to shape interpretations of evidence, rulings, or verdicts among judges and jurors: in other words, to “spin” the facts to their clients’ advantage. Strict prohibitions exist



against the presentation of false, fraudulent, or fabricated evidence. Nevertheless, through clever bargaining and strategies to shape reactions to the evidence, the attorney is free to attempt to lead the judge, jury, or opposing party to a more favorable (though possibly incorrect or unjust) result, such as exonerating a guilty party or inducing an unwitting opposing party to sign a plea, settlement agreement, waiver, or contract against his or her self-interest.

### **Standards for Truth in Evidence**

Rules of the courts and ethical standards of the profession are designed, as much as possible, to assure just and fair (correct) outcomes. In theory, this is best accomplished when decision makers, or those who enter into legally binding contracts, have the greatest amount of relevant and true information available before signing an agreement, making a ruling, or rendering a verdict. Toward this end, rules exist to control the truth and completeness of information presented in contracts or for use in litigation.

These rules prohibit the introduction of false information, whether represented in contracts; as objects and documents presented as physical evidence; in the form of written or oral statements, presentations, and pleadings of attorneys; or in testimony of witnesses. Specific rules within the American Bar Association (ABA) model rules of professional conduct address matters of deception in the presentation of arguments and evidence to the courts. Under Advocate Rule 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), attorneys may not knowingly make false statements to the court, they must not fail to correct false statements made relevant to a case or proceeding, and they may not offer evidence (including witness testimony) that they know to be false. If a lawyer, their client, or a witness called by the lawyer offers material evidence that the lawyer later learns is false, the lawyer must take reasonable measures to disclose it to the court. A defense attorney may refuse to submit evidence (other than the criminal defendant's testimony) reasonably believed to be false. Attorney-client privilege may be relevant in these instances, but if a court order is issued by a judge, that privilege may be superseded.

Moreover, under Rule 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), when representing a client,

attorneys cannot knowingly make a false statement to a third person, and must disclose facts to a third person in order to prevent fraud or an illegal act, unless attorney-client privileges prohibit it.

### **Rules of Discovery**

Discovery rules are designed to ensure that all relevant evidence is available to the two sides of a dispute. This refers only to what the attorneys for each side must disclose to one another, not to what they are obligated to present to the judge or jury. The use of this information is then governed by rules of evidence defining what is or is not admissible evidence, and by each side's trial strategy.

In noncriminal (civil) litigation, discovery requirements are the same for both parties. In contrast, in criminal litigation, a discrepancy exists between disclosure requirements for prosecutors and defense attorneys. The defense attorney's duty is to protect the rights of, and achieve the best outcome for, the defendant. Moreover, the Constitution provides that defendants have a right to avoid self-incrimination. Therefore, the defense lawyer is not mandated to disclose potentially incriminating evidence to the prosecution, and instead is required to disclose only specific classes of evidence, such as an alleged alibi, a list of witnesses to be called, recorded interviews of witnesses, reports provided by expert witnesses, and other relevant documents not excluded under the right to avoid self-incrimination.

Both the duties and standards for discovery are different for prosecutors. ABA criminal justice standards relating to prosecution functions (Standard 3-1.2.c) impose the duty on prosecutors to seek justice, not merely to convict. In line with this goal, prosecutors are legally bound to provide all evidence to a defense attorney, whether such evidence suggests the guilt or innocence of the defendant (under ABA Advocate Rule 3.8: special responsibilities of a prosecutor).

Arguably, violations of discovery are among the most common deceptive practices of attorneys. Failures to disclose relevant and potentially damaging information are often virtually undetectable. Lacking the deterrent of reliable detection and exposure, attorneys sometimes cannot resist the temptation to strengthen their case by

suppressing or destroying damaging evidence. The true extent of the problem is unknowable, but complaints among attorneys frequently address failure of their adversaries to disclose important evidence. In criminal law, such complaints are most often directed against prosecutors, who are obligated to disclose exculpatory information favoring the defendant; no reciprocal obligation exists for defense attorneys to disclose incriminating information.

### **Strategic Obfuscation, Managed Interpretation, and Misdirection**

While violations of discovery and outright misrepresentation of the evidence through fabrication, destroying evidence, or suborning perjury are strictly forbidden, attorneys are free to enact a variety of strategies to misdirect one another, judges, and juries. They are free to try to affect reactions to the evidence (but not to falsify the evidence) in an effort to facilitate their clients' interests, even if the desired reactions might be considered wrong or unjust. Lawyering has much in common with military strategies of obfuscation and misdirection outlined in Sun Tzu's classic *The Art of War*, and with stage magicians' strategies of misdirection.

Analogous to the magician's "smoke and mirrors," strategies of obfuscation are often practiced in legal documents, in which attorneys may use legalese and ambiguous language, and which may be unnecessarily lengthy and extensive. As a result, signatories will neither read nor understand much of the document that they sign.

The largest armament of strategies is practiced by trial lawyers as they prepare and try their cases before juries. Before trial, attorneys commonly present selectively relevant case law to judges in support of pretrial motions in attempts to influence judges' interpretations and rulings. They engage in plea-bargaining or settlement negotiations (or contract negotiations) in which they routinely bluff. In the process, they may attempt to exaggerate the strength of evidence favoring their case, or the resolve and willingness of their clients to accept specific outcomes. They attempt to conceal or misrepresent their coming trial strategies to the opponent, hoping to leave opposing counsel unprepared and ineffective in countering this strategy.

Attorneys may also work with lay and expert witnesses to shape their testimony to be more effective. They coach their witnesses about how to engage the audience and the appropriate demeanor needed to sound more credible and persuasive. Such coaching might involve specific lessons about diction, body language, appropriate attire, and word choices aimed at increasing the witnesses' credibility or implicitly complementing the attorney's case.

Because the goal of trial strategy is to convince the jury of the merits of one's case, the first goal of the attorney at trial is to seat an unbiased jury, preferably a jury biased toward his side. Toward this end, a highly sophisticated art and science of jury selection has developed to guide attorneys' attempts to achieve a favorable jury. Some strategies are intended to affect which persons end up on the jury. Others use the process of questioning potential jurors to bias their thinking to favor one's client, even before opening statements begin.

Each attorney has the opportunity to challenge and remove from the jury, a specified number of jurors who seem most biased against his client. One cannot select favorable jurors, but in order to get such people on the jury, a number of strategies of misdirection are enacted to prevent the opponent from correctly identifying which jurors are most biased against his client, and to protect these jurors from challenge. Other misdirections are utilized to mislead the opponent to believe that jurors who are actually favorable toward his client are instead biased against him, all for the purpose of getting the opponent to challenge the wrong jurors. This gives the attorney who successfully uses such strategies more challenges than he is allotted, and a jury that is more biased in his favor.

These strategies are enacted during the process of questioning prospective jurors through careful choice of questions and of jurors who will be asked them. Such questions are also intended to favorably frame the issues of the case, begin to shape jurors' interpretations of the evidence to come, selectively reveal (and inoculate jurors against) the influence of unfavorable evidence, and generally bias jurors to view one's interpretation of the case favorably.

Once the jury is seated and trial begins, each attorney is free to selectively present evidence. No attorney is obligated to present the entire truth.

Instead, lawyers are obligated to present the best case for their clients, selectively presenting evidence that they feel will serve that purpose while avoiding presentation of false evidence. Their presentations do not need to be predicated on actual truth, as they may vigorously argue for a position that they do not consider correct or just, as when a defense attorney defends an almost certainly guilty suspect or corporation.

To persuasively present the case, the attorney will attempt to define and present the issues to his advantage, and will present a story of what happened that, if true, would lead to the desired verdict (e.g., self-defense versus premeditated murder). In the process, he will attempt to control jurors' attention so that they will focus on favorable and ignore unfavorable evidence; manage their interpretations of evidence through arguments, examinations of witnesses, and presentation of expert testimony; and manage reactions to himself and his clients. Such efforts to shape conclusions are permissible, even if they lead judges or jurors to unjust conclusions, as long as no false statements or evidence are knowingly offered.

### **Advocacy, Self-Deception, and Self-Justification**

The role of strong advocate for a specific position sets in motion motivations and cognitive biases, setting the stage for attorneys to unwittingly deceive themselves. "Confirmation biases" refer to tendencies to selectively notice and search for information confirming individuals' desires and expectations, and to bias interpretation of information toward consistency with them. Such biases can make it genuinely difficult to "see" the other side of a case, including recognizing the importance of evidence that others readily view as favoring the opponent. Such biases can sometimes account for what appears to be willful deception.

Once an attorney has vigorously pursued a case, it can be very difficult to admit errors. The desire to think of oneself as a competent and good person can lead the attorney to try to justify and defend his position, deceiving himself in the process. This need is arguably responsible, for example, for many documented cases in which prosecutors have failed to recognize or admit that a defendant is innocent, notwithstanding exoneration by DNA or other seemingly definitive evidence.

### **Legal Regulations**

Questionable, misleading strategies are used by civil and criminal attorneys, both inside and outside the courtroom. Attorneys can implement their tactics, implicitly or explicitly, by instructing or directing others, such as law firm staff, clients, family and friends of clients, private investigators, witnesses, expert witnesses, and other professionals or persons providing services to the attorneys or the clients. The acceptability and lawfulness of these strategies hinge upon whether they cross the line between attorney-client obligations and outright falsification of the truth.

Attorneys practicing in any area of law may encounter situations offering them the temptation to cross the boundaries of acceptable deception. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility serves lawyers and judges by developing, promoting, and fostering standards of high ethical conduct and professionalism through leadership and guidance. The ABA model rules of professional conduct serve as models for the ethics rules of most states, with each state's bar association handling allegations of attorney misconduct.

Attorney misconduct is addressed in the model rules (maintaining the integrity of the profession, Rule 8.4: Misconduct). Professional misconduct can manifest as one of the following:

1. A violation or attempted violation of the model rules, or knowingly helping or inducing another attorney to violate or attempt to violate the rules
2. To violate or attempt to violate the rules through the actions of another person
3. Conduct to commit a crime that negatively affects the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law
4. To engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation

ABA Model Rule 8.3 (reporting professional misconduct) specifies that if a lawyer knows of another lawyer's violation of the model rules or knows of conduct that challenges that lawyer's integrity or trustworthiness, he must notify the appropriate professional authority, usually a judge (if during a case), or the state bar association.

Reporting an attorney does not include reporting any information that would otherwise be protected by attorney-client privilege.

### Ethical and Legal Consequences

Dishonesty among attorneys can have severe consequences for lawyers and their clients. Because an attorney is not permitted to be dishonest or to direct others to be dishonest, the attorney may be charged with such crimes as obstruction of justice or subornation of perjury and, based on the circumstances, the attorney may suffer suspension, fines, or perhaps even disbarment, expulsion from bar associations, and loss of the license to practice law. Those who were dishonest at the direction or behest of an attorney may also be charged with being an accessory to perjury, or with other crimes as determined by a judge.

Perhaps the more serious (and unjust) consequences are for the litigants whose outcomes are based on inaccurate, incomplete, or outright fraudulent evidence. They may suffer wrongful conviction, for example, when prosecutors have withheld exculpatory evidence. A seriously injured plaintiff may receive no compensation when corporate lawyers have participated in suppression of evidence of corporate responsibility for the injuries. A wealthy murderer might be acquitted when his attorney facilitates the perjury of a false alibi witness. These and many other wrongful results can occur when the evidence is false.

More broadly, public trust in attorneys and the legal system is eroded when dishonesty is exposed. The Professional Reform Initiative (PRI) of the National Conference of Bar Presidents has established a campaign to update the core values used to compare lawyers to other professionals. The PRI, a body of judges, lawyers, and nonlawyers concerned with the reputation of lawyers, seeks to influence the judiciary, the bar, disciplinary authorities, as well as law school and bar admission boards to assert and foster integrity, honesty, and truthfulness as the fundamental values of lawyers.

Valarie J. Bell  
J. Guillermo Villalobos  
Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Evidence, Strategic Use of; Law and Law Enforcement; Magic Tricks; Military Deception; Morals and Ethics; Perjury; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

- Bucklo, Elaine E. "From the Bench: When Lawyers Lie." *Litigation*, v.33/2 (2007).
- Center for Professional Conduct. *Model Rules of Professional Conduct*. Chicago: Center for Professional Conduct, 2012.
- Davis, D. and W. C. Follette. "Jurors CAN be Selected: Non-Information, Misinformation, and Their Strategic Use for Jury Selection." In *Handbook of Forensic Psychology*, W. T. O'Donohue and E. Levensky, eds. New York: Elsevier Academic Press, 2004.
- DeVore, Charlie. "Lie Is a Lie: An Argument for District Protection Against a Prosecutor's Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, v.101/2 (2011).
- Hodes, W. William. "Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth as the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and 'Lying With an Explanation.'" *South Texas Law Review*, v.44/1 (2002).

## Audience

The etymological root of the word *audience* can be found in the Latin verb *audere*, which means "to listen" and "to hear." The contemporary use of the word *audience* refers to a collective of people who may attend, witness, experience, and participate in a communicative event. There are several competing definitions of communication; still, no matter which meaning of communication is considered, "audience" represents its necessary condition of possibility, its ontological and epistemological foundation. Not surprisingly then, parallel to the noticeable conceptual development of communication in the last century, the idea of audience has become a powerful aspect of the communication metaphor, describing important aspects of social reality: an audience's activity as metaphor of people's political agency, an audience as the producer of public opinion, and an audience as creator and

manipulator of media content. Equally not surprising, if the notion of audience has been intimately connected with the idea of communication, and lying and deception are instances of it, then audience becomes a quintessential aspect of lying and deception as well.

Deception can take place and succeed only by assuming the presence of an audience; however, its significance may vary according to the way that the audience is conceptualized. An audience can be thought as a “particular” audience, the specific audience targeted by rhetoric and, therefore, the specific target of deceptive and manipulative attempts of persuasive communication. It may be treated as an “immediate” audience involved in face-to-face communication, or as a “mediated” audience, when the audience receives, consumes, or reads the message in a time and place different than that of the speaker.

Traditionally, mediated communication, because of both the physical and structural distance separating production and reception of messages, has been considered the most concerning level for deliberate lies and deception. The audience can be treated as “theoretical” or “imagined,” assumed to be present in any act of communication; an “audience of self-communicating”; and an “idealized” audience, such as the “universal” audience, composed of all demographics.

According to Jan Bordewijk and Ben Van Kaam, audiences can also be distinguished according to the different kind of medium of communication involved or through which they receive the information. The audience of transmission media, such as radio and television, has control over neither content production nor reception. Audiences of consultation media such as print, on the other hand, actively choose when to access the centrally provided content, and what content to access. Finally, the audience of conversational media relies on a communicative relationship characterized by the genuine, dialogical coproduction of meaning in which the roles of sender and recipient alternate.

### Deception and Audience Theories

In all kinds of communication, audiences may be the subject and object of deception and lies. However, whereas the variety of communicative

situations leads to differently conceptualize audiences, there seems to be a dominant frame to understand the relationship between lying and deception and the audience. In fact, in the tradition of audience studies, lying and deception have most frequently been associated with the political question of citizens’ agency and possible media effects on citizens.

In other words, assuming that (mediated) communication content is consistently shaped by particularistic, political, and economic interest, and is often translated into manipulative and deceptive communication, the capability of the audience to resist, criticize, and counteract such messages has traditionally been assimilated to the political power and civic sense of the *demos*. From this particular perspective, the debate on media influence on their audience has always been framed as a question whether democracy was deprived or empowered by modern means of communications.

The answer to those concerns varied throughout time. Traditionally, the audience has been considered to passively receive information, supinely driven by the force of the rhetorician, and therefore more exposed to deceptive communication. The metaphor of the hypodermic needle exemplifies how first audiences were understood by the behaviorist social scientific tradition and the social political and cultural context of the 1920s and 1930s. Just like a hypodermic needle, the mediate message could be injected under the skin of the recipient, the audience. Because the audience was sociologically understood as a homogenous entity, isolated, alienated, and vulnerable, it could be the object of deceptive communication such as propaganda, manipulation of advertising and public relations, or powerful rhetoric. Informed by such a perspective, mass media were considered a means of mass deception.

A reaction to the hypodermic needle came from a new paradigm that understood the role of an audience in making sense of the message in more articulated and active ways. The so-called limited defects tradition conceptualized the audience as concrete historic subjects who, because of their ideological, class, race, and gender positioning, could be more or less prone to receiving the intended message. Effects of communication had to be specifically qualified. Mediating, such as



subject position in time and place, level of attention, perception, and retention, were considered as decisive factors that could limit the effect, intensity, and duration of deceptive communication such as propaganda.

A theory that exemplifies such a new tendency is the two-step flow model, which describes how the mass-mediated message would, as a first step, reach active media users, the so-called opinion leaders. Then, if the message succeeded in passing these gatekeepers, the opinion leaders would spread the message to more dependent individuals (such as friends, colleagues, and family) in their immediate surroundings, the so-called opinion followers.

A step further in terms of the active meaning-making of an audience in receiving the message is respected by the uses-and-gratifications tradition, according to which the audience uses media for its own purpose and finds specific psychological and social gratification produced by those uses. Uses and gratification would not necessarily imply the overwhelming capability of the audience to detect or reject deceptive communication, but would argue that some deceptive aspects, such as myth, ideological positions, or what linguist Noam Chomsky defines as “necessary illusions” could be playing gratifying social functions.

Another seminal conceptualization of audiences has been provided by the encoding and decoding model provided by Stuart Hall. According to Hall, there are three basic ways in which the audience may relate to the intended (by the producer) meaning of a given message. In respect to intended hegemonic meaning encoded in the message, the audience could follow a dominant reading when conforming to the preferred meaning, it could follow an oppositional reading when it contested the ideological implications of the preferred meaning, and it could negotiate between the two extremes.

Ultimately, the capability of audiences to resist or comply with deceptive communication has always been considered a political act of complying or resisting rhetorical strategies of any kind of power.

Marco Briziarelli  
University of New Mexico

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Aristotle; Corporations; Deception Detection Accuracy; Disinformation; False Advertising; False Signals; Government Propaganda; General Communicative Suspicion; Goffman, Erving; Ideology; Information Manipulation Theory 1; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Kant, Immanuel; Language; Myth; Nazi Propaganda; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Public Relations; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Sexual; Rumor; Saint Augustine; Secrecy; Terrorism; Truth; Urban Legends; Vocal Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Jenkins, H. *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
- Jensen, K. B. and K. E. Rosengren. “Five Traditions in Search of the Audience.” *European Journal of Communication*, v.5 (1990).
- Livingstone, S., ed. *Audiences and Publics: When Cultural Engagement Matters for the Public Sphere*. Bristol, UK: Intellect Books, 2005.
- McQuail, D. *McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory*. 5th ed. London: Sage, 2005.
- Rogers, E. M. and J. D. Storey. “Communication Campaigns.” In *Handbook of Communication Science*, C. R. Berger and S. H. Chaffee, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1987.
- Windahl, S. and B. Signitzer. *Using Communication Theory: An Introduction to Planned Communication*. London: Sage, 1992.

---

## Authoritarian States

Defining a state as “authoritarian” is problematized by a number of competing definitions and typologies. However, at the core, classifying a state as such denotes that power and control within the state are unfairly concentrated, exercised, and maintained. Repression, whether political or physical, is utilized in order to safeguard the status quo and prevent political and social change.

As such, authoritarian states restrict or fail to maintain institutions and processes designed to foster and ensure the rights and political participation of their people. Therefore, the legitimacy of such states can be questioned because of a lack of accountability and direct input of the governed population.

Authoritarian states routinely practice deception at both domestic and international levels in the context of propaganda, self-interest, self-preservation, and repression of their people. Such deception can be used to foster nationalism and support for the regime through the caricaturing of other nations, with ethnic or cultural groups seen as threatening, thus uniting the population in common opposition. This is often done with the support of state-owned or state-influenced media. Deception can also be used to cover up human rights violations and atrocities, or scapegoat others once evidence of such acts emerge, thus distancing the regime from such acts.

Authoritarian states are often governed through autocratic rule, whereby an individual exercises total control and power. Libya, while under the iron rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, is a good example of this. Gaddafi ruled by suppression and violence for decades before he was overthrown and killed as part of the Arab Spring events in 2011. However, as Barbara Geddes's typology (and other typologies) of authoritarian regimes demonstrates, authoritarian states can be governed through a range of leadership regimes, including military and single-party leadership, in addition to the personalization dictator model. Tunisia under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is an example of the single-party type, whereas Algeria can be viewed as fitting the military type, in which unelected military and civilian personnel wield power and control. Authoritarian states can also exhibit a hybrid or amalgam of these models.

Such inequitable methods of governance can be contrasted with that of a democracy, in which greater accountability of leadership exists, and social and political rights of citizens are guaranteed and embedded by a range of institutions and processes. In authoritarian states in which some of these institutions and processes exist, they are influenced by the regime and ultimately serve to maintain the status quo and prevent political or social change.

### **Authoritarianism and Deception: Propaganda, Validation, and Denial**

Authoritarianism and deception go hand-in-hand. Aside from the dubious nature of how leaders come to power in authoritarian states, deception is wielded in the course of maintaining power and controlling the population. Deception is also crucial within the context of international power play, in which such states seek to exaggerate or invent their relative strengths, including military capabilities. The motivation for doing so often relates to a desire to intimidate and threaten external powers, as well as increase state interests in a competitive and conflict-heavy international environment, which can be viewed within the context of a realist perspective of international relations. Deception is also practiced in an attempt to dismiss or hide breaches of social, political, and human rights; to thus gain external legitimacy from actors such as the United Nations and strategic allies.

Propaganda is one key form of such deception, and is targeted at both domestic and international audiences. Such propaganda can be positive in playing up the relative strengths or achievements of the state, or negative in portraying external actors in an adverse manner. In the latter case, this often involves lying to the people of a country about the threats and intentions of external actors, therefore uniting people in populist support for the regime and in opposition to such common enemies. This can then direct attention away from the economic and social problems within the country.

Such deception can also serve to validate the authoritarian rule and policies that emerge from the regime. Modern history is littered with examples of this, such as Iran's anti-American position, with Iran caricaturing the United States as an anti-Islamist aggressor. Another example is China's continued dispute with Japan. Anti-Japanese sentiments, because of the troubled history between China and Japan, including Japanese atrocities in World War II, have served to scapegoat Japan for a range of contemporary problems in China. The anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 across Asia (mainly in China), and the recent territorial dispute over a chain of islands in the East China Sea, serve as examples of the ill feeling between the two nations. Ultimately, such tensions as those in Iran and China serve to galvanize nationalism



*The Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in North Korea displays the authoritarian state's version of the Korean War, including this mural of the "Great Leader," Kim Il Sung, depicted as victorious. In reality, the war ended with the two sides signing a truce on July 27, 1953; a peace treaty was never negotiated. Even 60 years later, current North Korean leaders continued the deception; on July 2013, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a massive military "victory" celebration in the capital of Pyongyang. Such propaganda is a key form of authoritarian deception, which is targeted at both domestic and international audiences.*

and popular support for the regime and its policies. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union can also be included in this context because strong nationalism and the perceived difference and threat of others were exaggerated and utilized for political gain with disastrous consequences.

Propaganda in relation to military achievement or prowess is also common in the context of authoritarian states. In addition to playing up strengths or embellishing the truth regarding military capabilities, this can include claims to possess advanced military technologies. For the most part, these claims must be treated with a grain of salt. Recently, Iran claimed to have developed and built stealth fighter jet capability. In early 2013, a televised unveiling of the

Qaher-313 fighter jet featured President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad imperiously inspecting the aircraft. Experts questioned the ability of the jet to fly, and a released image of the jet supposedly flying past snow-capped mountains caused embarrassment when analysis of the image showed that the image was altered by using Photoshop. Iran's attempt to create awe and intimidate through military prowess backfired.

Similarly, North Korea's efforts to propagate long-range missile technology and nuclear weapons have attracted both concern and skepticism from the international community. North Korea has a strong track record of seeking to deceive both its people and the wider international community.



Authoritarian states routinely lie to external actors and domestic populations to hide or deny complicity in human rights violations, torture, and even war crimes. The Syrian regime, under President Bashar al-Assad, has constantly denied claims by its civilians, s human rights watch groups, and foreign powers regarding its brutal and despotic rule. Such brutality is said to involve systematic torture, illegitimate imprisonment, murder, and even massacre. In addition to outright denial of the existence of such acts, another approach is to blame the actions on rebel or terrorist elements, often foreign, once the former approach becomes futile. Atrocities and wider human rights violations in places such as Syria have been documented by a range of independent reporting bodies, including Human Rights Watch. Televised news recordings of such events are usually met with state denials and the scapegoating of terrorist elements. The role of the media is important in both bringing awareness to state crimes, and in supporting the authoritarian regime.

### **Control of the Media**

Within authoritarian countries, core media outlets are often controlled or even owned by the governing regime, or at least run by close sympathizers of the regime. In Syria, for example, the media has been state-owned for decades, and in other authoritarian states, such as China, the freedom media is strongly monitored and curtailed, even though it has become increasingly commercialized in recent decades. Such states practice deception through hiding or denying civil and human rights breaches by restricting the media and information systems more widely.

In the context of China, the monitoring and blocking of Internet material is particularly noteworthy. This has led some commentators to describe this process as the Great Firewall of China. This works to restrict or prohibit access to Web sites deemed provocative, subversive, or embarrassing to the state and regime. Western-based news sites are among the sites blocked, as are those that discuss sensitive topics and those that question the legitimacy and human rights record of the state. A famous atrocity at China's Tiananmen Square in Beijing, where in June 1989 hundreds of prodemocracy protestors were killed by security forces, is

erased from the history annals through the blocking of content and discussion related to that event. The Internet material blocked by the Great Firewall of China also includes images, search terms, and social networking sites.

The censorship and control of media, combined with strict controls over the movement of their people, allows some authoritarian states to invent history, as well as erase it. For example, world events can be falsely reported to foster nationalism. A number of reports concerning this in North Korea have emerged, relating to events such as the Olympics and soccer's World Cup.

Despite the use of propaganda and iron-fist rule, there are many examples of people within authoritarian states rejecting the corruption and deception of the ruling regime, and rising up to oppose their governments. For example, the recent Arab Spring has involved both successful and suppressed revolutions in a number of Arab countries since 2010. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the regimes were overthrown, whereas in countries such as Syria and Bahrain, continued revolt has been put down. The method of put-down has often been brutal, with subsequent reprisals and further human rights violations. This is in keeping with other authoritarian regimes. For example, Robert Mugabe and his followers have brutalized opposition in Zimbabwe over a sustained period.

### **Nonauthoritarian State Deceptions**

State deceptions are not limited to just those states deemed to be authoritarian in nature. A number of recent examples clearly expose how Western democratic states have deceived both domestic and international audiences in the course of military and intelligence operations. The events associated with the West's War on Terror, for example, can be cited as proof of such high-level deception. Analysis has exposed dubious and even illegal practices by the United States and others in the course of fighting, occupying, and prisoner management in Iraq, which was initially covered up.

The very justification and legality of war have been questioned, with deception used to push through military action against Iraq in 2003. United Nations (UN) commentators, including Kofi Annan and Hans Blix, declared the war illegal, while the United Kingdom's government

utilized a flawed intelligence briefing document that outlined the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to justify action against his regime. The document, which became known as the “dodgy dossier,” made false claims about the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime was greatly exaggerated to make the case for war. The document was subsequently described by commentators and journalists as having been “sexed up.” Deception has also been used in the cover up of dubious or illegal practices outside of the conflict zones, including illegal torture and “extraordinary rendition” of terrorist suspects. Once details of such practices were leaked and emerged in the press, they were met with strong condemnation. In addition, difficult questions have been raised about the legitimacy and accountability of military and wider security operations.

Authoritarianism and deception go hand-in-hand. States that are governed by autocratic or similarly repressive mechanisms employ deception in the course of their propaganda, self-interest, self-preservation, and repression of their people. This deception can be targeted at both

domestic and external audiences, but the most worrying aspect of this relates to the covering up of human rights violations, violence, and even atrocities. Human rights watch groups and international bodies such as the UN are crucial in raising awareness of this and affecting change.

Tony Murphy  
*Sheffield Hallam University*

**See Also:** Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Hitler, Adolf; Iraq War; Korean War; Lying as Exercise of Power; Military Deception; Nazi Propaganda; Torture.

### Further Readings

Geddes, B. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science*, v.2 (1999).

Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org> (Accessed February 2013).

Murphy, Emma C. “Institutions, Islam, and Democracy Promotion: Explaining the Resilience of the Authoritarian State.” *Mediterranean Politics*, v.13/3 (2008).





# B

## Bailey, Frederick George

Frederick George Bailey is a British anthropologist, author, and academic born in 1924. Bailey taught at a number of American and British universities during the course of his academic career, and is currently a professor emeritus in the Anthropology Department at the University of California, San Diego. Bailey is a prolific writer who has authored texts covering a wide variety of topics. While perhaps best known for his work regarding formal and informal political systems and political processes, Bailey has also written on the significance of social structures and the processes associated with the societal resolution of human conflict.

In regard to the subject of deception, Bailey's work concerning the structural facilitation of human values and beliefs, and his work on the cultural integration of morality and the practicality of human deception, are the most significant. Much of this work initially focused on political processes, systems, and leaders, and their relationship to larger societal moral practices and ethical limitations. However, this work ultimately evolved to become more general in application during the course of Bailey's career by examining these phenomena in a broader context. In his later work, Bailey laid the foundation for his beliefs regarding the interplay of human social

interactions and organizational structures, and the use, application, and necessity of deceit.

In much of his early work related to human deceit, Bailey examined the significance, meaning, and purpose of human deception in relation to political processes and the practice of political leadership. Bailey ultimately determined that deception was an inescapable and perhaps even foreseeable consequence of the nature of social and political relationships and the practices that must necessarily be undertaken to exercise political power in a real-world environment.

Perhaps most interesting, Bailey asserts that the political reliance on chicanery is a common feature of the political process, and that this holds true regardless of the stature or public acclaim of any individual political leader. To underscore his assertion, Bailey notes that infamous leaders have employed the same strategies and tactics to manage and control the masses toward illicit ends, as have leaders who are widely viewed more positively, and are thought to be responsible for positive contributions to larger society. Further, the deception employed by political leaders is thought to be widespread. It involves the false assignment of blame and credit for failures and successes; the establishment of unrealistic expectations regarding the real capacity for political change and societal improvement; and a mischaracterization of the true complexity of significant social, economic, and

political issues in an attempt to mislead the public and achieve larger, often concealed, objectives.

In subsequent writings, Bailey expanded on his earlier discussions of human deception by examining two foundational presuppositions, or “saving lies,” that he believes provide human beings with the tools necessary to bring a sense of clarity and understanding to the complex world around them, and to navigate interactions and regulate relationships that they have with others. More specifically, Bailey compared and contrasted the concept he referred to as “methodological individualism” with the concept he referred to as “methodological holism.”

Methodological individualism refers to the human assumption that society is made up of individuals who are largely bent on acting in their own self-interest toward the accomplishment of their individual agendas. Methodological holism, on the other hand, refers to the paradigm that asserts that individuals largely act out of a perceived need to do what is thought to be morally acceptable and ethically required of them from a societal perspective. This behavior often involves doing for others at the expense of the individual.

Put more simply, Bailey examined paradigms that were previously dichotomously viewed as selfless versus selfish. In his analysis Bailey argued that it was wrong to assign moral preference to the two competing paradigms. Rather, he believed that both were necessary tools that could be used to either help build consensus, or as a weapon in the ongoing competition for power. As a result, these two competing saving lies are not diametrically opposed concepts; rather, they might rightfully be viewed as complimentary paradigms.

A number of important concepts run through Bailey’s collective work. Perhaps most important is the belief that deception and trickery might best be viewed as necessary and, in at least some ways, functional parts of human social interactions and political endeavors. Further, deceitful and manipulative tactics are regularly incorporated in many areas of human industry and human interactions for a variety of divergent purposes, and they are used by individuals who are characterized by both public disdain and acclaim.

Additionally, tactics that have historically been derided as undesirable may ultimately be seen as having both a purpose and a role in

social institutions and social interactions. Similarly, some of the previously identified dichotomies that were thought to exist between lauded and denigrated types of human behavior may be misguided in that these two supposedly opposed types of behaviors may ultimately be viewed as complementary, rather than wholly incompatible. Finally, it is important to look behind the ostensible meaning and purpose of human behaviors, institutions, and presuppositions in an attempt to determine their true significance and the real value and meaning that they hold for larger society specifically, and human interactions more generally.

Jason R. Jolicoeur

*University of Tennessee at Martin*

**See Also:** Academia; Deception, Characteristics of; Deception, Research on; Deception and Trust; Deception in Different Contexts; Deception Motives; Deception, Definitions of; Dishonesty; Disinformation; Distrust; Exaggeration; Half-Truths; Honesty; Lying, Intentionality of; Lying, Prevalence of; Lying as Exercise of Power; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Manipulation; Morals and Ethics; Truth.

### Further Readings

- Bailey, Frederick. *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Bailey, Frederick. *Morality and Expediency: The Folklore of American Politics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977.
- Bailey, Frederick. *The Prevalence of Deceit*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Bailey, Frederick. *The Saving Lie: Truth and Method in the Social Sciences*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.
- Bailey, Frederick. *Treasons, Stratagems, and Spoils: How Leaders Make Practical Use of Beliefs and Values*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.

## Bankruptcy

English legal practice in the 18th century sent numerous destitute and insolvent people to debtor’s prisons until they paid the debt. With no way



*General James Oglethorpe was the colonial representative from England's King George II to the American colonies. Deeply moved by the sufferings of bankrupt prisoners in England, he created a refuge for debtors in America, a colony that he named Georgia. Since that time, the state of Georgia has included a constitutional ban on imprisonment for debt.*

to work to earn money for repaying their debt(s), they would languish or die in debtor's prison. James Oglethorpe, who had investigated debtor's prisons while serving as a member of Parliament, was deeply moved by the sufferings and abuses that he witnessed among the prisoners. As a result of his findings of abysmal conditions, he took a leading role in organizing a company that sponsored a refuge for debtors. In 1732, King George II gave James Oglethorpe a charter to create this new colony in America, which he would name Georgia. As a consequence, the state of Georgia has included in its constitution a ban against imprisonment for debt.

Bankruptcy provides an alternative legal remedy to debtor's prison. Insolvent debtors can find refuge and relief from their creditors through bankruptcy, including bankruptcy law protections

enforced by the courts that allow for reorganization and time for eventual repayment. Totally insolvent debtors with no reasonable hope of repaying their debts may find relief from their insolvency by the court excusing their debts. Depending on the court decision, bankrupt debtors may be required to undergo psychological counseling, financial counseling, and other remedies that will reduce their likelihood of repeating unsound spending practices.

Modern business and bankruptcy practices often seek to reorganize a company's finances. Instead of liquidation of all assets and distribution to creditors, reorganization allows a business or government to continue to operate. The insolvent entity, when declared bankrupt, is given legal protection by the bankruptcy courts from creditors. It also provides an organized way for creditors to have an opportunity to be repaid. In some cases, bankruptcy gives persons or others owed money for taxes, wages, services, or goods to be able to collect payment.

In the case of companies that are not liquidated, they will be required to reorganize their operations, possibly restructure their debts with their creditors (usually with the aid of the court), and other remedies that will enable the company to re-enter the economy as a productive enterprise.

Around 1900, the U.S. Congress moved to federalize bankruptcy cases under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4, of the U.S. Constitution. This section allows Congress to enact "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." Today the subject of bankruptcy law is located in the U.S. Code at Title 11. Bankruptcy courts are legislative courts created by Congress under Article I of the Constitution. The judges are appointed of a set number of years.

Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code has several chapters. Chapter 11 is for business rehabilitation, whereas Chapter 13 is rehabilitation for individuals. In Chapter 11 and 13 cases, the individual or the business retains ownership of the assets and develops a repayment plan that is agreeable to the court.

Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are for liquidation of either an individual's assets, or those of a business. The debtor turns over all nonexempt property to a bankruptcy trustee, who then distributes the assets to the creditors. However, there

are some limitations. If a debtor has engaged in fraudulent behaviors, such as hiding records about their financial status, then the debts will not be excused.

In addition to the federal bankruptcy courts, there are various state laws on the subject of debtors. State laws play a major role in bankruptcy cases by setting terms for the exclusion of assets from attachment for the settlement of debts. Exempted property defined by state laws widely varies. Exempted items usually include personal clothing, household goods, or an older model automobile. Other protected assets include Social Security payments, unemployment benefits, trade tools, books, or a homestead in some states.

In bankruptcy cases, the debtor has the obligation to disclose all assets, even if they do not believe that the asset has any value. The decision about the value of an asset is up to the creditors, not the debtor. If a debtor does not disclose an asset, it is grounds for reopening the bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy trustee may then seize the “unscheduled” asset and have it sold for the benefit of the creditors. Undisclosed or “unscheduled” assets may be grounds for filing criminal charges of fraud and/or perjury if the trustee or bankruptcy judge believes it is warranted.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 made major changes to the Federal Bankruptcy Code. It was a controversial act that was argued to favor creditors over debtors. Some provisions were designed to prevent or remedy debtor frauds that were designed to use bankruptcy as a shield for people who were using the bankruptcy laws to “game the system.” Of major concern were credit card abusers who sought bankruptcy refuge.

### **Bankruptcy Fraud**

There were over one million bankruptcy filings in the United States in 2012. Cases of bankruptcy fraud undermine public confidence in the justice of the system. It also taints the reputation of honest people who are unwillingly associated with the lies and deceptions of criminals committing frauds.

Bankruptcy fraud in the United States is a federal crime. The fraud statutes usually focus on the mental state of the actors when committing the alleged acts of fraud. There are a number of

ways that people commit bankruptcy fraud, such as hiding assets, destroying or hiding financial records, or making false claims or declarations. Another way to defraud creditors is to distribute assets to relatives, friends, or allies.

Many cases involve debtors who hide assets. The goal is to keep from forfeiting them. Assets that are easy to hide are expensive jewelry, bearer bonds, cash, or properties registered in aliases. Some debtors seek to hide assets by transferring titles to relatives or some criminal associate who hides the assets. When these deceptive practices are successful, they raise the cost of lending, harming innocent borrowers.

Some debtors commit fraud by intentionally filing forms submitted to the bankruptcy court that are either incomplete or contain false statements. Another tactic used by unscrupulous debtors is to file for bankruptcy in multiple states, sometimes using aliases and false information. They may also use real information several times. The effect of multiple filings is to hinder the legal process of the bankruptcy courts. The multiple filings may also provide the criminal debtor more camouflage with which to hide assets.

Bribery of court-appointed trustees is another corrupt practice that some debtors have successfully used in order to cheat creditors. Criminals may combine these forms of fraud with other crimes such as identity theft, money laundering, mortgage fraud, and public corruption.

A growing abuse is the “petition mill” fraud. The criminals working the petition mill falsely claim to a poor tenant facing eviction that they can help. Pretending to be a consulting service, the petition mill lies to the tenant by claiming to be negotiating for the client, when in actuality, it is filing for bankruptcy in the name of the “client.” Meanwhile it is also collecting “service” fees, which are often exorbitant. When the tenant’s savings are depleted, the petition mill moves on to its next victim.

The Federal Code, Title 18 U.S.C. § 152 (concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, and bribery) deals with nine crimes that involve lying in a bankruptcy case. The punishable acts require that the government be able to prove that bankruptcy fraud was knowingly and fraudulently committed. The nine crimes are: (1) concealing property of the debtor’s estate from the court; (2) making a



false oath; (3) committing perjury; (4) presenting a false proof of claim against a debtor's estate; (5) receiving property from the debtor's estate with the intent to circumvent bankruptcy proceedings; (6) taking a kickback for forbearing on a claim against the debtor; (7) while acting as an agent, transferring or concealing property of an individual debtor or corporation; (8) "cooking the books" to hide a debtor's financial affairs; and (9) withholding property or financial affairs from the U.S. trustee or court.

The U.S. Department of Justice's antibankruptcy fraud program, the U.S. Trustee Program (USTP), seeks to identify fraud or abuse of the bankruptcy system. The program uses techniques to measure fraud or errors in personal bankruptcy filings.

Bankruptcy fraud is different from strategic bankruptcy, which is not a crime. This tactic may be used by a financially solvent company in order to achieve an important business goal that will make it more profitable. An example occurred in 2002 when Kmart filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. This gambit allowed the company to break long-term rental leases it had made for properties where it had stores. Because the stores had become unprofitable, bankruptcy was a way to break or renegotiate these long-term leases to its financial favor.

Andrew J. Waskey  
*Dalton State*

**See Also:** Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Disinformation; Enron; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Greenspan, Alan; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud; Madoff, Bernard; Marketing, Deceptive; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

- Clancy, Noreen and Stephen J. Carroll. *Identifying Fraud, Abuse, and Error in Personal Bankruptcy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007.
- Hamilton, Jill. *Bankruptcy*. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group, 2010.
- Koski, Kamikaze. *Bankruptcy*. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse Publishing, 2007.
- Nathalie, Tama Ocean Martin. *Inside Bankruptcy Law*. 2nd ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011.

Odak, Betty. *Before, After, and Beyond Bankruptcy: Tips on Savings and Using Financial Resources Carefully and Wisely*. Mexico, MO: Pleasant Word Publishing, 2009.

Palmer, Robert S. *Courts Without Justice: How a Conspiracy to Fabricate a Million Dollar Bankruptcy Was Aided by the Chief Justice, U. S. Attorney General, and the California State Bar*. Mountain View, CA: Focus Books, 1992.

---

## Barnum, P. T.

One of the most famous sayings attributed to Phineas Taylor (P. T.) Barnum is "There's a sucker born every minute." However, there is no evidence that Barnum actually uttered that phrase. Barnum was an entertainment promoter who presented and operated displays, museums, singing tours, and music halls that helped create and define popular culture in 19th-century America. His instructive observation about his role as a public entertainer and trickster is this: "The public appears disposed to be amused even when they are conscious of being deceived." In the arena of lies and deception, Barnum's "victims" came willingly.

Born in 1810, Barnum left the grocery business and entered the world of promotions in 1835, when he bought the rights to an exhibition featuring Joice Heth, who was described as "a negress aged 161 years, who formerly belonged to the father of Gen. [George] Washington. She has been a member of the Baptist Church for one hundred and sixteen years, and can rehearse many hymns, and sing them according to former custom." Heth would also recount stories about Washington as an infant to inform the audience. A year later, Heth died at the less remarkable age of 80, but Barnum's career was launched nonetheless.

Barnum remained in the business of identifying and catering to public appetites until his death in 1891. At that time, the *Washington Post* declared him to be "the most widely known American that ever lived." Scholars say that he helped craft the American middle class, and then entertained it, educated it, and took some of its money, all while becoming a national celebrity. While his name today often connotes shady practices, President

James Garfield referred to Barnum as “the Kris Kringle of America,” hardly an indictment then or now. He demonstrated his public spiritedness by serving in the Connecticut General Assembly four times between 1865 and 1879; in 1875, he was elected mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Barnum created and perfected many devices to harness public attention. By any strict measure, these devices misled the public, but no one objected. In fact, customers came by the tens of thousands. Among his refinements in mass persuasion was the ballyhoo or street bally, which was “the art of attracting a crowd,” and “endless schemes to start people talking about . . . attractions.”

Barnum’s enterprises included a museum that he acquired in 1841, the American Museum in New York City. In those days, museums were evolving from philanthropic enterprises to commercial entities that displayed wild animals, natural history artifacts, waxworks, and other curiosities. Barnum’s displays targeted a middlebrow audience, whereas cultural critics desired the sophistication of European museums. This criticism is embodied in the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) and the Smithsonian Institution, which were intended to supplant the vulgar commercial facilities such as Barnum’s museum. Nevertheless, Barnum’s facility served a million visitors at 25 cents apiece, and children for half price.

Barnum was also shaping culture through the museum’s theater, which presented morality plays such as *The Drunkard* and *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. The plays had two themes, which were slavery and temperance, and had a single message: the joys of morality and the inevitable harms of vice. The moral stage was a safe alternative to conventional theaters, where Christians had reason to worry. Barnum’s facility was didactic, guiding the lower classes toward virtue and away from urban wickedness. Successors to Barnum’s American Museum were called dime museums and stood in contrast to the cultural palaces of MOMA and the Smithsonian. Dime-museum theaters also spawned vaudeville.

As the 19th century closed, elites lamented that even the World’s Columbian Exposition, held in Chicago in 1893, had been “Barnumized.” Whereas the midway at the exposition presented foreign cultures as oddities, the White City

exhibition had a sophisticated tone. However, after three months and \$1 million in losses, middlebrow activities were brought into these areas. This sort of broadening was derided and labeled as a “transitory disease . . . Barnumism.”

Many have asked how Barnum drew attention to his events. He pioneered the use of press agents and handbills to inform citizens that the circus was coming. Another group followed and planted stories in the local newspapers. A third group arrived four hours before the circus train to scout the circus parade route. Circuses were sometimes denounced as immoral by some, but the parade and publicity were staged to demonstrate their harmlessness. The parade is the highest refinement of the street bally; even today, New York City’s Macy’s Thanksgiving Day parade is a department store publicity vehicle.

One of Barnum’s simplest devices was a man walking along a crowded sidewalk carrying two bricks. He would put one down and walk on to place the second, then he would return to the first, pick it up, and place it beyond the other brick. In this leapfrog fashion, citizens would follow the man to Barnum’s destination to figure out what was happening. Barnum also created the contest as a publicity vehicle in 1850, when he offered \$200 for the best song written for Jenny Lind, the “Swedish Nightingale,” who he brought to the United States on a landmark tour. The publicity was effective. In 10 months of touring, Lind earned \$176,000 (\$5 million today) from Barnum, who took in \$700,000 (\$20 million today), though he had to cover the tour’s expenses.

John T. Llewellyn  
Wake Forest University

**See Also:** Audience; Con Man; Humor; Lying as Ability or Skill; Magic Tricks; Marketing, Deceptive; News Media: Print; Public Relations; Morals and Ethics; Tall Tales.

#### Further Readings

Adams, B. E. *Pluribus Barnum: The Great Showman and the Making of U.S. Popular Culture*.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

Cook, J. W. *The Arts of Deception: Playing With Fraud in the Age of Barnum*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Fuhrman, C. J. *Publicity Stunt!* San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1989.

Harris, N. *Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.

## Baseball

The game of baseball was first referred to as “America’s pastime” in 1856, and from the beginning, deceit has played a central role in entirely legal baseball plays envisioned by the founders of the game. For example, at least once per season, a major league player will fall victim to the hidden ball trick. Even more often, a player will be caught too far from the bag, and be picked off by an observant pitcher. Pitchers, catchers, coaches, and batters have even created extremely complex series of signs in order to deceive opposing teams from being aware of their upcoming strategies. All of these elements of deceit serve to aid teams in legal ways throughout a game.

Not all lying and deceit, however, is as honorable. Consider the long-winded name of an American Studies course once offered at Carleton College: “An inside look at fighting, cheating, corking, scuffing, sign-stealing, drinking, race-baiting, name-calling, spitting, law-breaking, gambling, spiking, bug-hiding, doping, tomato-dropping, game-fixing, arrow-shooting, grooving, spying, lying, head-hunting, water-logging, freezing, sand-dumping, ridge-building, tackling, greasing, superball-stuffing, skull-smashing, head-pounding, potato-carving, bribing, lemon-tossing, field-burning, fling and other everyday occurrences in our nation’s beloved past-time: A historical analysis of ethics and ethical decision-making in Major League Baseball.”

This list provides only a sampling of the ethically questionable occurrences within baseball that could be labeled as either lying or deception. Baseball has seen more than its fair share of rule stretching by players, managers, and owners, including George Brett’s passion for pine tar, Albert Belle’s cork, John McGraw’s belt grab, Leo Durocher’s strategically placed bug, Barry Bonds’ steroids, Preacher Roe’s spitball, Danny Almonte’s birth certificate, Pete Rose’s gambling,

and the Black Sox throwing games. The following examples focus on a few of the most memorable bouts of lying and deceit in the history of American professional baseball.

### The Black Sox Scandal

The 1919 World Series would go down in history as producing the most famous scandal in all of professional sports, let alone baseball. Eight players for the Chicago White Sox were accused of intentionally throwing the series against the Cincinnati Reds. Ironically, the *Philadelphia Bulletin* published a poem before the World Series began, reminding readers that baseball was the cleanest sport in the country. Almost a century later, the details regarding the scandal and exactly how each of the players was involved remain relatively understudied.

On only the second pitch of the World Series, the White Sox starter hit the leadoff Reds’ batter. This action signaled that the White Sox were in on the fix. The players—eight total—were not found to be criminally guilty, yet they were still issued lifetime bans from Major League Baseball (MLB). The story made front-page news across the country, and an assumption of guilt—especially given the team’s overall performance in the series, compared to the season as a whole—was enough for baseball officials to justify the ban. The eight banned men were Shoeless Joe Jackson, Eddie Cicotte, Lefty Williams, Buck Weaver, Chick Gandil, Fred McMullin, Swede Risberg, and Happy Felsch. The scandal so marred the team that the 1919 White Sox are historically remembered as the Black Sox. Williams lost three games in the best-of-nine World Series, which is still a record.

### Pete Rose

In February 1989, outgoing commissioner Peter Ueberroth and his successor, National League president Bart Giamatti, met with Cincinnati Reds third baseman Pete Rose regarding allegations that he was betting on baseball, a violation of Rule 21, “Misconduct, (D) Betting On Ball Games.” The rule stated, “Any player, umpire, or club or league official or employee, who shall bet any sum whatsoever upon any baseball game in connection with which the bettor has a duty to perform shall be declared permanently ineligible.”

Despite the commissioners dropping the investigation at one point, *Sports Illustrated* went public with details of the allegations in an issue that coincided with MLB's opening weekend in April 1989. Attorney John Dowd, hired by MLB to lead the investigation, interviewed many individuals associated with Rose. By May, he reported that Rose had bet on 52 Reds games in 1987. Most concerning were his gambling activities while managing the team following his playing career. While players have some opportunities to influence games through their own performance, managers control the games and make decisions that could easily alter outcomes to favor personal betting needs.

Despite Dowd's report, Rose remained defiant in claiming his innocence. However, facing harsh punishment, Rose and his attorney sought a compromise with MLB. On August 24, 1989, Rose agreed to a voluntary lifetime ban from baseball, based on three key provisions: MLB would make no finding of fact regarding gambling allegations, and would halt its investigation; Rose would neither admit nor deny the charges; and Rose could apply for reinstatement after one year. In other words, in return for his voluntary placement, Rose was spared a formal ruling on his gambling. His reinstatement was applied for twice, but it was never approved.

In 2004, Rose finally admitted in his book, *My Prison Without Bars*, that the gambling accusations were true, a confession that he claimed he had already admitted to Bud Selig, who became the MLB commissioner in 1998. Rose, however, stated that he always bet on the Reds, never against them.

Despite being the all-time Major League baseball leader in hits, games, and at-bats, and being an All-Star 17 times from five different positions, Rose remains outside the MLB Hall of Fame. He has even been unable to have his number retired by his Cincinnati Reds. Since there is no evidence that he ever bet against the Cincinnati Reds, there are many who believe that Rose's punishment was severe, especially when compared to the activities of major league players during the steroid era.

### **Corked Bats: Albert Belle and Sammy Sosa**

Both the Black Sox and Pete Rose were criticized for potentially seeking monetary profits

in exchange for play. Albert Belle, Sammy Sosa, and four other players since 1970, however, were caught and suspended for intentionally trying to boost their performance through illegally altered bats. When considering altered bats—either through the insertion of cork or rubber balls—MLB's rule 6.06 (d) states the following:

A batter is out for illegal action when: (d) He uses or attempts to use a bat that, in the umpire's judgment, has been altered or tampered with in such a way to improve the distance factor or cause an unusual reaction on the baseball. This includes bats that are filled, flat surfaced, nailed, hollowed, grooved, or covered with a substance such as paraffin, wax, etc. No advancement on the bases will be allowed and any out or outs made during a play shall stand. In addition to being called out, the player shall be ejected from the game and may be subject to additional penalties as determined by his League Punishment advisor.

For both Belle (caught in July 1994) and Sosa (exposed in July 2003), the discovery of their cheating ways was public, thanks to shattered bats that exposed fans and players alike to the corky contents.

### **Banned Substances**

In the past eight years, the most prominent discussion regarding lying and deception in American baseball has centered on the use of banned substances by players in an effort to improve performance or minimize time away due to injury. David Wells, former MLB pitcher, suggests that just under half of all players are "juiced." Players such as Ken Caminiti, Mark McGwire, and Alex Rodriguez have all admitted to using performance-enhancing drugs at one point during their careers (typically steroids or human growth hormone). The issue was severe enough in 2005 that the U.S. Congress called in players to testify about performance-enhancing drugs and a specific nutrition center called BALCO. Toward the end, Chicago White Sox outfielder Jose Canseco, New York Yankees third baseman Alex Rodriguez, Baltimore Orioles first baseman Rafael Palmeiro, St. Louis Cardinals first baseman Mark



McGwire, and Baltimore Orioles right fielder Sammy Sosa were forced to swear an oath and answer questions.

For San Francisco Giants left fielder Barry Bonds, his single-season home run record in 2007 will forever be marred by his association with steroids. In 2007, Bonds was indicted for perjury and obstruction of justice for telling a 2003 federal grand jury that he did not knowingly use performance-enhancing drugs. In 2011, a federal court found Bonds guilty of obstruction of justice for his original evasive answer under oath.

In summer 2013, 13 baseball players were suspended for 50 or more games because of their connection to Biogenesis (a now closed rejuvenation clinic) that supplied human growth hormones (HGH) to players. Most importantly, Ryan Braun of the Milwaukee Brewers accepted a season-long ban (after successfully appealing a previous positive HGH test and accusing the blood sample collector for incompetence), and Rodriguez is facing at least a season-long ban, despite a career ban being mentioned throughout the media at one point.

### Conclusion

There are numerous examples of how baseball players have attempted to lie or deceive the general public, their teammates, and the sport of baseball as a whole. Whether they are gambling, altering equipment, or modifying their bodies, players will continue to be lured, despite the best efforts of baseball to minimize temptations and control the potential for players and managers to shirk the rules.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Basketball; Children's Sports Teams; College Sports; Football; High School Sports; Hockey; Perjury; Rose, Pete; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

Canseco, Jose. *Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits, and How Baseball Got Big*. New York: Regan, 2005.

CBS News. "Sports Scandals: Pete Rose." [http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-100\\_162-3093937-3.html](http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-100_162-3093937-3.html) (Accessed September 2013).

ESPN. "Barry Bonds Indicted on Perjury, Obstruction Charges." (November 19, 2007). <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=6347014> (Accessed September 2013).

Hardball Times. "Ranking Baseball's Ethical Transgressions" (August 7, 2008). <http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/ranking-baseball-ethical-transgressions> (Accessed September 2013).

Turbow, Jason and Michael Duca. *The Baseball Codes: Beanballs, Sign Stealing, and Bench-Clearing Brawls: The Unwritten Rules of America's Pastime*. New York: Pantheon, 2010.

Vecesy, Geroge. *Baseball: A History of America's Favorite Game*. New York: Modern Library Chronicles, 2006.

---

## Basketball

Deception plays an important role in basketball both on and off the court, from physical moves in the game designed to mislead an opponent to deceptions in player drafts. The referees can be a target of deception, with players faking injuries, but referees have also been investigated for deception.

### Offensive and Defensive Deceptions

On the court, deception involves offensive players attempting to fool defenders and find the opportunity to score. Two of the most common offensive moves are the "pump fake," faking a shooting motion and subsequently making another move; and the "crossover," a quick change of dribbling motion from one side of a player's body to another. The crossover is often listed as one of the most potent moves in the game. It involves a player handling the ball and leaning his body in one direction, giving the appearance that the player will attack in one direction, but then actually attacking in the opposite direction. This often leaves the defender unbalanced because of the quick change of direction, freeing the offensive player to either take a shot or drive to the basket.

This particular move has been used to devastating effect by players such as Michael Jordan, Tim Hardaway, Allen Iverson, and Dwyane Wade. For example, the game-winning shot by Michael



Jordan of the Chicago Bulls in the 1998 National Basketball Association (NBA) finals against Bryon Russell of the Utah Jazz was made possible by a crossover.

Another important move that relies on deceit is the pump fake. The ball handler feigns a shooting motion, without actually lifting his feet from the ground. Often, the defender will respond by jumping in an attempt to block the shot. This response gives the offensive player an opportunity to draw a foul or drive to the basket. Masters of the pump fake are Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant, Dwyane Wade, and Paul Pierce. In Game 1 of the 2008 NBA finals, Paul Pierce of the Boston Celtics



*Paul Pierce playing for the Boston Celtics, January 13, 2008. An important basketball move that relies on deceit is the pump fake. Pierce used it in one of the most memorable plays in National Basketball Association (NBA) playoff history—a three-point shot against the Los Angeles Lakers in Game 1 of the 2008 NBA finals while his team was down three points.*

made what some consider one of the most memorable plays in recent playoff history. With his team down three points to the Los Angeles Lakers, Pierce pump faked a three-point shot, which caused his defender Pau Gasol to challenge the shot. Pierce was subsequently hit by the falling Gasol, which resulted in a foul, but he still made the shot after contact. This was a pivotal turning point in the game.

### Referees

Referees are sometimes also the targets of deception because of their authority to call personal fouls on players. If a player receives six fouls, he is automatically disqualified from the game. A personal foul can also cause a team to give up possession of the ball or give a player the opportunity to take free throws (unopposed shots taken from the restricted area of the court). Players sometimes use deception to draw fouls by intentionally falling or faking injuries after little or no physical contact. As a result, deceived referees believe that misconduct has occurred and call a foul.

One example of this kind of deception is “flopping.” Flopping can transpire in many ways. One of the most popular forms is when a defender immediately falls to the ground upon feeling contact, giving the appearance of an offensive foul. The offensive player can also flail his body and fall to the ground upon contact with a defender, giving the appearance of illegal defense. Other in-game instances of deceit along these lines include faking injuries, in which a player feigns being hurt to give the appearance of a foul.

Basketball referees have also come under suspicion for deceptive activities. In 2007, the *New York Post* broke a story reporting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was investigating allegations that an NBA referee had been betting on games, uncovering one of the largest scandals in NBA history. The referee, Tim Donaghy, had reportedly been betting on games since 2005. In 2008, he pled guilty, and was sentenced to 15 months in prison and three years of supervised release. In one of his statements, he specifically acknowledged a playoff game, widely believed to be Game 6 of the 2002 Western Conference Finals between the Los Angeles Lakers and Sacramento Kings, in which fouls in full view of the referee were ignored because it was in the NBA’s interest

to add another game to the series. Statistics show that during the two seasons under investigation, games refereed by Donaghy resulted in teams scoring more points than expected by the Las Vegas sports books 57 percent of the time, a discrepancy with the odds of one in a thousand of happening.

### Off the Court

In professional basketball, such as the NBA, deception is also evident off the court. For example, one of the most important activities in the off season for NBA teams is the draft. During the off season, all teams are allowed to select recruits from a pool of draftees that include collegiate players and international professionals. NBA scouts rank players based on their opinion of a player's potential. They evaluate each player based on several criteria, including physical measures (i.e., height, wingspan, jumping ability, and speed) and mental criteria (i.e., knowledge of the game, leadership ability, and maturity).

Agents, players, and even college coaches will often resort to deception in order to raise the draft "stock" of the player. Lies take place when reporting the age of potential NBA players because younger athletes represent greater potential for growth. In 2011, the Minnesota Timberwolves drafted Tanguy Ngombo, a 21-year-old star athlete from Qatar. After the NBA draft, however, the Timberwolves discovered that Ngombo was 26 years old and a veteran of a professional basketball league in the Middle East. The NBA stipulates that any international player over the age of 22 is ineligible for the draft, and can join a team only as a free agent. However, because the occurrence of falsified ages is extremely rare, the NBA made an exception and allowed the Wolves to keep their pick.

Deception most commonly exists during interviews between basketball teams and the media. Players, coaches, and managers lie to the media in order to protect locker room morale, promote team unity, protect their image, or for a variety of business reasons. Players will often tell the media that they are happy after being traded to another team in order to be seen as cooperative and team-oriented individuals. However, most players actually resent trades because it forces them to move their family, start over with a new team, and prove their worth with a new organization.

In an effort to maintain a positive morale within the team and to keep fans hopeful and engaged, players will also tell the media that their team is competitive and is going to make the playoffs, even though the team has no realistic chance of doing so.

Lies do not always remain unnoticed. One of the worst examples of an individual caught lying occurred in spring 2012, when Dwight Howard of the Orlando Magic was confronted in an interview about reports claiming that he asked for his coach, Stan Van Gundy, to be fired. Although evidence proved the reports accurate, Howard publicly denied meeting with team management regarding Van Gundy's termination, and denied requesting a trade to another team. This resulted in a situation in which Howard could no longer comfortably play under Van Gundy because of the animosity between them. The Orlando Magic subsequently fired Van Gundy and traded Howard.

Kevin Lin  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Baseball; College Sports; Football; High School Sports; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

- Ballislife. "Charles Barkley on Why the NBA Lies About Player Heights." <http://www.ballislife.com/nytimes-charles-barkley-on-why-the-nba-lies-about-player-heights> (Accessed July 2013).
- Bleacher Report. "The 50 Biggest Lies in Sports." <http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/1259994-the-50-biggest-lies-in-sports/page/48> (Accessed July 2013).
- "The Crossover: The Genealogy of One of Basketball's Most Vicious Moves." *New York Times* (May 13, 2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/13/sports/basketball/the-crossover-genealogy-of-a-vicious-move.html> (Accessed July 2013).
- ESPN. "The HoopIdeal Guide to Flops." [http://www.espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/\\_id/50302/a-field-guide-to-flopping](http://www.espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_id/50302/a-field-guide-to-flopping) (Accessed July 2013).
- SB Nation. "Thirteen Lies You'll Hear on NBA Media Day." <http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2012/10/1/3436894/nba-media-day-2012-13-lies> (Accessed July 2013).

## Battle of Fishguard

Between February 22 and 24, 1797, the French launched an attack on Great Britain during the War of the First Coalition. Ultimately, it would end up being the last time in Britain's history that it was invaded. While the French had a stronger presence during the invasion, the British were successfully able to deflect French aggression by bluffing about the strength of their military in the immediate area. Through this deception, the French agreed to an unconditional surrender, despite having a significant advantage (albeit an unknown one) if they had opted to engage in further battle.

### The Invasion is Planned

The initial invasion was planned by General Lazare Hoche. He envisioned multiple attacks on Great Britain in order to assist Wolfe Tone's Irish Republicans. In the initial stages, two groups of forces would land on British soil in an effort to divert attention away from the third group, which would ultimately come to ground in Ireland. However, the plan failed miserably. Only one of the three groups (intended to land in Wales) was able to do so because of a combination of weather and personnel problems. After landing in Wales, the successful group then marched toward Bristol. Commander William Tate's forces consisted of almost 1,500 troops from La Legion Noire. More than half of those troops were irregulars, relatively untrained and unprepared for what was to come when compared to their full-time counterparts. They arrived in Wales on four French warships at Carregwastad Head (in the immediate vicinity of Fishguard) on February 22.

The immediate details after the landing have become sketchy over the years. An 1892 account claims that the French struggled to gain entry into Fishguard harbor, but no previous versions of the story mentioned that detail. As a result, it seems that the detail may be a stretch. Upon making land, the irregular soldiers lost any sense of discipline. They started by deserting the group, and then turned to looting for personal gain. The troops that chose to follow orders were almost immediately met by a group of 500 British. Most of these forces included reservists, militia, and a few sailors, who were led by John Campbell.

Much like the French side, the British forces were not used to working together.

The actual battle began with skirmishes between the two sides. With Fishguard led by a volunteer infantry, it took the efforts of Lord Cawdor moving his men nearly 30 miles overnight. Upon arriving, Cawdor was handed full responsibility and authority over command. He had control of some 400 troops and a series of artillery weapons. Yet, he was slow to arrive.

By February 23, the French had begun moving inland, and were becoming concerned for the British. Thomas Knox, the leader of the British efforts at that time, was ultimately given three choices: attack the French, defend Fishguard, or retreat toward Cawdor's men as they moved toward Fishguard. He chose to retreat—reasoning that he would have a greater chance against the significantly larger French group if all the British infantry was together.

By the time that Knox and Cawdor's men combined, Tate was beginning to struggle with the French effort. Discipline was nonexistent because his troops preferred drinking wine to waging battle. The irregulars who were still involved began calling for a mutiny. With their egregious behavior, the Welsh citizens quickly sided with the British forces. As a result of all these events, French and Irish officials began discussing the potential need to surrender.

### Change of Strategy

By dark on February 23, the British had returned to Fishguard with Cawdor in command, and opted to immediately attack the French and Irish. With a total of 600 men, they unknowingly marched directly toward an ambush. With the dwindling light and the narrow passages, Cawdor had a change of strategy while headed to attack. He opted to retreat to Fishguard and wait until February 24 to take action. This decision likely prevented the annihilation of his troops. Before the sun would rise, however, French officers arrived to negotiate a conditional surrender with Cawdor. In a high-risk, high-reward strategy, Cawdor bluffed and told the French that because of his superior forces, he would only be willing to accept an unconditional surrender, and would attack at 10:00 A.M. if the French did not decide to end hostilities by that time.

On the morning of February 24, the British lined up in battle formation and waited to see how the French and Irish would respond to the ultimatum. Despite efforts to delay the decision, they opted to accept the unconditional surrender offer, and the three-day skirmish ended. The French had lost—and lost quickly—with barely any fighting actually taking place. Legend has it that many French troops saw local women wearing red jackets and tall hats, and assumed that they were British soldiers. The number of such women may have impacted the decision to surrender as quickly as the French chose to.

The hero for the British was Cawdor, who orchestrated the bluff. When the French pushed for a safe passage home if they agreed to surrender, he stated: “The Superiority of the Force under my command, which is hourly increasing, must prevent my treating upon any Terms short of your surrendering your whole Force Prisoners of War.” The only understood reason as to why the French and Irish fell for this bluff was the belief that the British had to be reinforced if they were willing to make such a clear claim of superiority.

In a counterfactual sense, it would be interesting to see how the entire saga would have played out had Tate refused Cawdor’s mandate. Given the numbers of French and Irish soldiers who had already abandoned the mission, both sides were in equal disarray. The British went from nearly walking into an ambush the night before to winning on a bluff just a few hours later. While the battle would have ended either way, the forcing of the unconditional surrender sent a strong message to those who looked to attack British shores in the coming years—even though the British were not nearly as strong as perceived. Cawdor successfully turned a relative tie into a victory for the British over the French and Irish, squashing Hoche’s initial plans before they could even gain traction. They had snatched victory from the jaws of defeat.

William J. Miller  
Flagler College

**See Also:** Bluffing; Civil War, U.S.; Feigned Retreat; History of Deception: 1700 to 1800; Military Deception.

### Further Readings

Kinross, John. *Fishguard Fiasco*. London: H. G. Walters, 1974.

Latimer, Jon. *Deception in War*. London: Overlook Press, 2001.

Walters, Syd. *Fishguard and French Invasion: Cheating and Obtaining Funds by False Pretences*. Glastonbury: Syd Walters, 1995.

## Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge was the German offensive of December 16, 1944, to mid-January 1945 in the Ardennes Forest of Belgium during World War II. On September 16, 1944, Adolf Hitler announced a counteroffensive in the Ardennes with the goal of capturing Antwerp. German Panzer units had been organizing in the areas near the Ardennes Forest in Belgium near the German border. Allied forces made successful landings in France in June (Operation Overlord) and the Netherlands (Operation Market Garden) and were making steady progress toward the border of Germany. Military planning for the offensive was delegated to General Alfred Jodl of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on September 25.

Hitler chose the location of the Ardennes because it was the weakest part of the Allied line. He believed that an attack at this place would separate the British and the American forces and would hopefully lead to political problems between the Allies. The terrain was also ideal because it would require few German divisions to defend, and it was a heavily wooded area, thus providing secrecy from Allied air reconnaissance.

The final plan composed by Jodl was code-named *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine), involving the OB West commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and Army Group B under Field Marshal Walter Model. Upon review of the plan, von Rundstedt and Model revised and returned it to Jodl for Hitler’s approval. The proposed changes were not approved and ultimately Hitler’s original plan was approved on December 9, 1944, because he could not be swayed otherwise. The deception of the plan’s name, which alludes to a Rhine River attack



against the Ardennes, combined with the small number of persons who knew of the plan and the true location of the attack, all helped continue the ruse. For additional security, a separate diary related to the counteroffensive was maintained by officers involved in the planning, rather than by a secretary. All persons involved in the planning knew that the penalty was death if they violated the secrecy of the plan.

Hitler's plans called for the buildup of troops in secret locations without notice by the Allies. German forces gathered east of Aachen, where the Allies would see the false preparations for the counteroffensive, while the real buildup took place near Eifel by the Seventh Army. Northwest of Cologne, military and civilian activity increased during daylight for the benefit of the observing Allied forces. Road improvements, truck and rail traffic, increased anti-aircraft battalions, evacuated civilians, and a ghost army with real and false divisions all contributed to the charade. Meanwhile the real troop buildup continued in the Eifel. Troops hid in small villages; all movements of troops, supplies, and rails took place at night; and the area observed both a shooting and radio blackout. This plan was so well conceived that Allied intelligence failed to pick up on obvious indicators of a coming offensive.

Allied units in the area around Eifel did note changes in the weeks building up to the attack. Civilians reported a buildup of military vehicles, which was disregarded by commanders. Allied air reconnaissance noted train traffic with flat cars of Tiger tanks on the rail line between Düren and the Roer, but no one realized that a branch line went into Eifel. Other reports showed increased troop movements and traffic on the roads. A lack of coordination and communication between Allied air and ground units contributed to the success of the German counteroffensive. Even more unusual is the fact that the weather did not impede daily missions, and that the original attack date was moved from November 27 to December 16 because of problems getting more reinforcements and, more important, fuel to the area.

Three days prior to the attack date, German units began moving into place under the cover of night and using some tricks learned in World War I. Infantry divisions moved into place in sections labeled Area I, which had restraining lines six

miles deep. Artillery moved up, using horses and hay on the wheels to reduce the noise, and were placed five miles from their ultimate destination for the day of the attack. German planes buzzed areas known to have American listening posts in order for motorized vehicles to move into position unnoticed. All of these sections moved up the next day, and were in place two hours before the set time for attack.

In the first days of the attack, the weather in the Ardennes area provided a natural camouflage for the German army. Allied planes were grounded because of fog and mist, thus aircraft could not be called in for support or supplies. Snow allowed the Germans to disguise fortifications such as pill-boxes and gun emplacements, and soldiers wore white camouflage to disguise their uniforms. As the days passed, the weather warmed and the fog briefly lifted, allowing the Allies to see the enemy tanks. Roads became impassable because of mud, and then the winter began, bringing more fog, snow, and rain. This new storm hampered the German supply line and allowed the Americans to bring in their armor. The fog lifted, and Allied bombing runs began to attack German vehicles in the area. The weather contributed to the deception on both sides, giving each an advantage as the battle continued.

### **Allied Deception**

The Allied deception in the Battle of the Bulge was the secret counteroffensive launched on January 3, 1945, by the Third Army commanded by General George S. Patton. Allied command held a meeting at Verdun on December 19, where they assessed the situation and reviewed the messages from ULTRA indicating the German plans. General Dwight Eisenhower authorized General Omar Bradley and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery to launch a counterattack. Patton was told to launch an attack to relieve Bastogne and drive north to St. Vith. Patton had already ordered his staff to prepare for this possibility and was able to promise an attack on Bastogne in 72 hours, despite his army being over 100 miles from the city. Bastogne was relieved on December 26.

Hitler counted on the inability of the Allies to respond to a surprise attack that split them in two. Eisenhower reacted quickly and changed the command structure, overruling any challenges



that emphasized the British over the American military. Hitler realized that the Ardennes campaign would fail, so he changed his focus to the Alsace area and withdrew his forces. The Allied success in the Battle of the Bulge relied on the cooperation of the weather and the Allies' ability to quickly reorganize. In many ways, Hitler was the victim of his deception because he took command instead of listening to his generals. It is possible that if he had followed the advice of his commanders Model and von Rundstedt, the battle might have turned into a German victory.

As a matter of deception, Hitler's counter-offensive in the Ardennes was a great success. Armies and supplies in both the decoy area near Cologne and in the real areas in the Eifel were moved into place with little reaction from the Allies. The attack was so unexpected that typical indicators of impending military action by the enemy were ignored. Hitler correctly assumed that the attack would cause a rift between the Americans and British, but he did not count on the command abilities of General Eisenhower. The Germans benefitted from both the poor weather conditions, which effectively hid their armament, and the fact that the Allies did not plan on a counterattack. However, the same factors that helped with the deception of the German plan also contributed to German failure in battle. German reinforcements could not move up, the weather cleared and allowed for Allied air attacks, and German positions were compromised by thawing conditions.

The Battle of the Bulge is a turning point in history, and it is a good case study in the effectiveness of military deception. The ability to carry out an operation of this size without being detected indicates the experience of military planners in Germany, who employed lessons learned from previous military actions in the area of the Ardennes. The Allies also achieved a level of deception by being able to change the route of their army in a matter of days and to counterattack without being detected. The outcome of the battle exposed the weaknesses in the Allied command and signaled the need for better communication between air and ground forces.

Theresa S. Hefner-Babb  
Lamar University

**See Also:** Camouflage; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Military Deception; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Ardennes-Alsace*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004.
- Cole, Hugh M. *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.
- DeLaforce, Patrick. *The Battle of the Bulge: Hitler's Final Gamble*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Longman, 2006.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. *The Bitter Woods*. New York: Putnam, 1969.
- Parker, Daniel S., ed. *Hitler's Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997.

---

## Beatles Hoax

The Beatles were a rock and roll group that formed in 1960 in Liverpool, England. The band's classic line-up included George Harrison, John Lennon, Paul McCartney, and Ringo Starr (stage name for drummer Richard Starkey, who replaced the band's original drummer, Pete Best). At the height of their career, the Beatles dominated the airwaves and produced a record-breaking number of hit singles and albums. To this day, they remain one of the best-selling musical acts since the advent of recording technology.

In addition to their commercial success, the Beatles were critically acclaimed for the range and quality of their rapidly evolving music, much of which is credited to the writing team of Lennon and McCartney, even though some songs were actually solo compositions. Because of personal and professional tensions, the two frequently wrote independently of one another, especially toward the end of the band's career. The Beatles' groundbreaking albums and innovative songs challenged the conventions of pop music in terms of content, format, and length. The influence of the Beatles was not limited to their music, however. During the decade when they were active as a band, they exercised a significant influence on culture, fashion, grooming, religious beliefs and



A Beatles tribute prominently stands in an unlikely spot—downtown Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. The sculpture mimics the *Abbey Road* album cover, which has fueled the conspiracy theory that Paul McCartney died in 1967, and was surreptitiously replaced by a look-alike. Like the cover, which some fans argue symbolizes a funeral march, Paul is set off from his companions; he is also the only one barefoot.

practices, and social mores. In 1970, the band broke up, and each of its members went on to pursue successful solo careers.

### **“Paul Is Dead” Rumor**

In 1969, a rumor began to spread that Paul McCartney had died in an automobile accident in 1967 and had been replaced by the band with a look-alike. Speculation regarding Paul’s possible death was perhaps fueled by his relative absence from the media, from which he says he was taking a break at that time. The first known printed mention regarding the rumor appeared in an article written by Tim Harper that appeared on the front page of the September 17 edition of the *Times-Delphic*, the student newspaper for Drake University in Iowa. Harper claimed to have learned about Paul’s death from his friend, Dartanyan Brown, who said that he heard it from a musician who lived in his dorm, who in turn claimed that he heard of Paul’s death somewhere in coastal California.

Tracing the rumor back to its origin has proven an impossible task because it involves a pattern

of information transmission that folklorists specializing in urban myths refer to as “friend of a friend” (FOAF), in which one source references another, which points to yet another, and so on. In October 1969, disc jockey Russell Gibb of WKNR in Detroit related the rumor. Later that same month, Roby Yonge of radio superstation WABC in New York City discussed it at length on his show. Before long, the rumor had become such a pop culture phenomenon that it was reported upon by such respected mainstream news and entertainment media outlets as the *New York Times*, *Life* magazine, and *Time*. In response to the rumor’s rapid spread, the Beatles issued a press release denying that Paul was deceased.

Because the source of the rumor is unknown, it is impossible to determine whether its author intended to perpetrate a hoax or was merely reporting misinformation in the belief that Paul was dead. Likewise, it is difficult to determine whether initial disseminators of the rumor believed it to be true or were knowingly spreading a false

story to increase print sales and broadcast ratings by exploiting the public's interest in Paul's purported death. While the Beatles officially denied that Paul had died, the group playfully responded to the rumor, fueling it through verbal and visual suggestions that fans still point to as evidence that Paul had died and had been secretly replaced by an imposter.

The Beatles' rather tongue-in-cheek response to the rumor prompted the band's fans to search for hidden hints and minute clues related to Paul's death on album covers, in publicity photos, and in song lyrics. Some inventive fans seemed to find such hints wherever they looked. In searching for clues, fans even played albums backward in the hope of discovering some backtracked reference to Paul's death. An illustrative example of the extent to which some fans looked for such evidence can be found in the way that they interpreted the cover for the 1969 album *Abbey Road*, which featured a photograph of the four Beatles crossing the street single file near the suburban London location of the EMI recording studios (now Abbey Road Studios). Some fans have argued that the image represents a funeral march. Viewed thus, they see sartorial symbolism in the clothing that Paul and his companions wear. John, wearing a white suit, is the preacher; Ringo, in black, the undertaker; George, in denim, the gravedigger; and Paul, who is barefoot and walking out-of-step with his band mates, is the deceased.

The 1967 double-album *Magical Mystery Tour* includes the song, "Strawberry Fields Forever," at the end of which John Lennon is believed by some to have said, "I buried Paul," although the song's published lyrics renders the same passage as "cranberry sauce." Other clues pointed to as evidence of Paul's death have included pictures of Paul, who was left handed, smoking and playing the bass in ways purportedly inconsistent with his left-handedness.

The rumors regarding Paul's supposed death in 1967 offers a classic example of how such stories are spread in the age of electronic media. Decades after the rumor began, it still circulates and continues to foster arguments and claims adherents who use the Internet to advance their theories regarding Paul's alleged death and offer evidence in support of their views. In addition, people who believe or doubt the rumor now use social media

to make their case through blogs and Web pages. In this way, the new media continue to perpetuate what was originally spread by older mass media.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
*College of Charleston*

**See Also:** Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Marketing, Deceptive; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Relationships: Friends; Rumor; Urban Legends.

### Further Readings

- Dailey, Forrest. *Fifth Magician: The Great Beatles Impostor Theory*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2003.
- Patterson, R. G. *The Walrus Was Paul: The Great Beatle Death Clues*. New York: Fireside, 1998.
- Reeve, A. J. *Turn Me On Dead Man: The Beatles and the "Paul is Dead" Hoax*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2004.

---

## Behavioral Analysis Interview

One of the most important challenges facing law enforcement investigators is the detection of truths and falsehoods in the statements of the people they interview in the course of an investigation. Witnesses and victims may have motives to lie about aspects of the situation for reasons that have nothing to do with hiding their guilt or protecting the guilty party, and these falsehoods early in an investigation can taint the picture that emerges from the body of evidence, or lead investigators off the trail of the guilty party in pursuit of a red herring. Eyewitness testimony is of questionable reliability because of the construction of memory and various cognitive biases; when active attempts at deception are added to the mix, the interview process becomes fraught with obstacles. Though there are a number of remedies to this, the most popular is the Reid technique, a system of investigative processes designed to make inconsistencies and the possible lies causing them more obvious and to elicit confessions from subjects.



The key element of the Reid technique is the behavioral analysis interview (BAI), which is used not only with suspects, but also with witnesses, victims, and persons of interest to the case.

The BAI is a technique for interviewing witnesses, victims, and suspects in criminal investigations. It is designed to not only collect information, but also to help the interviewer ascertain the truthfulness of the interviewee. The Reid technique is the standard interviewing and interrogation method used by American law enforcement and in much of the rest of the world, but is criticized as too likely to elicit false confessions from suggestible interviewees. The Reid technique was developed by John E. Reid and Associates beginning in 1947, which also runs the Reid Institute to train investigators in the technique. The most recent revision of the Reid technique was published in the fourth edition of *Criminal Interrogation and Confessions* in 2001. Many of the basic precepts of the Reid technique are taught by other interrogation schools under other names. Even police departments and other law enforcement agencies that do not use the Reid technique are likely, especially in the United States, to use a technique heavily influenced by it. Most television shows portray a police force using similar techniques, albeit simplified and filtered through Hollywood tropes such as the “good cop/bad cop” interrogation.

### Behavioral Differences

The BAI component of the Reid technique was developed research in 1973 that found behavioral differences in deceptive and truthful subjects in a controlled test in which truthfulness was established by a polygraph. In such tests, subjects are usually asked to lie or tell the truth about information to which they have no emotional attachment, such as the results of a coin flip or the color of a playing card dealt to them. While the interrogation phase that follows it states the suspect’s guilt in unequivocal terms, and attempts to lead the suspect into a confession, the BAI is confrontational and coercive but not accusatory, and evaluates subjects’ behavior while collecting answers.

The BAI remains Reid and Associates’ flagship product. In contrast with an interrogation, it is described as a nonaccusatory interview, although

it may be used for suspects as well as victims and witnesses, and is still often considered adversarial because of its trademark use of “behavior-provoking questions.” These questions are designed not only to obtain information, but also to provoke behavioral responses in the subject that help the interviewer determine whether or not they are being truthful. Investigators are trained in the verbal and nonverbal cues to look for in order to determine truthfulness while attempting to lead the suspect into a confession.

The interview always begins with innocuous questions such as basic biographical information, even when the subject knows that the investigator is already in possession of that information (e.g., name, age, and residence). This provides a breather and allows the subject to relax while falling into a rhythm of answering questions. It also provides a baseline of behavior for the investigator to observe and compare with later behaviors. Biographical questions are usually followed with a question like, “Do you know why you’re here?” inviting the subject to describe the circumstances of the situation that brought them to police attention. Parties hiding something, even if they are not the person who committed the crime, often give evasive answers, as though in anticipation of avoiding more specific questions later.

The BAI commonly features as the second of three components in a Reid technique interrogation. It is preceded by a factual analysis stage, which guides the investigator through the generation of suspects and leads based on available information. The BAI is in turn followed by the interrogation stage, which is not a question and answer exchange, but a structured accusation leveled at the suspect, in which both the demeanor of the investigator (calm and understanding) and the behavior of the suspect in response to accusation (which is presented as though there is no doubt as to the suspect’s guilt) are critical. One of the aims of the BAI is to enhance an investigator’s ability to detect lies, deception, and inconsistencies in the statements given by witnesses, victims, and suspects.

### Interrogation

The Reid technique divides interrogation into nine steps that act as a script for the investigator to follow. This script presents the suspect with the

accusation that their guilt is known beyond the shadow of a doubt, and is provable, but the interrogation is actually designed to elicit a confession or other behaviors that will tip the suspect's hand, and is not reserved for occasions when a case is all but solved. A suspect who is known to be an unlikely candidate may well be treated as clearly guilty for the purposes of the Reid technique, and is subsequently eliminated when the suspect's behavior and responses to the interrogation give investigators no reason to treat them with enhanced suspicion.

The suspect is told or otherwise caused to believe that the evidence in the case led directly to them, and that he or she is being offered the opportunity to explain him or herself. Circumstances that might have justified the crime, regardless of whether they have any legal bearing on a prosecution, are forwarded in an attempt to craft a narrative that the suspect either confirms or denies. Opportunities to deny guilt are curtailed whenever possible on the belief that a confession is easier to obtain if the suspect is not asked, by the act of confession, to directly contradict an earlier assertion of innocence. Until a confession is obtained, the Reid technique encourages the investigator to do most of the talking, essentially floating and abandoning various narratives until the suspect positively responds to one, at which point the confession is recorded in some form later admissible in court.

The Reid technique has been challenged as too likely to lead to false confessions. The objection is principally to its structure and the way that it leads the suspect. For this reason, the use of the technique on young offenders and children is banned in some countries (though not the United States) out of concern that they are too impressionable and that too many wrongful convictions have resulted. Critics consider the Reid technique coercive, confrontational, and psychologically manipulative, especially when used earlier in an investigation when the body of evidence may still be developing.

### Employment Applications

John E. Reid and Associates offers a variety of services similar or related to its BAI. It administers polygraph examinations on behalf of law enforcement agencies and businesses in the

private sector throughout the country, conducts telephone interviews on behalf of businesses following up on consumer complaints, fraud investigations, or other concerns, and consults on interviews, interrogations, and background checks. The integrity interview, like the BAI, is a structured interview, but is designed for job interviews rather than criminal investigations, with an eye to discovering and discussing the applicant's past behavior patterns on the theory that past behavior indicates future behavior. Specific areas investigated include employment history, theft and other crimes, work-related drinking, drug use, company policy violation, and criminal behavior.

The Computer Employment Application (CEA) is a software package for administering interactive job applications for jobs in positions of trust, whether as law enforcement personnel (the traditional Reid and Associates clientele) or private sector positions of authority or in sensitive positions. The CEA delivers follow-up questions and asks for amplifications and clarifications based on applicants' responses, and is designed to be the first stage of a job application process, weeding out inappropriate or undesirable applications while minimizing application fraud with a minimal investment of face time or man hours.

The Reid Institute was established by John E. Reid and Associates in 1999, and is open to all graduates of Reid technique seminars. Through the institute, investigators may take advanced Reid technique seminars and work toward the Certification in the Reid technique (CRT). Seminars cover special topics such as the interviewing of children or witnesses who have experienced trauma and court decisions that impact the admissibility of confessions.

Bill Kte'pi  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Brain; Deception, Research on; Emotions.

### Further Readings

Blair, John P. and William P. McCamey. "Detection of Deception: An Analysis of the Behavioral Analysis Interview Technique." *Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Forum*, v.2/2 (2002).

Burgoon, Judee K., J. P. Blair, Tiantian Qin, and Jay F. Nunamaker Jr. "Detecting Deception Through



Linguistic Analysis.” *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, v.2665 (2003).

Horvath, F., B. Jayne, and J. Buckley. “Differentiation of Truthful and Deceptive Criminal Suspects in Behavior Analysis Interviews.” *Journal of Forensic Science*, v.39/3 (May 1994).

Kassin, S. M., S. C. Appleby, and J. T. Perillo. “Interviewing Suspects: Practice, Science, and Future Directions.” *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.15 (2004).

Vrij, Albert, Samantha Mann, and Ronald P. Fisher. “An Empirical Test of the Behavior Analysis Interview.” *Law and Human Behavior*, v.30/3 (June 2006).

---

## Betrayal

Betrayal occurs when a social actor violates an established rule or expectation underlying cooperative behavior. Social actors can be thought of as individuals, entities such as organizations, or even nation-states. Social actors cooperate with each other to accomplish a wide range of goals. In personal relationships, people depend on each other for caregiving and social support, companionship and affection, and sexual gratification and reproduction; people even rely on each other for the formation of personal identities—that of a parent, lover, or friend. In professional life, people work in collaborative teams and/or the work they do is contingent on other people’s contributions. From a societal point of view, complicated tasks such as organizing and maintaining a system of government, and mundane tasks such as walking down a bustling street, both involve complex patterns of cooperation.

### Expectations and Cooperation

Cooperation, however, requires shared expectations. In order to receive the benefits of working together, people must operate by an established set of rules and norms. Social contracts, which indicate everyone’s responsibilities, must be negotiated to achieve cooperation.

The expectations that underlie cooperation can be directly negotiated, in an explicit manner. For instance, at a societal level, some people’s

expectations are written into law. In professional life, organizations often spell out explicit policies outlining appropriate codes of conduct. In close relationships, partners can make their expectations clear by establishing specific rules about the types of behavior that are acceptable within their relationship.

Expectations underlying cooperation can also be established through more indirect means and can be implicit in nature. Implicit norms are acquired through a variety of methods, including socialization processes such as modeling other people’s behavior, the use of rituals, the telling of stories, or through direct experience with others. For example, through repeated interaction, people can indicate to others what is desired without articulating their specific expectations. If a spouse comes home from work later than expected, their partner may not explicitly address this issue, but rather signal their displeasure through nonverbal displays of disapproval or anger. Through socialization processes and repeated experiences, people implicitly learn what is expected of them across a variety of different situations. Most of the time, implicit norms or expectations operate in the background—outside of conscious awareness. For instance, people are not typically aware of the rules for riding in an elevator, but people nevertheless tend to follow the rules. Again, from a larger societal perspective all the way down to interpersonal relationships, cooperation is possible because people establish and adhere to an elaborate set of norms and expectations.

Although some of the norms that people establish are universal, such as the notion that kindness should be met with kindness, many of the expectations that people place on each other are influenced by one’s culture, group memberships, relational experiences, and personality differences. For instance, in some cultures, the expectation for sexual fidelity in a romantic relationship is less important than in other parts of the world, where infidelity can result in severe forms of punishment. At the individual level, people vary with respect to the expectations that they place on others, especially within their close relationships. Some individuals set unrealistic expectations about an intimate partner’s behavior, including the belief that a partner should always be available and always know exactly what the other person is thinking.

As a general rule, people establish more unique and idiosyncratic expectations as relational intimacy increases. While a wide range of both implicit and explicit norms underlie cooperative behavior, individuals' expectations become increasingly complex as they become more emotionally involved and interdependent. People tend to place more expectations on a spouse than a next-door neighbor.

Because people live under such a complex set of social expectations, especially in their close relationships, it is difficult for individuals to always live up to the expectations that have been agreed upon. Sometimes people lack the motivation to behave according to the norms that have been established. At any given moment, an individual's desires or wishes may run counter to what is expected. Sometimes people lack the ability to keep all of the promises they have made. People can also experience conflicting expectations, where one set of expectations may directly conflict with another set of expectations; for example, the common conflict of needing to put in long hours at work, while also trying to meet the expectations involved with being an attentive spouse and/or parent.

### When Betrayal Occurs

A betrayal occurs when a social actor violates established, cooperative, implicit, or explicit norms within a given relationship. By this definition, betrayals can occur within personal relationships, between organizations, and between individuals and organizations, just to name a few. Across all of these different types of betrayals, the basic dynamic is the same: Betrayal involves an actor's disregard for following pre-established expectations. An act of betrayal calls into question the basic rules by which people cooperate with each other.

The consequences of not meeting established expectations depends on a variety of factors, including the importance of the specific rule that was broken, as well as the nature of the relationship in which the violation occurred. People who have been betrayed often experience negative emotions, view the other person in a different light, and react by expressing their disapproval or engaging in some form of distancing and/or punishing behavior.

Given the negative consequences that can occur for failing to meet cooperative expectations, social

actors often try to conceal what they have done. Deception is frequently used to cover up such shortcomings. People cover their mistakes by explicitly lying about what happened and/or by deliberately failing to disclose the relevant information. For the most part, acts of betrayal are followed by deceptive attempts to conceal the truth.

There is a risk involved when trying to use deception to cover up the violation of an established expectation. For the most part, people expect others to be forthright and honest. Therefore, concealing an initial betrayal can be viewed as engaging in an additional act of betrayal. Furthermore, if the initial betrayal was unintentional—a mistake made in a moment of weakness—it is more difficult to argue that the cover-up was unintentional.

Discovered betrayals can produce intense, negative emotions, including anger, disappointment, shock, sadness, loss, and increased uncertainty. Discovered betrayals also result in a cognitive reappraisal of the self, the perpetrator, and the relationship in which the betrayal occurred. People often express their anger and disappointment, attempt to punish the betrayer, and in some cases terminate the relationship altogether.

Reactions to the discovery of betrayal are influenced by a host of factors, including the specific nature of the rule that was violated, the closeness of the relationship, the potential consequences or loss experienced, the intent of the perpetrator, the method of discovery, and the relational history between the parties. People react more strongly to discovering betrayal when important expectations are violated and the betrayal involves serious consequences, especially in close relationships, and when the violation appears to be intentional in nature.

Because discovering betrayal results in a loss of trust—that is, the awareness that another person has put their interests ahead of mutually negotiated expectations—it can be difficult for people to recover from a betrayal. Recovering from an act of betrayal requires cooperating with an individual who has just revealed that he or she is willing to violate norms of cooperation. Factors that influence whether individuals can repair a relationship after the discovery of a betrayal include the degree to which individuals were satisfied with the relationship before the discovery of the

betrayal, the importance of the rule that was violated, the specific consequences that were incurred by the betrayal, whether the betrayal was an isolated incident or part of a reoccurring pattern of behavior, the method by which the betrayal was discovered, the perceived intent underlying the perpetrator's actions, the amount of investment people have put into the relationship, the remorse or willingness of the perpetrator to make amends, and the degree of willingness on the part of the victim to work through a resolution and reestablish trust.

Tim Cole  
DePaul University

**See Also:** Cheating; Cooperation; Deception and Trust; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Sexual.

#### Further Readings

- Elangovan, A. R. and D. L. Shapiro. "Betrayal of Trust in Organizations." *Academy of Management Review*, v.23 (1998).
- Finkel, E. J., C. E. Rusbult, M. Kumashiro, and P. A. Hannon. "Dealing With Betrayal in Close Relationships: Does Commitment Promote Forgiveness?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.82 (2002).
- Jones, W. H. and M. P. Burdette. "Betrayal in Relationships." In *Perspectives on Close Relationships*, A. L. Weber and J. H. Harvey, eds. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1994.
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lies Are Uncovered: Emotional and Relational Outcomes of Discovered Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- Planalp, S., D. K. Rutherford, and J. M. Honeycutt. "Events That Increase Uncertainty in Personal Relationships II: Replication and Extension." *Human Communication Research*, v.14 (1988).

The book provides laws, parables, and principles about deception that have served as a guideline for generations. The complex legal code developed within the Bible returns to this prohibition time and again. The Bible also features stories of deception, evasion, manipulation, and self-deception, all of which conclude with lessons that these actions are discouraged because of their consequences. The books of Psalms and Proverbs feature several verses regarding the offense of lying and how people should strive to avoid it. For thousands of years, the Bible's moral tradition has instilled in its readers the attitude that deception is wrong.

The Hebrew Bible has served as the foundation for the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Academic sources indicate that it was written between 1200 and 100 B.C.E., with the latter texts progressively added until it was developed into a full canon. Based on the discovery of several ancient versions of the text, including the recent uncovering of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Bible is said to have reached its current edition around the 2nd century C.E. It is almost completely written in Hebrew, aside from several passages in Aramaic, which is the language that the Jews adopted once Hebrew became phased out as their colloquial language through the Diaspora.

Because the Bible has influenced many different societies, its impact on beliefs about deception is massive. The canon contains the stories of Creation, the Patriarchs, and Moses; the giving of the Torah, the religious and legal code that the Israelites were told to follow; a historical look at the Hebrew nation as it conquered and settled Israel and developed its religious framework; and poetic and theological texts. Together, these scriptures have influenced the followers of these religions in several aspects because of the diversity of their text. Literature, law, cultic practices, and history can all be derived from the writings within the Bible. Because of the canon's multifaceted nature, its outlook toward deception has pervaded the attitudes of its followers since it was written. Traditional Jewish methods of biblical analysis set the precedent for future religious interpretation, particularly in how moral lessons are derived from the law, principles, and parables.

---

## Bible

The Bible has served as the moral foundation of many societies, and it contains several references regarding the moral aspects of deception.

## Law

The most explicit law forbidding deception is the eighth commandment, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:16; Deuteronomy 5:20). The Ten Commandments are seen as a foundational list of absolute moral rights and wrongs, more so than any other law or story in the Bible. Because the Bible has been used both as a legal code (in ancient Jewish civilizations as one of the earliest known legal codes in the world) as well as the basis for other legal codes, this law has served as the moral impetus for the heavy weight of the crime of false testimony. The ancient understanding of the law was that false testimony is a sin against God, but modern interpretations regard it as a general warning against lying and deception.

Deception researcher Dan Ariely has used the Ten Commandments to establish a moral context in his subjects’ minds. He considers religion to be a social mechanism, and while it evolves over time, its tenets are intuitively important and pervasive enough to be used as moral framework.

## Principles

The poetic Book of Psalms has several verses regarding the offense of lying: “Save me, O LORD, from lying lips and from deceitful tongues.” (Psalm 120:2); “Let their lying lips be silenced, for with pride and contempt they speak arrogantly against the righteous.” (Psalm 31:18); “Remove from me the way of lying: and grant me thy law graciously.” (Psalms 119:29); “He . . . who has not . . . sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from the LORD.” (Psalms 24:4–5); “. . . the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped.” (Psalms 63:11); and “He that works deceit shall not dwell within my house: he that tells lies shall not tarry in my sight.” (Psalms 101:7). Similar verses can be found in the Book of Proverbs: “Lying lips are abomination to the LORD: but they that deal truly are his delight.” (Proverbs 12:22).

## Parables and Stories

The Bible’s stories depict human nature and desires. Moral lessons are often extracted from the text for religious reasons, but the stories can serve many purposes. The Bible is one of the earliest forms of writing to closely describe through

stories humankind’s innate deceptive dispositions, and the potential consequences if people succumb to them. Other forms of allegorical literature also follow this model: Greek classics; folklore, fables, and parables; and fairy tales. The risks that society associates with deception are rooted in how the Bible treats these actions, and other parables in history tend to similarly treat deception.

Stories of deception featured in the Bible often serve a moral lesson. Many are taught to young children in order to provide a foundational understanding of the consequences of deception. A commonly referenced story is Isaac’s blessing to his firstborn son (Genesis 27). Isaac’s sons Jacob and Esau were twins, but Esau was born first, and thus owed a blessing as part of his birthright. Rebecca, their mother, wanted Jacob to receive the blessing, so she encouraged Jacob to convince Esau to exchange a bowl of stew for the right to the blessing. Rebecca cooked Isaac’s favorite meal and helped Jacob plan an elaborate



*Johannes Sadeler I's engraving, Jonah Thrown to the Whale, circa 1582, depicts the end of the line for the prophet Jonah's deception, both to God and to the sailors. In the biblical Book of Jonah, the prophet used evasion as a way to avoid the truth.*



disguise involving wearing Esau's clothes and fur on his hands to make him appear as hairy as Esau. Isaac's eyesight was already poor, so the disguise was intended to fool Isaac into thinking that Jacob was Esau. Jacob explicitly lied to his father, saying that he was Esau, though between the disguise and the voice, Isaac was confused: "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau!" (Genesis 27:22). Isaac gave Jacob the blessing, leading to a lifetime of strife between Jacob and his brother Esau. Among other lessons, this story has traditionally been used to show that deception undermines relationships.

A story of deception concerning Jacob is also told in Genesis 37. Jacob's sons sold one of their brothers, Joseph, and lied to Jacob about what they had done. The brothers hated Joseph because he was treated as special compared to the others. They threw Joseph in a pit and then sold him to some Ishmaelite passersby. To cover their crime, they took Joseph's multicolored coat, a special gift from Jacob, and dipped it in blood. They brought it to Jacob as a sign that Joseph had been savagely killed. The roles of the brothers of the family are then reversed in Genesis 42–45, when Joseph is living as a governor in Egypt. Famine in Canaan brought the brothers to Egypt to seek food, and they unknowingly came to Joseph. "Joseph saw his brothers and recognized them, but he acted as a stranger to them" (Genesis 42:7). He accused them of being spies, only revealing himself as their brother after a long saga. Similar to the story of Jacob and Esau, this story is often taught as a warning to protect familial connections from deception.

The Bible suggests a more approving stance toward deception when it is necessary for personal survival. Genesis 12 tells of husband and wife Abraham and Sara, who sought refuge from the famine in Canaan. They came to Egypt and approached Pharaoh's palace, where they were worried that Sara would be taken as a wife for Pharaoh. If this were to happen, Abraham would be killed because he was her husband. Thus, Sara lied and claimed to be Abraham's sister so that when Pharaoh took her, Abraham's life was spared. When Pharaoh took Sara, God became enraged and plagued him, showing his disapproval. Pharaoh then realized that Sara and Abraham were husband and wife, and made

them leave Egypt. This scheme is repeated twice more in the book of Genesis: once again by Abraham and Sara, and then by their son Isaac and his wife Rebecca. All of these deceptions were essentially true: in these societies, married partners tended to be related. Allan Turner argues that they were just concealing the truth of their marriage while honestly conveying the fact that they were siblings. To cover up the truth is simply a method of deceiving through misleading rather than lying.

Thus, deception comes in many forms, not always directly as lies. Theories of deception include evasion, manipulation, and self-deception as ways to mislead people by disregarding the truth. All of these can be found in stories in the Bible, and are accompanied by moral implications, most likely that whoever wrote them disapproved of such actions.

### **Evasion, Manipulation, and Self-Deception**

Evasion is a way to avoid the truth in order to fool people. The story of Jonah the prophet's evasion of God is found in the Book of Jonah. God ordered Jonah to visit the city of Nineveh, where there were many sinners, and preach against it. Instead, Jonah ran away and hid from God. He first boarded a ship to escape, but he was thrown overboard by the crew. The boat had hit a storm, and the sailors decided that it was caused by God's anger toward Jonah's evasion. A fish finally swallowed Jonah for three days after he was thrown into the water. Humbled by what had transpired, Jonah went to the city and prophesied as originally intended. This act of evasion is a classic story teaching that it is both wrong and impossible to escape one's obligations. That Jonah was found out and held responsible for his actions proved that God cannot be "fooled" into being disobeyed.

Manipulation makes use of tools or information at one's disposal to control others' actions or beliefs. Genesis 3 contains a classic story of manipulation about Adam, Eve, and the snake, in which the snake misleads Eve into consuming the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, previously forbidden to her and Adam by God. Eve in turn convinces Adam to also eat the fruit. Once Adam and Eve consumed the fruit, the fate of humankind forever changed when they, as well as the



snake, receive curses. The snake traditionally has been abhorred for its characteristically deceptive nature. Eve has also been criticized for self-deception: that is, the act of misleading oneself, which is often a means of accommodating one's conflicting desires or intentions. Eve succumbed to the snake's tempting offer, despite knowing that it was forbidden. This is one of many examples of cognitive dissonance (holding two conflicting ideas or values) in the Bible. Characters often have to choose between personal desires and what is commanded of them by God or needed from the community.

Self-deception is not only found within the stories of the Bible; it might also be a consequence of commitment to Biblical texts. Because the Bible is so subject to human interpretation, it has often been used to serve drastically different agendas by delving into more complex levels of understanding. Jewish tradition teaches concepts regarding depth of interpretation. The Hebrew word *P'shat* (or *Peshat*) means the simplest or base understanding of the text, which can be derived without any other tools of interpretation. Society, though, moves far beyond the *P'shat* of the text to draw new meanings. Without knowing the actual intentions of the authors of the Bible, it is impossible to say if the reasons these people used it were loyal to its original purpose.

Because the Bible is so central to the Christian-influenced first world (as well as any region influenced by the Abrahamic religions), the assumption that this is the sole text that has dictated moral values to the rest of the world is an oversimplification; there are many societies in which the Bible is completely unknown. However, because the text was foundational as a legal code, there are notes of its influence in many subsequent legal codes. The Bible was received in Judaism's early days as a more modern, nuanced religious text than most other religions had the capacity for. Religion at the time was cultic: iconic imagery and idolatry were the mainstream beliefs, and people worshipped multiple gods. The Bible dictated a new religious order, commanding that God be worshipped as the only god, and all of the cultic practices were forbidden. Along with the new sacramental practices came a tone about the moral progress made by this new society of Hebrews. And despite thousands of years having passed to

allow for even more moral advancement, much of the Bible's emphasis on ethical principles remains the same. Among these principles is the rejection of deception; it may not be an exclusively Judeo-Christian tenet, but it has been carried out through religious practices and tradition through the Bible.

Rachel Blady  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Catholic Church; Cognitive Dissonance; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Fairy Tales; Islam; Judaism; Lie Acceptability; Manipulation; Morals and Ethics; Myth; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Ariely, Dan. "Religion and Research." <http://www.danariely.com/2012/06/21/religion-and-research> (Accessed December 2012).
- Encyclopædia Britannica. "Hebrew Bible." <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/259039/Hebrew-Bible> (Accessed November 2012).
- Holy Bible, New International Version. <https://www.biblegateway.com> (Accessed August 2013).
- Turner, Allan. *Is It Ever Right to Lie?* <http://allanturner.com/lying.html> (Accessed November 2012).

---

## Big Lie Technique

Originating in Germany during the rise of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party, the Big Lie is the practice of telling a lie so profound that the general public will not believe that someone would fabricate such a falsehood and, as a result, will accept the lie as truth. The origins of the phrase can best be traced back to Adolf Hitler's 1925 autobiography *Mein Kampf*. Retrospective studies of governmental propaganda have shown that big lies often have more influence over individual opinion than smaller ones. Thus, some governments still utilize the Big Lie technique today.

The Big Lie can be seen as an extension of Plato's "noble lie" described in *The Republic* in the 4th century B.C.E. Plato proposes that the noble lie is one that serves the purposes of advancing

a society and its goals, regardless of whether it is true. The definition of Big Lie, as it is known today, is sometimes falsely credited to Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, who said, "If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it." The origins of this quotation are unknown, and Goebbels never admitted to using the Big Lie technique, for admitting the lie would counteract its effects. Rather, in his 1941 article "From Churchill's Lie Factory," he accused Winston Churchill of using the Big Lie tactic, stating that Churchill repeated his lies until he believed them.

The first mention of Big Lie propaganda actually appears 16 years earlier in *Mein Kampf*. Like Goebbels, Hitler never admitted to using the Big Lie technique, but accused the Jewish population of using it. However, Hitler detailed how such propaganda should be used. He stated that propaganda should be directed toward the uneducated masses in such a way as to convince them that all of the information presented to them is fact. Hitler argued that the delivery of propaganda must be psychologically correct.

At no point did Hitler recommend fabricating the propaganda. Instead, he blamed the German collapse on the Jews' use of fabricated Big Lie propaganda. Hitler elaborated that individuals are used to telling small lies, and thus are not surprised by the use of small lies in others. However, individuals, being more corrupt than purposely evil, would be properly ashamed by telling a big lie. Because they would not engage in such purposeful falsehood, they in turn are unlikely to believe that others would be capable of such "monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation."

Beyond mere persuasion, Hitler accused his opponents (namely Jews, but also Americans and the British) of expertly using propaganda as psychological coercion. Hitler explained that propaganda should focus on emotions, rather than logic. In 1933, Hitler established the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda to spread Nazi propaganda throughout Germany. It is easy to see the technique of the Big Lie put to full use in the Nazis' creation of propaganda.

Many argue that all communication is some form of persuasion, and that the difference between the terms *education* and *propaganda* are simply a choice of words. Propaganda, originally

a neutral term, is now so closely associated with warfare and Nazi propaganda that it is largely considered negative. Most sources today define the differences between propaganda and education based on purpose and source. Education is persuasion based on truth and engaged in for the betterment of the target of the education. Propaganda is persuasion based on misrepresentations and half-truths and engaged in for the betterment of the source of the propaganda. Propaganda is the act of spreading information to some large audience in an effort to persuade or unite the public under some common goal. Propaganda often omits certain facts or misrepresents the truth in some manner. While discussion of propaganda and psychological warfare was abundant in the 1940s and 1950s, interest in the subject has declined over the years.

### Effectiveness of the Big Lie Technique

Small-scale studies have examined the effectiveness of the Big Lie technique used by individuals in bargaining; it was shown that the more extreme the lie, the more successful the bargain was for the liar. Unlike propaganda, however, repetition of the lie yielded no effect on the outcome because this study dealt with the individual, not a population. An imposed opinion (such as Big Lie propaganda), when compared with opinions held by individuals prior to being subject to outside influence, has a greater impact based on the degree that the lie differs from the individual's personal opinion. This can explain why Big Lie propaganda is so effective: Individuals, on average, shift their personal opinion a greater degree after they are influenced by an opinion drastically different from their own. Additionally, over time, individuals will tend to shift their opinion to group norms.

For the Big Lie to work, the perception that it is accepted as truth is more important than whether it actually is true. Part of the technique is convincing a populace not only of the lie but also that the lie is accepted by the group. The decision making of a group influenced by propaganda can be compared to groupthink. Groupthink, as explained by Irving Janis, is the phenomenon in which each individual's decision-making process and moral judgments deteriorate, or are pushed aside, in order to conform to group pressure. Individuals in groups will feel social pressure to conform,

which can lead to groupthink. An individual disagrees with the group's decision, but at the same time perceives that everyone else agrees, and thus, feeling isolated, agrees with the group as well.

The Big Lie technique has also been used by the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. China, in particular, claimed that Americans dropped diseased insects on the country in approximately one-third of the country's press space and radio time. After the Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945, the Chinese Communist Party claimed that Japan had killed 1.75 million Chinese; by 1995, the number had inflated to 35 million. China currently implements the Big Lie technique in covering up or manipulating its own history, such as the famine that plagued the country from 1958 to 1961, and again in the mid-1970s.

Communist nations are not alone in their use of the Big Lie technique. Recently, in the United States, former president George W. Bush was accused of using Big Lie propaganda in initiating the Iraq War by claiming that weapons of mass destruction were located in the country. Nearly every government or organization uses propaganda in an attempt to gain support and achieve its goals. The psychological operations division (PSYOP) of the U.S. military is specifically devoted to spreading pro-American propaganda in the United States and other countries. However, the act of spreading a simplified truth versus spreading an outright lie separate traditional propaganda from Big Lie propaganda.

Joel T. Nadler  
Tiffany Edwards

*Southern Illinois University Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Churchill, Winston; Disinformation; Government Propaganda; Hitler, Adolf; Nazi Propaganda; World War II.

### Further Readings

Chertkoff, Jerome M. and Suzanne L. Baird.

"Applicability of the Big Lie Technique and the Last Clear Chance Doctrine to Bargaining."  
*Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*,  
v.20/3 (1971).

Helson, Harry, Robert R. Blake, and Jane Srygley Mouton. "An Experimental Investigation of the

Effectiveness of the 'Big Lie' in Shifting Attitudes."  
*Journal of Social Psychology*, v.48 (1958).

Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf* (1925). [http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein\\_Kampf](http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf) (Accessed September 2012).

## Birds

While most deception research in nonhumans to date has focused on primates, research on complex cognitive behavior in birds dating back to the early 20th century has provided evidence indicating the presence of deception. While the existence of deception in birds is still contentious, alternative explanations for the function of certain behaviors have not been as well supported. Of the possibly deceptive behaviors in birds, those that have received the most academic support are: mimicry, brood parasitism, extra-pair copulations, injury-feigning, false feeding, false calls, and withholding information. A deceptive behavior is one performed nonrandomly by an actor that causes a receiver to react inappropriately in the given situation at a cost to the receiver and in a way that benefits the actor.

### Mimicry

Mimicry, a basic form of deception, is apparent in 15 to 20 percent of avian species. In almost all cases, the mimicry is vocal—birds are known to reproduce the sounds made by other avian species, other animals, and even human-made objects. Well-known mimics include parrots (Psittaciformes), the northern mockingbird (*Mimus polyglottos*), and drongos (Dicuridae). While no single function has been determined for such accurate vocal mimicry, some species, namely within the drongo family, appear to deceptively use this ability. Birds have been known to mimic calls of other bird species in order to attract individuals of that species to assist in mobbing a predator or to aid in foraging. It is argued that birds that produce accurate mimetic vocalizations in appropriate contexts are acting deceptively because the calls affect others in ways that benefit the caller. Alternatively, if birds randomly produce the calls, regardless of context, they are not behaving

deceptively, even if their calls occasionally impact the behaviors of others in a way that benefits the caller. The context of mimetic calls must therefore be studied to determine if they are a true example of deception.

### Reproductive-Related Deceptions

Related to mimicry is brood or social parasitism, most common in the cuckoo (Cuculidae), cowbird (Icteridae), and honeyguide (Indicatoridae) families. Brood parasitism is a reproductive strategy in which individuals of one species (the parasites) lay their eggs in the nests of another species (the hosts), leaving the host to raise the parasitic young. It is a prime example of coevolution because the hosts gradually evolve strategies to detect parasites while parasitic eggs evolve to look increasingly similar to eggs of the host, limiting the number rejected. The young of some species even mimic the begging calls or plumage of the hosts' young. If the parasites are not detected, the young of the hosts are typically killed. Nestlings of certain parasitic species have concave backs to push host young from the nest and specialized bill hooks to kill them, or they simply outcompete them by eating all the food that the adult hosts provide. In other parasite species, the adult will eject the eggs of the host as it is laying its own. Brood parasitism severely impacts the reproductive success of the host while benefiting the parasite.

Another form of deception that impacts reproductive success, extra-pair mating, has been reported in at least one species in nearly every avian family. The term applies only to bird species that pair bond, and has been well studied in the pied flycatcher (*Ficedula hypoleuca*) and great reed warbler (*Acrocephalus arundinaceus*). Extra-pair copulations occur when an individual mates with another who is not its social pair. Males have been known to mate with a first female and attempt to attract a second after she has laid her eggs. Some species, such as the pied flycatcher, achieve their deceptive polygyny by defending multiple territories, known as polyterritoriality. After its mate lays eggs, the male will establish a second territory from which to call. Species such as the great reed warbler, on the other hand, defend large territories, and will call to attract a secondary female from a location far away from

their mate. Whatever the method, extra-pair copulations can be called deceptive only if researchers are able to ascertain that the secondary female is not aware of the male's mated status. Extra-pair mating has been shown to reduce the breeding success of the secondary females that are left to raise the young alone while benefiting the male by increasing his fitness.

In order to improve reproductive success, nesting birds of many avian species use distraction displays as part of their behavioral repertoire when confronted by predators. While most displays are not considered deceptive, injury-feigning has been thoroughly studied and is believed by many to be an example of tactical deception. Injury-feigning, used most notably by plovers (Charadriidae), refers to birds acting in a way consistent with injury (such as fanning the tail, dragging one or both wings, and walking awkwardly) in front of a predator, apparently to lead the predator away from their nest. However, birds do not feign injuries in front of large animals that are not a direct threat to their young, that is, those who may accidentally trample eggs but would not eat them, suggesting that injury-feigning is not simply a natural response to animals approaching the nest but is deliberately used in appropriate contexts. This behavior appears deceptive because the birds move first to a location where the predator will see them, and then continue to move away from their nest while appearing to monitor the response of the predator. They will even fly back and repeat their actions if the predator does not follow.

While the young of most species are solely raised by a mated pair, cooperative breeding, in which more than two individuals are responsible for raising a single brood, occurs in approximately 3 percent of birds and allows for another potential deception—false feeding. A deceptive helper may go to the nest with no food, give nestlings only part of what it holds in its crop, or only pretend to feed the nestlings before eating the food itself. White-winged choughs (*Corcorax melanorhamphos*), laughing kookaburras (*Dacelo novaeguineae*), and carrion crows (*Corvus corone*) engage in false feeding. False feeding benefits the deceivers because they do not lose food, yet they still appear helpful to conspecifics (members of the same species) that



may otherwise punish them. It is likely that this behavior is an example of deception because it occurs most often when the cheater is alone at the nest and, if the cheater is caught, it is punished by the group.

### Calling and Caching

Another behavior in which duplicity is common is calling. Various birds use false alarm calls because the high cost of not responding to an honest alarm call generally causes animals to respond before they receive evidence of the call's veracity. False alarm calls are typically utilized in competition over a resource because they are safer to the caller than a threat display, which may lead to a physical altercation. False calls are considered deceptive because they are used when the situation does not apparently require them (i.e., an alarm call when no threat is present) and they benefit the caller in some way. Despite their low-risk and large benefits, false calls are naturally controlled because they will become ineffective if overused—conspecifics will stop responding to both honest and dishonest versions of the call.

Perhaps the most complex example of deception is practiced by members of the corvid family (Corvidae), which includes crows, ravens, rooks, jays, and magpies, regarded as the most intelligent of all avian species, with the possible exception of some parrots. Many corvids temporarily cache surpluses of food for later. Their high intelligence allows them to remember a great number of cache locations, and they are even capable of remembering locations where conspecifics have cached food. Therefore, an individual's cache may be raided by conspecifics, and corvids appear to prevent this raiding by manipulating the attention of others, primarily by withholding information. They choose to cache in areas with few or no conspecifics nearby, cache behind objects, delay caching, create false caches, and may even change cache locations. Research has shown that corvids often recache only if it is likely that a conspecific witnessed their initial hiding location, indicating that this behavior is not random.

This is a complex form of deception because the behavior depends on an individual bird's understanding what conspecifics can or cannot see and adjusting its behavior appropriately to prevent the others from learning its cache locations.

### Conclusion

Many behaviors performed by different avian species may be examples of tactical deception. Although other explanations are offered, deception remains the most likely function for mimicry (in certain species), brood parasitism, extra-pair copulations, injury-feigning, false feeding, false calls, and withholding information during caching. In all cases, the deceiver benefits from its actions and seems to utilize the behavior only when appropriate. Further research is necessary to determine whether these actions can definitely be attributed to deception.

Caitlin Homan  
University of Portsmouth

**See Also:** Animals; Courtship, Deception in; Darwin, Charles; Evolution and Natural Selection; Mimicry; Theory of Mind.

### Further Readings

- Clayton, N. S., J. M. Dally, and N. J. Emery. "Social Cognition by Food-Caching Corvids: The Western Scrub-Jay as a Natural Psychologist." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, v.362 (2007).
- Goodale, E. and S. W. Kotagama. "Context-Dependent Vocal Mimicry in a Passerine Bird." *Proceedings of The Royal Society*, v.273 (2006).
- Payne, R. B. "The Ecology of Brood Parasitism in Birds." *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, v.8 (1977).
- Ristau, C. "Aspects of the Cognitive Ethology of an Injury-Feigning Bird, the Piping Plover." In *Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals*, C. Ristau, ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

## Blair, Jayson

In 2003, the *New York Times* revealed that one of its reporters, Jayson Blair, had fabricated and plagiarized material in many of his stories. The mea culpa came in a more than 7,000-word article that began on the front page of the newspaper. According to the publication's apology, "The widespread



fabrication and plagiarism represents a profound betrayal of trust and a low point in the 152-year history of the newspaper, the 23-year-old reporter had severely tarnished the reputation of one of the country's top newspapers.

An investigation into the stories that Blair wrote found that he had often pretended to travel to places to interview sources but never made the trips. This was a violation of the *Times*' policy on "dateline integrity." Blair fabricated details and copied the quotes included in stories written by reporters for other newspapers. The stealing of quotes led to his downfall when a reporter at another newspaper noticed them. An investigation proved that Blair had a lengthy history of fabrication and plagiarism.

### Charging Ahead

Blair's rise to a reporting position at the nation's top newspaper was swift. He was a journalism student at the University of Maryland when he began to stand out as a driven reporter. His fellow classmates at the school's newspaper, *The Diamondback*, later noted that this was also when he began lying and making mistakes.

While reporting at the student newspaper, he exceeded the number of corrections that were allowed. Yet, after only one semester at the publication, he applied to be an editor. The staff supported another student, although an outside board chose Blair for the job.

As an editor, Blair continued to make mistakes, and was chronically unreachable. He would miss deadlines and make up stories. In one example, he did not return to the newsroom after saying that he was making a quick trip back to his apartment. The next day, he reappeared and announced that he had almost died the night before when the kitchen gas stove was left on; he was saved only when a roommate woke him up. Curious, one of the students made calls to campus housing and learned that there were no gas connections on the campus.

Despite the warnings about Blair's journalistic errors and deceptions, Blair was chosen for top internships. In 1996, he interned at the *Boston Globe*'s Washington, D.C., bureau, and he returned the following summer to the newspaper's Boston offices.

In the summer of 1998, Blair landed an internship with the *New York Times*. He returned to

intern at the newspaper the following summer. At this point, he had one year of college coursework left at the University of Maryland. He never earned a college degree.

At the *Times*, he continued to make errors. At one point, he told editors that he was having problems because of the death of a cousin at the Pentagon during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It was later learned that Blair had fabricated the cousin.

In April 2002, *Times*' Metropolitan Editor Jonathan Landman issued a memo recommending that Blair no longer report for the newspaper. Blair took a brief leave from the newspaper and, rather than being punished, was awarded with a top story—the Washington, D.C., sniper case. He was not questioned when he used anonymous sources for important information.

Some publicly questioned if Blair would have made such errors of judgment if he had spent more time at smaller papers and climbed the ladder like most reporters. Others noted that because Blair was African American, his race may have played a role in being hired so young and receiving extra chances after he had repeatedly erred.

A reporter at the *San Antonio Express-News* ultimately exposed Blair's deception. Macarena Hernandez noted how similar one of Blair's stories was to one that she had written. She checked with the subject of the story, learning that Blair had never interviewed her. She soon made a call to the *Times*, where she had previously interned with Blair.

After the *Times*' editors were notified of Blair's stealing quotes, an investigation was instigated. Five reporters and three editors spent a week verifying information that Blair had submitted from October 2002 through his resignation on May 1, 2003. They found problems with 36 of the 73 stories published. In a brief review of the other 600 stories he had written earlier, more fabrications were discovered.

In the aftermath, Blair signed a six-figure book deal. The book, *Burning Down My Master's House*, was panned by critics and sold poorly. More than 200,000 copies were published, but in the first nine days of sales, only 1,400 books were sold.

The fallout from Blair's actions was swift. A meeting was held and grievances were aired about how he had been protected. *Times*' Executive

Editor Howell Raines and Managing Editor Gerald Boyd resigned soon after because of the fallout from Blair's actions.

The scandal led to crackdowns at newspapers across the country, where editors demanded more information about sources. Journalism schools included Blair's story as a cautionary tale about lapses in journalism ethics.

Blair's name is often mentioned along with other journalists who fabricated information, such as Stephen Glass at the *New Republic* and Janet Cooke at the *Washington Post*. In Cooke's case, she was forced to return her Pulitzer Prize when it was revealed that she had lied about information in her award-winning story.

Kimberly Wilmot Voss  
*University of Central Florida*

**See Also:** Cheating; Glass, Stephen; Lying, Costs of; News Media: Print; Plagiarism.

### Further Readings

Blair, Jayson. *Burning Down My Master's House*. Los Angeles: New Millennium, 2004.

Calvert, Clay and Robert D. Richards. "Journalistic Malpractice: Suing Jayson Blair and the *New York Times* for Fraud and Negligence." *Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and Entertainment*, v.14/1 (2003).

Folkenflik, David. "The Making of Jayson Blair." *Baltimore Sun* (February 29, 2004).

Rieder, Rem. "The Jayson Blair Affair." *American Journalism Review* (June 2003).

Rosen, Jill. "All About the Retrospect." *American Journalism Review* (June 2003).

---

## Bluffing

Bluffing can be delineated from lying in general in that bluffing typically involves attempts at making someone believe something that is not true by virtue of displaying false confidence in one's position. This confidence can be either heightened, such as when an individual tries to convince someone of the strength of the individual's position; or deflated, such as when an individual

attempts to convince someone of the weakness of the individual's position.

Bluffing often entails the presentation of misinformation vis-à-vis the manipulation of attractive alternatives and/or information. That is, one may obscure the range of behavioral options available to another person by making some options seem more costly or less attractive. For example, a meek woman who is threatened by an attacker may bluff her opponent by standing tall and taking a fighting stance in the hope of prompting her attacker into thinking that the costs are too great to pursue his aggressive behavior.

Another differentiation from lying is that typically the person being bluffed has the (sometimes unknown) advantage of time and/or the ability to "call" the bluff. That is, usually over time, the bluffer's true position is revealed, as in the case of a poker hand. Also, the person being bluffed can always "call" or ask the bluffer to present proof of his or her false assertions and, unlike a lie, this proof is required to maintain the deception. Research on bluffing has focused on four key contexts: (1) interrogations, (2) sports, (3) bargaining or economic settings, and (4) games of chance or skill.

Police officers employ bluffing as an interrogation method in order to convince suspects that the evidence against them is stronger than it actually is. For instance, the police may lie about finding a particular piece of damning evidence or about the results of a forensic test in the hope of convincing the suspect that the evidence against him or her is particularly strong and that denial is futile. This technique is usually combined with falsehoods regarding leniency, should the suspect make a confession. Here, research has shown that bluffing increases the rate of false confessions. For example, in one study, research participants took dictation while in the presence of a confederate. During the dictation, the computer crashed, supposedly because the participants hit the ALT key (something they were informed explicitly not to do because it would result in crashing the computer). When participants were accused of hitting the ALT key in conjunction with having the confederate serve as an erroneous eyewitness, the rate of false confessions nearly doubled to 94 percent, and of those confessions, 55 percent of participants were convinced that they may have

actually hit the ALT key. Recently, other research has shown that even more subtle bluffs can result in surprisingly high levels of false confessions. Thus, apparently innocent suspects will admit to a crime, hoping that the false or misrepresented evidence will exonerate them.

In sports, the majority of research has focused on detecting or anticipating movement. Being able to anticipate an opponent's movements can give one a strategic advantage in games such as tennis or soccer. Laboratory and field studies have both shown that novices tend to perform worse at detecting the direction of movement than more experienced players. Research in this context typically uses judgments on kinematic movement; that is, attempting to discern direction of movement using videos or point-light displays. However, knowing that anticipation offers strategic advantage, players will often foreshadow false movements to mislead their opponents into thinking that they are taking a direction that they are not. For example, football players will often make a movement to the left (or right), and then advance in the opposite direction to throw off the defending player. Theoretically, the enhanced ability by experts to detect movement direction should extend toward detecting deceptive movements. Research supporting this hypothesis, however, is mixed and may depend on the sport. Boxing novices outperform experts with fewer false alarms, suggesting that too much expertise resulted in seeing deception that was not there, but expert rugby players were more discriminating of deceptive movements than novices.

In the business setting, research on bluffing has taken two tracks: One looks at attempting to conceal an individual's true position in bargaining, and the other on presenting falsified information to business rivals. In the first line of research, union contracts, car and house sales, and even market haggling all involve the use of bluffing tactics in that all tend to imply that their bottom-line walk-away position is far lower (or higher) than it really is. For instance, labor leaders often start by saying they want a large wage increase or else that they are walking away from the bargaining table. In the second line of research, businesses often mislead others by filing erroneous patents, announcing fictitious new products, or making false alliances. Research in both of these



*John Phan contemplates his strategy at the 2008 World Series of Poker in Las Vegas, Nevada, June 17, 2008. As in the case of a poker hand, the bluffer's true position is usually revealed over time, and the person being bluffed can "call" the bluffer on it.*

areas has focused on the moral permissibility of bluffing in business settings, with scant attention paid to the psychological mechanisms or implications of bluffing.

Bluffing in the context of games of chance or skill typically involves misleading one's opponent into thinking that one's odds of winning are either more or less likely than they actually are in order to secure greater economic or strategic advantage over the opponent. Bluffing in poker has amassed a sizable literature, whereas games of skill such as checkers and chess have received less research attention. Bluffing in poker often entails more subtle forms of deception, such as feigning that one has worse cards than one actually

does; whereas games of skill may often employ false moves to mislead the other player into committing to a desired course of action that is more advantageous to the bluffer.

Bluffing can take many forms and appears in a variety of contexts. Research supports that bluffing tends to be effective, even against experts.

Kevin Rounding  
Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen's University*

**See Also:** Baseball; Basketball; College Sports; False Confessions; Football; High School Sports; Poker; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

Ekman, P. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2009.

Jackson, R. C., S. Warren, and B. Abernethy. "Anticipation Skill and Susceptibility to Deceptive Movement." *Acta Psychologica*, v.123 (2006).

Perillo, J. T. and S. M. Kassir. "Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confessions." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.35 (2011).

## Bok, Sissela

Renowned philosopher and ethicist Sissela Bok was born in Sweden. She was internationally educated at the Sorbonne, Université de Paris, from 1954 to 1955; George Washington University, B.A. in 1957 and M.A. in 1958; and Harvard University, Ph.D. in 1970. Bok is the daughter of two Nobel Prize winners, Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, and has served on the Nobel Prize board as chair or a member for nearly a decade. She is married to Derek Bok, former law professor and president of Harvard University, and has one daughter, Hilary Bok, who is also a philosopher. In 2012, Bok was a senior visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies.

Bok is the author of numerous respected articles and books. Two publications of particular relevance to lying and deception are *Lying: Moral Choice in Private and Public Life*, originally

published in 1978 and reissued in 1989 and 1999, and *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*, published in 1982. *Lying* was well received, earning the George Orwell Award and the Melcher Book Award.

*Lying* was particularly relevant when originally published because there were few, if any, modern-day texts focused on ethics and lying. Bok's work provided the first thorough investigation of everyday moral choices, including relevant quotations from philosophers and theologians from earlier centuries. And while there are many current texts analyzing moral choices, *Lying* is still regarded as one of the preeminent sources.

According to Bok in *Lying*, lying is any intentional stated message meant to deceive. This dramatically narrows the topic of lying. Not considered as lying are statements that a person did not create to deceive, statements that the person did not know were false, and all the ways that individuals deceive without relying upon words. Bok's new forward to the 1999 reissued *Lying* addresses this weakness, adding that a more accurate definition of lying exists between two extremes: a false statement deliberately presented as true and anything meant to deceive or create a false impression. This would greatly broaden the definition of lying from the original definition presented in *Lying*, though Bok acknowledges that she has addressed this broader definition in many of her written works since *Lying*.

The Principle of Veracity is a premise developed by Bok in *Lying*, which argues that lies should be given a negative weight; the moral presumption is against lying. This includes white lies and all other lies. Bok's justification is that individuals live in a world that relies on a system of trust, and lies violate that trust; individuals do not have the time to verify all information each time they hear it, thus veracity is a fundamental requirement of the communication system. When a person violates this trust, he or she fails to maintain their part of the societal system, and in so doing takes unfair advantage of others. Furthermore, the liar harms him or herself, creating a future propensity to continue lying, expending energy to create and maintain lies, and creating the possibility to harm the liar's credibility if caught in the lie. Thus, Bok argues, lies are harmful to society, the dupe, and the liar.



However, Bok does not claim that all lies are unacceptable. Instead, she argues that lies should be a last option. She does not offer easy solutions to the question of when it is acceptable to tell a lie but instead offers the “Publicity Test.” This test requires that a lie be acceptable to a general audience of reasonable persons, including persons like the dupe. It is rare that people like the dupe accept being lied to. Thus, before lying, an individual should ask others or imagine how others of all different types would respond and only move forward with the lie if others would approve of its use. This is a difficult task because as an underlying requirement is to remain unbiased while analyzing other people’s actual responses or imagined hypothetical responses.

Applying these premises, the Principle of Veracity and the Publicity Test, Bok analyzed lying in a variety of contexts—for example, lies for the public good, deceptive social science research, and lies to the sick and dying—illustrating the need to address lies in particular contexts. In her most recent forward to *Lying*, Bok addresses additional contexts that she would analyze if the book were written today: stories told by brain-damaged individuals; pathological lying; pleasurable motives for deceit; and brutal, needless, or uncaring truth-telling.

Bok offers a follow-up to *Lying with Secrets*, and though lying and keeping secrets are similar in many ways, Bok offers cogent analyses of context-specific arguments that examine the appropriateness of keeping secrets to point out a fundamental difference. Bok evaluates lies as morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally neutral. This means that while every lie requires justification, every secret does not. Bok notes that this difference is derived from the paradoxical nature of secrets when she says, “secrecy both protects and thwarts moral perception, reasoning, and choice” in her preface to *Secrets*. Thus, instead of arguing for or against secrets, Bok depicts the need to thoroughly analyze every situation in which individuals choose to use secrets, demonstrating when they are appropriate and inappropriate. As in *Lies*, Bok conducts this in-depth analysis via a variety of contexts: corporate secrecy, secrets of state, whistleblowing, and investigative journalism, among others. However, in *Secrets*, Bok does not offer a set of similar premises to analyze each

context; instead, each context is independently analyzed.

In the early 21st century, Bok’s work broadened to include the study of happiness, but her earlier works are a cornerstone in the study of lying and deceit. Numerous book reviews speak to the significance of her work when originally published, and a current reading of the literature on lying and secrets attests to three specific ways that researchers rely upon her work: (1) as a fundamental source for legitimate definitional and conceptual references; (2) as a secondary source for relevant quotes by ancient philosophers; and (3) as juxtaposition, typically in book reviews, to current publications on the topics of lies and secrets. Sissela Bok is viewed as a distinguished ethicist among philosophers, and is accessible to the general public. Her rational arguments and concrete examples encourage people to analyze, not take for granted, situations in which lying and secrets occur.

Susan A. Stearns

*Eastern Washington University*

**See Also:** Dishonesty; Distrust; Lying, Intentionality of; Secrecy.

#### Further Readings

Betz, Joseph. “Sissela Bok on the Analogy of Deception and Violence.” *Journal of Value Inquiry*, v.19/3 (1985).

Bok, Sissela. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Bok, Sissela. *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.

---

## Bond, Charles

Charles F. Bond Jr. is a research psychologist specializing in deception and the statistical analysis of data. He is most well known for his meta-analyses of deception detection research and his work on cross-cultural deception.

Bond received his Ph.D. in 1980 from Duke University. He has held faculty appointments at several universities and has been widely published



in psychology and statistics. He moved to India for a year to research cross-cultural deception.

### Three Major Meta-Analyses of Deception

Bond has authored three highly influential meta-analyses of deception detection research. Meta-analysis is a study of prior studies. Statistical conversions are used to make prior findings comparable from study to study, allowing researchers to look for trends and to draw conclusions across large numbers of studies.

Bond's first and most influential meta-analysis of deception detection research was conducted with fellow psychologist Bella DePaulo, published in 2006 in *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. This meta-analysis summarized the results of more than 200 separate research reports, spanning more than four decades of research and just below 300 unique findings from more than 24,000 research subjects. It was a massive undertaking, and it remains the most authoritative and comprehensive summary of the deception detection literature available.

One of the major findings of the 2006 meta-analysis was that across studies, deception detection accuracy averaged just below 54 percent, slightly higher than the 50 percent expected by pure chance. Findings were normally distributed around the cross-study average, with 90 percent of prior findings falling between 45 percent and 62 percent, and 99 percent of all findings either below 68 percent or above 38 percent. The 54 percent accuracy value was statistically better than chance. Thus, the meta-analysis revealed strong, consistent, and compelling support for the idea that deception detection accuracy is slightly better than chance.

The meta-analysis also provided evidence for truth bias. Depending on the statistical approach used, somewhere between 55 percent and 57 percent of judgments were truthful. Presumably, as a consequence, the veracity effect received strong support. Accuracy for truths was 61 percent, whereas accuracy for lies was 47 percent.

The results showed that the slightly better-than-chance accuracy finding was very robust and that several factors made very little difference. It mattered little whether the research used forced-choice dichotomous truth-lie measurement, or whether honesty judgments were scaled.

If anything, the dichotomous measures yielded slightly higher accuracy. It also mattered little if accuracy was calculated as a raw average, or if complex signal detection statistics were used. Different measures correlated nearly perfectly. Differences in communication media made little difference (video, no sound, 51 percent; audio, no visual, 53 percent; both audio and video, 54 percent). Motivated liars (54 percent) yielded about the same degree of accuracy as liars lacking motivation (53 percent). Spontaneous lies (53 percent) and prepared lies (54 percent) produced similar findings.

Watching baseline honest communication first provided little help (53 percent versus 54 percent). The same was true for judge expertise (nonexperts, 53 percent; experts, 55 percent) and interaction (no interaction, 53 percent; interaction between sender and judge, 52 percent; interaction with a third party, 54 percent). Regardless, accuracy was slightly better than chance. The most influential factor affecting accuracy was the size of the study. The larger the study in terms of the number of judgments made, the closer the results to the 54 percent average. Thus, the 2006 Bond and DePaulo study documents slightly better-than-chance accuracy in deception detection experiments, regardless of methodology or an extenuating circumstance.

In 2008, Bond and DePaulo conducted another meta-analysis, which has been less influential than its predecessor, but is equally important and informative. Rather than looking at averages across studies, the focus was individual differences. Individual differences are concerned with how close people are, on average, to the average. In other words, looking at individual differences asks the question, "Are people pretty much the same, or are people different from other people?" With regard to deception detection, the Bond and DePaulo study investigated individual differences in both senders and judges, and differences and similarities in both accuracy and truth bias.

The results of this meta-analysis showed that there are very few differences between judges in their ability to detect deception. It matters little who the judges are in deception detection experiments because everyone performs similarly. In contrast, there were big differences in sender believability. Some people are seen as more honest

and sincere than others, regardless of whether or not they are honest. The individual differences in judge-truth bias and sender transparency lie between the two extremes.

Bond's third meta-analysis with Maria Hartwig, in 2011, combined research on deception detection accuracy with research on cues to deception to explain why people are only slightly better than chance. Two explanations were tested. One was that there are useful cues to deception, but people look for the wrong things; the other was that people use the more valid cues, but even the most valid cues are only weakly linked with actual deception. The findings were consistent with the second explanation. People tended to use more valid cues more than less valid cues, but even the most valid cues involved considerable error.

Besides meta-analysis, Bond has conducted important research on cultural similarities and differences in deception. Perhaps his most interesting and important finding regarding culture and deception was reported in 2006 in the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Bond put together a team of researchers who examined perceptions of liars in 75 different countries around the world. Research subjects were asked, "How can you know when someone is lying?" By far, the most common answer is that a liar will not look another person in the eye. Almost two-thirds of the people surveyed listed gaze aversion as a signal of lying. No other stereotype was close. Gaze was listed as the top response in almost 90 percent of the countries surveyed. The belief that liars act nervous was second (listed by 28 percent of the subjects). Thus, the belief that liars won't look another person in the eye appears to extend across cultures and is widespread.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; DePaulo, Bella; Honest Baseline Behaviors; Meta-Analysis; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

#### Further Readings

Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10 (2006).

Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).

Bond, C. F., Jr. and the Global Deception Research Team. "A World of Lies." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, v.37 (2006).

Hartwig, M. and C. F. Bond, Jr. "Why Do Lie-Catchers Fail? A Lens Model Meta-Analysis of Human Lie Judgments." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.137 (2011).

## Book of Mormon

There are at least two reasons that the Book of Mormon, which several million people consider to be sacred scripture, may be of interest to people who study lying and deception. The first reason is that the Book of Mormon contains many teachings about dishonesty. These teachings, from a book that is subtitled "Another Testament of Jesus Christ," are generally consistent with Christian doctrines about dishonesty. A second reason is that many people who have learned about the Book of Mormon's origins doubt believers' claims about what the book is, and where it came from. To many skeptics, it appears that the Book of Mormon's origins have been extensively lied about by its adherents.

#### Teachings About Lying

Like the Bible, the Book of Mormon teaches that lying is a serious sin. One Book of Mormon prophet states that liars will be thrust down to hell (a place of suffering in the afterlife for those who lived wickedly). The devil, a tempter of human beings and the overseer of hell, is described as the master of sin and the father of all lies. According to the Book of Mormon, the devil not only tempts people to lie but also rules over liars after they die and are banished to hell.

The Book of Mormon makes a distinction between God's true church and other, false churches. One prophecy describes false churches as having lax attitudes toward lying and taking advantage of others, with the implication that honesty should prevail in God's true church. Prophets in the Book of Mormon preach against

various deceptive behaviors and also teach that God is incapable of lying.

Several stories in the Book of Mormon suggest that under some circumstances, a just consequence for attempting to deceive people with false religious doctrines is death. In one such story, a preacher named Nehor is put to death for teaching perceived falsehoods (such as the idea that all of humanity will ultimately be granted eternal life). Nehor is executed in compliance with a law written by a God-fearing and well-respected king. In a second story, a vocal atheist named Korihor, who is also described as a deceiver of the public, is struck permanently speechless during a debate with a high priest. Korihor subsequently becomes a beggar and is ultimately run down in the street and killed. The author of the Korihor story ends the tale by noting that Korihor's death is an example of what can happen to those who try to deceive the public with false doctrines.

### Claims and Doubts About the Book's Origins

The introductory pages of the Book of Mormon identify the book as a volume of sacred scripture similar to the Bible, written by ancient prophets in the Western Hemisphere. (Later pages describe the events in the Book of Mormon as taking place between 2500 B.C.E. and 400 C.E.) The book's introductory pages also describe how Joseph Smith, a 19th-century American, found the book on a hillside near his home in upstate New York. Smith claimed that he found the original book, a set of inscribed plates of gold, with an angel's guidance. In other documents, some of Smith's associates described Smith as finding the plates not with the help of an angel, but with the help of a special stone that granted Smith private visions.

Smith claimed that his translation of the gold plates produced "the most correct of any book on earth." Within a few years, he established the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (or LDS Church) and described himself as a prophet. Some of Smith's modern followers in the LDS Church and several offshoot churches accept Smith's claims about the Book of Mormon's origins in their entirety; others value the Book of Mormon's religious teachings while doubting the book's historicity. People who reject Smith's claim of being a divinely selected prophet tend to also doubt Smith's claims about the Book of Mormon's

origins. The majority of scholars who study pre-Columbian history and archaeology have either ignored the Book of Mormon, or have expressed doubts about its historical value.

Book of Mormon skeptics have noted how little evidence there is that Smith ever had gold plates. Smith wrote that after he translated the plates, he returned them to the same angel who revealed their location on the hill. To many believers, the possibility that an angel made the plates unavailable is consistent with other instances of God testing people's faith. To nonbelievers, however, there seems to be an inconsistency. Having people accept the Book of Mormon was a priority to Smith. He initiated a missionary effort that today includes more than 50,000 LDS missionaries who teach about the Book of Mormon. If the plates were still available for inspection, they might provide convincing evidence of the Book of Mormon's authenticity and help bring many more believers to the LDS Church.

During the period that Smith is said to have had the plates, almost everyone who asked him for permission to see them was forbidden. However, two groups of Smith's trusted followers (one group of eight and another of three men) testified that they saw the plates. The two testimonies of these groups are published in the front of the Book of Mormon. Skeptics have noted that five of the 11 witnesses were from a family named Whitmer, and a sixth was a Whitmer son-in-law. Three more were from Smith's immediate family and a fourth was Smith's third cousin. Skeptics have also noted that there is evidence that the witnesses saw the plates only in spiritual visions.

Other doubts about the Book of Mormon have arisen from the book's content. To some authors, parts of the Book of Mormon appear to have been plagiarized from texts that were available in Smith's time. In addition, anachronisms in the Book of Mormon have been identified, such as mention of animals (e.g., horses, elephants) that did not exist in the Americas during the Book of Mormon era. The Book of Mormon teaches that Native Americans (some older editions imply most Native Americans, but a newer edition implies only some) are descended from people who migrated from Jerusalem. However, current genetic, archaeological, and anthropological evidence does not support this hypothesis. LDS

scholars, some affiliated with Brigham Young University, have published numerous responses to these and other Book of Mormon criticisms.

Paul Rose  
Southern Illinois University

**See Also:** Bible; Catholic Church; Historical Narratives, False; Plagiarism; Witness, False Testimony of.

### Further Readings

Abanes, R. *One Nation Under Gods: A History of the Mormon Church*. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2002.

Bushman, R. L. *Joseph Smith: Rough Stone Rolling*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.

Persuitte, D. *Joseph Smith and the Origins of the Book of Mormon*. 2d ed. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2000.

Smith, J. *The Book of Mormon: Another Testament of Jesus Christ*. Salt Lake City, UT: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1981.

## "Boy Who Cried Wolf"

Although most people believe that they are able to detect when others are lying, research demonstrates that they are not able to do so. Interest in being able to know when another is lying has resulted in a variety of studies undertaken to examine this phenomenon. The boy-who-cried-wolf effect is a psychological heuristic, or simple learned rule, that helps explain how individuals make the decision that someone is lying. The boy-who-cried-wolf effect demonstrates that most observers are unable to distinguish the trait of trustworthiness from honesty, and is thus consistent with other research in the field. Once individuals believe that another person is lying, they tend to rate that person as generally untrustworthy. It also seems that once a negative evaluation of someone's trustworthiness has been formed, it is very difficult to change that assessment.

Attempts to determine human ability to detect when deception occurs as a part of interpersonal communication have taken place for over

a century. The "Boy Who Cried Wolf" is one of Aesop's fables, a series of stories attributed to Aesop, a slave and storyteller who lived in ancient Greece. Fables have long been viewed as a way to teach truths, especially to children. The "Boy Who Cried Wolf" involves a boy who works as a shepherd, guarding sheep that graze in a pasture near a village. The boy becomes bored watching the sheep, and periodically goes into the town and falsely tells the villagers that a wolf is attacking the sheep. After several such false alarms, the villagers resolve not to be tricked again and no longer put faith in the shepherd's statements. When a real wolf then appears and begins attacking the flock, the shepherd again seeks the villagers' assistance, but to no avail. As a result of the shepherd's prior deceptions, the villagers refuse to believe him and the flock of sheep is destroyed.

For over 2,500 years, the "Boy Who Cried Wolf" has been used as a moral example of the risks of deception, especially for children. The fable has great appeal because it clearly makes the case that lying results in bad things occurring to the tellers of falsehoods. Because the "Boy Who Cried Wolf" is not tied to any one faith, it is accessible to members of various cultures and religions. The fable has had significant influence, so much so that the phrase "to cry wolf" has become synonymous with lying.

### Crying Wolf in Theory

Examinations of why individuals are unable to distinguish between the deceptive and truthful communication and behavior of others have begun to examine the role of cognitive heuristics in determining deception. Fundamental attribution error (FAE) is one such cognitive heuristic. FAE involves the tendency to overestimate the importance of dispositional factors, such as making eye contact or loquaciousness, when deciding whether another is making truthful or untruthful statements while underestimating the significance of the situation in which the observed behavior occurs (such as during a medical examination, as opposed to during an afternoon party). Studies that explore the boy-who-cried-wolf effect examine why humans have difficulty determining when a normally untrustworthy person is telling the truth, or when a normally trustworthy person is engaging in deceptive statements.



The boy-who-cried-wolf effect examines how a general reputation for veracity or dishonesty affects the abilities, biases, genetic capabilities, or motivations of the individual who attempts to distinguish truth from deception. Specifically, these studies have examined the characteristics of the receiver of information, not the person sending truthful or untruthful statements. By examining the difficulty in detecting lies from the perspective of the receiving party, these studies have disclosed a cognitive bias among observers that reflects observers' beliefs regarding the personal characteristics of the sender, rather than actual differences in the credibility or demeanor of those being assessed.

What these studies have found is that when receivers attribute positive traits to someone, such as thinking someone to be attractive, interesting, or likeable, receivers are more likely to believe the other person is also telling the truth. As a result, positive correlations are found between positive dispositional judgments and truth accuracy, but these same attributions will work against the receiver when the sender is actually lying. If a receiver thinks well of the sender, the receiver will be disposed to believe that the sender is truthful. When the sender who is well thought of is actually lying, the receiver's accuracy in detecting deception is negatively affected. The fundamental attribution heuristic is activated when observers are asked to decide whether another is telling the truth or lying. This finding has several implications.

Whenever individuals are asked to decide whether someone is telling the truth or not, a fundamental attribution heuristic is activated. Because most lies are not significant, individuals make an accurate overall judgment of another person that serves as a guide for their interactions with that person, rather than focusing only on the truth of the person's statements. Less than a minute is needed to reach such judgments, and consensus about credibility does not represent accuracy regarding truthfulness. Most important, however, is the realization that even confirmed liars tell the truth upon occasion, and even the most honest individuals lie from time to time. As a result, when determining whether another is lying, people should rely more upon situational-related relevant states, such as an individual's

motivations for lying, than upon the individual's enduring traits, such as a reputation for honesty.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Knox College

**See Also:** Academia; Behavioral Analysis Interview; Cognitive Heuristics; Deception Detection Accuracy; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Equivocation; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

- McGlone, M. S. and M. L. Knapp, eds. *The Interplay of Truth and Deception: New Agendas in Communication*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- O'Sullivan, M. "The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting Deception: The Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.29 (2003).
- Stevenson, Deborah. "The Boy Who Cried Wolf (Review)." *Bulletin of the Center for Children's Books*, v.59/8 (2006).

---

## Bragging and Grandiosity

Bragging is vanity on display. It occurs when a person refers to himself or his actions in excessively positive or grandiose terms. Bragging is much like praising; however, praise is offered to someone over whom the praiser claims no proprietary status. It is therefore an act of discursive giving, for it gives honor. In contrast, bragging, because it is self-referential, intends to take honor. One may brag of oneself, an object, or a bonded other such as an offspring, spouse, workplace, football team, or even a car. So long as a proprietary relationship exists between the speaker and the object, excessive positivity of language may be regarded as bragging.

### Bragging and Status

A brag is not regularly measured by the words spoken. A speaker's claim to have purchased a new car, for example, is merely a claim of fact, but it can be interpreted as a brag, depending



on the occasion, the audience, and the tone of voice, and so forth. Conceived as an attempt to claim or raise status, the dynamics governing bragging fall into place. One can hypothesize, for example, that bragging will be less tolerated among equals in contexts in which social status and mobility are comparatively rigid, such as classrooms and organizations. On the other hand, where status and mobility are flexible, bragging tends to be better tolerated, such as within competitive sports, where one can win “bragging rights” by advancing to a higher competitive level or by winning a game. Similarly, toddlers who brag about height, skill development, and even the quality of a bowel movement find their announcements well-received and congratulated, for the infant is obligated to a long period of status development.

Nevertheless, because social resources are finite, audiences regularly respond with trepidation to the bragger’s attempt to raise status and with envy of the bragger’s claim to new status. Bragging’s effect is best understood by imagining the words “I am better than you because . . .” prior to the boast, for it is a reminder that the one who is most sensitive to the brag is the one who feels a threat in it, a threat not felt by people who are far outside the status of the bragger. Neither a millionaire nor a vagrant, for example, will experience much more than boredom if a plumber brags that he averages \$200 for each house call; but another plumber who averages \$130 for his house calls will feel the bitter sting of lost status in the bragger’s words.

When the brag is discovered as a lie, the resentment is even greater because the brag in that case is patently recognized as an attempt to steal status. The dynamic relationship between bragging and resentment is well delivered in the Barry Levinson film *Envy* (2004), in which a 3M worker becomes unbearably envious and resentful of his friend and coworker’s successful get-rich-quick invention.

In Western culture, for century upon century, the virtue of *humiltas*, a caution against bragging, has been set forth as a quality of the refined in character. Similarly, in the East, *ch’ien*, commonly translated as “modesty,” takes a similar position. In this parallel, a cross-cultural disposition can be detected against bragging that is intimately connected with the preservation of established

hierarchies, a broadly distributed disposition against bragging that is organized around the dissuading aphorism “know your place.” Thus, when a bragger is referred to as “uppity,” the status ambition implicit in the phrase should not be overlooked. The corollary for *humiltas* was another virtue known as *magnanimitas*, which meant an awareness of one’s greatness. For the devout of the medieval tradition, this was a greatness grounded in their relationship with Christ. The “Christ loves me” expression has repeatedly played a role in social revolutions because it provides a logic from within which the oppressed can be in solidarity with a claim of higher status than the oppressor. Among the nobility, the term *magnanimitas* was self-referential, rather than exclusively Christ-directed, and is well-illustrated by Louis XIV’s well known articulation, *l’état, c’est moi* (the state, it is I).

### The Bragger’s Paradox

Because of envy, intimidation, and conflict, status transition is always a delicate and dangerous social process, one that is regularly mediated through passage rituals (weddings, graduations, or promotions) for just this reason. Bragging, as an attempt to change status and circumvent the legitimate process for doing so, can breed enemies and ultimately result in more status harm than good. The brag statement proposes a hierarchical no-man’s land, a wild west of social position. It thus can cause others to wish or bring harm onto the bragger, and thereby initiates dynamics that may escalate to the point that community wellbeing is threatened. As a result, communities that seek homeostasis tend to sanction bragging. To brag regardless of those sanctions is often seen as a weakness in character, to be a person who is arrogant or insecure. Thus, alongside the fear or envy it may breed, recognized bragging may even lead to status diminishment. Such are the considerations at the heart of what can be called the bragger’s paradox. Successful bragging is thus a delicate art, for one can get into the newspaper, even making headlines, but one cannot carry the newspaper across the street to ensure that the neighbors will see it.

Because of the contingencies of the bragger’s paradox, the artful bragger cultivates strategies to bring forth a brag with subtlety: the former friend

who calls after decades to inquire about a trivial reference that he needs for the book he has been asked to write, the associate who asks another person to mention one of his accomplishments at a party, or the man who used to live down the street and now “happens to be in the neighborhood” with his expensive new car. For the most part, such status bids minimize the bragging quality attendant to them.

The bragger’s paradox plays a prominent role in political rhetoric. Even in cultures in which political power is disproportionately in the hands of the wealthy, political ascendancy requires candidates to demonstrate that they are “of the people” in spirit, if not in fact. Politicians must therefore find a way to convince publics that they are better than their opponents, but not better than their electorate. To allow the public to sense its status inferiority during an electoral cycle is tantamount to political suicide. Consequently, prudent politicians cultivate an aura of humility and “hale fellow well met” in everything they do. Given the everpresent media, however, they are not always successful. Wealthy Mitt Romney, for example, was irreparably damaged by a video in which he expressed that the 47 percent of Americans who believe that “the government has a responsibility to care for them” would vote for Obama no matter what.

The bragger’s paradox also proved damaging to John Lennon when he famously bragged, “We’re more popular than Jesus now.” Lennon’s brag positioned the voice of that generation above, rather than among, its audience.

### Theatrical Bragging

Intimidation plays a role in the reception of bragging when comparing the real-world bragger with the nonintimidating, pretend braggers of the entertainment industry. From the time of Sweet Daddy Siki (a.k.a. Mr. Irresistible, the ladies’ pet and the men’s regret), outrageous theatrical bragging has been used by professional wrestlers to boost their public recognition. Hulk Hogan and the deceased Macho Man exemplified both the bragging of the hero and of the villain, and much of what they claimed was so grandiose that it had to be untrue. However, there is nothing original in that, for boasting in lies in order to glorify the self before battle can even be found in the prebattle brag that

Beowulf makes to Hrothgar in the Anglo-Saxon epic *Beowulf*. Among professional wrestlers, the bragging is spectacular, but it does not turn the audience against the character because theatrical bragging makes no claim for real status and intends no elevation of status in the real world; nor can lie-bragging performed in theatrical space be an act of status theft. Theatrical bragging thus provides a pretend context in which audiences can experience some of bragging’s effects without fully experiencing the intimidation and envy that genuine bragging elicits; it functions, that is to say, in the manner characterized by Aristotle for the reception of drama in general.

Bragging has also become something of an art form within the rock and rap music genre. For example, rapper Big Bank Hank of the Sugarhill



Carl Offterdinger's illustration in *The Valiant Little Tailor* depicts the tailor tricking a unicorn into ramming his horn into a tree, thus resourcefully fulfilling another heroic deed to support his grandiose deception to the king that he is a valiant fighter.

Gang identifies himself in the song “Rapper’s Delight” with the following description:

I’m the c-a-s-a-n-the-o-v-a, and the rest is f-l-y  
 . . . ya see I’m six foot one and I’m tons of fun,  
 and I dress to a t, ya see I got more clothes than  
 Muhammad Ali and I dress so viciously, I got  
 bodyguards, I got two big cars, that definitely  
 ain’t the wack, I got a Lincoln Continental and  
 a sunroof Cadillac.

Such bragging does not breed resentment in the audience, however, probably because audience members are attuned to the pre-existing status gap between themselves and the singer. Rappers may also engage in lie-bragging like professional wrestlers; however, reception of the message is governed by the principles governing theatrical bragging. As to any resentment that might exist between rappers, it is well known that the template for rap, in particular freestyle rap and rap battling, guides the creative toward the elevation of self-status and the diminishment of status in others. The M. C. Luscious hit “Boom, I Got Your Boyfriend!” illustrates this process. Audiences may also gain the satisfaction of pronouncing the vanquishing brag without being placed in the far more complex circumstances that its real world variant would generate, a form of cathexis not elaborated by Aristotle but one that is consonant with his argument. There is also evidence that some rappers, including prominent ones, have resented each other, such as, Big Daddy Kane and Tupac Shakur.

### Lie-Bragging

All such theatrical cases imitate the real world’s honorable tradition of bragging about physical power, possibly even lie-bragging, if the issues are confrontational. Deceptive self-magnification in order to intimidate is a cross-species phenomenon with deep roots in adaptation and survival, such as performances in puffer fish, lizards, and birds. They point to the suggestive notion that bragging, even lie-bragging, can be used to forestall aggression, intimidate others, unsettle opponents, gain workplace advantage, enhance social status, or gain sexual conquest. Male braggadocio, for example, can be something of an aphrodisiac in some cultures and contexts; thus, in William

Shakespeare’s *Othello, the Moor of Venice*, Iago makes plausible to Roderigo the attraction that Desdemona felt for Othello by saying that she was originally enchanted by the Moor’s “bragging, and telling her fantastical lies.” A relic of that sort of masculine braggadocio still exists across the wide spectrum of social performances typical of contemporary Western culture, and is illustrated in such popular reading as *Winning through Intimidation* and *Brag! The Art of Tooting Your Own Horn Without Blowing It*.

Nevertheless, to be regarded a bragger is usually damaging, and to be genuinely regarded a lie-bragger is even more harmful because lie-braggers are not merely regarded as status climbers, but further as status thieves. Lie-bragging is also more risky than simple bragging because all braggers can be challenged to provide unimpeachable evidence for the veracity of the claim and this is something a lie-bragger cannot do. In politics, accusing the opposition of lie-bragging is a staple of campaign rhetoric. During his bid for the presidency, for example, Al Gore was said to brag of a closer relationship to tobacco farming than he actually had. It has also been claimed that Gore bragged of creating the Internet; this charge does not hold up to evidence, but it illustrates the long-term resonance of charges that one is a liar and a bragger.

Where status-motivated lie-bragging occurs in a literary work, it regularly plays a role in a downfall. This happens in the short story “I’m a Fool” (1922) by Sherwood Anderson. The main character brag-lies to gain a girl’s attention, only to be ultimately trapped by his original deception. Similarly, Chichikov, the main character in Nikolai Gogol’s novel *Dead Souls* (1842), is characterized as a charlatan who brag-lies and puts on displays of great wealth (which he does not possess), intending to set in motion the most undignified of schemes that instead results in downfall. Fortunato, in Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Cask of Amontillado” (1846), is also a lie-bragger because his love for alcohol seems to exceed his arrogantly professed knowledge of wine.

Other lie-braggers who are more pathetic than ambitious, such as Mr. Pumblechook in Charles Dickens’s *Great Expectations* (1860), are ridiculous, rather than condemned, at the end of the



tale. George Costanza of the television comedy *Seinfeld*, who lie-brags that he is an architect (and another time a marine biologist) and deceives by wearing a toupee, is also brought to heel through ridicule.

If a bragging liar is to appeal to a reading audience, some other quality must diminish the impact of the false vanity. The Brothers Grimm, for example, record the story of “The Valiant Little Tailor,” who starts out bragging that he killed seven flies with one blow, yet inevitably is backed into the lie that the blow killed seven men in order to forestall the aggressions of a giant. The tailor’s position, however, can be likened to the position of the threatened puffer fish and lizard—he lies in the face of intimidating power. Ultimately, the tailor fares well in the story, which focuses less on vanity and misrepresentation and more on the value of a creative and resourceful mind when solving problems; the tailor therefore experiences a remarkable change in status when he marries the princess.

Another character who bragged in lies was Sarah Moffat of the 1970s British television series *Upstairs/Downstairs*. Sarah first appears with the tale that she was raised in France and of noble birth, only to be revealed both plebian and illiterate. In her case, the viewer understands that the poverty of her actual circumstances inclined her toward lie-bragging as a compensation for her ongoing sense of inferiority.

The complex character Randle McMurphy in Ken Kesey’s *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (1962) is also a bragger of lies; however, McMurphy is redeemed in that he performs truths of existence and character (e.g., living through his imagination, standing up for other people who are weak, and fighting injustice) that surpass both his and every other character’s capacity for language. His cocky and dissimulating surface is easily penetrated by the competent reader, who forgives McMurphy’s smaller vanities in the face of an antihero integrity that surpasses all characters in the text. Thus, bragging liars can become objects of affection if their predisposition is situated within an overall complex that renders the brag-lying warrantable, justifiably advantageous, or forgivable. In stable, highly ritualized environments, the brag-liar is anathema; however, in unstable and highly competitive or

conflict environments, the brag-liar may be an appealing figure.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** Iago (Shakespeare’s *Othello*); Narcissism; Overconfidence; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

- Bourdieu, P. *Language as Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Campbell, W. K., E. Rudich, and C. Sedikides. “Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and the Positivity of Self-Views: Two Portraits of Self-Love.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.28 (2002).
- Daubman, K. and H. Sigall. “Gender Differences in Perceptions of How Others Are Affected by Self-Disclosure of Achievement.” *Sex Roles*, v.37 (1997).
- Duncan, H. D. “The Purest Moment of Sociability: Equality.” In *Communication and Social Order*, Hugh Dalziel Duncan, ed. New York: Bedminster Press, 1962.
- Goffman, E. “Designs and Fabrications.” In *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, Erving Goffman, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Holtgraves, T. M. and J. Dulin. “The Muhammad Ali Effect: Differences Between African-Americans and European-Americans in Their Perceptions of a Truthful Bragger.” *Language and Communication*, v.14 (1994).
- Holtgraves, T. M. and T. K. Snull. “The Effects of Positive Self-Descriptions on Impressions: General Principles and Individual Differences.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.15 (1989).
- Klayman, J., J. B. Soll, C. Gonzalez-Vallejo, and S. Barlas. “Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask.” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.79 (1999).
- Miller, K., L. Cooke, J. Tsang, and F. Morgan. “Nature and Impact of Positive and Boastful Disclosures for Women and Men.” *Human Communication Research*, v.18 (1992).
- Moore, D. A. and P. J. Healy. “The Trouble With Overconfidence.” *Psychological Review*, v.115 (2008).
- PolitiFact. “The Truth-O-Meter Says: Mitt Romney Says 47 Percent of Americans Pay No Income Tax.”

<http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/sep/18/mitt-romney/romney-says-47-percent-americans-pay-no-income-tax> (Accessed July 2013).

Russo, J. E. and P. J. H. Schoemaker. "Managing Overconfidence." *Sloan Management Review*, v.33 (1992).

Urry, J. *Reference Groups and the Theory of Revolutions*. London: Routledge, 2012.

## Brain

A great deal of research has been directed toward a better appreciation of how the brain operates when people engage in deception. Such research may be applied to the development of lie detection technology, but a thriving field of academic inquiry, the cognitive neuroscience of deception, has been making important progress in illuminating the processes by which deception is enacted at a neural level. This complex question has been addressed by a number of scientific disciplines, and convergent lines of research have included (but are by no means limited to) analysis of deceptive behavior in animals, developmental trajectories of deceptive behavior in children, loss of function and pathological studies of human adults, and more recently, psychophysiological and neuroimaging techniques.

Deception is a common feature of communication within human groups, but it is also a common feature of social interaction in nonhuman species. Reviews of deceptive behavior in animals illustrate a number of levels at which deception may be observed and that animals mislead, bluff, and deceive with a range of objectives and levels of sophistication or complexity.

By examining the brains of different species and the ways in which they live and breed together, a startling relationship is found between the average size of a social group and the size of the brain. Specifically, the bigger the social group, the bigger the brain. The "Machiavellian intelligence" or "social brain" hypothesis puts forward the idea that the comparatively large brains and complex cognitive abilities of humans have evolved as a result of intense social competition. It is suggested that earlier on in the human evolutionary lineage,

some individuals may have developed increasingly sophisticated Machiavellian or manipulative and deceitful interaction strategies in order to obtain heightened social position and reproductive success, resulting in a developmental arms race.

### Prefrontal Cortex and Deception

In an extensive survey of trained animal observers in which a number of possible confounding factors were considered, it was discovered that, as both cortical volume and specifically the relative size of the prefrontal cortex in comparison to the rest of the brain increases, the frequency and complexity of reported episodes of tactical deception increases. The prefrontal cortex, which is directly behind the forehead, is strongly linked in humans with language, memory, planning, the control of automatic behavior, and the representation of the minds of other individuals. These processes are all strongly implicated in deception, a finding that more recent neuroimaging studies appear to support.

The role of the prefrontal cortex, and especially areas of the prefrontal cortex supporting the representation of the minds of others (known as theory of mind), is also supported by developmental research. Children are unable to understand or make use of deception prior to a certain point in their cognitive development, usually indicated as around the same time as the development of the fully fledged theory of mind. This includes the understanding that others can have false beliefs, or beliefs that are inconsistent with one's beliefs and may be crucially inconsistent with the true state of the world. Several strands of neurobiological research have shown this period of development to promote rapid development of the prefrontal cortices in children, which have been shown to be crucial for theory of mind, false-belief understanding, and deception.

A causally strong relationship between the brain and specific tasks can be shown by so-called loss-of-function studies, in which performance in a certain domain is altered in some way in brain-damaged participants, thereby establishing brain areas that are essential to the task in question. Such research has been conducted on deceptive behavior. Individuals with Parkinson's disease often demonstrate impairment of executive function, a collection of supervisory functions such as



attentional control, mental flexibility, and task switching. Parkinson's disease sufferers are often noted as being more "honest," showing fewer instances of deception in their everyday interactions. They report difficulty lying when asked to do so in experimental tasks, and this has been shown to coincide with reduced metabolic activity in the left dorsolateral and right anterior subregions of the prefrontal cortex. These parts of the brain appear strongly associated with deceptive tasks in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) is a noninvasive technique by which the normal operation of brain regions can be affected by the use of mild electric currents directed over the skull. These currents, depending on polarity, can be used to either excite or inhibit local cortical functioning. This methodology has been applied to deception in two recent studies. The first showed that excitatory, or anodal, TDCS to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex slowed the speed and reduced the efficiency of deceptive responses in an experimental task by upsetting the normal operation of the prefrontal cortices.

The second study, on the other hand, found that changes in the excitability of the anterior prefrontal cortex using inhibitory, or cathodal stimulation, actually improved deception in a number of important aspects. Response times were faster, but guilt and galvanic skin response (one of the measures used by the polygraph) were reduced. Interpretation of these second study results suggests that by suppressing activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex using cathodal TDCS, it is possible to reduce the moral conflict that people naturally feel when they engage in deception, thus making deception easier. Although there have been few studies of this type, these results again suggest that a significant role is played by the prefrontal cortex in deception. TDCS studies may prove to be useful in establishing the contribution of a number of cortical structures to deceptive ability.

Although lying is often considered to be a normal aspect of human social life, it is when lying becomes destructive or dangerous that it may be termed pathological and is consistent with the characteristics of a number of clinical conditions such as antisocial, histrionic, narcissistic, and


borderline personality disorders. By understanding brain abnormalities that may be associated with pathological deception, it may be possible to collect more evidence as to the brain structures involved in the process. A recent study examined pathological liars who had shown a pattern of high-stakes deceptive behavior, such as criminal fraud. Their results illustrated an increased level of white matter (the name given to myelin-coated axons of neurons that allow information to be transmitted by the neuron extremely quickly) in a range of prefrontal regions of the brain, specifically the orbitofrontal, inferior frontal, and middle frontal cortices, again illustrating the importance of prefrontal regions in the process of deception.

The various strands of research outlined above give a clear indication that areas at the front of the brain, referred to as the prefrontal cortex, are very strongly associated with the evolution, development, and successful deployment of deception. The advent of neuroimaging techniques, among which functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is perhaps the most well known, has given researchers the opportunity to more directly look at the processes at work in the brain as people go about the business of lying.

### **Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Analysis of Lying**

With over a decade of research employing fMRI and dozens of individual experiments employing a range of types of deception, evidence continues to contribute to the idea that the prefrontal cortices are very important in the process of deception. General findings borne out by behavioral research have shown that individuals report deception to be cognitively demanding. Observations of "response latency," or the time delay between asking a question and receiving a response, suggest that it usually takes longer to lie than to tell the truth. In both of these situations, whether talking about how difficult the task of deception may be or comparing times taken to give deceptive responses, the control condition (or baseline) is truth-telling.

The method for comparing patterns of brain activity used in fMRI studies of deception is exactly the same. Based on the assumption that truth-telling is the default or baseline in human



*Psychologist Daniel Jay Goleman, science journalist and author of *The Psychology of Self-Deception*, leads a talk at the National Institutes of Health Deputy Director for Management Seminar Series, February 14, 2013. He discussed how the amygdala, the brain's emotional center, interacts with the brain's executive center, or prefrontal cortex. Studies have shown that exciting or inhibiting areas of the prefrontal cortex, which is strongly related to an individual's ability to deceive, increases and decreases deceptive ability, respectively.*

communications, researchers employ statistics in order to identify regions of the brain that are significantly more active during the process of lying than when telling the truth. Analyses such as these have identified a broad range of brain areas that are more active when persons are lying than when they are telling the truth.

However, a number of researchers have found no areas of the brain that are more active when telling the truth than when lying, supporting the idea that deception is a taxing process for the brain to perform. Many of the regions noted for their activation during deception may be termed frontal executive systems, and regions identified as preferentially active in deceptive conditions include many distinct parts of the front of the brain, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex.

This complex interplay of cortical activations is consistent with deception viewed as a task that requires extensive “executive control.” Executive

control may be conceptualized as a broad range of higher cognitive processes permitting the flexible modification of thought and behavior to cater to changing situational and environmental conditions. For example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has previously been shown to be active during tasks in which response selection is required, perhaps similar to when making a decision to lie or to tell the truth. This area is also associated with aspects of working memory. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with task demands such as response inhibition, such as the inhibition of a prepotent truthful response. The anterior prefrontal cortex is often associated with a process of integration of subprocesses designed to meet some broader strategic outcome, whereas the anterior cingulate cortex is often associated with conflict detection, such as that which might emerge from deceptive responding when individuals are fully aware that this is not a true reflection of information that they have or memories they possess.

In considering results such as these, scholars unfamiliar with fMRI analysis should beware of the “reverse inference” fallacy, whereby researchers often wrongly claim that seeing a region of the brain active during a task means the categorical involvement of a particular cognitive process. The same area of the brain can be involved in a number of very different cognitive processes, and this complexity means that specifying that a certain brain region does a single specific task is not possible.

### Types of Lies and Brain Activity

As can be seen from any overview of deception research, behavioral or neuroimaging in nature, a broad variety of experimental paradigms are employed. Specific analysis of different types of lies has found that the anterior prefrontal cortex is employed for general deception, but in the case of lies that were rehearsed (rather than spontaneous), activity in this part of the brain increased. The anterior cingulate cortex, on the other hand, is sensitive to differences in the type of lie produced, with results indicating that it is more active in spontaneous lies, which do not sit within a coherent narrative, than in rehearsed lies. With just these two examples, it is clear to see that the type of lie produced, of which there may be hundreds ranging from lies of omission to white lies and sarcasm, has a strong influence on what parts of the brain may be active and which cognitive processes may be at work.

The current ability to record the activity in an individual’s brain and accurately determine whether he or she is deceptive is by no means perfect, although companies already exist to do just that, and published research testing possible analysis techniques often achieve accuracy results that exceed polygraphy. Individual brains vary a great deal in size, structure, and how they perform processes, and so-called individual differences make it very difficult to compare one person with another in the same study, let alone generalize to the population as a whole, which might be required for a robust and universal brain “signature” that accurately relates to deception.

Although the majority of research examining the brain has focused on instances in which an individual tells a lie, a few studies have also tried to understand the processes involved in lie detection.

One notable study asked people to watch clips of people performing nonverbal behavior to identify when they were deceptive. When people judged that a specific clip showed the intent to deceive, the amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate cortex were activated, and later results also indicated that the amygdala only responded when they realized that they had been lied to. This region of the brain is often active during tasks with emotional content, suggesting that an important part of the lie detection process, and the result of being lied to, may be emotional in nature.

Gordon R. T. Wright

Geoffrey Bird

*Birkbeck, University of London*

**See Also:** Animals; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception, Characteristics of; Electroencephalography; Evolution and Natural Selection; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery; Machiavellianism; Neurophysiology; Pathological Lying; Theory of Mind.

### Further Readings

- Christ, S. E., D. C. Van Essen, J. M. Watson, L. E. Brubaker, and K. B. McDermott. “The Contributions of Prefrontal Cortex and Executive Control to Deception: Evidence From Activation Likelihood Estimate Meta-Analyses.” *Cerebral Cortex*, v.19/7 (2009).
- Dong, Guangheng, Yanbo Hu, and Haiyan Wu. “The Presentation Order of Cue and Target Matters in Deception Study.” *Behavioral and Brain Functions*, v.7.1 (2011).
- Kireev, Maxim. “Brain Mechanisms of Deception.” *International Journal of Psychophysiology*, v.77.3 (2010).

## Brer Rabbit

Brer Rabbit is the most well known of the anthropomorphic animals populating the stories told by the fictitious Uncle Remus, a synthetic character invented by Georgia journalist Joel Chandler Harris (1848–1908), based upon several African American storytellers he knew. Harris wrote his

first Uncle Remus stories in 1876 as a regular column for the *Atlanta Constitution*. These were soon syndicated and distributed throughout the United States. They proved to be so popular both north and south of the Mason-Dixon Line that demand for a book-length anthology resulted in the publication in 1880 of *Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings*, which was followed by seven additional volumes. In these best-selling story anthologies, as well as his popular newspaper columns, Harris presented oral folklore that he had collected from former slaves in Georgia that he then retold in his written version of the African American dialect prevalent in 19th-century Georgia, which linguists regard as a fairly accurate transcription of that spoken language's syntax and vocabulary.

The stories are richly textured tales that draw upon the oral folk traditions of both African and Native American sources. They include additional material reflecting the lived experience, attitudes, and values of former slaves living in the south during and after Reconstruction, for whom such stories provided a narrative means of expressing outrage, critiquing injustice, vilifying tormentors, and vicariously enjoying revenge exacted by the oppressed upon their oppressors. Folklorists have found that Harris stayed true to his source material, and they have established relationships between many of the stories he recounts and their antecedents on both sides of the Atlantic. Others are unique to the Uncle Remus corpus, and might represent local oral traditions that would have been lost had they not been recorded by Harris.

The animal stories featuring Brer Rabbit and his friends and foes are told within a broader narrative framework, written in standard American English, in which a benevolent Uncle Remus shares his time and stories with a young white boy who he befriends. Harris's depiction of this relationship, and of the plantation life in which it takes place, has been criticized for promoting a romanticized version of race relations in the post-Civil War south, in which African Americans are, like Uncle Remus, content, passive, and pacific. Others, such as film director Spike Lee, suggest that through his tales, Uncle Remus cleverly subverts, rather than upholds, white authority.

### Clever Trickster

Brer Rabbit (Brer, or Br'er as it is sometimes spelled, is a syncope for Brother) is a clever trickster who manages to survive—even thrive at times—by employing his quick wit, sharp psychological insights regarding his adversaries, and an in-depth knowledge of the hostile cultural and geographic terrains that he must navigate. Brer Rabbit is especially adept at deceiving adversaries and even his friends and allies, when he deems it appropriate to do so. His skill in deception is central to many of the stories in which he features.

Of all the Brer Rabbit tales, none is perhaps as famous or popular as the story of his encounter with the Tar Baby, a doll crafted of tar and turpentine and placed beside a major thoroughfare by his perpetual nemesis, Brer Fox, who created it as a means of capturing Brer Rabbit. As Brer Rabbit passes by, he greets the doll, which as an inanimate object naturally remains silent. After several frustrated attempts to get the Tar Baby to respond, Brer Rabbit takes offense at its stubborn silence. He hits it with one paw, which sticks to the tar. As he continues to attack the Tar Baby, Brer Rabbit becomes inextricably stuck to it, at which point Brer Fox appears and announces that he will barbecue the rabbit, who—using reverse psychology—thanks the fox for planning to do that instead of throwing him in the briar patch. Brer Rabbit then declares that he would rather have Brer Fox hang, drown, skin, or maim him than be thrown into the briars. Wanting to hurt Brer Rabbit as much as possible, Brer Fox opts to throw him into the briar patch, which enables Brer Rabbit to disengage from the Tar Baby and escape.

Brer Rabbit is also capable of being fooled. In a story reminiscent of Aesop's famous fable, the race between the tortoise and the hare, Brer Terrapin bets Brer Rabbit that he can beat him in a race. However, instead of fairly competing, Brer Terrapin plants members of his family along the race course at the posted intervals, so that he wins the bet by appearing to have run the full course faster than his opponent.

The tales of Brer Rabbit have played an important role in American culture. For example, to this day, "tar baby" is used to denote an aggravating entanglement. (Some—perhaps unfamiliar with the term's African American roots—consider it to be a racial slur.) His stories also inspired the



1946 Walt Disney musical film *Song of the South*, which blended the studio's signature animation with live-action footage. A hit song from that film, "Zip-a-Dee-Doo-Dah," won the Academy Award for Best Original Song in 1947. It was sung by James Baskett, whose portrayal of Uncle Remus earned him recognition in the form of an honorary special Academy Award, making Baskett the first African American male to win an Oscar. The film features an animated version of the famous encounter between Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby that takes some narrative license with the original.

*Song of the South*, like the tales upon which it is based, has generated controversy, with critics condemning its sanitized version of southern plantation life and its depictions of African Americans as visually and verbally exaggerated caricatures that perpetuate negative stereotypes. Brer Rabbit has appeared in other films, as well as cartoons, comic books, songs, video games, and even an amusement ride, Splash Mountain, which is featured at several Disney parks around the world.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
College of Charleston

**See Also:** Animals; "Boy Who Cried Wolf"; Cheating; Fairy Tales; Humor; Myth; Tall Tales.

### Further Readings

- Brasch, W. M. *Brer Rabbit, Uncle Remus, and the "Cornfield Journalist": The Tale of Joel Chandler Harris*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000.
- Harris, J. C. *The Complete Tales of Uncle Remus*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955.
- Lester, Julius and Jerry Pinkney. *The Tales of Uncle Remus: The Adventures of Brer Rabbit*. New York: Dial, 1987.

## Burgoon, Judee

Judee K. Burgoon is an American scholar best known for her work in interpersonal and nonverbal communication, and on the detection of human deception using verbal and nonverbal cues. On the faculty at the University of Arizona since 1984, Professor Burgoon currently serves as the director

of research for the Center for the Management of Information, and she is the site director for the National Science Foundation-sponsored Center for Identification Technology Research.

Burgoon earned her doctorate in communication and educational psychology from West Virginia University in 1974, and she has since authored or edited 13 books and monographs and nearly 300 published articles, chapters, and reviews related to nonverbal and verbal communication, deception, and computer-mediated communication. Her research has been funded by U.S. government agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Defense, as well as private companies and non-profit foundations. She is one of the most-published and most-cited researchers in the discipline of communication and has been named by numerous publications as the most prolific scholar in communication in the 20th century.

The most notable of Burgoon's countless honors and awards are the B. Aubrey Fisher Mentorship Award and the Steven B. Chaffee Career Achievement Award from the International Communication Association, and the Distinguished Scholar Award and Charles H. Woolbert Research Award for Scholarship of Lasting Impact from the National Communication Association. She has also been elected a fellow of the International Communication Association, as well as a member of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology.

### Expectancy Violations Theory and Interpersonal Deception Theory

Burgoon's research in the late 1970s and early 1980s was on the reactions invoked by violations of personal space. She developed the expectancy violations theory (EVT), which posits that discrepancies from expected nonverbal behaviors generate arousal, causing either positive or negative reactions, depending upon the attractiveness (positive valence) or averseness (negative valence) of both the violation and the communicator. A robust research program conducted by Burgoon and others using EVT has demonstrated how violations of expectations can help draw attention away from the content of a message and toward the unexpected behavior itself, engendering more positive interpretations of both the behavior and the message for positively valenced



communicators, but more negative evaluations for negatively valenced communicators. Burgoon's research has examined the effects of a broad range of verbal and nonverbal expectancy violations on the credibility and attractiveness of communicators, and on the quality of relationships when such violations are enacted.

In the 1990s, Burgoon began a long collaboration with David Buller and others in which she applied her knowledge of verbal and nonverbal communication to the detection of interpersonal deception, leading to the development of interpersonal deception theory (IDT). IDT posits that deceivers use strategic and nonstrategic behaviors to deceptively communicate, while recipients attempt to assess deceiver credibility. Strategic behaviors are seen as purposeful attempts to manipulate interactions, whereas nonstrategic behaviors are thought of as "leakage" that may provide clues to the presence of deception.

IDT is one of the only theories to examine how the behaviors of the deceiver and the receiver interact to perpetuate deception. While the deceiver is manipulating his or her message to appear truthful, the receiver is assessing the credibility of the speaker (perhaps unconsciously) while hiding any suspicion and providing feedback to the deceiver. The deceiver, in turn, can use the feedback from the sender to alter his or her behavior and appear more persuasive. The unit of analysis for IDT thus becomes the interaction, rather than the acts of the deceiver, the content of the message, or the responses of the receiver in isolation. Ultimately, the theory offers a communication-based explanation for how the give-and-take of human interaction can be observed to affect both the detectability of deceivers and the accuracy of credibility assessments.

### **Interaction Adaptation Theory**

Burgoon's work with both EVT and IDT has spawned a third theory: interaction adaptation theory (IAT), which posits that certain preinteraction conditions, such as a speaker's biological requirements, social expectations, and psychological desires, set the stage for the interpretation of behaviors exhibited during an interaction. A comparison between the preinteraction requirements, expectations, and desires and the actual behaviors unfolding within an interaction leads

to potentially favorable reactions in the form of reciprocity, or unfavorable reactions in the form of compensation. According to IAT, when needs, expectations, and desires for truthful interactions with a partner are perceived as deceptive, receivers will compensate by withdrawing and decreasing intimacy. Conversely, when these three receiver-oriented components are met with behaviors perceived as veridical, receivers will reciprocate by enacting approach behaviors and increasing intimacy.

Thus, IAT has formalized a basic assumption underlying all three of Burgoon's theories, namely that interactants are influenced by both preinteractional conditions and by how conversations unfold. The actual behaviors of interaction partners can often override the preinteraction expectations, but both can have implications for the outcomes of interactions and the development, maintenance, or dissolution of relationships.

Burgoon's work in the early 21st century has focused on the interactive nature of human communication through mediated channels. She has developed a model of interactivity, proposing how the structural properties, or "affordances," of a medium—such as the synchronicity of the communication, the richness it allows, and the geographical proximity of the interactants—can influence the experience of participants and the outcomes of their interactions, such as task performance and social judgments.

Applying the principle of interactivity to deception detection, Burgoon has demonstrated that the richest mediums are not necessarily the most effective for deception detection. The volume of information in the form of verbal and nonverbal cues can overwhelm receivers and make it more difficult for them to detect deception. On the other hand, isolating the most diagnostic deception indices, such as those within the vocalic channel, can oftentimes be more efficient at detecting deception. In 2012, Burgoon was working with a team of investigators at the University of Arizona to examine the most effective technologies for automating the detection process to remove human biases from the equation, and advance the science of deception detection into the future.

Norah E. Dunbar  
*University of Oklahoma*

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Communication; Deception Detection Accuracy; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Leakage; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Buller, David B. and Judee K. Burgoon. "Deception: Strategic and Nonstrategic Communication." In *Strategic Interpersonal Communication*, J. A. Daly and J. M. Wiemann, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994.
- Burgoon, Judee K. "A Communication Model of Personal Space Violations: Explication and Initial Test." *Human Communication Research*, v.4/2 (1978).
- Burgoon, Judee K., Joseph A. Bonito, Bjorn Bengtsson, Artemio Ramirez Jr., Norah E. Dunbar, and Nathan Miczo. "Testing the Interactivity Model: Communication Processes, Partner Assessments, and the Quality of Collaborative Work." *Journal of Management Information Systems*, v.16 (1999).
- Burgoon, Judee K. and David B. Buller. "Interpersonal Deception Theory." In *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives*, Leslie A. Baxter and Dawn O. Braithewaite, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009.
- Burgoon, Judee K., Laura K. Guerrero, and Kory Floyd. *Nonverbal Communication*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2010.
- Burgoon, Judee K. and Jerold L. Hale. "The Fundamental Topoi of Relational Communication." *Communication Monographs*, v.51 (1984).
- Burgoon, Judee K. and Timothy R. Levine. "Advances in Deception Detection." In *Interpersonal Adaptation: Dyadic Interaction Patterns*, Judee K. Burgoon, Lesa A. Stern, and Leesa Dillman, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Carlson, John R., Joey F. George, Judee K. Burgoon, Mark Adkins, and Cindy H. White. "Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication." *Group Decision and Negotiation*, v.13 (2004).
- Kravis, Jeffrey and Mariam Zadeh. "Hunting for Deception in Mediation: Winning Cases by Understanding Body Language." *Mediator.com* (June 2006). <http://www.mediate.com/articles/kravis17.cfm> (Accessed August 2013).
- Smith, Sandi W. and Steven R. Wilson, eds. *New Directions in Interpersonal Communication Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010.

## Bush, George W.

George W. Bush was president of the United States from January 20, 2001, to January 20, 2009. After narrowly winning the 2000 presidential election against Vice President Al Gore, the Bush administration faced the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush and his administration have been publicly scrutinized and criticized for providing false information to the American people in the run-up to the Iraq War.

The Bush administration first made claims against Iraq and the country's connection to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in February 2002. Joseph C. Wilson, the former ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe, was commissioned by the administration to investigate Iraq's alleged desire to obtain yellowcake uranium from Niger in 2002. Wilson reported to Bush and his colleagues that the belief that Iraq was engaging in illicit construction of a nuclear weapon was "unequivocally wrong." However, the administration persisted in searching for a connection between Iraq and WMDs. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush professed that Iraq



President George W. Bush signs the U.S. Department of Defense Authorization Bill at the Pentagon on December 2, 2002, noting that Iraq's responses up to that date were "not encouraging." Signing the act helped chart the course of the War on Terror.

sought to obtain uranium, despite a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation confirming the opposite to be true.

In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency suspected that Iraq was looking for ways to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes in order to “make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.” The Bureau of Intelligence Research and Department of Energy refuted the assertion that high-strength aluminum tubes were being used to build nuclear weapons. Rather, the two agencies maintained that the tubes were being used for conventional military procedures, and that the tubes were not able to enrich uranium. Despite this information from various government departments, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented information to the United Nations (UN) implicating Iraq as a country destined to use high-strength aluminum tubes for the eventual creation of a nuclear bomb. Upon further review, Powell rescinded his statements to the UN, and noted that he was given “deliberately misleading” information on Iraq’s quest for nuclear weapons.

### **Downing Street Memo**

On May 1, 2005, the national Sunday newspaper of the United Kingdom, the *Sunday Times*, published the Downing Street Memo. The memo was documentation of a secret meeting held by the British Labour Party and British defense and intelligence figures on July 23, 2002. Meeting participants discussed the ramp-up to a war in Iraq, and referenced the United States as also having a stake in the war effort. The leader of the Secret Intelligence Service in Britain noted that during his most recent visit to the United States, “Bush wanted to remove Saddam Hussein,” the president and prime minister of Iraq, “through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” Despite numerous allegations from the Bush administration stating that Iraq was preparing to construct a nuclear weapon, substantial evidence never surfaced from either U.S. or UN investigations.

Presidential Press Secretary Scott McClellan, who served in the Bush White House from 2003

through 2006, later faulted his boss for succumbing to “self-deception” and “permanent campaigning” throughout the planning of the Iraq War. In his 2008 memoir, McClellan insinuated that Bush’s domestic and international strategies focused on intense nationalism, blind accusations about foreign policy, and personal concern about public approval, rather than making sound choices for the nation. While McClellan’s book never stated that Bush explicitly lied to the American public, he asserted that the Iraq War was a result of political propaganda employed by the Bush administration. Many administration officials denounced McClellan’s memoir, believing that his unhappy experience while serving in the White House made him speak falsely about the inner workings of the presidency.

The Iraq War has been analyzed by a variety of political organizations and interest groups. In 2008, The Center for Public Integrity (CPI), a non-partisan, nonprofit investigative news organization, created a project called Iraq: The War Card. During this investigation, researchers documented every public statement made by the Bush administration’s top eight officials from September 11, 2001, to September 11, 2003. The CPI found that the administration made 532 statements about Iraq, claiming that the country had, produced, or tried to obtain WMDs, and had links to Al Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist organization. As the 911 Commission report has made clear, these statements are false because Iraq did not have WMDs, nor did it have links to Al Qaeda. An important question related to deception is whether Bush and his administration made these statements knowing them to be false, or whether they believed the statements and were simply mistaken. While it is difficult to confirm that President Bush and his advisors deliberately lied to the American people about the rationale for the Iraq War, the statements made in the run-up to the war were false.

Immediately after his two terms in office, President G. W. Bush did not make many public engagements. However, he was part of relief efforts to raise funds for a massive earthquake that hit Haiti in January 2010. These efforts, in collaboration with President Bill Clinton, raised over \$5 billion. His philanthropic and diplomatic efforts, including those in Africa, have provided better health care for struggling populations and

have contributed to a rise in Bush's favorability. A June 2013 Gallup poll found that opinions about President G. W. Bush were more positive than negative for the first time since 2005.

George W. Bush's presidency will likely be remembered as one of the most trying times in recent American history. In 2013, Bush was quoted as being "out of politics" for good, giving no opinion about matters of diplomacy or domestic affairs. His silence has been met with mixed reviews, and his legacy will likely follow suit.

David Markowitz  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Clinton, Bill; Government Propaganda; Iraq War; Lying, Intentionality of; Terrorism; Torture; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

Center for Public Integrity. "Iraq: The War Card" (2012). <http://www.projects.publicintegrity.org/WarCard> (Accessed July 2013).

Corn, D. *The Lies of George W. Bush*. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.

Fieth, D. *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

McClellan, S. *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

---

## Business

Business, a profit-seeking enterprise, is often seen as synonymous with deception. Numerous illustrations of corporate scandals, buried under lies and deception, exist in industries throughout the world. Individuals entering the business world find that opportunities and temptation to lie and deceive are abundant. Often, the drive to be profitable is seen to conflict with the motive to behave ethically and truthfully. Based on high-profile scandals and news reports, deceptive individuals and groups seem to permeate the business world, driven by competition and a desire to

succeed. From teaching business ethics to some of the largest corporate scandals, ethical debates arise from business decisions and exposed deception, often leading to individual- and organizational-level humiliation, financial loss, and legal punishment.

Deception in the business world may be seen as a method to succeed, but it can also come with many costs. Unethical behavior can damage individuals by conflicting with their personal values. Deceptive practices interfere with the flow of information in an organization, impeding organizational success. Deception can result in serious theft and lawbreaking, leading to lawsuits and, in extreme cases, is costly and deadly to society at large. Estimations of the costs of dishonesty in business in the United States range from \$6 to \$200 billion annually.

Deception in business can occur at different levels. Deception on a micro-, person-to-person level, such as office politics, can damage morale, lower employee satisfaction, and create a climate of distrust. Such a climate impedes the amount of information that employees are willing to share with one another, ultimately damaging the output of the work. On a meso-, company, and company-to-company level, cultural climates that encourage dishonesty and deception can occur, and intracompany dishonest negotiations can severely impact the success of one or both companies. There is also an employee versus company dynamic in which unethical climates drive turnover and affect the bottom line by reducing the quality of the work. On a macro-, or organization-to-society level, corporate decisions have a vast impact on national and world economies, public health and safety, and the environment.

### Theories of Ethics

No set definition exists for what is or is not ethical in business. Each example must be looked at individually and, even then, debate can occur on the morality of many business decisions. Cultural relativism, the concept that morals and ethical standards differ among civilizations and cultures, is also important when considering deception in business, especially in today's global economy. For instance, Japanese negotiators have a tendency to reveal less information than U.S. negotiators. U.S. negotiators focus on direct information; Japanese



negotiators focus on indirect information. Cultural differences in negotiation style can easily be misinterpreted as a form of deliberate deception. Additionally, U.S. corporations must use deceitful financial tactics to conceal bribery.

In Germany, however, such deception is not always necessary, because bribery is seen as a business necessity and can even be tax deductible. However, bribery is generally frowned upon in global business in the interest of fairness. Compass, a foodservice company headquartered in England, was found guilty of bribing United Nations (UN) officials to ensure that it would obtain a \$235 million contract to provide food supplies to UN forces in Liberia. Compass settled with two competing companies, ES-KO International based in Monaco and Supreme Foodservice based in the United States, after they sued regarding the manner in which the UN contract was won. Compass also announced that all employees found to be involved in the bribery were terminated.

Defining deception in business decisions generally falls into one of the normative ethical theories, regardless of how individuals might view the theory based on their personal values. Normative ethical theories focus on how individuals should act. Some of the theories commonly taught in business schools include: virtue ethics, deontology, and teleological ethics (or consequentialism). A key element in all these theories is a focus on the malleable nature of ethics and a situational or conditional quality to all ethical decision making, often framed in issues of “the greater good.” Because the greater good in business is often framed in profit and success, an examination of the ethical theories taught in business schools provides the framework to examine deception in business.

Plato, one of the fathers of virtue ethics, states that the rulers of society are the only people who should have the privilege of lying at home or abroad. Rulers can lie for the good of the state in accordance with the Noble Lie, or the lie told by the elite in order to maintain order. Aristotle’s virtue ethics, expanding the philosophies of Plato, emphasize the moral character of a person. A virtue is a means between two extremes and the cardinal virtues are: fortitude, prudence, temperance, and justice. Temperance would be the mean

between rash action and complete inaction. In this line of thought, a decision to be honest might fall between a tactless or hurtful statement, and harmful deceit.

Deontology comes from the Greek *deontos*, meaning “ought.” Humans should act out of reason, not inclination or emotion; duty is the action that reason determines to be correct. According to Immanuel Kant, the morality of an action stems from the intention (motive) of the action. Duty is determined by the categorical imperative, or acting in a way that is universally acceptable and correct: If I act in a certain way, then it should be right for everyone to act that way; if not, the act is immoral. Kant does not claim that deception is always wrong. For instance, Kant once gave the example of lying to stop the plans of a potential murderer; in this instance, the duty to protect a life overruled the duty to not deceive. The theories of W. D. Ross suggest that no single formula for ethics is universal and immortal. Ross emphasizes the *prima facie* duties of: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and nonmaleficence. An absolute duty is a duty that, in a given situation, is the most important, determined by intuition.

Teleological ethics focuses on the outcome of an action. The most commonly taught consequentialist theory is John Stewart Mill’s utilitarianism, in which actions should produce the greatest amount of happiness (presence of pleasure, plus the absence of pain) for the greatest number of people. In this sense, the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few, or the one. A utilitarian might justify lying if it would prevent more harm than the lie itself would cause. None of the normative ethical theories blatantly claim that deception is always unethical. The thought process behind each theory can be used to justify lying in a variety of situations.

Today, most business school students in the United States are required to take a business ethics course. A common misconception is that professors are trying to teach students, at this point adults with their own developed moral compasses, how to ethically behave. Unlike teaching personal morals and values, which individuals acquire throughout their life, teaching business ethics is more focused on outlining professional responsibility and understanding the concept of



morality in oneself and others in order to allow students to critically evaluate situations. Business ethics courses generally cover the different ethical theories. The goal is not to say that “this philosophy is the most morally and logically sound,” or “everyone must adhere to this school of thought.” The theories are taught so that students might be better able to recognize how people arrive at a conclusion regarding the ethics of business-related decisions.

### **Individual-Level Deception in Organizations**

Individual-level lying in business often begins before the first day of work. Deception can often be found in the hiring process and continues in the day-to-day individual interactions in organizations. During the hiring process, the organization and the candidate have an obligation not to lie. It is the organization’s responsibility to properly advertise the position and provide a job description that accurately represents the job and lists the skills necessary for the position. A realistic job preview by the organization allows candidates to determine if the job is a good fit for them. Honesty on the part of the candidate allows the organization to decide if the candidate is in turn a good fit for the position. Dishonesty on the part of either party is ultimately costly if it leads to poor performance or turnover.

Individual deception in the workforce is commonly linked to impression management or the alteration of one’s presentation in order to be perceived a certain way. Job applicants will often try to appear more knowledgeable in order to gain approval from hiring managers. Once hired, employees may also appear happy and complacent with a new policy, even when they are displeased. Disadvantages of individual deception in business include: decreased job satisfaction, increased anxiety and stress, increased turnover, and reduced performance. Business deceptions on this relatively small scale (compared to multimillion-dollar corporate scandals), such as exaggerating work efforts, taking unearned credit for others’ work, deflecting blame for a poor job performance, buying personal items on the company credit card, and taking home office supplies, taken together, have a severe negative impact on the organization and reoccurring instances can be grounds for termination.

Much of the literature suggests that the competitive environment that drives business is also one of the motivational forces that also drives lying and deception (that is not to say that literature does not also point out the benefits of a collaborative environment). Additionally, competition can lead people to deceitful behavior in the workplace, and often this behavior results in positive and rewarded outcomes, such as winning in negotiations, looking better to the boss, and getting credit for the work. Organizational politics, the protection of self-interests over organizational goals, has been found to result in productivity loss and can result in toxic cultures within organizations. Susan Curtis provides instances in which lying may play a part in organizational politics, including controlling access to information, cultivating a favorable impression, developing a base of support, blaming and attacking others, and aligning oneself with more powerful others. Such a culture of deception has led to some financially devastating corporate scandals. The nature of an organization and the policies in place might also blatantly foster employee deception. For instance, consider call centers based in India that tell their employees to use Western names. In such cases, the organization is actively supporting a deceptive environment.

While deception in the workforce might serve the deceiver well, theories of organizational justice address the impact, inequalities, and unfair results of deception and deceptive practices. Organizational justice theories posit three main components of justice: distributive, procedural, and interactional. Distributive justice focuses on fair distribution of resources. Procedural justice relates to the use of formal processes to make decisions, and the fairness of these processes, leading to outcomes. As it relates to an organization, outcomes include pay, praise, and promotion. Interactional justice relates to how individuals treat and communicate with each other. According to a meta-analysis performed by Yochi Cohen-Charash and Paul Spector, distributive and procedural justice are largely related to organizational citizenship behaviors, or the positive work-related behaviors that go beyond the duties required for the job. Job performance is positively related and counterproductive work behaviors are negatively related to procedural justice. Job satisfaction is related to all

of the organizational justice components. Trust is also related to all of the components, but is most closely related to procedural justice. Research has found that perceptions of justice are related to organizational success and perceptions of justice are negatively related to deception.

### Research of Deception in Business

Studies have found that 86 percent of employees engaged in deceptive impression management through not providing honest opinions and feedback; 69 percent attempted to cover up poor performance through deceptive impression management; and 56 percent simply lied about facts. Of these behaviors, hiding opinions had no effect on the relationship between the supervisor and subordinate; the cover-up was often linked with poor performance evaluations (indicative that most people fail at this type of impression management); and overtly lying negatively impacts the supervisor-subordinate relationship. In addition, 85 percent of managers claim that they will not promote someone who has been caught lying. Deception can cause permanent damage to business relationships. Organizational research has found that, when witnessing a series of untrustworthy actions, it is possible to regain trust by displaying a series of trustworthy actions. However, following outright deception, trust is never reestablished.

Steven Grover presents role conflict as a motivational force behind lying in business. Grover suggests that lying is caused by structural constraints and conflict, individual differences, and reward structures. Deception is more likely to occur when there are conflicting interests, such as during negotiations. Beyond personal interest, Piet Eenkhoorn and Johan Graafland discuss how deception in organizations is allowed to occur to monumental decrees, which include: corporate regulations, unethical accounting practices, unfair and excessive executive compensation, and poor policies that encourage profit and success over ethical practices, resulting in a failure to adhere to social norms to achieve the desired results.

Supporting the idea that deception increases when pressure to appear a certain way is applied, Brent Weiss and Robert Felsman studied deception in job interviews. In a study utilizing mock interviews (in which candidates were led to believe

that they could actually land a job), 81 percent admitted to lying at least once in the interview. Of the lies told, 90 percent were to improve the job applicant's image. Furthermore, most of the lies told directly related to job requirements. Some studies have reported that 53 percent of applicants falsified their resume, but only 11.6 percent admit to such falsifications. These deceitful impression management tactics are likely to continue once the applicant is hired.

In a Careerbuilder.com survey, 19 percent of respondents admitted to lying in the workplace at least once a week. Studies have found that the consequences of such lying in business include: an untrusting environment, impeding the flow of information, damaging the organization's reputation, lower job satisfaction, loss of ethical employees, and perpetuating an environment in which dishonesty is acceptable. Frequent lying in the workplace damages an individual's reputation by making him or her appear unreliable, untrustworthy, or unknowledgeable. Although deception often occurs in the workplace, people are usually not as equipped to detect deception as they think they are. In a review of over 253 studies, lie detection accuracy is about 53 percent accurate, only slightly better than chance or blind guessing. Even if the lie remains unrevealed, liars hurt themselves by being ill-prepared because deception impedes outcome preparedness.

Much like a candidate might lie to a potential employer, customers also lie to businesses in order to attain some desired outcome. However, this deception decreases outcome preparedness, or the deception interferes with the liar's ability to detect certain clues that indicate a specific positive outcome. This unpreparedness leads to decreased satisfaction. Liars are more focused on their deception and can miss key communications and feedback from the party they are deceiving.

In business transactions between organizations or clients, deception is also a common problem in negotiations. Bluffing is deceptive, but debate arises in deciding if bluffing in business negotiations is acceptable and ethical when it is almost always expected. Despite the debate, a 1990 survey of M.B.A. students, managers, and clergymen revealed that not a single respondent believed that lying during negotiations was ethical.

During negotiations, one study found that groups are inclined to lie in negotiations, whereas individuals are more likely to be honest. Setting an ethical organizational climate can help groups overcome this natural tendency. Sarah Stawaiski, R. Scott Tindale, and Amanda Dykema-Engblade reported that groups were less honest than individuals, consistent with past research. Their study also found that groups had a natural tendency to compete, and only when specifically told to be honest was there a significant decrease in lying. For individuals, the natural tendency is to be honest, and an increase in lying was only found when participants were told to be aggressive. Results showed that while deception resulted in a better outcome as measured by sale price, it was at the expense of feelings of guilt and stress for the liar. It was shown that individuals were less satisfied with their groups when told to be honest, possibly because the honesty interfered with the group's natural tendency to compete and succeed. Groups were also more motivated by the bottom line (money) than individuals.

The common use of technology in business today must also be considered. Lying, in general, has been found to be more common in phone than in face-to-face communications. However, one study found that e-negotiators reported that they were less likely to use competitive or unethical and deceitful negotiation styles, compared to face-to-face negotiations. One explanation for this hesitancy is the knowledge that the deceit would be documented in e-negotiations, whereas face-to-face negotiations are not always recorded or documented. However, the self-reported likelihood to lie has also conversely been found to be higher for e-negotiators in other studies. The commonality between e-negotiation and face-to-face negotiation studies is that significant differences were found in the lying that was dependent on the medium of the communication.

### **Business Scandals**

A common theme, or more accurately put, a common excuse for lying in business is that everyone else is doing it. Lying and deception have been found to often result in short-term advantages for the deceiver. Situations can be manipulated to a liar's favor, and if someone chooses not to be deceptive, they are opening themselves to

potential deception and are placed at a disadvantage. Take the Chiquita Banana scandal, for example. Chiquita confessed to making payments to terrorists in Colombia in an effort to protect the company's employees there and paid a \$25 million fine. Some Colombian terrorists, however, are now also claiming that Dole and Del Monte made similar payments. Dole and Del Monte deny making such payments and have avoided any fines. If the allegations are true, then the deception of Dole and Del Monte worked in their favor financially, compared with the loss experienced by Chiquita.

Large-scale corporate scandals are rarely the fault of every employee in the guilty organization, but often the culprits are a handful of executives. HIH Insurance in Australia, for example, lost \$5.3 billion because of the false and misleading statements of its director. Beyond the organization using deceitful tactics to beat the competition, there seems to be such an environment of corruption that too often executives of multibillion-dollar corporations are found guilty of lies and deceit, not for the advancement of the business, but to advance themselves. For instance, in 2005, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of Tyco International were found guilty of stealing \$600 million from the company.

More often than not, corporate deception is discovered, despite every effort on the part of the company to conceal the corruption. One such instance is the Enron scandal, exposed in 2001, resulting in the largest bankruptcy in American history—\$63.4 billion. With over 20,000 employees, the energy company had the ability to affect the livelihood of thousands of workers. The firm handling the accounting for Enron, Arthur Andersen, helped Enron lie by illegally reporting increasing profits while concealing billions of dollars in debts. In addition to Enron's bankruptcy, Arthur Andersen was shut down in 2002, resulting in an additional 85,000 employees losing their jobs. When Enron's shares dropped from \$90.00 to 50 cents, thousands of employees and investors lost their savings. Enron, now Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., was unable to reverse the damage, and has since sold all of its North American power utility and gas assets. By 2011, Enron Creditor's Recovery Corp. paid over \$21 billion to creditors.

U.S. Department of Justice  
United States Marshals Service

# WANTED BY U.S. MARSHALS

NOTICE TO ARRESTING AGENCY: Before arrest, validate warrant through National Crime Information Center (NCIC). United States Marshals Service NCIC entry number: (NIC/ 2575089283).

NAME: ANTAR, Eddie  
ALIAS: STEWART, Alexander; ALEXANDER, Stewart; LEVY, Joseph; LEVY, Yosef; SHLOMO, Ezra Ben; "KELSO"; "CRAZY EDDIE"

DESCRIPTION:

|                                 |                               |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Sex                             | MALE                          |
| Race                            | WHITE                         |
| Place of Birth                  | BROOKLYN, NEW YORK            |
| Date(s) of Birth                | DECEMBER 18, 1947             |
| Height                          | 5'6"                          |
| Weight                          | 165 LBS                       |
| Eyes                            | BROWN                         |
| Hair                            | BROWN                         |
| Skintone                        | MEDIUM                        |
| Scars, Marks, Tattoos           | 10" VERTICAL SCAR ON ABDOMEN  |
| Social Security Number          |                               |
| NCIC Fingerprint Classification | PO 04 03 15 11 17 05 09 15 12 |

WANTED FOR: CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT  
Warrant Issued: District of New Jersey  
Warrant Number: 9050-0228-0111-F  
DATE WARRANT ISSUED: February 27, 1990

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION: ANTAR is a wealthy man and frequent international traveller. ANTAR speaks fluent English, French and possibly Hebrew. He has been described as a heavy drinker. ANTAR may be using an Israeli passport.

If arrested or whereabouts known, notify the local United States Marshals Office, (Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_).  
If no answer, call United States Marshals Service Communications Center in Arlington, Virginia.  
Telephone (800) 336-0102: (24 hour telephone contact or (800) 423-0719 (TDD). NLETS access code is VAUSMOOOO.

PRIOR EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE AND NOT TO BE USED.

Form USM-132  
(Rev. 4/90)

*A 1990 arrest warrant is issued for Crazy Eddie Company cofounder Eddie Antar, the chief financial officer who "cooked the books" and helped his relatives skim nearly \$1 million per year from their stores, much of which he hid in Israel.*

Starting with Enron's collapse, the discovery of several major corporate scandals in late 2001 and early 2002 contributed to a drastic drop in stock prices. According to Dow Jones reports, from 2000 to early 2013, stocks reached their second-lowest point near the end of 2002 (the lowest point came in early 2009 during the Great Recession). Other large corporate scandals that occurred soon, Enron's crash and contributed to the 2002 market downturn, involved WorldCom, HealthSouth Corp., Tyco International, Xerox, Adelphia Communications, and ImClone Systems.

Business are often accused of deceptive accounting practices in order to avoid tax payments, inflate earnings, increase stock value, and increase market share. Some of the largest accounting scandals include Waste Management, a publicly traded U.S. company, reporting \$1.7 billion in fake earnings; WorldCom, a telecommunications company,

inflating \$11 billion worth of assets by under-reporting operating costs and creating fake accounting entries amounting to \$3.8 billion; HealthSouth, a publicly traded U.S. health care company, inflating over \$1 billion in earnings over a span of seven years; Freddie Mac, a mortgage-financing company, falsely reporting and under-reporting \$5 billion in earnings; Saytam, an Indian information technology services company, inflating revenues by \$1.5 billion; and Xerox, falsely reporting reoccurring income (obtained by leasing machines) as one-time transactions, leading to a \$10 million fine when discovered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The accounting deception of these business resulted in lost jobs for employees, lost money for the shareholders, damaged reputations, jail time for the convicted culprits, and monetary fines targeting the organizations.

In 2009, Pfizer, one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, was forced to pay the largest health care fraud settlement and the largest criminal fine ever—\$2.3 billion for the illegal marketing of four drugs: Bextra, a painkiller; Geodon, an antipsychotic; Zynovox, an antibiotic; and Lyrica, an antiepileptic drug. Pfizer promoted off-label uses for Bextra as a pain reliever. Over half of Bextra's profits came from prescriptions written for uses that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had not approved. While doctors can prescribe drugs for off-label uses, drugmakers cannot market the drug for any use other than what the FDA approves. Bextra, for example, had been FDA-approved for treating rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, and menstrual pain. However, Pfizer promoted Bextra not only for off-label uses, but also distributed the drug in samples with dosages higher than the FDA-approved doses for rheumatoid arthritis and osteoarthritis. One whistleblower claimed that the Pfizer culture was driven by profit, encouraging deception and unethical sales techniques.

Insider trading is another example of deception in business. Executives have the power to unfairly use the information available to them to help their friends and family through insider trading. Insider trading is when business professionals leak confidential information about public corporations to their friends and family before the information is officially released to the public. These select few have an advantage in selling or buying stock,



based on information that is not publicly known. The chief executive and founder of ImClone Systems, a pharmaceutical company (since acquired by Eli Lilly), was sentenced to seven years for insider trading after he told his friends and family that the FDA rejected an ImClone Systems drug before announcing the news publicly. One of those insiders was Martha Stewart, who was sentenced to five months in prison for selling her ImClone Systems shares at a savings of \$45,673.

In addition to the bottom line (profits), businesses will also go to extreme measures to control their images and obtain information. The chairwoman of Hewlett-Packard (HP) hired a private investigator in 2006 to discover the source of boardroom leaks. The investigator went so far as to obtain the phone records of board members and journalists, resulting in an ethics scandal. No HP employees, however, were convicted of any crimes. Deutsche Bank in Germany was also involved in a scandal for spying on board members and investors. Such behavior in an effort to control business dealings often stems from the unethical and untrusting climate in business.

Corruption in business is so common that several countries have passed laws protecting whistleblowers in an attempt to stop corruption and deception. Such countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Jamaica, Ireland, and South Korea. In the United States, the number of whistleblower cases received annually is on the rise, growing from 1,934 cases in 2005 to 2,787 in 2012. However, of the business ethics complaints filed from 2005 to 2012 in the United States, only 305 were determined to have merit warranting legal action.

### **Reducing Deception in Business**

In an effort to minimize the deception and unethical conduct that permeates business, many organizations produce a code of ethics that employees are expected to follow. Studies support that the presence of an ethical climate promotes honesty. For instance, when specifically told to negotiate a favorable contract, but to also avoid dishonesty, participants were significantly less likely to use deception, compared to situations in which the ethical standards were not emphasized. It is not uncommon for a code of ethics to consider the shareholders, consumers, environment, and/

or society at large. However, many organizations put the stakeholders first, meaning that profits and sales are still the bottom line.

Johnson & Johnson is a recognized industry leader in ethical behavior based on its credo, which states that the company will protect people first and property second. Johnson & Johnson puts consumers and health care providers first, employees second, communities (local and worldwide) third, and stockholders last. The company emphasizes profit as its last priority, preceded by safety, fair and ethical practices, contributing to charities, paying taxes, and protecting the environment. For example, after seven deaths in the Chicago area were linked to extra-strength Tylenol, Johnson & Johnson recalled the product and stopped all advertisements in 1982 to ensure public safety. The company was not responsible for the deaths (because of product tampering once it had reached the shelves), but took responsibility for its product, incurring over \$100 million in losses.

### **The Business of Deception**

Lying and deception have become businesses. Selling fake diplomas in the United States is a multimillion-dollar industry, and can easily be accomplished on the buyer's side through a simple Internet search. An estimation reported by Cable News Network (CNN) in 2010 claimed that over 100,000 fake degrees are sold in the United States each year. Another deception-based business, The Alibi Network, provides alibis and excuses to customers for a fee. Services even include providing proof of employment to a new potential employer or alibis for an employee taking a "sick day" from work. Beyond these types of businesses is the Ponzi scheme. A Ponzi scheme, named after Charles Ponzi, a 1920s con artist, is an investment scam in which investors are given "returns" through money acquired through additional investments. The largest Ponzi scheme to date is the Bernie Madoff scandal, in which investors were tricked into "investing" an estimated \$18 billion over the course of two decades.

### **Conclusion**

Individuals spend such a large percentage of their daily lives in the workplace that it would be impossible to remove lying and deceptive impression management in all organizations and



business dealings. Lying, in many instances, can maintain the status quo when change would be too disruptive (in alignment with utilitarianism) or can simply be used to avoid offending others. The competitive nature of the business world, however, can lead individuals and groups to what most would consider unethical and immoral behavior. For some, there might not be a clearly defined line of when it is appropriate and acceptable to deceive in business, like the widely used bluff or impression management. However, corruption in business, in the United States and worldwide, can have negative effects on individuals, organizations, nations, and the economic and natural environment of the world.

Tiffany Edwards

Joel T. Nadler

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Accounting; Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Enron; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud; Letters of Recommendation; Madoff, Bernard; Morals and Ethics; Résumés.

### Further Readings

- Adair, Wendi, Tetsushi Okumura, and Jeanne Brett. "Negotiation Behavior When Cultures Collide: The United States and Japan." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, v.86/3 (2001).
- Carlson, John. "Lying Up on the Job: Does Deceptive Impression Management Work?" <http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/the-organization/lying-up-on-the-job-does-deceptive-impression-management-work> (Accessed July 2013).
- Cohen-Charach, Yochi and Paul E. Spector. "The Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.89/2 (2002).
- Curtis, Susan. "Lies, Damned Lies, and Organisational Politics." *Industrial and Commercial Training*, v.35/7 (2003).
- Eenkhorn, Piet and Johan J. Graafland. "Lying in Business: Insights From Hannah Aredt's 'Lying in Politics.'" *Business Ethics: A European Review*, v.20/4 (2011).
- Grover, Steven. "Lying, Deceit, and Subterfuge: A Model of Dishonesty in the Workplace." *Organizational Science*, v.4/3 (1993).

- Indvik, Julie and Pamela R. Johnson. "Liar! Liar! Your Pants Are on Fire: Deceptive Communication in the Workplace." *Journal of Organizational Culture, Communication, and Conflict*, v.13/1 (2009).
- Shulman, David. "Deception in the Workplace: Recent Research and Promising New Directions." *Sociology Compass*, v.5/1 (2011).
- Snoeyenbos, Milton, Robert Almeder, and James Humber. *Business Ethics*. Rev. ed. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992.
- Stawacki, Sarah, R. Scott Tindale, and Amanda Dykema-Engblade. "The Effects of Ethical Climate on Group and Individual Level Deception in Negotiation." *International Journal of Conflict Management*, v.20/3 (2009).
- Weiss, Brent and Robert S. Feldman. "Looking Good and Lying to Do It: Deception as an Impression Management Strategy in Job Interviews." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.36/4 (2006).

## Butterflies

Butterflies have evolved to include many different strategies that increase their chances of survival. They employ an array of tactics to avoid and/or deceive potential predators. Camouflage and mimicry are two major strategies used by butterflies to accomplish this protection.

There are several thousand different species of butterflies found around the world that belong to six or more families, depending on the system of classification followed, that comprise the subfamily Papilionoidea, which along with moths and skippers constitute the Lepidoptera order of insects. Most butterflies are brightly or strikingly colored, and are typically active during the day, which makes them vulnerable to predators. As natural protection against this predation, many species of butterfly utilize an array of defensive strategies. Chemical protection, built around toxic, repellent, or at least bad-tasting substances, make some butterfly species unpalatable to predators. The species that have developed this natural protection tend to be readily identifiable, and predators quickly learn, often after only one or two trials, to avoid attacking them. Other species

can mimic to varying degrees the physical appearance and behaviors of these protected species to also gain protection from these predators. Camouflage is another defensive strategy employed by some species at different stages of their lifecycle.

The lifecycle of a butterfly consists of four major stages: (1) the egg, (2) caterpillar or larva, (3) chrysalis or pupa, and (4) adult or imago. At either the caterpillar, chrysalis, and/or adult stages, camouflage and/or mimicry tactics may be employed. The caterpillars of many species are particularly adept at camouflage.

### Camouflage and Mimicry

Camouflage for butterflies consists of efforts to change external appearance or behavior to help them blend into or match their surroundings. Different environmental settings present myriad conditions that butterflies attempt to match. Through the use of different colors, patterns, and shapes, butterflies can attempt to look like the things around them. For example, the cassia (*Senna* spp.) is one of the host plants for the larva of the cloudless sulphur (*Phoebis sennae*) butterfly. When the cassia blooms, the larvae eat the flowers and turn yellow. The chrysalis of the cloudless sulphur butterfly is shaped and colored like a cassia leaf. When the adult butterfly emerges, it is yellow, like the large flowers of the cassia.

Mimicry is a strategy that butterflies use to appear similar to another butterfly species that predators avoid. During the 19th century, Henry Walter Bates, a British naturalist who studied butterflies in the Amazon, first described this type of mimicry, which is now known as Batesian mimicry. For example, many birds find the Viceroy (*Limenitis archippus*) butterfly very tasty, but some Viceroy butterflies have evolved to protect themselves by mimicking the appearance of the Monarch (*Danaus* spp.) butterfly, a species that birds generally find very foul-tasting. Another type of mimicry consists of using a body part to imitate another type of body part of another animal.

This type of mimicry is known as Mullerian mimicry, which is named after Fritz Mueller, a German zoologist who worked in the Amazon region three decades after Bates. Many butterfly species, for instance, have developed what appear to be large eye spots (*ocelli*) on their wings, and

these can be rapidly flashed by the flapping of their wings, which frequently startles a predator, allowing the butterfly to escape. For example, the owl (*Caligo* spp.) butterfly has eye spots that appear similar to those of an owl, which is a common predator of many birds that might, in turn, prey on the butterflies. The gatekeeper (*Pyroni tithonus*) and the grayling (*Hipparchia semele*) butterflies have eye spots that are used as decoys to divert bird attacks away from their vulnerable bodies and toward the outer parts of their wings.

The group of butterfly species related as mimics and models, such as the viceroy and monarch butterflies, is referred to as a mimicry complex. However, the relationship between the viceroy and monarch butterflies is more complex than simple Batesian mimicry. For instance, some genetic variants of Viceroy, such as some Florida viceroy (*Limenitis archippus floridensis*) butterflies, have evolved complex chemical defenses that make them somewhat unpalatable to bird predators. Monarch butterflies are unpalatable to predators because their larvae feed upon milkweed (*Asclepius* spp.) and sequester the bitter and emetic cardiac glycosides contained in the plants. Unfortunately for the monarchs, the concentration of cardiac glycosides decline as the adult butterfly ages. Consequently, the monarch butterfly that could be highly unpalatable while young, could convert and become more palatable later in life, which limits its ability to then serve as an effective model for mimics.

Further, testing has indicated that some viceroy butterflies are actually more unpalatable to some avian predators than some purported mimicry models (e.g., *Danaus gilippus berenice*). This suggests that some Viceroy butterflies are actually Mullerian mimics of the Monarch queens. In addition, some monarch butterflies are Mullerian mimics of other butterfly species, such as the common tiger (*Danaus genutia*) butterfly and the African monarch (*Danaus chrysippus*), also known as the plain tiger butterfly. Because the African monarch is relatively unpalatable, it generally flies in a straight line at a slow, leisurely pace, and it also usually stays close to the ground; this behavior gives potential bird predators more time to recognize and avoid it. Inexperienced predators, such as young, newly predatory birds,

may from time to time attack an African monarch butterfly. However, in addition to its defensive concentration of distasteful alkaloids, it has tough, leathery skin that affords some protection, and when attacked, it exudes a nauseating substance that makes it both taste and smell bad.

Other species of butterflies besides the viceroy have evolved as Batesian mimics of the African monarch (*Danaus chrysippus*). These include the danaid eggfly (*Hypolimnys misippus* form *inaria*) female and Indian fritillary (*Argyreus hyperbius*) females. Several other species closely resemble the African monarch, including the common palmfly (*Elymnias hypermnestra*) female, the Indian Tamil lacewing (*Cethosia nietneri mahratta*) male and female, and the leopard lacewing (*Cethosia cyane*) butterfly.

Another example of Batesian mimicry is that of the black and blue pipevine swallowtail (*Battus philenor*) butterfly, which is highly repugnant to predators. At least four other butterfly species, including the red-spotted purple (*Limenitis arthemis astyanax*), mimic the chemically protected pipevine swallowtail. The African swallowtail (*Papilio dardanus*) is another well-studied example of a Batesian mimic. All the males and nonmimetic African swallowtail females are white with black markings and have tails on their hind wings. Female African swallowtails are polymorphic and can appear in different forms in different regions varying according to the protective species present. Thus, in some regions, the female African

swallowtails may mimic the golden brown danaid (*Danaus chrysippus*); or in other places, they may mimic the black and white danais (*Ammauris* spp.). The females of another species of butterfly that do not have the chemical protection, and that also mimic the pipevine swallowtail, are eggfly (*Hypolimnys misippus*) butterflies. Consequently, mimicry and camouflage are employed by a wide array of butterfly species.

Victor B. Stolberg  
Essex County College

**See Also:** Animals; Assassin Bugs; Camouflage; Evolution and Natural Selection; Insects; Mimicry; Plants.

### Further Readings

- Alonso-Meijia, A. and L. P. Brower. "From Model to Mimic: Age-Dependent Unpalatability in Monarch Butterflies." *Experientia*, v.50/2 (1994).
- Ritland, David B. "Comparative Unpalatability of Mimetic Viceroy Butterflies (*Limenitis archippus*) From Four South-Eastern United States Populations." *Oecologia*, v.103/3 (1995).
- Ritland, David B. and Lincoln P. Brower. "The Viceroy Butterfly Is Not a Batesian Mimic." *Nature*, v.350/6318 (1991).
- Stevens, Martin. "The Role of Eyespots as Anti-Predator Mechanisms, Principally Demonstrated in the Lepidoptera." *Biological Reviews*, v.80/4 (2005).

# C

## Camouflage

Camouflage is the act of hiding or disguising the presence of a person, animal, or thing, or to conceal the existence of something undesirable. The word *camouflage* has its origins in World War I, from the French word *camoufler* (to disguise). In the military, camouflage is the disguising of objects used in war, whether concealing something large like a camp or a ship, or something smaller like a gun or a human. This type of camouflage may use textures, various colors of paints, nets, foliage, a change in landscape, or just about any technique needed to deceive the enemy from discovering what needs to remain secret. Camouflage enables troops to move into and stay in areas that keep them closer to the enemy, without being discovered. It can hide personnel and equipment and may even trap the enemy in an unknowingly dangerous position. Camouflage designs can be colorful or dull, depending on the circumstances and targets. Camouflage can conceal shapes and the traveling directions of these shapes.

### Methods of Camouflage

Two ways to conceal the location of something are to either cover it up, or disguise it to resemble the background so that it cannot be discovered. In nature, the colors of some animals are used to blend in with their surroundings, such as a polar

bear's white fur. The fur and scales of some creatures add texture to skin, preventing bright reflections from the sun.

The most useful colors for concealment are dull earthy colors, such as greenish browns, grays, or brick reds. Green is a favorite, but it can be difficult to maintain because it can become rather blue in color as it fades, and loses its concealment properties. There is very little blue-green in nature, and blue reflects light more than green.

Texture added to the color also enhances protection. If a smooth board and a rough bath towel are painted the same color, the board will appear lighter in tone because of its ability to reflect light. Texture can make a huge difference, especially in aerial views.

A design pattern known as “disruptive camouflage” is found throughout nature, such as the spots on a leopard, stripes on a zebra or tiger, or colorful rings on a coral snake. This disruptive camouflage technique was often used during World War I, and was known as the “dazzle” style.

### Camouflage in Military History

Throughout history, British soldiers wore brightly colored shields and plumes, eventually settling on red jackets. One of the reasons for such bold colors may have been to scare off the enemy, but occasionally, the uniform color was chosen to reflect their national color. Military leaders could



also sometimes watch from a distance and follow the success or failure of their men in battle. However, by the end of the 19th century, as the number of snipers increased, uniforms became less vibrant as troops realized that bright colors created easier targets.

Soon after World War I began, an English artist and royal academician, Solomon J. Solomon, began working with various textures and materials that could be used to hide trenches from enemy planes flying above. He convinced British military authorities to experiment with some of his ideas, and because they were familiar with the camouflage work of the French, they were encouraged with Solomon's proposals. Military leaders offered him the position of technical advisor for this project.

In 1915, Lucien-Vincent Guirand de Scévola, an artist in the French infantry during World War

I, determined that a team of talented individuals focusing only on the camouflage needs of the military was required. The British Royal Engineers officially set up the *section de camouflage* in 1916, and named it the Special Works Park, with Royal Engineer officer Lt. Col. Francis Wyatt in charge. Its priority was to conceal guns and gunners from the air. Solomon and other artists, painters, and designers were given temporary military rankings. Ultimately, the Special Works Park consisted of 60 officers and 400 men of other rank. As the war continued, troops began to realize the increased need for camouflage, and the requirements for this process continued to grow.

By 1917, de Scévola was in charge of a team of approximately 5,000 artists, painters, and designers, many of whom came from the theater. That year, the first published use of the word *camouflage* appeared in Britain in the *Daily Mail*, where



**Shoot Ships to Germany and  
help AMERICA WIN—Schwab**

At this Shipyard are being built ships to carry to our men "Over There"—Food, Clothing, and the Munitions of War.

Without these ships our men will not have an equal chance to fight.

The building of ships is more than a construction job—it is our chance to win the war.

He who gives to his work the best that is in him does his bit as truly as the man who fights.

*Delays mean danger.*

*Are you doing your bit?*

Are you giving the best that is in you to help your son, brother, or pal who is "OVER THERE"?

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION  
MADE BY PRODUCTIONS SECTION, ARMY-Navy COOPERATION, WASHINGTON



Camouflage, then and now: The "dazzle" style of camouflage (left) originated during World War I in 1917, when British Naval Lt. Norman Wilkinson introduced the idea that abstract patterns on a ship would interfere with a submarine's vision when a periscope was used to set the direction of a torpedo. A Navy Seal (right) demonstrates modern military concealment during drills on Virginia Beach, Virginia, July 17, 2004. Camouflage in the modern military varies from disguising one man to concealing several divisions.



it was stated that “The act of hiding anything from your enemy is termed camouflage.”

The “dazzle” style of camouflage originated in 1917, after the Germans succeeded in sinking over 900 British ships. Alarmed, British Naval Lt. Norman Wilkinson introduced the idea that colors painted in an abstract pattern on a ship could confuse an observer as to which direction the ship was traveling. This pattern would interfere with a submarine operator’s vision when a periscope was used to set the direction of a torpedo.

Wilkinson convinced the British Navy that there was a need to organize a dazzle department, and this agency was set up under his guidance in the basement of the Royal Academy of Arts in London. Here, artists painted models with contrasting tones of pale colors, black, and gray. Sharp, angular shapes with color were used to distort a ship’s outline and traveling direction, allowing it to blend in with the background. This type of painting continued with caution in various shipyards. Some doubted the effectiveness of such a scheme, whereas others touted its success. Wilkinson also traveled to the United States to help the U.S. government start a camouflage unit.

The British War Office set up the Camouflage Development and Training Centre in 1940, continuing with disruptive camouflage techniques during World War II. John Graham Kerr, a professor of zoology at Glasgow University, strongly believed that the creation of camouflage should come from biologists, not artists. He and others wrote that camouflage came from nature, and many of the artists responsible for concealment work were missing important principles of nature that scientists thoroughly understood. Artists, however, believed that a great knowledge of colors and their blending and contrasting capabilities were paramount to creating camouflage. Authorities eventually agreed that a variety of talents and skills, such as those of engineers, scientists, and artists, were needed to work together for effective camouflage.

### Modern Camouflage

Camouflage in the modern military continues to vary in degrees, from the disguising of one man to the concealment of several divisions. Deception with camouflage includes many processes, such as

using products especially developed for human skin. Earth-toned paints are spread over the face and other exposed areas of the body. Before the development of these paints, troops often used mud, soot mixed with flour, or even cow dung for human concealment.

To hide larger targets, netting mingled with leaves, twigs, and other elements from the surrounding terrain are utilized for cover. Vehicles may be used to create multiple paths to and from a camp so that enemy photographs show no clear direction of travel, and sometimes tracks are raked over to conceal all vehicle activity. When large amounts of dirt are removed from a site, it is taken away and scattered, instead of piled up in fresh mounds nearby. Another camouflage technique that even civilians use is to turn off lights after sundown.

New methods and processes for camouflage are constantly being explored. Currently, researchers are utilizing the antireflective properties of moth eyes on unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). A private company is developing what it calls an “invisibility cloak,” which makes it possible for a vehicle to blend into its surroundings by working over infrared frequencies. The U.S. Department of Defense is currently working to develop new camouflage designs for its military forces. Much has been learned in the 20th century regarding camouflage, and work is continuing toward more discoveries in the 21st century.

Antoinette W. Satterfield  
U.S. Naval Academy

**See Also:** Animals; Department of Defense, U.S.; Espionage and Counterespionage; Military Deception; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

Forbes, Peter. *Dazzled and Deceived: Mimicry and Camouflage*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

Goodden, Henrietta. *Camouflage and Art: Design for Deception in World War II*. London: Unicorn Press, 2007.

Penrose, Roland. *Home Guard Manual of Camouflage*. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1942.

Sparkes, Boyden. “The Paintbrush War.” *Saturday Evening Post*, v.207/46 (May 1935).

## Cardiff Giant

The Cardiff Giant was one of the most celebrated hoaxes of the 19th-century United States. This famous scam surrounded the discovery of a large stone sculpture, purported to be either an ancient statue or the petrified remains of an antediluvian giant being.

The Cardiff Giant was a 10-foot, 4.5-inch-tall stone statue of a man that was found on October 16, 1869, as laborers were digging a well behind the barn belonging to William C. “Stub” Newell in Cardiff, New York. Word of the colossal find rapidly spread and people began visiting Newell’s farm to view the marvel. Newell initially charged 25 cents and was soon charging a 50¢ fee to see the giant stone man.

Two major theories arose to explain what the Cardiff Giant might actually be. Some theorized that it was an ancient statue. Dr. John F. Boyn-ton was a leading proponent of this view; he suggested that perhaps a Jesuit missionary had carved it during the 17th century to help attract converts to his faith among the indigenous Native American people of the region. A competing theory was that the Cardiff Giant was the petrified remains of a member of an ancient race of giants. This petrificationist position was based on a biblical passage (Genesis 6:4) that referred to “giants in the Earth.” This view was particularly popular among Christian fundamentalists, who saw the find as substantiation of holy scripture.

However, it was all a clever ruse. An entrepreneur, George Hull, who was an atheist and failed tobacco farmer and cigar manufacturer from Binghamton, New York, devised the idea of burying a stone giant in the ground after having a heated discussion at Ackley, Iowa, with a Methodist revivalist, the Reverend Mr. Turk, who asserted that whatever the Bible said should be taken literally and at face value. This, of course, would include the reference to “giants in the Earth.” Hull, in collaboration with Newell, formulated an elaborate plan to create the giant figure.

Hull found a railroad construction site in Fort Dodge, Iowa, that had exposed a layer of gypsum, a soft, easily carved rock. He paid the grading crew a keg of beer for a block of gypsum measuring 12 by 4 by 2 feet. This three-ton block of

stone was wrapped in canvas and moved 40 miles to the nearest active railroad line; on the way there, its weight broke two wagons and a bridge, so one ton was cut away. Hull found Edward Burkhardt, a Chicago stone cutter from Germany, who with two assistants carved out the figure, whose face happened to resemble that of Hull. The stone cutters created special hammers, made of darning needles set in a lead base, to simulate skin pores, and they rubbed the statue with water, sand, ink, and sulfuric acid to produce an antique look. The final Cardiff Giant statue weighed in at 2,990 pounds.

Newell, Hull’s cousin, agreed to have the statue buried on his farm in exchange for a quarter share of interest in the scheme. The statue was carefully interred in November 1868. In October 1869, Newell hired two neighbors, Gideon Emmons and Henry Nichols, to help him dig a well, indicating where they should dig. After the statue’s surprising discovery, scholars and scientists came from colleges and museums to inspect it, and most declared it to be an ancient statue. Numerous other gawkers came to see the marvel. Newell fenced off the area around the find, hired a carnival barker, and continued charging a 50¢ admission fee.

The total cost of creating this deception was probably slightly more than \$3,000, but Hull and Newell recouped this investment and made a handsome profit besides; they raised an estimated \$20,000 from the admission fees alone. A syndicate of investors headed by David Hannum paid \$37,500 to purchase the Cardiff Giant and moved it to Syracuse, the nearest local city, where it could be more prominently displayed.

While in Syracuse, a paleontologist from Yale University, Professor Othniel C. Marsh, closely examined the Cardiff Giant and quickly concluded that it was a recently made fake. Marsh noted that there were fresh chisel marks visible on the surface of the statue, but these would have been worn smoother had the object actually been buried in the ground for as substantial a period of time as was claimed. Marsh also noted microscopic areas in cracks where the ink had not discolored the stone.

On December 10, 1869, Hull confessed to the fraud, perhaps spurred on by Newell’s telling of the story to his local friends when sufficiently

inebriated. However, people kept coming and paid a modest fee to view the Cardiff Giant. They even gave it the affectionate nickname of “Old Hoaxey.” The Cardiff Giant was also sent on exhibition to Boston and elsewhere, including an appearance at the 1901 Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York.

In light of the continued public interest in the Cardiff Giant, the great showman P. T. Barnum offered the syndicate that now owned the colossus the amazing fee of over \$50,000 for a three-month lease so that he could exhibit it. When the offer was refused, Barnum hired an artist to surreptitiously produce an exact plaster and papier-mache replica of the statue, which was then placed on display at Barnum’s American Museum in New York City. To help attract larger crowds, Barnum offered a \$1,000 reward for anyone who could prove that his giant was less genuine than the Cardiff Giant. The replica was soon drawing more visitors than the original on display in Syracuse; this prompted the owners of the Cardiff Giant to file a lawsuit against Barnum, but the judge who was given the charges refused to hear the case unless the authenticity of the original could be conclusively proven. The charges, not surprisingly, were quickly dropped.

In 1876, Hull attempted to create another giant hoax in Colorado, but this scheme, known as the Solid Muldoon, was unsuccessful. There were several other 19th-century attempts to promote so-called petrified men, but none approached the fame of the Cardiff Giant. The Cardiff Giant is currently on display at the Farmer’s Museum in Cooperstown, New York. Barnum’s plaster replica is believed to be on display at Marvin’s Marvelous Mechanical Museum in Farmington Hills, Michigan.

Victor B. Stolberg  
*Essex County College*

**See Also:** Audience; Barnum, P. T.; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Piltdown Man.

### Further Readings

Franco, Barbara. “The Cardiff Giant: A Hundred Year Old Hoax.” *New York History*, v.50/4 (1995).  
Rose, Mark. “When Giants Roamed the Earth.” *Archaeology*, v.58/6 (2005).

Sears, Stephen W. “The Giant in the Earth.” *American Heritage*, v.26/5 (1975).

Tribble, Scott. *A Colossal Hoax: The Giant From Cardiff That Fooled America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

---

## Cardinal Newman

John Henry Cardinal Newman was a significant religious figure in 19th-century Britain, influential both to the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. During this era, anti-Catholicism was a mainstay of English life, sometimes manifested in open meetings in which former Catholics denounced their beliefs and told disparaging stories regarding the church. Newman was sued for libel when, in a public forum, he cited a series of offenses committed by an individual who had made anti-Catholic utterances. Under English law that Newman needed to prove every charge he had made was true. He was unable to do so because of interference from the judge, so he was found guilty of misrepresentations, although documents were later found that proved his allegations.

### Background

Newman was born in 1801, the son of a London banker whose wife was a descendant of French Huguenot refugees. The eldest of three boys and three sisters, Newman’s parents were disposed toward the evangelical branch of the Anglican Church. After attending George Nicholas’s Great Ealing School, in 1816, Newman had an epiphany, converting to evangelical Calvinism and embracing many anti-Catholic opinions. He next enrolled at Trinity College, Oxford, where he studied a broad range of topics, and after graduating, he became a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, considered by many to be the intellectual center of the Oxford University circle. By 1824, Newman had been ordained as an Anglican priest, and he was made the vice principal of Alban Hall the following year. In 1828, Newman became the vicar of St. Mary’s, Oxford, after which he became interested in what would be known as the Oxford movement.

The Oxford movement was composed of individuals who believed that ecclesiastical, liturgical, and theological matters should emphasize formality and a resistance to modernization. Sometimes considered to encompass the “high-church” faction, the Oxford movement advocated using a number of rituals more commonly associated with the Catholic Church. Newman, who possessed strong administrative skills and a keen intellect, soon became a leader of the Oxford movement, writing a variety of influential essays. Newman began writing a series of 90 publications, *Tracts for the Times*, issues of which ultimately were written by most of the movement’s leaders. The low cost and ready availability of the tracts helped make the objectives of the Oxford movement widely known, and catapulted Newman to a position of leadership among high-church Anglicans.

In 1839, Newman began to have doubts regarding the ascendancy of the Anglican Church, although he kept these misgivings private. In 1842, Newman left Oxford and moved to Littlemore, where he lived with a small group of adherents in monastic conditions. In 1843, Newman published an anonymous retraction of all criticisms that he had previously made of the Roman Catholic Church, and he formally converted to Catholicism in 1845. Ordained as a Catholic priest the following year, Newman moved to Birmingham, where he established a religious community where he would live for the next 40 years. Although Newman had converted to Catholicism in midlife, he soon became an apologist for his new faith.

### Libel Action

Although anti-Catholic sentiments had been present in Britain since the 16th century, by 1850, such feelings were especially heated. In that year the Vatican issued its papal bull *Universalis Ecclesiae*, which reestablished the Catholic diocesan system in England. Many Anglicans believed this was an attempt by the pope to reassert authority over Britain, and it was widely criticized in the press. Prominent Britons such as Prime Minister Lord John Russell stirred up anti-Catholic sentiments. As a result, many prominent Catholics sought to rebut this sentiment through an organized series of lectures. Newman was

called upon to present a series of lectures, and he booked the Birmingham Corn Exchange for this purpose. Newman planned to deliver nine lectures, and also prepared a series of pamphlets that contained the content of the lectures to be simultaneously distributed.

Earlier that year, Nicholas Cardinal Wiseman, the archbishop of Westminster, had written a pamphlet denouncing the apostate Dominican friar Giacinto Achilli. Achilli, based in Naples, had been removed from the exercise of his office by church authorities after repeated charges of sexual misconduct, and he was ordered to report to a remote monastery for three years’ penance. Instead, Achilli fled, joining members of the Protestant-led Bible Society on British-controlled Corfu. Achilli eventually made his way to London, where he joined the Evangelical Alliance, which at that point was involved in a debate with Cardinal Wiseman regarding Catholicism.

As Newman was preparing his lectures, he considered revealing the true reasons that Achilli had left the Catholic Church, namely his sexual assaults of women as young as 15 years old. Consulting his attorney friend James Hope-Scott regarding the advisability of bringing up these events as a way of denouncing and undermining the anti-Catholic movement, Newman was informed that because the allegations had already been published by Wiseman, the chances of a libel action were slight. As a result, in his fifth lecture, “Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View,” Newman attacked Achilli by name, mentioning numerous actions against women, and the steps that the Catholic Church had taken to prevent these behaviors from recurring. In November 1851, Achilli brought a criminal action for libel against Newman.

Newman faced an unlimited fine and imprisonment of up to one year if convicted of libel. Because he had to prove that each of the 23 contested statements that he had made regarding Achilli was true, he wrote to Wiseman requesting documentary proof of the allegations contained in the cardinal’s pamphlet. Wiseman was unable to lay his hands on these documents, although he produced them after Newman’s trial. Newman next sent a group abroad to interview witnesses, including women raped by Achilli, and to bring some of them back to England so that they could



testify at his trial. At the trial, however, John Campbell, the presiding judge, who himself harbored anti-Catholic sentiments, refused to allow these witnesses to testify and attempted to stir the jury's prejudices against Newman. When the verdict was rendered in June 1852, Newman was found guilty on 22 of 23 counts. Although he was spared the expected imprisonment, Newman was fined 100 pounds and forced to bear legal fees of over 12,000 pounds, an amount equivalent to over 1 million pounds today.

Newman's expenses were paid for by a coalition of Catholics, who joined an international appeal to defray his costs. Although Newman was shaken by the verdict, public sentiment soon turned his way. In an editorial, the *Times* denounced the verdict, and suggested that the result diminished international opinion with regard to the English justice system; the editorial maintained that such prejudicial behavior blackened the English character. His reputation in tatters, Achilli was forced to flee to America, where he was again accused of engaging in adultery. Newman, on the other hand, was named rector of the newly established Catholic University of Ireland (now Trinity College, Dublin), and he published a series of lectures on education as *The Idea of a University* (1873). Returning to England after four years, Newman established a number of schools, and was named a cardinal in 1878. Newman died in 1890. Many colleges and universities today house Newman centers, which provide pastoral services to Catholics at non-Catholic institutions.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Jason A. Helfer  
*Knox College*

**See Also:** Audience; Catholic Church; Charles II Plot; Honesty; Libel and Slander; Morals and Ethics; Reputation.

#### Further Readings

Dulles, A. *John Henry Newman*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2009.

Ker, I. *John Henry Newman: A Biography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Strange, R. *Newman: A Mind Alive*. London: Dutton, Longman and Todd, 2008.

## Carnegie, Dale

Known chiefly as the pioneer of the self-help movement in the United States, Dale Carnegie became known around the world as a lecturer, newspaper columnist, radio figure, and the author of the best-seller, *How to Win Friends and Influence People*. First published in 1936, the book continues to sell well into the 21st century. Carnegie never claimed to be an original; he admitted to borrowing quotations from others that spanned both geography and time, including Abraham Lincoln, businessman Charles Schwab, educator John Dewey, columnist Dorothy Dix, Greek philosopher Socrates, and Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu.

Carnegie's personal story provides considerable proof that his tactics could be used to achieve success. He was born Dale Carnegie on November 24, 1888, in Maryville, Missouri. His parents, James William and Amanda Elizabeth Carnegie, were impoverished farmers. Carnegie attended but never graduated from Warrensburg State Teachers College. In 1908, he took on a job as a traveling salesman for International Correspondence Schools and for Armour and Company. Carnegie had honed the skills needed for these endeavors during his years as a high school debater and by attending public speeches that allowed him to glean knowledge on oratory from skilled speakers such as politicians and lecturers.

After a brief stint in which he tried acting in New York, he convinced the New York YMCA in 1912 to allow him to teach a class on public speaking for adults for 20 percent of his profits. He was soon earning \$500 a week. That same year, he established the Dale Carnegie Training Institute. The Dale Carnegie course was designed to teach sales personnel and business managers to increase productivity by keeping customers and employees happy. Carnegie courses included tips on firing employees without generating hostility and on using attitude rather than cash to create positive work environments.

Subsequently, Dale Carnegie became Dale Carnegie. While he has been accused of lying by claiming kinship with the family of financier and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, Dale Carnegie never publicly claimed such a relationship. Nevertheless, in the minds of many people, the association was assumed.



Carnegie argued that the classic example of using charm to influence people by defusing a potentially explosive situation occurred in a speech given by John D. Rockefeller after the Ludlow Massacre of 1914, in which 18 people, including women and children, were killed during a coal mining strike. Without backing down an inch or conceding to the strikers' demands, Carnegie maintained that Rockefeller made the strikers believe that the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company had their best interests at heart.

Carnegie acknowledged that some people would always lie and attempt to deceive others, regardless of attempts to maintain honest relationships. In order to eschew controversy with such people, Carnegie encouraged his followers to avoid those masters of deception when at all possible.

### ***How to Win Friends and Influence People***

In 1936, Carnegie gathered together his material and published *How to Win Friends and Influence People*. Within a short time, the book sold 768,545 copies and became the best-selling non-fiction work of the early 20th century. Companies ranging from Westinghouse and the New York Telephone Company to the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce used Carnegie's courses to train their employees. Government officials decided that the book could help in the rehabilitation of prisoners and began distributing it at Alcatraz, Leavenworth, and the Atlanta Penitentiary. Carnegie's core audience extended to community leaders and clubwomen. By 1938, he had begun writing a syndicated newspaper column, *On Success*, which aimed to spread his tactics to the American public. By 1949, Carnegie's courses were attracting some 15,000 people per week.

When Carnegie died in 1955, *How to Win Friends and Influence People* had sold more than 5 million copies. By 1988, 165,000 people in all parts of the world had enrolled in Carnegie courses. The institute had established chapters in 750 cities across the United States, and had spread to 15 other countries. By that time, *How to Win Friends and Influence People* had sold more than 40 million copies, and had been produced in every major language in the world. It had also been produced as an audio book. By 2013, Dale Carnegie training institutes had expanded to all 50 states and 80 foreign countries.

While supporters continue to praise Dale Carnegie for his honesty and sincerity, critics have labeled him a hypocrite. Carnegie's critics have argued that he taught people to use glib words and false cheerfulness to accomplish their goals. They further contend that it is lying to teach people how to win influence by telling others only what they want to know. Carnegie responded to his critics by insisting that intentionally influencing people and swaying them to a particular way of thinking was not lying. He compared catering influence to fishing, suggesting that it is necessary to provide people, like fish, with the bait that attracts them. Carnegie also believed that criticism was generally useless, and only served to alienate others. He maintained that a smile was the most successful tool in any would-be influencer's arsenal.

In a reexamination of *How to Win Friends and Influence People* that was written for a special issue of *American Quarterly* in 1977, Gail Thain Parker suggests that Carnegie was somewhat inarticulate in his personal conversations, often choosing to quote from his book spontaneously, rather than converse. She argues that the key to understanding Carnegie lies in understanding that he was interested in conveying attitudes rather than ideas. Parker faults Carnegie for laying the groundwork for the deceptions practiced in the self-help books written by "new feminizers" who surfaced in the wake of the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s. In books such as Marabel Morgan's *The Total Woman* (1973), wives were taught to submit to their husbands, ostensibly agreeing with all decisions, and doing whatever was necessary to keep them happy.

In addition to the book with which he is so closely identified, Carnegie authored *Lincoln: The Unknown* (1932), *Little Known Facts About Well Known People* (1934), and *How to Stop Worrying and Start Living* (1948). Despite the many criticisms leveled against Carnegie and his methods, he remained enthusiastic about his work until the end of his life, and those methods have long outlived their founder. Amazon reports that the book continues to be one of its top sellers.

Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Audience; Business; Impression; Morals and Ethics; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

Carnegie, Dale. "Enthusiasm and Appreciation." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v.19/7 (January 15, 1953).

Carnegie, Dale. *How to Win Friends and Influence People*. New York: Pocket Books, 1940.

Kemp, Giles and Edward Claflin. *Dale Carnegie: The Man Who Influenced Millions*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989.

Longwood, William F. *Talking Your Way to Success: The Story of the Dale Carnegie Course*. New York: Association Press, 1962.

Marshall, Margaret. "Columnists on Parade IV: Dale Carnegie." *Nation*, v.146/2 (March 19, 1938).

Parker, Gail Thain. "How to Win Friends and Influence People: Dale Carnegie and the Problem of Sincerity." *American Quarterly*, v.29/15 (Winter 1977).

## Catholic Church

It is important to distinguish between Catholic teachings on lies and deception, and the controversies that have affected the Catholic Church that have provoked claims that the church has been deceitful in responding to issues such as sexual abuse. These are quite different areas; one has a long historical tradition, and the other controversies are of a more recent origin.

### Catholic Teachings on Lies and Deception

Catholic theology makes specific reference to lying and its relationship to ethics, morality, and sin. A fundamental basis of the Catholic Church's beliefs about lying and deception can be found in the Eighth Commandment: "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor." Furthermore, because God is the source of all truth, his followers are called upon to live truthful lives and shun lies and deception. Both in word and deed, Catholics are called upon to live truthful lives.

Three types of lies that have been identified by Catholic leaders are injurious or hurtful lies, officious lies, and jocose lies. Injurious lies hurt

the person who is the subject of the deception. Officious lies are made to avoid hurting someone; sometimes, these are called "white lies." Jocose deception involves lies told for amusement and meant to be understood by everyone as a joke. They are not intended to be harmful, and most people, including Catholics, do not consider them lies at all.

The writings of Saint Augustine are another major influence on Catholic theology about lies and deception. He believed that it was never appropriate to tell an injurious or jocose lie because lying is the opposite of the virtue of truth and veracity. Lies are often associated with hypocrisy, further demonstrating their unethical nature. Friendships and trust are formed on the basis of honesty among people; lying destroys this basic foundation of relationships. For Catholics, the end never justifies the means.

In the 16th century, Saint Thomas Aquinas played a major role in defining Catholic beliefs about lying. He defined lying as "a statement at variance with the mind."

Forms of deception that are similar to lying include flattery, which is not malicious, but is still designed to provide a false impression. Such adulation, which is not justified by either the desire to help and serve or the possibility of friendship, is considered inappropriate by Catholics. Boasting and bragging are other forms of duplicitous exaggeration, and are also offenses against the truth. Irony or sarcasm, aimed at maliciously hurting someone, are other forms of behavior that are an offense against the truth.

The seriousness of a lie depends on the amount of harm suffered by the victim, the liar's intentions, and the circumstances in which the lie is told. A lie becomes unforgivable when it does injury to justice and charity.

The purpose of communication is to share the truth with others, so lying is condemned by its very nature. Lying and deception are against the basic Catholic principles of justice and charity. They are a form of violence and disrespect toward others, and they sow the seeds of many other sins.

Catholic teaching suggests that every sin requires reparation, even if the person is forgiven. Such reparations can involve apologizing or making amends to a particular person, making donations to charity, and other acts to address the

harm done to another person. These are the types of acts that Catholics are obligated to perform in order to clear their consciences when they have sinned against others by lying.

### Sex Abuse Scandals

The sex scandals that have affected the Catholic Church involve children as young as 3 years old (but mostly between the ages of 11 and 14) who claim to have been sexually abused or assaulted by priests and members of the Roman Catholic orders (such as nuns or Christian brothers). The vast majority of victims have been male. Many of these cases have been tried as criminal offenses and have resulted in convictions, but the role of the church in responding to the cases has embroiled it in controversy. Critics claim that leaders within the Catholic Church either ignored, or willfully covered-up, cases of abuse. In some cases, critics charge that priests were simply transferred, or even internationally moved, without the church notifying police and criminal prosecutors of the alleged behavior.

A study by researchers at John Jay College of Criminal Justice funded by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops found that of the 94,607 U.S. priests for the period 1960 through 2002, 4,392 priests were alleged sex abusers. This amounted to 4.3 percent of the total number of priests in the church during that period. Police were contacted in less than one-quarter of these cases, and 252 priests whose actions were reported to police were convicted, with at least 100 serving prison time. This means that only 2 percent of the number of priests who were alleged to have engaged in sexual abuse served time in prison.

According to one report, there have been approximately 14,000 lawsuits alleging abuse against Catholic clergy since 1950, and the cost of court settlements is estimated to be approximately \$2.3 billion.

A 2009 Irish government inquiry into the level of abuse at Catholic institutions for young boys found that abuse was “endemic” in the institutions. More than 2,000 people testified before an inquiry that they had been personally abused in these institutions. Another 2009 Irish inquiry found that the crimes of 46 priests in the Dublin area had been covered up. In 2011, a third inquiry by the Irish government concluded that

the Catholic Church is not proactive in responding to allegations of abuse.

The debate over alleged sexual abuse has shaken the standing of the Catholic Church in the eyes of many people—not simply because of the betrayal of trust and degree of evil involved in the actions of the perpetrators, but also because of the wider allegations that the church has not been fully honest about its knowledge of child molesters and pedophiles within its ranks. This issue—one in which critics allege that church officials have engaged in lying and deception—has been at the core of debates over the church’s response to child abuse.

Aleiah Jones  
University of Toledo

**See Also:** Aquinas, Thomas; Bragging and Grandiosity; Lying as Exercise of Power; Morals and Ethics; Saint Augustine; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Boisvert, Donald L., and Robert Goss. *Gay Catholic Priests and Clerical Sexual Misconduct: Breaking the Silence*. New York: Harrington Park, 2005.
- Catholic Church. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994.
- “Hundreds of Priests Shuffled Worldwide, Despite Abuse Allegations” *USA Today* (June 20, 2004). [http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2004-06-19-church-abuse\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2004-06-19-church-abuse_x.htm) (Accessed January 2013).
- John Jay College of Criminal Justice. *The Nature and Scope of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States 1950–2002*. Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2004.
- Keenan, James F. *Ethics of the Word: Voices in the Catholic Church Today*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
- Slater, Thomas. “Lying.” In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm> (Accessed November 2012).
- Zoll, R. “Report: Homosexuality No Factor in Abusive Priests.” *USA Today* (November 17, 2009). [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-11-17-Catholic-abuse-report\\_N.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-11-17-Catholic-abuse-report_N.htm) (Accessed January 2013).

## Caveat Emptor

*Caveat emptor* is a Latin phrase that when literally translated means “let the buyer beware.” The phrase comes from two separate new Latin words: *emptor*, or “buyer,” and *cavere*, the verb for “caution.” The caveat emptor warning is most pronounced when the purchaser assumes the risk that the product is defective or unsuitable for his or her needs. Caveat emptor is not a transfer of responsibility to protect a seller who chooses to engage in fraud by making false statements or by issuing misleading representations about the quality or condition of a product. The caveat emptor warning simply reiterates and summarizes the concept that purchasers must inspect and examine for themselves any product considered for purchase, the failure of which may be considered negligence on the part of the buyers.

The concept of caveat emptor is believed to have been used as far back as ancient Rome as a rule for buying within the marketplace. The earliest recorded uses, however, were in medieval England as common law protection established by the English Parliament against unfair dealings within consumer transactions. Some scholars believe that the 1817 Supreme Court case of *Peter Laidlaw and Company v. Hector M. Organ* was the first to codify as rule of law in the United States the issues of duty to disclose concerning what information sellers were required to disclose or keep to themselves. The concept of caveat emptor, however, did not become widely used until the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, when the buying and selling of manufactured products and real estate became a fast-paced, mainstream market.

Since the time of the Industrial Revolution, the premise behind caveat emptor has been a valuable doctrine used for buyer protection. The idea of “let the buyer beware” was especially valuable to emerging, large corporations because it put the duty of inspection on the buyer, rather than the seller. The seller of goods could effectively make false representations about quality, without fear of repercussion.

The tide began to turn toward greater consumer protection in 1914, when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) mandated that companies had a “duty to disclose” all known defects

and accurately portray the value of the goods that they produced. Prior to the 1960s, however, the duty to disclose was not a strictly enforced practice, despite the 1914 FTC Act. Instead, large corporations still denounced the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for use under the theory of caveat emptor, placing the burden on the buyer to have the product examined prior to purchase, despite all statements by the seller regarding the value, maintenance, or condition of the product. During the 1970s, however, consumer protection laws were further codified under the Uniform Commercial Code, essentially eliminating the outdated theory of caveat emptor altogether.

Since the 1970s, these consumer protection laws have helped regulate the relationship between buyers and sellers, protecting buyers from sellers who actively engage in illegal acts such as false advertising and failing to disclose known defects. Today, consumer protection laws create a duty to disclose upon sellers that serves as an exception to any legal defense of caveat emptor. Over time, real estate and consumer transactions, as well as manufacturing and advertising, became more complex, necessitating more regulation than what could be addressed by common law concepts of caveat emptor, now considered a highly inequitable imposition upon a buyer. Such regulations effectively obliterated the seller’s claims of caveat emptor as a safety net for sellers who wished to use it as an excuse for poor advertising practices. Interestingly, although the express codification of consumer protection appears to make the claim of caveat emptor obsolete, the resulting legal loopholes have also given rise to the claims of caveat venditor (let the seller beware) and caveat emptor light.

### Caveat Emptor Light

Recent economic instability, failures of oversight within the banking industry, and large corporate bailouts by the government have resulted in consumers who are even less trustful of large corporations, as well as government and court protections once ensured under the existing consumer protection laws. This lack of faith has led to a rise in privately funded transactions, especially in real estate. Consumers no longer trust that corporations are accurately representing themselves or



their products and have again adopted the ideology that the buyer should beware when engaging in such transactions. Even though the legal defense of caveat emptor may be outdated, it still seems to affect private consumer transactions in the revised, smaller doctrine of caveat emptor light. This revised theory of buyer prudence in knowledgeable transactions is applied to help keep consumers safe in private transactions that are not otherwise regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code.

Especially used in private real estate transactions, and taught to real-estate brokers and agents, caveat emptor light encourages diligent buyers to have private inspections done, and educates sellers as to what they are, or are not, required to disclose when selling their home. The necessity for a buyer to examine the product, or land in the case of real estate, for condition and appropriateness of title to be transferred is the prerequisite of diligence for equitable claims of relief in which the buyer seeks to be made whole upon transactions in which the buyer has the implied duty to beware.

Caveat emptor light may help consumers avoid the pitfalls of false advertising because, while a little puffery of a product may be expected, it is still incumbent upon a consumer to do research about the product in question before purchasing. Whether it is lying and deceit by a major company or by a neighbor selling a car, the concepts of caveat emptor are still worthy precautions for a buyer from those who might purposefully engage in false representations.

Webster B. Baker  
Saint Leo University

**See Also:** Advertising; Bankruptcy; Consumer Products; Consumer Protection Laws; Deception and Trust; Disinformation; Drug Advertising; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Marketing, Deceptive; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Puffery; Tobacco Advertising.

#### Further Readings

Ellison, R. "Time to Revisit Caveat Emptor? What Has Regulation Ever Done for Us?" *Pensions: An International Journal*, v.13/3 (2008).

Freedman, Tracy. "Back to Caveat Emptor at F. T. C." *Nation*, v.238/9 (1984).

Johnson, Alex M., Jr. "An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learned From the Caveat Emptor Doctrine." *San Diego Law Review*, v.45/1 (2008).

*Peter Laidlaw and Company v. Hector M. Organ*, 15 U.S. 178 (1817).

## Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the bureau of the U.S. government charged with providing national security intelligence to other federal agencies and the military. Created in 1947 to succeed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA was responsible for coordinating and leading all intelligence activity conducted by the U.S. government and its agencies. While this changed after 2004, the CIA is still the primary source of intelligence information regarding foreign governments, corporations, organizations, and individuals, and also conducts tactical operations in the field, some of which are covert.

At various times over its history, leaders and agents of the CIA have been accused of lying or engaging in other deceptive practices that have caused skepticism about the reliability of the agency's work. The CIA has also been charged with relying too much on information sources that are at best unreliable and at worst purposefully providing incorrect or inaccurate information to the agency, which has caused the U.S. government to make decisions that have been costly, and even harmful to citizens of the United States and other countries.

#### Background

Although intelligence had been gathered for use by the military and government agencies since the Revolutionary War, there was no centralized system to coordinate this information until World War II. Before this, various branches of government, including the U.S. Army, Navy, State, and Treasury departments, maintained





*General David Petraeus shakes hands with his biography author Paula Broadwell, July 13, 2011. Sworn in as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director with his wife, Holly, by his side in September 2011, Petraeus began an extramarital affair with Broadwell two months later, creating yet another deception scandal for the CIA. The Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered a private Gmail account where Petraeus used an alias.*

separate intelligence-gathering offices. There was no coordination or cooperation between these different offices, and there was often duplication of efforts. After the United States entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to improve the control and direction of intelligence gathering conducted on behalf of the United States. To that end, Roosevelt formed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) by means of a military order on June 13, 1942. The OSS was charged with collecting and analyzing intelligence data needed by the military during the war. As a result, the OSS provided the military with reports containing facts and analysis, although it did not have the sole responsibility for intelligence gathering internationally. The Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintained control of information-gathering in Central and South America, while the Army and Navy jealously maintained control of their own intelligence infrastructure.

After the allied victory in World War II, President Harry S. Truman dissolved the OSS by means of an executive order in October 1945. At that point, the OSS's Strategic Services Unit, which was responsible for clandestine intelligence and counterespionage, was absorbed into the War Department. The Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which conducted analyses on intelligence, was moved to the State Department. The Psychological Warfare Division, which focused on morale and propaganda, was split between the War Department and the Army General Staff.

In early 1946, however, President Truman formed the Central Intelligence Group, which reclaimed some of these powers, despite fierce opposition from the State Department, the War Department, and the FBI. By the next year, the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, which was initially led by Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter.

First authorized to carry out covert operations in 1948, the CIA was next allowed to use confidential fiscal procedures, which exempted its budget from customary oversight and transparency related to federal expenditures. Although it took the lead role in foreign intelligence gathering and participated in international crime investigations, it possessed no domestic police authority. Instead, the FBI was responsible for domestic law enforcement, and the CIA also shared some authority with the U.S. Army Special Forces, with whom it shared some resources.

The CIA chiefly focused on gathering intelligence information, which it continues to do today, although its role has changed over time. Pressure was exerted on the CIA throughout the last four decades of the 20th century to both gather the best intelligence available while also eschewing practices that involved lying and deception. This pressure often resulted in the CIA attempting to reach what some felt were mutually exclusive goals.

Through 2004, the director of the CIA also served as the manager of the U.S. intelligence

community, meaning that the position oversaw intelligence efforts, served as the chief intelligence advisor to the president, and provided other services as needed. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, however, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created a new office that oversees all intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI has taken over some of the responsibilities and functions that had previously been under the purview of the CIA, and the CIA now reports to the DNI, rather than the president.

### Controversies and Disagreements

Although the CIA largely works in secret, a variety of events have caused critics concern regarding the veracity and reliability of its reports and the integrity and ethical nature of its actions. Intelligence collection often involves lying and deception, yet the public and Congress have increasingly demanded more openness about how the work proceeds. Certainly the clandestine nature of much intelligence work requires the CIA to be less than completely transparent with regard to its work. Unlike other federal operations, the CIA's budget and other important information related to its management are confidential and are not released for public scrutiny. While this different role is accepted by most, at various times, disclosures of covert actions by the CIA have included misrepresentations to other governments, the press, and even the agents of the executive branch. This has caused skepticism of the CIA's actions and has raised questions regarding the quality of its intelligence and analysis.

During the 1950s, for example, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union made procuring intelligence information about the nation difficult for the CIA. Allen Dulles, the CIA's director and brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was given more leeway regarding covert operations than his predecessors. Unable to receive reliable information about military installations within the Soviet Union, the CIA initiated a series of reconnaissance flights over Soviet airspace by aircraft equipped with especially sensitive camera equipment. The Lockheed U-2, which remains in use in the 21st century, was especially developed for high-altitude,

all-weather intelligence-gathering. The U-2 aircraft, which can operate day or night, flies at an altitude of 70,000 feet, which makes its detection difficult. Because military aircraft entering another nation's airspace without authorization can be construed as an act of war, the CIA flew the U-2s under its own operation, known as Project Dragon Lady. Beginning in 1957, flights from U.S. bases in Pakistan provided the United States valuable intelligence regarding the Soviet military capacity. On May 1, 1960, U.S. pilot Francis Gary Powers flew a U-2 plane on a mission to photograph intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a plutonium processing center before landing in Norway. Detected by the Soviets, Powers's plane was intercepted by missiles and he was captured after bailing out.

The initial U.S. response was to send news releases four days later, alleging that a plane had gone missing over Turkey. Believing Powers to be dead, the United States stated that the U-2 had been a weather research aircraft that may have strayed into Soviet airspace after experiencing "oxygen problems." The Soviets then disclosed that they had captured Powers, and that the plane was still intact. A peace conference planned for Paris collapsed, and the Soviet Union convened a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to expose untruths by the CIA and the U.S. government. The U-2 incident caused the U.S. government great embarrassment, and sowed the first seeds of doubt regarding the CIA's veracity and practices.

Between 1953 and 1959, Cuban insurgents led a revolution against the pro-U.S. government of President Fulgencio Batista. Concerned with the close ties that the new Cuban government was forging with the Soviet Union, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to spend \$13 million to overthrow the Cuban government. In its efforts to overthrow the government led by Fidel Castro, the CIA collaborated with the Mafia and Cuban dissenters to train a group known as Brigade 2506. Recruiting over 1,400 men to be members of the brigade, the CIA trained the insurgents in a variety of locations, including Florida, Kentucky, Georgia, and Mexico. In mid-April 1961, members of Brigade 2506 landed near the Cuban Bay of Pigs, leading to a series of battles that were ultimately won by the

Cuban government. The defeat embarrassed the administration of President John F. Kennedy and strengthened Castro's ties with the Soviet Union. Although President Kennedy first asserted that the Bay of Pigs action was the effort of Cubans dissatisfied with the Castro government, the CIA's role in recruiting and training Brigade 2506 soon came to light. This series of untrue statements caused the Kennedy administration some negative press, and made many people question the policies of the CIA. The acknowledgement of lying and deception by CIA agents reduced support for the organization and its mission.

During the Vietnam War, the CIA was harshly criticized by many who did not favor the involvement of the United States in the conflict. CIA analysts were involved in assessing the political strength of the South Vietnamese government as early as 1954, and many of their reports were less sanguine than those of the U.S. military. Numbers contained in reports that the CIA provided the White House during the 1960s and 1970s were allegedly changed so that political support for the conflict would not diminish. This deception was related to increasing numbers of American casualties, which made the war unpopular with much of the electorate. By the mid-1970s, allegations regarding abuses of the CIA's power grew stronger, as Congress attempted to reassert control over the agency. Congressional hearings elicited stories of assassinations of foreign leaders and spying on U.S. citizens.

After former CIA operatives were involved in the burglary of the Democratic Party's National Committee offices in the Watergate office complex in 1972, the agency's standing fell to an all-time low. The situation was exacerbated when President Richard M. Nixon attempted to have the CIA interfere with the FBI's investigation into the Watergate break-in and subsequent coverup. These actions caused a loss of public support for the CIA, and in an era when the power of the executive branch was weakened, disclosure of these deceptive practices created a groundswell of support for change and reform.

### Response to Past Deceptions

James Schlesinger, the CIA director, moved to examine the allegations of past illegal activities, including those involving lying and deception, on

the part of the agency. To that end, he commissioned a series of reports that became known as the Family Jewels. In late 1974, the *New York Times* ran a series of stories about the Family Jewels, immediately drawing negative attention to the CIA. In these articles, the *New York Times* alleged that the CIA had used the hallucinogenic drug LSD in experiments with human subjects who had not given informed consent for this, assassinated foreign leaders, and conducted illegal surveillance on thousands of Americans involved in the antiwar movement. After Schlesinger left the CIA to become the secretary of defense, his successor, William Colby, was forced to deal with questions from multiple fronts related to the policies of the agency. The relationship between Congress and the CIA became increasingly strained as the Family Jewels reports indicated that the CIA had lied to and deceived members of Congress in the past.

The U.S. Senate formed a committee under the leadership of Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) to explore the actions of the CIA, and the House of Representatives convened a similar committee chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-New York). As a result of these committees, Colby testified before Congress over 30 times in 1975, forced to answer questions about the policies of the CIA and its lack of truthfulness with previous congressional committees. President Gerald R. Ford also became involved in the evaluation process, issuing an executive order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders, and convening a committee of his own under the chairmanship of Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller. Both members of Congress and representatives of the executive branch distanced themselves from the CIA's actions, leading to the public perception that it was a rogue agency that eschewed respect for the legislative process or the chain of command necessary to conduct foreign policy. Public opinion demonstrated reduced support for the CIA.

During the 1980s, further controversy kept the CIA in a position where it was on the defensive with both Congress and the public. In 1986, reports surfaced alleging that the administration of President Ronald Reagan had negotiated the sale of weapons to Iran, then under an arms embargo, and used the proceeds from these sales



to fund various rebel groups (the Contras) who opposed the government of Nicaragua, an action that had also been prohibited by Congress. These transactions, which required lies and deception to achieve, had been facilitated by the CIA. A member of the National Security Council, Lt. Col. Oliver North, was charged to have implemented the plan, and it was alleged that officials as prominent as CIA Director William Casey, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and even President Ronald Reagan had been involved in the scheme. Although Reagan initially denied the transactions, he later admitted that they took place and took full responsibility for them, although he denied knowledge of the scheme.

Reagan appointed a bipartisan committee led by former U.S. Senators John Tower and Edmund Muskie to investigate the matter (the Tower Commission), and the panel found fault with the president's lax management style and lack of oversight of the CIA and others. Although North, Weinberger, and others were indicted for their actions, pardons issued by President George H. W. Bush took care of many of the chief players, while other convictions were overturned on appeal.

The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 was a direct attempt to constrain the CIA from engaging in behavior that was not in keeping with U.S. and international laws. Specifically, members of Congress codified their desire to be kept abreast of actions involving the CIA. The act mandated that all covert operations of the CIA must be approved by the president, and that all parties involved in secret operations must be listed and shared with Congress on a regular basis. In 1993, further legislation restructured the agency, increasing the level of documentation required for CIA operations. These actions were later criticized for unduly restraining the CIA, making it more difficult to assemble the intelligence reports necessary to protect national security.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, these changes were believed by some to have prevented the CIA from determining the movements of certain terrorist groups because of difficulties engendered in complying with these regulations. After the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, a newly created office of the Director of National Intelligence assumed many of the intelligence community functions

that the CIA and its director had previously held. The CIA now reports to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), one of 16 agencies reporting to this agency.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Jason A. Helfer  
Knox College

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Communication; Conspiracies; Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment; Department of Defense, U.S.; Eisenhower, Dwight; Espionage and Counterespionage; Iran-Contra Affair; Iraq War; Middle East; Military Deception; Terrorism; Torture; Vietnam War; Watergate.

### Further Readings

- Andrew, C. *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency From Washington to Bush*. New York: HarperCollins, 2005.
- Andrew, C. *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of the MI5*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009.
- Crumpton, H. A. *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons From a Life Inside the CIA's Clandestine Service*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.
- Dulles, A. W. *The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering in a Free World*. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006.
- Hathaway, Robert M. "Present at the Creation: The Birth of the Central Intelligence Agency and America's Postwar Intelligence Community." *Diplomatic History*, v.18/3 (1994).
- Houston, Philip. *Spy the Lie: Former CIA Officers Show You How to Detect Deception*. New York: St. Martin's, 2012.
- "Petraeus Affair: Timeline on Paula Broadwell and the General's Physical Special Ops." *Daily News*. (November 12, 2012). <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/petraeus-broadwell-diary-affair-article-1.1200840> (Accessed August 2013).
- Schulsky, A. N. and G. J. Schmitt. *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2002.
- Wallace, R., H. K. Melton, and R. Schlesinger. *Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs From Communism to Al-Qaeda*. New York: Dutton, 2008.

## Charles II Plot

The plot to kill King Charles II of England (also known as the Popish Plot) was supposedly a plan to kill the king and replace him with his Roman Catholic brother James, the Duke of York. Although there was no plot, many people believed the story.

In the year prior to the plot, English public opinion was inclined to believe anti-Catholic rhetoric. Many Londoners had blamed the Catholics for the Great Fire of 1666. The fire, which lasted from September 2 to 5, destroyed much of the city, forcing many Londoners to evacuate. Robert Hubert, a French Catholic, confessed to having started the fire, even though he did not actually arrive in the country until two days after the fire started.

Despite the questionable nature of Hubert's claim that he was a French spy in service of the pope, the Frenchman was convicted and executed because it suited the needs of those in Parliament who believed that Charles II was sympathetic to Catholics. Catholics, who constituted less than 10 percent of England's population, became convenient scapegoats for all of the country's ills, so a claim that Catholics were behind a plot to kill the monarch had a receptive audience.

The plot was the creation of Titus Oates, an Anglican priest who had become a Catholic in 1677. He entered Jesuit seminaries, but was expelled from the seminary in St. Omer in France in June 1678. After his expulsion, Oates returned to England, where he shared with Dr. Israel Tonge his stories of plots by Jesuits, including the plot to kill the English monarch.

### Catholic Scapegoats

Tonge and Oates wrote a manuscript detailing the Catholic conspiracy against the king. They claimed that the leaders of the Catholic Church in Great Britain had approved the assassination plot, which was to be carried out by the Jesuits. Allegedly, the English Catholics had entered into a conspiracy with King Louis XIV of France to raise an army of 50,000 men who would seize the country and kill the king, place his brother (who was Catholic) on the throne, and murder thousands of Protestants. No such plot existed, but Oates's story was readily accepted by English

Protestants who feared the possibility of James, the Duke of York and a Roman Catholic, ascending to the throne if his brother died. Charles II had himself become a Catholic in 1670, but kept this a secret.

The king was informed of the plot by Christopher Kirkby, a chemist, and Tonge. Charles II, who did not really take the plot seriously, turned the investigation over to Thomas Osborne, Lord Danby, the lord high treasurer. Osborne was an opponent of the Roman Catholic Church in Great Britain, having opposed Charles II's 1672 Royal Declaration of Indulgence, which suspended criminal sanctions against those who did not conform to the Church of England or were Roman Catholics. Osborne also was a supporter of the 1673 Test Act, which barred nonconformists and Roman Catholics from public service or public office. Unlike the king, Osborne was interested in pursuing the plot. Tonge decided to have Oates tell his story, under oath, to Sir Edmund Geoffrey, a magistrate. Oates testified before Geoffrey on September 6, 1678. On October 12, the magistrate disappeared, and his body was found a few days later, which only heightened the belief that Oates's story had some merit and that the Jesuits had killed him to insure his silence.

Osborne had Oates brought before the Privy Council on September 28, 1678, where he presented his charges. He claimed that hundreds of Catholics were involved in the plot. Many of those accused by Oates were prominent Catholics, or had connections to Catherine of Braganza, the king's Roman Catholic wife. Sir George Wakeman, Catherine of Braganza's doctor, was accused by Oates of having turned down 10,000 pounds to poison the king because he wanted more money. Oates claimed that the doctor had agreed to poison the king when the offer was raised to 15,000 pounds. Another person charged by Oates was Edward Colman, the one-time secretary to Mary of Modena, who was the Duchess of York (the wife of the king's brother) and a Roman Catholic. Colman, who had been forced from office by Osborne, had been in contact with officials in the French government and French Jesuits, giving credibility to Oates's charges. Colman was charged with high treason, and Oates testified against him, claiming that he had carried letters to the French for Colman and had witnessed a



meeting in which the plot to assassinate the king was discussed. Letters seized from Colman's home were also placed in evidence against him. While Colman acknowledged having corresponded with the French, he said that the communication had stopped in 1674, and that he had never conspired to kill the king. Despite his declarations of innocence, Colman was convicted and executed on December 3, 1678. Wakeman was indicted for high treason in July 1679, but was acquitted at trial despite the testimony of Oates.

Others accused by Oates included Dr. William Fogarty; Peter Talbot, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Dublin; John Belasyse, 1st Baron Belasyse; Henry Arundell, 3rd Baron Arundell of Wardour; and William Herbert, the Earl of Powis. Oates identified 81 individuals who he claimed were part of this plot, and they were rounded up by Lord Danby to face prosecution.

In November 1678, Oates claimed the queen, Catherine of Braganza, was conspiring with Charles II's doctor to poison him. The queen was Roman Catholic, and her complicity in a plot could be easily believed by those fearful of the "papist plot." Charles, who had been skeptical of Oates's allegations in the first place, interviewed Oates, concluded he was lying, and ordered his arrest. However, within a few days, Parliament demanded that Oates be released. Charles, who had been forced from England and spent nine years in Europe after the execution of his father and his defeat by Oliver Cromwell at the Battle of Worcester in 1651, acceded to Parliament's wishes, and Oates was freed. Upon his release, Oates was given a state apartment and an allowance of 1,200 pounds a year.

The campaign against the "plotters" continued. At one point, Oates claimed that the king would be shot with silver bullets so that his wounds could not be treated (although there was no evidence of such a plot or that silver bullets caused untreatable wounds). Over the next three years, 15 innocent men were executed. By the middle of 1681, the English courts began to declare more people innocent, and opinion turned against Oates.

In August 1681, Oates was told to leave his apartment. He was then arrested for sedition, fined 100,000 pounds, and thrown into prison. When James II became king after Charles II's death in 1685, he had Oates retried, and Oates

was convicted of perjury. His punishment was life imprisonment, with the additional sanction of being "whipped through the streets of London five days a year for the remainder of his life." In 1689, following the Glorious Revolution, Oates was pardoned by William III of Orange and Mary II and was granted a pension of 260 pounds a year. Oates died on either July 12 or 13, 1705.

While the plot may have come to an end, the persecution of Catholics continued. The Popery Act of 1698, enacted by Parliament in 1700, offered rewards to those who would turn Catholic priests into the authorities; this law was not repealed until 1846. The Act of Settlement (1701) bars a Catholic from becoming the monarch. It was not until 1778, with the passage of the first Catholic Relief Act, that Roman Catholics were permitted to own and inherit property and join the army. However, the American Revolution and wars with France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic, were protested by Protestants who feared that Catholic soldiers would join with French and Spanish soldiers to invade Great Britain. In June 1780, a march on Parliament turned into a riot against the law (the Gordon Riots), with buildings owned by or associated with Catholics attacked by the mobs. It was not until 1829 that Catholics were given the right to vote or were permitted to hold public office, rights that had been taken away a century and a half earlier in a climate that fostered the creation of Oates's plot and fed the anti-Catholic hysteria of the age.

Jeffrey Kraus  
Wagner College

**See Also:** Catholic Church; Cromwell, Oliver; Espionage and Counterespionage; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700; Lying, Accusations of.

#### Further Readings

- Gibney, John. *Ireland and the Popish Plot*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Hinds, Peter. *The Horrid Popish Plot: Roger L'Estrange and the Circulation of Political Discourse in Late Seventeenth-Century London*. New York: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2010.
- Kenyon, John P. *The Popish Plot*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972.

# Cheating

Cheating can generally be defined as an immoral and socially undesired behavior that can lead to lying about the behavior in question in order to avoid punishment. What is accounted as an extreme kind of immoral and socially undesired behavior is manifested in written rules and laws. A more precise definition of cheating, and what behaviors are seen as cheating behaviors, depends on the context in which a person cheats (e.g., in academics, romantic relationships, industry/organizations, or sports). Concerning research on cheating, the academic context is one of the most prominent ones. People cheat in order to gain advantages. More specific reasons for cheating depend on the context in which the behavior takes place.

Synonyms for cheating also depend on context: In the academic context, the synonym is academic dishonesty; in a romantic relationship, unfaithfulness or infidelity; and in the industrial/organizational context and in the sports context, fraud. In an academic context, cheating behaviors in schools, colleges, or universities include using a cheat sheet during a test or exam, copying homework or answers during a test or exam from a classmate, using a mobile device with Internet access during a test or exam, and plagiarizing homework. In science, plagiarizing scientific articles and manipulating results or datasets are all considered to be cheating behavior.

In a romantic relationship, cheating ranges from a one-night stand to an affair over a longer time period. In the industrial/organizational context, cheating can be considered with regard to embezzling money or virtually stealing money. When it comes to sports, cheating can be understood in the same way as in an industrial context, especially in the context of big sporting events, such as the Olympic Games. But it can also mean that a player is doped or a game is fixed (i.e., the players are paid to lose).

## Prevalence of and Reasons for Cheating

The prevalence of cheating depends on the context. Academic dishonesty frequently occurs. Studies report that over 75 percent of high-school and college students have cheated at least once. The data on the prevalence of infidelity in

committed relationships varies between studies, but one can conclude that infidelity occurs in less than one-quarter of committed relationships. In the organizational context, research indicates that every second job applicant is cheating. The prevalence of cheating within a sports context depends on the type of cheating behavior (e.g., game fixing or doping). For example, the rates for doping are nearly nonexistent or over 75 percent, depending on the type of drug (caffeine or anabolic steroids) as well as the sport (endurance sports, weight lifting, or gymnastics).

In general, people cheat to gain certain advantages. Those advantages can be either material or nonmaterial, and either direct or indirect. In an academic context, direct nonmaterial advantages of cheating can lead to good grades, higher authorization (to attend a certain college or university), and publications in scientific journals. An indirect nonmaterial advantage of academic cheating can lead to increases in honor (such as earning certificates) and reputation (e.g., increased listings in the curriculum vitae). These kinds of advantages can follow an indirect material advantage, such as a good job with high income. In a romantic relationship, a direct nonmaterial advantage of cheating can be pleasure. An indirect nonmaterial advantage of cheating in a romantic relationship—following an evolutionary approach—can be the maximization of the chances of gene survival. Cheating within the industrial/organizational context, as well as within the sports context, can lead to direct material advantages, such as monetary gains. Additionally, cheating in sports can also lead to the direct and indirect nonmaterial advantages of increased honor and reputation.

If a person who has been cheating is confronted with his or her behavior, a common reaction is to lie about the behavior in question in order to avoid punishment. However, in order to understand that cheating is immoral and socially undesirable, and that cheating can lead to punishment if discovered, a person needs to learn and develop a sense that cheating is not an accepted behavior. Avoiding punishment is one reason not to cheat, and is also the first stage of Lawrence Kohlberg's stages in moral development, which is a common way of thinking for all human beings. Even small children learn that avoiding punishment is an

indication that a certain behavior is not socially desired.

A tendency to assume that someone is cheating or not cheating creates a certain judgment bias. Assuming that someone is generally not cheating creates a so-called truth bias (a tendency to judge messages as truthful) and explains the veracity effect (truths are more accurately identified than lies). However, assuming that someone is a cheater creates a so-called lie bias (a tendency to judge messages as lies). The type of bias that a judge has depends again on the context. Whereas a truth bias can be found for teachers and romantic partners (and laypeople, such as students who are not experienced lie detectors), a lie bias can be found for police officers.

The truth bias can be explained by concern for certain errors: People who have a close, personal, and sometimes intimate relationship with the alleged cheater—such as teachers with their students and partners in romantic relationships—are more concerned with wrongly accusing the other. Wrongful accusation can be seen as a violation of relationship rules (e.g., trust) and can negatively affect the relationship quality. Thus, even if there is a suspicion of cheating, an accusation might be more harmful in regard to protecting the relationship than the actual cheating. This tendency to avoid the error of wrongful accusation leads to a truth bias. However, people who do not have a close and personal relationship, such as police officers and suspects, are more concerned with not catching a cheater. Thus, if there is a suspicion of cheating, not catching a cheater is more harmful than wrongfully accusing someone. This tendency to want to catch every cheater leads to a lie bias.

One of the most prominent areas of research on cheating is within the academic context. Generally, academic cheating is a serious problem concerning frequency and consequences of cheating. Academic integrity (attitudes, beliefs, and behavior that promotes a climate of integrity, for example, through honor codes) and moral standards are factors that reduce academic cheating. When it comes to the detection of lies about cheating in school, accuracy is at chance level, and thus detection is not different than accuracy of lies about cheating in other domains. Also in line with accuracy of detecting lies and truths

about cheating in other domains, the accuracy is higher for true compared to invented statements (veracity effect).

## Conclusion

The behaviors that characterize cheating can only be specified if the context is known. But the reason why people cheat is universal and independent of the context: Cheaters intend to gain advantages that they would not otherwise gain if they did not cheat. Also, the reason why people lie about their cheating behaviors is independent of the context: People want to avoid punishment for their immoral and socially undesirable behavior. When it comes to the detection of lying about cheating, people do not perform better than chance.

Tamara Marksteiner  
Marc-André Reinhard  
*University of Mannheim*

**See Also:** Academia; Adolescence, Lying in; College Sports; Deception Detection Accuracy; High School Sports; Morals and Ethics; Plagiarism; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

## Further Readings

- Blow, A. J. and K. Hartnett. "Infidelity in Committed Relationships II: A Substantive Review." *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy*, v.31 (2005).
- Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).
- Masip, J., H. Alonso, E. Garrido, and C. Anton. "Generalized Communicative Suspicion Among Police Officers: Accounting for the Investigator Bias Effect." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.35 (2005).
- Mazar, N., O. Amir, and D. Ariely. "The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance." *Journal of Marketing Research*, v.45 (2008).
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- Miller, A., C. Shoptaugh, and J. Wooldridge. "Reasons Not to Cheat, Academic-Integrity

- Responsibility, and Frequency of Cheating.” *Journal of Experimental Education*, v.79 (2011).
- Neville, L. “Do Economic Equality and Generalized Trust Inhibit Academic Dishonesty? Evidence From State-Level Search-Engine Queries.” *Psychological Science*, v.23 (2012).
- Power, F. C., A. Higgins, and L. Kohlberg. *Lawrence Kohlberg’s Approach to Moral Education*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- Reinhard, M.-A., O. Dickhäuser, T. Marksteiner, and S. L. Sporer. “The Case of Pinocchio: Teachers’ Ability to Detect Deception.” *Social Psychology of Education*, v.14 (2011).
- Rost, D. H. and K. P. Wild. “Cheating and Achievement-Avoidance at School: Components and Assessment.” *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, v.64 (1994).
- Shackelford, T. K. and D. M. Buss. “Cues to Infidelity.” *Personality and Social Psychological Bulletin*, v.23 (1997).

## Childhood, Lying in

Childhood is a challenging time when figuring out how the world works and what is or is not appropriate behavior are key goals. While relaying false or incorrect information is part of this general learning process, the more specific skill of lying in order to deceive is of particular interest to parents and educators alike. The paradox of lying for children exists in the hypocrisy of adults who say “lying is bad,” but they lie to each other and to their children. To confuse matters further, children learn from an early age that while they will be punished for telling a lie, they can also be punished for telling the truth.

Children navigate this conundrum over the course of childhood and adolescence, gaining perspective and insight as they move through the many developmental stages hypothesized to comprise the period from birth to young adulthood. Over time, they come to realize the importance of honesty, the stakes and consequences associated with lying, and that under certain circumstances, lying is not only acceptable but also necessary. In order to successfully navigate this learning curve, children must develop three vital skills:

perspective-taking, understanding the concept of intent to hurt, and the ability to communicate both truths and untruths.

### Lying in Early and Middle Childhood

Between the ages of 2 and 4, most children become verbal and enjoy the process of hearing and telling stories. They do not, however, have the ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy, often confusing the two. Added to this, children in this age group have short memories and often are unable to remember what they have done, even in the recent past. When this occurs, they are likely to try to retell the story of the events by guessing at what might have happened. A 3 year old, for example, may tell someone a very detailed story about her third birthday party, when in fact she is telling the other person what she hopes her fourth birthday party will include. She cannot remember what actually happened at the party, so she fills in the gaps with her desires for her future celebration, not understanding that the two are not interchangeable. At its most basic level, this story is a lie simply because it is untrue; however, for most adults it falls into the murky territory between lies, mistakes, and wishful thinking.

In this stage of development, children will sometimes tell outrageous and unbelievable lies, simply because they lack the ability to judge whether a statement is believable, or even to understand what the concept of believability is all about. This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that at this age parents often begin to teach their children about being polite, which in many societies actually involves telling lies. “I had a good time at your party,” or “I like visiting Auntie May’s house,” are lies that many children are encouraged to tell, despite the fact that they are simultaneously being told that lying is bad. Though imaginative, children in this age group are unable to take on the perspective of others, do not yet understand the concept of intent to harm through lying, and lack the communication skills to effectively lie.

As children age, however, they begin to gain further insight into the difference between lies and errors. Conscience, or the ability to recognize the difference between right and wrong and feel guilty when committing wrong actions, appears to emerge between ages 5 and 7. At this point



children learn that by lying, one has the possibility of avoiding negative consequences, guilt, and even punishment for one's wrongdoings. This understanding occurs before they develop the theory of mind necessary to understand why it works. At this stage, broken lamps are often blamed on siblings, imaginary friends, or freak earthquakes. Children in this age group are old enough to know that what they did was wrong, smart enough to know that there will be consequences attached to those wrong actions, and self-focused enough to try to deflect blame and punishment toward others, rather than tell the truth.

In addition to these self-serving lies, children in this age group also begin to recognize that lying can garner attention from other children and adults. Self-aggrandizing stories that cast the child as hero or adventurer begin to emerge, holding other children's rapt attention and inspiring admiration, acceptance, and sometimes even envy as the story unfolds. Not all of this attention is good, however. As the lie passes the point of believability, children and adults alike will



*As children age, they begin to gain insight into the difference between lies and errors. Between the ages of 5 and 7, a child's conscience emerges, and lying is used a way to avoid guilt and consequences. At that age, a broken lamp might be blamed on the cat, or a stolen cookie might be blamed on a sibling.*

lose interest and begin to doubt the veracity of the child's word. This need for attention can then backfire, cause the child to be excluded from his or her peer group, and garner disdain from the adults in his or her circle. These behaviors suggest that the 5- to 7-year-old child is developing his or her perspective-taking skills and improving in terms of communication; however, the child still lacks the understanding of how lies can be used to deliberately hurt others.

When middle childhood arrives between the ages of 8 and 10 years, children become better at considering another person's perspective and considerably improve their communication skills. In this age group, children still lie to avoid punishment, but they also start to lie in order to avoid having to do things that they do not want to do. For example, at this age children begin to complain of illness on test day or experience a turned ankle when it is time to take out the garbage. A new type of lie emerges at this stage, a lie designed not to hurt others or protect the self as much as to avoid disappointing or hurting others. Children between 8 and 10 years old are better able to understand the perspective of others and so can more effectively gauge when their wrongful actions or misbehaviors will be distressing to those they care about most. Because they are afraid of disappointing or hurting others, particularly their parents or other important adult figures, these children lie to cover up what they perceive to be their inadequacies or embarrassing actions.

For example, a 9 year old who has fallen while ice skating will not own up to a lack of skill on skates but will instead lie and insist that "I fell because John tripped me." This allows the child to save face and avoid seeing the look of disappointment from Mom and Dad, who the child believes will be embarrassed by his lack of athletic prowess. This shift in lying patterns suggests that while their ability to understand the power of lies to deliberately inflict pain on another person is still virtually untapped, children are aware that their actions can cause hurt or embarrassment to others and seek to avoid causing this disappointment by lying.

### **Preadolescent and Teen Lying**

As preadolescence begins, the scenario shifts again. Children ages 11 and up have had years to



hone their communication skills and are becoming much more effective at taking the perspective of others. At this point, their lies change from strict protection from consequences to more goal-oriented untruths. Preadolescents and adolescents begin to lie more to increase their autonomy from parents and other authority figures. Their ultimate goal with these lies is increased independence, ironic because often the price they pay for having their lies discovered is being grounded or having their actions and interactions restricted by these same authority figures. These young people, however, believe that the end goal is worth the risk and tell their parents that they are going to a movie with a friend when they are actually going to an unsupervised party where there will likely be alcohol.

This increase in autonomy goes hand-in-hand with lies told to resist or flout parental control. “The car ran out of gas,” for example, is a lie that is designed to allow a teen to break curfew while maintaining the possibility of truth. Even more important, preadolescents and teens are honing their lying skills, thereby becoming more convincing liars, and find their attempts at lying reinforced by getting away with the questionable behavior. The biggest difference with this age group, however, is the development of their understanding of the use of lies to inflict hurt on others. Often, these damaging lies are told to improve their standing with peer groups, maintaining their position as a member of an “in-group” by denigrating any “outsiders.” As research on bullying has found, this use of lies to hurt others as the foundation of malicious gossip can be just as or more damaging to the target of the lie as a physical attack.

### Parents’ Response to Children’s Lies

Children do not have an inborn ability to lie, let alone effectively lie. It is only after watching respected adults and older friends and siblings hone their deception skills that children develop the understanding of how to lie. Very young children are certainly capable of lying, but do not understand why it is not a particularly desirable trait. Not surprisingly, children learn prosocial lying early in life, and it remains the major type of lie that children (and likely adults) tell. Problems arise when people branch out from polite lies into

those that have the potential for negative consequences or deliberate infliction of harm. Whether parents want to believe it or not, children learn to lie from those around them.

As children grow, mature, and experience the world around them, they come to realize that everyone lies, even parents. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that a child will never lie. The question that is more important than whether or not a child lies is to ask why the child is lying. Age and understanding of falsehoods matters, but so does the reason behind the lie. Treating a lie as an opportunity to better understand a child’s inner and outer world, to see from his or her perspective how society functions, can be an invaluable tool in helping children navigate a world in which the truth is not always told.

To minimize the amount of lying in which children engage, parents and other adults must create an environment that minimizes the need for lies to be told and encourages the telling of even the toughest truths. This can begin very young and continue throughout the child’s lifespan, even into adulthood. By enacting a norm of reciprocity within the family, parents who respect their children enough to tell them age-appropriate truths, rather than easy lies, open the door to their children being more comfortable talking about the difficulties that they experience in day-to-day life. By avoiding setting a double standard, parents can teach their children how to be more honest, accountable, and responsible as they move toward adulthood.

Stacey L. MacKinnon

*University of Prince Edward Island*

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Brain; Deception Motives; Fairy Tales; Fantasy and Imagination; Lies, Types of; Lying as Ability or Skill.

### Further Readings

- Ekman, Paul. *Why Kids Lie: How Parents Can Encourage Truthfulness*. Toronto: Penguin, 1991.
- Lee, Kang and Victoria Talwar. *Children and Lying: A Century of Scientific Research*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2013.
- Rotenberg, Ken J. *Children’s Interpersonal Trust: Sensitivity to Lying, Deception, and Promise Violations*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991.

## Children, Development of Deception in

Academic investigations of children's ability deceive and lie dates back to the late 1800s and early 1900s, with scholars such as Charles Darwin and Jean Piaget noting instances of lying in children as young as 2.5 years old. Research in the last 20 years indicates that although a child as young as 3 years of age may be able to recognize deceitful behaviors, the ability to use lying and deception strategically emerges more clearly at ages 4 and 5. Development continues throughout childhood and adolescence, as does the ability to differentiate prosocial from antisocial lying. These developments are typically tied to children's moral development, theory of mind, and executive functioning. In addition, recent research indicates that lying is both culturally and developmentally universal.

Although there are varying definitions of deception and lying in the literature on children's development of these skills, deception is generally held to be the intentional communication of something known to be untrue in the attempt to deceive another person and induce a false belief. These deceptions can be verbal or nonverbal, and can include role-playing and magic tricks and omission of relevant information. Lying is typically defined more narrowly as the use of knowingly false statements or assertions. Thus, lies are by default deception, but not all deception is lying.

Children are taught that deception is a moral issue: Lying is bad and honesty is a virtue. Society is replete with narratives and parables to support the virtue of veracity, from the story of George Washington and the cherry tree to Peter and the Wolf. Honest people are seen as heroes and role models, whereas chronic liars are seen as untrustworthy. Research indicates that lying reduces credibility and damages personal and social relationships. Chronic liars are also seen as developmentally delayed and socially maladjusted.

### First Lies

Children's first lies are typically told to avoid consequences for misdeeds, thus to protect themselves or to injure another person (get someone in trouble). These lies are antisocial lies, which are self-interested acts that put the needs of self above

the needs of others. Self-protective lies are among the most common lies in early childhood, and they emerge the earliest, some studies suggesting as young as 2.5 years of age.

Studies frequently investigate these issues through an experimental procedure called the temptation resistance paradigm: Children are invited into a lab and told not to look at an enticing toy or other object while the researcher leaves the room. When the researcher returns (and has been watching the child), the child will be asked if he or she peeked at the forbidden object. Though over 80 percent of the children at all age groups peek, fewer younger children lie (approximately 30 to 40 percent of 3 year olds) than older children (majority by age 7). Scholars suggest that as children develop, they are more concerned about the consequences of misdeeds, thus they are more likely to conceal them. Thus, fearful of punishment for disobeying, older children believe that they can lie to avoid consequences.

### Prosocial and Antisocial Lies

Children are more likely to engage in antisocial lies for self-gain as they age. In one study, 87 percent of 5 year olds lied about the location of a prize to keep it to themselves, whereas only 29 percent of 3 year olds did. Moreover, when trained to mislead an investigator about the location of the prize, most children were able to do so by age 4. In addition, as children age, their spontaneous antisocial lies become harder to detect: By age 8, it becomes difficult for adults to discern which children lied and which children were truthful. Thus, older children lie more frequently and are better liars than younger children.

Conversely, children learn that some lies are not only acceptable, but are also desirable and the morally right thing to do. For instance, white lies that protect the face of others are seen as polite. Socially skilled children learn that honesty can also be seen as rudeness when it can hurt the feelings of others. Moreover, deception can be playful, such as the early games of peek-a-boo, in which an adult tends to disappear when only hidden behind a cloth, and games such as "Got your nose," in which adults will place their thumb between their index and middle finger and pretend that it is the child's nose removed from his or her face.

Children's ability to distinguish their moral evaluations of antisocial and prosocial lies changes with age. Studies show that young children assert that all lies are bad, yet they rate prosocial lies less negatively than antisocial lies. However, by late elementary school, although antisocial lies are evaluated as negative, prosocial lies are deemed positive. In middle childhood and into adolescence, research indicates that this pattern holds. It has been suggested that this change is not only related to moral development, but may also reflect children's linguistic flexibility.

Utilitarian thinkers note that in order for children to understand when and how lying and deception are appropriate, they must learn to differentiate socially inappropriate from socially appropriate uses of deceptive behavior. Studies indicate that adolescents develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding (e.g., not classifying prosocial misleading statements as lies) of deception than younger children. Children become increasingly concerned about the needs of others and will use deceit and lies to protect their relationships with others.

In laboratory studies, researchers found that when given a disappointing gift (a bar of soap), both older and younger children were likely to feign appreciation for the soap, though it was more common in older children (84 percent of 9 to 11 year olds, versus 72 percent of children ages 3 to 5). Most evidence indicates that the rate of lying also increases from early childhood, with decreases from middle childhood through adolescence.

### **Theory of Mind and Executive Functioning**

Aside from morality, another explanation for the development of lying is tied to theory of mind. Theory of mind is a person's ability to accurately understand and predict the beliefs and expectations of others whose knowledge and information may be different from one's own. A classic test of theory of mind involves presenting children with a false-belief task in which the child is privy to information that characters in a story would not be; the child then has to determine what one of the characters in the story would think. Thus, this test requires a child to separate his or her beliefs from another person's understanding.

Theory of mind scholars point out that although very young children may lie, studies indicate that they have more difficulty maintaining the lie, which involves not only understanding that they can utter something untruthful and that the other person may be fooled (first-level planning), but also consistently executing the lie, which requires them to think not only about the lie told, but also about how another person might reason about the initial false belief. Thus, metareasoning, or an understanding of recursive beliefs, is necessary for advanced or second-level strategic lying.

In addition to theory-of-mind development, it is only with age that children learn how to present their lies in ways that make their deception believable. Specifically, in the later elementary school years, children are routinely able to craft lies that are convincing to adults, which include being consistent in dishonest utterance and controlling both verbal and nonverbal leakage cues. At approximately 8 years of age, the variety of skills necessary to lie convincingly begin to converge.

There are differences in skill levels even among same-age children. Children with more advanced executive functioning skills are better able to mask their lies than children with weaker skills. Because the success of a lie is predicated on whether the lie is worth telling and whether a deception can be maintained, the executive functioning skills in areas such as planning behaviors and cognitive flexibility have also been related to success in lying.

Moreover, sophisticated, strategic lies take planning and behavior execution. Children with stronger working memory capacity are better able to conceal their lies and can better differentiate helpful from harmful information. Therefore, more skilled children are better able to facilitate the variety of necessary processes than lesser skilled children.

The development of lying as a skill is also associated with several positive outcomes. Several studies have tied the ability to lie with interaction in socially appropriate ways. The skills necessary to detect deception in others, such as decoding nonverbal cues and perspective-taking, are also precursors to competent interactions. Recent research suggests that children with better lying skills are also more likely to be successful in later life.

### Cross-Cultural Consistency

The research on deception in children has been conducted in several different countries and continents, including the United States, Canada, Africa, China, and Japan, and the results have been relatively cross-culturally consistent. Thus, it appears logical to assert that children's use of lying operates similarly in different cultures, operating both for self-preservation (antisocial lying) and relational preservation (prosocial lying). Furthermore, the developmental factors underlying children's ability to deceive and lie also appear consistent.

Some cultural factors affect the specific types of lies that are acceptable. For example, Chinese children rated self-effacing lies (modesty) and lies that benefit the collective good more positively than Western children in more individualistic cultures. Although some factors, such as the differences in collectivist versus individualist cultures, may affect the timing of lies or the context necessitating lies, the overall process and skill set appears to be the same.

### Conclusion

The increasing development of moral and cognitive skills enables children to become more adept in determining not only when lies are appropriate, but also whether or not they will be successful in maintaining deception. Children who deceive others too frequently or who tell antisocial lies more than their peers are deemed chronic liars and may, in the extreme, be identified as having signs of maladjustment or even at risk for psychopathology.

Deception is ubiquitous and serves both positive and negative ends. Children learn to lie to protect themselves and their relationships with others, and although they are taught that lying is morally wrong, they are also taught that it is right to mask certain thoughts and emotions that may bring harm or discontent to another person. Several developmental skills and abilities are necessary for children to navigate this often difficult terrain.

Carol Bishop Mills  
University of Alabama

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Anthropology, Cultural; Childhood, Lying in; Deception Motives; Morals and Ethics; Theory of Mind.

### Further Readings

- Fu, G., A. D. Evans, F. Xu, and K. Lee. "Young Children Can Tell Strategic Lies After Committing a Transgression." *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, v.113 (2012).
- Poplinger, M., V. Talwar, and A. Crossman. "Predictors of Children's Prosocial Lie-Telling: Motivation, Socialization Variables, and Moral Understanding." *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, v.110 (2011).
- Talwar, V. and A. Crossman. "From Little White Lies to Filthy Liars: The Evolution of Honesty and Deception in Young Children." *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*, v.40 (2011).
- Talwar, V. and K. Lee. "Development of Lying to Conceal a Transgression: Children's Control of Expressive Behaviour During Verbal Deception." *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, v.26 (2002).
- Vasek, M. E. "Lying as a Skill: The Development of Deception in Children." In *Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit*, R. W. Mitchell and N. S. Thompson, eds. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- Wimmer, H., S. Gruber, and J. Perner. "Young Children's Conception of Lying: Lexical Realism—Moral Subjectivism." *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, v.37 (1984).
- Xu, F., X. Bao, G. Fu, V. Talwar, and K. Lee. "Lying and Truth-Telling in Children: From Concept to Action." *Child Development*, v.81 (2010).

## Children's Sports Teams

Professional sports are a multibillion-dollar, worldwide industry. Club sports and intercollegiate sporting teams, once a bastion of amateur competition, are today fraught with scandals of all kinds. The emphasis on competition from those higher levels has filtered down to youth athletic leagues, and in the interest of winning, young participants, overzealous parents, and their coaches have increasingly used deceptive practices to gain advantages that are not permitted by established rules and regulations.

Deception has been documented in cases in which a youth's eligibility to participate would



otherwise be invalidated during game play in order for players and teams to gain an unfair advantage over their opponents, and in efforts to further criminal activity that is tangentially connected to the athletic competition. Similar to other fields of human endeavor, deception in children's sports can involve intentional fabrications and omissions. Likewise, cheating and deception in children's sports are not bound by gender.

Deceptive practices have been used to make children eligible to participate in sports leagues in which they normally would be disallowed. For example, age limitations are commonly enforced in certain levels to maintain competitive balance between athletes and teams, but the ages of children have been falsified in certain instances to produce an unfair competitive advantage. This type of deception is typified by the case of Danny Almonte, who competed for a Little League baseball team from the Bronx, New York, in the 2001 Little League World Series. Playing under a falsified birth certificate, Almonte was actually two years older than the Little League age limitation of 12 years. Following a game against Apopka, Florida, in which Almonte pitched a perfect game (i.e., no opposing player successfully reached base) against his younger opponents, investigators uncovered the false document, and ultimately had Almonte's team disqualified from play and its victories vacated. The incident also motivated Little League officials to modify their existing eligibility policy, to require multiple documents and proofs of residency for player eligibility.

Age falsification is not solely the province of youth sports in the United States. In 2012, the chief of the naval staff in Nigeria testified to the rampant age falsification occurring in the under-14 and under-17 soccer programs in his country. Deception has not only been employed to validate overage athletes, but also to validate underage youth. Dong Fangxiao, a member of the Chinese women's gymnastics team competing in the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, came under suspicion of being less than 16 years old, the minimum age to compete in this sport. An investigation by the International Gymnastics Federation concluded that her true age of 14 had been falsified in order to comply with the rule, and as a result, the team was forced to forfeit its bronze medals.

### **Game Play Deceptions and Confidence Scams**

At times, deception has also been a part of actual game play. Many youth leagues have instituted rules intended to protect youth from overuse injuries by setting limits on their participation, which requires coaches to monitor players' participation and prevent them from surpassing the limit, taking a player out of an ongoing game if necessary. However, numerous coaches have been observed in violation of such rules by, for example, purposely under-reporting the number of innings that an athlete has pitched in the past week in a baseball game, with the intent of keeping a star player on the field.

Deception has not always been performed with the goal of winning in mind. In the summer of 2012, the coaching staffs of two youth baseball teams participating in the Encinitas (California) National Little League (ENLL) were suspended from coaching for the rest of the season following a game in which one team was suspected of deliberately "throwing" the contest. Because of a point-differential formula used to qualify for the league's postseason tournament, the players on the ENLL Threshers were allegedly instructed to intentionally lose to the opposing Redwings, which would allow the Threshers to qualify for the league semifinals. Because the coaches were not found guilty of collusion, the outcome of the game stood, despite their suspensions.

Deceptive practices influencing game play can also be collaborative. In 2012, coaches of youth football teams in south Florida were charged with operating a massive gambling ring involving the teams in their charge. The 18-month investigation, known as Operation Dirty Play conducted by Broward County Sheriff's Department, resulted in the arrests of nine men, some of whom were previously convicted felons. Players as young as 7 years old were allegedly paid for their performances, and at times, were bribed during attempts to sway game outcomes. Betting on the league championship game alone was described as involving over \$100,000.

Finally, youth sporting teams have been used to make inroads toward unsuspecting targets of confidence scams. A notable example involved the founder and coach of the Houston (Texas) Select Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) boys' basketball team, David Salinas, who came under



investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2011. According to investigators, Salinas used his position as a coach of highly touted prospects to make personal connections with collegiate and professional basketball coaches and players, with the intention of inviting them to invest in his financial group. The bonds that were offered to investors did not exist, and the identification codes used to verify the bonds were fabricated. Salinas ultimately embezzled close to \$47 million through the fake portfolio, including \$8 million from some 13 college basketball coaches alone.

Though many believe that an emphasis on winning at all costs has become more pervasive in recent years, public parks and recreation programs in municipalities across the United States have also increased their efforts to establish educational programs, policies, and a culture that reinforces principles of fair play. Youth are particularly at risk because of their age and stature relative to parents and coaches encouraging their duplicity. However, the use of deception, or the lack thereof, ultimately lies within the individual. The decision to use deception in sports was perhaps best illustrated by former Major League Baseball player Mark Grace, who once stated, “If you’re not cheating, you’re not trying.”

Kent Marett  
*Mississippi State University*

**See Also:** Baseball; Basketball; College Sports; Football; High School Sports; Hockey; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

- Eitzen, Stanley. *Fair and Foul: Beyond the Myths and Paradoxes of Sport*. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.
- Hong, Fan. “Innocence Lost: Child Athletes in China.” *Sport in Society*, v.7/3 (2004).
- Rotella, Robert J., Tom Hanson, and Richard H. Coop. “Burnout in Youth Sports.” *Elementary School Journal*, v.91/5 (1991).
- Shields, David, Brenda Bredemeier, Nicole LaVoi, Nicole, and Clark Power. “The Sport Behavior of Youth, Parents, and Coaches: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” *Journal of Research in Character Education*, v.3/1 (2005).

## Churchill, Winston

Winston Churchill was the son of Lord Randolph Churchill of Great Britain and Lady Jenny Jerome. As a soldier, member of Parliament, and the prime minister of Britain, Churchill was well known for his honest character and raw wit. However, many of Churchill’s most significant actions were the result of strategic deception through innovative military intelligence. Inspired by the deceptive ploys of his 18th-century ancestor Lord John Marlborough, Churchill believed that cleverness was essential in the art of war.

In the backdrop to his political career, Churchill gained nationwide acclaim for deception in the Second Boer War (1899–1902). A young war correspondent in 1899, he explored conflict between Britain and Dutch settlers over the Boer region in South Africa. While traveling by train to report on the detainment of British settlers in prison camps, he was ambushed by Boer soldiers and held captive. Coming from a royal family, he was a high-profile prisoner, held under constant surveillance. However, in quick response to his guard’s relaxed watch, Churchill jumped the fence and fled. Luckily, he found refuge with a local businessman who was sympathetic to the British. The businessman hid him until he could travel to safety. Returning home after one month in Boer detainment, Churchill gained national recognition for his daring escape.

### Strategy of Deception

As prime minister during World War II, Churchill’s deception was pivotal to the Allied victory. His strategy of deception began with his creation of the London Controlling Section (LCS), a secret intelligence office devoted to generating military stratagems. LCS members were not trained in military science, but took a historical approach in their research of deception. They were experts on Adolf Hitler’s strengths and weaknesses and patterns of operation within the Third Reich. Churchill fueled the daily operation of LCS with Ultra, a breakthrough program that gave the British access to Enigma, the main communication line between Hitler and the German military.

This secret operation developed by chance when former Enigma expert Richard Lewinsky was kicked out of Germany because he was



*The Big Three meet at a palace in Yalta, Ukraine, February 1945. Seated from left: British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin. Churchill, whose wartime deceptive strategies were crucial to the Allies, once said, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."*

Jewish. Out of spite, Lewinsky approached the British, sharing his skill and insight into the design of Enigma and the code used to encrypt the information. After heavy evaluation by British intelligence officers, Lewinsky created a system that allowed the British to intercept and decrypt German messages with speed and precision. Ultra became an invaluable resource to Churchill and selective chiefs of staff in bargaining with the Allies, persuading neutral actors including the United States, and in deceiving the Allies' enemies during World War II.

With a daily inflow of German correspondence, Churchill was protective of Ultra. He appointed himself the minister of defense and took discretion over the collected intelligence. Churchill

initially realized the value of Ultra during the Battle of Britain, when Hitler attempted to overtake Britain so that it would not be used as a base of operations against him later in the war. Ultra gave Churchill direct information regarding Hitler's plan of attack. Churchill was able to preemptively place extra reinforcements in target areas, deceiving Germany without its knowledge of a breach. This insight gave Churchill an advantage and helped attain Britain's victory.

However, in November 1940, Churchill's protection of Ultra was tested when it revealed Hitler's plan to attack the city of Coventry. This information came at least two days in advance of the attack and, despite heated deliberations to intercept, Churchill commanded that no action be

taken. He could not risk Germany investigating the reinforcement and finding the breach. When information regarding Ultra became available to the public three decades later, many argued that Churchill deliberately deceived British citizens by sacrificing them for the protection of Ultra. However, others contended that Churchill believed that Coventry's military protection was sufficient to respond to the German attack.

Ultra was not limited to German communications but was also able to decrypt Italian and Japanese correspondence. Although neutral prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States often cooperated with Churchill regarding intelligence information against communist forces. Britain needed military aid and strategically disclosed certain information to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in return for supplies. As these exchanges progressed, Churchill increased the amount of information privy to American interests, and Roosevelt realized the value of this relationship. These interactions led to an alliance between British and American intelligence operations. This American step away from neutrality was among many controversial subjects surrounding the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. While no evidence was found to show deception of neutral objections, antiwar sentiments held that Churchill persuaded the United States to become embroiled in the conflict. This controversy includes earlier private correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill during the latter's service as the lord of Admiralty.

Allied forces gained the greatest advantage over the Axis powers by joining their intelligence agencies in a grand plan of deception named Operation Bodyguard. This name was in response to Churchill's clever rhetoric insisting that "in wartime, truth is so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." Churchill knew that British and American intelligence could not carry out this campaign without Russian support. On March 3, 1942, delegates representing Russia, the United States, and Britain met to sign a contract of intelligence cooperation. This contract led to the grand alliance of the Big Three. Their overarching plan against Hitler included dozens of secondary projects in which Churchill, the LCS, and Ultra were tasked with operational responsibility.

Under Operation Bodyguard were Operation Overlord and Operation Fortitude. Overlord sought to deliberately confuse Hitler regarding the location and date of the attack, delaying his ability to send reinforcements. Fortitude's goal was to convince Hitler of the need to thinly spread his forces throughout Europe while, in reality, diluting German strength against attack. Within these projects, Churchill's British intelligence service created the Double-Cross Committee. This group enlisted German agents to relay strategically formulated information between Britain and Germany. These double agents deliberately deceived Hitler into believing the ploys within Operation Bodyguard. Ultra provided confirmation that Hitler was falling for the illusion. On June 6, 1944, the Allies successfully invaded German-occupied Europe. Hitler believed that Normandy was the real diversion, and failed to provide reinforcements in time to counter the attack. This was a pivotal turning point for the Allies' victory.

From his clever days of reporting to his intentional direction of the LCS and Ultra, Winston Churchill was a strategist. He understood the boundaries of power, the necessity of deception against Germany, and the value of intelligence information in forming alliances. However, despite the secrets and controversies, Churchill created a legacy of determination. He proved that deception of the right kind is greater than injustice.

Tobias T. Gibson  
Michael A. Applegate  
Westminster College

**See Also:** Big Lie Technique; Camouflage; Espionage and Counterespionage; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Hitler, Adolf; Military Deception; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Bennett, Ralph. *Intelligence Investigations: Collected Papers of Ralph Bennett*. Portland, OR: Frank Class, 1996.
- Brown, Anthony Cave. *Bodyguard of Lies*. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
- Strafford, David. *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets*. New York: Overlook Press, 1999.



## Civil War, U.S.

During the U.S. Civil War (1861–65), both the Union and Confederacy employed deceptive practices in hopes of defeating the enemy and winning the war. Efforts at deception included civilian spies, military intelligence, sabotage, and agreements for foreign support. Ultimately, the Union's efforts were more successful, largely because of superior manpower and a stronger communication network.

When the war started on April 11, 1861, neither side had an established system for military intelligence. In fact, the U.S. Army did not have an official organization for intelligence. The accepted practice was for commanders to handle intelligence, or delegate it to their provost marshal. Manuals existed on related topics but not on the specialty of military intelligence. Some soldiers with Mexican War service offered some expertise in the area of intelligence, but they also served as commanders during the Civil War. Some of these men opted to serve in the Confederate Army, so they took their connections with them when they left the Union forces.

### Confederate Actions

Initially, the Confederacy heavily borrowed from the federal regulations and practices they knew. One practice was to subscribe to Union newspapers under a false identity, and these newspapers provided a great deal of information in the early months of the war. Newspapers initially carried information about troop movements and other rumors. Soon, the combination of martial law in some areas and the realization that most of the information was not only dated, but untrue, led to a change of tactics.

The Confederacy established the Signal Bureau in 1862 to handle military intelligence. Prior to its establishment, the Confederacy relied on information provided by people such as Lt. Col. Thomas Jordan and others who were stationed in Washington, D.C., before the war. Jordan served as the assistant adjutant general for Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard after the war began. Prior to his departure to join the Confederacy, Jordan established a network of informants in Washington, D.C., who helped the Confederates win the First Battle of Bull Run.

The Confederacy created a series of agencies under the umbrella of the Secret Service. Special missions and their respective agents reported to Judah Benjamin under the State Department of Secret Service. The War Department worked with field commanders and the Signal Bureau to get information to commands and to Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia. The War Department Torpedo Bureau and Navy Submarine Battery Service oversaw the planting of land mines and underwater mines in rivers and harbors. The Greenhow Group was an espionage organization based out of Washington, D.C., which supported the Army of Northern Virginia throughout the war, despite the arrest of some of its operatives, such as the spy Rose Greenhow. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart recruited and trained a group of cavalry scouts to keep him informed about enemy movements. These scouts also reported to Gen. Robert E. Lee, who relied upon their information until Stuart's death impacted their effectiveness. A final group under the Secret Service was the operatives who worked in Canada during the latter part of the war. While not an official organization, these agencies did a great deal to contribute to the early success of the Confederacy.

The Confederacy actively used soldiers as messengers in order to deceive the Union armies. Three times during the war, Union forces were tricked by messengers sent by the Confederates who bore orders while wearing Confederate uniforms. Contributing factors to the success of this deception were the common language spoken by both sides and a lack of curiosity by the Union officers, who did not question the messengers about their clothes or their accents. In most cases, the commander would see through the deceit. One instance proved that Union Gen. Ulysses S. Grant could not be taken in by false information. A Confederate deserter with the rank of second lieutenant provided information about a future battle that swayed Secretary of State Edwin M. Stanton to call for a change in plans. When approached about the change, Grant knew that something was amiss because officers at the lower ranks are not privy to the level of information that the deserter claimed to know.

Confederate generals effectively used deception against the Union in a number of instances during the Civil War. In many situations, the Union forces

and supplies outweighed the resources available to the Confederates. A common deception used by the south was the Quaker gun, a fake artillery piece made from a barrel mounted on a carriage and painted to look like a cannon. From a distance, the deception was convincing, and often the enemy would wait days before approaching the battery.

Gen. John B. Magruder faced a force of Union troops five times the size of his force in Yorktown, Virginia, in April 1862 by using the same troops along the same line of defense. The soldiers would move from one position to another, and troops in the area would create sound effects, including cheers and other sounds typical of a garrison. Union Gen. Erasmus Keyes believed the ruse and postponed the attack. Gen. George B. McClellan, the Union commander, also opted not to attack but rather to use a siege tactic to take Yorktown. Magruder and his forces were able to escape before the siege took place.

Beauregard used a similar ploy to escape from Corinth, Mississippi, in May 1862. Faced with enemy forces commanded by Gen. Henry Halleck and Gen. John Pope, it was necessary to withdraw Confederate forces in order to save these troops for another battle. Through the night, Union scouts heard the constant cheering of soldiers, marching music, and trains arriving at the station and unloading reinforcements. In truth, Beauregard ordered his troops to run the train back and forth on the track, and for the troops to cheer each time it arrived. Artillery soldiers manned their guns near the campfires as ordered by their commander. In an act of deception, Beauregard sent some of his soldiers disguised as deserters to enter the Union camp in order to give the soldiers false counts about the number of reinforcements. Instead of reinforcements arriving, however, the Confederates actually withdrew their troops from Corinth, and upon arrival, Union forces found stuffed dummies manning the Quaker guns along the line.

The best deceptions along the Confederate line came from Commanding General Robert E. Lee. In May 1862, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was in Virginia near troops commanded by Union Generals Nathaniel P. Banks and Irvin McDowell during the Peninsula Campaign. Banks was ordered to link up with McDowell

and McClellan near Fredericksburg, and Lee sought to prevent the merger of the two Union armies. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of State William Seward, and President Abraham Lincoln learned that Lee ordered Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson to attack Banks's force, which caused great concern about the safety of Washington, D.C. As a result, Banks did not receive reinforcements, and because of the threat in the Shenandoah Valley some of his forces were moved. Lee was able to get the Union forces away from Richmond and McClellan. Jackson moved his forces to avoid the attempt by McDowell Banks and Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont to catch him in a pincer movement, and was able to defeat McClellan in a combined attack with Lee, thus turning the victory in the Peninsula Campaign toward the Confederates.

Aside from actions taken in battle, the Confederates had limited success in other attempts to deceive the Union. Because the Confederates needed to establish diplomatic relations for their new country, men were sent to Canada and countries in Europe to establish relations and gain support for the new government. While attempts were made to discredit the Union and sway support to the Confederacy, little was accomplished because Union diplomatic officers were in contact with the same officials.

Confederate deserters and prisoners of war often tricked Union soldiers with false information about troop locations and intentions. Deserters and others associated with the war effort but not serving in the military often tried to disrupt transportation and communications. Southerners would capture supply trains, destroy rail lines, and raid the farms of those who refused to side with the Confederacy. In Missouri, a border state that remained in the Union despite having a declared Confederate government, warehouses were damaged by attempted arson and river barges were set on fire. Southern sympathizers also attempted to set fires in New York, freed prisoners of war, and even tried to establish a new confederacy in the northwestern United States, a mission that failed.

### Union Deceptions

Deceptive actions did not occur solely in the Confederate government; the Union side also made some successful attempts. Early in the



war, the north learned to rely on the news in the southern papers for some of its information about troop movements. Unlike the northern press, which had some publishing restrictions, southern newspapers had no blackout on news. The southern sense of independence would not tolerate being restricted, and not until late in the war was it necessary to limit news coming out of Richmond.

Deceptive practices were used early on in the war in the contested state of Missouri. Pro-Union citizens and soldiers such as Frank Blair suspected that the National Guard camp in north Saint Louis was actually a Confederate training ground operating under the guise of the National Guard. Blair rode through the camp in his mother-in-law's carriage disguised as a female. He observed that the street names were changed to the names of Confederate generals, and with information from his sources, he surmised that the governor of Missouri, Claiborne Jackson, was planning to use National Guard troops to attack the federal arsenal. Blair was prepared when the guard troops attempted to attack the arsenal, thus keeping Missouri in the Union.

In 1862, Confederate forces were winning on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh. That night, Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of Ohio arrived to reinforce the Army of Tennessee commanded by Gen. Grant. Confederate scouts thought that the troops were fellow southerners until the band struck up a tune that was a northern song; they realized that Grant's reinforcements had arrived. Once this discovery was made the scouts attempted to notify Beauregard about the Union counterattack, but were unsuccessful. As a result, Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest had no choice but to retreat.

Union generals had similar success deceiving the Confederates during 1863. Grant successfully laid siege to Vicksburg, Mississippi, from the south by using small skirmishes in the area to distract the Confederates. Grant was able to march his forces undetected down the opposite bank of the Mississippi River and across the river south of Vicksburg at Bruinsburg. Grant attacked from the south, and eventually Vicksburg surrendered in early July 1863. In a similar feint, Gen. William Rosecrans sought to cross the Tennessee River to capture Chattanooga in August 1863

without detection by Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg. Rosecrans sent part of his army east and then north to attempt to cross the river while the rest of the force was coming from the south. Bragg planned on an attack from the north and waited too long to reinforce his southern flank, enabling Rosecrans to cross the Tennessee River into Chattanooga, and forcing Bragg to surrender the railhead.

Lee's supply line between Fredericksburg and Richmond came under attack by Union Gen. George Stoneman following orders issued by Gen. Joe Hooker. Lee's forces intercepted a false message created by Hooker's chief of staff, Gen. Daniel Butterfield, who knew that the Confederates had figured out the cipher code used among the Union armies. He decided to send a message indicating an attack on troops led by Confederate Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's troops. Once the message was intercepted, it was sent on to Lee, who moved his forces in preparation for an attack in the Shenandoah Valley led by Stoneman. However, the attack never came. Instead, Lee was tricked into creating a gap in his defensive line that resulted in the Battle of Chancellorsville. However, the Army of Northern Virginia survived because Lee sent General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson around Hooker's line and forced Hooker to retreat.

Union Adm. David Porter managed a successful ruse and escape in the battle of Vicksburg. Porter's ironclad river gunboat, USS *Indianola*, was attacked and run aground in the Mississippi River. Porter escaped onto a barge, and had his men convert the barge to look like an ironclad. In hope of drawing fire away from Union forces, the sailors drifted downriver near Vicksburg, where the batteries fired on them. As they approached the wreck of the *Indianola*, the Confederates who tried to salvage it found themselves without protection from the Confederate ships. Faced with a Union ironclad and no protection, the men opted to blow up the *Indianola*. Thus, Porter prevented the Confederates from adding his ship to their fleet and learning the secrets of how to construct Union ironclads.

As the tide of war began to turn toward the Union, the Confederacy in 1864 increased its attention toward trying to influence a peace movement. Northern voters needed to be influenced, and the Confederates hoped to accomplish

this goal through covert operations. Southern operatives would conduct acts of sabotage in northern cities, as well as use forms of irregular warfare among Union troops. Confederate plans included an attempt to disrupt the Union command as Robert E. Lee retreated from Richmond, and an attempt to blow up the White House in mid-April 1865.

Neither plan took place, but Confederate records indicate that money was distributed to John Singleton Mosby and Thomas F. Harney to accomplish these tasks and other raids. Mosby's Rangers were to disrupt supply lines, capture Union soldiers, and prove elusive to the Union. Even after the surrender at Appomattox, Mosby did not surrender but rather disbanded his unit 12 days later, on April 21. His activities in the war made him a wanted man, but after his capture in Lynchburg, Virginia, in June 1865, he was reprieved by Grant and sent home.

### Intelligence After the War

By war's end, neither the Union nor the Confederates had a superior organization for military intelligence. The practice of deception in battle and military strategy was in its infancy. Both sides relied on civilian spies who were all too easily captured. As the war dragged on, the Union became more familiar with Confederate activities and more effective at disrupting them. Attempts by the Confederates to get the British and Canadians to help their cause in secret, using agents sent to Canada, resulted in failure.

Both sides had scouts responsible for keeping track of the locations of armies and troop counts. It was important to keep the high commands informed about the number of regiments, artillery, and status of supply. For the north, this information indicated the effectiveness of its blockade and the prevention of runners making it through successfully. For the south, the location of armies and supply lines helped determine where it could acquire material to supplement its ill-equipped forces. News about the location of armies also contributed to the rate of desertion in the south, as the morale of the troops declined.

The use of lies and deception during the U.S. Civil War was unique because it was a war fought by fellow countrymen. This posed greater

challenges because persons fighting for the Confederacy and serving as its leaders had ties and connections with persons in the north, especially in Washington, D.C. Rose Greenhow was a successful spy in the early part of the war because of her connections. She had southern sympathies but was able to act the part of a northerner. Other spies were not as successful and failed on their first missions.

The press in both the north and south gave away a great deal of information about troop movements, both true and false. Union officials were able to control the press, but southerners would not condone having their freedoms limited. The invention of the telegraph in the years prior to the war increased the ability to disseminate information. An enemy spy could decode the information sent by wire and pass it on to interested parties. The commonality of the English language allowed some people to pass themselves off as trustworthy messengers, if the commander did not pick up on the speech and dialect differences.

Theresa S. Hefner-Babb  
*Lamar University*

**See Also:** African Americans; Cromwell, Oliver; Espionage and Counterespionage; Feigned Retreat; Historical Narratives, False; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Military Deception; Mimicry.

### Further Readings

- Canan, Howard V. "Confederate Military Intelligence." *Maryland Historical Magazine*, v.59/1 (1964).
- D'Aoust, Maurice. "Hoodwinked: Confederate Military Deception." *Civil War Times*, v.45 (June 2006).
- D'Aoust, Maurice. "Hoodwinked: Union Military Deception." *Civil War Times*, v.45 (May 2006).
- Davis, James A. "Musical Reconnaissance and Deception in the American Civil War." *Journal of Military History*, v.74/1 (2010).
- Feis, William B. *Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War From Belmont to Appomattox*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
- Tidwell, William A. *April '65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil War*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1995.

## Clausewitz, Carl von

Carl von Clausewitz lived during a time of considerable unrest in Europe. Born in 1780, just after the French Revolution, he joined the Prussian military at age 12 and served in campaigns during which the Prussians invaded France and Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Prussia. He was a prisoner of war in France from 1807 to 1808. He also served in the Russian military from 1812 to 1813 during the Russian campaign against Napoleon. He returned to the Prussian army in 1815 and served in battles as part of the larger Waterloo campaign in which Napoleon was defeated.

Clausewitz was made a major general in 1818. In 1830, revolutions broke out in several places in Europe, and he was appointed chief of staff to the Prussian army on the Polish border. He died in 1831 from cholera. His famous book *On War* was unfinished when he died, but was compiled into its published format by his wife.

### *On War*

*On War* is the first robust philosophical treatise to study war. It continues to maintain significant influence, sometimes more so outside the West than in the West. It was a favorite of Vladimir Lenin's and was relied upon by Mao Zedong. Clausewitz is known to have studied philosopher Immanuel Kant, and to perhaps have known philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but there is no agreed upon philosophical influence in his study.

Clausewitz is best known for defining war as the continuation of politics by other means. He also maintains that war is the use of force on another to realize one's will. As such, there is a subordination of goals in war. There is the immediate goal of causing harm or destroying others property, but this is nested within the larger political goal that might have nothing to do with the military goal.

Clausewitz is sometimes cited as maintaining that in war, there are no laws. However, this is a misunderstanding of a more general point that he was making about the nature of war. Once a nation is committed to the use of war as a means to a political end, he argues, the rules governing this kind of behavior are not the same as those governing political actions independent of war. If a nation refuses to commit specific kinds of

actions during war, then this becomes a source of weakness for that nation and a possible strength or advantage for the other side. The nation with such restrictions has placed a limit on its political goal by indicating in essence where it will stop in pursuit of this goal.

In a similar way, Clausewitz argues that the more powerful the motives for a war, the more this war will affect all aspects of the existence of the nations involved. The more powerful the motives, the more each nation will be given to the final destruction of its enemy. The limits in war are therefore relative to these initial motives for the war, and these in turn place restraint on the extent to which a nation will act to achieve its goal.

Clausewitz had been in real military campaigns, and he brought his knowledge to his theory by noting that each individual case of war is unique. He famously said, "War is, therefore, not only a veritable chameleon, because in each concrete case it changes somewhat its character, but it is also, when regarded as a whole, in relation to the tendencies predominating in it, a strange trinity." This trinity is composed of the original violence in the essence of war, the hate and enmity that introduce a kind of probability and chance and make war a free activity of the emotions, and its subordinate character as a political tool that makes it a matter of pure intelligence.

It is in this area of interaction between the known and the unknown that Clausewitz applies his theory to actual human conditions. He argued that while persons strive toward clarity and certainty, there is something strong in chance that often greatly influences human choice. Therefore, he said, the more self-confidence and courage, the more chance is permitted. Nevertheless, this applies to theory in that such aspects of the human condition can be factored into a commander's considerations.

War is not merely the release of energy in a random manner not guided by rules. Instead, Clausewitz observes the following:

War in the real world, as we have seen . . . is the operation of forces which do not in every case develop in exactly the same way and the same proportion but which at one moment rise to a pitch sufficient to overcome the

resistance which inertia and friction oppose them, while at another, they are too weak to produce any affect.

So while war lasts, it is the exertion of force toward a goal, and the interaction of forces no matter what the outcome affects that goal, thus war is always guided by intelligence.

The subjective, and therefore the possibility of deceit, enters into war in the area of the known and unknown. The commander must act on what is known while taking into account all that remains unknown to influence the outcome of efforts. Clausewitz does not recommend the use of deceit in war because it is an attempt to influence what is unknown for the enemy, but with unknown results for one's side. Where these unknowns can be eliminated, deceit might play some purpose.

Finally, what is attractive about his theory is that Clausewitz subordinates war to the idea of a larger goal. Insofar as the highest goal can be identified, a person or nation is able to determine which side in a conflict should be chosen and the extent to which war can help attain the highest goal. War is therefore not simply the violence of one will against another, both equally arbitrary, but a conflict of wills in pursuit of competing goals. All sides in a conflict might be mistaken about what is actually the highest goal, but it also presents the case that some side has identified what is truly the highest goal.

Owen Anderson  
Arizona State University

**See Also:** Camouflage; Espionage and Counterespionage; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Kant, Immanuel; Military Deception; Napoleon Bonaparte; Sun Tzu.

### Further Readings

Clausewitz, Carl von and Col. J. J. Graham, trans. *On War*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004.  
Clausewitz, Carl von and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Jan Wilhelm Honig, and Daniel Moran, eds. *The State and War*. Stuttgart, Germany: Steiner, 2011.  
Herberg-Rothe, Andreas. *Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

## Clever Hans

In 1904, a school teacher in Germany by the name of Wilhelm von Osten announced to the world that his horse, Hans, had remarkable talents. Hans appeared in newspapers and magazines and on postcard and liquor bottles, and his exploits were even sung about on the stages of Europe. Von Osten had previously served as an instructor of mathematics at a German gymnasium, and he was an enthusiastic horseman and hunter. He had apparently trained his horse to answer arithmetic questions such as multiplication, subtraction, and division.

Hans would answer questions by tapping his hoof on the ground, indicating the correct answer. For example, if the question was "What is three plus seven?" Hans would tap his hoof 10 times. When the answer to a question involved a small number, Hans would tap slowly with his right foot. When larger numbers were part of the answer, he would respond by tapping faster from the start of his answer. Initial investigators claimed that this indicated that Hans knew he that would have to tap a larger number, thus proving his level of intelligence. Aside from arithmetic, Hans was able to read German. Von Osten had created a table containing every letter of the alphabet designated by a pair of numbers. Hans indicated his ability to read by spelling words by tapping those pairs of numbers. For example, when a picture was shown to him of a horse, Hans spelled the word by tapping *pferd*, the German word for horse. He ignored questions presented by von Osten in other languages such as French or Latin (in which von Osten was also not fluent). As Hans was further tested, it was suggested that beyond the language barrier, he was comparable in development to a human of 14 years of age.

### Skeptics and Tests

Hans had his skeptics, who believed that von Osten was tricking the public. To prove that he



was not, von Osten allowed skeptics to question Hans in his absence. All indications were that von Osten was convinced that Hans was capable of inner speech and independent thought. He also believed that Hans was capable of experiencing and showing emotion. Von Osten offered these emotional states as the explanation when Hans failed to produce the correct answer to a question. The evidence was strong enough that most doubters came to believe that Hans was an exceptional horse.

However, there was a persistent skeptic who was still not convinced—an experimental psychologist named Oskar Pfungst. Pfungst was not satisfied with the evidence that Hans was a wonder horse. He set up several experiments to discover how the horse was able to answer the many questions presented, and whether he was really capable of independent thought. Von Osten was open to allowing the experiments, because he was convinced that Hans was answering the questions.

During the initial experiments, different persons were used to ask Hans the questions. Even without von Osten present, it appeared as though the horse was able to correctly answer the questions. After several experiments were conducted, Pfungst noticed a theme. When Hans's audience did not know the answer to the question, Hans's accuracy severely decreased. Pfungst then had one person whisper a number in Hans's ear, and then a different person would whisper another number in his other ear. Then, Hans was asked to add the two numbers together. Neither questioner knew what number the other had whispered, thus neither knew the answer. Hans either could not produce an answer, or would just continue endlessly tapping.

Subsequent tests also supported the idea that Hans could only answer questions to which the questioner knew the answer. A reading test was conducted in this manner: Words such as "Hans" or "Stall" were written on placards and placed above the horse so that he could see them. However, they were hung in such a way that the experimenter did not know which word was currently presented to Hans. The experimenter would then ask Hans which word was on the placard. When the experimenter did not know the word, Hans guessed incorrectly every time. However, when

the experimenter could see the word, Hans was correct every time.

A memory test was also conducted. Specific numbers were given to Hans at the beginning of the week, and at the end of the week, he was asked to recall the numbers. Hans was unsuccessful at recalling any numbers. Another memory test was conducted in which specific dates were given to Hans and he was to answer what day the dates fell on. Of 14 trials, 10 were unsuccessful and four were successful. However, von Osten was present during this trial and admitted to knowing some of the answers. When dates were questioned that von Osten did not know how to answer, the horse also lost his ability to tap the correct answer.

Pfungst found that the people asking the questions were unconsciously cuing Hans through their body language. Hans was able to read a person's body language, including the slightest movements, such as slightly leaning in and widening the eyes as his taps approached the right answer. Hans could thus sense when his questioner or audience was waiting for him to stop tapping. When Hans saw those signals, he knew he should stop. While this was still a magnificent talent for a horse, Clever Hans was not as clever as originally thought. A combination of audience expectations and a simple behavior resulted in an unintentional lie that convinced many skeptics and taught an important lesson regarding the need for strict experimental controls in evaluating extraordinary claims.

Joel T. Nadler

Kirsten Smith

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Academia; Animals; Audience; Barnum, P. T.; Deception, Research on; Lying, Accusations of; Magic Tricks; Nonverbal Cues; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

Ladewig, J. "Clever Hans Is Still Whinnying With Us." *Behavioural Processes*, v.76.1 (2007).

Mook, D. G. *Classic Experiments in Psychology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007.

Pfungst, O. and C. Rahn. *Clever Hans (The Horse of Mr. von Osten): A Contribution to Experimental Animal and Human Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt, 1911.

## Clinton, Bill

In one of the most publicly documented instances of American political deception, President Bill Clinton lied to the American people about his extramarital affair with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. The origin of this scandal dates to November 1995, when the 22-year-old Lewinsky began a relationship with the president during his first term. White House officials suspected mischievous activity between Clinton and Lewinsky before any allegations of misconduct had surfaced. This belief came from personnel who asserted that Lewinsky was spending too much time with Clinton, especially for someone in her low-level position. As a result, Lewinsky was reassigned from her duties at the White House to a job at the Pentagon.

### The Lewinsky Scandal Unfolds

Lewinsky confided in White House colleague and friend Linda Tripp about her relationship with the president. Tripp secretly recorded phone conversations between Clinton and Lewinsky, which would eventually be used as evidence to prove that the president was engaging in an illicit affair with the White House intern. These exchanges included statements of how Lewinsky believed that Clinton had a problem with women, but she hoped that their relationship would never publicly surface so that his presidency would not be compromised. Lewinsky admitted that her biggest fear was not a plagued career because of her actions, but the threat of Tripp divulging information about the affair.

At the same time that Clinton was participating in an extramarital affair with Lewinsky, he was being investigated for involvement in another sexual harassment scandal involving Arkansas state employee Paula Jones. His deposition in this case included a denial of having relations with Lewinsky, which contradicted the phone conversations that were recorded by Tripp. This information was brought to the attention of Kenneth Starr, who was investigating the president and his administration on several matters, such as alleged illegal real estate investments by the Clinton family, improper access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) security documents, and the improper firing of White House travel officials.

Tripp revealed the recorded phone conversations to Starr in exchange for immunity from prosecution for concealing the Clinton-Lewinsky relationship.

After an extensive investigation, Starr had enough evidence to confirm Clinton's infidelity. The American press broke the news of Clinton's affair, with the first report appearing in the *Drudge Report* on January 17, 1998. Nine days later, on January 26, the president vehemently denied any involvement in a statement that led to criticisms



President Bill Clinton (right), daughter Chelsea Clinton (center), and First Lady Hillary Clinton (left) stroll on the South Lawn of the White House, July 24, 1998, supporting the illusion that all was well in the family circle when, in fact, impeachment over Clinton's perjury and obstruction of justice charges was just months away.

of paltering because he inserted a critical pause between “woman” and “Miss Lewinsky”:

But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to me. I’m going to say this again: I did not have sexual relations with that woman... Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time; never. These allegations are false.

This public statement directly contradicted the taped phone conversations from Tripp, as well as physical evidence, including stained clothing. Clinton allegedly had nine separate sexual encounters with Lewinsky. Approximately 11 months after the scandal was reported, the U.S. House of Representatives voted on December 19, 1998, to issue an Article of Impeachment of Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice. This vote was followed by a 21-day trial in the U.S. Senate. However, the president was acquitted of the charges on February 12, 1999, because the Senate was 17 votes short of removing Clinton from office.

Public reaction to the scandal and impeachment was mixed. In a *USA Today*/Gallup poll, approximately 50 percent of Americans were in support of the Clinton prosecution. However, while the president’s honesty, moral character, and integrity ratings declined, his job approval scores increased.

Although Clinton focused on engaging in the public good after his time in office, including diplomacy, humanitarian relief, and philanthropy, the Lewinsky scandal remains an important part of his legacy. Lewinsky continued to be a presence on public television and to openly discuss the scandal in interviews, editorials, and books.

David Markowitz  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Discovered Deception, Reactions to; False Confessions; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Lying, Intentionality of; Paltering; Relationships: Sexual; White House Press Secretaries.

#### Further Readings

Alterman, E. *When Presidents Lie*. New York: Viking Penguin, 2004.

CBS News. “Tripp: I Am Not Intimidated.” (February 11, 2009). <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1998/07/07/archive/main13349.shtml> (Accessed January 2013).

Clinton, Bill. “Response to Lewinsky Allegations.” (1998). American President: A Reference Resource. <http://www.millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3930> (Accessed January 2013).

CNN Politics. “A Year After Clinton Impeachment, Public Approval Grows of House Decision.” (December 16, 1999). [http://articles.cnn.com/1999-12-16/politics/impeach.poll\\_1\\_bill-clinton-impeachment-white-house-hopefuls?\\_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS](http://articles.cnn.com/1999-12-16/politics/impeach.poll_1_bill-clinton-impeachment-white-house-hopefuls?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS) (Accessed January 2013).

Posner, R. A. *An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

## Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance describes the state of simultaneously holding two or more conflicting cognitions. The aversive state that an individual experiences during this time is described as dissonance and can cause a variety of uncomfortable feelings and emotions such as guilt, anger, or embarrassment. The theory of cognitive dissonance, originally articulated by Leon Festinger in 1957, describes how the aversive nature of dissonance motivates an individual to reduce the uncomfortable state by creating a consonant or consistent belief system. The theory and the seminal research paradigms that have been used to explore it have spawned a variety of theoretical perspectives and countless research efforts. Cognitive dissonance and the related theories directly apply to deception because they help predict the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reaction that individuals may experience upon telling a lie or deceiving someone, including deceiving themselves.

#### Theory of Cognitive Dissonance

The basic premise of the theory of cognitive dissonance is that individuals are motivated to achieve consonance or consistency among their cognitions, beliefs, ideas, and values. When an individual experiences dissonance because of an

inconsistency in cognitions, it is predicted that he or she will engage in dissonance reduction in an effort to regain consistency. Dissonance reduction can occur in one of four ways: (1) adding a consonant cognition, (2) subtracting a dissonant cognition, (3) increasing the importance of the consonant cognition, or (4) lowering the importance of one of the dissonant cognitions.

One of the first documented accounts of cognitive dissonance that would later lead to Festinger's fully articulated theory is in *When Prophecy Fails* (1956). In this book, Festinger and colleagues report on a small unidentified flying object (UFO) cult that predicted the end of the world. Membership in the cult came at great personal and financial cost to those who joined. When the apocalypse failed to occur, rather than give up on their beliefs, Festinger and colleagues found that the members' beliefs and commitment to the cult and its apocalyptic prediction only strengthened. They believed that their lives had been spared, at least temporarily, to allow them more time to spread their beliefs to others. They responded by fervently attempting to convince others that the end of the world was nigh. Based on the cognitive dissonance theory, the acute dissonance experienced by the cult members after being presented with such irrefutable evidence that opposed their beliefs was reduced by adding a consonant belief that the world would end, but not until they had more time to spread the word and expand their membership.

### Research Paradigms

The experience and outcomes of cognitive dissonance have been explored in numerous research efforts in a variety of contexts. Two of the most prominent research paradigms used in cognitive dissonance research are the free-choice paradigm and the induced-compliance paradigm.

The free-choice paradigm assesses dissonance after a decision or a choice has been made. The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that once a decision has been made, the cognitions in favor of the choice will be consonant and the cognitions in favor of any alternatives will become dissonant. As two or more alternatives become closer in attractiveness, the greater the amount of dissonance will be experienced. This dissonance can be reduced postdecision by viewing the chosen

alternative as more attractive and the rejected alternative as less attractive.

In 1956, Jack Brehm conducted an experiment in which participants either made an easy decision (between two choices where one choice was much more attractive than the other) or a difficult decision (between two choices that were similar in attractiveness). Participants' attitudes toward each choice were evaluated before and after they made their decisions. Results demonstrated that participants who made the difficult decision saw the rejected alternative as less favorable after they made their choice compared to their prechoice assessment. This was not the case with those who made an easy decision.

The classic experiment conducted by Festinger and James Carlsmith in 1959 implemented the induced-compliance paradigm in an effort to assess the theory of cognitive dissonance. It was hypothesized that dissonance would be elicited when individuals behaved in a manner contrary to their attitudes. Participants were instructed to spend an hour doing a boring, repetitive task. Upon completing the task, participants were asked by the experimenter to tell the incoming participant that the task was interesting and fun. Participants were paid either \$1 or \$20 to do this. Unbeknownst to the participants, however, the incoming "participant" was actually a confederate, and was fully aware of the experimental design. After telling the incoming participant that the task was fun and interesting, the participant's attitude and perceptions of the task were assessed. Findings demonstrated that those paid \$1 expressed more positive attitudes and perceptions of the task than those paid \$20.

The theory explains these findings through the reduction of dissonance by adding a consonant cognition. Those paid \$1 lied to the incoming participant regarding their perception of the task, but did so for very little money. Those paid \$20 also lied, however, they were paid a substantial sum to do so, thus their counterattitudinal behavior was justified. Those paid \$1 had increased dissonance because of inconsistent cognitions—"I am an honest person, but I just lied and did so for a paltry sum." Thus, their dissonance was reduced by adding a consonant cognition to achieve cognitive consonance: "I do believe that the task was fun and interesting, thus, I'm not really a liar."



### Self-Perception Theory

Despite its extreme influence, the original theory of cognitive dissonance has experienced many criticisms. Daryl Bem criticized the theory by stating that individuals do not consider their attitudes, much less whether they are in conflict with one another. Rather, Bem offered the self-perception theory as an alternative perspective. The self-perception theory states that the findings from Festinger's work and related research can be explained through individuals inferring their attitudes from their behaviors. For instance, in the induced-compliance paradigm described above, the self-perception theory would interpret those findings as those who paid \$1 believed that they thought the task was fun and interesting because that is what they said they thought. Alternatively, those paid \$20 had a strong external incentive for their behavior and could identify that the significant monetary reward was the reason that they said the task was fun and interesting.

In 1969, Elliot Aronson expanded upon the self-perception theory by introducing the idea of the self-concept. Aronson emphasized that cognitive dissonance is elicited when conflicting cognitions threaten one's positive self-image or self-concept. Individuals are motivated to return their self-concept to one of a good or an honest person. Aronson's further work explicates and tests the concept of self-justification as an extension of this theoretical perspective.

### Implications for Deception

The theorizing, studies, and findings from research focused on cognitive dissonance and its related constructs directly apply to the study of deception, and in particular self-deception. The experience of cognitive dissonance and the mechanisms for dissonance reduction occur internally within the individual. This process is thought to occur in an effort to return an individual's cognitions or self-concept to one of consistency and, ideally, to one in which the individual can view himself or herself as a good and honest person. This can occur in varying levels of severity.

The experiment conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith demonstrates the self-deception that occurred in participants who were only paid \$1 to lie to the incoming participants. In this case, these individuals added the consonant cognition

of "the task was fun and interesting" so that their attitudes were aligned with their behavior. Simply put, they convinced themselves or lied to themselves that their experience with the task was indeed positive. Similarly, findings from Brehm's work suggest that self-deception or justification of behavior can occur when a difficult decision is made. These outcomes provide evidence that lying or deceiving another can induce cognitive dissonance, whereas lying to oneself may be used to reduce that dissonance.

Furthermore, engaging in behavior that is inconsistent with a positive self-image or self-concept can also influence individuals' general perceptions of that behavior. For example, in 2003, Eric Storch and Jason Storch found that students who engaged in academic dishonesty were more likely to approve of academic dishonesty in general. Findings such as these would indicate that engagement in inconsistent behaviors or behaviors that elicit cognitive dissonance (e.g., "I'm an honest person but I have cheated on an exam") result in strategies that are self-deception, and also change perceptions of that behavior (academic dishonesty) in others.

Despite criticisms, cognitive dissonance and the theory of cognitive dissonance have stimulated countless research efforts that span over half a century. Although this research offers implications for a variety of social and cognitive areas of interest, it especially informs the study of deception. In particular, it offers implications for the cognitive processes that occur when individuals experience inconsistent cognitions or behave inconsistently with their attitudes, including engaging in acts of deception. Research indicates that engaging in the deception of others can elicit dissonance, and acts of self-deception may be used to rationalize those acts in an effort to align cognitions back to a state of consonance.

Lauren M. Hamel  
*Dublin City University*

**See Also:** Emotions; Mental Effort in Lying; Rationality; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

Aronson, Elliot. *The Social Animal*. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1995.

- Aronson, Elliot. "The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, L. Berkowitz, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1969.
- Bem, Daryl. "Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena." *Psychological Review*, v.74/3 (1967).
- Brehm, Jack W. "Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, v.52/3 (1956).
- Festinger, Leon. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957.
- Festinger, Leon, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. *When Prophecy Fails*. New York: Harper & Row, 1956.
- Storch, Eric and Jason Stroch. "Academic Dishonesty and Attitudes Toward Academic Dishonest Acts: Support for Cognitive Dissonance Theory." *Psychological Reports*, v.92/1 2003.

---

## Cognitive Heuristics

Research indicates that lie detection accuracy rates are only marginally better than chance, and a variety of cognitive heuristics and biases may be responsible for these low accuracy rates. Cognitive heuristics are basic decision rules formed by one's beliefs and expectations, and people are more likely to rely on heuristics when they lack the motivation and/or ability to adequately process information. These mental shortcuts can be beneficial (e.g., they allow one to make decisions quickly), but they also can lead to biases and inaccurate judgments because of the reliance on a limited number of informational cues.

### Examples of Cognitive Heuristics

Many of the heuristics relevant to lie detection are related to the fundamental attribution error (sometimes referred to as the correspondence bias), or the tendency to attribute people's behavior to personality traits or internal characteristics, rather than the situation or external causes. One example from the lie detection domain is the Othello error, in which nervousness is perceived as a sign of deception, disregarding that the situation (e.g., being interrogated by the police) may

actually be the source of the person's anxiety. The Othello error can also be explained by the representativeness heuristic, which in this application would mean being more likely to conclude that someone is deceptive because his or her nervousness is consistent with the prototype of a liar's demeanor.

The facial appearance heuristic pertains to the stereotype that people with more attractive or "baby" faces are more likely to be honest, which often leads people astray. In one study, participants who attributed positive characteristics to the individual they were judging rated that person as more truthful, and consequently, were less accurate at detecting that person's lies.

The truth bias or truthfulness bias is the tendency to perceive the truth over lies when judging a message, or to perceive honesty over dishonesty when judging a person. The truth bias is more pronounced in face-to-face conversations and when interacting with close others such as romantic partners, good friends, or family members, leading some to call it the relational truth-bias heuristic.

Various explanations have been offered for the truth bias, including reliance on other heuristics. One explanation involves applying the availability heuristic or the belief that examples or events that more easily come to mind more frequently occur. According to this explanation, people are more likely to recall examples of honesty, and are therefore more likely to conclude that the statement in question also is the truth, rather than a lie. Others have proposed that one's default assumption is the truth, and only if one has the time, motivation, and energy to think more about a message will they be less credulous. A similar explanation has been offered for the fundamental attribution error; that is, one's default judgment is a disposition, and greater effort is required to adjust that judgment to consider situational factors.

Related to this idea is the application of the anchoring or anchoring-adjustment heuristic, which pertains to the failure to adequately correct away from a starting value (i.e., an anchor). If people are more likely to initially view a message as truthful, then based on the anchoring heuristic, even if they try to adjust, their final judgment still will be closer to the honest than the dishonest end of a continuum.

The falsifiability heuristic has also been offered as an explanation for the truth bias, at least when the lie pertains to something subjective. According to the falsifiability heuristic, individuals may, somewhat paradoxically, deem something deceptive if too much of the content is objective or easily verified (e.g., observable behaviors or factual references), and conversely perceive something as truthful if the content is subjective or not easily verified (e.g., feelings, emotions, or attitudes). The falsifiability heuristic has been shown to occur when people provide too much information or use a more salient medium of communication. An example of the latter comes from a study in which the same message was less likely to be believed if it was presented via audiotape than in written form.

Another paradoxical heuristic is the probing heuristic. Research has shown that people are more likely to believe someone after they have had the opportunity to put the person on the spot by asking him or her follow-up questions. This heuristic may be a more specific example or combination of the representativeness and truth bias heuristics. That is, people typically believe that lying requires more cognitive effort than telling the truth. Accordingly, a person would struggle to immediately devise a deceptive response to probing questions, but would provide truthful answers with relative ease. When probing questions yield quick and seemingly effortless responses, as typically occurs regardless of whether the respondent is lying or telling the truth, then the questioner is more likely to view the respondent as honest, rather than dishonest.

Most people believe that nonverbal behaviors (e.g., tone of voice and eye gaze) are altered when an individual is lying, rather than being truthful, but truth-telling can be accompanied by increases or decreases in nonverbal behaviors. The visual bias leads individuals to disregard vocal, linguistic, and other social indicators of deception and instead place emphasis on visual and facial cues, which may not be reliable indicators of deception. Also related to nonverbal displays, the nonverbal conspicuousness heuristic leads individuals to interpret unusual or odd nonverbal behavior (e.g., very slow speech) to be indicative of deception, and the expectancy-violation heuristic leads people to interpret unexpected behaviors (e.g., keeping one's eyes shut during a conversation)

as evidence of dishonesty. The latter, however, should not be confused with the infrequency heuristic, in which people are more likely to judge another person's report of an unexpected or rare event as fraudulent.

### Police Officers

Police officers, with all of their experience and for whom lie detection is even more important, are not markedly better at lie detection than laypeople. In contrast to laypeople, whose default is truth, police officers often have a deception or lie bias and instead believe that other people are more likely to be dishonest than honest. This tendency actually becomes more pervasive the longer they are on the job and may explain why some research has shown that police officers are better at detecting lies than detecting the truth.

Individuals often seek out information that will confirm already-held beliefs and avoid information that will disconfirm their beliefs, known as the confirmatory bias. When police officers rely on this bias during interviews, it can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy by evoking specific behaviors from the suspect that seem to confirm or support the officer's prior conclusions about guilt or innocence. For example, a police officer may treat an assumed innocent person more gently, which puts the person at ease and helps them think more clearly, thus making them appear less nervous. In contrast, a person assumed to be guilty may be more likely to be threatened or treated in a harsher manner, making the person more agitated and more easily confused. Police officers will sometimes accuse a suspect of the crime in an attempt to evoke a confession. In such a situation, a suspect, innocent or guilty, may begin to exhibit signs of fear and/or nervousness, and the Othello error might increase the chances that a police officer will view the suspect's nervousness as a sign of lying or guilt rather than attributing the person's behavior to the situation or to the officer's actions.

Although knowledge of heuristics and biases is often not sufficient to make people less susceptible to their influences, certain factors (including personality variables) that increase people's motivation and ability to process have been successful in reducing biases. In the lie detection domain, simply increasing participants' suspiciousness

(e.g., reminding them that not everyone may have been truthful) has been effective in diminishing use of these heuristics.

Madeleine T. D'Agata  
Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen's University*

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Investigator Bias; Law and Law Enforcement; Lie Bias; Nonverbal Cues; Othello Effect; Probing Effect; Racism; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Burgoon, J. K., J. P. Blair, and R. E. Strom. "Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.34 (2008).
- Colwell, L. H., H. A. Miller, R. S. Miller, and P. M. Lyons Jr. "U.S. Police Officers' Knowledge Regarding Behaviors Indicative of Deception: Implications for Eradicating Erroneous Beliefs Through Training." *Psychology, Crime, & Law*, v.12 (2006).
- Feeley, T. H. and M. J. Young. "Self-Reported Cues About Deceptive and Truthful Communication: The Effects of Cognitive Capacity and Communicator Veracity." *Communication Quarterly*, v.48 (2000).
- Fiedler, K. and I. Wanka. "Training Lie Detectors to Use Nonverbal Cues Instead of Global Heuristics." *Human Communication Research*, v.20 (1993).
- Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies; Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).
- Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." *Science*, v.185 (1974).
- Vrij, A. "Why Professionals Fail to Catch Liars and How They Can Improve." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.9 (2004).

years. It consists of two approaches. The imposing-cognitive-load approach aims to make the interview setting more difficult for interviewees. This should affect liars more than truth-tellers, resulting in more and more blatant cues to deceit. The strategic-questioning approach examines different ways of questioning that elicit the most differential responses between truth-tellers and liars.

### The Imposing-Cognitive-Load Approach

Cognitive load can be defined as a multidimensional construct representing the effort that performing a particular task imposes on the actor's cognitive system. Lying can be more cognitively demanding than truth-telling, particularly during interviews. Formulating the lie, monitoring and controlling behavior, monitoring whether the interviewer appears to believe the lie, role-playing, justifying the lie, and suppressing the truth all add to cognitive load.

An investigator could exploit the different levels of cognitive load that truth-tellers and liars experience in order to more effectively discriminate between them. Liars who require more cognitive resources than truth-tellers will have fewer said resources left over. If cognitive demand is further raised, which could be achieved by making additional requests, liars may not be as good as truth-tellers in coping with these additional requests.

One way to impose cognitive load is by asking interviewees to tell their stories in reverse order. This increases cognitive load because it runs counter to the natural forward-order coding of sequentially occurring events, and it disrupts reconstructing events from a schema. Another way to increase cognitive load is by instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer. When people have to concentrate on telling their stories—which is likely when they are asked to recall what has happened—they are inclined to look away from their conversation partner (typically to a motionless point), because maintaining eye contact is distracting.

In two experiments, half of the liars and truth-tellers were requested to recall their stories in reverse order (Experiment 1) or to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Experiment 2), whereas no instruction was given to the other half of the participants. More cues to deceit emerged in the reverse-order and maintaining-eye-contact

## Cognitive Load

The cognitive lie-detection perspective is a new lie-detection approach that has been tested by scholars in university labs over the last five to 10





*U.S. Army Pfc. Samantha Desvoignes, left, a human intelligence collector, conducts interrogation training with Sgt. Jeneane Eurell, role-playing as a prisoner during an exercise at Fort Hood, Texas, June 4, 2013. The cognitive-load perspective of lie detection consists of two approaches: the imposing-cognitive-load approach, which aims to make the interview setting more difficult for interviewees, and the strategic-questioning approach, which examines different ways of questioning that elicit the most differential responses between truth-tellers and liars. Lying can be more mentally demanding than truth-telling, particularly during interviews.*

conditions than in the control conditions. Moreover, observers who watched these videotaped interviews could distinguish between truths and lies better in the reverse-order and maintaining-eye-contact conditions than in the control conditions. For example, in the reverse-order experiment, 42 percent of the lies were correctly classified in the control condition, well below the amount typically found in verbal and nonverbal lie-detection research, suggesting that the lie-detection task was difficult. Yet, in the experimental condition, 60 percent of the lies were correctly classified, more than is typically found in this type of lie-detection research.

### **Strategic-Questioning Approach**

A consistent finding in deception research is that liars prepare themselves when anticipating an interview. Planning makes lying easier, and planned lies typically contain fewer cues to

deceit than spontaneous lies. However, the positive effects of planning will only emerge if liars correctly anticipate which questions will be asked. Investigators can exploit this limitation by asking questions that liars do not anticipate. Though liars can refuse to answer unanticipated questions, “I don’t know” or “I can’t remember” responses will create suspicion if the questions are about central (but unanticipated) aspects of the target event.

In the first experiment to test the unanticipated-questions technique, pairs of liars and truth-tellers were individually interviewed about having had lunch together at a restaurant. Whereas the truth-tellers actually had lunch together, the liars did not but were instructed to pretend that they had. All pairs were given the opportunity to prepare for the interview. The interviewer asked conventional opening questions (e.g., “What did you do in the restaurant?”) followed by questions about spatial

details (e.g., “In relation to where you sat, where were the closest diners?”), and temporal details (e.g., “Who finished their food first, you or your friend?”). Further, they were asked to sketch the layout of the restaurant.

The spatial questions and drawing requests came as a surprise to interviewees (this was established after the interview). Based on the overlap in responses to the anticipated questions between the two pair members, the liars and truth-tellers were not classified above chance level. However, based on the responses to the unanticipated questions, up to 80 percent of pairs of liars and truth-tellers were correctly classified (i.e., the answers to spatial questions and the answers to drawings were less alike for pairs of liars than for pairs of truth-tellers). Asking unanticipated questions about central topics therefore elicited cues to deceit.

### Devil's Advocate Approach

Spatial and drawing requests are unsuitable when examining lying about opinions. Determining the veracity of such conceptual representations can be important in security settings, as demonstrated by the loss of seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in Afghanistan in December 2009. They were killed in a suicide attack by a man who they believed was going to give them information about Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan's tribal areas. The CIA was aware that this man had posted extreme anti-American views on the Internet but believed these to be part of a cover.

The devil's advocate technique aims to detect deception in expressing opinions. Interviewees are first asked an opinion-eliciting question that invites them to argue in favor of their personal view (e.g., “What are your reasons for supporting the United States in the war in Afghanistan?”). This is followed by a devil's advocate question that asks interviewees to argue against their personal view (e.g., “Playing devil's advocate, is there anything you can say against the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan?”).

People normally think more deeply about, and are more able to generate, reasons that support rather than oppose their real beliefs. Therefore, truth-tellers are likely to provide more information in their responses to the true opinion eliciting question than to the devil's advocate question.

This pattern is unlikely to occur in liars because for them, the devil's-advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than the opinion-eliciting question. In effect, for liars, the devil's-advocate approach is a set-up wherein they first lie when answering the opinion-eliciting question and then are lured into telling the truth when answering the devil's advocate question.

In an experiment, participants were asked to tell the truth or lie about their views regarding issues they felt strongly about, including the war in Iraq. Truth-tellers' opinion-eliciting answers were longer than their devil's advocate answers, whereas no differences emerged in liars' answers to the two types of questions. Based on this principle, 75 percent of truth-tellers and 78 percent of liars could be correctly classified.

### Conclusion

The cognitive lie-detection approach is designed to differentiate between truth-tellers and liars by making the interview setting more difficult, which should affect liars more, or by asking questions that liars have not anticipated, and thus have not prepared answers for. Research has shown support for this innovative lie-detection approach.

Aldert Vrij  
University of Portsmouth

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Deception Detection Accuracy; Leakage; Mental Effort in Lying; Meta-Analysis; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F. and B. M. DePaulo. “Accuracy of Deception Judgements.” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10/3 (2006).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. L. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. “Cues to Deception.” *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129/1 (2003).
- Leal, S., A. Vrij, S. Mann, and R. Fisher. “Detecting True and False Opinions: The Devil's Advocate Approach as a Lie Detection Aid.” *Acta Psychologica*, v.134/3 (2010).
- Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, and S. B. Porter. “Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection.” *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.11/3 (2010).

## Coherence and Correspondence

Coherence and correspondence are lie-detection concepts advanced by J. Pete Blair of Texas State University, Torsten Reimer of Purdue University, and Timothy Levine of Korea University. They reflect two different ways of understanding what it means to be consistent. Statements can be consistent or inconsistent in different ways, and coherence and correspondence address an important distinction between types of consistency information as related to deception and deception detection. As a method of lie detection, correspondence is superior to coherence.

Coherence refers to the logical consistency within a single statement or between two or more statements. A single statement is coherent if it is not self-contradictory. Two statements are coherent if one does not contradict the other. If a person says, “Steve is my friend,” but later denies knowing anyone named Steve, his statements do not cohere. Logically, one must be false. But if the same person says, “Steve is my friend,” and then says, “Steve and I have known each other for a long time,” coherence is maintained.

Correspondence, on the other hand, refers to the consistency between a statement and some evidence or prior knowledge. A statement may be assessed to determine if it corresponds with the facts as they are known, or if it is inconsistent with the facts. Statements that contradict facts are said to lack correspondence and can be judged as objectively false, while statements that conform to evidence are true. For example, if a person says, “I don’t know anyone named Steve,” but another person has seen them together often and has read research that they coauthored together, his statement about not knowing Steve lacks correspondence and can be judged false. But if the same person says that he has coauthored work with Steve, and someone conducts an Internet search that shows that he has indeed coauthored several research articles with Steve, it can be concluded that his statement is true.

The general ideas of coherence and correspondence have a long history in philosophy and science. Any theory that is true needs to be

internally consistent (coherence) and consistent with known facts (correspondence). Theories that are self-contradictory or that contradict known facts are rejected and do not count as valid knowledge.

### Deception Detection

Coherence and correspondence information are often used as indications of lies in deception detection. H. S. Park and colleagues’ examination of reported deception-detection methods, conducted in 2002, showed that variations on coherence and correspondence were involved in a substantial majority of detected lies. People detected lies by obtaining contradictory information from other people, by comparing statements to physical evidence or prior knowledge, and by soliciting confessions of deception. P. A. Granhag and L. A. Stromwall came to a similar conclusion about the frequent use of consistency in assessing other’s honesty. People often use consistency information to assess honesty. Inconsistency is seen as an indication of dishonesty and is used as a deception cue. More recently, correspondence information was shown to be at the core of effective lie-detection methods, such as the strategic use of evidence examined by M. Hartwig and colleagues in 2005 and content in context as examined by Blair and colleagues in 2010.

Despite their prominence in philosophy and science, coherence and correspondence are not perfect indicators of deception. While it may be the case that statements that are self-contradictory, inconsistent with other statements, and/or contradict known facts may either be false or provide legitimate reason for doubt, it is not the case that these statements are necessarily indications of deception. First, with regards to coherence, while incoherence may signal that something is not right, false statements can be coherent. That is, coherence alone is not sufficient evidence of truth. Further, regarding multiple statements, if two statements are contradictory, one or the other might be true, and it is often unclear which statement to believe. Moreover, just because people contradict themselves from time to time does not mean that they have deceptive intents. People’s everyday talk is often not perfectly logical, people’s memories are far from perfect, and statements that appear inconsistent on the

surface may not be inconsistent when more information is learned. Even statements that are known to be factually false may stem from an honest mistake or misunderstanding, rather than deceptive intent.

Blair and colleagues contend that correspondence information is generally more useful in detecting lies than coherence information. Information that contracts facts is likely false. But people can lack coherence when they are honest, and liars may make greater efforts to appear logically consistent. When comparing statements from multiple individuals, people can collude to produce consistent but false statements that are highly believable. Thus, correspondence is probably a more useful tool in lie detection than coherence.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Collusion; Content in Context; Context; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception in Different Contexts; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Statement Validity Assessment.

#### Further Readings:

- Blair, J. P., T. R. Levine, and A. S. Shaw. "Content in Context Improves Deception Detection Accuracy." *Human Communication Research*, v.36/3 (2010).
- Blair, J. P., T. O. Reimer, and T. R. Levine. "The Role of Consistency in Detecting Deception: The Superiority of Correspondence Over Coherence." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Communication Association, New Orleans, 2011.
- Granhag, P. A. and L. A. Stromwall. "Deception Detection: Examining the Consistency Heuristic." In *New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence*, Vol. 2, C. M. Breur, M. M. Kommer, J. F. Nijboer, and J. M. Reintjes, eds. Antwerp, Belgium: Intersentia, 2000.
- Hartwig, M., P. A. Granhag, L. A. Stromwall, and A. Vrij, A. "Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.29/4 (2005).
- Park, H. S., T. R. Levine, S. A. McCornack, K. Morrison, and M. Ferrara. "How People Really Detect Lies." *Communication Monographs*, v.69/2 (2002).

## Cold Fusion

The detection of cold fusion reactions was made public on March 23, 1989, by Stanley Pons, professor of chemistry, and Martin Fleischmann, professor of electrochemistry, of the University of Utah at a press conference prior to publication of a rushed technical article. Historically, there had been earlier claims of cold fusion discoveries in the 1920s and 1930s, but none of these could be reliably demonstrated or replicated.

Cold fusion as envisioned by the Pons and Fleischmann experiments has been relegated to a level of pathological science, pseudoscience, or voodoo science, whereby belief and research in the topic are fraught with unsubstantiated evidence. The researchers' self-deceptions were caused and perpetuated by the initial meteoric media frenzy and subsequent professional pressures.

Cold fusion is a type of nuclear reaction that can occur at low temperatures, such as room temperature, yet generates high levels of energy, with more energy produced than consumed in the reaction. Currently, there is no unequivocal science that supports an operative cold fusion reaction. Cold fusion reactions seemingly violate laws of thermodynamics, which suggest that a physical closed system (such as a cold fusion reaction) cannot continue to generate energy without exhausting itself or reaching entropy. Cold fusion may be contrasted with "hot" fusion reactions, which occur well into the million-degree mark (the sun is an example of a fusion reaction, as is a hydrogen bomb explosion), and the more familiar nuclear fission reactions from which nuclear power is generated.

Why the drive and fascination for cold fusion reactions? The attractive features of these reactions are that the required fuels are easily obtainable or created, the byproducts are low on pollutants, and radioactive waste is short-lived. Therefore, to discover a viable cold fusion reaction would make the creation of energy extremely efficient, inexpensive, and resulting in few, if any, dangerous byproducts.

#### Flawed Research

What role did deception and lies play in the cold fusion research of the late 1980s? Initially, Pons and Fleischmann unknowingly had



methodological flaws in their experiments, so they believed in their findings. This in and of itself is not deception; methodological flaws do sometimes occur in any scientific research field. However, such mistakes are discovered during the article-writing phase by researchers, or during the peer-review phase prior to scientific publication. Because of competing research at Brigham Young University that was poised for release by another researcher, the University of Utah held a press conference, with Pons and Fleischmann releasing their findings prior to publication of a less than scientifically rigorous article. Coupled with a slow news cycle, a torrent of news stories ensued, and within a few weeks announcements by additional scientists from respected institutions noted similar cold fusion reaction findings (ultimately, these were also found to have methodological problems). Grant money was also provided to Pons and Fleischmann within the initial weeks after the University of Utah's press conference.

Thus, Pons and Fleischmann's research findings were initially supported by other researchers, hailed in the media, and rewarded through grant money. By the time other academics, elite academic research institutions, and a better informed media (for example, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times*) began questioning the findings, the cold fusion effect as reported by the researchers had become reified. Self-deception for these researchers, driven by the positive reinforcement after the announcement and fear of public and academic embarrassment, was now evident. For Pons and Fleischmann to simply state "we made an error" was not seen as an option.

Further, the social psychology of attitudes and persuasion may have also influenced their decision to adhere to their findings. Pons and Fleischmann's public media events led to increased ego involvement (as described by M. Sherif and H. Cantril), and thus their commitment to the findings, even in the face of failed replication, was anchored in self-protection. Seeking congruency across what they reported and believed regardless of later research, may have also played a role similar to Leon Festinger and colleagues' report on a doomsday group's reaction to a failed end-of-the-world prophecy.

Strong beliefs in phenomena that are seemingly anchored in flawed science or colored realities are often maintained by individuals, regardless of unequivocal counterarguments or evidence, especially when situational pressures are strong. Strong situations lead to conformity, even in the face of untruths.

Though Pons and Fleischmann's subsequent papers failed to show support for their findings because of methodological issues, both researchers continued to claim that the initial effects that they recorded were real. In addition to the grant money from the University of Utah, they received research funds in the 1990s from private sources. However, their subsequent research in the 1990s yielded little if any progress on the topic.

Fleishman died on August 3, 2012. Because the term *cold fusion* currently has a negative connotation, those who continue to study the phenomena refer to it as a "nuclear effect," or "low energy nuclear reactions." The topic continues to receive popular press, but little is published in mainstream, peer-reviewed science journals.

William D. Marelich

Jamie Graham

California State University, Fullerton

**See Also:** Academia; Cognitive Dissonance; Deception in Research Design; News Media: Print; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Festinger, L., H. W. Rieken, and S. Schachter. *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957.
- Krivit, S. B. "1989 March 23, Cold Fusion Press Conference at University of Utah." <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CfHaeQo6oU> (Accessed October 2012).
- Lewenstein, B. V. "Cold Fusion and Hot History." *Osiris*, v.7 (1992).
- Park, R. L. *Voodoo Science: The Road From Foolishness to Fraud*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Pool, R. "How Cold Fusion Happened—Twice!" *Science*, v.244 (April 28, 1989).
- Sherif, M. and H. Cantril. *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements*. New York: Wiley, 1947.

## College Sports

College sports are athletic competitions played on both the competitive and recreational level at colleges and universities. While some college sports are sanctioned by a variety of organizations, others are available to any member of the student body who would like to engage in them. Lying and deception are sometimes perceived as problems in college sports, especially within the context of major college athletic teams. As the popularity of college sports has grown, and as increased revenue has become available as a result of contracts with broadcast and cable television companies, so has the temptation for certain individuals to attempt to profit from behaviors that give them an unfair advantage over rivals. Multiple groups, including sanctioning bodies, law enforcement agencies, and government departments, have attempted to curtail lying and deception in college sports.

### Background

College sports have existed for over 180 years on a formal basis, although students have informally engaged in athletic endeavors since the establishment of higher education. To this day, many students participate in intramural and recreational club sports, which are available to practically all members of the student body. Intercollegiate athletics, in which sports teams from one college or university compete against those of another, originated as informal student-led activities. In 1843, students at Yale University formed a boat club, followed a year later by students at rival Harvard University. While these boat clubs initially pursued opportunities to practice only on their campus and with teach school's students, by 1852 a competition was scheduled between the two schools. The race took place at Lake Winnepesaukee in New Hampshire, and led to other competitions between the two.

The growing popularity of games involving bats and balls, such as early forms of baseball, grew in popularity during the 19th century. In 1859, teams from Amherst College and Williams College played each other in a baseball game, which proved so successful with students from both schools that regularly played games were scheduled from this point forward. By 1870, baseball teams from a variety of colleges

and universities were playing regular schedules. The Intercollegiate Baseball Association (IBA), the first baseball league, was formed in 1879 by Harvard, Amherst, Brown University, Princeton University, and Dartmouth College. Yale initially refused to join the IBA because it permitted professional players to participate, but the university joined the following year. Less than a decade later, in 1887, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale withdrew from the IBA, and formed the Eastern League with Columbia University. Although the membership of both leagues frequently changed, this set a model for future intercollegiate athletics.

However, with the advent of intercollegiate football competitions, college sports grew to new heights of popularity. The first collegiate football game was played between Princeton and Rutgers University in 1869, and in 1873, representatives from Columbia, Princeton, Rutgers, and Yale met in New York City to agree upon a common set of rules that would govern the game. This led to an explosion of popularity of the sport, and the foundation of historic rivalries between both large schools (for example, the University of Minnesota and the University of Wisconsin first met in 1890) and small schools (for example, Knox College and Monmouth College first played in 1888).

This growth in popularity was not without its downside; between 1890 and 1905, 330 men died playing college football. As a result, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) was formed in 1906 to make the game safer for players. The IAAUS changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1910, and worked to develop rules to make the game safer and to protect players. The organization added sports for women in 1980. By 2013, the NCAA had over 1,280 member institutions, and was organized into three divisions, two of which (Divisions I and II) can offer athletic scholarships and one (Division III) that cannot. The NCAA offers 23 sanctioned sports, only two of which (baseball and wrestling) are sanctioned for men only. Bowling, field hockey, rowing, and softball are sanctioned for women only.

The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) is a rival to the NCAA, serving about 250 schools and sanctioning 23 sports.

Issues regarding rules and compliance thereto are settled by the NCAA or the NAIA.

### **Lying and Deception in College Sports**

A variety of situations exist in which lying and deception can affect college sports. There are situations in which a coach or team will behave in ways that are prohibited by the appropriate sanctioning body. Such infractions are usually undertaken to gain an unfair competitive advantage over rivals, and are generally frowned upon and prohibited by the institution at which that coach is employed. Also problematic are cases in which an individual athlete will engage in certain behavior that is forbidden. The reasons for this noncompliance are more varied, as a student athlete might engage in lying and deception to gain an unfair competitive advantage, to monetarily benefit, or for some other reason. Common instances involving lying and deception in collegiate athletics include recruiting violations, game-related infractions, athletes receiving improper benefits, or gambling scandals. All such behaviors are serious, although each has different repercussions for the athletes involved and the schools that they attend.

### **Recruiting Violations**

Athletes who participate in college sports are amateurs, and are not allowed to be paid for playing for their college or university. However, because the recruiting of a star player or athlete can have a tremendous positive impact on a team's success, many coaches and college or university boosters are tempted to provide student athletes with illegal compensation in order to convince a player to commit to a given team. The improper compensation might include cash, a summer job, an automobile, or some other benefit to the student. In recent years, payments to students' families have also drawn scrutiny from the media and other schools. Because member institutions in both the NCAA and the NAIA agree to certain restrictions on recruiting when they join the organization, lying and deception related to recruiting diminishes the community of trust that such groups try to engender.

A classic case of recruiting violations, and the harm they can cause to a rogue college or university sports program, involved the Southern

Methodist University (SMU) football team during the 1980s. The SMU Mustangs had a long and storied history, having won the 1935 national championship and 10 Southwest Conference (SWC) titles, and they played in 11 bowl games. Although SMU football had been most successful during the 1940s and 1950s, when star halfback Doak Walker won the Heisman Trophy, the Mustangs went 45–5–1 from 1980 through 1984, finishing second in the final national polls in 1982. SMU achieved this success, despite being one of the smaller schools in the SWC, with its 9,000 students far fewer than the much larger enrollments at rivals such as the University of Texas (with over 50,000 students) and Texas A&M University (with over 45,000 students).

While other SWC schools had also been charged with recruiting violations, SMU was found to have paid several recruits and their families thousands of dollars to sign with the Mustangs. After having been placed on probation by the NCAA for doing this, it was found that SMU boosters had continued to make payments to players, with the knowledge and consent of the coaching staff. As a result, SMU was given the NCAA "death penalty," which meant that its football program was suspended for the 1987 season and denied its four scheduled home games in 1988. SMU also lost 55 scholarship positions and was given a television and postseason bowl ban that lasted through 1989. Additionally, multiple boosters were banned from contact with the football program, and on-campus visits by recruiters were prohibited through 1989.

### **Performance-Enhancing Drugs**

Certain substances, often called performance-enhancing drugs, are used by athletes in an attempt to improve their accomplishments on the playing field. Performance-enhancing drugs encompass a variety of substances, but the term is most often used when discussing anabolic steroids and other such preparations that play a role similar to that of testosterone in the body, building muscle mass by increasing the level of protein present in cells. First produced during the 1930s, anabolic steroids are banned by both the NCAA and the NAIA because of the competitive advantage that they provide users, as well as the negative effects that users undergo. These negative



effects include increased risk of cardiovascular and heart disease, elevated blood pressure, liver damage, testicular atrophy, and cardiac arrhythmia. Additionally, aggression, psychosis, mood disorders, addiction, and increased risk of suicide have been linked to use of performance-enhancing drugs. Stimulants, painkillers, sedatives, diuretics, other lean-mass builders, and blood-masking agents are banned by the NCAA and the NAIA for similar reasons.

In an effort to discourage the use of performance-enhancing drugs by student athletes, both the NCAA and the NAIA conduct drug testing programs. These programs are intended to identify violators of the established drug policies and discourage students who might be considering using performance-enhancing drugs. The NCAA, for example, has developed a program of drug testing that has three separate checkpoints intended to promote a drug-free environment.

First, school-sponsored testing is permitted, which allows individual institutions or conferences to conduct their own testing programs. Second, approximately 11,000 Division I and Division II athletes are randomly tested each year for steroids, diuretics, masking agents, and other substances. Finally, the NCAA tests student athletes in all three divisions at championship events at least once every five years, resulting in over 2,500 annual screenings. Through this system, the NCAA works to preserve fair competition and protect student athletes' health.

### Other Criminal Acts

College sports have also been rocked from time to time by other assorted criminal acts. When student athletes or their coaches become involved with gamblers, sexual scandals, or the trading of tickets or jerseys for other goods, these acts may have broad repercussions for the college or university, the



*Ohio State University (OSU) quarterback Terrelle Pryor and teammates congratulate one another during a game in Minnesota, September 27, 2008. In 2010, OSU suspended five football players for five games at the beginning of the 2011 season after discovering that the players had traded autographs for tattoos. OSU head coach Jim Tressel was later dismissed after it was revealed that he had known about the infractions but had lied to investigators about them. The lying and deception that occurred after the actual infractions intensified the subsequent punishments that the university received from the National Collegiate Athletic Association.*



coaching staff, or the athletes involved. Although such actions are in themselves often against NCAA or NAIA rules or procedures, situations are often exacerbated for the individuals or schools involved when lies or other deceptive statements are made in an attempt to cover up the matter. When such obfuscations are discovered, they inevitably cause the consequences for the athletes, coaches, and colleges or universities to be more severe than would otherwise have been the case.

Point shaving, a type of fixing in which players attempt to adjust the score of a game so that a particular point spread is or is not met, is particularly effective in basketball. During the 1978–79 NCAA men's basketball season, players from the Boston College (BC) team accepted cash payments to ensure that their team would not win by the expected margin, allowing gamblers who had bet that the team would not cover the point spread to reap large gambling wins. When the team's contact was arrested on other charges, he disclosed the operation to the police, earning a lighter sentence. The BC players who had been involved were sentenced to terms in prison of from 4 to 20 years.

The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) football program was rocked in 2011 when long-time assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky was charged and later convicted for sexually molesting numerous children. When it was disclosed that PSU head coach Joe Paterno and other university officials had knowledge of these crimes as early as 1998 but failed to report it to the proper authorities, Paterno, the PSU president, and various other university officials were fired, and many were charged with crimes. The NCAA placed PSU's football program on a five-year probation, enforced a four-year postseason ban, vacated 112 victories, fined PSU \$60 million, and eliminated 40 football scholarships.

In 2010, Ohio State University (OSU) announced that it was suspending five football players for five games at the beginning of the 2011 season as a result of the discovery that these individuals had traded autographs for tattoos. When it was later discovered that OSU head coach Jim Tressel had known about these infractions and lied to NCAA investigators about them, he was dismissed as OSU's coach and the university was placed on probation, banned from bowl games for a year,

made to relinquish nine scholarships, and forced to vacate 10 2010 victories. Lying and deceptive statements made all three incidents worse for the players, coaches, and universities involved.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Barry L. Swanson  
Luke A. Oosterbaan  
*Knox College*

**See Also:** Academia; Adolescence, Lying in; Basketball; Baseball; Children's Sports Teams; Colleges and Universities, For-Profit; Drugs; Games, Children's; High School Sports; Hockey; News Media; Television and Radio; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

- Armstrong, K. and N. Perry. *Scoreboard, Baby: A Story of College Football, Crime, and Complicity*. Lincoln: Bison Books/University of Nebraska Press, 2010.
- Clotfelter, C. T. *Big-Time Sports in American Universities*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Oriard, M. *Bowled Over: Big-Time College Football From the Sixties to the BCS Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Smith, R. A. *Pay for Play: A History of Big-Time College Athletic Reform*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011.
- Smith, R. A. *Sports and Freedom: The Rise of Big-Time College Athletics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Sperber, B. *Beer and Circuses: How Big-Time College Sports Is Crippling Undergraduate Education*. New York: Henry Holt, 2000.
- Yost, M. *Var\$ity Green: A Behind the Scenes Look at Culture and Corruption in College Athletics*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

---

## Colleges and Universities, For-Profit

Since 2000, enrollment at for-profit colleges and universities has surged as a result of many Americans' increased optimism in the ability of

for-profit universities to provide higher education to a greater proportion of the population. The profit-seeking nature of for-profit companies, however, produces incentives that have led some of these institutes to engage in deceptive practices in order to increase enrollment.

For-profit colleges and universities such as University of Phoenix, DeVry University, and Kaplan University, are owned by private, profit-seeking businesses and are often publicly traded or owned by private equity firms. For-profit universities grew over 14 percent between 2003 and 2004. These institutions can provide the means to meet the rising demand for a university education in the United States, especially for nontraditional students who attend college later in life, those who work while getting a degree, and those who are raising children while obtaining their degree. Through online classes and highly structured programs, for-profit universities are thought to help reduce the barrier to education.

Critics of for-profit education believe that Congress has failed to regulate these schools' profit-seeking incentives. In 2011, taxpayers paid \$32 billion to companies that own these institutions. Conversely, strong proponents of for-profit universities believe that the government should not meddle with markets, even if those markets deal with a public good such as education. Since the early 1990s, numerous allegations have surfaced in opposition to certain moneymaking practices of for-profit universities.

In order to regulate the for-profit sector of education, legislation within the United States has been applied, modified, and created to keep educational institutions honest. The Higher Education Act has regulated postsecondary education since 1965 and is reapproved every five years. Reforms to this act occurred in 1992 after an investigation of for-profit institutions by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. In the 1980s, concern about the dropout rate of students at for-profit colleges resulted in the enactment in California of the Maxine Waters School Reform and Student Protection Act of 1989. This law cited the unfair and deceptive operations of for-profits, such as misrepresenting facts at enrollment, and it imposed stricter regulations, such as minimum program completion rates and minimum employment rates.

### **The Harkin Report**

From 2010 to 2012, for-profit colleges and universities were investigated by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), resulting in a report rebuking these institutions' unjust profit-seeking practices. The senator's team discovered deceptive practices at for-profit universities through an in-depth examination of 30 companies providing for-profit education. This examination involved a process that included numerous interviews with employees and students, as well as sending undercover investigators to experience the recruitment processes.

Released on July 30, 2012, Harkin's report pointed to evidence of deception occurring in the following categories: cost and financial aid, graduation and postgraduation success statistics, accreditation, and sales tactics. The report contends that some institutions deliberately underproject the number of terms that a student will need to complete a degree. Other universities only state the price of attending their school for one term, rather than the yearly cost. Prospective students might also assume that there will be two or three terms per year, as is conventional at most universities. However, some colleges (e.g., Westwood College) have five terms per year. The report concludes that these tactics can lead students to have false beliefs upon enrollment.

The Harkin report also cited instances in which recruiters were instructed to evade questions from prospective students regarding the total cost of obtaining a degree, citing such practices at National American University. Other for-profit institutions were found to deliberately hide financial aid information from prospective students. This omission is a form of deception that obscures the cost of the degree and how students may pay for it. Recruiters were also found to falsely convey statistics regarding student success, as is evident from institutions such as Potomac College, Kaplan College, and Bennett Career Institute. These organizations overestimated their graduation rates and postgraduation salary statistics, misleading prospective students about their likelihood of graduating and potential salaries.

Harkin's team found further deception in university accreditation. Even though a for-profit college can be nationally accredited, it does not mean that the institution is also regionally accredited, as are major nonprofit and public colleges, as well

as some for-profit schools. Many for-profit institutions are nationally accredited, which means that they are recognized by an agency that primarily deals with vocational or distance-learning institutions. Credits earned at nationally accredited schools are often not accepted at regionally accredited schools. Recruiters were found to take advantage of the students' lack of knowledge about this topic; the confusion between national and regional accreditation was deceptive on the part of many universities. This has implications when students attempt to transfer credits from a for-profit college to a regionally accredited school, and may not be able to do so.

Finally, the report found that recruiters are often instructed to use deceptive sales tactics in order to earn the institution money in lieu of students' best interests. One such technique was discovered at Career Education Corporation, which instructed its recruiters to not give prospective students much information. Further, Harkin alleged that some colleges instructed recruiters to use "pain points" from the prospective students' pasts to pressure the students into enrolling, "overcome objections" to enrolling, and make enrollment seem urgent. This sales tactic deceives prospective students by placing undue pressure on them to enroll in the university.

The University of Phoenix is a for-profit university that has been accused of violating the Higher Education Act and other regulations. In 2003, two former recruiters for the university filed a whistleblower lawsuit alleging that the institution paid recruiters based on the number of students that they enrolled. This led to the university gaining hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid and directly infringed upon the Higher Education Act. The U.S. Department of Education investigated the matter and found that the University of Phoenix used unethical and illegal sales practices, such as encouraging recruiters to enroll underqualified students through bribes. The university did not admit offense but settled by paying \$9.8 million to the Department of Education in 2004, and \$78.5 million in 2009.

The growth of for-profit colleges and universities is undisputed, even as the business practices of these companies are scrutinized. Many reports and investigations have described numerous deceptive practices at for-profit colleges,

specifically in the areas of cost and financial aid information, graduation and postgraduation success statistics, accreditation, and sales tactics.

Sarah Elliott  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Academia; Business; Disinformation; False Advertising; Public Relations.

### Further Readings

- Lewin, Tamar. "For-Profit College Group Sued as U.S. Lays Out Wide Fraud." *New York Times* (August 9, 2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/education/09forprofit.html> (Accessed November 2012).
- Tierney, William G. "New Players, Different Game: Understanding the Rise of For-Profit Colleges and Universities." Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
- U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. "For Profit Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success." <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo26044/CPRT-112SPRT74931.pdf> (Accessed October 2012).

---

## Collusion

Deception is not always be a solitary act. Instead, people may engage in a form of deception known as collusion, in which two or more individuals or entities collaborate to bring about mutual gain, often at the expense of others outside of the collusive relationship. The most well-known examples of collusion are found in the marketplace, when corporations agree to work together to rig prices or selectively share information. The practices of colluding companies foster monopolies and hinder an independent market system. But collusion is not limited to the marketplace. For instance, gamblers might collude to cheat and beat the house. Divorcing couples can collude to try to circumvent the red tape of the court system. Though collusive partnerships can be difficult to detect and punish, they stem from self-interest, which

undermines the cooperative effort needed to sustain them. As a result, collusive pacts are often unstable and fleeting.

Collusion can occur within and between organizations, involving agreements that are unspoken or overt. In explicit collusion, participating parties directly communicate with one another through a phone call, an in-person meeting, or in rare cases, a written document. For example, two vendors might explicitly discuss selling merchandise at a set price. In tacit collusions, parties achieve similarly effective agreements through indirect signaling. In this case, a vendor may set high prices under the assumption that colluding partners will match those prices, without discussion. The results of this type of price-fixing include higher profits for all when customers no longer have cheaper options. Both explicit and tacit forms of collusion occur within and between organizations.

Internal collusion involves parties within an organization defrauding the organization that houses them. For example, one employee might authorize false expense reports or grant unearned overtime pay for another employee. Internal collusive acts account for about 5 percent of frauds perpetrated within corporations. Organizations can also engage in external collusion to defraud one another. A seller may arrange a special rate with a supplier that his competitors do not receive, giving that seller an unfair market advantage. Moreover, internal and external collusion can simultaneously occur. For instance, Corporation A may bribe individuals within Corporation B for access to B's resources in order to take over B's share of the market.

In addition to its organizational forms, collusion can occur on interpersonal levels. Couples may collude in deceit to expedite divorce hearings when legal forums bar consensual divorce. For example, New York City in the 1930s experienced a spate of "soft-core adultery," in which men staged photos of themselves undressing with women that colluding couples used as evidence for divorce cases. Similarly, weary soldiers may engage in unspoken "live and let live" agreements. This type of collusion among enemy soldiers can result in unsanctioned cease-fires between trenches. High-stakes poker players may also collude to win big. Players may signal information

about others' cards in order to collectively raise or lower the bet and trap other players. Importantly, bluffing in poker is not collusion, because all players knowingly agree, expect, and accept that bluffing occurs as part of fair play. In true collusion, at both organizational and interpersonal levels, all but the colluding partners are unaware of any unscrupulous coordination.

### Collusion in the Marketplace

In economic terms, collusion is an agreement between would-be rivals to cooperate, in direct violation of market expectation that they compete. Such actions often result in a surge in profits for the parties involved, but destabilize the market as a whole. This potential for corporate gain, in spite of a broader cost, highlights the many examples of corporate collusion. In one of the most well-known collusion scandals of the 1970s, the aerospace manufacturer Lockheed Corporation allegedly gave \$12.6 million in bribes to middlemen and corporate executives in Japan in order to ensure the sale of their planes to a Japanese corporation. In the short term, this action increased profits for both Lockheed and its Japanese contacts. However, over time, Lockheed's collusive practices led to turmoil within the Japanese aerospace industry and created hesitancy to trade with the United States.

To understand the marketplace conditions that promote collusion, economists turn to game theory. Game theory posits that in a market of independent, competitive players, equilibrium depends on each player selecting the optimal, rational preference, given the likelihood of rival responses. In relationships incorporating tacit collusion, one player makes an economic decision and signals his partner to follow. While such collusion may produce optimal reward for both parties, tacit collusion reduces and at times eliminates the ability for third parties to make optimal decisions for themselves. Economists suggest that players, or colluding companies, need multiple "games" to solidify these tacit agreements.

Prolonged association between colluding companies is required to establish the terms of the arrangement, secure trust, and communicate information. If the terms of the collusive relationship are violated, traitors of collusive partnerships can be punished. This encourages the



loyalty of colluding parties, a necessary measure because of the fragility of collusive relationships. Once parties have engaged in collusion to corner a market, there is a strong incentive for them to then edge out their “partner,” who stands as the last remaining barrier to their exclusive individual control.

### **When Collusion Dissolves**

While the benefits of collusive partnerships may seem appealing, most collusive relationships fail. One frequently cited example of failed collusion involved a clandestine partnership between major electrical equipment manufacturers in the 1950s and 1960s. A handful of large companies, including Westinghouse and General Electric, met to set prices for machinery. They meted out portions of the sales market, agreeing that one partner would set prices lower than the others in certain regions, ensuring sales to the intended party. Competitors not involved in this agreement were shut out of the market in what journalists called the Great Price Conspiracy. In a major turn of events, General Electric dropped out of this explicit arrangement in 1954, starting a contentious free-for-all in the marketplace. All parties were forced to try to undersell one another, at unsustainably low rates. This left machinery prices depressed and destabilized the electrical equipment market for years. Despite an explicit collusive pact, the opportunity for individual companies to corner the market overwhelmed the desire to honor the collusive arrangement.

The dissolution of collusion fosters ill will among companies. American Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Japanese national baseball association (Nippon Professional Baseball) formed a tacit collusive pact. These organizations had a “gentlemen’s agreement” not to sign amateur players from each other’s nations, despite an international market that expected competitive recruitment. However, in 2008, MLB scouts recruited Junichi Tazawa, a pitcher from the Japanese amateur leagues. Japanese officials were outraged at the violation of their unspoken agreement. While some MLB managers acknowledged honoring the agreement, other clubs, such as the Boston Red Sox who signed Tazawa, did not. Like many examples of collusion, this gentlemen’s agreement degraded in the face of competitive

market forces. Especially when collusive agreements are tacit, no formal arrangement binds two parties together, increasing the ease with which such collusive partnerships can dissolve.

### **A Marker of Collusion**

Collusive agreements can be detected by the heightened consistency of the stories told by involved parties. Forensic research has found that there is much greater consistency in the stories of collusive pairs telling a shared lie than the consistency in the stories told by truth-telling duos. Truthful storytellers must reconstruct events from memory, which is a notoriously unreliable enterprise. Pairs of colluding liars must simply repeat an agreed-upon story. This contradicts the lay theory among law enforcement officers that inconsistency signals deception. Officers may instead treat undue consistency between individuals as indicative of collusive practices. Consistency may serve as a potential clue for detecting tacit collusive pacts.

### **Detection and Prevention of Collusion**

Collusion can be difficult to detect, but corporations or governments can utilize certain strategies to monitor such practices. For example, a corporation can watch for discrepancies in gross profits. Sudden drops in profits may signal fraud on the part of internal agents colluding with external parties by issuing prices that are too low. A company may also institute policies that prevent the likelihood of collusion. For example, policies occasionally rotating personnel duties or preventing gifts from vendors may prevent employees from establishing collusive partnerships with external agents. Governments create bodies to monitor and prevent collusion. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission detects and investigates claims of corporate wrongdoing and begins the process of legal punishment and censure.

When corporations or governments detect collusion, they may find it difficult to legally prove that those collusive actions took place. To support an accusation of price rigging, for example, one would have to show that two or more entities fixed prices, engaged in a noncompetitive relationship, and that their actions negatively impacted the trade of others in their industry. An informant can often help make a case for collusion. This is

exactly what happened within the Archer Daniels Midland Company in the late 1990s. An informant aided the Justice Department in an investigation that uncovered price fixing among numerous agricultural producers. After prosecution, the Arthur Daniels Midland Company, a core member of the collusive agreement, paid \$100 million in fines—one of the largest fines in American history issued for this kind of corporate misconduct. This verdict was made possible by antitrust laws, which promote an open market by punishing actions, such as collusion, that interfere with competition.

### Conclusion

In an increasingly interconnected society, deception is becoming more social. Especially in economic contexts, in which increasingly more competitors are struggling to get ahead of the pack, it can be difficult to succeed or survive alone. Collusion can enable groups or corporations to cooperate in deception, often for great financial reward. However, collusive partners quickly turn on each other when the same selfish motives that united them drive them to seek a bigger portion of their ill-gotten profits.

Yael Granot  
Emily Balcetis  
*New York University*

**See Also:** Bankruptcy; Business; Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Federal Trade Commission; Insider Trading; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

- Friedman, Lawrence M. *Law in America: A Short History*. New York: Modern Library, 2004.
- Granhag, Par Anders, Leif A. Stromwall, and Anna-Carin Jonsson. "Partners in Crime: How Liars in Collusion Betray Themselves." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.33/4 (2003).
- Johnson, Gary G. and Eleanor G. Henry. "Collusion." In *Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society*, Vol. 1., R. A. Kolb, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008.
- Leisner, James. "Collusion: When There's a Team Effort to Defraud." <http://www.stonebridgebp.com/fraud-forensics/library/when-theres-team-effort-de-fraud> (Accessed September 2012).

## Colonialism

Colonialism is generally defined as extended rule over a foreign territory. Colonial rule had political, economic, religious, social, and cultural aspects. Widespread indigenous independence movements, beginning in the 1960s, broke apart Western colonial empires. Western-developed nations, however, continued to maintain economic control of developing nations, a phenomenon termed neocolonialism. Questions regarding colonialism's legitimacy and concerns over hypocrisy and dishonesty within the colonial system began to emerge alongside justifications of the practice. Critics of colonialism and neocolonialism cite the untrustworthiness of colonial powers, based on their history of dishonest behavior. They also cite colonialism's negative impacts, including military and political domination, economic exploitation, claims of racial and cultural superiority, forced assimilation, and sometimes genocide.

The practice of maintaining colonies has existed since ancient times, but colonialism is most often associated with European control of American, Australian, Asian, African, and other overseas territories from the 15th to 20th centuries. Advances in navigation were a key factor in facilitating this wave of colonization. Great Britain administered the largest colonial system, with the British Empire encompassing India and portions of Africa, the Americas, and the Caribbean. Colonial experiences differed based on each individual colonized nation's unique resources and conditions, as well as the motives of the colonizers.

Scholars further divide colonialism into settler versus exploitation colonialism. Settler colonialism is defined as control over a foreign territory for the purpose of widespread permanent settlement by emigrants from the home country. Examples include North America, Brazil, and Australia and New Zealand. Exploitation colonialism involves control of a foreign land with no plans for large-scale settlement. Examples include European colonialism in Africa. Exploitation colonialism is more associated with a dominant nation seeking to impose its culture on subordinate peoples.

Local government bodies provided daily local rule over settler colonial states, and members of the indigenous population held political offices under exploitation colonialism, but the colonial



*Hernán Cortés and his men kneel before Emperor Montezuma in an illustration in Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly, Volume 6, 1878. Some scholars assert that Cortés was able to conquer the Aztecs of Mexico by leveraging their belief that his arrival equaled the expected return of their god, Quetzalcoatl.*

country maintained ultimate sovereign political control in both cases. Critics argued that this practice provided a false illusion of settler or indigenous participation in their colonization, or that those indigenous figures in power hid ulterior motives of self-interest within the guise of helping their people. Trouble often arose when settlers felt that home governments were suppressing their local interests, such as occurred in the American Revolution against British rule.

### Justifications and Criticisms

A variety of justifications for colonialism have been posited throughout history, although widespread theoretical justification for colonialism emerged in the more modern period. These justifications have included national and individual

prestige, the natural dominance of the strong over the weak, economic benefits, beliefs in a progressive view of history and its accompanying motive to spread civilization, and the missionary impulse. Critics of colonialism often state that these justifications for modern colonialism, especially those claiming the best interest of the colonized as their primary motivation, are backed by either hypocrisy or self-deception.

Older colonizing nations and military conquerors did not find it as necessary to justify their actions in a theoretical context, although there were a few early critics of colonialism. Overt motives such as curiosity, the desire to explore, the search for better trade routes, military ability, or perceived economic benefits such as the lure of gold, silver, and luxury items drove early colonization. Colonies and their resources were the naturally justified benefit of such explorations. As some critics and philosophers began to question the negative or hypocritical aspects of colonialism, more theoretical justifications began to arise.

One of the most cited theoretical justifications for colonization was the concept of the “white man’s burden.” This theory posited that the dominant developed nations, believed to be the most civilized, had a duty to spread civilization to developing nations. Developed nations viewed these developing nations as farther back in the progressive historical evolution of societies, from savage to barbarous to civilized. Through their control, developed nations would act as guardians and teachers until the developing nation was prepared for self-sufficiency. Beliefs in racial and cultural superiority also played a role in this rationalization of the movement to spread civilization.

Proponents of colonialism argued that it served the interests of the developing nation’s peoples as well as global interests and not just the interests of the dominant nation. Critics, on the other hand, argued that justifications of colonialism based on civilizing and missionary impulses were either a deceptive front hiding more self-serving political and economic motives or a self-delusion held by exploiters who were sincere but misguided in their stated motives. Colonizers were accused of downplaying or hiding motives of personal gain and national glory behind the guise of providing aid to the colonized.

Critics maintained that the relationship between colonizer and colonized was less the purported student–teacher relationship and more of a patronizing, paternal relationship. Colonialism in the name of guiding the development of indigenous populations was often accompanied by such antithetical actions as enslavement, genocide, warfare, and forced assimilation to the dominant culture and religion. Critics also pointed out the outright deception involved in colonialism. Indigenous peoples were often deceived into surrendering land through swindles, land deals with bad terms, or treaties that were not honored.

Religious motives provided another key justification for the military conquest of lands viewed as controlled or inhabited by lost souls in need of salvation since the time of the Crusades. Many colonizers and their supporters truly believed that Christianity was the one true religion, and paganism, Islam, or other forms of religion were akin to savagery, idolatry, and devil worship. Missionary colonialists also justified their actions by stating that peoples such as the Native Americans were violating natural law, thereby abrogating their rights to independence and self-rule through a demonstration of their inability at this point in their cultural evolution to act with reason. Commonly cited examples of such behaviors included polygamy, cannibalism, and nakedness.

Religious motivations also served to hide the desire for personal wealth or to justify a nation's political and economic exploitation of another people because religious control often extended into political, economic, and cultural control. Hypocrisy within the missionary impulse included the emphasis on labor exploitation and land, natural resource, or wealth appropriation while religious training and conversions remained secondary. Religious deception aided colonization in other ways. Some scholars believe that Hernán Cortés was able to conquer the Aztecs of Mexico through the widely held Aztec belief that Cortés's arrival equaled the expected return of the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl.

Spanish colonial missionary efforts in the Americas sparked lengthy debates as to their legitimacy and the truth behind their religious motives. The Spanish conquistadors of the 15th through 17th centuries cited religious conversion of the New World's indigenous peoples as

a primary justification for colonization. Early explorers such as Hernando de Soto, however, viewed the Native Americans as obstacles or potential sources of wealth, rather than converts. Later scholars note the irony that the desire to civilize and convert indigenous peoples for the advancement of their societies instead resulted in widespread population loss, warfare, and enslavement or other forms of economic exploitation.

One of the most well-known and influential of the early critics of religious colonial practices was the Spanish priest Bartolomé de Las Casas. Las Casas was active at the time when Europeans were debating whether Native Americans had souls, considered a crucial question to religious motives for colonization. The passage of the New Laws of 1542, which declared that Native Americans had souls that could be saved, placed a greater emphasis on religious motives. Las Casas remained critical of Spanish colonial practices because of their harsh treatment of these Native souls for which they claimed to seek salvation.

Philosophers, political theorists, and religious leaders have also struggled with the issues raised by colonialism. The 17th through the 19th centuries saw the rise of movements such as the Enlightenment that emphasized universal natural laws and human rights, uncomfortably juxtaposing beliefs in the universal human capacity for reason, equality, cultural pluralism, and self-determination with colonialism and its assumptions of racial and cultural superiority and domination over the “uncivilized.” Scholars began to question whether European colonial powers had the right to dominate other countries or force other cultures to abandon practices that they found alien or in violation of natural law.

The Enlightenment, active in the late 17th and 18th centuries, emphasized universal human reason, the natural development of human cultural pluralism, and the capacity of all peoples for self-government. These beliefs came into conflict with colonial practices such as enslavement, economic exploitation, property and wealth expropriation, and forced assimilation. Thus, questions of hypocrisy and deception played a central role in Enlightenment debates as to the legitimacy of colonialism and the civilizing impulse. Key Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Denis Diderot offered scholarly critiques of colonialism.



Other scholarly critics of colonialism included Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville. Mill highlighted the inherent difficulties in colonial rule, including lack of adequate local knowledge and the natural tendency to favor one's cultural background and those who share one's cultural beliefs. De Tocqueville believed that the one-sided dialectical relationship between colonial settlers and indigenous populations could never be resolved as civilizing justifications claimed. Scholarly defenders of colonialism countered that indigenous peoples were simply not far enough along on the scale of civilization to be ready for self-determination.

### **Modern Decolonization and Neocolonialism**

Western imperialism and colonization began to decline after their height in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A wave of anticolonial sentiment and national independence movements rose in the post–World War II period. Independence movements were aided by the foundation of the United Nations, which played an active role in decolonization. Its founding charter called for the independence or self-government of all peoples still under colonial rule, and international oversight of all areas that did not yet meet those goals. Some called for an immediate end to all colonial rule, while others argued for a transitory period in which independence would be slowly ushered in.

The spread of free trade, as well as growing criticisms of colonialism, imperialism, and racism aided the end of widespread colonialism. Modern critics of colonialism pointed to its continued impacts after decolonization, mainly through the legacy of the centuries of colonialism that preceded independence, as well as the subsequent ongoing economic dependency of many former colonial nations. Many countries began to view their colonial past in a less positive manner as previous justifications were increasingly criticized as either outright deceptions or self-deceptions. Lasting impacts of colonialism include inequality, political instability and violence, oppression, and widespread poverty, as well as a lack of economic development, effective medical care or education, adequate sanitation, and other necessities.

Although widespread colonialism ended by the late 20th century, former colonial powers continued to exert influence over the developing world.

The older justification of aiding a country that is not yet prepared for full independence remained a justification for new forms of neocolonial aid that emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These include economic and political controls such as foreign capital, foreign aid, preferential trading relationships, and training programs. Critics claim that Western nations now use economic development, rather than direct political or military domination, to maintain control, resulting in continued economic exploitation in the name of modernization and the global economy.

This phenomenon is commonly known as neocolonialism. Neocolonialism posits that independence is simply a deception, allowing former imperial countries to maintain economic and political control of their former colonies. They also cite the negative self-serving aspects of neocolonialism, such as the use of developing nations as new markets and sources of cheap labor for transnational corporations. Others point to ongoing military or political control, citing examples such as the United States' involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Critics call for increased international oversight through organizations such as the United Nations, citing the past history of deception as proof of the untrustworthiness of former colonial powers.

Modern interest in the study of indigenous experiences of colonization highlights the differences in worldviews that affected colonial relations between colonial and colonized populations. These differences in worldviews among the colonizers and the colonized included different beliefs concerning deception. Studies have shown that the colonized utilized these differences in worldviews as they adapted to colonization. Lying and deception were employed as a strategy of survival in the intercultural encounters engendered by colonialism.

For example, scholars have explored such differences in worldviews concerning truthfulness among Native Americans and their European colonizers. Both Euro-American cultures and their Native American counterparts held religious and cultural worldviews that disapproved of the practice of lying, but differed in their beliefs with regard to motivation and punishment. Native American worldviews held that people lied out of insanity, a true inability to distinguish reality, versus outright dishonesty. Liars were usually

pitied, rather than punished. Euro-Americans, on the other hand, traditionally viewed lying and deception through a religious framework, declaring it a sin. The dishonest operated out of self-interest and were shunned or otherwise harshly punished.

Colonized people adopted numerous survival strategies, including lying and deception. Indigenous peoples who believed their colonizers to be liars or hypocrites employed deceptive practices. European accounts of interactions with Native Americans describe numerous situations in which Native American groups who encountered European explorers seeking material wealth sent them on their way by describing a wealthier Native American settlement somewhere in the distance. The enslaved often deliberately slowed down their work or broke tools, feigned illness, and held secret meetings to plot rebellion.

Postcolonial theory emerged in the academic world in the late 20th century, especially within the fields of literature and the humanities. Postcolonialism explores the power of language to either aid in colonial subjugation or to allow indigenous populations to directly speak to the perceived truth of their experiences. Postcolonial theory focuses on the use of history and literature to justify the colonial legacy and forces of neocolonialism, and to downplay or hide their negative aspects. It also explores the colonial expropriation of indigenous cultures, which can give a distorted picture of such cultures as viewed through the interpretive lens of another culture.

Marcella Bush Trevino  
Barry University

**See Also:** Ethnic Differences; Ideology; Native Americans; Racism; Spanish-American Conquests.

#### Further Readings

- Byrd, Jodi A. *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
- Cannadine, David. *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Cooper, Thomas W. *A Time Before Deception: Truth in Communication, Culture, and Ethics*. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 1998.

Kohn, Margaret. "Post-Colonial Theory." In *Ethics and World Politics*, Duncan Bell, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Muthu, Sankar. *Enlightenment Against Empire*.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Widdowson, Frances and Albert Howard. *Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: The Deception Behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008.

Young, Robert. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

## Columbus, Christopher

The juxtaposition of Christopher Columbus's name with lying and deception is ambivalent. The focus can be on the lies that have been told about Columbus, or on the lies that Columbus told. Among the many untruths written in history books is that of Columbus as the discoverer of America, and not even Columbus, who turned out to be quite a deceptive figure, even dreamed of playing that role. In fact, the lies that Columbus told are much more interesting and still warrant careful examination.

Initially, there appeared to be a wholesome effort at truthfulness. Christopher Columbus had succeeded at selling his project to the Spanish Crown, finding a more direct route to the Indies, and finding gold. A journal would be kept of this voyage. Thus, it is with the verb "to write" that Columbus refers in the journal to his expedition: "... I thought of writing on this whole voyage, all that I would do and see and experience ..."

Admiral Columbus needed to write about this journey, for the journey could not be justified without the writing, and the writing was there to make up for the absence of the sovereigns of Spain who had funded the journey. Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand needed to be convinced that their money was well spent. The act of writing in the journal was therefore tied to an effort to gain and share knowledge and understanding of what lay beyond the rim of

the horizon, to unveil the ocean's secret, which was an unrecognizable object, the New World. Soon enough, truthfulness and accuracy would become impossibilities.

### The Need to Lie

Uncertainty led to a need for two journals: one that told the truth, and one that veiled reality. The crew needed to go about daily life onboard, goaded by the promise of future wealth and perhaps even renown. Any intimation that this enterprise could perhaps fail, any hint that they could possibly be navigating toward their doom, had to be quickly crushed. Hence, the lies: The number of knots traveled was rethought every night so that the crew would continue believing that land lay ahead, and that they had not traveled that far without reaching land. As the days passed, the more urgent it became to reassure the crew that they had not traveled that far. This initial, internal deception explains the difficulties in determining for sure where Columbus first made landfall.

Time and circumstance have given many dimensions to Columbus's journal that can be approached as a diary, a letter or the rough draft to a letter, a journal, and, once it was transcribed by Bartolomé de Las Casas, as a diary, a letter, and a journal written in different persons. In the beginning, the text is in the first person, but soon the "I" becomes "he," and remains that way until October 13. Moreover, having "he/that" alternating with the "I" not only is an attempt to put words to the landscape but also talks to them (the sovereigns) and tries to justify this landscape.

Granted, this text is not literature. However, it can be approached as a literary text, not so much because of its intention to be literary, but for the epistemological change that it originated by its gaze, for its effort to find words for an unknown and incomprehensible world, and even for the liberty that this gaze takes with the first-, second-, and third-person singular—regardless of the fact that this liberty is accidental. In other words, the text written by Columbus could very well have meant to be honest in the beginning, as did the text written by Las Casas. However, the literary happened, and at times the "I" and the "he" are so intertwined that they share the same sentence (written on December 21, 1492). In fact, the

journal can be considered a lie because the original journal was never found; all that is left is a text written by Las Casas.

### Inventing a New Language and a New World

So Columbus proceeded, from Friday, August 3, 1492, to write down ". . . each night whatever I experience during the day and each day what I sail during the night . . ." The act of writing (much like the act of naming) also has everything to do with taking possession. From the day the crew made landfall, this unknown world, so full of water and so very green, was there for the naming, writing, and taking. Therefore, from the moment the admiral and his crew spotted the first signs of land, there was need for a new language. However, as described by author Walter Mignolo, to invent a new language means running a risk. His observations in *Historia de la Literatura Hispanoamericana* can be translated as, "To invent a new language when the recipient of the message has not seen the object amounts to producing an unintelligible discourse." This haste to name and take possession, in turn, paved the way for further deception.

On Thursday, October 11, the crew saw sandpipers, a green branch, a cane, a stick, another small stick, a small branch, vegetation that grows on land, and a small branch covered with vegetation. At this early juncture, there is a certain monotony in the discourse, mostly because of the repetitive use of nouns and adjectives such as stick, small stick, branch, small branch, green reed, and brown cane, and therefore there is less effort at hyperbole. In fact, it would appear that the admiral is at a loss for words. These remain, however, the first words used to announce what lay ahead—the American landscape.

The Americas did not yet exist, but they needed to be described, so a language had to be invented in order to describe them. Although Las Casas transcribes the lost journal with hindsight, on October 11, 1492, the objective was to discover a new route to the Indies, not a new world. At that point, the brown sticks and the green reeds were merely harbingers of Cipangu. Oddly enough, Columbus had no qualms about renaming these islands that had to be of the Indies because they were exactly where the Indies should be. Tzvetan

Todorov believes that this approach gives insight into the admiral's character and manner of knowing and gazing at the world. According to Todorov, Columbus has none of the qualities of a modern empiricist because the decisive argument does not come from experience. Columbus knows beforehand what he will find and real life experience is not to be questioned, it serves only to illustrate the truth.

At 2:00 A.M. on October 12, Rodrigo de Triana, who was on the lookout on the *Pinta's* fore-castle, saw something that resembled a dark line of land in the moonlight and shouted, "¡Tierra! ¡Tierra!" Early that same morning, the famous landing often depicted by artists without much respect for the actual topography took place. The admiral and his crew set foot on a small island of the Lucayos that the natives referred to as Guanahaní, what is present-day San Salvador, or Watling's Island.

When they set foot on Guanahaní, they saw naked people living in a state of nature. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, the virtuous savage myth began precisely with the Taínos on Guanahaní, which means iguana, a reptile now extinct on Guanahaní.

### Deciphering an Unknown World

Critic Anderson Imbert writes that Columbus did not have a direct vision of America, but rather a reflection, much like clouds reflected on the surface of a quiet lake. For most of the first voyage, the gaze is not yet turned toward the Americas; it is either turned inward (toward the conviction that these are the outer islands of Cipangu), or it is turned back toward Europe, and it is using the words or elements from medieval literary tradition to describe the landscape. These elements are few and invariable: trees, water, air, birds. They are used time and again to describe a pastoral scene, or the Garden of Eden.

Mignolo explains that knowledge is not only extracted from an object, it is also the result of what one knows before taking the object into consideration. The admiral and his men landed with all their cognitive baggage; they saw, interpreted, named, and took possession of the new world before them.

For the first time, the Europeans were attempting to decipher this new geographic dimension,

an unknown natural world. It is so new that their cognitive abilities cannot yet recognize it as new; they are literally stunned. The place that they are beholding for the first time has to be given either old names, such as the Indies, Cipangu, or the land of the Great Khan, or new names, such as Isabella, San Salvador, and Fernandina. As to the available adjectives to describe this world, they are scarce, and they lack local color.

### Conclusion

The journal was a "dress rehearsal" for the letter that the admiral later wrote to the Spanish Crown on his way back from this first voyage in an effort to convince the monarchs that the expedition they had funded had been a total success; that they had not wasted their money, but on the contrary, that they should fund a second voyage because there was no time to waste in this harried search for an alternate route to the Indies, for gold and alternate sources of wealth. By simply stating that it was a pleasure to gaze upon the greenness of the island, the admiral was already attempting to "sell" the place to Ferdinand and Isabella. Obviously, selling could very well require lies and deception.

Beatrix Rivera-Barnes

Pennsylvania State, Worthington-Scranton

**See Also:** Ethnic Differences; Exaggeration; False Advertising; Fiction; Half-Truths; Historical Narratives, False; Ideology; Language; Marketing, Deceptive; Memoirs; Puffery; Spanish-American Conquests.

### Further Readings

Anderson Imbert, Enrique. *Historia de la Literatura Hispanoamericana*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura, 1954.

Columbus, Christopher (Colón, Cristobal) and Consuelo Varela, ed. *Los Cuatro Viajes, Testamento*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1999.

Dunn, Oliver and James E. Kelley Jr. *The Diario of Christopher Columbus's First Voyage to America 1492-1493*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

Gerbi, Antonello and Jeremy Moyle, trans. *Nature in the New World*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985.



- Jane, Cecil, ed. and trans. *The Voyages of Christopher Columbus*. New York: Argonaut Press, 1970.
- Las Casas, Bartolomé de and Jean Paul Duviols, ed. *Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias*. Buenos Aires: Stockcero, 2006.
- Mignolo, Walter. "Cartas, Crónicas y Relaciones del Descubrimiento y la Conquista." In *Historia de la Literatura Hispanoamericana*. Tomo I. Madrid: Catedra, 1998.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Admiral of the Ocean Sea*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942.
- Pastor, Beatriz. *Discursos Narrativos de la Conquista: Mitificación y Emergencia*. Hanover, NH: Ediciones del Norte, 1988.
- Petersen, Ronald H. *New World Botany: Columbus to Darwin*. Konigstein, Germany: A. R. G. Gantner Verlag, 2001.
- Rivera-Barnes, Beatriz and Jerry Hoeg. *Reading and Writing the Latin American Landscape*. New York: Palgrave, 2009.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. *La Conquête de l'Amérique*. Paris: Seuil, 1982.
- Vogel, Joseph Henry and Camilo Gomides. "Ecological Debt and the Existence Value of Biodiversity: The Evidence Begins With the Diario of Columbus' First Voyage to America, 1492–1493." *Ometeca*, v.9 (2005).

## Communication

The word *communication* comes from the Latin word *communicare*, which means to impart, share, and make common. In its original use, communication referred to concrete social practices, such as the sharing of gifts or duties. However, in the last two centuries the word has been used to describe increasingly more abstract phenomena. Especially in contemporary Western thought, communication has become a powerful and rich metaphor utilized to account for several aspects of social reality, such as the creation of meaning, social learning, the emerging of social relations, the constitution of social groups, and the functioning of social systems.

The simplest and most minimalist way to define communication is to describe the activity of conveying information through the exchange


of thoughts or messages between individuals. However, even such a concise definition does not completely gain consent in the field. In fact, beneath distinct definitions of communication stand competing theorizations of knowledge and society. It is a political and ideological matter but is also a question of development of the academic discipline. The field of communication lacks consolidation to the extent that J. A. Anderson was able to identify hundreds of distinct definitions in a handful of textbooks. One of the reasons for this disunity was that, prior to the academic recognition of communication as a discipline, multiple definitions of communication independently arose from distinct fields, such as mathematics, philosophy, sociology, political science, and psychology. The complexity in defining communication also explains the complexity of the word's relation to deception.

### Deceptive Communication: Seven Primary Ways to Approach It

According to Robert T. Craig, communication as a proper field does not exist. Instead, one can identify several different domains, seven main theoretical traditions of communication, such as rhetoric, semiotics, phenomenology, cybernetics, sociopsychological, sociocultural, and critical. Each one, according to its ontological and epistemological assumptions, implies a different approach to deception.

According to the rhetorical tradition, communication consists of practical discursive persuasion; in other words, communication aims at finding an ideal identification between the position of the speaker and his or her audience. From a practical rhetorical perspective, which evaluates communicative practices based only on their rhetorical effectiveness, without contemplating morality or the content of the particular values conveyed by the rhetorical act, lying and deception may lose their traditionally negative connotations. In fact, such a point of view may potentially celebrate lying and deception as rhetorical performances in the framework of successful strategic communication.

Furthermore, rhetoric regards authentic communication and the idea of truth as dangerous myths that have favored the universalization of specific social group interests in the form of



The April 16, 1892, cover of the French Social Party publication *Le Petit Journal* illustrates the arrest of French anarchist and assassin Ravachol. Media have profound negative impact on societies by increasing social conflict and confrontations between different ideologies; this is the essence of propaganda, or the use of communication to propagate specific beliefs and expectations.

ideologies. This especially applies to the recently emerged field of critical rhetoric, which contextualizes language in a framework of production, reproduction, and contestation of power. Under such a perspective, deceptive communication should be countered by the ideology-critique capabilities of rhetoric to use the knowledge of the techniques of effective communication that are used by deceptive communication against itself to uncover it.

According to semiotics, communication is defined as social mediation taking place through signs. Especially under the influence of poststructuralist tradition, semiotics could be considered

the science that studies how language deceives because it celebrates the nonidentity, the ambiguousness of language, or what Jacques Derrida defines as *différance*. Whereas the act of lying and deceptive communication consistently implies the intentionality of the subject who falsifies and manipulates reality, semiotics points out the inherently deceptive nature of language, thus introducing an impersonal dimension to it. For instance, even though intentional deception increases the distance between the constitutive elements of a given sign, a signifier (sound, object, image, or the like), and a signified (concept), such a distance, according to semiotics, is always present because it is inherent in language.

Semiotics assumes that language is deceiving because it is founded on the arbitrariness of the link present in the very sign between signified and signifier. For instance, the difference between the denotation of a phrase such as “thank you,” with its literal expression of gratitude, may differ from or deceive a much more specific connotative and cultural meaning, or a meaning dependent on specific context. Consequently, the same expression of gratitude, “thank you,” during a quarrel may be deceiving because of its actual sarcastic and reproaching intention.

### Phenomenology and Cybernetics

According to phenomenology, communication consists of the experience of otherness and tends to privilege the establishment of social relations and the authenticity of such relationships. Consequently, deception and lying are negatively regarded as hijacking communication from such genuineness and openness. Deception negates the normative base of the phenomenological tradition, which results in an overt negation of the objectives of such tradition because it undermines the aspiration to establish a common ground among subjects.

Phenomenology may frame deception within the perspective of an artificial Cartesian separation of body and mind. In fact, according to Craig, communication begins with the prereflective experience arising from “our bodily existence,” deception as reflective, strategic behavior par excellence, and separates the worldly relations with a mediation of consciousness. In doing that, it deifies the possibility of dialogue and instead

paves the way for the establishment of instrumental and dominating relations with others.

Cybernetics, arguably, has substantially contributed to the modern and dominant understanding of communication as information processing. According to cybernetics, communication should consist of a transmission and elaboration of information in a system. Communication for cybernetics is the most powerful metaphor and description to address functional interrelationships of a system. The success of communication consists of extracting meaning from the conversation so that the subjects involved can move the conversation in the right direction, according to their goals. Lying and deception could be potentially regarded as neutral instances of the passage of information.

For instance, by only considering as relevant the objectives of the lying subject, as long as the given lie or deceptive behavior does not interrupt the flow of communication or create noise, cybernetics in principle would not approach deception in a different way than any other communication mode. In the same way, by only considering the objective of a given system, cybernetics could relativize the general negative connotations of deception because communication is almost exclusively evaluated for its function within a given system. Cybernetics tends to overlook the problem of sincerity, arguing that there must be more effective ways to establish the reliability of information. In such a practical view, the typical phenomenological issues regarding authenticity and immediateness are discarded.

### **Other Approaches to Lying and Deception**

According to the sociopsychological approach, communication influences, affects, and reflects personality and behavior. Communication constitutes the dimension in which individuals interact and influence each other, and therefore is considered a fundamental social mediation. However, the main mediating ground of communication is not based on signs (semiotics) or bodily experience (phenomenology), but on psychological predispositions. In the context of such an interaction, lying and deception may be approached as an outcome of both emotions and the rationality of subjects. Thus, deceptive communication could be at the same time strategic and nonstrategic.

Such a tradition, historically involved in the study of mediated propaganda, could also approach lying and deception as effective strategies of psychological manipulation. Lying and deception could then be used both for particularistic communication, as in the case of the psychological leverage frequently produced by advertising, and as public communication to reach collective and common goals.

According to the sociocultural approach, communication is a symbolic process that produces and reproduces the social order through social interaction. Lying and deception could be regarded as potentially disruptive factors of the social order and equilibrium; but also, from a strictly functionalist perspective, lying and deception could be seen as necessary illusions to create consent. According to J. W. Carey and his ritual model of communication, by allowing the exchange of information, communication produces and reinforces communities. The sociocultural approach seems more preoccupied with the lack of social coordination because of the lack of shared rituals and sense of community than with authentic communication.

Finally, the critical approach to communication looks at communication in self-reflective ways and how it produces and reproduces power in ways similar to the critical rhetoric perspective. Lying and deception could be regarded as means to reproduce such power by disseminating false ideologies and oppression, limiting consciousness, and contributing to create a misleading image and understanding of social reality. According to the classical Marxist branch inside this tradition, ideology consists in lying and deception that prevent people from understanding the real nature of social reality. According to Michel Foucault, communication is the mechanism by which power is exerted, while for Louis Althusser, through communication, power “interpellates” people.

Like the phenomenological tradition, the critical approach tends to assume the existence of a more authentic level of communication (relatively) emancipated from power and particularistic interests. Performing an ideological critique, the critical tradition also finds deception in the alleged neutrality of science, and more generally in social institutions. The critical tradition assumes

that self-reflection can liberate social reality from lies. It is also worth mentioning that such a tradition has been criticized by postmodern thought because it is based on noncritical assumptions defined as grand narratives, which in the end, could be defined as self-deceiving instances of communication.

In sum, according to specific definitions of communication with their equally specific assumptions, lying and deception are evaluated differently. When the effectiveness of communication is privileged, as in the case of rhetoric's persuasive communication and cybernetics's effective information flow, lying and deception are potentially seen as neutral. Conversely, when communication is evaluated in its capability to both mystify and demystify reality, as in the critical approaches, then lying and deception assume negative connotations because they support the power to falsify reality for the particular objectives of a given social group.

### Detecting Deceptive Communication

The detection of deceptive communication was not only a concern of the critical tradition but also of scholars who intended to find scientific ways to detect lies. Deception theory studies deceptive communication, strategies to detect deception, and the strategic communication for deceivers to recover from deception detection. Several experiments have been conducted to detect deceptive communication. These studies consistently point to the difficulty in finding a reliable method to distinguish truthful communication from lies. According to Judee Burgoon, deception may be detected two-thirds of the times by experts. Despite the fact that deception detection in communication studies has been explored by thinkers such as Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Niccolò Machiavelli, Immanuel Kant, and Sigmund Freud, it never really developed into a subject matter in its own right, which is possibly linked to the subject of deception detection.

There have been several attempts to develop tools to detect lies: the control question, the polygraph, the cognitive polygraph, electroencephalography, eye-tracking, voice analysis, and nonverbal behavior. Burgoon argues that communicators may identify deceivers by detecting certain behavioral features that allegedly are

consistently present in deceiving communications. She has noted how "deceivers exhibit an overall communication style that is less involved, immediate, and cooperative, and more uncertain, tense, and nervous," verbally, the messages of liars are less forthcoming in that they are "shorter, lack content details, are less logical and plausible, have fewer spontaneous corrections or admissions of poor memory, and contain more discrepancies." She also maintains that the voices of deceivers are "higher-pitched with more repetition-style dysfluencies," and that, "Kinesically, their pupils dilate more, they are less pleasant facially, they use fewer illustrator gestures, and they exhibit more fidgeting and adaptor behaviors such as pressed lips."

The typical study of deception detection consists of having subjects try to distinguish a series of truths from lies. T. R. Levine argues that in these experiments, the accuracy is slightly better than chance. The polygraph is the most reliable way to detect deception, and such a technology improves lie detection, but some scientists argue that polygraph results are unreliable.

### Instances of Deceptive Communication

The relationship between communication and lying and deception does not only depend on dissimilar definitions of the former, but also on the level in which communication is approached. For instance, through the lens of intercultural communication—the subfield of communication dedicated to the study of communicative context formed by individuals from different cultural/religious/social contexts—lying and deception could be relativized as miscommunication and misinformation. Even what could be considered an unvaried element, such as the deceptive intention of the speaker, an intercultural communication perspective could problematize as a homogenous, universal understanding of such an intention.

Another instance in which lying and deception assume a particular meaning is communication understood as dramaturgical action, a form of strategic interpersonal behavior. In Erving Goffman's *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (1959), the sociologist argues that when individuals are engaged in social interactions, they will attempt to control or manage the impression that others might make of them by modulating their appearances and manners in order to present



themselves in particular ways and to avoid embarrassing situations. From such a perspective, relocating the dramaturgical stage outside the theater, the playing of social actors may involve lying and deceptive communication. In fact for Goffman, social actors play differently in the “front stage,” the public sphere in which performative communication is enacted in front of their audience, and “back stage,” the private sphere in which individuals can more genuinely act without the pressure of social identities.

From the dramaturgical perspective, the “moral” agency of individuals involved in deceptive behavior must be placed in a context of intense social pressures. On the one hand, the social actor has the ability to play his or her specific performance on his or her stage. On the other hand, Goffman recognizes the existence of structural pressures and boundaries that contribute to substantially determine such a performance and its degree of necessity in order to allow individuals to be sufficiently socially integrated. However, the social context does not only exert pressure, but also contributes to the reproduction of deceptive behavior. When, for instance, the impression management of a given social actor fails, his or her audience may pretend to have seen the fumble in the situation as profitable for them. This is a situation in which the deception is collectively experienced and constructed.

In the picture described by Goffman, deceptive communication becomes both an aspect of individual agency and an aspect of impersonal structural pressures because actors strategically shape their social environment as much as they are shaped by somebody else, and they are pushed to reproduce untruthful acting. Furthermore, according to Goffman, the “generalized other,” the ubiquitous judging social eye, sometimes is so much internalized that impression management strategies can even be employed in front of an imaginary audience, therefore pushing the front stage into the private sphere.

At an interpersonal level, as the examples already mentioned show, deceptive communication is not necessarily characterized in negative terms; instead, it seems to be the result of the intersection of the strategic attitudes of individuals and social contingencies. On the contrary, in the field of mediated communication, lying and

deception have almost consistently been seen as collective pressing issues. This is evident in two examples: propaganda studies and journalism studies.

### **Propaganda and Journalism**

Deception and lying enter at the heart of communication studies as materialized in concerns about propaganda. Since the introduction of the first means of mass communication, the press, followed by radio and television, the media were believed to have a profound negative impact on societies by increasing social conflict and confrontations between different ideologies. A term that summarized such concerns about the disruptive potential of media was “propaganda,” or the use of communication to propagate specific beliefs and expectations. In fact, early communication theorists were convinced that an undedicated mass audience was not able to resist the manipulative force of propaganda.

The dissemination of particular beliefs from a particular subject such as a political party is not in itself negative. In fact, within the category of propaganda, one can distinguish between what was considered as positive “white propaganda,” and the more negative “gray propaganda” and “black propaganda.” White propaganda implies the intentional suppression of potentially harmful information, or the deliberate promotion of positive information and ideas. This form of propaganda implies that a degree of deception was considered to be positive overall. In contrast, gray propaganda is the dissemination of ambiguous information, which could be false or true, and in which no effort is made to determine its validity. Black propaganda is the deliberate strategic dissemination of lies.

The subjects perpetrating propaganda could be private citizens or public institutions. On the one hand, individuals could be involved in political campaigns, or advertising or denigrating products for economic purposes. On the other hand, in societies in which the collective action was no longer determined solely by the will of the monarch or a purely coercive power, governments realized that in order to effectively function, they needed a level of popular consent. For example, when the nation needed to mobilize for war, deceptive communication could produce and reinforce hatred for the enemy.

For propaganda theorists such as Walter Lippmann and Harold Lasswell, propaganda was necessary to selectively inform the public, manufacture consent, promote democratic symbols, and fight “enemy” propaganda. Public relations specialist Edward Bernays considered the use of public relations as the attempt to engineer public support for an activity, cause, movement, or institution. However, contrary to Lippmann, Bernays did not consider the public so easily manipulable. For this reason, public relations had to be conceived as holistic campaigns. Furthermore, Bernays accentuated the neutral value of public relations, compared to the negative value of propaganda, because public relations could be employed to take care of public economic subjects, such as big companies or corporations.

The media, whether publicly or privately owned and controlled, are considered to provide a public service, and for this reason, media propaganda has tended to be characterized in negative terms. In contrast, the propaganda found in advertising and public relations predominantly looks at lying and deception from a pragmatic point of view, seeing it as strategic communication. The mediated communication provided by the media can also be conceptualized in highly normative terms as institutions of the so-called public sphere.

According to Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere is an area of social life in which individuals come together to freely discuss and identify matters of mutual interest, ideally in which public opinion is formed and the government’s activity is put under scrutiny. In this sense, the term *public sphere* describes a form of democratic power that, through the idea of publicity—placing something under public scrutiny—directly challenges the ancient regime exemplified by the notion of *arcana imperii*, or government secrecy. Therefore, media are fundamental agents of public-ness, ideally conceptualized as democratic tools that deify the government’s machinations and attempts at deception.

*Arcana imperii* describes a power that operates in the private sphere—secret policymaking—in which the government can potentially operate by deception. At the same time as the emergence of the modern press in the Enlightenment period, such a model of power lost its moral and social justification because of the development of the idea of public use of reason. Immanuel Kant was

one of the most important theorists of the public use of reason and the way that lies and deception harm society. Truth then becomes an unconditional, universal duty.

The modern conception of journalism derives from such a normative conceptualization of communication as a democratic resource. In fact, journalism ethics as a subset of a media professional code represents one of the communication practices that most explicitly disapproves of and rejects deceptive communication. As a matter of fact, some of the most important elements of this code are truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality, fairness, and public accountability. The professional ethical code of journalism understands media as collective resources that make everybody socially, politically, and morally accountable.

However, communication, lying, and deception within the frame of journalism produce important tensions. On the one hand, journalism explicitly rejects lies and deception because, according to libertarian theory (as set forth in John Milton’s *Areopagitica*), truth and liberty are strongly linked, and only in a free, open debate will truth triumph. On the other hand, a theory founded on the absolute value of liberty negates in principle the freedom to lie and deceive, even when such deception is necessary to avoid major negative repercussions.

In the contemporary debate about journalism, another tension emerges when one considers the activity of the media from the political and economic point of view. As soon as information and communication in general becomes a commodity, its social value as a commonwealth is relativized and becomes more the value of particular interests as way to accumulate capital. Thus, commodification, concentration of ownership, vertical integration, and conglomeration may potentially prevent the triumph of truth because the media become subject to the marketplace, and the principles of the marketplace do not necessarily follow truth.

## Conclusion

Because of an inherently communicative element present in both lying and deceptive behavior, communication provides a powerful point of view to understand these phenomena. However, communication studies have failed to establish a subfield

dedicated to such practices. One possible reason for this can be found in the inconsistency of data about lying: whereas J. F. George and A. Robb report that lying and deception have been estimated to be present in 25 to 33 percent of all conversations, K. B. Serota and colleagues claim that most lies are produced by only a few prolific liars. A second reason for such a lacuna is the fact that communication, like many disciplines, contains a highly normative charge, and such a charge most frequently treats lying and deception as malfunction, degeneration, impediments, or even explicit negations of communication.

Marco Briziarelli  
University of New Mexico

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Aristotle; Audience; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Corporations; Deception Detection Accuracy; Disinformation; False Advertising; False Signals; General Communicative Suspicion; Goffman, Erving; Government Propaganda; Ideology; Information Manipulation Theory 1; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Kant, Immanuel; Language; Myth; Nazi Propaganda; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Public Relations; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Saint Augustine; Relationships, Sexual; Rumor; Secrecy; Terrorism; Truth; Urban Legends; Vocal Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Carey, J. W. *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- Derrida, J. *Grammatology*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- George, J. F. and A. Robb. "Deception and Computer-Mediated Communication in Daily Life." *Communication Reports*, v.21 (2008).
- Goffman, E. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1959.
- Hardt, H. *Critical Communication Studies: Communication, History, and Theory in America*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Mattelart, A. *The Invention of Communication*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Peters, J. D. *Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Schiller, D. *Theorizing Communication: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Serota, K. B., T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster. "The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Reported Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

## Computer-Generated Images

Computers are powerful tools for the display of images. They have also been used to manipulate and manufacture images through the use of graphic applications. These computer-generated images (CGIs) can then be used in many different areas such as art, printed media and advertisements, movies, television programming and commercials, simulators, and video games.

### "Photoshopping," Motion Pictures, and Virtual Worlds

Programmers have developed graphics software for computer-generated images, many of which are relatively inexpensive for the production of artwork, games, and other works on personal computers. For individuals and graphic design studios, software packages include Photoshop, Art of Illusion, Blender, POV Ray, Clamix Modeler, Genesis 3D editor, and Z Modeler. Changes made to photographs are called "photoshopping" or, in earlier times, "airbrushing." Graphic images are altered in order to deceptively create the illusion that what is seen is the actual original photograph. When viewed on the Internet, these images are difficult for most people to detect as alterations.

More complex packages are expensive and are used to produce full-length animated or special-effects motion pictures. For example, graphic special-effects imagery studios such as Pixar use complex programs and professional "plug-ins" to create animated movies. The 3D imagery generated by these computers are in some ways similar

to the imagery produced by the traditional methods of Walt Disney Studios and other firms that produced cartoon films. Disney and other studios had armies of artists who drew picture after picture to produce the numerous frames that moved so rapidly that to the human eye, the pictures seemed to move.

Computer-generated images can be static or move dynamically. They can be flat, two-dimensional works, or generated in three-dimensional formats. Some motion picture releases, such as *Turbo* (2013), have been created in 3D format. These graphically animated films are a development from the first anaglyphic production in 1915 and later, the “golden era” of 3D movies of the 1950s, such as *Fort Ticonderoga* (1953). However, they have usually been treated as a novelty. Modern computer-generated images have advanced into new frontiers of visualization through special effects.

Commercial animated films are produced on rapidly advancing digital imaging products that are used from storyboard to shooting and editing films. There are two basic ways in which digital imaging is used. First, it can remove unwanted elements from each frame of a motion picture. The second use of CGI is to build images. For example, the feather in *Forrest Gump* (1994) that flutters by the steeple of the Independent Presbyterian Church in Savannah, Georgia, or the creation of herds of dinosaurs in *Jurassic Park* (1993). Today’s filmmakers no longer need vast collections of miniature models for filming battle scenes or other events.

Computer-generated animations may also create virtual worlds. Like motion pictures in general, they are the makers of illusions, such as creating the illusion that the viewer is seeing motion. It also draws the viewer into the imaginary world of the story, even if the story is about historical events.

False stories or trick photography was also used in the motion pictures of the age of film, and new computer-generated images have increased the opportunity for deception. Because people understand that motion pictures are illusions created by the work of filmmakers, the deception is usually socially acceptable. However, one result is that film theory is facing new problems about visual effects and ideas of realism.

### **Fantasy, Politics, and Propaganda**

Because modern technology enables the public to see imagery that does not exist in reality, even more concerning to many is the fact that current graphic imaging technologies make it reasonable to believe that people can no longer trust anything they see on film, Facebook, or other digitalized formats. The saying, “a picture is worth 1,000 words,” has now shifted to “no picture can be trusted.”

Advances in the art of CGI have reached the point that distinguishing between fantasy and reality is difficult. For the cinema industry, this is just business as it has been practiced for over 100 years. Hollywood is a dream factory, and illusions are the stock in trade of movie making. However, the blurring of fantasy and fact has opened the door to the dangerous world of propaganda. Propaganda machines that practice to deceive now have access to many new CGI technologies that may be used to create disinformation as a deceptive fog that blinds the general public. Therefore, deceivers may be more likely to win in their struggle for power and policymaking.

The work of politicians is to persuade the public or other lawmakers on policy issues. Persuasion often means creating images in the minds of people. Images may encompass the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, global warming, or the threat posed by revolutionaries, criminals, terrorists, or enemy states. The use of doctored images by politicians, news media, or even the government as propaganda tools has been aided by new CGI technologies.

As CGI technologies advance and drop in price, new possibilities have opened up for amateur or other producers of politically sensitive graphics to manipulate imagery for partisan purposes. Technological advances have also made it increasingly difficult to detect manipulations. Uncertainty about the truth or the reality presented by graphic images may increase to the point where sound decision making is difficult. For example, in the United States, news stories and political positions on domestic tragedies—especially those involving gun violence or domestic terrorism—have been attacked or rejected as propaganda. Some critics believe that CGI alterations have been used to pursue agendas that will lead to violations of personal liberties. Some of these critics



are conspiracy-minded, yet the ease with which images can be manufactured or manipulated hinders any easy conclusions.

Numerous complaints have been made about the use of deceptive video fakery that is used for propaganda. For example, complaints have been made against Al Gore for using computer-generated scenes from low-budget science fiction movies to promote his global warming agenda. ABC News revealed that one of the famous shots in his film, *An Inconvenient Truth*, of supposed Antarctic ice shelves, was actually a computer-generated image from the science fiction film *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004). For a documentary to use computer-generated images to make claims that are alleged to be factual is considered by many to be a deceptive practice.

A 2013 North Korean propaganda video vilified the United States while bragging about its flourishing nuclear weapons program. The crux of the propaganda was the burning of the United States in CGI images borrowed from a modern warfare video game. The difficulty in situations like this is to determine if the propaganda is just a game, or a real intention. American officials and the general public treated the propaganda images as a threat.

Law enforcement officials have growing concerns that CGI manipulations may fool

forensic experts. Image restoration work can also be manipulated to falsify evidence. For example, dental imagery or radiology can be manipulated to show disease in order to justify insurance payments, which are fraudulently obtained because the alleged dental work was billed to a third-party payer for work that was not actually performed.

Experts engaged in forensic dental work to identify bite marks or dental remains are developing techniques to detect graphic manipulations. Alterations may be spotted if the photograph is far too perfect. If there are straight lines and perfect angles in teeth or perfect margins or shading in regrowth, the image may be suspect. On the other hand, geometric imperfections, brush marks, and uneven pixilation may also indicate image manipulation. Larger-than-normal file sizes for images of teeth may be the product of CGI manipulations.

Ethical issues have been raised about slight alterations in images by news organizations. The February 1982 cover of *National Geographic* altered an image of a camel train walking in front of the Pyramids of Giza in Egypt in order to make it fit the magazine cover's format. The magazine did not disclose that the pyramids had been digitally moved slightly closer together—that is, not until the photographer, Gordon Gahan,



Adobe Photoshop was used to create this composite of 16 different digitally manipulated photos to give the impression of a real landscape. Computer-generated images may also create virtual worlds through animation and film illusion. This deception is usually socially acceptable because most people understand that the illusion is the work of filmmakers. However, film theory is facing new issues involving visual effects and perceptions of realism and the resulting difficulty in distinguishing between reality and deception.

complained. The magazine cover became a source of major controversy, prompting Sheila Reaves, a journalism professor at the University of Wisconsin, to remark, “The enormity of moving such a large object brought home to people that you can move a shoulder or a smile.”

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Deception and Technology; Fantasy and Imagination; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Government Propaganda; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Marketing, Deceptive; Movies, Lying in; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Photographs, Altered; Plagiarism; Spin, Political; Thermal Imaging.

### Further Readings

- Goldberg, Emily. “The Middle Row: Editorial.” J201: History of News in Modern America (March 23, 2013). <http://historyinnews.uscannenber.org/group5/editorial-2> (Accessed August 2013).
- Holiday, Ryan. *Trust Me, I'm Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator*. New York: Penguin Group, 2012.
- Kiel, Judy. “Who Moved My Pyramid? An Overview of Digital Imaging Ethics in Photojournalism.” Museum of Hoaxes. (March 26, 2013). [http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/hoax/photo\\_database/chronological/P50](http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/hoax/photo_database/chronological/P50) (Accessed August 2013).
- Magnenat-Thalmann, N. and Daniel Thalmann, eds. *Computer-Generated Images*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986.
- Petrou, Maria and Anil Bharath. *Next Generation Artificial Vision Systems: Reverse Engineering the Human Visual System*. Norwood, MA: Artech House, 2008.
- Schachter, Bruce J. *Computer Image Generation*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983.
- Sheppard, Noel. “Gore Used Fictional Video to Illustrate ‘Inconvenient Truth.’” *Newsbusters* (April 22, 2008). <http://newsbusters.org/blogs/noel-sheppard/2008/04/22/abc-s-20-20-gore-used-fictional-film-clip-inconvenient-truth> (Accessed August 2013).
- Zhang, Yongjie (Jessica). *Image-Based Geometric Modeling and Mesh Generation*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2012.

## Con Man

A *con man*, or the more gender-neutral phrase *con artist*, is a shortened reference to a confidence person. A con artist plays upon the trust underlying social situations. Deception is the con artist's trade. Essentially, con artists rely upon the trust individuals grant in social interactions by portraying a role that encourages others to place confidence in them, and then demand that their victims demonstrate this confidence. This is illustrated by scenarios such as the gentlemanly attorney who contacts individuals who were previously sold worthless stock, offering to buy the stock while first securing a legal fee to process the paperwork; or the helpful woman tourist who phones elderly people, sadly informing each that their grandchild is in a foreign jail and, though she tried to pay the amount owed, she only had a portion of the amount and is hoping they have the additional necessary funds. In both these examples, the con artist presents him or herself in a trusted social role—the attorney with high social status, and the Good Samaritan stranger—while offering to assist the unknowing victims and simultaneously making an implicit or explicit demand for the victims to financially exhibit their confidence.

Con artists are called by a variety of terms: swindler, scammer, grifter, hustler, charlatan, chameleon, and the broad-termed criminal. Yet the term *con artist* is unique because it suggests that an individual has presented him or herself in a social role not true to their self, that of an imposter. The con behavior occurs within the confines of what is called the con game, though it is also referred to as the trick, hustle, scam, swindle, bamboozle, or flimflam. This may take the form of a short or long con.

In the short con, the con artist, without preparation and preplanning, relieves the victims of whatever money they have available at that specific point in time, while the long con refers to con games that take a great deal of time, preparation, and preplanning to contrive. An example of a short con is the contractor who approaches a homeowner offering a cut-rate price on a service, such as a new roof, because he can see she is in need. Negotiation occurs, and the cost is lowered to fleece the individual of what she has available.

The supposed contractor then spray-paints the roof of her house, making it appear as though he has installed a new roof.

A well-known long con is the Ponzi scheme, in which investors are duped to believe that they are earning high rates of profit, yet in reality they are only receiving fake paperwork or the investment of newcomers into the con. Because long cons expose con artists to prolonged examination, Ponzi schemes are frequently in the news as these con artists are exposed and imprisoned.

Over the years, these terms have come to refer to ends of a continuum representing not so complicated to complicated con games. Long cons are frequently depicted in the media. The movie *The Sting* and the television series *Leverage* are examples, sharing a common denominator: The complexity of long cons frequently require the use of accomplices, known as shills, outside men, steerers, or ropers. This leaves one final person to label in a con game: the victim, who is referred to as the mark, sucker, or dupe.

### Manipulating Social Expectations

Key to the con game is the management or manipulation of social roles and social situations, that is, deception. A con artist is particularly savvy about human nature and unwritten rules of social interaction, with acute understanding of when to portray a particular social role or situation to encourage others to continue to perceive the role/situation as presented (i.e., to assist the dupe in suspending his or her disbelief). While many authors argue otherwise and depict con artists as basing their duplicity in the other's greed, vanity, or other motivating factor, it is much more complex than that. If con games were readily understood from analyzing a motivating factor or factors, law enforcement could profile marks and con artists.

However, this remains impossible because the complexity of social interaction is involved and is further complicated by the ability of con artists to expertly manipulate social situations to achieve their deceptive goals. When the con artist fails to successfully manipulate these situations and/or roles, marks defeat the con artist's goals; they spot the "tell," a behavior or some other information that contradicts the con's other claims, and become suspicious, refusing to continue the

suspension of disbelief. The mark's perception keeps him or her from becoming the dupe.

The vast majority of literature regarding con artists are fictional stories and research by criminal justice and sociology researchers. Con men have been beloved fictional characters for decades, beginning in the mid-1850s. In 1851, Herman Melville published one of the better-known fictional characterizations of a con man in *The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade*. Until Melville's novel, most characterizations depicted con men as conniving Yankee peddlers, but Melville created a gentlemanly character appearing in various duplicitous social roles, each time scamming a different victim. While many believe that Melville based his character on an actual con man, William Thompson, the dupes depicted in the novel were greedy and avaricious, not the everyday people Thompson conned. A more recent con man, Frank William Abagnale Jr., from the 1960s, is widely known as an infamous con artist who in his youth pretended to be various professional men, including a medical doctor and a commercial airline pilot, all in his pursuit to fraudulently obtain millions of dollars. A close reading of the book or an examination of the movie *Catch Me If You Can*, which depict Abagnale's exploits, or of *The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade*, illustrates the key aspects of a con man in the midst of his con games: assumed social roles, deception, violations of trust, and associates.

### "Cooling the Mark"

Criminal justice scholars historically discovered the difficulty of profiling a mark or con artist, and currently focus on categorizations, or types, of cons, including identity theft, traveling cons, Ponzi schemes, and Internet scams. Sociologists have delved into the complexities of the deceptive social situations and roles presented by con artists. Erving Goffman, a well-known sociologist, contributed to the con man literature with his focus on "cooling the mark."

The focus of the con man literature is primarily on the star of the show, the con man. However, Goffman places the social situation and the mark in the forefront. In so doing, he highlights the interactive nature of a con game; the con artist in pursuing his or her deceptive goals creates expectations in the mark. The mark's new

identity is that of the would-be millionaire, new home owner, helper of many—whatever the con artist via the scam suggested and the mark came to believe. But time eventually comes for the blow-off, when the con artist takes the money and leaves the mark behind.

The con game is over, but the mark now has to face his or her new identity; marks may recognize that they are now a dupe, or merely think that a terrible fate has befallen them. Essentially the mark is confronted with a new identity that they may be unwilling or incapable of embracing; and “cooling the mark” refers to techniques that a con artist uses to help the mark accept this new identity, without drawing the attention of law enforcement to the con man. In this rendition of the con, the social system of a con game becomes transparent, the importance of social roles for both the con artist and the mark are highlighted, and the interactive nature of the communication is essential.

Overall, con artists are the star of a cast, or perform solo, in a con game that is essentially one deceptive act or a series of deceptive acts designed to fraudulently obtain financial gain. Each con game has one or more marks, and each must adjust to a new, unwanted identity once aware of the outcome of the game. After the game, the con artist typically changes locales to avoid consequences, and the mark adjusts to a new identity over time.

Susan A. Stearns  
*Eastern Washington University*

**See Also:** Anderson, Anna (Anastasia); Barnum, P. T.; Cardiff Giant; Duping Delight; False Advertising; Forgery, Art; Disbelief, Suspension of; Goffman, Erving; Hartzell, Oscar; Investment Fraud; Magic Tricks; Marketing, Deceptive; Movies, Lying in; Piltown Man.

### Further Readings

- Bergmann, J. D. “The Original Confidence Man.” *American Quarterly*, v.21 (1969).  
Goffman, E. “On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure.” *Psychiatry*, v.15/4 (1952).  
Maurer, D. W. *The Big Con*. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1940.

## Concealed Information Test

Arguably the greatest concern about lie detection is the risk of falsely accusing a truthful person of being deceptive, the so called Othello error. The concealed information test (previously called the guilty knowledge test) takes an indirect approach to deception detection. Rather than assessing whether someone is or is not lying, the concealed information test assesses whether someone knows details of the crime that only the culprit could know. Although the concealed information test is more difficult to apply in real-life settings than traditional lie-detection tests, hundreds of studies confirm the validity of the concealed information test, and the Othello error is rare.

### How the Test Works

For example, say it is 8:00 A.M. and a man is having breakfast when he hears someone knocking on his door. He opens the front door and sees two police officers. They tell him that there has been a fire at his former partner’s place. He is accused of arson, and the police invite him to take a concealed information test to find out whether he knows more about the fire. The police ask if he has any idea where the fire started and what kind of material was used.

The police connect him to a polygraph in order to measure skin conductance, breathing, and heart rate. Then the concealed information test starts. The police ask, “Do you know where the fire started? Was that in the kitchen? In the garage? In the cellar? In the porch? In the hallway?”

He answers “no” to each of the options. Then, he is questioned about the kind of material that was used to start the fire. After a few questions, the test is over.

While he gets the chance to sip his coffee, the police examiner takes a few minutes to analyze the test results. As all alternatives are equally plausible, a key assumption of the concealed information test is that the innocent examinee will show similar physiological responses to all alternatives. Because the man is stressed out, his heart rate may be abnormally high but it will not be particularly higher or lower while truthfully denying recognition.



This situation is quite different for the guilty examinee. If the man did start a fire at his former partner's porch using paint thinner, the concealed information test expects him to recognize these crime details and show a marked physiological response to it.

### Studies on the Test

Since its introduction at the end of the 1950s, there have been hundreds of studies on the concealed information test, examining whether it works, under which conditions it works, and why it works. The majority of these studies were conducted in university laboratories. Here, researchers make sure some study participants have specific knowledge of a crime. Participants may be asked to select one of five playing cards, allowing the researcher to develop concealed information test questions such as "Did you select the Queen of Hearts? The King of Spades?"

Other options are to ask for autobiographical information, such as participants' birth date, or to have participants learn a list of words and ask them to conceal word recognition for the experimenter. The great advantage of such laboratory studies is that the researcher knows for sure who knows what (ground truth). A disadvantage is that the stakes are low, and that the set up and questions differ greatly from those of real-life criminal investigations. The most realistic laboratory set up is the mock crime design. Here, some participants enact a crime (e.g., the theft of \$20), whereas others have nothing to do with the crime. Promising participants that they will get an extra \$20 if the concealed information test considers them innocent is one technique that has been used to raise the stakes.

These studies have identified factors that influence the validity of the concealed information test. For example, validity is highest when the examinee is instructed to answer "no" compared with answering "yes" or remaining silent; when several questions, each having several answer options, are used; when the test is performed soon after the acquisition of the critical knowledge; when questioning about salient and central details; and—paradoxically—when the examinee is motivated to appear innocent. The concealed information test accurately detects recognition of critical information (moderate to high sensitivity). More

important, specificity is high, meaning that the chance of falsely accusing the innocent is small.

However, there is virtually no research that examines how the concealed information test performs in real life. This is all the more surprising because in Japan, the concealed information test is systematically applied, with several thousand tests being conducted each year, and the outcome of the test has been accepted as evidence in court. Laboratory studies suggest that the sensitivity of the concealed information test may be lower under real circumstances. After all, the culprit may not have noticed some details, and/or forgot them by the time of testing. Given that as many as half of all crimes are conducted under the influence of alcohol or drugs, memory failure is an important concern that could reduce the validity of the concealed information test under real-life circumstances.

There are only two published field studies in which investigators examined the accuracy of the concealed information test as applied by the Israeli police in real-life criminal investigations. These studies indicate that real criminals escape detection at a higher rate than what was observed in laboratory settings. On the positive side, specificity remained high, with only a few innocents being falsely accused of possessing crime knowledge.

### Skin Conductance and Brain Studies

Most laboratories to date have used skin conductance recorded with a polygraph to detect concealed information. Although the validity of several other autonomic nervous system measures (including breathing rate and depth, blood pressure, heart rate, and eye blinking) was explored, skin conductance remains the measure with the highest validity. In the 1980s, researchers also started to explore brain measures. Most brain studies recorded an electroencephalogram (EEG) and found that recognizing concealed information is accompanied with a positive deflection in the EEG that may start as early as 300ms after question onset. The direction and latency of this wave gave it its name: P300 (P standing for positive). More recent brain studies use brain imaging technology such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), enabling researchers to map which areas of the brain are most active when the examinee

tries to conceal certain information. Several regions of the brain, predominantly in the inferior parts of the prefrontal cortex, were found to be reactive to concealed information.

There is also renewed attention for a nonphysiological measure—reaction times. Although in principle, under voluntary control, in dedicated paradigms most examinees are slower to react to concealed information than to control information. Researchers have only started to explore whether a combination of measures may be more valid than any single measure. For now, there is no sound evidence that any single measure outperforms the oldest and best validated measure: skin conductance.

Having established that guilty, but not innocent, examinees show a stronger skin conductance response (and greater P300 and slower reaction time) to critical items compared to control items in the concealed information test, the question is still, why? Is it the fear of getting caught, stress, or guilt? Strong emotions such as anxiety are known to be associated with specific bodily reactions, for instance, racing of the heart. That is not what happens, however, when a guilty examinee recognizes a critical crime detail. Studies in different countries (such as Belgium, Japan, Germany, and Israel) with different participants (undergraduates and prisoners) and different set ups (playing cards, autobiographical information and crime details) showed the same thing: Recognition of concealed information is associated with a decline in heart rate.

This finding appears counterintuitive at first, but fits with the dominant theory of the concealed information test that was already outlined in the 1970s. Orienting theory states that novel and salient information captures attention, which is associated with a number of bodily responses, including an increase in skin conductance and a decline in heart rate. The cocktail party phenomenon illustrates the orienting response. While actively engaged in a conversation at a party, people are unlikely to pick up what people at other tables are talking about. When somebody calls an individual's first name, however, it is still likely that this critical information will grab the individual's attention. Applied to the concealed information test, orienting theory holds that the critical details stand out only for the guilty

examinee, and will capture only the guilty examinee's special attention. Some recent studies suggest that other mechanisms—such as inhibition—may also be at play.

Decades of research has confirmed the validity of the concealed information test, whether measuring peripheral, brain, or behavioral correlates. One of the main strengths of the concealed information test is that it provides safeguards for the Othello error and the risk of false accusations can be restricted to an arbitrarily low level. It remains to be firmly established, however, how the concealed information test performs under real-life circumstances. The key for such research lies in Japan, where the concealed information test is applied on a daily basis in real-life criminal investigations.

Bruno Verschuere  
*University of Amsterdam*

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment; Electroencephalography; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Leakage; Memory; Othello Effect; Polygraph.

### Further Readings

Ambach, Wolfgang. "Advances in the Concealed Information Test: Introductory Remarks." *International Journal of Psychophysiology*, v.77/3 (2010).

Lykken, D. T. *A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998.

Verschuere, B., G. Ben-Shakhar, G., and E. Meijer, eds. *Memory Detection: Theory and Application of the Concealed Information Test*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

---

## Confession

Confessing is often considered to be the act of "coming clean" and telling the truth. But confessions offered to national intelligence personnel, law enforcement officers, and corporate security can be deceptive. This deception is sometimes the

result of confessors' motives to deceive (to gain notoriety, or protect others), but often it is the result of coercive and deceptive tactics by interrogators. These confessions may be wholly false, implicating the confessors in events in which they had no role at all. Or, they may recount true events, but contain many false details. Even if wholly false, confessions taken by skilled interrogators can be deceptively compelling, convincing those who judge the truth of the confessor's story, and virtually assuring the confessor's conviction. But how do these deceptive confessions come about?

Sometimes, confessions are voluntarily offered, with little to no influence from interrogators. Confessors may contact law enforcement specifically to confess, or may offer their confessions to others, such as friends, snitches, or undercover agents, without intention or awareness that they may be used against the confessor. These voluntary confessions may be true, or may be attempts to protect others, brag, take credit for a notorious crime, gain attention, or even be returned to jail. Voluntary false statements to intelligence officers may be offered to strategically mislead.

Most confessions are taken by national intelligence, law enforcement, corporate interrogators, or civilian interrogators from firms specializing in interrogation. Interrogation techniques used in these contexts have ranged from outright torture, to deceptive tactics designed to trick the target into confessing, to more honest counseling techniques designed to encourage confession. Widespread debate has surrounded issues such as ethics of coercive or deceptive techniques, their relative effectiveness, and the estimation and valuation of relative risks that each technique might elicit false information versus failure to elicit true information.

Physical and psychological coercion of prospective confessors is outlawed by U.S. law and the Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war, though these prohibitions have been violated. Public awareness of torture among national intelligence interrogators is widespread, increasing in recent years as a result of controversy surrounding their use and sanctioning by the U.S. government during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Proponents argue that torture is sometimes necessary to elicit required information

(particularly if needed quickly to save lives), and that these goals justify its use. Opponents consider torture unethical and ineffective, in that the target may disclose information to terminate the torture, but this information will often be false.

Though torture is still used for intelligence-gathering in some parts of the world, it is now rarely used for criminal interrogations. Though once prevalent in criminal interrogations, such techniques were implicated in the elicitation of many notorious false confessions, provoking changes in the law to discourage their use. Military and civilian courts in the United States and other countries now prohibit the introduction of confessions obtained through physical coercion, threats, or promises of leniency contingent on confessions as evidence against criminal defendants. Modern interrogation techniques have evolved to minimize the risks that a confession will be false, or that it will be regarded as involuntary (i.e., inadmissible) by the courts.

### Evolution of U.S. Interrogation Methods

In the United States, this evolution began during the early decades of the 20th century, when trickery and deceit evolved to replace more overtly coercive tactics. The Reid nine-step method—developed during the 1920s and 1930s, and refined through the latest edition of the associated manual *Criminal Interrogation and Confessions* (2011)—became the most widespread method of interrogation in North America and other jurisdictions. The method is intended to avoid interrogation of the innocent (and thereby the problem of false confessions) by first assessing suspects for deception and guilt. Only suspects deemed deceptive and likely guilty are then subjected to interrogation, in which the goal is to convince them that confession is in their best legal interests, without use of forbidden coercive tactics, thereby preserving the admissibility of any confessions obtained.

In the United States, interrogators are permitted to lie about virtually anything. For example, they may mislead suspects regarding the purpose of the interrogation, motives of the interrogator, the interrogator's authority to affect suspects' legal outcomes, and evidence against the suspect. Moreover, interrogators are free to imply that suspects will be better off if they confess. Undercover



*A Viet Cong prisoner is interrogated during the Vietnam War at the A-109 Special Forces Detachment in Thuong Duc, 15.5 miles (25 kilometers) west of Da Nang, January 23, 1967. Military and civilian courts in the United States and other countries now prohibit the use of torture in order to elicit a confession. However, torture still is used in other parts of the world for intelligence gathering.*

officers may also lie about their identity to attempt to elicit confessions.

Such deceptive tactics have been widely criticized by legal scholars and social scientists. These tactics have been implicated in causing a large number of proven false confessions. Reid techniques for discrimination between guilty and innocent suspects are controversial, and have been widely debunked by scientists studying detection of deception. Thus, innocent suspects are still interrogated. When interrogated, they can become convinced, through interrogators' lies about evidence against them, that they have no hope of exoneration, and therefore become more susceptible to interrogators' misrepresentations of the consequences of confession. Some suspects even become convinced that they must have committed the crime because the (false) evidence appeared so thoroughly to implicate them (an "internalized false confession").

Critics also assert that the Reid method, through implication, conveys threats and promises concerning the consequences of confession, violating the intent of the law to forbid their use. Whether conveyed explicitly or implicitly, critics maintain that these threats and promises function identically to convince suspects they will be treated more harshly if they refuse to confess, and more leniently if they confess. Therefore, the argument is made that confessions obtained in this way should be considered involuntary and coerced, and therefore inadmissible as evidence. However, this argument has almost universally failed to convince the judiciary. Courts in many jurisdictions have accepted threats and promises conveyed through implication, while rejecting the same threats and promises if explicitly conveyed.

When admitted into evidence against a defendant, confessions (even if false) are highly likely



to result in conviction. Interrogators are trained to elicit highly detailed and emotional written or video confessions that will seem uncontested to those who judge. Whether true or false, confessions are compelling, and are more likely to lead to conviction than any other class of evidence. Even DNA is more easily explained away than a confession.

Despite criticisms concerning ethics, efficacy, and their role in wrongful conviction, U.S. military and civil law enforcement continue to pervasively use Reid-like methods for criminal interrogations. Reforms have been more widespread in jurisdictions in Europe and Canada, removing most, or all, deceptions integral to the Reid method—most prominently, lying about evidence against the suspect. Nevertheless, such reformed methods have successfully obtained perpetrator confessions. Deceptive methods are apparently unnecessary to obtain confessions, further calling into question their ethics.

Michael J. Williams

J. Guillermo Villalobos

Deborah Davis

*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Cognitive Heuristics; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception Motives; False Confessions; Investigator Bias; Law and Law Enforcement; Polygraph; Secrecy; Torture.

### Further Readings

- Davis, Deborah and William T. O'Donohue. "The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics in the Interrogation Room." In William O'Donohue and Eric R. Levensky, eds., *Handbook of Forensic Psychology*. New York: Academic Press, 2004.
- Kassin, Saul, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo, and Allison D. Redlich. "Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.34/1 (2010).
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Army Field Manual: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (FM 2-22.3)*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006.
- Williamson, Tom, ed. *Investigative Interviewing: Rights, Research, Regulation*. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2006.

## Consciousness

Consciousness is a concept that has puzzled disciplines, including philosophy and more recently psychology and neurology, for years. *Consciousness* is a term that has been deemed difficult to define, with various disciplines and focuses of study taking slightly different angles. While some disciplines lay their foundation in the determination of consciousness as a valid concept, others view the idea of consciousness as a potential deception.

Dualists hold that consciousness is a property that is separate from the physical properties of the body and the brain; however, as the understanding of biology and the physical world, and specifically of the brain, has increased, the concept of consciousness as separate from physical processes has fallen into disuse. John R. Searle suggests that from a biological perspective, consciousness refers to the first-person phenomenon involving states of awareness, feeling, and perception that begin when individuals are awake and continue until they go to sleep, fall into a coma, or die. However, if consciousness is to be defined from a biological perspective, then it would have to be able to be compared with other biological processes, such as growth or digestion. These parallels have so far not been supported through empirical study, creating scientific problems with supporting consciousness from a biological perspective.

The acceptance of consciousness as a legitimate subject of scientific study in the life sciences has continued to gain prominence since the mid-20th century, replacing philosophy as the primary discipline involved in examining, defining, and explaining consciousness. As a concept, consciousness is an accepted experience of being human and is often used to explain much of human experience, awareness, and behavior. The concept of consciousness has remained elusive to study. With the inability to study consciousness comes the idea that this concept has the potential to be a great deception, a potential lie used to inaccurately explain much of the human experience.

### Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives

The discussion of consciousness has often been a phenomenon historically discussed from a philosophical viewpoint with the mystery of

consciousness as its focus. According to philosophical thinking, consciousness is the place where an individual witnesses life through sights, smells, and sounds, as well as a place of self-awareness. Beyond this, consciousness is where the appreciating of these phenomena takes place, and individuals' intentional actions are formed. Free will and self-determination occur here. It is the reason why human beings do things, and why the things they do matter to them.

The largest issue facing the concept of consciousness is the difficulty that comes with applying the scientific method to its study. The scientific fields may have avoided attempts to study consciousness because it has been seen as a philosophical issue or viewed as too premature to study. Consciousness, as it is commonly defined, is not discussed as something physical, such as the firing of neurons. Within psychology, this viewpoint echoes back to Sigmund Freud's concepts of the id, ego, and super ego. Freud's theory of consciousness shares a failing with more recent theories in that it appears to be a sound theory explaining the experience of consciousness, but it is unable to be proven or disproven through experimentation.

Some researchers of human behavior have put forward the concept of consciousness as a deception that individuals have convinced themselves to believe. It is suggested that consciousness is an illusion that each person manufactures to explain the complexity of his or her behavior. In this theory, consciousness is an illusion driven by the inability of science to operationally define and therefore reliably study the experience of consciousness in an objective and repeatable way. Although a person is considered to be unconscious when he or she is asleep or in a coma, and to be conscious when in a state of awareness, this is more of a description of arousal and awareness than the broader concept of consciousness. Using this on-or-off approach, consciousness is then explained in a black-and-white sense. There is no continuum for partial consciousness; individuals are conscious, or they are not. To reiterate consciousness as a scientific concept lacks agreed-upon objective structure and function, and thus there is no physical account that currently explains the concept of consciousness as each individual experiences it.

Cognitive psychologists explore consciousness as a cognitive illusion in which individuals learn to understand their experiences through introspection—the process of an individual self-examining one's thoughts and feelings. Introspection is highly contrastable with external observation, such as the measurement of physical processes within the brain. Introspection can only offer an incomplete understanding of what is objectively happening in the brain. Introspection and self-report inherently include a degree of self-deception. Neural imaging has not produced a clear understanding as to how states of consciousness are related to physical phenomena.

Consciousness can be contrasted with other mental phenomena by looking at a separate example of a concept that individuals can feel, explain, and understand, such as pain. The concept of pain can be grasped, defined, experienced, and viewed in a physical manner, such as neurological processes and brain activities that are consistently associated with the experience of pain. These factors lead to the general scientific consensus that pain is a scientifically supported concept. Consciousness is not specific feelings but the construct defining the ability to experience feelings in the first place.

### **Behaviorist Perspectives**

The behaviorist branch of psychology espoused a strong focus on psychology by only studying behavior that could be objectively measured. The primary names in behaviorism, John Watson and B. F. Skinner, completely rejected the concept of consciousness. Ivan Pavlov stated that the consciousness of the dogs in his studies played no important role because all psychological states could be attributed to conditional reflexes. Pavlov and Jacques Loeb both looked at consciousness as simply reflexes and associations, instead of an inner, subjective state of awareness. As early as 1900, Loeb denied the relevance of consciousness and considered it to be nothing more than a deception that is determined by mechanisms of associative memory. In summary, the behaviorists believed that consciousness is not a valid concept, but a phenomenon that can instead be explained by the linking of information to other relevant information in the human brain, allowing quick associations.

Skinner also believed that consciousness was a deception, and that individuals' experiences of learning behavior through conditioning and responding to stimuli in their environments explained the phenomenon. Consciousness is not a driving force of free will, as people have come to believe, but a byproduct of the complexity of individuals' learned responses involving their experiences, behaviors, and surroundings. Overall, the problems with defining consciousness for behaviorists came from the attempts to provide a mechanistic explanation for consciousness, a problem that persists today. Modern researchers value the contributions made by the behaviorists, but the question the strict criteria set of what can and cannot be studied by psychology.

To contrast the behavioral concept of consciousness, it is necessary to return to Freud. Skinner thought there was a danger involved in using mentalistic concepts to explain behavior because the arguments become circular and cannot be easily tested. There is also the issue that once a circular explanation has deceived individuals, that very deception will continue to be handed down with little questioning. This pattern is evident when discussing consciousness because of the difficulty involved in defining it. Further, Skinner used the term *explanatory fictions* to describe something that seemed to explain behavior, but actually explained nothing because there were never any real explanations involved. For instance, individuals cannot truly explain consciousness in full because they are unsure of what consciousness actually is, and therefore are trying to explain a concept that still needs to be explained wholly within itself. Skinner went on to say that these concepts cannot be objectively studied, and for this reason scientific study is difficult to achieve.

As an example of the difficulty of an untestable theory, Freud suggested that there are three levels of consciousness that determine human behavior based on his introspection and the self-reported introspections related to him by his patients. Skinner criticized Freud's ideas observable scientific research had already started to generate reliable data that genetic and environmental factors played important parts in shaping human experience and behavior, factors completely missing from Freud's theories. Skinner stated that there was no reason to assign special significance to a state of awareness

when it comes to studying behavior. Genetics, learning, and environmental factors are much less complex to study than a nonphysical concept that may or may not exist. If genetics, learning, and environment are able to be objectively measured and are shown to explain much of human behavior, there is no need to resort to intangible constructs such as consciousness. In sum, the research of the behaviorists highlight legitimate concerns about the potential of consciousness to be either a deception or a lie, used to explain the complexity of individuals' thought processes.

### Recent Research

More recent research conducted in support of consciousness as a valid and worthwhile construct of study still considers the nonobjective nature and loose definition of consciousness to be issues. One of the larger problems is that there is no comprehensive, agreed-upon description or overall testable theory of consciousness. Neurology can be used to study human behavior, but it has yet to answer why people experience consciousness or provide a model of the processes involved in consciousness. Consciousness is presented as a shared, common-sense concept, it is an obvious idea and an agreed-upon experience, and yet when researchers try to objectively examine it they realize the complexities involved. The majority of psychological and neurological researchers tend to agree that consciousness needs to be studied, and such scientific research is now attempting to address why researchers cannot answer these questions about consciousness, or for that matter prove its existence. Instead, individuals have continued to fall into the potential deception of consciousness. Researchers who argue against the existence of consciousness, such as Daniel Dennett, acknowledge that they are going against the traditional opinion and shared cultural acceptance of consciousness.

Searle argues that the brain causes consciousness, and as a philosopher, he recognizes that there are problems with the biology of consciousness as a concept, but that does not hinder his confidence. Searle, like many researchers, has taken the potential deception of consciousness as an accepted, valid concept because everyone has an experience that they agree is verbally defined by the term *consciousness*. Few concepts of human thought, feeling, and behavior have defied

objective definition, scientific study, and physiological support; consciousness is the exception in direct conflict with its common acceptance. Without true scientific data to validate the concept of consciousness, researchers are not left with much to rely on other than flawed self-reports and introspection. As a result, some researchers have concluded that consciousness may be the ultimate human deception.

Attempts to define consciousness tend to be circular; people know that consciousness exists because they label an experience as “consciousness.” As Skinner stated, such mentalistic concepts tend to become the explanations of themselves, and this then leaves the purview of science. How valid is a concept that defies a unified accepted definition, and yet the only support for its existence is that rough and unproven definition, which is then used to further define the concept while still unable to be proven or disproven. This is all suggestive of the deception that lives behind individuals’ acceptance of a unified and singular “consciousness.”

Joel T. Nadler

Alyssa Gretak

*Southern Illinois University Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Brain; Cognitive Heuristics; Communication; Consensual Reality; False Memories; Fantasy and Imagination; Freud, Sigmund; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Impression; Psychoanalysis; Self-Deception; Theory of Mind.

#### Further Readings

- Crick, F. and C. Koch. “Consciousness and Neuroscience.” *Cerebral Cortex*, v.8/2 (1998).  
 Nye, R. D. *What is B.F. Skinner Really Saying?* Englewood Cliffs: NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979.  
 Searle, John R. *The Mystery of Consciousness*. New York: New York Review of Books, 1997.

why attempts at deception succeed and fail. The idea that consensual realities matter in social life is traceable to sociologist Émile Durkheim, who noted that societies are held together by their collective consciousness—that is, by “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society.”

However, consensual realities need not be common to society’s average members. Consensual realities become particularly relevant to deception when they are not shared, and when a person deliberately attempts to make another believe a particular reality. Consensual realities are often invisible, are embedded in social life, and provide a vehicle by which objective truth becomes less important than what appears to be true.

#### Consensual Reality and Successful Deception

A deception attempt is successful when it leads the target to accept that a false reality is actually consensual—for example, when the target believes that he or she knows something that the deceiver knows, but which the deceiver actually knows to be a fabrication. Social conflict and competitions frequently produce examples of how consensual realities can be deceptive.

As Sun Tzu observed in the 4th century B.C.E., “All warfare is based on deception,” and in order to deceive, parties to a conflict attempt to make their adversary adopt erroneous beliefs about capabilities, strategies, and geographical location. A competitor may feign weakness when in a position of strength (a “slow play” in poker), or may feign strength when in a position of weakness (bluffing). Whether or not one is successful depends, in part, on the target “falling for” the desired reality. It also depends, in part, on not falling for the adversary’s desired reality.

In more everyday circumstances, consensual realities are often implicitly assumed and unquestioned. Marxist theory describes the prevalence of false consciousness, in which people unknowingly accept false beliefs that undermine or hide their material self- and group interests. However, these false realities are eventually uncovered, and people may act to change the false bases of reality. In popular culture, when the hero in the film *The Matrix* discovered that his assumed reality was actually a computer simulation, he and his team staged a revolution to overthrow the purveyors of

## Consensual Reality

Consensual realities exist whenever two or more people share an assumption, attitude, metaphor, or ideology, and they are critical for understanding



the false reality. Similarly, civil rights movements are frequently motivated by the observation that a society's consensual realities—for example, that blacks are not equal to whites, or that gays are not equal to straights—are in fact lies that much of society assumes as truth.

These examples highlight a critical feature of consensual realities: Although people often remain unsuspecting about their reality, when the seeds of suspicion are sown—that is, when people come to believe that there is more to their reality than meets the eye—people may be motivated to establish the truth. When so motivated, the consensual realities that operate in the background can be detected and deceptive realities can be exposed. Attempts to discover the consensual realities held by one's adversaries have led to very creative and notable solutions.

Alexander George describes how during World War II, the British attempted to infer the consensual realities of the Germans, and in particular the Germans' beliefs about their military developments and capabilities. The British analysts believed that by studying what German commanders said in propaganda and, just as important, what they did not say, it might be possible to glean information about the German military's progress on developing a new, potentially devastating weapon.

A critical assumption was made by the British. Based on careful observation, they assumed that the German command never deliberately misled their people when it came to propaganda touting increases in the power of the German military. The German command did not bluff about their military might to their citizens. Thus, if German propaganda discussed the imminent development of a new retaliatory weapon, the British inferred that progress on such a weapon was being made. If, on the other hand, talk about the new weapon suddenly ceased but restarted in earnest six-weeks later, the analysts inferred a temporary setback in the weapon's development.

Using such techniques, the analysts were able to successfully estimate the timetable for the German development and eventual deployment of their V-weapons—the first long-range ballistic missiles ever used in combat. Knowledge of the timetable informed the urgency for military action before the devastating weapon was unleashed.

George's discussion of propaganda analysis also illustrates another feature of consensual realities. Consensual realities provide common ground from which people communicate with one another. If two people share a basic cultural metaphor, for example, that "the squeaky wheel gets the grease," their explanations and attributions will tend to converge for why, in this example, a braggart was admonished by the group. Likewise, if a culture believes that it is important that leaders not bluff to their citizens about their military power, expectations should collectively rise or fail to rise, according to the claims made. The British analysts employed such knowledge about common ground in communication and, in attempting to understand what the Germans knew but would not openly say, they were able to infer information about the Germans' consensual reality.

### **Establishing False Reality**

People appear to be psychologically built to achieve and maintain consensual realities, and this fact greatly aids in efforts to establish false realities in the minds of others. For example, people often exaggerate the extent to which their views of the world are consensual. In a classic sociopsychological study by Lee Ross and colleagues illustrating the consensus bias, students were asked if they would stand and wear a large sandwich board advertisement (e.g., "Eat at Joe's") outside a restaurant for 30 minutes. They were also asked what proportion of other students would agree to wear the sandwich board. A consensus bias emerged, as students tended to overestimate the prevalence of their attitudes and decisions. Those who agreed to wear the sign (in reality, about 50 percent) overestimated how many other students would also agree (estimate of about 66 percent), while those who refused to wear it overestimated how many other students would also refuse. People tend to view their preferences as normative, regardless of whether those preferences are actually normative. Thus, even when consensual realities are not present, people may behave as if they are.

The consensus bias illustrates how people come to believe that the realities they subjectively encounter are, in fact, shared with others. In Operation Mincemeat during World War II, British operatives sought to capitalize on the

consensus bias to deceive the Germans. The British took a cadaver from a local morgue, dressed it in British military uniform, and dropped the cadaver in the ocean to be discovered. Attached to the cadaver was a briefcase that contained false intelligence reports about an imminent British invasion. The notes suggested that the British would be invading Sardinia and Greece, whereas their true destination was Sicily. Along with the briefcase, the British included several stray artifacts, such as a ticket stub from mass transit, to increase the appearance of soldier's authenticity.

This deception was highly successful. The Germans reportedly continued to believe the false reality, even after the invasion of Sicily had begun. One can imagine how the discovery of the soldier must have been met: "What luck! We found an intelligence soldier that the British assume was lost at sea!" In wanting to believe their great find was authentic, the Germans may have been victims of consensus bias: They assumed that their beliefs and perceptions about the soldier's authenticity were shared by the British, when in fact the British held the opposite belief.

Once in place, consensual realities can be perpetuated by confirmation bias. Confirmation bias occurs when people attend to and favor evidence that confirms their hypotheses. Once the Germans had the hypothesis that the cadaver was authentic, seemingly irrelevant evidence such as the ticket stub was construed as evidence that confirmed the erroneous belief. The British planted evidence that might allow the Germans to "confirm" that the soldier was authentic. Confirmation bias is not confined to World War II anecdotes. For example, Thomas Kuhn describes how a scientific field's adoption of a particular theoretical paradigm can operate as a consensual reality that produces biased knowledge. Scientists adopting a particular paradigm may become alert for, and more likely to observe, events that conform to theoretical expectations than events that are inconsistent with or irrelevant to those expectations.

Consensual realities are pervasive and play an integral role in both successful deception and in investigating and uncovering deceptive realities. Through sleight-of-hand, misdirection, and obfuscation, people attempting to deceive others succeed by convincing them that what appears

to be true and consensual is actually false. Consensual realities frequently operate in the social background and go unnoticed, and people appear to be built to adopt and maintain them. However, once a consensual reality is recognized and deemed false, reality can be manipulated and vigorously contested in a quest to establish new realities.

Kevin R. Binning  
*University of California, Los Angeles*

**See Also:** Big Lie Technique; Bluffing; Communication; Consciousness; Ideology; Investigator Bias; Lie Bias; Nazi Propaganda; Operation Mincemeat; Racism; Sun Tzu; Truth Bias; World War II.

### **Further Readings**

- Clark, H. H. and S. E. Brennan. "Grounding in Communication." *Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition*, v.13 (1991).
- Durkheim, É. and L. A. Coser, trans. *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press, 1997.
- George, A. L. *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made From Nazi Propaganda in World War II*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1959.
- Hardin, C. D. and E. T. Higgins. "Shared Reality: How Social Verification Makes the Subjective Objective." In *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition*, Vol. 3, R. M. Sorrentino and E. T. Higgins, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 1996.
- Koch, S. and S. Deetz. "Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations." *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, v.9/1 (1981).
- Kuhn, T. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- Ross, L., D. Green, and P. House. "The 'False-Consensus' Effect: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, v.13/3 (1977).

---

## **Conspiracies**

Almost nothing is as it seems. World events are guided by the unseen hands of elite, secretive, self-interested, and/or malevolent groups. Everything

is connected. What may appear to be unrelated accidents, coincidences, or even insignificant occurrences in world affairs are actually integrated components of complex plots to control the world. The truth is actively suppressed and misrepresented to the masses by these powerful but unseen conspirators and their puppets: the mainstream media. Members of the “establishment” cannot be trusted. Evil is everywhere afoot!

Such beliefs are but a few of the suspicions reflected in the many conspiracy theories promoted by conspiracists (proponents of conspiracy theories) throughout the world. Conspiracy theories have in common the belief that an organization of individuals or groups is acting (or has acted) covertly and deceptively to achieve a malevolent end. However, the theories widely vary, including the purported size of the group(s) of conspirators, the scope of their goals and activities, the destructiveness of their intent, and the variety of separate events allegedly connected to the conspiracy.

### World Domination

Perhaps the most expansive of conspiracy theories concern the New World Order, alleging that global affairs are controlled behind the scenes by a group of international elites manipulating entire governments, and controlling financial institutions, industry, and media organizations worldwide. Variations of New World Order theories feature such alleged conspirators as international bankers, Jews, Freemasons, or the Illuminati. The Bavarian Illuminati formed in 1776 with the purpose of eliminating religious and political control in their society, but it was dismantled nearly 10 years later. No evidence of their continued existence is available, yet some conspiracists continue to assert that those who would deny the Illuminati’s current existence are deceiving themselves.

The persistence of such conspiratorial beliefs stems, at least in part, from the seminal texts of John Robinson and Abbe Barruel, written in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which have inspired others to write about the extent of the Illuminati’s power throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Another world domination theory—the purported Judeo-Masonic world-domination conspiracy—is described in the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, an anti-Semitic publication that was originally published in a Russian

newspaper in 1903, and was later widely circulated, including by Adolph Hitler and Henry Ford. In 1921, the London *Times* revealed it as a hoax.

While some world-domination conspiracy theories implicate secular individuals or groups, others implicate religious groups or figures. The anti-Christ conspiracy is prominent among individuals who expect a particular individual to create a New World Order, initially deceiving the world by disguising his identity and leading the creation of a one-world government. Countless individuals have at times been accused of being the anti-Christ, including the Roman emperor Nero, Adolf Hitler, Ronald Regan, Saddam Hussein, Barak Obama, and even the Pope.

### Control of Information and Technology

Other relatively sweeping conspiracies are alleged to control information or technology, and largely implicate governments or businesses presumed to benefit from collection of information, propagation of deceptive misinformation, or suppression of technology. Popular conspiracy theories in this class include the theory that the military-industrial complex is designed to promote and profit from war; suppression of alternative fuel technologies by Big Oil and gas; suppression of alternative medicine by mainstream medicine; climate scientists’ fabrication of evidence of global warming to achieve power, research funding, or other financial gain (and the reverse conspiracy of big business to deny global warming); Bible conspiracy theories alleging that much of the Bible is deceptive; and secret groups alleged to possess control of the bloodline of Jesus (as portrayed in the novel *The Da Vinci Code*).

Among the most popular conspiracy theories in this class is that of government lies regarding evidence of space-alien visitations. While many conspiracy theories are largely promoted on the Internet or other relatively less publicized sources, theories of alien visitations and their cover-ups are widespread in books, movies, television, and other media. Some extraterrestrial conspiracy theories suggest that the U.S. government has conspired with aliens who abducted citizens—essentially bartering human rights for alien technology—and collaborated to suppress those who would report such activities. Numerous books,

as well as popular movies and TV shows such as *The X Files* or *Men in Black* reflect such theories. Arguably, conspiracies involving the existence of aliens and associated government cover-ups are among the most popular and enduring in U.S. culture (such as the widespread awareness of Area 51 and its depiction in popular media). Despite this widespread acceptance in popular culture of the existence of aliens, the U.S. government maintains that there is no factual basis for such beliefs.

### **Harm, Suppression, or Population Control**

A number of conspiracy theories allege lying or deceptive activities by governments designed to harm, suppress, or control their populations. For example, collection of vast amounts of private information by government agencies; creation of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus by the Central Intelligence Agency (or other secretive government agency) as a tool for genocide/ population control; or fluoridation of water supplies to render populations submissive, to cover disposal of industrial waste, or for other nefarious purposes.

### **Single Perpetrator or Single Event**

Conspiracy theories far less sweeping in scope primarily address single perpetrators (e.g., President Bill Clinton and his alleged body count or assassinated associates) or single events (e.g., conspiracies surrounding the downing of Pan Am Flight 103). Many such conspiracies have surrounded assassinations (e.g., President John F. Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or Malcolm X) or deaths (e.g., Princess Diana, actress Marilyn Monroe, or union organizer Jimmy Hoffa).

A subcategory of such theories is called false flag operations, referring to attacks by governments or other entities designed to appear as if carried out by another. Perhaps the most widely discussed such theory among the U.S. citizenry is the allegation that the U.S. government lied to and deceived the general public regarding the actual perpetrators of the attacks on September 11, 2001. This conspiracy alleges that the U.S. government perpetrated the attacks (or, alternatively, that the government knew of the attacks in advance but did nothing to prevent them) in order to garner support for the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These are only a few of the countless types and examples of widespread conspiratorial thinking among the populations of the world. But are these conspiracies real? If not, why have they been so popular, infecting popular thought throughout history?

### **Conspiratorial Thinking and the Nature of Human Cognition**

Conspiracy theories tend to have in common a dearth of credible supporting evidence in the face of substantial, credible, contradictory evidence. Evidence on which conspiracists depend for the maintenance of their ideologies is considered stigmatized knowledge, because of its lack of official recognition in mainstream society. Why, then, do conspiracists believe and defend them so strongly? What kinds of people are most likely to do so?

Conspiracists are often thought of as oddballs, those on the fringe of society who have some defect of character or deficiency of intellect that has led their thinking astray. However, psychologist Michael Schermer has argued that modern conspiracists simply suffer an evolutionarily valuable, but overly developed, set of three fundamental cognitive skills and tendencies. First is the ability to detect patterns and connections in their experiences, such as when a rustling in the bushes might be associated with a tiger's movements, darkening of the sky with an impending storm, or a particular shoot with an edible root. Evolutionary theory suggests that those most skilled at detecting such associations would be best able to avoid danger, attain nourishment, and survive to reproduce.

However, any learned association is fallible; the rustling sound could be no more than the wind. But when it came to potentially life-threatening events, it was better to be safe than sorry. Consequently, the genes from those suspicious and scared, yet safe, ancestors still flows through the veins of modern-day humans, giving rise to the potential for overly active pattern detectors to misperceive patterns that do not exist. From this perspective, the potential to make strange associations—to form conspiracy theories—comes from humans' evolved ability to make otherwise mundane associations.


However, the ability to learn patterns is insufficient to cause conspiratorial thinking. The second essential ingredient is the human tendency



to believe that things happen for a reason: that events are caused by seen, or unseen, causal agents. Evolutionary theory suggests that this tendency came about as humans learned to avoid carriers of contagious diseases. Those who believed that an unseen but malevolent causal agent made the carrier ill would be more likely to avoid the carrier and therefore to avoid illness and survive. This tendency to assume that intentional agents are behind otherwise unintentional events is exacerbated by humans' ability to have insight into their own thinking, and to infer the thoughts of others. Humans are capable of planning and acting—including lying and deceiving—on purpose to achieve those plans; they are also aware that others do the same. Therefore, this intellectual capacity gives rise to the notion that events happening around people may be due to the planning and actions (and perhaps the lies and deceptions) of others. When those events appear malevolent, the stage is set to assume that they are part of a conspiracy. From this perspective, conspiratorial

thinking is a natural byproduct of the human ability to learn, plan, and infer that others do the same.

Though the tendency to develop a belief in conspiracies is dependent upon these first two aspects of evolved cognition, the tendency to maintain and defend such beliefs in the face of apparently overwhelming contradictory evidence requires a third tendency: to interpret information and experiences as consistent with what people already believe. This tendency is a byproduct of the human-evolved ability to automatically categorize objects and experiences based on already existing beliefs about their nature. This automatic categorization allows people to know what to expect and how to react to objects or circumstances. Though generally helpful, these belief-based expectancies can also mislead people to interpret their experiences as more consistent with their expectancies than warranted. Strong belief in conspiracies can support suspicion of the contradictory evidence provided by (presumably deceptive and malevolent) authorities, or unwarranted belief of unscientific



*Protesters demand an investigation of a 9/11 conspiracy during an antiwar protest parade, Los Angeles, California, October 28, 2007. This conspiracy theory is an example of a false flag operation, which refers to alleged attacks by governments or other entities that are disguised as attacks by a different entity. The 9/11 conspiracy alleges that the U.S. government perpetrated the attacks, or knew of the attacks in advance but did nothing to prevent them as a way to get support for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.*

or otherwise incredible “evidence” provided by fringe sources with lesser credentials but greater presumed trustworthiness.

### **Face-Saving and Social Support**

Belief in conspiracies and secret societies can offer face-saving benefits for conspiracists. The thought that one’s experiences are predestined or controlled by others can allow one to maintain a reduced sense of responsibility for one’s actions and the state of one’s life, and thereby reduce shame and maintain self-esteem. In short, by blaming lies that they have been told, or deceptions perpetrated upon them, conspiracists can soften the blow to their self-esteem that would otherwise be produced by taking responsibility for the shortcomings in their lives. Such beliefs may also provide social connection and support through conspiracists’ associations with communities of like-minded people. In other words, those who feel that they have been victims of lies or deceptions, endemic to conspiracies, may find comfort among their like-minded peers.

### **Personality**

Two personality traits have been associated with belief in conspiracies. Those with an external locus of control (who tend to believe that life is largely out of their control because of constraints placed upon them by others) tend to believe more in conspiracies than those with an internal locus of control (those who tend to believe that they can make things happen, and that they can control both their current situation and their destiny). This makes sense because belief in conspiracies requires individuals to believe that a deceptive and malevolent game beyond their control is afoot. Moreover, those high in psychoticism (i.e., those who have trouble distinguishing the real from the unreal) are more likely to believe in conspiracies. They are likely to be highly creative and excellent at pattern recognition, but relatively impaired at recognizing when those patterns are imaginary or random, rather than meaningful. Therefore, such individuals are prone to believing that things are not as they appear, that they have been lied to or otherwise deceived.

### **Environmental Factors**

At least two environmental factors encourage conspiratorial thinking. The first is uncertainty.

The more unpredictable an event, the further the imagination must stretch to make sense of it, leaving more room for error in the process. Such sense-making (even if through a seemingly far-fetched conspiracy theory) can render events seemingly more predictable, allowing the person to envision means of self-protection and thereby helping to restore a sense of security. Second, increasingly dangerous events promote greater need to understand their causes and avoid future danger. All conspiracies entail an element of danger and the unknown, the precise ingredients that cause some people to concoct conspiracy theories that appear to explain them. In the quest to attain a sense of certainty, control, and security, an implausible explanation is superior to no explanation at all. For conspiracists, self-deception is preferable to reality insofar as it renders the world more understandable and predictable, and allows them to take steps to safeguard themselves against their (imaginary) foes.

The tragic September 11 attacks are excellent examples of how uncertainty and danger can give birth to conspiracy theories. Virtually no one expected a plane, much less four planes, to be used as weapons on U.S. soil. If terrorists could coordinate such elaborate surprise attacks, what could they do next? It was as though the United States, if not the world, waited for the proverbial shoe to drop, as evidenced by widespread security measures quickly tightened in government buildings and airports.

The fears and uncertainties prompted by the September 11 attacks gave rise to a crop of conspiracy theories alleging orchestration of the attacks by U.S. leaders. Because of the human need for a sense of security, especially in the face of unpredictable danger, such a conspiracy theory may be preferable to reality, affording the relatively comforting belief that the United States was not under attack, but that U.S. leaders had merely lied to and deceived the public in order to grab more money and power through control of oil in the Middle East.

### **Some Conspiracies are Real: How to Tell the Difference**

Real conspiracies do exist, and excellent guidelines have been offered to help people recognize when a conspiracy is almost certainly illusory. In keeping with the scientific method, investigation

begins by assuming that any given theory is false (i.e., a lie). The burden of proof rests with conspiracists, and exceptional claims require exceptional evidence.

Such proof also requires every link in the chain of reason, not just some of them, to be logically connected, culminating necessarily at the conclusion. As for the conclusion, no other plausible explanations should account for the events. If there is more than one plausible explanation, abide in Occam's Razor; favor the simplest explanation, the one with the fewest "moving parts." Conspiracy theories are particularly likely to be deceptions when those allegedly involved must have near-superhuman powers to pull them off; when they are very complex and require many elements to occur and interlock successfully; when many actors (who must have kept silent about their activities) are involved; when they are particularly widespread in scope; or when they coningle facts with speculation and there is little distinction between the two.

As with any theory, conspiracy theories should have multiple sources of evidence from multiple, independent, objectively verifiable sources. Humans—including conspiracists and scientists alike—have a tendency to believe information in favor of their theories and disbelieve contrary evidence (known as the confirmation bias). By following these guidelines, one may hope to avoid mental biases that can distort one's perception of reality.

Michael J. Williams

Lindsay Perez

Deborah Davis

*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Charles II Plot; Cold Fusion; Collusion; Computer-Generated Images; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Cooperation; Denial; Disinformation; Distrust; Fantasy and Imagination; Fiction; Gossip; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Kennedy, John F.; Nixon, Richard; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem; UFOs; Urban Legends; Watergate.

### Further Readings

Barkun, Michael. *A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Sagan, Carl. *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

Schermer, Michael. *The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies—How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths*. New York: Times Books, 2011.

## Consumer Protection Laws

Consumer protection laws were first enacted in the early 1900s during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and continue through legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The publication of Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* (1906) exposed Americans to the dangers of the meat-packing industry and resulted in the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. Over time, more legislation was enacted and, as a result, a series of laws now protect American consumers from false advertising, hidden ingredients, unfair practices, and faulty products. Government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Safety Product Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulate industries and provide information and a way for consumers to report deceptive practices.

### Food and Drug

Prior to 1900 and the progressive reforms that accompanied the early part of the 20th century, consumer industries operated with little or no regulation. Consumer protection can be divided into two areas, consumer products and financial products. Congress stepped in to pass laws to govern these areas and create agencies responsible for oversight and education. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 sought to protect consumers from deceptive practices in advertising and labeling. Patent medicines marketed to adults and children often contained high alcohol or opiate content, and the drug makers advertised false claims of the medicines curing all kinds of health

conditions. The act required labeling of products and the mandatory listing of the 10 drugs that were on the dangerous list if these drugs were ingredients in a medication. One example is Coca-Cola. Originally, the beverage contained cocaine and an attempt was made in 1909 to outlaw it. The company replaced the cocaine with caffeine and had to negotiate with the government about the amount of caffeine in the drink before it could be legalized.

Drug labeling did not require testing before the medication was marketed. In 1938, the Massengill drug company created a liquid formula of the popular antibiotic sulfanilimide and used diethylene glycol to make the syrup. Multiple deaths occurred, and it was discovered that the solution had not been tested prior to distribution. The chemical used in the medication was toxic. This spurred Congress to pass the Food and Drug Act, expanding consumer protections to include testing and approval processes for new drugs, new inspections for food processing, and testing of all new cosmetics and medical devices. The law required that products must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before they are sold to consumers.

In 1958, testing of food additives was added to the law, and in 1962, legislation barred any item that causes cancer in animals from being marketed to humans. These changes came as a result of medical devices that promised cures but harmed users, beauty products that caused blindness, and medications that were largely made from alcohol or harmful chemicals. Monitoring of medications continues today. As recently as 2010, the FDA pulled over-the-counter children's cold medicines and required that they be labeled for various age groups with warnings about dosages.

### **Federal Trade Commission**

Created in 1914 by the act of the same name, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) works to protect consumers from deceptive and unfair business practices. The commission tracks complaints to see if federal intervention is needed to protect consumers from either deceptive practices in a single company or an industry. One major investigation undertaken by the commission was Operation Telesweep in 1995, targeting telemarketers. A series of court cases was filed at the state

and federal levels to crack down on 100 business scams. The FTC also started regulating the funeral home industry because of deceptive practices in pricing and services. Today, all funeral home staff must provide both a copy of the general price list for the industry and the home's price list to all customers or potential customers. Another example of FTC consumer protection is the National Do Not Call Registry, which allows consumers to list their phone numbers for free, and then legally obligates telemarketers not to call consumers who are listed.

A major agency in the FTC is the Bureau of Consumer Protection, which is responsible for educating consumers about a variety of topics and providing services for consumers. The Advertising Practices section enforces truth-in-advertising laws and investigates complaints related to over-the-counter medicines, Internet technology, and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. National education campaigns for consumers are planned by the section on Consumer and Business Education, which also works with businesses to make sure that they understand national compliance measures. All civil legal cases are addressed by the section on Enforcement. Issues related to Internet scams, marketing scams, spam, the Do Not Call Registry, and others are handled by the section responsible for Marketing Practices. Financial Practices oversees issues related to credit cards, credit counseling, debt collection, unfair loan practices, and predatory lending. Personal financial information issues and identity theft are addressed by the section on Privacy and Identity Protection. These various sections all work together to protect American consumers from the increasing number of deceptive practices.

### **Financial**

The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression created the need to regulate and educate the consumer population. Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to protect bank deposits and the Federal Reserve to oversee the banking and financial sectors. Initially, the FDIC insured bank deposits up to \$2,500, but the amount is now capped at \$250,000. Insurance premiums are paid by the member banks, and these banks must post their proof of membership for the public. The FDIC



monitors all financial institutions to make sure that they are following banking regulations and consumer protection laws. When a bank fails, the FDIC steps in and transfers the member's funds to another financially stable institution, thus protecting the failed bank's investments.

The economic recession in 2008 revealed problems with financial practices of banks and other lending institutions in the United States. Many consumers were approved for mortgages with adjustable rates based on their gross income, versus their net income. At the same time, consumers' credit card debt increased monthly because they were allowed increased lines of credit or given offers to open new accounts. The companies extending this credit collected fees for charges that exceeded consumers' credit limits and raised interest rates and minimum payments without warning. Credit card companies made healthy profits, whereas American consumers began losing their jobs, stopped paying their mortgages, and filed for bankruptcy. Consumers are increasingly paying fees to use their money and financial institutions have grown larger via mergers.

Lenders benefitted from the intricate language of contracts that most consumers just signed without checking or trying to understand the fine print. Many financial institutions took advantage of consumers' lack of diligence when signing contracts. The downturn in the economy led the federal government to investigate banks and the fees that they charged. In the interest of the consumer, banks had to clarify the language used in agreements and simplify some of their processes.

To prevent financial companies from failure, these firms received funds from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) or loans from the government to maintain their operations. To protect American consumers, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to update the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and other regulatory legislation that permitted deterioration of the financial sector. Dodd-Frank established the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau as an avenue for consumers to file complaints and have their questions answered. The law changed the language of the FTC Act to include the word *abusive* in the phrase "unfair and deceptive practices." The

word *abusive* was added to protect consumers and to give them additional rights when dealing with lenders.

The recession revealed deceptive practices related to checking accounts, hidden fees, processing payments, raising interest rates, and other financial issues. It was found that the language of financial documents was often confusing to consumers and endangered consumers' financial situations. The law requires a 45-day notice from credit card companies before interest rates can be raised, and consumers must choose if they want protection plans on their bank accounts. The recession also revealed the need to educate the consumer about responsible practices and to encourage consumers to monitor financial practices for deception. Problems with deception are not limited to banking products; consumers also need to be careful about the products they purchase.

The Consumer Product Safety Commission was created in 1973 to regulate industry and reduce the number of deaths caused each year by faulty products. The commission regulates industry and tracks reports of injuries created by baby beds, toys, and many other products. If the number of injuries is excessive, the commission examines the product, tests it, and recommends corrections or recall of the product. The role of educating consumers on the proper use of the item is the duty of the company marketing the product. The commission writes the standards and regulations and publishes them for comment before they are enforced. Deceptive marketing practices by companies whose sole interest is selling their product, regardless of its safety for the target age group, are now restricted by the commission's actions.

This process also applies to items imported to the United States from other countries. An increasing amount of goods come from other nations that do not regulate industry as stringently as the United States. Consumers need to be cautious when purchasing items for children because of small parts, poor craftsmanship, and lead. The popular Thomas the Train wooden trains were recalled because of excessive lead in their paint, which could make children sick. Most of these items are made in China, where products are not closely regulated. Foreign-made baby beds with drop sides are no longer sold in the United States

because children could get trapped between the mattress and the rails. Some of these accidents are caused by consumers' careless use, but they also result from defects in the products' construction. To protect consumers, it is often safer to recall the product and remove it from stores.

Consumer protection is more complicated today because of the Internet. Personal information is found on Web sites and increases the likelihood of identity theft. Social media sites increase the likelihood of problems because of the amount of personal information posted. Agencies such as the Consumer Protection Bureau of the FTC work to educate children and adults about the dangers of posting too much information. This agency provides educational materials on home financing, work-at-home scams, telemarketing, Internet spam, and many other topics relevant to consumer protection.

Consumer protection laws have increased their scope as technology has become more advanced. U.S. law has progressed from making sure that consumers know the ingredients in a product to requiring drug interaction warnings. Some areas, such as prescription drugs and over-the-counter medicines, require both education of the consumer and diligent monitoring by the FDA. The numerous ways that criminals can obtain personal information via hacking, identity theft, response to spam e-mails, and payday loan data demonstrates the need for consumer protection. Ultimately, consumers need to be educated about how to check their personal information and the dangers that this posting can create.

As the world becomes smaller, the opportunity for consumer deception has increased. Threats come from all over the world, caused by people who can hack into computer systems or export products that do not meet the U.S. level of product safety regulation. Consumer protection laws are designed to protect the American consumer and provide agencies and commissions to oversee consumer issues. Laws are in force to protect the consumer from industry deceptions, but consumers also need to educate themselves on issues that pertain to them. Education on consumer issues is key to consumer protection.

Theresa S. Hefner-Babb  
Lamar University

**See Also:** Accounting; Advertising, Consumer Products; Bankruptcy; Business; Caveat Emptor; Collusion; Drug Advertising; Exaggeration; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Hearst, William Randolph; Marketing, Deceptive; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Puffery; Tobacco Advertising.

### Further Readings

- Cohen, Lizabeth. "Colston E. Warne Lecture: Is It Time for Another Round of Consumer Protection? The Lessons of Twentieth-Century U.S. History." *Journal of Consumer Affairs*, v.44/1 (2010).
- Henry, Paul C. "How Mainstream Consumers Think About Consumer Rights and Responsibilities." *Journal of Consumer Research*, v.37/4 (2010).
- Samli, A. Coskun. *Empowering the American Consumer: Corporate Responsiveness and Market Profitability*. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2001.
- Schonberg, Rebecca. "Introducing 'Abusive': A New and Improved Standard for Consumer Protection." *California Law Review*, v.100/5 (2012).
- Tousley, Rayburn D. "The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938." *Journal of Marketing*, v.5/3 (1941).

## Contagious Disease Outbreaks

Contagious disease outbreaks can have national (epidemic) and global (pandemic) impacts. The spread of infections is sometimes intensified by the use of deception, either to shield the public from the emergence of the diseases or to mislead the public on the cause of their development and spread. The spread of disease because of deception also occurs on the part of the public and individual members of the community.

A contagious disease outbreak refers to the spread of an infection that occurs in greater numbers than is expected or normal for a particular community or region, or during a given season. Such an outbreak might last one day, or several years. In some instances, a single case might be labeled an outbreak if the disease is unknown to the scientific community. The single case might

also raise alarm if it has not been known to exist for a long time within a particular region or population. Contagious diseases can spread through a variety of means, including contaminated drinking water, commercially packaged food, person-to-person or human-to-animal contact, insects and other vectors, or bioterrorism. An epidemic usually refers to an outbreak at the regional or national level; a pandemic refers to the worldwide spread of an infection. The 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an example of an outbreak, which claimed nearly 800 lives. Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is considered a pandemic.

### Emergence and Spread

Deception can play a significant role in the emergence and spread of contagious diseases. For instance, the presence of an infection can go undetected if the methods for monitoring and reporting a contamination are hidden or not reported. Such was the case when waterborne contamination raised alarm in the Canadian community of Walkerton, Ontario, in May 2000. Dangerous amounts of *E. coli* and other pathogens were discovered in the water supply, affecting more than 2,300 individuals. A total of 65 people were hospitalized, 27 developed a potentially fatal kidney disease, and seven individuals died from infection. The provincial government launched an investigation into the causes and source of the contamination. This investigation revealed that the number of collections of samples for testing was far below the minimum number required, although this number was over-reported. Moreover, the logs used to keep track of sample chlorine levels were routinely falsified with fictitious entries. Although not the sole cause of the contamination, these deceptive practices had implications for the delay in reporting dangerous levels of pathogens, which could have prevented some or all of the illnesses and deaths that resulted.

### Government Propaganda


The threat of a contagious disease can be deceptively used to instill fear in the public, and even reinforce hatred and discrimination against a group of people. Among the many propaganda campaigns that Nazi Germany used against the

Jewish population was the claim that Jews were “filthy” and to blame for spreading typhus and other diseases. This particular campaign was prevalent in occupied Poland and was targeted toward Catholic Poles. Propaganda that Jews spread diseases was a recurrent theme used to justify quarantining Jewish communities into ghettos and isolating them from the rest of the German and Polish populations. Quarantine signs were often posted at entrances to these ghettos to prevent non-Jews from entering and seeing the poor living conditions endured within. This threat of disease evolved into a self-fulfilling prophecy as the poor sanitation and water quality within the ghettos gave rise to typhus and other infections.

With regard to real threats of contagious diseases, community members can take personal measures to protect themselves and prevent their spread, such as washing hands often, avoiding excessive exposure to public places, staying home if one shows signs of sickness, or wearing a face mask if one must come in contact with an infected person. However, individuals’ efforts can be hampered when they are deceived about the cause of the infection or how it is spread. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains a Pandemic Severity Index (ranging from one to five) to help inform the public about the seriousness of diseases that are monitored. If local, regional, or national numbers used to report disease incidences are altered or tampered, such deceptive measures could affect how the CDC reports on the disease severity, perhaps underestimating the potential danger to the public.

Deception about contagious diseases is not limited to high-level government agencies. It can also manifest as information distortion from the bottom levels upward. It is widely documented that in early April 2004, the Chinese government was making great efforts to isolate and control the SARS outbreak; officials at the national level reportedly took the epidemic quite seriously. Their efforts, however, were often hampered by some local-level officials who compromised the upward flow of information.

Out of fear of looking incompetent, these individuals either intercepted or distorted important information about the epidemic. Such deception was sometimes driven by fears that any disaster reported in their districts could put jobs in



*A public service poster warns of disease spread in the manner of Typhoid Mary, an early-1900s New York cook and typhoid carrier, Mary Mallon, who sickened numerous families via the food she prepared as a previously unknown asymptomatic carrier. Assuming that she was lying about her condition in order to continue working, health officials incarcerated and quarantined her.*

jeopardy, prevent some officials from being passed over for promotion, or simply portray a district in a negative light.

### Deception by Individuals

Even when the public is informed about the threat of disease and given measures to protect themselves, deception on the part of individuals can still intensify its spread. During the SARS outbreak, several individuals traveling out of Asia inadvertently took advantage of a loophole in the international quarantine system when they boarded flights out of their countries. During the height of the outbreak, restrictions were put in place to limit international travel out of Asia only to those infected with SARS. Unfortunately, many

contagious individuals slipped through. Some infected travelers, in an attempt to bypass the restrictions and get to their travel destinations, disguised their symptoms in order to board their planes, despite the risks to other travelers. The choice of some travelers to hide their symptoms was partly attributed to the high cost of treatment in the areas in Asia affected by the disease. In general, this loophole in security allowed contagious travelers to avoid inspection and quarantine, which could have caused the outbreak to reach countries outside of Asia.

An infected individual might also engage in deception about his or her contagion as a way to avoid stigma or ostracism. This was often the case in the past, when the nature of communicable diseases was not as well understood as it is today. A cook named Mary Mallon—more commonly remembered as Typhoid Mary—lived in New York in the early 20th century and cooked for several affluent households. Many of these households had family members who contracted typhoid fever soon after Mallon started working there. Although healthy in appearance, Mallon was believed to be a carrier of typhoid fever, transmitting it via the food she prepared for households that employed her. Mallon denied being infected with the disease throughout her life. Health officials assumed that she was lying about her condition in order to continue working as a cook. Believing that Mallon would continue infecting households, law enforcement agents incarcerated her and eventually quarantined her, on North Brother Island, east of Manhattan.

### Debates and Conspiracy Theories

Many cases of deception regarding contagious disease outbreaks have received a significant amount of documentation. More contested are the debates and conspiracy theories about deception used to mislead the public about widespread diseases such as HIV/AIDS. For instance, there is the contention that the public is kept ignorant about some of the ways that HIV/AIDS is transferred. The scientific community generally accepts that this infection can be spread through blood, semen, and vaginal secretions. However, some writers warn that there are other forms of transmission, of which the public is made ignorant, such as normal, nonsexual skin contact.



Other writers contend that when AIDS first received public attention, the federal government hid facts about its severity, transmission, and treatment from the public in an attempt to reduce or eradicate the gay male population. Still others warn that the notion that HIV can be transmitted through sexual contact is a lie. These individuals claim that the original research papers published by Dr. Robert Gallo and others were based on fraudulent data.

Juliann C. Scholl  
*Texas Tech University*

**See Also:** Conspiracies; Courtship, Deception in; Deception in Research Design; Disinformation; Drugs; Espionage and Counterespionage; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites Korean War; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Native Americans; Nazi Propaganda; Racism; Relationships: Sexual.

### Further Readings

- Bourdain, A. *Typhoid Mary: An Urban Historial*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2001.
- Hrudey, S. E., P. Payment, P. M. Huck, R. W. Gillham, and E. J. Hrudey. "A Fatal Waterborne Disease Epidemic in Walkerton, Ontario: Comparison With Other Waterborne Outbreaks in the Developed World." *Water Science and Technology*, v.47/3 (2003).
- Knobler, S., A. Mahmoud, A. Lemon, A. Mack, L. Sivitz, and K. Oberholtzer, eds. "Learning From SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak—Workshop Summary." <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10915.html> (Accessed December 2012).
- Lee, C. W., Y. S. Tsai, T. W. Wong, and C. C. Lau. "A Loophole in International Quarantine Procedures Disclosed During the SARS Crisis." *Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease*, v.4 (2006).
- U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Deceiving the Public." *Holocaust Encyclopedia*. <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007822> (Accessed December 2012).
- WebMD. "What are Epidemics, Pandemics, and Outbreaks?" <http://www.webmd.com/cold-and-flu/what-are-epidemics-pandemics-outbreaks> (Accessed December 2012).

## Content in Context

In order to charge a person with lying, it must be shown that the person knows what is true and intentionally covered up the truth. This act of covering up is the act of deception. Lying and deception are therefore different than misunderstanding or miscommunication. Much of what is called a lie in a dispute between persons or groups might in reality be the result of misunderstanding or miscommunication. In order to avoid incorrectly labeling another as a liar, it is necessary to understand the context of his statements or actions. To understand the context is to understand that which is "within the text," or the setting in which the text occurs.

While lying is generally taken to be a positive action wherein a person makes a statement that he knows is not true, and therefore can also be said to know the truth, there can also be a negative condition of lying. A kind of culpable ignorance occurs when a person makes a false statement that he does not believe to be true, but also does not know what is true. In such a situation, the person states what he believes to be false, but what he believes to be true is also mistaken, yet he is responsible for this ignorance. This kind of ignorance can be called culpable ignorance, and a person is culpably ignorant when he does not know what is clear. To use a metaphor from vision, such a person must close his eyes to avoid what is clear; or more pointedly, such a person must deny his rationality to avoid knowing what he should know. This kind of culpability is especially important in considering the levels of context.

### Seven Layers of Context

The first factor in determining if a person has lied, and in establishing a context for the lie, is meaning. When a person tells a lie, that person is making a statement that he does not believe to be true. However, in labeling someone a liar, it must first be determined whether or not there has been a misunderstanding, whether or not the person's meaning was grasped.

Meaning is more basic than truth in that if individuals do not know what a person means, they cannot determine if that person is telling the truth. The goal of establishing context is first

and fundamentally to understand meaning. At the narrower levels of context, meaning is only partially grasped, and therefore there remain difficulties in correctly assigning truth or falsehood. Ambiguity remains at narrower levels of context, and is clarified as more context is given.

The narrowest sense of context is the most popular sense because it is at this level, or perhaps the next level, that most examinations of context end. This first level is the meaning of a given term. Because words, as conventional signs, can be used to communicate more than one concept, they can be ambiguous. This ambiguity can lead to misunderstanding or miscommunication. Specifying the exact concept expressed by a word sometimes requires the next level, which is to take note of the word's placement in a sentence. The grammatical structure of a sentence can sometimes help narrow down the meaning of a word. Nevertheless, neither of these levels rules out all ambiguity, and in the case of interpreting texts, there are many disputes about meaning, even when these two levels are carefully identified.

The third and fourth levels involve setting the sentence in a larger section or passage of a text, and then that section within the chapter of the book. This can be applied to a speech in taking the context of a word and sentence in the paragraph in which it occurs, and taking that paragraph in relation to the larger point in the speech that it supports. Both of these help in identifying the fifth level, which is the purpose of the text or speech. The idea of purpose helps one to consider the meaning of "meaning." Sometimes, "to have meaning" is identified with "to have purpose." At other times, it is identified with "to communicate content." These need not be antithetical. To know meaning is to understand, and to understand is to explain in a way that identifies what something is, and contrasts it with what it is not. In doing this, one identifies a thing's purpose, and when there is no meaning, there can be no purpose. Purpose here should not be reduced to mere utilitarian efficacy, but rather purpose has to do with the goal or end of a thing.

This greater understanding of meaning can help identify the sixth and seventh levels of context. There can still be ambiguity, even with the previous levels of context in place. This ambiguity can be identified as philosophical ambiguity.

The sixth level is meant to clarify the philosophical or worldview context of a belief. Take for instance the statement, "I believe in God." Taken in the context of a Christian as compared with a Hindu worldview, this statement takes on very different meanings. Without taking into account a speaker or writer's worldview, the use of words can remain ambiguous.

The seventh and final level of context returns to the idea of culpable ignorance. This is the level of the basic beliefs that logically support a given worldview. A person who believes a given worldview may not be aware of the basic beliefs that are logically presupposed by that worldview. Or, a person may be aware of these beliefs, and indeed profess them as true, yet they are not true. To say that a worldview logically presupposes that a given set of basic beliefs is true is to say that the truth of the rest of this worldview depends on the truth of these beliefs. The consequence is that if these basic beliefs are false, so is the rest of the worldview.

### Context and Meaning

The full act of determining context therefore requires establishing the meaning of a given term or belief within the context of a larger worldview, and identifying the presuppositions of that worldview. Where this full sense of context has not been determined there will remain ambiguity. Or to put it another way, where this sense of context has not been determined, the full meaning of the beliefs have not been understood.

Here is a third sense of "meaning," different than "purpose" or "content," and more akin to "implication." Just as "purpose" and "content" are related, so is "implication" to these prior meanings of "meaning." Unless one understands how a belief relates to a larger worldview and the presuppositions of that worldview, one will not yet know its full meaning in terms of its implications for oneself and one's intended audience of communication.

This relates to the issue of lying in that although a person might not be lying in the sense of affirming something to be true that he actually believes is false, the person might nevertheless be responsible for not having known that the given belief, nested in a larger worldview, is false. When the search for context stops at the sixth level of worldview,

there is a tendency to conclude in worldview relativism. That is, it can appear sophisticated to be able to demonstrate how different beliefs relate in competing ways when set in different worldviews. The mere awareness of competing worldviews can appear erudite.

However, when one stops at the sixth level of context, then meaning is lost rather than clarified. If there is only the plurality of worldviews with their competing meanings and truth assignments, then there is no final way to know what is meaningful and true.

Ending with the sixth level of meaning is a prominent feature of postmodernism. Where modernism tended to be unaware of its worldview assumptions (particularly empiricism and materialism), postmodernism deconstructs texts to show that they are historically situated in a given worldview. Those who hold to postmodernism often claim that the belief in truth and meaning is naïve and not sufficiently nuanced in its understanding of context.

However, postmodernists tend to fail to notice that worldviews are not merely aggregates of beliefs, but they are logically structured with an order not unlike that of the relationship between premises and conclusions. The most logically structured elements in this relationship are the basic beliefs of a given worldview. Basic beliefs are not relative to a worldview, but rather a worldview is relative to its basic beliefs. Basic beliefs are easily identifiable and are the answer to basic questions about the nature of knowledge, reality, and value.

### **Lying and Deception**

If lying involves deception in that it involves stating as true what the person actually believes to be false, then truth and falsehood must be more than simply “whatever the person thinks they are.” In other words, lying is not merely the attempt to deceive others, it is the attempt to deceive others about reality. It is the attempt to deceive others by encouraging them to have false beliefs about reality. So, lying requires that there actually are true and false beliefs about reality. Furthermore, truth assumes meaning. If a belief has no meaning, then it cannot be said to be either true or false. The implication is that all lying and deception presuppose that there is meaning.

In contrast, worldview relativism ends in the denial of meaning. All meaning is relative to a worldview, and one cannot know which worldview accurately describes reality. In the end, nothing is clear. This includes even the starkest contradictions between competing worldviews. If nothing is clear, then there can be no meaning; no given concept is clear, no sentence or belief is clear, no paragraph or chapter is clear, nothing is clear. If nothing is clear, then basic beliefs are not clear. If one cannot know even the most basic things about knowledge, reality, and value, then one cannot know anything else that presupposes these basic things.

Therefore, if one affirms that there is meaning, one must affirm that the most basic things are clear. This returns to the idea of culpable ignorance. If a person does not know the most basic things, then much of what else that person believes will either be false, or correct only by accident. Such a person might not be lying in the active sense of stating what he believes is false, but he will be stating false beliefs that he should know are false. The levels of context are intended to help avoid such a condition, and to identify those who are culpably ignorant.

In addition to lying as a way of deceiving others, lying can be a form of self-deception. Self-deception particularly relates to thinking that one knows when one does not know, and to thinking that one has been seeking to know when one has not. Self-deception can therefore be used to cover up culpable ignorance so that a person does not have to face the reality of an unexamined life. However, self-deception carries with it the loss of meaning, and therefore those who are self-deceived have an interest in denying that there is a reality of meaning and truth.

Owen Anderson  
*Arizona State University*

**See Also:** Context; Deception in Different Contexts; False Signals; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lying, Intentionality of; Self-Deception.

### **Further Readings:**

Blair, J. P., T. R. Levin, and A. S. Shaw. “Content in Context Improves Deception Detection Accuracy.” *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

- Fetzer, Anita and Etsuko Oishi, eds. *Context and Contexts: Parts Meet Whole?* Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2011.
- Wieder, D. L. *Language and Social Reality: The Case of Telling the Convict Code.* The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1974.

## Context

The context in which deception occurs is of fundamental importance. Context is typically embedded, an essential aspect of naturalistic (i.e., qualitative) forms of research. For example, D. L. Wieder's ethnomethodological study examines how former convicts in a halfway house negotiate their communicative acts to abide by the situated rules of the rehabilitative center, the explicit and implicit rules of the staff and the implicit rules of fellow former convicts. A thorough understanding of this particular context allowed the researcher to develop a sense-making explanation, which includes examples of when to expect a former convict or staff member to lie or deceive, and how these particular communicative acts may be differently understood by staff and former convicts. Understanding context led to a fuller understanding of the nuances contained within these communicative acts.

More recently, context has also become acknowledged as important in quantitative social science research. The primary example is the research of J. P. Blair and colleagues presenting 10 studies, each including context as an element of the study, in which participants' exhibited a much higher percentage of deception detection than previous research literature not including context, that is, a difference of on average from 54 percent accuracy to 75 percent accuracy when context is included. Context is essential to better understanding and detecting lies and deceptions in social situations.

Yet the ubiquitous nature of context, or all relevant information about a communicative act, makes it very difficult to analyze. The sheer amount of information deemed as context is overwhelming, yet research has exhibited the importance of understanding context to better

understand and detect lies and deception. Sissela Bok, in her two books *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life* (1978) and *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (1984), demonstrates the importance of context in the very structure by which she analyzes these concepts as exhibited in her table of contents; after first defining and explaining the overall concepts, she analyzes them via the different contexts in which they are exhibited, such as lies for the public good, lies to the sick and dying, and secrets of state.

### Context and Social Situation

The social situation of the context is relevant. Many professional situations call forth perceived needs to lie and/or deceive: the nurse and doctor who prevaricate when a child asks if he or she is dying while awaiting the arrival of the parents, who have specifically asked to be present; the social scientist who deceives participants in a research study because he can perceive no other way to conduct the study; and the undercover narcotics officer who encourages drug lords to believe that he is a drug user. Many deem these deceptions acceptable.

However, deception also occurs professionally in situations carrying much stronger moral overtones: the salesman who manipulates his accounts and presents much higher sales figures to his colleagues and supervisor than he actually obtained; the nurse who claimed she administered all the narcotics she initialed for, and instead reduced the amount administered to patients, thereby obtaining the remaining pills for her addiction; and the chief financial officer who blames the economy for the poor company profits but is in fact embezzling funds. These situations would likely remain undetected by others in the workplace because of the expectation of honesty in individuals' social roles. Thus, unless the deceiver in some manner violates the norms expected of the situation, there is nothing to encourage others to critically examine the situation seeking deception and/or lies.

There are also professional situations calling forth a critical view from at least one participant, that is, when the typical expectation of honesty is not expected: the professor proctoring an exam in a course that has a notorious reputation for



student cheating; the police detective interrogating the prime suspect for a homicide; and the manager exploring via conversations with employees why the unsupervised graveyard-shift production has dropped 30 percent in the last month. In each of these examples, prior to the social situation, an act or acts has occurred to encourage the individual to put aside the natural expectation of honesty. Professional situations are only one type of social situation. There are also a variety of other social situations, for example, reading or dining clubs, churches, synagogues, study groups, and neighbors, among others. Life is full of a variety of social situations, and as with professional situations there is a breadth of expectations possible for each of these social situations in regard to lying and deceiving.

A variety of other aspects further complicate the concept of context, of which a few are mentioned here. One is the relational aspect: Are the other individuals involved in the interaction friends, acquaintances, family, or enemies? Close familial and friend relations place demands upon an individual to support another's claims, regardless of their veracity, whereas distaste for another individual may encourage claims that present the self as better than reality.

Another is the cultural aspect: Do particular regional, ethnic, or age groups influence perceptions of lying and deception? Particular social cultures see face saving as most important, above deception, which can lead an individual to place primary importance upon saving another's face. Culture can dictate taboo topics, such as sex and sexuality, religion, and finances, in which case-deceptive ambiguity assists in fulfilling cultural demands when another attempts to violate said demands. Each individual is affected by numerous cultures, including those of gender, religion/non-religion, family, ethnicity and age. There is also the culture in which the social situation resides: for example, a work group is situated within an organizational culture, and a neighborhood group is situated in the neighborhood culture.

The environmental aspect also complicates the concept of context. How do the physical surroundings impact perceptions of lying and deception? In physical settings, one can physically sense issues that confirm or disconfirm lies and deception: The little boy who reeks of

daddy's cologne while vehemently denying that he ever entered his parents' bedroom; the woman claiming that she's single and available while fidgeting with her wedding ring; and the person who calls out from the back of the house just as the home owner tells the police officer that he is home alone. Another environmental phenomenon is online interactions. Responses to various surveys indicate that respondents do not necessarily expect nor present truthfulness regarding the social roles, such as age, gender, and social status, that people project online. These surveys imply a lowered expectation of others' online honesty. Thus, physical and online environmental aspects inform the context. Even with only a few examples, the labyrinth nature of context becomes apparent.

### Consequences of Problematic Situations

Social situations suggest the breadth of context, while contextual aspects plumb the depths of layers, but there is a further element that has yet to be discussed: problematic situations with ramifications. These situations pressure individuals to choose to lie and deceive as a means of self-protection: the student accused of cheating, the citizen blamed of violating state law under a harsh regime, and the employee held for questioning regarding a case of fraud.

The sheer potential of these situations for consequences may very well influence prior behavior: the student, citizen, and employee suspecting potential harsh consequences may choose not to lie or deceive, or they might strategize more effective types of lies and deceit. Thus, the student may decide that cheating is not worth the potential consequences, or may change his or her cheating behavior from notes written on the palm of their hand to photos of cheat notes on a password-protected smart phone in a classroom in which the lecturer allows students to keep technological devices with them during an exam. This latter type of response further complicates context because possible negative ramifications motivate individuals to become consummate liars and deceivers, thereby further complicating the issue of context.

Three relevant conditions demonstrate how context can assist with the detection of lying and deception. First, an individual familiar with

another's everyday behaviors is likely to be aware of deviations from veracity, which can assist in the detection of lies and deception. Criminal investigations typically include interviews of the victim and suspect's friends, neighbors, and coworkers in the hope that they will disclose inconsistencies that could alert the investigators to lies or deception.

Second, an expert regarding the particular context perceives more information than a non-expert. An expert does not need to be licensed or credentialed, but rather have special understanding of context. Thus, an avid bicycle rider can see the muscle development in a person's calves and know whether they, too, are a bicyclist, while a financial analyst can examine a set of account books and see irregularities. Experts are frequently requested to examine contexts for potential lies and deceptions.

Third, contexts allow a verification of consistency across signals. Verbal and nonverbal claims should corroborate each other, lending coherence to the interaction. A lack of coherence, one or more false signals, can encourage participants to verify honesty or seek to see if deception is occurring.

Thus, context is a sophisticated, nuanced concept with both breadth and depth complicating a thorough understanding of its importance. Researchers of all types, while still attempting to define this complex concept, acknowledge the fundamental importance of context to the detection and further understanding of deception and lies.

Susan A. Stearns  
Eastern Washington University

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Con Man; Content in Context; Deception in Different Contexts; Disbelief, Suspension of; False Signals.

### Further Readings

- Blair, J. P., T. R. Levine, and A. S. Shaw. "Content in Context Improves Deception Detection Accuracy." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).
- Hunt, J. and P. K. Manning. "The Social Context of Police Lying." *Symbolic Interaction*, v.14 (1991).
- Wieder, D. L. *Language and Social Reality: The Case of Telling the Convict Code*. The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1974.

## Cooperation

Any symbiotic relationship can be seen as a cooperation through which the several observed systems perform mutually beneficial work. Thus, living entities are said to cooperate when they behave in a manner that can be described as functionally interdependent. The incidental phonetic relationship between "cooperation" and "corporation" is significant in this regard, for corporation comes from the Latin word *corpus*, or body, and cooperating entities divide labor in much the way that a body does.

Cooperation can also take this form among human beings who can, unreflectively, perform tasks that work to their several benefits, much as the flower does not know its role in making honey for the bee, and the bee does not know that it is pollinating flowers. A great part of social life takes place at this prereflective, yet cooperative level. For example, in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Adam Smith provides an incomplete list of those who must cooperate to make a cheap woolen coat, including "the shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the woolcomber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser," and he goes on to illustrate how a cooperative of 10 people is 200 to 4,000 times as efficient as 10 people working in isolation. The high levels of productivity in social life are thus largely the result of unnoticed, cooperative labor, which can be realized by looking at one's shoes, dinner, or reading surface; if all the tasks and equipment involved had to be personally made and handled, all of these combined elements could not be obtained by a person working alone, even in a lifetime of effort.

Nevertheless, not all cooperation goes unnoticed or unintended. Where individuals deliberately cooperate, cooperation is more distinctly human and approaches mutuality, which is Erik Erikson's ideal for human coinvolvement.

### False Signaling and Exploitation Within Cooperatives

Cooperation, whether it is apparent or unapparent, conscious or unconscious, is facilitated by signaling between the several interdependent entities within the system. With this in mind, lying can be understood as a form of deliberate false

signaling introduced into a cooperative system. As such, lying can unjustly influence group outcomes, manipulating the specified activity from one that is cooperative into one that is exploitative.

Cooperative systems share goals, establish temporal frameworks, divide tasks, and distribute resources; therefore, lying can be used to manipulate and exploit other participants and the group as a whole. A lie can manipulate cooperative goals, as occurs in the novel *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1960), when Mayella Ewell accuses Tom Robinson of rape, thereby redirecting the community away from its daily routines and into a criminal prosecution. A lie can also manipulate the temporal framing of events in a cooperative system, as happens in the first tale from *One Thousand and One Nights*, when King Shahryar catches his wife committing adultery by lying to

her about when he will be home. Lies can also alter the division of tasks within a cooperative system, as happens in the tale “The Frog Prince,” when the princess lies to the frog so that he will retrieve her golden ball. Finally, lies can redirect the distribution of resources within a cooperative system, a strategy employed by the televangelist Jim Bakker in order to siphon millions of dollars away from his church-building fund, and into his personal accounts.

In all such cases, whether to benefit others or to harm them, the management of a cooperative system through lying removes the condition necessary for an autonomous agent to exercise human freedom (i.e., knowledge of what is the case) when submitting to the task. It thus draws the form of cooperation away from the principle of mutuality, and in the direction of manipulation,



The princess meets the frog in R. Anning Bell's 1912 illustration of Grimm's "The Frog Prince." Lies can alter the division of tasks within a cooperative system, as happens in this tale, when the princess lies to the frog to convince him to retrieve her golden ball. Besides dividing tasks, other characteristics of cooperative systems include sharing goals, establishing temporal frameworks, and distributing resources. Through these systems, lying can be used to manipulate and exploit other participants and the group as a whole.

or even exploitation. While the duped party may engage in cooperative ventures within the system, the mutuality governing the system as a whole (or at the level of the lie) is subverted. A wife may help her husband prepare for a business trip, and together they may resolve the financial details—the laundry, the hotel, and so forth, which could be characterized as cooperation. However, if the husband's story of a business trip is a lie, it would not be appropriate to say that the wife cooperated in his affair, nor would it be wise for the husband to use this packing and planning occasion as evidence of how well they work together when she tells him that she wants a divorce.

### **Lying to Access and Exploit Cooperative Systems**

Lying and deception are strategies of choice for those who would access unmerited positions and resources within a cooperative system. Falsifying degrees, forging passports, padding resumes, inventing backgrounds, and impersonating authorities are a few illustrations.

It is through lies and deception that the September 11, 2001, conspirators engaged the unwitting cooperation of patriotic Americans, from the instructors who taught them to fly, to the workers who built the planes, to the refiners who processed the jet fuel. By subverting the normative character of cooperative social organization through lies, 15 men were able to do to the American mainland what no army was able to do throughout the 20th century, an indication of the power of the lie.

Lies can also arise and persist in otherwise truth-telling cooperatives, particularly in order to maintain access to the benefits already derived from prior acts of integrity within the system. A spouse, for example, is a member of a cooperative system (a family) in which labor is divided and resources are distributed—resources that include familial property, income, transportation, and access to children. However, spouses make promises with respect to sex, narcotics, labor, friendships, finances, and so forth; impulse-driven at least in part, they sometimes fall short of these commitments. When that happens, the transgressor may lie to hide the unacceptable actions, thereby preserving the structural characteristics and resources of the cooperative system. Such lies are often bolstered by the efforts of duped

partners, who often collude in such lies, taking pains to allow themselves to be deceived, specifically because they also fear the damaging effects of truth upon the cooperative system. The protagonist of Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* (1877) exemplifies the liar who seeks to maintain a status quo, as her husband illustrates the colluding dupe. Such liars do not live without consequence, however; by exploiting the moral character of the relation, they compromise the psychic benefit of true mutuality within the innermost circles of their lives. Moreover, the lies shift the nature of domestic reality from “what is the case” to “what we are pretending is the case.” Simon and Garfunkel's 1966 song, “The Dangling Conversation,” gives lyrical testimony to the spiritual wasteland of such relationship, especially with the last substantial line: “You're a stranger now unto me.”

### **Cooperating to Lie and Deceive**

Lying can be a cooperative act when liars solicit accomplices into their process in order to falsify a reality for persons outside the colluding structure. Evidence in history appears as early as Homer's famous tale of Spartan soldiers cooperating to build a hollow wooden horse that could deceptively appear as an offering when it was actually a hideaway for a strategic advance force. Operation Valkyrie was the name given to the German attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1944, in which confederates involved certainly cooperated in an elaborate deception in order to orchestrate the bombing. Wherever there are plots or coups, there will also be cooperatives engaged in deceptions.

The strategy is also used in literature and film. For example, Sikes cooperates with Nancy in *Oliver Twist* (1838), confirming her lie that Oliver is her brother so that they may abduct him without interference from bystanders. The Academy's best film of 1973, *The Sting*, involved a story of cooperative deception.

In economic marketplaces, cooperative lying may occur in order to raise prices on a given commodity, a practice known as collusion in economic theory. Lying cooperatives have also been created for social research studies, such as the Stanley Milgram experiments on obedience to authority. At the domestic level, a couple having marital



problems may collude in a lie to their children or neighbors that all is well.

Cooperating liars and deceivers can also be found in sports. For example, some members of the Chicago White Sox cooperated in the deception that they were playing competitive baseball, when they were in fact throwing the 1919 World Series. On the other hand, all team sports involve cooperative deception, convincing opponents that one pattern on the field or court will be played while signaling the real strategy to teammates. There is a subtle art to simultaneously signaling the truth to partners and falsehood to opponents to create cooperative deception.

Often, the moral status of a lie is determined by the nature of the cooperative circumstances. Hannibal's deceptions when fighting Roman armies leave him regarded even now as a brilliant general, not as a liar, because deception is a normative resource in conflict, just as it is in many sports and card games. Hannibal also illustrates the fact that deceptions may have value to the group and be heralded if this is so. Group interest does not justify all lying, however, as the French military involved in the Dreyfus scandal (1894–1906) eventually learned.

Accusations of cooperative lying may be untrue; in any case, they are hard to prove or disprove. Conspiracy theories associated with the 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon and New York City World Trade Center are regularly founded on the presumption that a significant number of government representatives have cooperated in an elaborate lie against the American public. Conversely, the Watergate investigations in the 1970s can be regarded as the protracted dismantling of a cooperative lie. Whenever it is said that a government has lied to its people—a frequent claim that is made about many governments—the speaker presumes the existence of a cooperative lie.

### Shamming and the Family

The most elaborate analysis of cooperating to lie and deceive can be found in the work of Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick, and Juergen Ruesch. These authors pioneered the systems theory of communication and mental health that was later

popularized by psychiatrist R. D. Laing and cultural anthropologist Jules Henry. Henry's use of the term *sham* is critical because it characterizes the tacit assent to claims that are untrue, by all parties within a system, as a condition for preserving the homeostasis of the political economy. Within cooperating systems, there are sham invitations that recipients know to be insincere, sham compliments that recipients know are dishonest, and sham expressions of love that recipients know are falsehoods.

Nevertheless, as these authors document, those who are shammed regularly cooperate in the falsehood, even to the point of shamming back. Thus, social grace still requires one to offer a handshake when presented to a backbiting enemy. While cooperative sham dynamics preserve and stabilize system order at the functional level (e.g., family structure, organizational hierarchy, relational constancy) they do so at a tremendous phenomenological cost, particularly to young people entering a system and trying to make sense of what is real.

Laing uses the terms *mystification* and *fantasy* to describe the quality of experience lived by people raised in sham. His book *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* (1964) documents the impact of parental, discursive sham on the confused realities of young women who had been institutionalized; and Henry's *Pathways to Madness* traces the dynamics of performative and discursive sham for five families in which a member had been institutionalized.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** College Sports; Collusion; Conspiracies; Daily Life, Lying in; False Signals; Fantasy and Imagination; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Hitler, Adolf; Impression; Nazi Propaganda; Relationships: Family; Trojan Horse.

### Further Readings

Boorstin, D. *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. New York: Vintage Press, 1992.  
Henry, J. *On Sham, Vulnerability, and Other Forms of Self Deception*. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.

- Kenny, R. W. "The Good, the Bad, and the Social: On Living as an Answerable Agent." *Sociological Theory*, v.28 (2010).
- Laing, R. D. and A. Esterson. *Sanity, Madness, and the Family*. New York: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Lissek, S., S. Peters, N. Fuchs, H. Witthaus, and V. Nicolas, et al. "Cooperation and Deception Recruit Different Subsets of the Theory-of-Mind Network." *PLoS ONE*, v.3/4 (2008). <http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0002023> (Accessed May 2013).
- Meyer, Pamela. *Liespotting: Proven Techniques to Detect Deception*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010.
- Sterelny, Kim, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott, and Ben Fraser, eds. *Cooperation and Its Evolution*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013.

---

## Corporate Fraud

In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued 242 indictments and obtained 241 convictions of corporate fraud criminals, resulting in \$2.4 billion secured in restitution orders and \$16.1 million from fines. By the end of 2011, there were 726 pending corporate fraud cases. Fraud does not just occur in large corporations such as Enron, where over 4,000 people lost their jobs. Any organization is subject to fraud. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the typical organization loses 5 percent of its revenues to fraud each year.

Corporate fraud, as defined by the FBI, involves the following activities:

- Falsification of financial information of public and private corporations
- Self-dealing by corporate insiders (e.g., insider trading)
- Obstruction of justice designed to conceal any of the above-noted criminal conduct.

Investopedia's definition states that corporate fraud involves "activities undertaken by an individual or company that are done in a dishonest or illegal manner, and are designed to give an advantage to the perpetrating individual or company."

Fraud is not isolated to the private sector; both public and nonprofit organizations are subject to fraud, as is illustrated by the fraud perpetuated by vendors who tried to take advantage of E-Rates. E-Rate was established by President Bill Clinton to increase Internet access in schools and libraries. By increasing access, the digital divide between those of high and low socioeconomic status could be reduced. Through E-Rate, schools and libraries are able to acquire the funding needed to connect to the Internet or increase their already existing Internet access.

The Schools and Libraries Division of the Universal Service Administration Company (USAC), which was authorized to monitor the use of E-Rates, failed to provide sufficient oversight. Without oversight or accountability, vendors inflated costs to schools and libraries and sold these institutions unneeded equipment. This fraudulent conduct took place throughout the United States, in San Francisco, El Paso, New York City, Chicago, and Atlanta. The largest of the discovered fraud cases occurred in Puerto Rico, where it was estimated that the former secretary of education misdirected \$100 million of the E-Rate funding.

Many individuals can be held accountable for fraud. Even those who are not directly responsible, but may know about the fraud, can be considered liable. The legal theory of scheme liability, maintains that individuals who do not directly commit fraud, but act as secondary actors, can be held responsible and prosecuted for fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted in response to fraud in large corporations like Enron, in which corporate lawyers had some knowledge of financial mismanagement. This law establishes the expectation that instead of maintaining confidentiality, corporate lawyers will communicate up the hierarchy in the organization to report alleged fraudulent behaviors.

### How Corporate Fraud Occurs

Bella DePaulo and colleagues argue that fraud occurs when individuals have a desire to maintain privacy. According to DePaulo, "privacy and secrecy are not just personal but can be used to establish an interpersonal bond, which can then be exploited in the most nefarious ways." DePaulo cites the selling of the Eiffel Tower to

exemplify this theory. The tower was sold not once, but twice, by Victor “The Count” Lustig. Lustig first sold the tower to a scrap metal dealer. After his fraud was discovered, Lustig fled and then returned to France and sold the tower again. Meeting with dealers in secret provided him the opportunity to persuade the buyers, without the threat of anyone else finding out or calling him out on his lie.

Because individuals who perpetrate fraud are often highly educated and skilled in the art of negotiation and handling people, they may also be skilled in charming those who might otherwise be suspicious of their actions. Yet suspicion, which may be encouraged by an outside source, is needed to expose the scam. Cloaking fraud in secrecy and privacy therefore increases the ability of the fraud to continue.

Much research has focused on how to prevent or detect fraud. The composition of a corporation’s board of directors has been found to be one method of decreasing fraud. For example, in a content analysis of over 1,000 letters written by corporate presidents in annual reports, an outside director of the board who was not a shareholder significantly improved the truthfulness of the presidents’ disclosures. Further, having accountants and well-organized oversight committees responsible to the board, and not the president or chief executive officer, will help in keeping fraud at bay.

Once fraud occurs, the most effective method of discovery is through whistle blowers. Whistle-blowers are individuals within the organization who are aware of the misconduct or fraud and report it to individuals higher in the organizational hierarchy or to legal officials outside the organization. There are laws that protect whistle-blowers, but these individuals often suffer a backlash for reporting on an organization. They can lose their jobs and even their homes, and when looking for a new position, they may be unable to find work. Corporations do not want to hire individuals who have turned in their previous organization for fraud. Research has shown that whistle-blowing can be encouraged through incentives from the company or from court proceedings because the whistle-blower may be able to share in a court settlement, if fraud is proven.

Corporate fraud, costing U.S. stakeholders, workers, and the government billions of dollars

each year, remains a nebulous and challenging criminal activity that is difficult to catch and prosecute. It is possible to reduce the chances for fraud through vigilant oversight and to detect it through whistle blowers, but these are not perfect solutions.

Anne P. Hubbell

*New Mexico State University*

**See Also:** Bankruptcy; Corporations; Enron; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Secrecy; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

Abrahamson, Eric and Choelsoon Park.

“Concealment of Negative Organizational Outcomes: An Agency Theory Perspective.”

*Academy of Management Journal*. v.37 (1994).

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. “Cost of Fraud: Is Your Company at Risk?” [http://www.acfe.com/cost-of-fraud.aspx?gclid=COvu\\_av9bMCFal\\_QgodhTgAWA](http://www.acfe.com/cost-of-fraud.aspx?gclid=COvu_av9bMCFal_QgodhTgAWA) (November 2012).

DePaulo, Bella M., Chris Wetzel, R. Weylin

Sternglanz, and Molly J. Walker Wilson. “Verbal and Nonverbal Dynamics of Privacy, Secrecy, and Deceit.” *Journal of Social Issues*, v.59 (2003).

Federal Bureau of Investigations. “Federal Crimes Report to the Public.” <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011> (November 2012).

Investopedia. “Definition of ‘Corporate Fraud.’”

<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporate-fraud.asp> (November 2012).

Knapp, Mark L. “Unassisted Lie Detection.” *Lying and Deception in Human Interaction*. Boston: Pearson Education, 2008.

Meer, Jonathan. “Highway Robbery Online: Is E-Rate Worth the Fraud?” *Brigham Young University Education & Law Journal* (January 2006).

Rutherford, Sally J. “Confidential Corporate Communications in the Business Context Under Sarbanes-Oxley.” *Journal of Global Competitiveness*, v.14 (2006).

Uzun, Hatice, Samuel H. Szweczyk, and Raj Varma. “Board Composition and Corporate Fraud.” *Financial Analysts Journal*, v.60 (2004).

Xu, Yin and Douglas Ziegenfuss. “Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Reporting Wrongdoing.” *Journal of Business and Psychology*, v.22 (2008).

## Corporations

The existence of corporations is beneficial because of the goods and services they yield, as well as the large number of employment opportunities that they provide. Yet, even with many laws, rules, and regulations in place, corporations and their employees are susceptible to unethical behaviors. Corporate deception is prevalent, and must be examined in order to educate individuals on how to effectively prevent, identify, and eliminate it.

Deception in corporations is a topic that is often displayed in news headlines. These headlines are attention-catching because the deception often impacts the corporation, employees, stakeholders/investors, and consumers. Many individuals may be financially affected, and some, such as customers, may lose trust in the corporation. The Enron, WorldCom, and AIG scandals made for some of the largest headlines because of the size of these corporations and the amount of money involved. Scandals such as these can mean the end of business because of fines incurred and loss of customer loyalty.

### Types of Deception in Corporations

Deception within corporations can be categorized in two ways: deception occurring during the job-selection process and deception occurring outside this process. The selection process can be defined as the nature of assessments put into place by the potential employer and taken or participated in by the candidate. The nature of the job-selection process, in which both parties hope to make a good impression while simultaneously evaluating the other, makes it an ideal environment for deception. Deception can occur at any point during the selection process, including on the corporation's Web site, job descriptions, resumes, personality tests, and during the employment interview and other noncognitive assessments. Perhaps the medium best suited to portraying an attractive, positive image of the company is its official Web site. The interview is also influential in determining an applicant's impression about the company because applicants often interpret the interviewer's behavior as a signal of what the company is like.

Corporations are not alone in trying to create favorable impressions; job applicants may also be

deceptive by changing dates on resumes, embellishing previous tasks and accomplishments to sound more impressive, or lying about past salaries. Any noncognitive self-report test is also susceptible to deception and socially desirable responding. For instance, applicants may choose the answers that they think are most likely to get them the job, such as extroverted responses on a personality test for a job in sales. Deception during the interview can include stretching the truth, omitting information that could hurt one's chances, taking credit for others' work, or even blatantly lying about experiences and qualifications.

Deception is not just problematic for selection, but may also affect individuals already employed by the organization. The various types of non-selection-related deception can be broken down into deception: about money, involving bias, about one's own work, about others' work, and involving communication.

Financial deception covers a wide range of behaviors, including compensation dishonesty, falsifying records, padding expense accounts, and embezzlement. Many employers are not altogether upfront with their employees about compensation, paying comparable employees unequally and then lying about it. Falsifying financial records ("cooking the books") is another form of financial deception. The Enron scandal is a classic example of this behavior, in which the company falsified its financial figures to look more favorable. In response to this and similar scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted to protect investors from the fraudulent financial activities of corporations.

While cooking the books is typically limited to those with access to financial information, padding expense accounts may be carried out by a greater number of employees. Padding expense accounts involves adding false expenses or inflating the value of items to obtain undeserved reimbursement from the organization. Finally, embezzlement involves the deceitful use of organizational assets (such as money, resources, and products) by individuals entrusted with them. To be categorized as embezzlement, the embezzler must have had the right to possess or use the assets at the time of the embezzlement, but must have secretly converted the assets for an unintended use.



Deceptive bias or favoritism involving nepotism and/or discrimination against protected groups is also a type of corporate deception. Nepotism is the unearned favoring of relatives, regardless of their actual skills and abilities. Discrimination involves treating an individual differently based on his or her membership or perceived membership in a certain group. According to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, individuals are not allowed to discriminate against others on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Deception typically goes hand-in-hand with nepotism and discrimination because companies would make trouble for themselves if they admitted to preferentially treating certain individuals based on group status, rather than merit.

Deception about one's work may involve areas such as wasting time engaging in nonwork activities, passing off another's work as one's own, exaggerating accomplishments, and avoiding blame. Employees who waste time essentially are lying about working during the hours that they are paid for working. Many may not view this as a form of deception because it often does not involve blatantly telling lies to others. Passing work off as one's own, exaggerating accomplishments, and avoiding blame, on the other hand, are more direct forms of deception that frequently involve telling lies to others.

Not only may employees lie about their own work, they may also lie about the work of others during performance appraisals. In this way, performance appraisals are more often a reflection of office politics than actual performance. Raters may deflate or inflate scores to build a case for disciplinary action or firing, allocate financial rewards such as raises, avoid backlash or retribution from the employee appraised, provide an incentive to improve performance, get even with employees, or make the rater look like a better leader. Raters may give out lower ratings to good performers because they do not want the employee to be promoted out of their current position, or on the contrary, give high ratings to poor performers to have them promoted out of the department.

Finally, lying and deception may also infiltrate employees' communications in terms of feigned deference and deception in negotiations. For instance, employees may act like they defer to their superiors when in their company, but then later

say or do things in direct opposition to their superiors' wishes. Similarly, in negotiation, employees may deceive the other party if it benefits them.

### Research Findings

Research aimed at discovering the reasons behind corporate deception point to many variables and scenarios that allow deception to occur. When the fallout from a corporate scandal occurs, many look to blame the organization's leaders and executives. Research indicates that corporate deception can be attributed to what is considered unethical behavior by corporate executives; these unethical behaviors are competitive and predatory in nature. When a corporation and its executives display predatory behaviors (i.e., behaviors that seek to take advantage of the weak) it opens the door for financial fraud. This financial predation and the lack of regulations to prevent it can be a leading cause in corporate deception.

Other research examines organizational culture as an explanation for unethical activities. While there are bound to be "bad apples" or unethical individuals, it is also possible that there are "bad barrels," or unethical cultures. Researchers explain that individuals are a product of the environment and context they are in. Corporate employees act as they see others act or as they are instructed. Unethical behaviors do not seem unethical when a corporation reinforces or neglects them. Individuals who engage in unethical behaviors often state that "they had no other choice," or that they were "told to do so." Some are forced with the choice of either being ethical, or being successful in their corporation.

The role of a strong organizational culture on individuals' whistle blowing (publicly announcing the unethical activities of an organization) can have an effect because transparent organizations with cultures lacking the ethical characteristics of clarity, congruency, supportability, and discussability will have fewer individuals partaking in whistle blowing activities, including confrontation, reporting to management, calling an ethics hotline, and external reporting.

Researchers look to psychological traps as the root cause of unethical behavior. They define psychological traps as devices that encourage an individual or organization to move in a specific direction, even when unethical. There are three types

of psychological traps: primary, personality, and defensive. Primary traps are comprised of external stimuli, such as stress to obey authority. Pressure from superiors and the desire to appease them is often stronger than one's ethical stance. Personality traps are comprised of internal stimuli in the shape of personality traits. These personality traits can make some individuals more susceptible to unethical behaviors. An example of a personality trap is the need for closure. An individual may value any outcome or concrete reasoning, even unethical, over an ambiguous one. Finally, a defensive trap is a maneuver to reverse the course of action, often to rationalize feelings of guilt or shame. An example of this would be the "false conscious effect." This can occur when an individual rationalizes his or her unethical behavior(s) to reduce the internal negative consequences, such as "I steal company supplies, but that's okay, because everyone else does too."

The organization's code of conduct may also spur unethical behavior. Simply having a code of ethics in place is not sufficient to deter unethical behavior. For example, all of the biggest corporate scandals that have occurred in recent years (e.g., AIG, WorldCom, and Enron) occurred at corporation that had a code of ethics in place. A successful code of ethics must be both high in quality and effectively utilized. P. M. Erwin's research indicates that companies with more developed and utilized codes of conduct experience less unethical behavior while experiencing higher sustainability, corporate citizenship, and a better public perception.

Finally, some researchers suggest that the lack of ethical education and knowledge leads to unethical behaviors. A prime example is an article by L. K. Trevino and M. E. Brown, debunking five business ethics myths. First, the authors explain that ethical decisions are often quite complex. They go on to suggest that the decision process is multistage, and requires moral awareness. Second, they explain that unethical behavior is much more than just the result of "bad apples."

Third, Trevino and Brown reinforce the notion that unethical behaviors cannot be curbed by a simple ethics code or program. The ethics code or program must be a true reflection of the organization and its culture to be effective. Fourth, the authors explain that ethical leadership must

go beyond the integrity of the leader. An effective leader must be ethical, but must also lead those around him to remain ethical. Finally, Trevino and Brown dispel the myth that people are more unethical now than ever before. Unethical behavior is nothing new, and organizations must learn from mistakes and educate themselves.

### Best Practices

There are a number of methods for preventing corporate deception. Some of these methods address deception in general, while others take more targeted approaches to reducing it in specific areas (e.g., in the job-selection process, or in performance appraisals).

Corporations wishing to minimize general deception have the option of requiring employees to attend ethics training. This training can promote ethical behavior and describe the impact of deception on company performance. In addition to training, upper management must support honest and ethical behavior, make honesty a part of the organizational culture, and model this behavior. If employees feel that upper management does not model honest behavior, then training and codes of conduct are not likely to be effective. Employees should be rewarded and praised for honesty, and held accountable for deceit.

Taking a more targeted approach, there are a number of steps for reducing deception during the job-selection process. First, training should be given to employees involved in the interviewing process. Corporations should emphasize the benefits of giving employees realistic job previews, especially jobs with high turnover. All literature given to applicants should focus on both the positive and less desirable aspects of working for the company to help the candidates determine whether they are a good fit for the company. To encourage applicant honesty, the organization may put warnings to respond honestly on all assessments, letting the applicant know that responses will be cross-referenced with other sources to ensure accuracy.

Corporations can also minimize the effects of lying and deception by including certain selection instruments that are immune to faking, such as cognitive ability tests (because these tests have right and wrong answers, they are difficult to fake). Finally, other selection tests, such as

personality tests, should have indicators built in to detect inconsistent or extreme responding, as well as possible faking.

Corporations may also aim to reduce lying and deception in performance appraisals as well. Upper management's support of honest and accurate evaluations is crucial. Companies should thoroughly analyze the job, identifying job requirements and job standards to ensure that raters understand the tasks against which the employee will be rated. Furthermore, organizations should make an effort to create appraisal forms that are not cumbersome, but have clear and specific directions. Raters should be trained not only on how to use the forms, but also how to keep track of employee behaviors and conduct a performance appraisal.

Corporations may hold raters accountable by using multiple raters and requiring that raters explain their reasons for ratings. Requiring raters to document behaviors as they occur throughout the appraisal period should also reduce deception to a degree. Finally, involving employees in the process may also reduce deception, especially if the employee and rater work together to develop ratings. Even if those who are rated are not allowed to directly assist in the evaluation process, there should be procedures in place for employees to appeal any unfair or incorrect ratings.

## Conclusion

Despite corporations' best efforts to curb deception through codes of conduct and other preventative measures, deception nevertheless may emerge from current employees and those applying for employment. Research in the area tends to focus on the causes and underlying mechanisms of unethical behavior in organizations, including deception as part of that broader category. Using the findings of this research as a starting point, corporations can begin to devise both widespread and targeted measures for preventing, identifying, and combating corporate deception.

Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*

Jordan Zurowski  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

Heather Heimbaugh  
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**See Also:** Corporate Fraud; Enron; Letters of Recommendation; Résumés.

## Further Readings

Erwin, P. M. "Corporate Codes of Conduct: The Effects of Code Content and Quality on Ethical Performance." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.99 (2011).

Hoyk, R. and P. Hersey. "The Root Causes of Unethical Behavior: Psychological Traps That Everyone Falls Prey To." *Graziadio Business Review*, v.12 (2009).

Kaptein, M. "From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.98 (2011).

Mesly, Q. "The Dark Side of Organizations: The Story of Financial Predation and Inadequate Regulations." *Journal of Finance and Accountancy*, v.9 (2012).

Trevino, L. K. and M. E. Brown. "Managing to Be Ethical: Debunking Five Business Ethics Myths." *Academy of Management Executive*, v.18 (2004).

# Cottingley Fairies

The Cottingley fairies was a phenomenon involving photographs of purported fairies. A series of pictures taken by two young girls allegedly depicted several of these enchanted supernatural beings. These photographs became widely disseminated as supposed proof of the existence of these legendary creatures.

In July 1917, Elsie Wright, 16 years old, and Frances Griffiths, her 10-year-old cousin, claimed that they had seen fairies while playing by a small stream, which they called the "beck," located near the Wright's family garden plot. They both lived in the same house in Cottingley Glen, a small village outside Bradford, West Yorkshire, in England. Arthur Wright, Elsie's father, thought that the story was nonsense, but the girls persisted, insisting that they had indeed seen the fairies. Mr. Wright eventually loaded a photographic plate into his Midg quarter-plate camera and sent the girls off, telling them to return with a photograph





B. ELSIE AND THE GNOME

Photograph taken by Frances. Fairly bright day in September, 1917. The "Midg" camera. Distance, 8 ft. Time, 1/50th sec. The original negative has been tested, enlarged, and analysed in the same exhaustive manner as A. This plate was badly under-exposed. Elsie was playing with the gnome and beckoning it to come on to her knee.



D. FAIRY OFFERING POSY OF HARE-BELLS TO ELSIE

The fairy is standing almost still, poised on the bush leaves. The wings are shot with yellow, and upper part of dress is very pale pink.

*The photographs and captions for "Elsie and the Gnome" (left) and "Fairy Offering Posey of Hare-Bells to Elsie" appear in The Coming of the Fairies (1921) by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who was fooled by the trickery of two schoolgirls using paper fairy cutouts and a camera in 1917. He was not the only one deceived; careful examination of the photographic plates by representatives of the Kodak company in 1920 could not find "any evidence or superposition, or trick." The spiritualist fervor of the era lent credence to the hoax.*

of the fairies. Elsie returned with the camera, and later that Saturday afternoon, Arthur Wright developed the plate, unsure of what he saw appearing as the plate was developing in his dark-room, with Elsie behind him claiming that they were fairies. The photograph showed Frances in a semireclining pose, with four fairies dancing in front of her and the babbling brook behind her.

That August, Frances used the camera to take a picture of Elsie with a gnomelike figure. The second picture was rather unclear and underexposed, and Mr. Wright thought the girls had been playing tricks and refused to lend them his camera again. He, his wife Polly, and Annie Griffiths, Frances's mother, searched the attic bedroom that the two girls shared and the wastepaper basket, looking for any evidence of scraps of cut-outs and other signs of fraud. Elsie and Frances stuck to their story; the pictures were circulated to neighbors and friends, and then were largely forgotten.

Two years later, in the summer of 1919, Polly Wright, Elsie's mother, attended a meeting of the local Theosophical Society in nearby Bradford. She had initially been dismissive of the girls' stories. Nevertheless, the Theosophy (spiritualism) lecture that evening happened to be on fairy life, and after the talk, Polly mentioned the two fairy photographs that her daughter and niece had taken. The discussion was overheard, which is how these mysterious prints came to the attention of the Theosophists, who displayed them at their annual conference a few months later in Harrogate, England. By early 1920, news of the photos caught the attention of Edward L. Gardner, one of the leading Theosophists, who asked to see the pictures.

Gardner was initially cautious, and sent the original glass plate negatives for analysis by Harold Snelling, a photography expert, who concluded that the negatives were genuine and



showed no indications of tampering. In July 1920, Gardner travelled from London to Cottingley Glen with two Kodak Cameo cameras and about 20 photographic plates, secretly marked. Frances, who by then had moved to Scarborough, England, with her parents, was asked by her Aunt Polly to come back to Cottingley Glen, where she and Elsie met with Gardner. Gardner gave each girl a camera and some of the plates, along with instructions on their use and cautions about distance and lighting; he told them that they were under no compulsion, but if the weather was fair and they could entice the fairies to come out and be photographed, he would be appreciative.

Word of the Cottingley fairy photographs made its way to the ears of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the noted author and creator of the fictional character Sherlock Holmes. Doyle was interested in spiritualism and had been commissioned to write an article on fairies for the 1920 Christmas edition of the *Strand Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly*. Conan Doyle's article, "An Epoch Making Event—Fairies Photographed," was released in late November. At the urging of Gardner and Doyle, Elsie and Frances took three more purported fairy photographs. In 1921, Doyle published another article in *The Strand Magazine* titled "The Evidence of Fairies," which featured two of the three additional photographs taken in 1920.

In 1921, Gardner made another expedition and his final visit to see Elsie, then 20 years old, and Frances, age 14, at Cottingley Glen; this time, he was accompanied, on the recommendation of Doyle, by the clairvoyant Geoffrey Hodson, who claimed to see numerous fairies. However, the fairies refused to be photographed on this occasion. Doyle's original article from the *Strand Magazine* on the fairy photographs was reprinted in his 1930 book *The Edge of the Unknown*, a collection of essays on psychic phenomena. In 1945, Gardner published his book, *Fairies: A Book of Real Fairies*.

Gardner commissioned Snelling to make contact positives, negatives, prints, and two glass lantern slides, without retouching or any other modifications, which Gardner could use to illustrate the Theosophical Society lectures that he regularly delivered across Great Britain. Snelling continued to provide prints that were sold at these talks.

Gardner and Conan Doyle sent copies of Snelling's prints and negatives to Kodak for analysis by the company's experts, who agreed with some of Snelling's findings, but added that this should not be taken as conclusive evidence that they were authentic photographs of fairies. The pair also contacted another photographic company, Ilford, to review the evidence, but when the company concluded that there was evidence of faking, Gardner and Conan Doyle dismissed these findings.

In 1978, James "The Amazing" Randi, a well-known American debunker, along with a team of experts from the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of the Paranormal, studied the Cottingley fairy photographs with a computer enhancement process, and thought that strings seemed to be attached to some of the fairy figures. Randi also reported that the images in the initial Cottingley fairy photograph bore a striking resemblance to illustrations from *Princess Mary's Gift Book*, published in 1914.

Geoffrey Crawley, editor of the *British Journal of Photography*, examined the evidence and concluded in reports published between 1982 and 1983 that the photographs were fakes. In an interview for the *Yorkshire Press* on March 19, 1983, Elsie finally confessed that she and Frances had cut out pictures of fairies from a book, glued them on cardboard, and mounted them on hat pins before staging them for the infamous photographs. Frances died in 1986, and Elsie followed in 1988. The photographs and two of the cameras used to create them are currently on display at the National Media Museum in Bradford, England.

Victor B. Stolberg  
Essex County College

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Fairy Tales; Fantasy and Imagination; *New York Sun* Moon Series; Photographs, Altered.

### Further Readings

Cooper, Joe. *The Case of the Cottingley Fairies*.

London: Pocket Books/Simon & Schuster, 1997.

Doyle, Arthur Conan, Sir. *The Coming of the Fairies*.

New York: G. H. Doran, 1921.

Losure, Mary. *The Fairy Ring or Elsie and Frances Fool the World*. Somerville, MA: Candlewick Press, 2012.

Owen, Alex. "‘Borderland Forms’: Arthur Conan Doyle, Albion’s Daughters, and the Politics of the Cottingley Fairies." *History Workshop*, v.38 (1994).

Sanderson, Stewart F. "The Cottingley Fairy Photographs: A Re-Appraisal of the Evidence." *Folklore*, v.84/2 (1973).

Smith, Paul. "The Cottingley Fairies: The End of a Legend." In *The Good People: New Fairylore Essays*, Peter Narvaez, ed. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991.

## Courtship, Deception in

The primary purpose of the courtship process is to have the time and space to thoroughly get to know a potential partner, to determine similarities and differences, and to decide whether or not the relationship has the potential to become a more permanent commitment. Multiple studies have shown that trustworthiness and honesty are seen as the most desirable characteristics in a romantic partner, regardless of the length of relationship sought or the sex of those involved. Trustworthiness and honesty ranked higher than an exciting personality, good health, adaptability, dependability, sense of humor, and kindness/understanding. This suggests that people believe that honesty is an essential part of any close relationship and is a characteristic that each partner should strive to achieve. However, the reality is that the vast majority of relationship partners lie to each other at some point.

### Lies During Initial Courtship

When embarking on a new courtship, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of first impressions. Research suggests that people make their first impressions of others in less than three seconds after meeting them. Ensuring that they are putting their best foot forward becomes imperative in order to attract and engage with high-quality potential partners. From an evolutionary perspective, competition for quality mates is challenging, particularly for women who bear the brunt of the responsibility for having and raising offspring. For this reason, women are more

likely than men to exaggerate, downplay, or out-and-out lie about who they are.

Evolutionary theorists propose that men are attracted to women because of their desire to father as many healthy offspring as possible, and for this reason they are attracted to younger, healthier-appearing women. Thus, women are motivated to lie about their age (generally saying they are younger than they actually are), or are particularly careful with their physical appearance in the hope of appearing younger and healthier. In addition, women have been found to downplay or hide any major diseases or illnesses that they have experienced or are experiencing in order to avoid questions concerning their ability not only to procreate, but also to birth healthy babies. From the same evolutionary perspective, women are thought to be focused on finding a mate who will not only be able to father offspring, but will also be able to financially support and physically protect those children that come from their union. In this way, men are motivated to overestimate their earnings, the importance of their job, their physical prowess, and level of maturity.

While some may suggest that these theories are more appropriately applied to times past, research on deception in online dating sites bears out these claims. Men who use online dating sites are more likely to exaggerate their income, education level, age, and desire for a long-term committed relationship. In their online ads, men are also likely to enhance their physical appearance, claiming to be taller, more muscular, and having more hair than in reality. Women, on the other hand, tend to downplay their income, education, age, and desire for a long-term relationship. Their ads also enhance their physical appearance in ways that map onto evolutionary theory, claiming to be larger-breasted, thinner, and with long hair (implying youth).

Even in face-to-face modes of courtship, researchers found that if they could make a date with a potential mate who was high in facial attractiveness, both men and women were willing to lie about their intelligence, personal appearance, personality, income, past relationship experiences, and career skills. Once they secured that first date, things appeared to worsen. A full 92 percent of college students admitted to lying to a potential romantic partner about sexual issues.

Lying does not end when two people establish a close relationship; at best, lying decreases in frequency. While one in every three interactions with a close nonspouse romantic partner involves deception, only one in 10 interactions with close-relationship partners is a lie. This is not as substantial a drop in frequency as many might think.

### **Lies Once the Courtship Has Begun**

Outside of the lies that people tell when they are first meeting, or planning to meet someone new, courtship partners are more likely to engage in lies of omission, rather than lies of commission. In these developing relationships, information that may be unflattering to the individual is often withheld, sometimes permanently, other times until the relationship has developed to a deeper level and is capable of withstanding serious revelations. “Secrets” such as surviving childhood sexual abuse, having a criminal record, or being in remission from a serious illness such as cancer are topics, few people address on a first or even second date. While some courtship partners see this as a lie, those who are in possession of this potentially sensitive information are often not hiding the facts, as much as they are waiting until they feel comfortable enough with the partner to disclose such personal information.

There are even more gender differences in terms of lying within courtship or romantic relationships. Both men and women lie, and tend to do so in relatively equal numbers; however, what they lie about most significantly differs. Men are most likely to lie about their past, while ironically, women are more likely to lie to their partner in order to support him and be positive in the hope of increasing closeness in the relationship. Once a serious lie has been told, however, women are more upset, anxious, fearful, and remorseful than men. Men and women also differ in terms of the premeditated nature of their lies. Research also suggests that men put greater planning into the lies that they tell casual friends, while women put more premeditation into the lies that they tell their close friends.

### **Joint Lies**

The lies that people tell and deceptions that people enact in courtship and relationship situations

vary from those told to strangers and acquaintances in at least one other vital way. First, most research on lying treats this type of deception as an individual act. In courtship and other close relationships, however, there are circumstances in which the receiver or target of the lie is directly involved in its perpetration.

The first type of jointly constructed lie is known as *connivance*. This is a situation in which an individual knows that his or her courtship partner has lied but chooses to act as though they are unaware of that fact. They may be “letting sleeping dogs lie,” respecting the liar’s right to privacy, storing away the information for future blackmail purposes, or waiting for him or her to confess. For whatever reason, the target of the lie chooses to pretend that he or she does not know that deception is being practiced by his or her partner.

The second jointly constructed lie is known as *collusion*. In collusion, the teller and receiver of the lie agree in advance to collaborate in deception. One of the most common examples of this type of collusion is when one partner tells the other up front that, if he or she has an affair, “do not tell me about it.” More specifically this means, “if you have an affair I want you to lie to me about it.” This type of joint deception is often used when the punishment for telling the truth may well equal the punishment for lying about the action.

Second, lies told in courtship or romantic relationship situations are rarely one-offs. One of the problems with lying in these types of relationships is that once the individual starts lying he or she has to keep up the pretense. Lies frequently come back to haunt the teller, which then necessitates remembering the lie, repeating the lie, and potentially telling even more lies to maintain the original deception. This is particularly true with complex lies in which the lies are being told in order to continue with a deceitful behavior, such as cheating.

### **Detecting Deception in Courtship**

People like to believe that they are good lie detectors and that with their romantic partners they are particularly skilled at unearthing untruths. Studies have shown that in these circumstances, people are accurate in detecting deception about 54 percent of the time. However, this number is

likely artificially inflated by the fact that individuals engaged in courtship are much more accurate at recognizing the truth. One of the biggest courtship-oriented problems that people face in terms of deception is that they believe that they are generally successful at lying to their courtship partners, and conversely, that the partners are not successful at lying to them. Put more simply, people are good at recognizing the truth, bad at recognizing deception, and when they are not sure if they are being lied to, they prefer to extend the benefit of the doubt to their courtship partners. McCormack and Parks model of deception detection (published in 1986) supports this belief, indicating that as a relationship becomes closer and the partners become more intertwined, their confidence in their ability to detect their partner's deception increases. Coupled with a "truth bias," in which partners presume that they are always honest with one another, this suggests that a great deal of deception may go undetected in courtship and indeed many other types of close relationships.

### When Deception is Detected

When deception is successfully detected, at least three factors play a role in determining the impact of the lie on the relationship. Research has shown that increases in the importance of the information lied about, the importance of the act of lying to the relationship, and the level of relational involvement experienced by the partners are all positively associated with greater emotional intensity when the deception is discovered. In particular, the importance of what the lie was about appears to be the strongest predictor of whether or not the relationship will continue. For example, even if an individual believes that honesty is a crucial part of a relationship and they are not yet deeply involved with their partner, they are far less likely to break up if the discovered lie involves a preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla than if the lie deals with relational fidelity. This suggests that while the motive for lying certainly matters, what exactly people are deceptive about is equally important in deciding the fate of an interpersonal relationship.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
University of Prince Edward Island

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception Motives; Internet: Online Dating; Lies, Types of; Men; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; Truth Bias; Women.

### Further Readings

- Boon, Susan D. and Beverly McLeod. "Deception in Romantic Relationships: Subjective Estimates of Success at Deceiving and Attitudes Toward Deception." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18/4 (2001).
- Keenan, Julian P., Gordon P. Gallup Jr., Nicole Goulet, and Mrinmoyi Kulkarni. "Attributions of Deception in Human Mating Strategies." *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, v.12/1 (1997).
- Lawson, Helene M. and Kira Leck. "Dynamics of Internet Dating." *Social Science Computer Review*, v.24/2 (2006).
- McCornack, Steven A. and Timothy R. Levine. "When Lies Are Uncovered: Emotional and Relational Outcomes of Discovered Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- McCornack, Steven, A. and M. R. Parks. "Deception Detection and Relationship Development: The Other Side of Trust." In *Communication Yearbook* 9, Margaret L. McLaughlin, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1986.
- Rowatt, Wade C., Michael R. Cunningham, and Perri B. Druen. "Lying to Get a Date: The Effect of Facial Physical Attractiveness on the Willingness to Deceive Prospective Dating Partners." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.16/2 (1998).

## Coyote

A coyote is a human smuggler who shepherds would-be illegal immigrants within and across borders in their journeys to new homes. The name *coyote* is derived from depictions of the namesake animal as a mythical trickster in Native American and indigenous Mexican cultures. The combination of heroic and deceptive characteristics attributed to the trickster in these cultures is likewise attributed by would-be immigrants and their local cultures to the human coyotes who both assist and betray them. Migrants, who would otherwise face dangerous and unfamiliar



obstacles as they illegally cross one or more borders and many miles of terrain in transit to their (primarily) U.S. destinations, heavily rely on their coyotes to provide protection and guidance, and to trick and deceive agents tasked with preventing or detecting migrants' illegal crossings.

### **Illegal Immigrant Crossings**

Coyotes' main objectives are to help immigrants travel within an intermediate country en route to the target border, cross borders into intermediate or target countries, and travel without detection to final destinations within target countries once their borders are successfully crossed.

Several common strategies are used for border crossings, including some aimed at successful deception at legal ports of entry. Coyotes may provide forged documents and identities, or legal documents for temporary use, enabling migrants to successfully cross legal ports of entry and immigration checkpoints once across the border. They may also conceal migrants as passengers or cargo in vehicles that are legally crossing.

Coyotes may also assist migrants to cross at illegal points of entry along the border, while successfully evading the U.S. Border Patrol, frequently guiding migrants by foot through arduous terrain such as desert, brush, and mountains to avoid immigration checkpoints. They may use infrared scopes, cell phones, and computers to keep track of their clients' destinations, often cooperating with other coyotes in a larger sophisticated network. Clients may transition between several coyotes as they cross within and between countries.

The need for coyotes' services among those who cannot achieve legal or less dangerous methods of entry into the United States appears to outweigh concerns about their reliability, and may render migrants vulnerable to coyotes' many self-serving machinations. While marketing their services as helpful and protective, coyotes are also known for deception and abuse of their clients. This deception may begin with coyotes' attempts to attract clients. In order to overcome the reluctance of doubtful or fearful clients, coyotes may misrepresent such issues as the dangers and difficulty of the terrain that migrants will travel through, the amount of time required, conditions for transport, probability of successful arrival at their destination, total fees for the coyote's services, and

the dangers of some coyotes' trickery, and even violence.

### **Codependence in Deception**

Once the journey has begun, migrants' isolation from external support or law enforcement and their position in unknown and challenging terrain, creates a dependence upon the coyote that can enhance fear, increase the need to trust the coyote, and render migrants vulnerable to new demands that the coyote may impose. The coyote may change the terms of engagement when faced with a newly fortified border, for example, knowing that the now dependent client will have little choice but to agree. Coyotes argue that these unexpected new obstacles require more money, and may even hold migrants hostage until the families pay their increased smuggling fees.

Though not commonplace, in some instances, the increased power and control enjoyed by the coyote can be reflected in physical force or abuse. Moreover, in some instances, the coyote may completely violate his "contract" by abandoning migrants who do not maintain the pace of the group. Coyotes have even been known to rape, rob, and murder their clients, or provide them to others for use as drug mules or sex slaves.

While migrants are heavily dependent upon their coyotes during the journey, coyotes can also become dependent upon their clients. If caught attempting illegal border crossings, coyotes face steeper legal consequences than migrants. To avoid such sanctions, coyotes attempt to masquerade as migrants, thereby becoming dependent upon their clients to maintain this deception. When questioned by the U.S. Border Patrol, for example, migrants may claim that their coyote abandoned them. Coyotes whose clients are caught after arrival in the United States may likewise depend upon the clients to conceal their identities, if questioned by law enforcement.

Coyotes may also depend upon referrals for continuing success in their business. Despite the opportunities and temptations of the power that coyotes enjoy over their clients, their reciprocal dependence on these clients suggests that it is in the best interests of individual coyotes, and the community of coyotes as a whole to maintain a positive reputation in the migrant community, and the good will of their clients during transport.

Assisted by migrants' desperate need for their services, coyotes as a group appear to maintain a sufficiently positive reputation to support a thriving business. Despite widespread knowledge of the dangers and fallibility of illegal border crossings, and of the risks of dishonesty and abuse among coyotes, many nevertheless trust coyotes to guide them, perhaps hoping or assuming that their coyote will not be among those who betray and take advantage of their clients. Such desperate and hopeful migrants will continue to attempt coyote-assisted illegal crossings for the foreseeable future. Increased border surveillance on behalf of the U.S. Border Patrol, in addition to more stringent immigration laws, has rendered would-be immigrants ever more dependent upon their services.

Lindsay Perez  
Matthew Ghiglieri  
Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Betrayal; Credibility; Deception and Trust; Dishonesty; Hispanic Americans.

#### Further Readings

- Marquardt, M. F., T. J. Steigenga, P. J. Williams, and M. A. Vasquez. *Living "Illegal": The Human Face of Unauthorized Immigration*. New York: New Press, 2011.
- Singer, Audrey and Douglas S. Massey. "The Social Process of Undocumented Border Crossing Among Mexican Migrants." *International Migration Review*, v.32/3 (1998).
- Spener, David. *Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
- Spener, David. "Mexican Migrant-Smuggling: A Cross-Border Cottage Industry." *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, v.5/3 (2004).

journalistic credibility. To fully understand the scope of credibility and its role in deception, one must examine both contexts. The word *credibility* can be traced back to Aristotle and his *Rhetoric*, in which he stated the following:

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided . . . his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.

Aristotle used the Greek word *ethos* to refer to credibility. When considering the classic mode of the concept of credibility, insight is gained from understanding the three components of *ethos*. According to Aristotle, *ethos* is made up of intelligence, virtue, and good will. Each of the three components is connected to what Aristotle refers to as *hexis*, or "habits." Intelligence is a mental habit, virtue is a moral habit, and good will is an emotional habit.

*Ethos* or credibility, as defined by the classicists, is created by what people say, or the message, and is dynamic, ever-changing. Just because a person has credibility does not mean that he or she will always have it. Credibility is a caused response; it is earned through the message or the actions of the person. One cannot discuss credibility without mentioning the seminal work of psychologist Carl Hovland, who investigated source credibility and the connection it had with the likelihood of message acceptance.

If credibility is something that is earned, one may ask how is it earned, or what is the best way or earning the highest credibility. Early research maintained that credibility was connected with expertness and trustworthiness; however, later research provided evidence questioning this oversimplification of credibility. General trustworthiness and how much one is worthy of confidence remain important elements of personal credibility. Credibility is often assessed in terms of intent as well as reliability and accuracy. Long-term consistency in reliability and accuracy leads to a good reputation or greater credibility. Building a

## Credibility

When considering credibility and deception, one may think of relational credibility, or one may consider credibility of information, such as

history of accuracy is an important determinant of credibility. Another determinant is confidence. Confidence is considered to be one of the most prevalent indicators of assessing one's credibility.

### **Calibration of Credibility**

Calibration refers to one's confidence level and the accuracy or likelihood of being right. A well-calibrated person has a high confidence level when he or she is likely to be right and low confidence when he or she is likely to be wrong. Through interactions, individuals become aware of how calibrated others are and make assessments of credibility. Researchers have concluded that understanding the value in reading the calibration of another person is a learned skill that people gain over time. Adults are better at reading calibration cues in others, and when another person is deemed credible, adults gain confidence in interacting with him or her. However, if credibility is violated at any time, adults will be suspicious in future interactions as a result of the loss of credibility. Children, however, are less skilled in reading calibration cues. Confidence overrides calibrations in many cases for children. Research has yet to discover at what age or stage of development calibration decoding cues are learned.

Some psychologists believe that credibility is not an attribute of one's personality but rather of the message. For instance, U. Undeutsch argues that creating truthful or deceptive messages is a situation-specific behavior, not a personality trait. According to Undeutsch, credibility can only be detected in the message, not the person *per se*. There are four types of indicators to assist such detection: characteristics of the verbal message (e.g., content of message, details or lack of details, and logical consistency), paralinguistic cues (e.g., speech rate, tone of voice, and pauses), nonverbal behaviors (e.g., smiles, gestures, and head nods), and psycho-physiological reactions (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate, and respiratory rate). The last type of indicator is usually measured by a lie-detector machine that shows various psycho-physiological reactions.

### **Journalistic Credibility**

Credibility is not just an interpersonal or relational construct. Credibility of information, such as journalistic credibility, is important to

examine. With the widespread reach of the Internet and other forms of media, the credibility of information is not always apparent. It is worth asking if all information is of equal value. Traditional news outlets, both print and broadcast, employ a longstanding tradition of editorial and gatekeeping rules that help ensure the accuracy and trustworthiness of the information presented.

However, in recent years, there have been lapses in this gatekeeping, resulting in loss of credibility. Unlike traditional forms of media, the Internet lacks editorial and gatekeeping rules, which results in avenues for deception.

Over the years researchers have examined the credibility of the media. Media credibility is complex and depends on many elements. It is thought that the most important elements are believability, fairness, accuracy, bias, degree of sensationalism, and depth of information. E. Ognianova's research frames online news story credibility in terms of nine semantic differential items: factual/opinionated, unfair/fair, accurate/inaccurate, untrustworthy/trustworthy, balanced/unbalanced, biased/unbiased, reliable/unreliable, thorough/not thorough, and informative/not informative. Other researchers, such as C. Nadine Wathen and Jacquelyn Burkell of the University of Western Ontario, maintain that there are seven criteria needed to judge if the information on the Internet is credible: source, content, format, presentation, currency, accuracy, and speed of loading. They argue that readers/users use different, less traditional, considerations to form judgments about credibility.

Credibility researchers Shawn Tseng and B.J. Fogg identified four types of source credibility: presumed, reputed, surface credibility, and experienced credibility. Presumed credibility occurs when a person relies on his or her general assumptions about a person. For example, a person generally assumes that his or her best friend is a good person, or his or her parent has good intentions. Reputed credibility is based on an outside source, such as an endorsement. This type of credibility is very prevalent on the Internet. One Web site deemed credible may offer links to other sites, which may or may not be credible; however, because there is a connection between the Web sites, there is an implied credibility. Reputed credibility is often related to one label, such as

president, doctor, priest, or teacher. Source credibility is based on one's first impression and initial judgment, whereas experienced credibility is based on one's consistent experience with the source. This type of credibility is earned through usage and/or interaction.

Credibility is a rich transactional process, which varies across contexts. There are common themes that are deeply rooted in one's evaluation of credibility. Themes that are consistent across context and time include trustworthiness, accuracy, consistency, and overall believability.

Diane M. Monahan  
Saint Leo University

**See Also:** Aristotle; Honesty; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio.

### Further Readings

- Mills, J. and J. M. Jellison. "Effect on Opinion Change of How Desirable the Communication is to the Audience the Communicator Addressed." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.6/9 (1967).
- Ognianova, E. "The Value of Journalistic Identity on the World Wide Web." Paper presented to the Mass Communication and Society Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Baltimore, August 1998.
- Undeutsch, U. "The Development of Statement Reality Analysis." In *Credibility Assessment*, J. C. Yuille, ed. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- Walster, E., E. Aronson, and D. Abrahams., "On Increasing the Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, v.2 (1966).

---

## Cromwell, Oliver

Oliver Cromwell continues to be a controversial figure. Defamed as a dictator by some, he is praised as a hero and protector of liberty by others. Although a leader in the English Civil War who elevated the powers of Parliament against

the monarchy, he is criticized for taking a position as lord protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland that amounted to having the powers of a king. Although in some ways he worked toward religious toleration, including reversing the banishment of Jews from England, he is cited with the use of violence against those with whom he disagreed, particularly the Catholics. Although he is known for having encouraged a high level of morality among the soldiers under his command, he is also held responsible for brutal acts of warfare, particularly in his campaigns in Ireland. The result is that today he is cursed by the Irish, and is remembered for having deepened the divide between the Irish and the English.

As in considering any controversial figure, all of these elements must be taken into account in order to give a full picture of the person. Rather than presenting Cromwell as either a saint or a sinner, or as a person with extreme personal incongruities, it best to understand him within the context of his religious enthusiasm.

Cromwell lived from 1599 to 1658. He was born into a middle-class gentry family. There is some indication that he struggled with depression in his earlier life, but at some point in the 1630s he underwent a religious conversion. This conversion is known from the letters he wrote, in which he described himself as the chief of sinners, who was now repentant and converted. He rose from leading one cavalry unit to being a chief commander in the New Model Army, and then a part of the Rump Parliament that signed and executed the death warrant for Charles I in 1649. Cromwell's role in the execution of the king is most relevant for considering his beliefs about lying and deception.

### Religious Enthusiasm

Cromwell's reliance on what is called "religious enthusiasm" helps make sense of his conversion, his strong emphasis on morality, and his commitment to fighting against any perception of compromise or deception in England. Religious enthusiasm refers to the belief that God is directly speaking to a person, particularly through the person's feelings or affections. This can be seen in Cromwell's conviction of sin and his need for redemption, but also in his belief that God was directly guiding him in the choices that he made



as military commander. Religious enthusiasm is different than the belief that the Bible can be applied to current situations, or that there is a moral law known from general revelation (both of which Cromwell perhaps also believed).

Because of his religious and political beliefs, Cromwell played a leading role in the decision to execute Charles I. Cromwell believed that the king had lied and been deceitful in his dealings with the English people. This kind of deception provoked the displeasure of God and nullified the contract between the king and the people. This deception necessitated not only the removal of Charles I, but also his execution because it had led to bloodshed among the English people. Cromwell was the third person to sign the execution document of Charles I.

This principle that deceit by a king nullified the king's right to rule was a point of contention in the 17th century. This principle was in contrast with the belief in the divine right of kings, which held that a king was given his throne by God, and that only God could remove him, not Parliament or any human being. Cromwell championed the idea that a king is only entitled to rule while he maintains certain moral and social conditions, which in England dated to the Magna Carta. However, Cromwell also believed that the rule of law was sovereign, and that the rule of a king or any other person was not. When a king violates the rule of law, especially if this violation occurs through deception, then the king must forfeit his rule.

### Cromwell and the Puritans

It seems evident that Cromwell viewed himself as having a special role in advancing both this political philosophy and the Puritan cause. At the time, the Puritans understood that they were in conflict against hierarchies led by human figures, whether the king or the pope, who had violated the law of God. It is especially notable that during this time, the Westminster Confession of Faith was written (1648), which is a high-water mark of Reformed and Puritan theology. The confession came to have significant influence in the American colonies and the United States, whereas its influence was considerably less in England, perhaps because of the political turmoil during and after it was written.

Cromwell is best understood in light of his religious enthusiasm, his commitment to the rule of law over the rule of kings or popes, and his conception of the struggle between the purity of worship and society against institutions that assert personal authority and hinder persons from true Christianity. However, this view also includes a combination of religious and political goals. When political goals sometimes require force, as during war, the people in the 21st century are especially concerned that religion remain separate from politics. For that reason, Cromwell is now judged as having improperly combined the two.

Owen Anderson  
*Arizona State University*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Charles II Plot; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700.

### Further Readings

- Little, Patrick, ed. *The Cromwellian Protectorate*. Rochester, NY: Boydell, 2007.
- Little, Patrick, ed. *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Morrill, John. *Oliver Cromwell*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Worden, Blair. *God's Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

---

## Crying

Crying is a complex human behavior that is most often regarded as an irrepressible expression of pain or sorrow. Crying first appears immediately after birth, long before speaking, walking, and other forms of human behavior that exist across the lifespan. In its earliest form, it functions as instinctive signaling; the cry indicates to caretakers the infant's state of discomfort. Such crying can thus lead to burping, feeding, changing, holding, and other caretaker actions in the service of the infant's needs. Eventually, infants

learn other strategies for meeting their needs, including grasping, walking, and speaking. As this happens, the role of crying as a form of social signaling diminishes for the child.

Nevertheless, crying persists in childhood and throughout adulthood, and can still be seen across the stages of life. In its most primeval form, crying persists as a spontaneous reaction to forms of discomfort or pain, especially in childhood. Adults are generally socialized against crying as a response to pain, however, there is a tendency to replace pain-driven crying with other forms of emotional release, such as swearing and screaming. Adults and children may also cry when something is lost, such as a valued object, family member, lover. Under such circumstances, the act of crying is regularly treated as an irrepressible emotional outburst, indicative of deeply experienced feelings.

The audience response to infant crying is important to any understanding of the relationship between crying and lying. First and foremost, the infant cry is experienced as authentic. The person who hears an infant crying takes the sound to be a genuine expression of a negative emotion, one that is deeper than a communicative strategy, and this means that audiences are primed to interpret crying as evidence of truth. The infant cry is also experienced as anguish-inducing. Mirror neurons that govern empathic experiences cause audiences to live the anguish of the other in an imitative neurological state, and this happens to audiences exposed to an infant's cry. Finally, the infant cry is experienced as impelling; it triggers within its audience a motivation to eliminate the infant's suffering, as well as its own.

### **Crying as Artifice**

While crying is often spontaneous and true, it can also arise as a powerful form of artifice. The controlled signaling of crying behavior emerges before the end of the first year, in the form of anguished sounds ceasing when the infant is granted trivial satisfaction. For example, a baby may make anguished noises in order to be lifted from the crib, bounced in a jumper, or repositioned in front of a television. All such goals have comparatively little to do with suffering, and might therefore indicate that the child has moved past crying as

an exclusively pain-driven instinct toward crying as a conscious signaling strategy.

Even without the conscious decision to manipulate by crying, however, manipulative crying may develop. Various psychological theories, including Ivan Pavlov's classical theory and B. F. Skinner's operant theory, support the notion that manipulative crying can develop in a person who has no intention, and possibly not even the competence, to develop it. Thus, while false crying and real crying appear to be two alternatives at polar odds, they may rather be points on a continuum. Deceivers can believe their lies, and they can believe their lies to varying degree, even enough to cause them to cry. All the same, where such performances exist, the roots of strategic crying as a form of deception and social control are well in place.

All lies have weight, and they grow more believable as they grow heavier. In order to get the measure of their truth value, sense-making audiences attend not only to words but also to word contexts, which include persons, places, things, and actions. One may say, following W. I. Thomas, that audiences are constantly keen to establish the definition of the situation, whether the situation be defined as play, real, or a falsification of the real. The first two definitions are negotiated between the speaker and the audience; the latter must be independently determined, particularly when the audience has preliminary reasons to doubt. A successful liar attends not only to the character of the lie but also to the false physical and emotional environment that the lie creates. (For example, liars who claim that they were mugged tear their shirts and bloody their noses in advance of the lie.)

An accomplice can add weight to a lie, as can false evidence, and crying is another way to add weight to deception. Crying, to the extent that it is presumed a spontaneous release of irrepressible emotion, adds to the veracity of the claims that attend it when the performed grief is consonant with the declared falsehood (e.g., "I can't take my test this morning because my grandfather died").

A well-placed tear can have national repercussions. Anchorman Walter Cronkite, for example, attained an iconic position in the history of television because he took off his glasses and wiped a

tear from his face when announcing the death of President John F. Kennedy. It is therefore possible to wonder whether other journalists have strategically struggled for the elusive teardrop around which careers are made. Whether such tears are regularly deceptions cannot be known, for the deceiver is an elusive animal.

Nevertheless, the mechanism is well-known and was used to powerful effect in the film *Broadcast News*, when Tom Grunick (William Hurt) demonstrated to his love interest, Jane Craig (Holly Hunter), that his crying while reporting the news was a talent over which he had dramatic control. The mistrust that he engendered in her character with this crying is similar to the actual effect that attended O. J. Simpson's crying after his wife's death, with crying episodes following his murder trial and during his armed-robbery trial. Broadcaster Howard Stern interpreted Simpson's crying after his murder trial as evidence that Simpson was a sociopath; Judge Jackie Glass called Simpson both ignorant and arrogant when she sentenced him for armed robbery after his tearful plea. Once one is believed to be a tearful liar, tears can do more harm than good because they germinate an emotional energy in their audience but they no longer signal the presence of truth. Instead, they signal the dangerous character of the speaker.

Literature has long recognized the dangerous nature of crying and tears when they are used to warrant a deception, with William Shakespeare, for example, referencing the crocodile's tears in *Othello*. The liar who can support a lie with tears is feared, in part because his tears can elicit classically conditioned or mirror-neuron-induced, emotional responses in an audience, even after the audience consciously knows that the crier is an untrustworthy deceiver. For this reason, it is not uncommon to experience the crying liar in what Anna Freud has labeled a reaction formation—the audience channeling the evoked emotional energy away from its dangerous form (in this case and with this crier, pity) toward a form more appropriate for the deceiving recipient of the feeling (in this case, contempt).

### Crying and Politics

In public life, it has often been claimed that politicians cultivate a talent for deceptive tears.

Presidents Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Barack Obama have been accused of using tears to their political advantage. Because crying can work to a positive rhetorical effect, the accusation that one is a false crier may be strategically necessary to dispossess a speaker, often a politician, of whatever audience gains that the crying garnered. On such occasions, it matters little to the accuser whether the crying was deceptive or not—the intent of the accusation is not to reveal the truth of a person but to subvert the crier's advantage, although the distinction may mean little to the accuser. At some levels, it is often the case that public expressions of grief are stage-related, because it is easier to release some forms of emotional energy in a staged event, a phenomenon



*Crying persists as a spontaneous reaction to forms of discomfort or pain, especially in childhood. Crying as a powerful form of artifice, outside of suffering, emerges before the end of the a child's first year, in the form of a child stopping his or her anguished sounds when he or she is granted trivial satisfaction.*

observed by sociologist Randall Collins and one that can be seen in the collective histrionics of revivalist groups.

Sociologist Émile Durkheim was also well acquainted with the releasing effect of collective sentiment. Generally, persons cultivate a capacity to withhold emotions in order to function in society, which correlatively means that they carry unreleased emotions. A ritual event, an event that is apart from daily life, unburdens the individual from the pressures of routine, offering an occasion for the release of what might otherwise be held back, something of a vacation from habitual emotional control. This context, in combination with the effect of what Durkheim referred to as the energy of the collective, can work to release emotional energy that has been present but has been held under control. The effect can seem excessively timed, but this may be no more an indication of falsehood than the fact that people do not tend to close their eyes and sigh with relief until they are at home, in comfortable reclining chairs, with their shoes off. However, some crying is nothing more than

deception, and the falsified tears of the accused, ambitious, vengeful, and even the disenfranchised are legion.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** “Boy Who Cried Wolf”; Bush, George W.; Children, Development of Deception in; Childhood, Lying in; Clinton, Bill; Dishonesty; Distrust; Emotions; False Signals; Iago (Shakespeare’s *Othello*); Manipulation.

### Further Readings

- Carmichael, Kay. *Ceremony of Innocence: Tears, Power, and Protest*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
- Frey, William H. III and Muriel Langeth. *Crying: The Mystery of Tears*. Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1987.
- Thompson, N. S., Brian Dessureau, and Carolyn Olson. “Infant Cries as Evolutionary Melodrama: Extortion or Deception?” *Evolution of Communication*, v.2/1 (1998).



# D

## Daily Life, Lying in

Researchers studying lying in everyday life have surveyed participants, often on a daily basis, to ascertain key details about lying, including the frequency with which people lie, the type and function of lies, individual differences in lying, and the emotional consequences of lying. Researchers have concluded that lying is incredibly common, serves personal and social functions, varies considerably across individuals, and may trigger acute distress. Although there are methodological limitations in this area of research, these studies provide useful insights into lying on an everyday basis.

### Form, Function, Personality, and Emotions

Lying to others is not entirely unusual. A review of empirical literature assessing daily lying frequency reveals that human beings admit to telling lies in, on average, 20 percent of social interactions. On a typical day, people lie an average of approximately one time, but some lie as many as five times, and about 10 percent avoid lying altogether. The type, function, and perceived magnitude of these lies vary across individuals and contexts. To better understand this variability, researchers have created taxonomies of everyday lies, drawing from human participants' reports of their routine lying experiences—an assessment technique often referred to as the daily diary technique.

Types of routine lies that have been identified using this technique include active lies, passive lies, and exaggerations. Active lies are characterized by an outright attempt to conceal or contradict the truth by presenting false facts. For example, a college student going to a party may claim to his parents that he will be studying all night with his peers. Also, a cheating partner or criminal suspect may lie about their whereabouts. Passive lies involve deliberately omitting or evading information with the objective of creating a false sense of reality. For example, a real estate agent may fail to notify a potential home buyer about a leaky roof with the aim of fashioning a positive impression of the property. Similarly, in a relationship, one partner may avoid mentioning a stressful aspect of their day in order to avoid triggering unnecessary distress for their partner. Finally, exaggerations are marked by an overstatement of the truth, in contrast to blatant fabrication. For example, a tropical vacationer may boast a temperature that is 10 degrees warmer to a distant hometown friend. Similarly, an individual may play up personal accomplishments during a job interview or first date.

### Motives for Lying

Not all lies have the same function; motives for telling lies are variable. Lies may be self-focused, other-focused, or altruistic (some deception researchers use the latter terms interchangeably,

though a distinction is made here). Self-focused lies are generally told to save face (that is, impression manage), or to avoid judgment or admission of personal weaknesses and failures (e.g., a university student tells his peers that he earned high marks on his failed biology exam). People may also tell self-oriented lies to avoid discussing sensitive emotional information, evade responsibility or commitment, or even to avoid verbal or physical confrontation (e.g., a tenant tells his landlord to expect a rent payment tomorrow, despite a depleted bank account).

Some empirical studies have found that self-oriented lies are more frequently told to strangers or acquaintances than close others (e.g., friends, family, and romantic partners), perhaps attributable to the desire to maintain interpersonal closeness or the presumption that close others may be more suspect of deception (though this varies by attachment style). Other-focused lies are told to protect the psychological welfare or self-interests of others on the receiving end of the lie (e.g., a dinner party guest praises the host's cooking skills despite his disgust). Resembling other-focused lies, altruistic lies are intended to protect the interests and emotions of others; they are distinct in that they are told to a third party regarding the individual to be protected (e.g., a college student reports to her professor that her class-skipping roommate and classmate is attending a funeral).

While people are less likely to tell lies to close others (in contrast to acquaintances or strangers), overall the lies that they tell close others tend to be other-focused in nature. Deceiving friends, family members, or romantic others can be personally distressing, particularly when lies are self-serving. However, in circumstances in which the psychological welfare of a close individual would be at stake when presented with an honest statement, the use of other-focused lies may be more readily justified.

### Attachment Style, Personality Theory, and Demographics

The finding that self-oriented lies are generally told to strangers or acquaintances is nuanced because exceptions have been found in literature about attachment style. One's attachment style, or way of relating to intimate others (e.g., parents,

lovers, and friends), is associated with the types of lies one tells and to whom. In particular, some research has identified differences in daily lying between individuals with an anxious versus avoidant attachment style. The anxious attachment style is marked by a desire for emotional closeness, a fear of abandonment, and dependency on others; this style is associated with telling a higher frequency of self-oriented lies to strangers or nonromantic friends than to romantic partners. Alternatively, those with an avoidant attachment style, characterized by a fear of dependency and intimacy, are prone to tell more self-oriented lies to their romantic partners (a close other) than to strangers or friends, seemingly to maintain an air



*People may tell self-oriented lies to avoid discussing sensitive emotional information, evade responsibility, or avoid verbal or physical confrontation. For example, a tenant calls her landlord and tells him to expect a rent payment the following day, when in truth, she has a depleted bank account.*

of independence and to limit vulnerability in their most intimate relationships.

Building on this attachment style literature, researchers have also attempted to understand variation in lying through the vantage point of personality theory. Personality refers to characteristic patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior. Commonly, personality is measured across five broad domains: neuroticism (the tendency to experience negative emotions and emotional dysregulation), extraversion (the tendency to experience positive emotions and prefer social interactions and activity), openness to experience (the tendency to try new things and enjoy intellectual topics), agreeableness (the tendency to be polite and nonconfrontational), and conscientiousness (the tendency to work hard and be orderly and responsible). Each of these domains incorporates a number of smaller facets of personality; for example, neuroticism facets often include anxiety, anger, depression, self-consciousness, immoderation, and vulnerability.

Personality research shows that liars in their daily life are less conscientious, less agreeable, and more neurotic than average. For example, in the authors' research involving large international samples of adults, individuals who reported lying more frequently were particularly low on conscientiousness; they reported that they had a lower sense of duty or ethical obligation to others, had lower academic achievement, were less self-disciplined, and were less friendly to others. Those who lie more often are also more disagreeable; for example, they find it challenging to trust others, they describe themselves as less moral and altruistic, they are less cooperative, and they are apparently less humble in describing their strengths. Those prone to lying are also more neurotic, and are particularly prone to sadness and depression. Lying is not particularly related to extraversion or openness to experience. In summary, personality research suggests that in their daily lives, individuals prone to lying are more self-interested, confrontational, and sad, and less interested in morality and work ethic.

There may also be important demographic differences in daily lying. Much of the research in this domain has focused on gender differences. On average, females report that they lie slightly more frequently than males. They also

tend to believe that they lie more successfully than males. However, the gender of the person being lied to also plays a role. Specifically, lies are more likely to occur in same-sex interactions than opposite-sex interactions, with lying most common in female-to-female interactions. Other demographic characteristics have received less attention. Some studies suggest that across adulthood, individuals lie less frequently and are more trusting with age. Other factors, such as race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, have not received attention in research on daily lying. Although lying varies across the population, it is relatively common.

### **Social and Personal Acceptance of Lying**

Despite its commonness, lying is not an explicitly accepted social behavior. If one is asked whether they support the act of lying, or if they would teach their children to tell lies, it is most probable that they would respond negatively; frequent use of the age-old maxim "honesty is the best policy" speaks to this claim. Not all lies are equally socially unacceptable, however. There are some data that suggest self-serving and malicious lies are condemned more than lies that are intended to protect others (other-oriented and altruistic lies).

For the average individual, the perceived magnitude of telling everyday lies is diminutive, resulting in minimal guilt and cognitive stress. This is particularly true of individuals who are characteristically manipulative (have the ability to influence) and are able to act in social situations, as some research has demonstrated. This may also be an artifact of confidence in lie telling; some data suggest that everyday lie tellers tend to be confident that they will not be exposed, and if one's lies are convincing, considering how the target might feel in the case of disclosure is futile. Lying also has emotional consequences for the person being lied to, including anger, sadness, and contempt. When someone is lied to in an interaction, they report greater dislike of the lie teller and are also more likely to increase their lying in return. Thus, while the lie-teller may experience minimal guilt and cognitive stress in the moment, the longer-term repercussions of lying are potentially sizeable in that they may risk harming later socioemotional functioning.

The notion that lying is a reproachable behavior highlights the difficulty that lying and deception researchers confront when trying to learn about the frequency and content of individuals' lies. A significant methodological concern in research on daily lying is that it assumes that individuals will report their lies with relative openness and honesty. For example, when an individual reports lying zero times per day, this is taken at face value, but it could be that some dishonest individuals also lie to understate their frequency of lying. This may be more common when individuals are asked to report on lies told in contexts that are socially undesirable (e.g., lying about cheating on a partner, or lying to cover up a crime).

Thus, existing reports may underestimate the frequency with which people lie, particularly in socially undesirable contexts. Some techniques have been developed to destigmatize lying and make participants more likely to honestly report on their lying behaviors in a research context. One approach is to emphasize to participants that lying is not condemned in the context of the investigation. Other strategies include emphasizing confidentiality or providing participants with anonymity. Still others include embedding response validity items within surveys, items such as "I read the entire newspaper each day," to weed out participants who are providing obviously invalid information.

A number of studies have been conducted to document the form and function of everyday lying. This research shows that lying is common, but complex; it comes in a variety of forms and serves several different functions. The form and function of lying varies among individuals, based on their attachment style, personality, and demographic characteristics. Although lying is common, it has emotional consequences. There are methodological challenges in research on everyday lying, leaving the door open for novel future investigations in this domain.

Holly L. Ketterer  
Central Michigan University  
Michael Hoerger  
Tulane University

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Cheating; Cooperation; Deception Motives; Emotions; Distrust;

Lying, Costs of; Lying, Prevalence of; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy. "Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74/1 (1998).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70/5 (1996).
- Ennis, E., A. Vrij, and C. Chance. "Individual Differences and Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.25/1 (2008).
- Gonza, L. F., A. Vrij, and R. Bull. "The Impact of Individual Differences on Perceptions of Lying in Everyday Life and in a High Stakes Situation." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.31 (2001).
- Ketterer, H. L. and M. Hoerger. "Open Access Data on Personality Correlates of Lying." <http://www.psychmike.com/lying.php> (Accessed October 2012).

## Darwin, Charles

Charles Darwin left the world a substantial legacy of theory and research through both animal and human observational and experimental study. An English naturalist, Darwin proposed in his book *On the Origin of Species* (1859) the theory of evolution of species by descent from common ancestors, describing the evolutionary mechanism of natural selection and the struggle for survival. Darwin's works have informed and at times predicted future research on deception in the social and evolutionary sciences. While Darwin did not often directly write on deception, and while such descriptions often focused more on animals than humans, Darwin's ideas are a forerunner of modern deception research regarding both detection and practice.

Darwin mentions human deception detection in his book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), in which he argues that facial expressions are inherited and adaptive for the persons generating an emotion, allowing for better reaction to their environmental context. Darwin describes communication with colleagues who



report how people of various races detect deceit from expressions. Shifty and guilty eyes and eye movements play a prominent role in these descriptions, which foreshadow later work on beliefs about deception detection. Darwin did not focus on the mechanics of differentiating deceptive from genuine emotionally rich facial expressions or on their production, but his ideas concerning betrayal of true feelings and of feigned emotional expressions led him to originate two important hypotheses in early deception-detection research. Paul Ekman refers to the first as the inhibition hypothesis: If one cannot produce an action voluntarily, then one cannot prevent it when it is triggered by involuntary impulses such as emotion. The second involves Darwin's idea that facial muscles are the most difficult to control when one is emotional and that body cues (e.g., shaking from anger) are easier to suppress.

Ekman has argued that Darwin's first hypothesis is consistent with his own hypothesis concerning emotional leakage (betrayal of emotion, despite attempted concealment). Similarly, Ekman and his colleagues' work on microexpressions (brief, involuntary facial expressions presumably caused by emotional experience) directly follow on Darwin's idea regarding leakage. Darwin also refers to what is now called the Duchenne smile—the genuine smile, almost impossible to voluntarily produce or prevent.

### Challenging Darwin's Ideas

Recent research challenges Darwin and Ekman's ideas. Studies consistently find that people are normally only slightly better than chance (about 54 percent) at discerning truths from lies. The various cues that both Darwin and Ekman refer to may largely be misconceptions, or those exhibiting them examples of "leaky liars" (4 percent above chance). Darwin's ideas provided scientists with greater understanding of the coevolution of deceivers and the deceived, with some researchers positing that the evolutionarily functional advantages of human facial expressions to deceivers are also advantageous to observers by signaling emotions. Analysis of the latter aids observers' survival. Some researchers have proposed and found support for the idea based on Darwin's inhibition hypothesis that facial cues (e.g., muscle contraction), leakage of genuine emotion,

and unsuccessful false-emotion displays are more prominent in high-stakes emotional situations involving complex lies.

Before discounting Darwin's contributions, consider that much of modern deception-in-practice research—concerning when, why, and how people lie—can also be traced back to Darwin's ideas. Based on his reasoning, including thoughts on levels of animal mimicry and human social behavior, several modern authors posit categories of deception generally equating to genes-based, learned, and intentional. Humans fall in the latter group, which requires theory of mind (TOM)—the ability to attribute differential mental states to oneself and others.

Darwin's ideas about human social interactions are primarily discussed in chapters 4 and 5 of *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871). Together with TOM, these ideas later influenced the Machiavellian intelligence or social brain hypothesis, a key competing hypothesis of human brain evolution. The idea is that humans' large brains and enhanced cognitive aptitude evolved through social pressures to develop more sophisticated deceptive strategies for helping navigate social environments and enhancing survival and reproductive success. Darwin's discussion of cooperative behavior within groups in *Descent* also spurred later research on the evolution of cooperation and defection, with deceptive cheaters trying to maximize their reproductive success; research on group solidarity to examine why in-group members may be deceptive toward out-group members; studies on the effects of reputational concerns; and research involving subtle cues of being watched increasing prosocial behavior. Research on cooperators and defectors inspired by Darwin's insights on the desire for good relations with in-group members, in which he speaks of the loyalty of savages to each other but not to strangers, anticipates modern deception research, showing that people lie more to out-group members than to in-group members.

Darwin's logic of evolution by natural selection also provides an underlying reason for Bella DePaulo's three-part classification of the lies people tell—self-oriented, other-oriented, and third-party altruistic—in which the type of lie told would depend on the survival/reproductive benefit to the individual and/or group. Darwin's

observation in *Descent* regarding the seemingly inherited tendency of certain upper-class families to lie and steal has also recently been supported by research showing that higher social class predicts increased unethical behavior.

Finally, regarding the animal kingdom, Darwin's observations led to and informed later research on mimicry, the evolution of (dis)honest signals in relation to both prey-predator interactions and mate acquisition (e.g., courtship), and potential instances of tactical deception in non-human primates and other animals. Such work, along with Darwin's writings on sexual selection, formed the basis for many scholars today studying the role of deception in human partner acquisition and retention.

Charles Darwin's works and the ideas formed from those he passed on to his collective descendants have played an important role in shaping the way deception research is conducted in the modern world. His theory of evolution via natural selection and his insights into behavior have informed work on both deception detection and practice.

Brian Mayer  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Animals; Cooperation; Courtship, Deception in; Deception Detection Accuracy; Duchenne Smile; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Evolution and Natural Selection; False Signals; Fireflies; History of Deception: 1800–1900; Leakage; Lying, Intentionality of; Machiavellianism; Microfacial Expressions; Mimicry; Nonverbal Cues; Primates; Relationships: Romantic; Reputation; Theory of Mind.

#### Further Readings

- Darwin, C. *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. London: John Murray, 1871.
- Darwin, C. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. London: John Murray, 1872.
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein, "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Ekman, P. "Darwin, Deception, and Facial Expression." *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*, v.1000 (2003).

Guzeldere G., E. Nahmias, and R. Deaner. "Darwin's Continuum and the Building Blocks of Deception." In *The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition*, M. Bekoff, C. Allen, and G. M. Burghardt, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.

ten Brinke, L. T., S. Porter, and A. Baker. "Darwin the Detective: Observable Facial Muscle Contractions Reveal Emotional High-Stakes Lies." *Evolution and Human Behavior*, v.33/12 (2012).

## Deception, Attitudes Toward

Most research on attitudes toward deception points in the same direction. It shows that attitudes tend to be negative. Although telling a lie is publicly condemned, research and experience prove that deception is nonetheless very common. This resonates with other often-found evidence demonstrating that even though a person might hold a negative attitude toward deceiving someone else, this attitude will be attenuated by a multitude of factors, including situational aspects, intentions, and his or her position or perspective. It seems, therefore, that an exception to the rule is easily made.

Deception can be found in all realms of life, and attitudes vary accordingly. Most people will agree that lying about Santa Claus to their children is permissible, whereas deception by governments or banks is widely criticized. On one hand, parents want to raise their children to be honest people and for that reason parents teach their children to never tell a lie. On the other hand, parents also want their children to be polite, decent people, so that on their birthday, a child must pretend to like grandma's gift. In some situations, telling a lie is even seen as the moral thing to do. Almost all people, even those who have a high moral standard, will deceive another person while holding the belief—and maintaining it to others—that they are adhering to their ideal of honesty.

Throughout history, records of attitudes toward deceptive behavior have been dominated by accounts of theologians and philosophers. The

philosopher Immanuel Kant, for example, declared that one should never tell a lie. Doing so would throw away a man's dignity. He reasoned that people owe the truth to everybody, even to a murderer at the door inquiring about a friend's whereabouts. However, the notion that lies are at times justifiable—an idea that was already common in antiquity—could not be held back. Although historical accounts inadvertently condemn the act of telling a lie, bending the rules to serve self-interest was not an exception; with the prescription not to tell a lie, exemptions always followed soon thereafter.

### **Factors Affecting the Acceptability of Lying**

Today, attitudes about deception are also predominantly negative. However, one should not jump to the conclusion that all lies are seen as bad. One reason for this is that factors that make telling a lie more or less acceptable are taken into account when individuals evaluate a specific lie, but these factors are not taken into account when they formulate their negative evaluations of lying overall. In addition, individuals want to maintain an image of themselves as honest persons. This behavior is explained by psychologists, who maintain that people have a negative attitude toward deception, while allowing some room for justification when they tell a lie. Factors that make people more tolerant of lying include differences in the situation, the reason a lie is told, the target of the deception, whether the person is the deceiver or the deceived, and the liar's personality.

Attitudes vary across situations. For instance, lies are judged less harshly when the stakes are low and a lie has little impact. When the stakes are high and a lie can potentially have large consequences, judgments are more unforgiving. Different situations also vary in the amount of room that they leave for deception to be accepted. This is partly because of the expectations that situations inherently bring with them. In a poker game, a player is expected to bluff; but in a negotiation, people believe that using a deceptive tactic, like making false promises, is inappropriate.

One other often-mentioned factor that influences whether an attitude toward deception is more or less negative is the reason that a lie is told. For instance, one reason for telling a lie can be to save another person from harm. A large proportion of all lies are told with this apparent altruistic

intent, and this tends to make evaluations of these so-called other-oriented lies—although still tending toward the negative end of the spectrum—more favorable. Empirical research confirms that attitudes toward telling a lie are more accepting when the reasons for telling it are not self-serving, for instance, to save another from losing face or to protect his or her self-esteem.

Another factor that influences a person's attitudes toward deception is the target of the deception. Telling a lie to a friend is less accepted than telling a lie to an acquaintance, and, ironically, it seems the lies people do tell their close others are more severe, bigger lies. In romantic relationships honesty is also highly valued. Yet, comparable to the aforementioned situations, when the target of a lie is one's romantic partner, people are quick to come to the conclusion that misleading one's partner is in some situations acceptable, and is even the moral thing to do.

When a lie is told, there are always at least two sides to the story. The person telling the lie will have a different view of the situation than the person who is lied to. Whether one is the deceiver or the deceived, or the perspective one has, affects one's attitude toward deception. For those who are left to deal with the consequences of a lie told to them, attitudes are strongly negative.

Attitudes toward lying have also been found to vary according to the personality of the person who has this attitude. Although a clear relationship between specific personality characteristics and general attitudes toward lying is hard to find, some personality characteristics can predict the acceptability of different types of lies. For example, people with high self-monitoring—the ability to regulate one's self-presentation to achieve a desired appearance of oneself—have been found to judge self-serving lies more acceptable than people low on this personality variable.

Other factors that have been found to influence attitudes toward deception include age and culture. It seems children acquire an increasing appreciation for factors such as the intention of the liar. For adults, it seems that as people get older, their attitude toward telling lies becomes slightly more negative. Although research suggests that attitudes are in part learned and culturally determined, there is no hard and fast rule for different cultures when it comes to attitudes toward deception. Differences

that exist between cultures vary according to relationships, situations, and motives for the lie. An example of how cultures have been found to differ in their attitude is a lie about a good deed. Chinese children were found to view this kind of lie as a more positive act than Canadian children because they considered telling the truth about a good deed to be bragging.

### Attitude and Behavior

However, the attitudes that influence deception are mostly self-reported and therefore might be influenced by social desirability and lack of self-knowledge. There is uncertainty about whether these explicit attitudes are in accordance with actual behavior. The question remains whether a person who has a positive attitude toward deception will deceive others more often than a person who holds a more negative attitude toward deception. It can be argued that a positive attitude will benefit a liar, because lying without the anxiety and guilt stemming from a negative attitude toward deception might make the lie more difficult to detect. For the act of deceiving another person, as well as for other socially sensitive behavior, implicit attitudes might have a greater predictive power. It seems people who have positive implicit attitudes toward deception might be more inclined to engage in spontaneous deceptive behavior, but future research must find more evidence to support this statement.

People's attitudes toward deception are predominantly negative, although not unconditionally so. Even though individuals have the tendency to hold the belief that telling a lie is wrong, there is a multitude of factors that moderate this tendency. This may be for a good reason: The fact that individuals hold such a belief while recurrently and intentionally deceiving each other may make them hypocrites, but the belief that telling a lie is wrong also allows them to maintain a view of themselves as honest people.

Anna E. van 't Veer  
Mariëlle Stel  
Tilburg University

**See Also:** DePaulo, Bella; Lie Acceptability; Lies, Types of; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Lying, Intentionality of; Santa Claus; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Backbier, E., J. Hoogstraten, and K. M. Terwogt-Kouwenhoven. "Situational Determinants of the Acceptability of Telling Lies." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.27 (1997).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Gordon, A. K. and A. G. Miller. "Perspective Differences in the Construal of Lies: Is Deception in the Eye of the Beholder?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.26 (2000).
- Gozna, L., A. Vrij, and R. Bull. "The Impact of Individual Differences on Perceptions of Lying in Everyday Life and in a High Stake Situation." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.31 (2001).
- Seiter, J. S., J. Bruschke, and C. Bai. "The Acceptability of Deception as a Function of Perceivers' Culture, Deceiver's Intention, and Deceiver-Deceived Relationship." *Western Journal of Communication*, v.66 (2002).

## Deception, Characteristics of

It is commonly accepted that the word *deceive* is a success or achievement verb, such that an act of deceiving is not such unless a certain result has been achieved. In this sense, "deceive" differs from "lie" because "lie" is not a success or achievement verb. It is also commonly accepted that deception does not require language or the use of conventional signs. For example, it is possible to deceive by using only natural or causal signs, such limping or leaving a glove at the scene of a crime.

Conversely, it is also possible to deceive by failing to say something, or by making untruthful statements. Many believe that lying requires language or the use of conventional signs, or that lying requires a statement—an untruthful one. In these ways, deception also differs from lying.

### What Does Deception Involve?

Nevertheless, there remain a number of questions about what deception involve: (1) What result





*Although many philosophers speak of unintentional and intentional deception, it is more common to use the term mislead to cover all cases of propagating false beliefs, to distinguish between intentional and unintentional misleading, and to restrict the term deceive to the concept of intentional misleading. It would be unorthodox to say that "Jane deceived Susan" during their conversation, when in fact Susan simply misinterpreted what Jane said. It may even be unorthodox to say that Jane misled Susan.*

is necessary for deception? Is a new false belief required, is the maintaining of a false belief sufficient, or may a person be deceived merely by losing a true belief, or even by merely failing to gain a true belief? (2) Must deception be intentional, or may one unintentionally deceive? (3) Must a deceiver commit a certain act, or must a deceiver merely not prevent something from occurring (such as the acquisition of a false belief)? (4) Must the belief-forming agency of the deceived person be involved, or does deception occur simply in virtue of the result obtained? (5) Does deception require that the deceiver possess certain relevant knowledge or true belief, or can a deceiver deceive without possessing any relevant knowledge or true belief? (6) Is the only true deception other-deception, or is self-deception truly a form of deception?

According to R. M. Chisholm and T. D. Feehan, there is both positive and negative deception. Positive deception occurs when one acquires a false belief or continues to maintain a false belief. Negative deception occurs when one loses a true

belief (without acquiring a false belief), or fails to acquire a true belief (without acquiring a false belief). Although most are willing to accept that "causing someone to persist in a false belief can constitute deception," and hence that all positive deception is deception, most people have traditionally not been willing to accept that merely preventing a person from acquiring a true belief constitutes deception. As Chisholm and Feehan note, "... both St. Augustine and St. Thomas ... do not call it 'deception.'"

An act of concealing information or withholding information, which are distinct acts, may only be an act of keeping a person in ignorance of something. This is distinct from deceiving a person: As philosophy professor and author Thomas Carson notes, "We need a term other than 'deception' to describe cases of preventing others from learning the truth. The English expression that most closely describes this is 'keeping someone in the dark.'"

Furthermore, causing a person "to lose one of his true beliefs," as noted by Chisholm and Feehan, can be understood as an act that is distinct

from an act of deceiving that person, as observed by J. E. Mahon. Causing a person to have amnesia, for example, is not necessarily an act of deception. For this reason, Chisholm and Feehan may be erroneous to state that negative deception is, in fact, a type of deception. The result that is necessary for deception may be the acquiring or maintaining of a false belief.

According to Carson, "Deception requires some kind of intention to cause others to have false beliefs. I take it to be self-contradictory to say that someone deceived another person unintentionally." Although it is possible to speak of unintentional deception and intentional deception, it is more common to use the term *mislead* to cover all cases of producing or maintaining false beliefs, and to distinguish between intentional misleading and unintentional misleading, where "deceive" is restricted to intentional misleading. It is highly unorthodox to say that "Jane deceived Bill" in the case of Bill misinterpreting what Jane said. However, it may also be unorthodox to say that Jane misled Bill. Hence, even if "deceive" is to be understood as an intentional act, it may be that "mislead" is to also be understood as an intentional act, and that another term is required to include cases of someone being caused to inadvertently or mistakenly have or maintain a false belief.

### Deception by Commission or Omission

According to Chisholm and Feehan, there is both deception by commission and by omission. Restricting explanation to cases of what they call "positive deception," deception by commission occurs when one causes someone to acquire or maintain a false belief, and deception by omission occurs when one allows someone to acquire or maintain a false belief. As they explain, "Let us say that a man allows a certain state of affairs to occur or obtain provided only (1) he could prevent that state of affairs from occurring or obtaining and (2) he does not thus prevent it from occurring or obtaining."

A person deceives by commission if, for example, she intentionally writes a false report that is believed by those who read it. A person deceives by omission if, for example, he (not being the author) allows another person to read and believe the false report, knowing or truly believing that

it is a false report. However, it is not clear that not preventing a person from acquiring or maintaining a false belief should be considered an act of deceiving that person. Whether or not acts of allowing are morally equivalent to acts of doing, or not morally equivalent, acts of allowing are not acts of doing. It is possible to restrict the meaning of "deceive" to an act of doing. It is possible to say that "Paul allowed Bethany to be deceived by Robin's false report," without saying that "Paul deceived Bethany" (at least about the report's contents). For this reason, Chisholm and Feehan may be erroneous to claim that "deception by omission" is in fact deception. A deceiver may have to commit a certain act.

### Belief-Forming Agency

According to Gary Fuller,  $x$  only deceives  $y$  if " $x$  gets  $y$  to believe" a falsehood "by bringing about evidence on the basis of which  $y$ " believes the falsehood. The deceived person must form the false belief herself or himself; therefore, his or her belief-forming agency must be involved in the deception. To use his example, if Christopher gets Peter to believe that there are vampires in England by operating on his brain, giving him an electric shock, or by drugging him, then Christopher does not deceive Peter because Peter's belief-forming agency is not involved at all. However, if Christopher gets Peter to believe that there are vampires in England by writing a book that "proves" that vampires exist, and that book is subsequently read and believed by Peter, then Christopher deceives Peter. It is Peter who forms the false belief that vampires exist on the basis of the "evidence" assembled in Christopher's book.

The restriction of deception to cases in which the person's belief-forming agency is involved is controversial. About putative cases of deception that bypass the person's belief-forming agency, Carson has noted the following:

At present we cannot directly cause other people to have beliefs; few people consider such cases and apply or fail to apply the word *deception* to them, so there is not a basis for saying that ordinary language has clear rules and understandings about what to say in such cases.

About such hypothetical cases, opinion remains divided as to whether they should count as cases of deception. Traditionally, it was held that a deceiver could only be said to deceive another person if he knew or truly believed that the falsehood that he caused the other person to believe was false. According to several writers, however, including Bas van Frassen (1988) and Annette Barnes (1997), it is possible to deceive another person without knowing or truly believing that falsehood to be false. Van Frassen illustrates this with the following:

Suppose that a certain bridge is dangerous, and I do not know this, that I really have no evidence that makes it less likely than not, for me, that the bridge is safe. But suppose in addition that I think it would be very good for me if you believed the bridge to be safe, and I successfully persuade you to believe this falsehood. Then I have certainly deceived you, although I do not know that the information was false.

It is not clear that convincing someone of something that one neither knows to be true nor false counts as deceiving that person, at least about that thing, as opposed to one's beliefs about the thing. In van Frassen's example, I have presumably deceived you about my beliefs, but I have not necessarily deceived you about the bridge if I neither know nor truly believe that the bridge is dangerous, but simply don't know or believe either way and convince you that it is safe when it is not.

### Self-Deception and Other-Deception

Deception is traditionally divided into other-deception (or interpersonal deception) and self-deception. However, it remains an open question as to whether self-deception and other-deception are both species of a single genus of deception. There are at least two problems for the claim that self-deception is a species of deception. First, because deception requires having a false belief, self-deception would seem to require both believing a falsehood to be true, and believing the falsehood to be false. This seems paradoxical (the "static" paradox). Second, because deception is an intentional act, self-deception requires intending to get one to believe something to be

true that one believes to be false. This also seems paradoxical (the "dynamic" or "strategic" paradox).

To these paradoxes there have been two responses. Intentionalists about self-deception hold that self-deception is a species of deception. They do this by dividing the self into earlier or later selves (temporal partitioning), or into different parts (psychological partitioning). An earlier self may intend to deceive a later self and may succeed in doing so. For example, an earlier self may write a false message to a later self, and the later self may believe it to be true. The cost of this intentionalist approach is that it is not clear why deception of later selves by earlier selves, or of one part of a self by another part, should be called self-deception.

Nonintentionalists about self-deception hold that self-deception simply consists in the holding of false beliefs that are motivationally biased. False beliefs are held on the basis of desire, anxiety, or some other emotion, rather than on the basis of evidence. The cost of this nonintentionalist approach is that it is not clear why holding a false belief on the basis of some desire or emotion should be understood as deceiving oneself.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Deception, Definitions of; History of Deception: 1950 to the Present; Lying, Intentionality of; Secrecy; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

- Adler, J. "Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating." *Journal of Philosophy*, v.94 (1997).
- Barnes, A. *Seeing Through Self-Deception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Carson, T. L. *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Chisholm, R. M. and T. D. Feehan. "The Intent to Deceive." *Journal of Philosophy*, v.74 (1977).
- DeWeese-Boyd, I. "Self-Deception." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2012). <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-deception> (Accessed August 2013).
- Faulkner, P. "Lying and Deceit." In *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, H. LaFollette, ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.



- Foot, P. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect." *Oxford Review*, v.5 (1967).
- Fuller, G. "Other-Deception." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, v.7 (1976).
- Kagan, S. *The Limits of Morality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
- Lackey, J. "Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce." *Analysis*, v.73 (2013).
- Mahon, J. E. "A Definition of Deceiving." *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, v.21 (2007).
- Mahon, J. E. "Two Definitions of Lying." *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, v.22 (2008).
- Mele, A. *Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Rachels, J. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." *New England Journal of Medicine*, v.292 (1975).
- Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson, 1949.
- Siegler, F. A. "Lying." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, v.3 (1966).
- Van Frassen, B. "The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire." In *Perspectives on Self-Deception*, B. P. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Williams, B. *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

## Deception, Definitions of

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines deception as, "To cause to believe what is false; to mislead as to a matter of fact, lead into error, impose upon, delude, 'take in.'" However, this is a rather simplified definition of deception because it refers only to those situations that involve propagating a falsehood. Deception also includes other cases, such as concealing important truthful information, allowing the hearer to continue believing a falsehood, and causing the hearer to cease to believe something that is true. Truth, here, does not mean the objective truth. It means some state of affairs that, correctly or not, the speaker believes to be true.

### Verbal and Nonverbal Deception

The following examples are all verbal deception. Consider an example of propagating a falsehood, in which a mean-spirited student seeks, during a test, to mislead his classmate who he dislikes. The student knows that his classmate needs to know what the capital of Turkey is. Knowing that it is not Istanbul, in order to cause his classmate to believe something false, he says: "Istanbul is the capital of Turkey."

An example of concealment would be a man who returns home very late because he had a long meeting in the afternoon, left work later than usual, and then went to see his girlfriend. When he gets home, his wife asks him, "Why are you so late?" In order to conceal the truth from her, he tells a half-truth, "We had a long meeting this afternoon that went on into the evening." If this scenario is slightly modified, and the wife, falsely assuming that her husband must have been working late, says, "Oh, you worked till so late today" (instead of asking him why he was late, as in the previous example), it would be an example of allowing the hearer to continue believing something false.

Now consider an example that causes the hearer to cease to believe something true: Knowing it was her 6-year-old son who emptied the cookie jar of all the cookies, she says to him, "You took the cookies, and I told you not to." The boy, wanting his mother to stop believing that he took the cookies, denies it: "I didn't take them. It wasn't me."

Deception can also be nonverbal. Nonverbal deception is prevalent in domains such as sports and the military, in which one misleads the opponent with respect to plans, strategies, and moves. A nonverbal deception in an everyday situation is of a person pretending to talk on the phone to make another person believe that he is busy.

### Deception and Self-Deception

The prevalence of deception in everyday life is much higher than is usually assumed. People regularly deceive one another for a variety of motives, which may be socially sensitive, tactful, and diplomatic, or self-serving, manipulative, and deceitful.

Deception primarily occurs because, by default, people have a truth bias. They assume that they



are being told the truth, unless there is a reason to believe otherwise. Deceivers exploit this truth bias. The satirical movie *The Invention of Lying* highlights how frequently people use deceptions in their lives. Mark, the protagonist, lives in a full-disclosure world in which the concept of lying does not exist and in which everybody always expresses their thoughts to others. Mark discovers a radically new concept that is alien to the culture in which he lives; he discovers the concept of lying.

Apart from deceiving other people, humans also deceive themselves. Self-deception means believing something to be true, even if there is strong evidence to the contrary. The benefits of self-deception are that it helps individuals maintain a positive self-image by paying less attention to their failures and emphasizing their achievements. On the other hand, too much self-deception might lead individuals to make unreasonable assumptions about themselves, which may result in bad decisions and a loss of credibility in their social world.

It is not only humans who engage in the act of deception; deception is a common phenomenon of nature. Animals and plants also engage in forms of deception to mislead conspecifics, predators, and prey for various reasons. Camouflage is a common form of deception in nature. It is a method of concealment that allows animals and plants (or other objects) to remain unnoticed by blending with the environment or by resembling something else. For example, some species of octopuses can intentionally alter their body shape and color to resemble dangerous sea snakes.

Swati Gupta

Kayo Sakamoto

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Insects; Lies, Types of; Linguistic Cues; Lying, Prevalence of; Morals and Ethics; Nonverbal Cues; Plants; Self-Deception; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

Castelfranchi, C. and I. Poggi. "Lying as Pretending to Give Information." In *Pretending to Communicate*, H. Parret, ed. New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1993.

Chance, Z., M. Norton, F. Gino, and D. Ariely.

"Temporal View of the Costs and Benefits of Self-Deception." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, v.108/3 (2011).

Chisholm, R. M. and T. D. Feehan. "The Intent to Deceive." *Journal of Philosophy*, v.74/3 (1977).

Gupta, S., K. Sakamoto, and A. Ortony. "Telling It Like It Isn't: A Comprehensive Approach to Analyzing Verbal Deception." In *The Goals of Cognition: Festschrift for Cristiano Castelfranchi*, F. Paglieri, L. Tummolini, R. Falcone, M. Miceli, eds. London: College Publications, 2012.

Levine, T. R., R. K. Kim, and L. M. Hamel. "People Lie for a Reason: An Experimental Test of the Principle of Veracity." Presentation at the 2007 National Communication Association Convention: *Communicating Worldviews: Faith-Intellect-Ethics*. Chicago: November 15–18, 2007.

Pasteur, G. "A Classificatory Review of Mimicry Systems." *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, v.13 (1982).

Serota, K. B., T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster. "The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Reported Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

Vincent, J. M. and C. Castelfranchi. "On the Art of Deception: How to Lie While Saying the Truth." In *Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics: Proceedings of the Conference on Pragmatics, Urbino, Italy, July 8–14, 1979*, H. Parret, M. Sbisa, and J. Verschueren, eds. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1979.

Wickler, W. *Mimicry in Plants and Animals*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

---

## Deception, Research on

Deception is a topic that has interested researchers in the social and behavioral sciences for decades. A multitude of studies, using a variety of techniques and research methodologies, have been conducted in an attempt to answer some important questions related to lying and deception. Some of the most common techniques used by researchers can be found in three primary domains of deception research: the study of

people's tendencies to lie and deceive, including how often, why, and in what contexts; the study of deception cues and the ability of people to detect deception in others; and the study of the outcomes and consequences of deception for both the deceiver and the deceived.

### The Tendency to Deceive

A core area of deception research focuses on the tendencies of individuals to lie and deceive others. Questions asked in this area of research include: How often do people lie? Do some people lie more frequently than others? Are certain circumstances especially conducive to deceptive behavior?

One particularly useful method for tracking how frequently individuals lie in their everyday lives is the daily diary study. Over the course of a set number of days, participants in this type of study use either a notebook or, more recently, a smart phone application to record all of their social interactions. They also report all of the times that they intentionally lied or tried to mislead someone during these interactions and their reasons for doing so. At the end of the set time period, participants turn in their diaries, which are analyzed for the frequency and types of lies that were reported.

Results of these diary studies—for example, in research by K. B. Serota, T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster in 2010—reveal that, on average, people tend to report intentionally deceiving others quite frequently, averaging about one lie per every four social interactions (or about one to two times per day). When participants' lying tendencies are individually analyzed, however, it is revealed that a majority of the total lies reported can be accounted for by a relatively small percentage of individuals in each sample. A similar pattern of results has been found by researchers using nationally representative surveys of self-reported lying behavior. Thus, in their everyday lives, most people do not report lying very often, but a minority of the population seems to engage quite prolifically in deceptive behavior.

In addition to tracking overall lying frequency, by coding participants' descriptions of the lies that they reported, researchers are able to determine how frequently people engage in specific types of deception. For example, the majority of the lies reported in the daily diaries are self-oriented and

are thus told to promote the individual's self-interest. These include lies told to embellish personal accomplishments, make oneself seem kinder and more intelligent, and save oneself from embarrassment in social situations. However, to a much lesser extent, participants report telling other-oriented lies, usually with the intention of protecting the feelings of others.

Deception researchers frequently use survey and daily diaries in conjunction with personality assessments and other individual-difference measures to determine what types of people are more prone to lying in their everyday lives. For example, individuals who score higher on scales of manipulateness and impression management tend to report lying more frequently in their diaries. Relationship quality is perhaps the most robust predictor of everyday lying. Participants who report being involved in satisfying and enduring relationships with others tend to record fewer lies (especially self-oriented lies) than those with less satisfying relationships.

Another paradigm frequently used in the study of deceptive tendencies is the monitored social interaction. In these studies, participants are brought into a lab two at a time, where they are told to introduce themselves to one another and engage in a short conversation that is secretly videotaped. Following the interaction, the participants are taken to separate rooms, where they watch the video of their conversation and record any lies they told during the interaction. Using this method, researchers have more control over the social situation in which deception tendencies are measured than the daily diary paradigm.

Researchers can even manipulate certain aspects of the interaction to see if varying social conditions affect people's tendencies to deceive. For example, researchers have found that manipulating participants' motivations influences the number of lies that are told. Participants who are told to focus on presenting themselves as likeable or competent to their interaction partners tend to tell more lies and exaggerations than those who are not given such instructions. Additionally, participants who are told that they might be interacting with their partners again in the future tend to report telling more lies during the exchange than those who are led to believe that they will never see their partners again.

Researchers have also conducted studies showing that, in some contexts, deception can be especially prevalent. One such context is the job interview. In the job interview paradigm, participants are brought to a lab and are led to believe that they are applying for a particular job (such as a tutor or office assistant). They complete a written application containing questions about their background and academic history and take part in a mock job interview in which they are asked scripted questions regarding their job-relevant skills and experience. At the conclusion of the interview, it is revealed that the job is not real, and participants are asked to review their application and video of the interview and identify any lies that they told. The results of these studies reveal that people frequently lie in the context of job interviews, and they tend to tell lies that they think will make them appear to be a better fit for the job. For example, if the job is described as more technical in nature, participants tend to exaggerate their computer skills, whereas if the job is more academic in nature, participants are more likely to enhance their academic record.

Another context in which researchers have found deception to be especially prevalent is dating and romantic attraction. In one particular experimental paradigm, participants are provided with a picture and personality profile of a potential dating partner. They then complete a profile of themselves that they assume will be given to the potential date. When participants view the profile of a date toward whom they report being highly attracted, they tell more self-enhancing lies in their profile (e.g., exaggerating their income and intelligence) than when the potential date is not as attractive to them. Participants also alter their self-descriptions and tailor them to better match what they think their potential date is looking for in a partner.

### **Deception Cues and Detection**

A second domain of deception research centers on deception cues and the ability of individuals to detect deception in others. In order to study deception cues (behaviors that people tend to exhibit while lying) researchers induce participants to either lie or tell the truth. This can be done in a variety of ways. In some instances, participants are told to lie to an interaction partner about certain

personal facts or beliefs, such as their favorite type of music or their position on a particular political issue. In other cases, they may be presented with a visual stimulus (such as a set of pictures or a video tape) and asked to describe what they see to an experimenter in either a truthful or deceptive manner. Another common manipulation is to induce participants to cheat on a laboratory task and then have them lie to an interviewer about what they did. In all of these cases, participants are generally audio or video recorded, and following the experiment, these recordings are observed by researchers and coded for certain behavioral cues that may be indicative of deception.

From these studies—including research published in 2003 by B. M. DePaulo and colleagues—researchers have concluded that when people are being deceitful, they tend to make more negative statements and come off as less pleasant than when they are being truthful. Additionally, they tend to be more tense and anxious when lying, as is manifested by speaking more slowly and deliberately, pausing more frequently, and avoiding eye contact to a greater extent than those who are telling the truth. Such deception cues tend to be most pronounced when telling self-related lies or when lying following a transgression (such as cheating).

Deception researchers are also interested in how accurate people are in detecting deception in others. The interview paradigm is one of the most frequently used methods in this type of research. It involves bringing previously unacquainted participants into a lab two at a time and assigning one to be the “sender” and the other to be the “receiver.” The receiver asks the sender a series of questions, and the sender responds with either a truthful answer or a lie. It is the receiver’s job to determine whether each of the sender’s statements is truthful or not. At the conclusion of the interaction, the researcher tallies the number of statements that the receiver correctly identified as either truths or lies. Using this paradigm, it has been found that people are generally not much better than chance at detecting deception by the senders (i.e., they are able to correctly identify the truthfulness of just over 50 percent of the statements). Participants have been shown to be more accurate in judging truths than lies, but only because they exhibit a strong truth bias, or

tendency to judge a majority of overall statements as true.

Variations on this basic interview structure are used to test a variety of hypotheses regarding a person's ability to detect deception. One variation is to alter the medium through which senders present their statements to receivers. For example, a receiver's deception detection accuracy is relatively consistent, regardless of whether the sender's statements are transmitted in person, over video, or via audio recording. In a common video-based design, participants are presented with a series of video clips in which a sender expresses opinions on a variety of controversial political and social issues (such as capital punishment and abortion). Half of the statements reflect the real beliefs of the sender, and half reflect views that run contrary to the sender's true opinions. While watching the videos, receivers must indicate whether they think the speakers are expressing their actual opinion or a contrary opinion for each issue.

The interview paradigm has also been used to explore factors that lead to improvements in deception detection accuracy. Deception "experts," such as police officers and military personnel who have been trained in interviewing and interrogation methods, do not significantly differ from "novice" participants when it comes to differentiating truths from lies in the interview paradigm. However, some experimental manipulations have been shown to lead to slightly better detection abilities. When participants are told to focus on more indirect indicators of deception, such as whether or not the sender appears to be tense or thinking hard before responding, they are more accurate than if they are simply told to report if they think the sender is lying. Similarly, receivers who report focusing on certain cues that are reliable predictors of deception, such as slower, more deliberate speech, word repetition, and use of negative statements, tend to be more accurate than those who do not.

Because strangers have proven to be relatively unsuccessful at detecting deception in one another, researchers have begun to use longitudinal designs to see if detection accuracy improves between two individuals over time. In a longitudinal study, pairs of same-sex friends who have only known each other for a short time (generally a month or less) are recruited to participate.

Their abilities to detect deception in each other are assessed using the receiver/sender interview paradigm at an initial time period, and then again at various time periods further along in their relationship. Close friendship pairs tend to show modest improvement over time in their ability to tell true statements from false ones. Overall, however, friends tend to be just as accurate (or inaccurate) as complete strangers in detecting deception.

### Consequences of Deception

Deception researchers have also focused their attention on a third domain: the outcomes and consequences of deceptive behavior. Much of the scientific research conducted in this area falls within the context of close interpersonal relationships. The standard procedure for such studies involves instructing participants to reflect on past events in either their current or most recent romantic relationship. They are asked to think about a time when either they lied to their partner or their partner lied to them. They then report if and when the lie was discovered, describe the events that followed, and explain their and their partners' emotional reactions to the event.

Additionally, participants are usually asked to complete various questionnaires and survey items, depending on what questions the researchers hope to answer. By recording participants' scores on scales measuring such interpersonal qualities as attachment style, communication patterns, and social desirability, researchers are able to develop links between certain types of people and their responses to partner deception. For instance, people who report being securely attached to their relationship partners tend to have open communication styles and thus are able to quickly resolve issues related to deception. Those who are less securely attached, however, report hiding their feelings more frequently and avoid talking about incidences of deception with their partners. This avoidance is related to negative relational outcomes, including low relationship satisfaction and dissolution.

A few studies have explored the consequences of deception in nonrelationship contexts. In these studies, participants are induced by an experimenter to lie to a target person, and then their perceptions of themselves and the target person



are measured. An interesting finding revealed in this paradigm is that people who are experimentally instructed to lie tend to rate the target person as less trustworthy than participants who do not engage in deceptive behavior. Thus, an individual's deceptive behavior has consequences on how that person perceives others.

### Conclusion

A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the topic of deception. Using daily diary and monitored social interaction paradigms, researchers can track people's deceptive behavior both quantitatively and qualitatively. Results of studies using the interview paradigm reveal that people (both "novices" and "experts") tend to be relatively unsuccessful at detecting deception in others. Finally, a number of studies have been conducted linking people's scores on various personality-based questionnaires with how they deal with deception in their relationships. These responses to deception are shown to have different consequences on relationship satisfaction and longevity.

Gaven A. Ehrlich  
Richard H. Gramzow  
*Syracuse University*

**See Also:** Academia; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception in Different Contexts; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Lying, Prevalence of.

### Further Readings

- Anderson, D. E., B. M. DePaulo, and M. E. Ansfield. "The Development of Deception Detection Skill: A Longitudinal Study of Same-Sex Friends." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.28 (2002).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Frank, M. G. "Research Methods in Detecting Deception Research." In *The New Handbook of Methods in Nonverbal Behavior Research*, J. A.

- Harrigan, R. Rosenthal, and K. R. Scherer, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Jang, S. A., S. Smith, and T. Levine. "To Stay or To Leave? The Role of Attachment Styles in Communication Patterns and Potential Termination of Romantic Relationships Following Discoveries of Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.69 (2002).
- Serota, K. B., T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster. "The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).
- Weiss, B. and R. S. Feldman. "Looking Good and Lying to Do It: Deception as an Impression Management Strategy in Job Interviews." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.36 (2006).

---

## Deception and Technology

Changes in technology have made deception easier to practice and more difficult to detect. Recent developments in technology have enabled people to doctor existing images and create new fake images, and to lie and deceive using new forms of interpersonal communication, including the telephone and instant messaging. New technology has also enabled users to target large numbers of people at once, as in the practices of spamming and phishing, and cognitive hacking more generally. This new form of deception is called digital deception. However, not all new forms of technology promote deception. Some new forms of technology may in fact promote honesty and self-disclosure. Furthermore, developments in technology have also led to new ways to detect attempted deception.

Photographs are taken to capture how things actually are, or at least how they actually look. To doctor them is therefore to engage in an attempt to deceive, because the image will be assumed to be true by those who see it. However, creating fake images and doctoring images is nothing new to photography. The 1860 heroic style photographic portrait of Abraham Lincoln is a composite of two photos: the head of Lincoln and the body

of a southern proslavery politician named John Calhoun. Between 1917 and 1920, two girls in Cottingley, Yorkshire, manufactured photographs of fairies in their garden that were actually photographs of paper fairies, fooling many. Josef Stalin had his political enemies removed from official photographs as though they never existed.

With computer technology and software, the doctoring and forging of images has become much easier and is much more widespread. Doctoring is so prevalent that people simply expect the photographs in magazines to be airbrushed or Photoshopped to make celebrities look younger, skinnier, or prettier; to be more tanned; to have whiter teeth; or even to be better dressed. There is no apology for this practice in the magazine industry. Nevertheless, people continue to be deceived by a doctored photograph of, for example, Oprah Winfrey's head on a skinnier white woman's body. People are also deceived by composite images in magazines and tabloid newspapers that present celebrities as being in the same place at the same time, when in fact they were the same place at different times or were never in the same place at all. Finally, people are often deceived by doctored or fake photographs used in social network profiles.

### Doctored Photographs

The doctoring of photographs in other media, however, provides more worrying examples of deception. The University of Wisconsin-Madison issued a 2001 to 2002 undergraduate application booklet featuring a cover photograph of a group of cheering white student football fans with an African American student's head (Diallo Shabazz) from a 1994 photograph that was digitally inserted into the cheering group. The doctoring was supposed to be an attempt to reflect racial diversity at the university, but after a student journalist detected it, the university admitted that it should not have done it. It was deceptive advertising about how students associate with each other at the university. More egregiously, in the 2004 presidential campaign, a photograph of John Kerry was altered to include antiwar activist Jane Fonda at his side, and the fake photograph was distributed to voters in an attempt to undermine his campaign.

Reporting on war by the broadsheet press has also included altered photographs. In March 2003, the *Los Angeles Times* published a

photograph of a British soldier telling Iraqi civilians to seek cover. The photograph had been doctored for dramatic effect: It was actually a composite of three different photographs taken within minutes of each other. When it was discovered to be a composite, the photographer was fired. The photographer could attempt to argue that the photograph was not deceptive concerning anything significant about the war. Nevertheless, it was deceptive about exactly what happened, and how, at that particular time. A complete prohibition on doctored news photographs is one way to prevent a decline into more egregious cases of doctored news photographs.

One further reason why such doctoring of photographs is of concern is that studies have shown that doctored images can implant and affect people's behavior, even if they know that they are doctored.

### Photography and Technology

The widespread doctoring and forging of images has led to the development of software that can detect doctored photographs. This can be done by detecting inconsistencies in lighting (position relative to light source and shadows), image cloning, retouching, and the particular cameras from which the photographs are taken, known as "digital ballistics." There is something of an arms race between different technologies, with "the next generation of cameras that automatically removes wrinkles (Panasonic) or ten pounds (Hewlett-Packard) at the push of a button," according to Hany Farid.

Jeffrey T. Hancock, who has written on the use of technology in deception more generally, has provided a definition of the deception to which it has given rise. Digital deception is defined as the (successful) "intentional control of information in a technologically mediated message to create a false belief in the receiver of the message." In keeping with other definitions of deception, such deception must be intentional, and must result in a false belief. The only distinction between digital deception and other forms of deception is that the message in question must be technologically mediated. The various forms of technological mediation include the telephone, e-mail, instant messaging, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, Internet message boards, and the sending and displaying

of digital images. This kind of communication is inexpensive, which allows for communication on a massive scale.

Digital deception is in turn divided by Hancock into two types. Identity-based digital deception stems from a false identity of some kind, such as an e-mail purporting to be from a bank or from a person in need of a partner for a fictitious scheme. Message-based digital deception takes place between two or more people in which the messages exchanged between the people contains lies or is deceptive (e.g., someone who is having an affair texting to say that he is working late at the office). Such deception may or may not involve a false identity.

One common form of digital deception is spamming, or the sending of unsolicited messages to large numbers of people, sometimes in the millions, especially via e-mail. Approximately two-thirds of these messages are deceptive as to the sender's identity or the subject line of the e-mail. Even if spamming is not always a case of theft, the purpose of a large number of these messages is to make money through some form of deception. Even tiny response rates lead to profits for the spammers.

### Phishing

A related form of identity-based digital deception is phishing, or “a form of social engineering in which an attacker, also known as a phisher, attempts to fraudulently retrieve legitimate users' confidential or sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic communications from a trustworthy or public organization in an automated fashion,” according to Markus Jakobsson and Steven Myers. The phisher attempts to obtain confidential information (including login names, passwords, PINs, account numbers, credit card numbers, and social security passwords), and especially financial information from a receiver in order to steal the receiver's money. The most common form of phishing is an unsolicited e-mail that lies to the receiver about some problem (that a bank account has been breached, or that an e-mail account is full), lies to the receiver about the sender's identity (the sender pretends to be a bank or a company or a university), and directs the receiver to log on to a fake Web site that mimics a true one. Phishing is also practiced in the

form of fake Web sites—Web site spoofing—and phone calls. The resulting theft of confidential information is called identity theft. Identity theft normally leads to the theft of money or important information.

Such is the sophistication of phishing deception that it is a common tactic of phishing attempts to ask receivers to give up their secure information in order to protect themselves from phishing attempts. As Markus Jakobsson has pointed out, people continue to be quite susceptible to phishing attempts:

It has been shown that the typical computer user is unable of distinguishing a valid certificate from one that is invalid or self-signed, and that he may not even detect the absence of indicators that a connection is SSL secured. [...] 23 percent of subjects completely overlooked browser based security clues such as the address bar, the status bar and the SSL lock icon, and [...] 40 percent of subjects made the wrong security decision.

An even more insidious form of phishing is to send receivers e-mails with links to Web sites, or with attachments to download, that install malware (malicious software) on computers that can allow phishers to gain access to information (e.g., spyware that logs the keys that are used).

### Identity-Based Digital Deception

Another form of identity-based digital deception is catfishing, or the inventing of fake online identities to deceive people into having romantic relationships or friendships. Even if there is no financial loss involved, such deception can be traumatic for those deceived in this way.

*Cognitive hacking* is a general term used to refer to when people at the user end of a networked computer system are targeted for a disinformation attack. One example of this would be a “pump and dump” scheme in which people publish a fake or misleading story on the Internet about a publicly traded company in order to change the stock price and buy or sell accordingly in order to make a profit.

In business and consumer contexts, there are also many forms of digital deception, especially of identity-based digital deception. At least seven

different kinds of deceptive tactics have been identified. Masking is the concealment of important relevant information about the item (not revealing that the newsletter receives money from the stocks it recommends). Dazzling is the obscuring of information regarding an item (not revealing to consumers that a free trial leads to automatic enrollment).

Decoying is the distracting of the attention of consumers from the transaction (free product offers that require revealing detailed personal information). Mimicking is the assuming of someone else's identity in order to appear legitimate (inducing users to disclose information to a fake Web site that resembles the real thing). Inventing is the making up of information (Internet auctioneers who don't actually possess the item they claim to be selling). Relabeling is describing a transaction in order to deceive (selling questionable

investments as sound ones). Double play is duping someone into believing that she or he is getting some kind of advantage (sending someone an e-mail that looks as though it were sent by mistake and contains insider information).

In addition to these forms of digital deception, some companies offer a range of deception services to customers. Alibi agencies provide alibis and excuses for people by using technology (providing a customer with a number that will function as a hotel number, complete with a "receptionist" to take the call). There are also alibi and excuse clubs in which members will lie for another member (pretend to be the person's boss and order her back to the office).

### Medium of Deception

Developments in technology have also allowed people to lie, and more generally to deceive, in



*An original photo of actress Denise Richards (left) is professionally enhanced by a Photoshop retoucher (right); her wrinkles are smoothed and her skin is softened. With the growing availability of computer technology, doctoring and forging of images has become much easier and more widespread. Modern magazine readers practically assume that celebrities will be enhanced in their photos to appear thinner, younger, or more tanned, and camera manufacturers are working on technology that automatically removes wrinkles and pounds.*



interpersonal communication in new ways. This is principally because of the ability of people to communicate with others without being physically present. The innovation of modern technology is to allow real-time communication over any distance without people being physically present or face-to-face. In the case of deception in which the identity of the deceiver is known to the deceived, Hancock and others have proposed three features of the technological medium that are relevant for determining the degree to which deception is practiced in interpersonal communication. First, there is the synchronicity of the medium, the extent to which the messages are instantaneously exchanged. Second, there is the recordability of the medium, the extent to which the interaction is documented. Third, there is the matter of whether or not the speaker and the listener are distributed or not, whether or not they share a space.

Synchronicity is relevant because lying is often unplanned and spontaneous. In a face-to-face conversation, it is often difficult to avoid responding to a searching question, and there is less time to construct an answer that avoids a lie. In non-synchronous communication, such as e-mail, one can refuse to respond to a question, or compose a response that avoids a lie. Recordability is relevant because lying is easier to detect if it is recorded. The more that the medium is recordable, such as an e-mail, the less likely people are to tell lies using that medium. The less the medium is recorded, for example a telephone conversation, the more likely people are to tell lies using that medium. The degree to which the speaker and the listener are distributed is relevant because the more they are distributed, the greater the possibility of deception ("I am working late at the office"); and the less they are distributed, the less opportunity there is for deception.

Tests conducted on subjects have revealed that people lie most frequently on the telephone (37 percent of interactions), followed by face-to-face conversations (27 percent), neither of which are (typically) recorded, and both of which are synchronous, with telephone conversations more distributed. After that, people lie more when exchanging instant messages (21 percent), which are usually not recorded for very long. Such exchanges tend to be more synchronous, with

the exchangers not copresent. Finally, people lie least over e-mail (14 percent), which is the most recordable medium, and the least synchronous. Although technology can facilitate deception (such as the telephone), it appears that technology can also constrain deception (with recordable e-mail).

Finally, there are examples of technology that promote honesty and self-disclosure, and that discourage lying and deceiving. Online diaries, chat rooms, and news groups encourage self-disclosure. For example, PostSecret is a Web site that posts online postcards sent to a P.O. box that anonymously tell secrets, such as the fact that one cheated at college. Online anonymity allows people to lose their inhibitions. People are more prone to disclosing more personal information in such text-based interactions because their attention is directed more toward their personal thoughts and feelings, and they are less concerned with how others may view their actions. However, it is also possible for imposters to join such chat rooms, deceiving others about their identity. Trolling is the practice of posing as a legitimate member of a community in order to post messages intending to disrupt the community. Pedophiles, for example, can impersonate children and teenagers in online chat rooms. More generally, social network Web sites allow for people to engage in gender deception and identity concealment, two types of category deception. Although assessment signals such as e-mail addresses and phone numbers may be more difficult to fabricate for online profiles, conventional signals such as claims to be wealthy remain easy to fabricate.

James Edwin Mahon  
*Washington & Lee University*

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Internet: E-Mail; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Internet: Online Dating.

### Further Readings

- Farid, H. "Digital Doctoring: Can We Trust Photographs?" In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Hancock, J. T. "Digital Deception: The Practice of Lying in the Digital Age." In *Deception: From*

- Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Hancock, J. T. "Digital Deception: Why, When and How People Lie Online." In *The Oxford Handbook of Internet Psychology*, A. N. Joinson, K. Y. A. McKenna, T. Postmes, and U-D. Reips, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Jakobsson, M. and S. Myers, eds. *Phishing and Countermeasures: Understanding the Increasing Problem of Electronic Identity Theft*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007.
- Sacchi, D., F. Agnoli, and E. Loftus. "Doctored Photos and Memory for Public Events." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.21 (2007).

---

## Deception and Trust

Trust is often defined as the confident expectation that another will have one's best interests at heart, and they will take into account and/or act on those interests, even when they conflict with their interests. From an evolutionary perspective, trust is based on the ability to make accurate predictions about the intentions and behaviors of others. Inaccurate predictions of this nature can result from a genuine inaccuracy on the part of the person who trusted another or, in a significantly more damaging way, from the motivated deception of another. This type of betrayal or realization that a relationship is not what it was portrayed to be can be devastating to the self-esteem and judgmental confidence of a trusting individual and can end the relationship.

### Frequency and Focus of Deceptions in Trusting Relationships

Multiple studies have shown that trustworthiness and honesty are seen as the most desirable characteristics in a partner, regardless of the length of relationship sought, or the sex of those involved. Trustworthiness and honesty ranked higher than having an exciting personality, good health, adaptability, dependability, sense of humor, and kindness/understanding. That having been said, however, the reality is that the vast majority of close relationship partners lie to each other at some point. Research has shown that the biggest

deceptions that people undertake occur most often in the relationships with the people they trust the most. For example, studies show that lies occur in one of every 10 interactions that people have with close others in general. This ratio increases to one of every three interactions with a dating or common-law partner, and one of every two interactions that college students have with their mothers. In fact, 92 percent of people admitted that they had lied to their lovers.

When lying to those they are closest to, people most often lie in ways that benefit the liar by avoiding embarrassment, guilt, or inconvenience, though 25 percent of lies are told to benefit others by protecting their feelings or aiding in advancing their strengths or interests. Many of these lies are small or "white" lies, but when people tell serious, highly impactful lies, they tell them more often to their closest partners than to anyone else.

### Impact of Deception

Some of the impact of deception is regulated by the victim's attachment style within the relationship. For example, people with a fearful or preoccupied attachment style, and who experience higher levels of anxiety about the possibility of abandonment, are particularly vulnerable to deceptions perpetrated by close others. The intent to deceive (and the transgression that the deception is usually created to hide) is interpreted by these individuals as significantly devaluing the relationship. This results in feelings of sadness, anger, and, most important, hurt. The impact of the hurt experienced in a trust violation cannot be underestimated because research has shown that hurt feelings produce similar physical responses to actual physical pain. Ironically, this same group of insecurely attached individuals tells more lies than those whose experience has led to a more secure attachment style.

### A Deceiver's Distrust

Deception can be a vicious cycle not only in the sense that a liar may continue to lie but also because the more people lie to others, the more they perceive others as lying to them. This "deceiver's distrust" results in liars perceiving others as less honest and trustworthy than they actually are. There are at least two reasons for this erroneous belief. First, liars incorrectly assume that others are just

like them, and therefore must share their motives to deceive. Second, believing that their deceptive tendencies as shared by others serves to normalize the experience of deceiving in ways that may make the actions more understandable, socially acceptable, and more palatable to the deceiver. Ironically, by succumbing to deceiver's distrust, betrayers do not trust others based heavily on their projection of their own negative motivations and actions onto others.

### **Detecting and Discovering Deception**

Most people believe that they are more accurate "truth detectors" than they actually are. In fact, according to meta-analysis, the average person's ability to detect deception is little better than the results of flipping a coin (54 percent on average). While many people are very confident that they would be better able to tell if a close partner than a stranger were lying because of their personal, unique knowledge of him or her, the reality is that there is little difference in actual accuracy. This is due in large part to the "truth bias" that characterizes close relationships. In essence, people in close relationships trust each other, and this results in them assuming more often than not that their partner is telling the truth. In fact, not only does accuracy not improve as relationships become more trusting and intimate, it actually declines because of this tendency toward truth biasing.

McCornack and Parks's deception detection model (published in (1986) supports these findings, suggesting that as relationship partners grow closer, the assumption that the truth will be told increases, as does their confidence in their ability to detect deception in their partner. Given the prevalence of deception in even the closest relationships, this suggests that there may, for better or worse, be many lies of differing magnitudes of importance remaining undetected in peoples' lives.

While the nature of the information lied about plays a vital role in predicting relationship continuity, the method of detection also has to be taken into consideration when lying is uncovered. Unfortunately, because their ability to detect deception is little better than chance, despite the closeness and trusting nature of the relationship, individuals most often discover that

they have been deceived through others, thereby compounding the potential for hurt and embarrassment that results from being the "last to know." Research has shown that relationships are more negatively affected and forgiveness is more difficult to achieve if the liar is caught in the act, or the lie is discovered via a third party, than if the lie is confessed upon accusation. The preferred and least damaging mode of discovery is for the liar to admit to the wrongdoing without the victim having to ask or accuse. However, to whatever degree, these deceptions have a negative impact not only on the relationship as it pertains to the wrongdoing and lies at hand, but they also cast a shadow of suspicion on the past and future of the relationship in terms of how the deceptive partner's actions have been and will be monitored and interpreted. Trust, once broken, is difficult to restore.

### **Perspective Differences**

One of the reasons why trust is so difficult to restore after a betrayal has occurred is the different views of the violation that are held by the victim and perpetrator. Victims of transgressions almost always believe that the events had a serious negative impact on the relationship, damaging the sense of partnership and resulting in greater suspicion and doubt, which significantly lowers relationship satisfaction. Only about half of perpetrators, on the other hand, even acknowledge that their behavior harmed the relationship. As many as one in five perpetrators report that their betrayal may have actually improved the relationship. Even when they do acknowledge that their actions have been harmful, liars are still more likely to believe that their lies are less harmful and offensive than the target of the lies. By underestimating the harm that they have done to their victims, perpetrators are denigrating the victims' feelings, thoughts, and beliefs, as well as their ability to believe that someone who doesn't appear to understand the negativity of their actions would be motivated to refrain from hurting them again.

### **Deception and Trust Outside Intimate Relationships**

Most of these theories and studies also hold for nonintimate but highly trusting relationships,

such as working relationships or even relationships with corporate brands. When deception occurs in these circumstances, findings for the attachment style of the individual, the impact of the deception, the issues of detection and discovery, and the incongruence in perspectives between deceivers and the deceived remain consistent with findings for romantic relationships. This suggests that the core issue in deception is not how well one knows the liar but how much the liar is trusted by the target. This trust is what is damaged by deception and remains the focus of what must be restored in order for the relationship, intimate or otherwise, to continue.

### Restoring Trust After Deception

Though difficult, it is not impossible to restore trust after deception has occurred. Certainly an alignment between the victim and perpetrator's perspectives on what happened, why it happened, and the impact of the deception make forgiving and moving forward easier. It is not uncommon, however, for victims of deception to be hypervigilant about their partner's behavior, wanting to account for his or her whereabouts, and monitoring his or her interactions with others. Transparency on the part of the deceiver is essential for the rebuilding of trust in the relationship. This holds as well for nonintimate relationships people have with workplaces and corporate brands. Promises to "never do it again" are insufficient when actions are necessary to demonstrate that trust, once replaced, will be valued and respected.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
University of Prince Edward Island

**See Also:** Confession; Courtship, Deception in; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Distrust; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Romantic.

### Further Readings

Boon, S. and B. MacLeod. "Deception in Romantic Relationships: Subjective Estimates of Success at Deceiving and Attitudes Toward Deception." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18/4 (2001).

McCornack, Steven A. and Timothy R. Levine.

"When Lies are Uncovered: Emotional and Relational Outcomes of Discovered Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).

McCornack, Steven A. and M. R. Parks. "Deception Detection and Relationship Development: The Other Side of Trust." In *Communication Yearbook* 9, Margaret L. McLaughlin, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1986.

Metts, S. "An Exploratory Investigation of Deception in Close Relationships." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.6 (1989).

Miller, R. *Intimate Relationships*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012.

Pratt, M. and K. Dirks. "Rebuilding Trust and Restoring Positive Relationships: A Commitment-Based View of Trust." In *Exploring Positive Relationships at Work: Building a Theoretical and Research Foundation*, J. Dutton and B. Ragins, eds. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007.

## Deception Detection Accuracy

Deception detection accuracy, along with non-verbal cues, has been a mainstay of deception research in the social sciences. More than 200 deception detection experiments have been conducted to assess how accurate people are at distinguishing truthful communications from lies. The conclusion from this research is that people are typically only slightly better than chance at distinguishing truths from lies. On average, people are 54 percent accurate, compared with 50 percent accuracy expected by pure chance. People are better than chance at distinguishing truths from lies, but they are not much better than chance.

The typical deception detection experiment exposes research subjects to a series of truths and lies. Subjects are asked to make judgments about which are honest and which are lies. Deception detection accuracy is calculated as the number of correct judgments divided by the total number of judgments that the subject has made. Accuracy is typically reported as a percentage of the correct judgments averaged across both truths and lies.



Research on deception detection accuracy has been summarized in meta-analysis, showing that the findings from experiments have been remarkably consistent across studies and over time. The slightly better-than-chance outcome is reliable and consistent. Almost all studies report accuracy within 10 percentage points of this across-study average. Further, more discrepant results tend to be from small-scale studies.

Deception detection experiments typically find that people are truth biased. Truth bias is the tendency to believe a message, that is, to judge that it was honest, regardless of whether or not it is actually honest or deceptive. In experiments in which research subjects judge an equal number of truths and lies, 57 percent of messages are judged as honest. As a consequence, accuracy is typically higher for truths than for lies. Across studies, accuracy for truths is 61 percent, compared with 47 percent for lies. This difference is referred to as the “veracity effect.”

### Variables and Accuracy

A number of variables have been shown to have relatively little impact on detection accuracy. For example, it does not seem to matter who does the judging. College students perform similarly to police officers and people of other professions. Age, biological sex, and intelligence have little effect on deception detection accuracy. It also seems to matter little over which media the truths or lies are communicated. The slightly better-than-chance accuracy finding appears to hold for face-to-face communication, videotaped communication such as television, audio-only communication such as the telephone, and text-based communication such as letters, e-mail, and texting.

It also matters little how motivated the senders are, or whether or not the judge knows or has a relational history with the sender. Judge suspicion, asking probing questions, and nonverbal training do not appear to substantially affect accuracy. Instead, the slightly better-than-chance finding has been found to hold up, regardless of these other factors that might be expected to affect accuracy.

Generally, who the sender is affects accuracy more than the identity of who is judging. Some people are better liars than others. While most

people lie well most of time, there are some people who are transparent liars.

There are even larger differences in how believable people are. These differences are called “sender honest demeanor.” Some people tend to be believed by almost everyone, regardless of whether or not they are honest. There are other people who come off as less sincere, even when they are telling the truth. These differences in sender demeanor that have little to do with actual honesty may explain why deception detection accuracy tends to near chance. Alternately, the few senders who are poor liars keep accuracy from being purely chance.

Research suggests that most lies that are accurately detected are discovered over time, often well after the fact. These lies are detected either though a confession on the part of the liar, or because some evidence is discovered that shows the lie for what it is. For example, there might be some physical evidence, or some other person might contradict the lie, showing that it is false.

### Use of Evidence or Prior Knowledge

Exceptions to slightly better-than-chance accuracy often involve the use of evidence or prior knowledge. For example, if someone is asked a question and the questioner already knows the answer, but the person asked does not know that the questioner knows, then lies can be detected by comparing what is said to what is known. A variation on this approach is called the “strategic use of evidence.” This involves questioning a criminal suspect when the questioner does not tell the suspect what evidence is already known. If the suspect’s answers contradict the evidence, this suggests a lie. Then the suspect can be confronted with the relevant evidence to see if his or her story changes. In this way, a suspect can be trapped in lies. Research on the strategic use of evidence has shown that it can increase deception detection accuracy to over 80 percent.

The other path to improved lie detection is through the use of technological aids, such as the polygraph, electroencephalograph (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), or voice stress analysis. Of these, the polygraph is the most researched. Although not perfect, the polygraph usually produces more accurate deception detection than unaided lie detection. Research on

the use of EEG and FRMI is less well developed. Voice stress analysis is least promising.

A large amount of research suggests that people are typically poor lie detectors, performing only slightly better than chance. Deception detection accuracy can be improved, however, with technological aids such as polygraphs, or with the use of evidence to fact check statements.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Electroencephalography; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Meta-Analysis; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Sender Demeanor; Transparent Liars; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect; Voice Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10 (2006).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).
- Frank, M. G. and T. H. Feeley. "To Catch a Liar: Challenges for Research in Lie Detection Training." *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, v.31 (2001).
- Hartwig, M., P. A. Granhag, L. A. Stromwall, and A. Vrij. "Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.29 (2005).
- Levine, T. R. "A Few Transparent Lars." In *Communication Yearbook 34*, C. Salmon, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010.
- Levine, T. R., S. H. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).
- Levine, T. R., K. B. Serota, H. Shulman, D. D. Clare, H. S. Park, A. S. Shaw, J. C. Shim, and J. H. Lee. "Sender Demeanor: Individual Differences in Sender Believability Have a Powerful Impact on Deception Detection Judgments." *Human Communication Research*, v.37 (2011).
- Park, H. S., T. R. Levine, S. A. McCornack, K. Morrison, and M. Ferrera. "How People Really Detect Lies." *Communication Monographs*, v.69 (2002).

## Deception in Different Contexts

Deception is an area of academic inquiry pertinent across a range of academic disciplines and in a variety of practical, fictional, and experimental contexts. Exploring the manifestation of deception in different contexts provides an overall understanding of the concept in its myriad forms, as a deliberate tool directed toward the accomplishment of a specific outcome, an unintentional product of a situation, or an object of analytic inquiry.

Both its production and its detection are popular areas of study, generating interest from academics across a variety of disciplines, as well as practitioners from a range of roles, including policing, motor insurance, education, and the general public. Research into deception often sits at the intersection of research and practice. Emphasis often drifts between academic analyses of the production of deceptive utterances and the investigation of deception for the purposes of generating knowledge and developing skills that can be deployed in the practical business of deception detection.

Deception may not have the same meaning in different contexts; part of understanding this area is to recognize that there are different consequences tied to the act of deception in accordance with the context, and this can alter the form that deception takes. There are a variety of assertions on the form that deception takes in different contexts. However, it is generally understood that generating a "blueprint" of deception in any particular context for the purposes of identifying or categorizing such behavior as an accurate means of establishing truth or otherwise is not a feasible or prudent prospect.

Changes in consistency during interaction, rather than specific words, phrases, or actions, may signal deception. This may take the form of inconsistency in details of an account, behaviors throughout an encounter, other prosodic cues such as tone or pitch, or the unusual presence of pausing or repetition.

The majority of research in the area of deception focuses on fields that involve professional lie-catchers such as the police, judges, and psychologists. This reflects the emphasis of research in this



*A man is arrested and led into a patrol car in Chicago, August 17, 2004. The point at which an interaction sits on a formal–informal scale affects the reasons for and investment in deceiving, such as the consequences of deception during police questioning versus a “white lie” told in a social setting.*

area on its application in policy and practice. It also reflects the emphasis of research into deception directed toward deception detection.

Much of the enthusiasm for understanding deception and its detection is driven, underpinned, and bolstered by fictional representations of high-stakes work that involves skillful deception detection, such as the television dramas *Lie to Me* and *CSI*. Many of these fictional representations are almost universally based on law enforcement or aspects of the legal system, and they retain an essence of realism by keeping a sufficient amount of their foundations loosely based in reality.

### Leakages

For the purpose of compiling a blueprint of behavior to aid in acquiring the “skill” of detecting deception, much research concentrates on deception detection rather than deception itself. However, many types of deception cues documented in

training manuals, such as averting eye gaze and hesitancy, can often be confused with the talk and behaviors of someone telling the truth under stress or in response to an incriminating question. From a research and practice perspective, it is useful to link together the reasons behind deception, the context in which the deception occurs, and the research that has been carried out about these subjects. These provide an understanding not only of the act of deception but also how this relates to the context and the way in which deception is seen and interpreted.

There is no clear and undisputed benchmark of behaviors that signify or distinguish deceptive utterances, but they generally involve some level of both verbal and nonverbal leakage of behaviors. Some behaviors are contextually dependent; for example, manifestations of deception will vary in accordance with modality.

Examples of verbal leakages include the presence of silence or pausing (which is linked to the higher cognitive load associated with generating a deceptive, rather than a truthful utterance) and specificity (the less specific the deception, the lower the cognitive load for memory recall and maintaining a logical thread when linking a series of deceptive answers, or of having to develop the deception beyond its original form). Deception in face-to-face interactions will typically involve longer sentences than in audio-only interactions such as on the telephone, and longer yet than deceptive interactions by text.

Nonverbal leakages can include rubbing one’s face, which has been attributed to the physiological effect of increased blood flow to the extremities during stress. Face-to-face interactions will also transmit visual artifacts that will offer the receiver a breadth of information different from written interaction.

Because of the *CSI* effect, many deceivers have an exaggerated expectation of the interviewer’s ability to detect deception, and therefore try and avoid producing “classic” signs of deception revealed in popular representations of lying, such as touching their noses or shifting about in their seats. This assumption can result in a marked stillness or other behavior such as prolonged pausing because of the higher cognitive load associated with deception. Ironically, these behaviors are more likely to be noticeable and therefore detected.

### **Deception in Political, Medical, and Educational Contexts**

The business of deception detection is heavily weighted toward a specific objective, such as determining if an insurance or benefits claim is genuine before issuing a payout, or whether a witness's story adds up before they are released. In this way, deception detection is part of the operational requirements of a profession, rather than simply a way to find out if someone is lying.

In some contexts, such as in politics, the focus shifts to the presence and production of deception, rather than its detection. In the arena of politics, deception or mixed messages are somewhat expected to form part of the rhetoric and tactics of a political campaign, and research in this area is heavily weighted on the linguistic structure of the rhetoric, rather than its detection. It is not unusual for the public to carry a guilt bias, considering politicians to be unpopular or untrustworthy at some point in their careers. This is dissimilar to the truth bias, such as in close relationships, in which people are more inclined to believe what the other person is saying.

In medical contexts, one way in which deception can manifest is "malingering," which is the deliberate fabrication of medical symptoms motivated by the deceiver's desire for a specific gain, such as to affect a payout in a fraudulent insurance claim, or to compel leniency from a court of law on the grounds of ill health. Deception in medical contexts can also be the result of a psychiatric disorder that causes patients to factitiously claim that they are suffering from ailments, such as Münchausen syndrome.

Other manifestations of deception in medical contexts involve patients purposefully using deception as a strategy, such as denial of their substance abuse, or arise as an unintended result of a medical problem, such as a traumatic brain injury.

Much like the subject of police interviews, the medical malingerer will not want to admit to a deception because there often are high stakes involved in the deception. However, there are considerable economic, social, and legal pressures placed on those on the receiving end of the interaction, as is reflected in the considerable volume of literature that focuses on detection of deception in these contexts.

The discipline of education applies more focus on the techniques and technologies designed to detect deception, than an examination of the ways in which it is manifested. Deception in this context primarily manifests as plagiarism, which is similarly treated to fraud. Differences in cultural backgrounds can alter students' perceptions of the seriousness of the dishonesty of plagiarism. Approaches to plagiarism detection and resulting sanctions may vary, but increasing students' awareness of plagiarism and academic dishonesty is a more effective way of reducing its prevalence than increasing sanctions.

### **Social, Moral, and Legal Spectrums**

Different contexts are underpinned by frameworks composed of diverse balances of requirements and expectations along social, moral, and legal spectrums, which may affect the composition of deceptions. The point at which the interaction sits on the institutional–noninstitutional scale, or formal–informal scale, affects the reasons for deception and therefore the investment in deceiving (such as the consequences of deception in a police interview, whereas a "white lie" told in a social setting). The way in which contextual differences affect the presence, expectation of, frequency, and manifestation of deceptions informs the study of deception detection and the underlying social, psychological, and cognitive mechanisms and behaviors associated with interaction.

Of particular interest to deception-context researchers are the interactions that sit at the high-stakes end of the spectrum, rather than low-stakes interactions such as ordinary conversation. However, research in lower-profile contexts may reveal underlying patterns, structures, and insights into the production and receipt of deceptions that may be less distorted by the background "noise" of contextual constraints and pressures and, on a more practical level, may be more easily identified. On the other hand, the additional constraints and pressures of high-stake deceptions also serve to intensify lie production in order to maximize their effectiveness and minimize the chances of detection.

Deceptions in different contexts involve different levels of perceived and actual seriousness of the consequences of both attempting to deceive and any deception being discovered. There are



numerous reasons for deception across contexts. In police interviews, for example, suspects—despite being tied to the institutional structure, legal boundaries, and high-stakes nature of the interaction—remain strongly bound to social norms and conventions within conversational interaction, and will act to protect their social persona. The power of societal acceptance and scrutiny is evident in the “name and shame” approach by police forces that publicly expose wrongdoers, asserting a shaming punishment, rather than private reprimand.

This is why minimizing the crime or presenting potential reasons for the crime in police interviews can be effective techniques for drawing out admissions of prior deception, as is illustrated by the following exchange between an officer and a suspect. Prior to this exchange, the suspect repeatedly denied the theft of videos after they were rented from a shop and not returned. It is only after the officer goes to some lengths to describe potential (relatively innocent) reasons that the suspect may have been kept from returning the videos that the suspect confesses. Once the officer has alleviated the moral and legal demands of the suspect, the suspect retracts his earlier deceptions, and reveals the reasons behind their production. The following exchange was related in E. Carter’s *Analysing Police Interviews: Laughter, Confessions, and the Tape* (2012):

Officer: All it is, I mean, for the sake of two video games and computer game, I mean I dunno if you forgot to return them, or you’ve passed them on to somebody else, or you’ve just thought, “well, you know, I’ll keep these; I’m going on holiday fairly soon . . . ?”

Officer: It could have been a misunderstanding, right, so I’m asking you now, is it a misunderstanding, have you taken those videos out and not returned them for whatever reason, best known to yourself, and if you have, are you prepared to take them back, to give them back?

Suspect: Yes, I will take them back.

### **Uncontrollable or Purposeful Deception**

The motives for deception can vary, altering its manifestation and increasing the difficulty of

categorizing its form in each context. Gaining a full understanding of why someone has produced a deceptive account is potentially impossible. This is because of several factors, including the unwillingness of the deceiver to provide such an account, or their inability reflect, make sense of, and verbalize an internal and potentially habitual response.

This leads to the discussion of purposeful and uncontrollable deception. Deception occurs when there is some sanction or penalty that is avoided by the act of deception. Evading a social sanction can take the form of a face-saving act among social and family groups, such as opting to not respond honestly about a friend’s haircut. It can also take the form of avoiding the violation of social norms, such as hiding one’s discriminatory or prejudicial opinions when among a group of peers that may not share such views. Deception can also be employed to avoid a penal, rather than a social sanction; these cases may involve higher-stake deceptions, and therefore a stronger motivation to deceive, such as avoiding a criminal record or prison sentence.

Research also reveals that the act of deception requires a more cognitive load than an emotional one, so engaging in the emotional aspects of a situation will yield less obvious indicators of deception than answering questions that require recollection of particular elements of a story. Methods used by the police, such as asking a suspect to recount the events of the day in question and then repeat that account in reverse order, engage with this theory by applying a cognitive load, which is difficult to maintain if the story is false.

Similarly, an attempt to draw an admission of deceit or halt deceptive utterances by appealing to a deceiver’s sense of moral duty to tell the truth, or a duty to protect those falsely accused, would have less of an impact than requiring the deceiver to recall several interlinking aspects of their fabricated account, therefore making their lie untenable.

Deception is not the sole preserve of the interviewed, questioned, or examined; it is also often used by academics as a tool of research design in many social scientific disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and criminology. It is often integral to research in the social sciences to deceive the participant of the true nature of the research in

order to protect the study's integrity and achieve responses that are untainted by the research objective. Deception in research is often closely linked with research ethics and debates surrounding informed consent.

Elisabeth Carter  
*Buckinghamshire New University*

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Cognitive Load; Confession; Content in Context; Context; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception in Research Design; Emotions; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Leakage; Lie Bias; Linguistic Cues; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Morals and Ethics; Nonverbal Cues; Truth Bias; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Carter, E. *Analysing Police Interviews: Laughter, Confessions, and the Tape*. London: Continuum, 2012.
- Rogers, R., ed. *Clinical Assessment of Malingering and Deception*. 3rd ed. New York: Guilford Press, 2012.
- Strömwall, L. A. and R. M. Willén. "Inside Criminal Minds: Offenders' Strategies When Lying." *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*, v.8 (2011).
- Vrij, A. "Behavioral Correlates of Deception in a Simulated Police Interview." *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, v.129/1 (1995).
- Vrij, A. and S. Mann. "Detecting Deception: The Benefit of Looking at a Combination of Behavioral, Auditory, and Speech Content Related Cues in a Systematic Manner." *Group Decision and Negotiation*, v.13/1 (2004).

---

## Deception in Research Design

Deception in research design, or the intentional misleading of participants about the real method or objective of a study, is both commonly used and controversial. Deception has a long scientific history in various academic fields, and there are

several types of deception still in use today. Many researchers argue that deception is essential to scientific research, yet many critics have serious ethical and methodological concerns about its use and advocate against it. Although reliance on deceptive research has declined in some fields, it remains a central component of a larger societal discussion about the ethical boundaries of scientific advancement.

Deceptive research can take many forms, and is not always intentional. Types of deception include giving erroneous information or concealing information, not following through on promises, providing inaccurate feedback, misrepresenting one's identity, and the use of surreptitious surveillance, confederates, and placebos. Each case of deception encompasses a distinct set of legal and ethical concerns, and a number of governmental, international, and organizational entities have established ethical guidelines for conducting this research. A ubiquitous component of these guidelines is a condition that participants must give informed consent before participating in a study. In the United States, when situations arise in which insufficient information may be given to subject volunteers and deception is suspected, institutional review boards assess the ethical acceptability of a study.

### Medical Research and Placebos

Some academic fields have independently elected to prohibit the use of deception altogether. Experimental economists, for instance, generally refrain from using it and are often outspoken critics. In contrast, medicine and psychology have frequently used deceptive techniques in the past and continue to employ such techniques today. In medical research, deception usually takes the form of placebo studies. Placebo studies test the effectiveness of medications and medical therapies by comparing the outcome of an experimental group given a medical treatment to a group given a pharmacologically ineffective placebo treatment. The purpose of the placebo is to make participants in the control group believe that they are receiving a medical treatment, even though they are not.

There is a consensus among medical researchers, federal agencies, and review boards that the placebo-controlled study is the most effective means

of testing new treatments and therapies. However, modern ethical codes of medical research mandate that when an effective treatment for a condition is available, it cannot be withheld from research participants, even if they consent to placement in a placebo group. These ethical codes of conduct were partly established in response to historical cases of ethical misconduct involving the use of deception, such as in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study initiated in 1931.

Conducted by the Public Health Service to track the progression of untreated syphilis, the study followed the lives of hundreds of black men who had contracted the disease. In the absence of ethical regulations at the time, researchers continued to observe the catastrophic effects of the disease, even after a successful treatment (penicillin) was discovered in 1943. While obvious instances of abuse like this would be forbidden by ethical codes today, there is disagreement in some current medical studies about whether effective therapies exist and if they should be used in place of the placebos currently administered.

Some researchers also contend that because placebos can have significant effects on a participant, a placebo should not be characterized as a control condition at all, but instead, a condition representing alternative placebo-induced effects. Some proponents of placebos maintain that barring their use has adverse methodological consequences because it hinders the ability of researchers to develop treatments that are more effective. Thus, well-intended efforts to provide all participants with effective treatments might only be succeeding in providing all participants with less effective treatments overall. Despite strongly divergent perspectives on the ethics of their use, placebos are still considered an important methodological tool in biomedical research.

### Psychological Research

Psychology has perhaps the most extensive tradition of deceptive research, and the ethical acceptability of using deception poses a contentious debate. In the 1930s, pioneering social psychologist Kurt Lewin began using experimental methods as opposed to the naturalistic observations and attitudinal measurements most commonly used in earlier studies. Lewin and his students utilized deception in order to manipulate

independent variables in the experimental situations they created. Because of the control for extraneous variables that deception provided, many social psychologists followed this tradition, and deceptive research saw a dramatic rise in the 1950s. As deception in research design became commonplace by the 1970s, some researchers began challenging its ethical validity.

In 1964, Diana Baumrind published a critique of Stanley Milgram's use of deception in his landmark study of obedience, and a dispute emerged about potentially harmful effects of deceptive research techniques—an argument that continues today. Proponents of deception in psychological research typically argue that it is, at times, necessary to mislead or misinform participants about the real purpose of a study in order to elicit behavior that is more genuine. For instance, participants may alter their behavior in an experiment if they are under the impression that they are being observed or analyzed. Critics counter that misleading or misinforming participants undermines informed consent procedures. Because experimenters do not fully inform subject volunteers about an experiment beforehand, the experimenter is lying to the participant—an outright morally reprehensible act. Furthermore, experiments posing a risk of pain or indignity are inappropriate candidates for deceptive designs because of the fraudulent means by which informed consent is attained.

Yet, ethical disputes about deception are most often characterized in terms of utility—a question of whether the benefits of deception outweigh the costs. In addition to informed consent, the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association (APA), which govern most behavioral research, affirms that the use of deceptive techniques is not justified unless a study demonstrates significant educational or applied value, and researchers illustrate that nondeceptive measures could not have been taken. Advocates of deception argue that deceptive research designs have provided a considerable amount of valuable scientific knowledge from which society has greatly benefited. For example, Milgram's study of obedience transformed the study of personality and social psychology and advanced scientific conceptions of obedience. Proponents claim that this would not have been possible without

the experimental advantages that deceptive techniques provide scientific investigation.

Detractors claim that deceptive experiments with higher risks of injury to participants are a strong utilitarian argument against using deception, and these risks of injury should be weighed against possible benefits. Critics also contend that participants in deceptive research studies are especially vulnerable to feelings of anger, disillusionment, and anxiety as a result of an inherent violation of trust between a participant and an experimenter. The APA requires that experimenters debrief a participant about deception by providing a true account of the intentions of a study and divulging any information that was previously withheld. This additional requirement is designed to alleviate any anxiety that a participant may have suffered and to re-establish trust between experimenter and the participant.

On a more pragmatic level, arguments about methodological implications do not focus on the potential harm or costs of deception, but rather deliberate whether deception enhances the methodological integrity of social experiments. Critics argue that deception undermines experimental control by making participants suspicious of research and researchers, which in turn causes participants to atypically act in research settings. Instead of the intended consequence of eliciting naturalistic behaviors in the laboratory, the expectation of deception leads people to behave in ways that they normally would not. Some investigators have sought to verify these claims, and their results suggest that participants who have been deceived in the past are more likely to be distrustful of experimental designs in the future. Yet, evidence of this distrust spreading from an individual participant in a deception study to society as a whole in the form of public skepticism has yielded inconclusive results.

In contrast, other studies examining the attitudes of people who participated in deceptive experiments found that participants rated the experience more favorably than people who participated in experiments that did not use deception. Nevertheless, research also suggests that deceptive studies that risk harm or an invasion of privacy are viewed as more unethical than studies examining innocuous behavior. Proponents of deception emphasize not only the educational

gains it affords the scientific community, but also highlight studies suggesting that participants experience more educational benefits from participating in deceptive experiments. These researchers cite the results of studies that highlight favorable experiences of deceived participants as a persuasive justification that the costs of deception are minimal or nonexistent.

Although many modern opponents of deception in both psychology and medicine accept its prevalence, they advocate for stricter efforts to regulate its use. Critics of psychological research using deception claim that debriefing is not an effective countermeasure for the potential risk, and that ambiguity in current APA guidelines leads to inconsistent interpretations of what constitutes deception. Critics of deception in medical research claim that placebos should only be used in circumstances in which effective treatments are not available, and that current regulations do not clearly define these circumstances. Thus, there are appeals in both fields for the operationalization of ethical guidelines into clearer and more precise directives. These recommendations aim to maximize the potential gains of deception in research while mitigating unwanted consequences.

Deception in research has a dubious and, at times, contemptible history. Even though deceptive research has become more highly regulated, it continues to be a contentious issue among academics of various disciplines.

Joel T. Nadler

Geraldine Y. Hannon

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Clever Hans; Cold Fusion; Deception and Trust; Deception Motives; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Drugs; Manipulation; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Morals and Ethics.

### Further Readings

Baumrind, D. "Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Research: After Reading Milgram's 'Behavioral Study of Obedience.'" *American Psychologist*, v.19 (1964).

Christensen, L. "Deception in Psychological Research: When Is Its Use Justified?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.14 (1988).



- Koocher, G. P. and P. C. Keith-Spiegel. "Scholarly Publication and Research Ethics." In *Ethics in Psychology: Professional Standards and Cases*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- La Vaque, T. J. and T. Rossiter. "The Ethical Use of Placebo Controls in Clinical Research: The Declaration of Helsinki." *Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback*, v.26 (2001).
- Nicks, S. D., J. H. Korn, and T. Mainieri. "The Rise and Fall of Deception in Social Psychology and Personality Research, 1921 to 1994." *Ethics & Behavior*, v.7 (1997).
- Ortmann, A. and R. Hertwig. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology." *Experimental Economics*, v.5 (2002).
- Pascual-Leone, A., T. Singh, and A. Sciorria. "Using Deception Ethically: Practical Research Guidelines for Researchers and Reviewers." *Canadian Psychology*, v.51 (2010).
- Pittenger, D. J. "Deception in Research: Distinctions and Solutions From the Perspective of Utilitarianism." *Ethics & Behavior*, v.12 (2002).
- Young, S. N. and L. Annable. "The Ethics of Placebo in Clinical Psychopharmacology: The Urgent Need for Consistent Regulation." *Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience*, v.27 (2002).

---

## Deception Motives

While lying is pervasive in our society, people rarely engage in deception when the truth would be acceptable. The reason for this is simple: Telling the truth is easier because it requires no explanation. Lying, on the other hand, requires justification, not only to the target (should the lie be discovered), but also to the self in order to engage in the deception in the first place. Psychopathy aside, people tend to lie and deceive primarily when truth-telling is perceived to interfere with the attainment of meaningful personal and interpersonal goals.

The specific goals that can be thwarted by honesty are many and varied, however, they can generally be characterized by six overarching motives: being polite or socially acceptable, protecting others, protecting relationships, protecting the self, promoting the self, and deliberately hurting others.

### Polite Lies

The imperative to be polite is ingrained in many societies. This social imperative breeds what are known as "polite lies." These lies are intended to be tactful, and both the target and the liar are aware that they are untrue. For example, in North America, the socially acceptable response to the question "How are you?" is "Fine, thank you" regardless of whether or not one is actually fine. If a person responds to this question with a detailed description of his or her lousy day, the questioner will often attempt to change the topic of discussion or avoid further discussion.

Socially acceptable lies such as "You look wonderful" or "I'm so glad you stopped by" forestall any further discussion, and give the questioners the opportunity to feel positively about themselves while allowing the liars to maintain their positions as nice people. In many societies, the punishment for not telling these socially sanctioned lies is more harsh than the consequences for those telling the polite lie who are then found out. Avoiding social ostracism, one of the most common responses to telling unpopular truths, is a powerful motivator for liars to tell polite lies. In addition, polite lies have a direct benefit to the liar of not having to reveal personal information, should he or she feel uncomfortable doing so. Polite lies then serve the dual purpose of avoiding social ostracism from telling too much truth and enabling the liar to maintain his or her privacy, should that be desired.

### Protecting Others

Other lies are told in the belief that the target will be protected, helped, or benefitted by the lie. These are commonly known as "benevolent lies" or "altruistic lies." These prosocial lies, such as overpraising another with the intent of increasing his or her self-esteem, operate on the principle of self-fulfilling prophecies. The liar may believe that if the target is told that he or she is better than in the reality, then the target may begin to change his or her behavior, outlook, and/or beliefs, and start to actually bring them in line with the well-meaning untruth.

Another type of prosocial lie is lying to someone who intends to harm others. For example, if a family member is abused by their spouse, lying to the abuser by claiming no knowledge of the

victim's whereabouts would be considered prosocial, with the intent to protect another. As with polite lies, the consequences of not telling these prosocial, other-protective lies would be serious, potentially resulting in the truth-teller being held responsible or blamed for any further abuse experienced by the victim. In essence, other-motivated protection-based deception can sometimes be viewed as socially supported and relationally beneficial.


### Protecting the Self

Understandably, not all lies are intended to protect others. Lies that are motivated by self-protection generally involve a poor choice or unintended negative experience that individuals feel compelled to hide or explain in such a way that their positive sense of self is protected. In its more extreme forms, people are often motivated

to lie about their actions in order to avoid punishment for wrongdoing (e.g., "It wasn't me who stole it") or put a more positive spin on why it happened (e.g., "I only took it to pay for my mother's surgery"). Trying to make an intentional wrongdoing appear as though it were an accident or an unexpected byproduct of a more positively intentioned act is one of the biggest lies that people tell in order to protect their sense of themselves as good people and to avoid the consequences, should their actions be found to be deliberate or careless.

### Protecting the Relationship

Many lies cross the boundaries between protecting the self and protecting the other, especially when the liar and target share a close relationship. One of the more common forms of relationship-protective lies are those designed to avoid



*Some lies are told in order to promote the self (such as in a job setting in order to create a more positive impression), while some lies are told in an effort to protect the self (such as saying, "no thanks, I'm full" when offered food, while the truth is actually a dislike of what is offered). Other motivations for lying are to be polite, protect a relationship, protect others, or deliberately hurt others.*

conflict. For example, when people are facing a potential conflict with a friend, one which they realize they have little hope of winning, people often lie to avoid the conflict. They either pretend to go along with the friend's belief or conjure up a plausible, though still untrue version of the story that will allow them to hold their own in the conflict.

Relationship-protective deception can be beneficial to a relationship, but under some circumstances, it can further complicate matters. For example, conflict avoidance may reduce the stress on a relationship in the moment, but over time, when the conflictive issues are consistently avoided, problems simply are not resolved. This is detrimental to the relationship in the long run. In addition, self-protective lies are often told under the guise of protecting the relationship. A classic example of this grey area of relationship-protective lies can be found in stories of infidelity. Often, the unfaithful spouse claims to have lied to his or her partner in order to protect him or her from being hurt. While this may not be completely untrue, a good deal of the motivation for lying about cheating stems from a desire to protect the self from punishment or censure for bad behavior. This type of self-focused deception is generally perceived as more negative than other-focused lies because the liar is acting for selfish reasons, rather than for the positive protection of the relationship.

### **Promoting the Self**

Not only can people lie to protect themselves, they are also motivated to lie in order to promote themselves. This is most often found in the business sector and in close relationships. What these two situations have in common is that a positive first impression is a vital part of any successful relationship, be it personal or professional. In an ideal world, that impression would be based on the reality of who people really are. Some people either lack the positive impression or confidence that they naturally project a positive image. In these cases, many people will create a false, more positive impression of themselves in order to gain the favor and approval of others.

For example, when applying for a new job, many people put a significantly more positive spin on their resume and job experience than reality

can support. They will inflate their role in previous successes and/or overestimate the level of skills they possess. Sadly, this tactic often backfires when they are hired and end up taking on projects for which they are unprepared to complete. In this sense, the confidence they project is not related to their actual capabilities, but successfully serves to give the impression that they were the right hire for the job. Similarly, when meeting potential new relationship partners, people also attempt to "put their best foot forward" by using self-promotional lies. For example, men tend to overstate their income and the importance of their jobs. Women trying to make a more positive first impression on a date will lie about their age, education level, and the type of relationship they are interested in pursuing. All of these lies, which are seemingly easily uncovered, are designed to create a more positive impression of the self than the individual believes exists in reality. The two-pronged consequences of more positive self-perception and a potential increase in external rewards such as a better job, higher paycheck, or more attractive mate make self-promotional lies highly tempting to many people.

### **Deliberately Hurting Others**

Antisocial or malicious lies are considered the most serious and intentionally hurtful form of lying. These lies are used to deliberately hurt and/or discredit the target. While the liar may derive some pleasure from the pain experienced by the target, the primary goal of this type of lie is to deliberately cause the hurt. Often, these malicious lies stem from jealousy or the liar's sense of inadequacy. For example, a coworker may falsely accuse a person of sharing insider information to a competitor.

The point of the lie is to cause the employer to become suspicious of an employee's activities, creating stress and distrust in the workplace. If the accusations cannot be disproved, this potentially leads to the employee being fired and shamed in front of his or her colleagues. This need to hurt may stem from dissatisfaction in the liar's life, or jealousy over what the target has that the liar does not, or may be used as revenge to right a perceived wrong, such as when a coworker was promoted over the liar without what the liar feels is a justifiable reason. Whatever the ultimate reason



for the lie, the goal is the same—deliberately causing hurt by sharing untruths.

While these categories neatly break down the potential reasons for liars to tell their untruths, there are at least two challenges in discerning the true motives of liars. Both are linked to the fact that the only ones who have access to the motives of liars are the liars themselves. First, regardless of their true motives, when asked about their lies, liars tend to try to justify their motivations by linking them to larger, positive, and broadly held values. Liars suggest that their lies are morally acceptable because they are in the best interest of the target or the relationship with the target. They may spin their actions in terms of the “rightness” of the lie in the big picture. While this analysis suggests that liars are consciously and deliberately misrepresenting the motives for their untruths, a second issue in determining motive involves the extent to which liars are even aware of why they are lying. It is only when liars have been caught in their untruths that they even begin to evaluate what they have done and why. The veracity of the motives that liars ascribe to their actions must be weighed against the conscious or self-conscious desire to present as having a “good” reason to tell untruths.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
University of Prince Edward Island

**See Also:** Duping Delight; Lie Acceptability; Lies, Types of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Pathological Lying; Self-Justification; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Bok, S. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Pantheon, 1979.
- Kaplar, Mary E. and Anne K. Gordon. “The Enigma of Altruistic Lying: Perspective Differences in What Motivates and Justifies Lie Telling Within Romantic Relationships.” *Personal Relationships*, v.11/4 (2004).
- Knapp, Mark L. *Lying and Deception in Human Interaction*. Boston: Pearson/Allyn Bacon, 2008.
- Levin, Timothy R., Rachel K. Kim, and Lauren K. Hamel. “People Lie for a Reason: Three Experiments Documenting the Principle of Veracity.” *Communication Research Reports*, v.27/4 (2010).

## Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment

The Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (DACA) is the former title of the federal government agency that was formally redesignated the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) in 2010. The NCCA is the government agency that is responsible for the provision of training and education related to the use and application of psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD), which is more commonly known and referred to as the polygraph.

The change in the NCCA’s title is not unexpected given that the agency has experienced a great deal of change during the course of its existence. Since its origination, the NCCA has been housed under the Department of Defense (DOD), the Defense Security Service (DSS), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Before acquiring its current title, the NCCA had officially been known as the U.S. Army Polygraph School (USAPS), the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI), and the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (DACA).

### Mission of the Agency

While the alignment and title of the NCCA may have changed over time, the mission of the agency has remained largely the same. More specifically, the mission of the NCCA is to provide federal government agencies and their employees with the educational programs and the credibility assessment tools that they need in order to effectively protect and secure the interests, property, and citizens of the United States. It is believed that the NCCA’s role in providing education and training regarding credibility assessment techniques is a critical part of ensuring the achievement of this protective mission.

In order to accomplish its mission, the NCCA is charged with a variety of duties related to its core credibility assessment function. The nature and scope of these duties have dramatically changed over time as the types of threats presumed to exist have changed, the tactics and stratagems used to discover deception have evolved, and the technologies related to credibility assessment and deception identification have developed and advanced.



The NCCA was originally charged with providing basic polygraph training for employees of various federal government agencies. While this vocational training role has been maintained, the set of duties assigned to the NCCA has dramatically expanded. Currently, these duties include a compliance and oversight role, an advisory and consultative duty, and a research and testing expectation, in addition to the provision of both initial and ongoing training and graduate level educational programs.

While education remains the primary duty of the NCCA, in some of its most recent initiatives, its regulatory and research roles have demonstrated greater significance and visibility. Near the close of 20th century, the NCCA developed a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) for federal PDD programs and PDD technicians. This program is mandatory for some federal polygraph programs, while many other federal agencies with polygraph programs have voluntarily agreed to comply with its mandates. The QAP established standards for federal PDD programs and provides a means by which periodic inspections of federal PDD programs can occur. In another important development, near the end of the 1990s, the NCCA's existing research agenda was rejuvenated and strengthened. The renewed research agenda included the provision of additional funding for relevant credibility assessment research and an increased focus on the creation of collaborative PDD research agendas with academic institutions and industrial organizations.

As the NCCA has grown and developed, its scope and influence have expanded beyond its traditional target audience. While the NCCA was traditionally associated with the provision of PDD training for federal agencies and personnel, it does not exclusively limit the training that it provides to this specific population. The NCCA has created an alternative admissions process through which members of state or local law enforcement agencies can gain admission and receive credibility assessment training. Further, the NCCA involves itself with research and training that is of substantive concern to both government agencies and private industry. While PDD techniques are used extensively within certain government agencies, they are also widely employed within the private sector. As a result, much of the research

conducted by the NCCA may ultimately influence PDD policies and practices as they are currently employed within both government and private industry.

It is likely that the future will see further revisions to the mission and duties associated with the NCCA. An increased focus on foreign and domestic terrorism and the related increase in the importance of intelligence-gathering will likely increase the NCCA's role in the counterintelligence field. While counterintelligence has always been a part of the NCCA's mission, it will likely take on increasing significance and play a more prominent role in the agency's future.

In addition, advancing technologies and future innovations in the field of credibility assessment will likely result in significant changes in the way in which the NCCA undertakes its educational and research duties. Ongoing revisions of this nature are expected if the NCCA is to continue providing law enforcement and intelligence agencies and their employees with relevant training and access to the most current credibility assessment tools.

Jason R. Jolicoeur

*University of Tennessee at Martin*

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Confession; Corporations; Deception and Technology; Deception Detection Accuracy; Department of Defense, U.S.; Dishonesty; Electroencephalography; Espionage and Counterespionage; False Confessions; History of Deception: 1900–1950; Law and Law Enforcement; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Voice Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Ben-Shakhar, G. and J. J. Furedy. *Theories and Applications in the Detection of Deception: A Psychophysiological and International Perspective*. London: Springer, 2011.
- Gacioppo, J. T., L. G. Tassinary, and G. G. Berntson. *The Handbook of Psychophysiology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Granhag, P. A. and L. A. Strömwall, eds. *The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- National Research Council. *The Polygraph and Lie Detection*. Committee to Review the Scientific

*Evidence on the Polygraph*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003.

Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2d ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2008.

## Deniability

The definition of “deniability” seems simple on its face as a combination of the ability or capability to be denied, and this was how it was initially used in the English vernacular. Early word usage did not necessarily connote deception or the prospect of deceiving, but reflected a range of possible associations, such as candor or humility, as in poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s phrase, “Beyond all deniability, I am a coward in giving pain.” The popularization of the word in the 1970s, however, produced two new connotations directly related to deception: (1) the possibility of denying a “discreditable action” (*Oxford English Dictionary*) and (2) deniability as a function of “being officially uninformed” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary*).

These new associations have meant that “deniability” has come to be used almost exclusively in the context of lying (the potential to lie without being perceived as lying), and is almost always combined with the word *plausible* to highlight the potential of the denial to be effective, that is, to deceive and manipulate the impressions of others. Any potential misdeed is deniable. For example, throwing a rock and breaking a glass window in front of a crowd is a deniable act, but is not likely believable or plausible.

The term *plausible deniability* was popularized when it was used to describe the specific doctrine of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as revealed by the Church Committee, but this term was quickly extended to characterize similar behavior in political, governmental, and legal spheres in which public officials sought to escape accountability for their actions or actions of their subordinates. More recently, plausible deniability has been broadened to the interpersonal realm to help conceptualize forms of communication (e.g., indirect speech) that might involve deception or

evasion and to understand how potentially unacceptable social attitudes are masked or denied (e.g., racism).

### Governmental and Presidential Behavior

In 1974, the Church Committee of the U.S. Senate used the term *plausible denial* to refer to the government doctrine by which the president could disavow knowledge of CIA plots against various foreign leaders, most notably Fidel Castro. By being kept uninvolved and uninformed, the president could deny any awareness of these activities. If the president was not perceived to be involved, then the entire nation would, by extension, seem to be uninvolved and this perception would not only forestall blame but also prevent any potential for retaliation. The Church Committee outlined a number of important fatal flaws in the logic of this strategy.

In a subsequent governmental invocation of plausible deniability, Admiral John Poindexter used the term during the Iran-Contra Affair. While his usage retained the idea of keeping the president free of information that might be discreditable, he used it more narrowly to suggest that it referred to protecting the president, not the entire government or the American people, from the knowledge of the illegal diversion of funds, which is why Poindexter explained that he took personal responsibility for authorizing the movement of money from Iranian arms sales to the Contras.

In this context of government and political actions, plausible deniability might be seen as a variety of propaganda, a kind of official, preemptive lying, through which a specific narrative is crafted to create a particular impression that either obscures or refutes the actual discreditable actions and behavior of politicians and governments. Douglas Walton suggests that this works by escaping the burden of proof by “putting forward a proposition that a target respondent (or audience) is meant to accept, while building in a defense to shield off the need to respond to any request to justify (or give evidence to support) the proposition queried by the respondent.” These deniability-serving government narratives, according to David Bogen and Michael Lynch, have the wider potential to distort or obscure important details surrounding actual U.S. and government history.

In a sense, plausible deniability is unique in the world of deception because it involves a recognition that an action is wrong in advance of its execution, and that one must have contingency plans (in the form of excuses) to save face or avoid retaliation, if the discreditable act is discovered. One must deceive in advance to avoid the revelation of a more damaging instance of deception.

### Indirect Speech

In the context of linguistics, Steven Pinker and his colleagues have placed plausible deniability at the center of their theory regarding the function of indirect speech (or conveying the spoken information in a manner that is not explicit). Pinker and colleagues posit the strategic speaker theory, in which, because the individual does not know the identification (and therefore the predispositions or thoughts) of his or her interlocutor/audience, the speaker has to be cautious in what he or she says. The identification problem has particular gravity in social contexts that might exact certain economic or social costs, such as attempting a veiled bribe, sexual advance, covert threat, polite request, or solicitation for money.

Indirect speech permits plausible deniability in such instances because the speaker can always assert that his or her ambiguous statements were misunderstood, when they were correctly understood. Pinker and James J. Lee maintain, "Indirect speech allows plausible deniability of a breach of a relationship type and thus avoids the aversive social and emotional consequences that would be triggered by such a breach." Marina Terkourafic and other critics of this theory have argued that cooperation better accounts for indirect speech than deniability, but it remains an important theory.

### Racism and Other Biases

Modern racism might also be seen as a form of plausible deniability around the potential disavowal of racial bias, while simultaneously holding or expressing racial prejudices. (This use of deniability might easily be extended to illuminate other forms of bias.) The theory of symbolic (or modern) racism holds that while it is no longer socially acceptable to openly express racist attitudes, people still hold racial prejudices and express these in veiled symbolic statements about racial groups.

James H. Liu and Duncan Mills found four factors underlying modern racism that relate to plausible deniability:

1. Minority group members are criticized for specific misdeeds that violate traditional majority group values.
2. The specific criticism against the minority group member(s) is qualified.
3. Majority group values are affirmed in the process of criticizing the minority and warranting this critique.
4. Racism or racist intent is denied.

Missing from this analysis is the possibility that symbolic racism might be used as a kind of social attunement strategy to assess and adjust to the attitudes of others. The symbolic statements about an out-group might be hazarded or floated to gauge the degree of agreement with an interlocutor. High levels of agreement would reinforce one's implicit bias, and low levels of agreement could lead to denial of, but even possibly a change in that bias.

Future research would benefit from a broader focus on the role of plausible deniability in biases and biased statements more generally. It would also be useful to have a better understanding of plausible deniability as an impression management, social attunement, and/or relationship formation strategy.

Marcus Patterson  
*University of Massachusetts, Boston*

**See Also:** Deception Motives; Denial; Disinformation; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Iran-Contra Affair; Plausibility; Racism.

### Further Readings

- Bogen, David and Michael Lynch. "Taking Account of The Hostile Native: Plausible Deniability and the Production of Conventional History in the Iran-Contra Hearings." *Social Problems*, v.36/3 (1989).
- Lee, James J. and Steven Pinker. "Rationales for Indirect Speech: The Theory of the Strategic Speaker." *Psychological Review*, v.117/3 (2010).
- Liu, James H. and Duncan Mills. "Modern Racism and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Discourses

of Plausible Deniability and Their Multiple Functions.” *Journal Of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, v.16/2 (2006).

Pinker Steven, Michael Nowak, and James J. Lee.

“The Logic of Indirect Speech.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, v.103/3 (2007).

Terkourafi, Marina. “The Puzzle of Indirect Speech.” *Journal of Pragmatics*, v.43/11 (2011).

Walton, Douglas. “Plausible Deniability and Evasion of Burden of Proof.” *Argumentation*, v.10/1 (1996).

## Denial

The term *denial* has several meanings in the English language, including refutation, refusal, and renunciation. In the varied disciplines of psychology, denial closely relates to self-deception. In the context of psychology, denial encompasses several means for a person to protect the self from any number of threats, imagined or real.

When a person experiences a threat, denying the threat may afford the person time to appraise its meaning and severity before reacting to it. During denial, the perceived time lag from perceived threat to the actual perception of discomfort places denial in the category of self-defense and sometimes in the category of coping. Psychological science has shown that denial more closely relates to a self-protective motive than to a coping skill or strategy. Nonetheless, researchers garner empirical support for denial, and thus it is no longer merely a notion of 20th-century esoteric conjecture.

### Freud and Kübler-Ross's Concepts of Denial

In the early 20th century, denial was central to the writings of Sigmund Freud; it was one of several of his professed psychological defense mechanisms. From this view, denial was potentially dangerous psychologically because a person refused to accept what had occurred in the observable, physical reality as the truth. Denial was a person's blatant disregard for what others could verify as real. For instance, when diagnosed with a terminal illness, the person refuses to believe that life will continue as it was prior to the illness.

Freud believed that denial was one of several defensive reactions to threat that manifested in adulthood from repressed urges and conflicts thought to have occurred in a person's childhood. Freud thought of denial, among other defensive reactions to threat, as a conflict between a person's unconscious motive to maintain pleasure and the idealistic motive to maintain righteousness, that is, to do what is right in the eyes of others. The disruption of hedonic balance sometimes triggers a defense, such as denial in which a person may think, “This is not happening.”

In Freud's view, psychological negation—denial—included anything from the refusal by a person to accept a character in a dream as a symbol of one's mother, to the failure by individuals to accept their current emotional states as unpleasant. In denial, someone attempted, albeit unknowingly, to reconcile the discrepancy between what the person desired with the reality of the actual occurrence or with others' expectations. In sum, Freud's notion of denial is broad. It occurred beneath a person's awareness; hence, the psychoanalytic therapist would attempt to facilitate the person through the acceptance of that which the person defensively denied.

Later in the 20th century, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross narrowed the scope of denial to personal loss, such as during bereavement. Among her five stages of grieving, she posited denial to occur first. When dealing with the loss of a close relation, Kübler-Ross suggested that individuals implicitly or explicitly engage in a process of refusing to accept the fact of loss, “This can't be happening to me!” The passage of a person from life to death often provokes intense feelings of sadness, and even trauma. From this view, denial occurs naturally, consequent to someone or something perceived as gone, a barrier between intense discomfort and the person's sense of self.

In addition to the focus on bereavement, Kübler-Ross's notion of denial included the surprise, shock, and suddenness of the change or loss to a person. The shock could pertain not only to news of the loss of someone or something, but also about one's self, such as compromised health status. As an initial emotional response to loss, denial affords a means to create a space between the stability of the known past and the uncertainty of the present and future. Similar to Freud's view, the discrepancy



that arises from the comfort of knowing that someone is alive and the discomfort in knowing that a person has died provokes denial, ostensibly as a means to shield one's self from intense unpleasant feelings. Denial often includes a perceptual time lag for a person. Distorted temporal perceptions provide a psychological platform for a person to attempt to reconcile the emotional contrast.

### Modern Concepts of Denial

The modern conceptualization of denial includes a broad range of phenomena, many of which have been the subject of empirical scrutiny. Personality and social psychology research preserves the theme of denial: Individuals refuse to accept threatening information as evident, whether it is real or imaginary. A common paradigm of such research includes presenting to a person negative feedback or some form of unflattering information that directly relates to the person's self-concept, such as to their sense of self-worth and self-esteem.

For instance, results from a meta-analysis suggest that when under a perceived threat such as failing an exam, many individuals attribute the failure to external sources, blaming the difficulty of the exam, rather than their ineptitude or lack of study. When faced with self-enhancing or self-affirming situations, such as doing well on an exam, they may attribute the success to their competence or intelligence, regardless of whether or not such competence is veridical. Both kinds of attributions are a form of denial. From this view, individuals tend to maintain a positive view of their self, are motivated to reduce discrepancies that challenge their positive self-views, and are motivated to maintain self-consistency when faced with self-challenging information.

Social and personality psychology research has posited and examined a wide range of phenomena that fit within the framework of denial. An important distinction in such research has emphasized the conceptual and practical relatedness of denial to coping. Among the most basic psychological processes that set denial apart from coping is a person's observable adherence to reality. A person may deny reality in a number of ways; however, coping implies an appraisal of a presumably negative situation.

In response to a personal threat such as an insult, a person in denial would be likely to avoid

the personal relevance of the threatening stimulus by thinking, "He wasn't talking to me." On the other hand, in coping, a person would be likely to acknowledge the personal relevance and manage the threatening stimulus, "He was upset and didn't mean to hurt me." A convergent aspect of denial and many coping strategies is that, in response to a personal threat, each may at times help a person manage negativity, and each may at times fail to do so. Like denial, coping does not always work; however, like coping, denial is sometimes an effective means to deal with negativity.

Denial and coping overlap in the case of avoidant coping: a reaction to negativity that prompts a person to maintain physical or psychological distance from the threatening stimulus. Another point of convergence concerns the information on which a person focuses. Whereas active coping primarily concerns a person focusing on a problem to be solved and the goals needed to solve it, both coping and denial can focus on the emotions to be dealt with, like diminishing negativity. Denial can sometimes be a form of emotion-focused coping, such as keeping oneself at a distance from potential or actual sources of threat, or ignoring that a problem exists at all.

Similarly, research has shown that some individuals are more prone to denial than others. Some evidence suggests that dispositional pessimism, a generally negative view of the self and the world, correlates with distancing and denial. Such relations occurred for individuals who were under stress. Similar to differences in coping foci, optimistic individuals look to others for help and attempt to examine the presenting problem. Their pessimistic counterparts instead withdraw from problem-solving goals and attempt to ameliorate negativity by denying the severity of the stress. Further, denial maintains its relevance in the assessment of personality, in part because of the invention and use of a wide range of items and scales purportedly assess that global and domain-specific forms of denial.

### Adaptive Denial

Whereas historical accounts of denial tended to emphasize it as maladaptive, a modern account, backed by research evidence, suggests that denial can sometimes be adaptive, similar to some coping strategies. From an information-processing view,

research suggests that in the immediate experience, individuals are more attentive to negative information than positive information. However, after a passage of time, they tend to recall positive information better than negative information, especially information that is relevant to one-self, compared to information about others. Such memorial biases evince diminished negativity and accentuated positivity.

These cognitive biases are potentially conducive to self and emotion regulation. Indicators of depression and anxiety disorders include the spontaneous rehearsal of negative information; such information is undesirable, intrusive, and is often the focus of treatment in psychotherapy. By extension, the disproportionate rehearsal of positive information in memory is a signal of mental health, and is therefore adaptive. Consistent with older accounts of denial, the comparatively infrequent occurrence of past negative events and personal information, like the rumination on one's negative attributes, suggests that denial of this type may preserve mental health.

Another modern view suggests that denial, among other defensive responses, can sometimes help individuals maintain continuity to their life stories. When thinking of one's past, denial can shield a person from the anxiety that would otherwise be provoked by revisiting unpleasant memories. In service to a person's present self-concept, denial may afford the opportunity to augment a past pleasant memory, perhaps exaggeratedly, such that the person experiences a boost in present self-esteem.

Denial may contribute to a person's authorship of the life story by inhibiting a contamination theme and by fostering a theme of redemption instead. Rather than recount the past as it actually felt, laden with both negative and positive emotions, individuals instead deny many of the negative emotions and elaborate the positive ones. Selective denial of past unpleasant events and of the negative feelings associated with such events contributes to rose-tinted retrospection, a perception of the past as more pleasant than it actually was. This includes denial in the framework of self and emotion-regulatory processes.

The future of denial in the psychological sciences would appear to be promising as a general valid construct that is unique from similar

constructs, such as coping. Theorists and practitioners will likely continue to study specific forms of denial, the contexts in which denial is useful and potentially harmful to the person and to others, as well as individual differences that are relevant to the experience of various forms of denial. Ultimately, the era of denial as a catchall term and something to avoid entirely has passed.

Timothy D. Ritchie  
University of Limerick

**See Also:** Deniability; Freud, Sigmund; Meta-Analysis; Psychoanalysis; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

- Baumeister, R. F., K. Dale, and K. L. Sommer. "Freudian Defense Mechanisms and Empirical Findings in Modern Social Psychology: Reaction Formation, Projection, Displacement, Undoing, Isolation, Sublimation, and Denial." *Journal of Personality*, v.66 (1998).
- Cohen, S. *States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering*. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
- Folkman, S. "Personal Control and Stress and Coping Processes: A Theoretical Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.46 (1984).
- McAdams, D. P. "The Role of Defense in the Life Story." *Journal of Personality*, v.66 (1998).
- Miceli, M. and C. Castelfranchi. "Further Distinctions Between Coping and Defense Mechanisms?" *Journal of Personality*, v.69 (2001).
- Scheier, M. F., J. K. Weintraub, and C. S. Carver. "Coping With Stress: Divergent Strategies of Optimists and Pessimists." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.51 (1986).

---

## Department of Defense, U.S.

There is no greater honor than the opportunity to serve one's country, and if need be, to die for it. This perception of patriotism has been ingrained into the American psyche since the American Revolution. Many Americans have an idealist image

that the nation's armed forces can do no wrong, and that the nation should forever be indebted to the military for its service. However, as history has shown, even the most patriotic individuals can engage in acts that can challenge this image.

Since its creation under the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), often called the Pentagon, has evolved into the most superior military force in human history, capable of waging war and gathering intelligence on a global scale. However, such power comes at an extreme price, both financially and morally. At times, DoD officials have demonstrated that the protection of its homeland and assets abroad outweigh its moral obligations. By employing deceptive tactics both domestically and abroad, this institution has caused many people to question its true intentions. At times, the department's concealment of information, blatant dishonesty, and manipulation of reality have undermined its objectives and have proven detrimental to its credibility.

Politically, deception is more than a simple mistake or naïve confusion; rather, it is the intentional misinforming of others in order to gain a strategic advantage. The Pentagon has used deception as a means to maintain and broaden control over military operations. Deception can be passively used, to mask real intentions or capabilities, or actively to provide evidence of intentions or capabilities that do not actually exist. By luring another party into believing an alternative scenario, the Pentagon, aware of the misconception, can capitalize on the situation and further advance its goals and objectives.

The key factor in the use of deception is determining the intended target and any unintended victims of the strategy. In a broad sense, deception can be waged against foreign enemies in order to disguise the reality of pressing international situations. More cynically, yet certainly verifiable, deception can be waged against the general public and media in order to conceal the truth. More often than not, these two targets of deception are related and inseparable, meaning that a deceptive action taken abroad is likely to be strategically fabricated domestically so that there is no discrepancy in signals. Any disparity could result in serious consequences that would adversely affect the Pentagon's legitimacy as a

trustworthy institution and its authority to use such actions in the future.

### **Deception in the Budget Process**

With a defense budget larger than that of the next 17 countries combined, there is little doubt that the DoD's superior reputation can be attributed to its enormous budget. Each year, Pentagon officials regularly testify before Congress in defense of their programs so that Congress can receive additional information before approving requested funds. Yet, there is ample evidence that proves that the department is not always telling Congress the whole truth, especially regarding the budgetary process.

Most within the department take great pride in the amount of resources allocated to their particular program. The Pentagon, like all federal agencies, is not limited by general profit and loss considerations, thus there is no benefit from decreasing its budget and increasing efficiency. In fact, many look down upon those who do not spend their entire budget because Congress will take back what is left of their unspent funds and appropriate less in the following year. Within the DoD, there are cultural incentives to spending its entire budget, yet there are little to no incentives for cutting spending. If there is a weapons program that is not meeting congressional expectations, it is more advantageous for Pentagon officials to omit important details and provide a fallacious perception of the program to Congress, rather than risk the deprivation of funds.

For example, in September 1985, Brigadier General Ronald Yates testified before Congress regarding the suspiciously exaggerated price for support equipment for the F-16 fighter aircraft. The product in question, the F-16 pulley puller, was priced in the proposed budget as \$8,832. During a prior investigative interview, Yates contended that the product should cost just a few dollars. Yates did the best he could to deny his previous statement before a congressional committee, however, he was eventually caught in his obvious lie. There are many examples of such obvious Pentagon budget fabrications brought to light by Representative John Dingell, who chaired the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Dingell was regarded as one of the few members of Congress who would challenge high-ranking

military officials about inconsistencies in their testimony.

### **Iran-Contra Affair**

Such compromising scenarios greatly tarnish the department's reputation. In some cases, evident deception has ruined the reputations of some of the most senior Pentagon officials. This was the case for former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Between August 1985 and October 1986, Weinberger was highly involved with the Iran-Contra Affair, a controversy that would engulf the Reagan administration. Weinberger's department was responsible for replacing Israel's missiles as Israel transferred their missiles to Iran, as directed by the United States. Ultimately, it was not the initial arms transfer that brought the demise of Weinberger. Instead, Weinberger gave false testimony about the extent of his personal knowledge of the affair, and he deliberately concealed his personal notes from the independent counsel. Through the efforts of an investigation led by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, Weinberger was indicted by a federal grand jury on two counts of perjury and one count of obstruction. President George H. W. Bush later pardoned him in 1992. The Iran-Contra Affair is a testament to the negative power of deception and the amount of risk that is associated with the controversial strategy.

### **Abuse of Secrecy and the Pentagon Papers**

Because of the department's sensitive nature regarding its operations, intentions, and links with national security, the concept of secrecy is a privilege allotted to the Pentagon, although not without limitation. The government's monopoly on secrets is well understood as necessary in order to ensure adequate national defense, preserve governmental integrity, and enable foreign nations to trust that the United States will not reveal these nations' secret information. However, understanding the reasons for secrecy does not make the public any less skeptical of their government. When the department is seen as abusing its exercise of secrecy, the confidence of the general public and the international community declines, as does the Pentagon's credibility.

Government concealment from the public is persistently challenged today, largely because of

the debate over release of the Pentagon Papers. In 1967, as the credibility gap between President Lyndon B. Johnson and the public was growing because of increasing dissatisfaction over the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration was searching for new ways to win the war. That spring, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the organization of all papers regarding the war. He planned to make an encyclopedia of U.S. policy in Vietnam so that he could study what had gone wrong and how he could fix it. The 47-volume, 7,000-page compilation was finished in 1969, and was classified as "Top Secret." A few copies were stored at the RAND Corporation, where a few individuals were given access to the documents. Late one evening, Daniel Ellsberg, who had access to the documents, and his friend Anthony Russo photocopied the documents, which eventually landed in the hands of reporter Neil Sheehan. On June 13, 1971, the *New York Times* published its first article based on the classified papers.

The documents, which came to be known as the Pentagon Papers, had a dramatic effect on the political landscape in Washington, and further fueled antiwar opposition. The papers gave a detailed look into the truth behind the Vietnam War, which, as many suspected, did not match what the general public was being told at the time. Ellsberg had essentially released and mass-distributed conclusive evidence of the repeated deceptions carried out by the government.

For example, the Pentagon Papers indicate that the Tonkin Gulf affair in August 1964 was a result of the Johnson administration's clandestine warfare against North Vietnam. This indicates that Johnson took advantage of the alleged incidents to secure the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which brought the United States into open warfare in Vietnam. This story contradicts the supposed unprovoked attacks on the United States that was proposed to the public. Additionally, there is evidence that Johnson had already been searching for an excuse to escalate the war months before the Tonkin Gulf affair. The papers also reveal frequent falsifications by the president and his advisors, notably McNamara, about strategic plans and military action.

The legality concerning the publishing of Top Secret documents was determined by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1971, which ruled in





*Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fields a question during the first Pentagon press briefing on the day of the September 11, 2001, attacks. While Rumsfeld rose to the challenge of combatting the new terrorist threat, he went about it in a way that many considered controversial. The Department of Defense (DoD), recognizing the need to craft favorable international opinion toward the United States, developed techniques to strategically harness the media as a means of giving the DoD the most advantageous reputation.*

favor of the *New York Times* on the basis of the First Amendment. As a result of this incident, the press became far more skeptical of the government, and reporters increased their investigations of government misconduct.

### **Waging the War on Terror**

The Department of Defense thrives when there is public confidence that it is doing what is best for the country and when the agency has an understanding of the world. When the Pentagon lacks this understanding and is less confident of its direction and goals, what remains is uncertainty, which is the root of deception. The more uncertain the DoD is of its intentions, the more it is inclined to amplify its deceptive strategies, domestically and internationally, in order to obtain a better grasp of the world.

In Vietnam, the Pentagon was unsure of its direction and failed to understand the big picture,

as the policy discussions in the Pentagon Papers indicate. Likewise, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon lost its sense of direction and understanding. The 9/11 attacks were the realization of the DoD's worst nightmare: American was vulnerable.

The department's lack of confidence and the subsequent War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq have come to symbolize the resurgence of powerful deception as a strategic tactic. What was new about the department's action during the Iraq War was that the United States was no longer fighting a state actor, but was instead waging war against a militant substate actor that used terrorism as its strategy. The Pentagon needed to adapt and rise to the new challenges of the globalized world. President George W. Bush placed a great deal of confidence in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to combat the new threat of terrorists. Rumsfeld rose to the

challenge, but in a far more controversial way than most had anticipated.

In the process of developing new methods and strategies, Rumsfeld's Pentagon adopted a hard-line stance against terrorism and those who were suspected of harboring terrorists. However, in order to implement this transition in policy, the DoD recognized the need to craft international opinion in favor of the United States. Thus, the Pentagon had to develop techniques to harness the media as a mechanism of war by controlling the distribution of information in order to strategically give the U.S. military and its policies the most advantageous reputation.

One way that the military influenced the flow of information was by establishing the Rapid Reaction Media Team in January 2003. The job of the media team was to distribute news about the new Iraq government and the chance for a democratic future, all of which had to be approved by the Pentagon. In this strategy, the DoD used the media to support the new Iraqi government by means of deceptive propaganda. Another way that the military exercised control over the media was by using the more traditional technique of embedding journalists in military units. This tactic allowed the military to exercise control over what the reporter would see, based on what unit he or she was assigned. Also, by including reporters in the day-to-day routines of a particular unit, reporters would tend to develop personal relationships within the unit, and as a result were more likely to defend the troops, an advantage for the military. In both regards, the military was able to control the flow of information to people in the United States and abroad by deceptively directing what the journalists could see and with whom they made connections.

Deception is as much a potential strategy as it is a potential risk for all parties involved. The DoD has had its deceitful tactics exposed many times over the years. Between fabricated defense budget hearings, blatant lying, cover-ups, concealment, classified leaks, and control of information abroad, the credibility of the institution and the integrity of those who serve there have been tested many times. The Pentagon is an institution that can be seemingly beaten and tarnished beyond compare, and yet despite all odds, persist and grow. DoD deception strategies

against the American public and international community have damaged its credibility. Yet, while the American people have expressed dissatisfaction with on many occasions, and sharply criticized government authorities, they are reluctant to question the activities and policies of the Pentagon.

Tobias T. Gibson  
Ryan Harrison  
*Westminster College*

**See Also:** Bush, George W.; Camouflage; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Espionage and Counterespionage; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Iran-Contra Affair; Iraq War; Military Deception; Secrecy; Terrorism; Torture; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Brian-Bland, D. and D. Rasor. "Lies, Half-Truths, and Misrepresentations: How the Military Gets Its Money." *Yale Law & Policy Review*, v.5/1 (1986).
- Caddell, J. W. *Deception 101:Primer on Deception*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub589.pdf> (Accessed May 2013).
- Copeland, P. A. "Secrecy in the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations: Recent Policy and Practice." *Cornell International Law Journal*, v.6 (1973).
- Gendzier, I. "Weapons of Mass Deception and What We Don't Know About U.S. Policy in the Middle East." *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems*, v.21 (2012).
- Herring, G. C., ed. *The Pentagon Papers*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
- Payne, P. "The Media as an Instrument of War." *Parameters*, v.35/1 (2005).

---

## DePaulo, Bella

Bella DePaulo (Ph.D., Harvard University, 1979) is a social psychologist and renowned researcher of deception. From 1979 to 2000, she was on the faculty of the Psychology Department at the

University of Virginia, where she received numerous awards and grants for her research. Since 2000, she has been a visiting professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She has published over 150 books, journal articles, chapters, and reviews. DePaulo studies deception and the detection of deception without the use of physiological tools. Since 2005, DePaulo has also become a prominent researcher and writer on the topic of people who are single, using scientific studies to debunk myths and stereotypes about singles.

### **Lying in Everyday Life**

Perhaps DePaulo's most famous research is her documentation of lying in everyday life. In two studies, she and her colleagues asked college students and community members to keep diaries of all their social interactions over a week, and to record information about any lies they told. These were the first studies to document how often people lie (approximately once or twice per day, on average), as well as the types and contexts of these lies. People generally told more self-centered lies than altruistic lies, except in dyads involving only women. People usually did not regard their lies as serious, did not plan most of their lies in advance, and usually did not worry about being caught.

Although people told fewer lies to close relationship partners (e.g., friends, family, and romantic partners), these lies tended to be more altruistic. Because most of these everyday lies were not considered serious, DePaulo and colleagues asked participants in a separate study to report the most serious lies they told and the most serious lies told to them. Most of these serious lies took place within close relationships.

Working with Charles Bond, DePaulo conducted a meta-analysis that synthesized the results of 206 previous studies to determine the ability of ordinary people to detect lies with no technical aids or special training. On average, people were accurate only 54 percent of the time, hardly better than chance (or 50 percent accuracy). However, people were better at judging lies based on auditory rather than visual information.

DePaulo is well known for dispelling the misconception that there is a Pinocchio's nose, or certain verbal or nonverbal cues that always mean that someone is lying. She and her colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of 120 previous studies,

examining a total of 158 potential cues to deception; most behaviors were not linked or were only weakly linked to deception. Nevertheless, they found some statistically significant differences between liars and truth-tellers; liars make a more negative impression, are less forthcoming, are more tense, and tell stories with fewer imperfections. Ironically, cues to deception are more pronounced among liars who are more motivated to succeed in getting away with their lies. DePaulo's research has also shown that the cues that people think indicate deception are not actually strongly related to deception.

DePaulo is one of very few researchers who have examined lie detection in friendships. She and her colleagues found that close friends are more accurate at detecting lies than less close friends.

DePaulo has also published an extensive and seminal theoretical analysis of the extent to which people use nonverbal behavior for self-presentational purposes. Nonverbal behaviors are often thought to automatically occur, in response to internal affective states. In her review, DePaulo challenged this notion, cataloguing the many ways in which people can (or occasionally cannot) feign affective states to manage social interactions. DePaulo found that people are frequently successful in their nonverbal "identity claims" in large part because perceivers tend to honor these claims, generally not questioning the truthfulness of senders' nonverbal expressions.

Some of DePaulo's earliest studies conducted with Robert Rosenthal examined sex differences in the ability to decode deceptive nonverbal cues. Although women are more accurate than men at decoding nonverbal cues to emotions, DePaulo and Rosenthal found that women were not any better (or worse) than men at detecting lies. They theorized that women tend to be more "polite" in their reading of nonverbal cues, which leads women to lose their advantage at decoding nonverbal cues when those cues are intended to be hidden from them.

Although lie detection accuracy is generally low, DePaulo has written about the possibility of "implicit deception detection," meaning that people may detect differences between deceptive and truthful communications, even though they do not know that these differences are indicative

of deception. Studies by DePaulo and others have found that people are less comfortable, less confident, less informed, and more suspicious when they hear a lie rather than a truth—even though these same people cannot identify the communication explicitly as a lie.

In other studies, DePaulo and her colleagues have examined the types of lies that people tell to spare the feelings of someone they like, the effects of physical attractiveness on deception detection, the effectiveness of salespersons and highly motivated liars at telling lies, and the deception-detection ability of special groups such as law enforcement personnel, socially anxious people, and dysphorics to detect deception. DePaulo's research underpins much of the current scientific understanding of deception and deception detection in everyday life.

R. Weylin Sternglanz  
Nova Southeastern University  
Wendy L. Morris  
McDaniel College  
Jaibel Makiyil  
Nova Southeastern University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Meta-Analysis; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Romantic.

### Further Readings

- Anderson, D. E., M. E. Ansfield, and B. M. DePaulo. "Love's Best Habit: Deception in the Context of Relationships." In P. Philippot, R. S. Feldman, and E. J. Coats, eds., *The Social Context of Nonverbal Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Bella DePaulo. <http://www.belladepaulo.com> (Accessed January 2013).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).
- DePaulo, B. M., M. E. Ansfield, S. E. Kirkendol, and J. M. Boden. "Serious Lies." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, v.26 (2004).
- DePaulo, B. M. and K. L. Bell. "Truth and Investment: Lies Are Told to Those Who Care." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.71 (1996).
- DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy. "Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).

- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Kashy, D. A. and B. M. DePaulo. "Who Lies?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).

## Disasters

The word *disaster* originally contained an astrological referent: the pejorative prefix *dis*, meaning "away from," attached to the Latin *astrum*, meaning "star." An ill-starred occurrence, much like its synonym "catastrophe" (that also contains the word *star*), the initial paradigm is that of disaster as a malevolent astral influence. Hence, the notion of disaster as an exceptional event that creates imbalance, a shift in the scales, or better yet, a destruction of the normal order of things.

Such an explanation asks for a definition of normality that, in turn, renders disaster studies all the more problematic. Therefore, a keen awareness of the definitional complexities of disaster calls for an analysis of the fine line that barely separates natural disasters from technological disasters and/or disasters instigated by an individual or a group, as well as for an exploration of the geography and politics of disaster. Thus, disaster will inevitably be tied to deception: Not only can disaster itself be deceptive, especially when causes are confused with effects, but it can also pave the way for deception, or political efforts at concealing, redefining, and rerouting the initial hazard. There is no possibility of separating disaster from deception or of disconnecting deception from the cultural politics of disaster.

### Disaster and Vulnerability

According to anthropologists such as Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna M. Hoffman, disasters have pasts, presents, and futures. The past can



be interpreted as the hazard itself, the present as the pattern of vulnerability, and the future as the expression of disaster, its treatment, and either deception or the possibility of deception. Oliver-Smith and Hoffman add that, "Whether rapid or slow in onset, disasters and the vulnerability leading to them unfold over time, often considerable amounts of time." This argument implies that vulnerability sets the stage for disaster.

However, cause and effect do not entirely delimitate the relationship between disaster and vulnerability, for this relationship also happens to be of a circular nature: Preliminary vulnerability eventually determines the magnitude of the subsequent disaster, and the ensuing disaster leads to augmented vulnerability. As a result, a subject rendered vulnerable (a subject that can be an entire population) is more likely to seek out a savior who is capable of deception, but who promises a return to normalcy. (Obviously, this savior has multiple possible manifestations: a despot, government, ideology, or religion) There exists, therefore, a constant link between disaster and deception: vulnerability.

### Hazards and Disasters

Disaster studies often begin by juxtaposing the words *natural* and *disaster*, and then proceed to distinguish natural disasters from non-natural or technological disasters. This approximation is of some value in an analysis of disaster as a concept and as an event because it suggests that in all disasters the initial tendency is to assign blame. The simplistic conclusion would be that natural disasters are the fault of nature, as opposed to non-natural disasters, which would be the fault of humans.

The next step is to classify as natural disasters events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, desertification, pestilence, drought, volcanic eruption, famine, and tsunamis, to name but a few. The problem with this categorization, however, is that it fails to mark a distinction between hazards and disasters.

Oliver-Smith and Hoffman define hazards as forces that carry a potential for social, infrastructural, and environmental damage, and disasters as processes combining potentially destructive forces from the natural or built environment, and a population that socially and economically produces a

condition of vulnerability. Consequently, the list of natural disasters becomes a list of natural hazards, and with those two definitions in mind, it is possible to better interpret the distinction that critic Mark Anderson makes between sudden-onset disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, and recurring disasters, such as drought, famine, and volcanic activity. Anderson is actually referring to hazards, not the ensuing disaster.

On the other side of the spectrum are the non-natural disasters (hazards), whether or not man-provoked, and the technological disasters (hazards), such as oil and chemical spills and chemical and nuclear explosions. Such hazards, in turn, and their disastrous consequences are more likely to be blamed on humans (rather than nature), even if Oliver-Smith and Hoffman argue that things that humans do (e.g., crimes, arson, war, terrorism, mass murders, civil disobedience, ) are actually not disasters.


Deception could very well begin with the first attempt to list disasters because this attempt confuses or dissimulates causes and effects. The truth is that earthquakes and hurricanes are not disasters, but rather occurrences. Kenneth Hewitt's classification is much more pertinent. In this case, there is no such thing as a natural disaster. Instead, there are natural hazards, and these can be atmospheric (hurricanes), hydrological (floods), geological (earthquakes), and biological (pestilence). With this type of categorization in mind, natural, technological, and human-made disasters become an effect rather than a cause, the accountable cause being either the natural hazards or the social processes. In other words, either man or nature is, in this case, held responsible, not the disaster itself.

### Social Processes and Disasters

Additionally, Ann Varley points out that in order to understand disasters, it is necessary to focus on social processes; in other words, "on human vulnerability rather than natural hazards." Her argument is that similar hazards, such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, can and will produce different outcomes in California and in Nicaragua, for example. It is likely that the vulnerability will be greater in an economically challenged country such as Nicaragua, whereas the disaster management in place in California,

although by no means perfect, could very well protect the state from greater loss of life and property.

Kenneth Hewitt, in turn, considers that the emphasis of vulnerability studies should not be on the character of the hazards, whether natural or technological, but rather upon how communities are exposed to dangers. Hewitt's argument is that society, rather than nature, "decides who is



*A man carries a baby through the flooded streets of New Orleans outside the Super Dome football stadium after Hurricane Katrina, August 31, 2005. All disasters and the ensuing deceptions can be seen in light of the concept of social vulnerability and social processes, which become camouflaged when the hazards that trigger the disaster are emphasized.*

more likely to be exposed to dangerous geophysical agents, and to have weakened or no defenses against them." Some of the forms and conditions of vulnerability listed by Hewitt include disadvantages or structural weakness such as poverty, dependency, lack of capabilities and rights, as well as "defenselessness," or lack of protection or aids to counter danger. Three categories fall under the rubric vulnerability syndromes: political economy (stages of development, class and power), worlds (first, second, and third), and impersonal forces (population, economics, and race).

All disasters and the ensuing deception can be seen in light of these concepts. There are countless examples of efforts to camouflage the social processes that augmented the initial vulnerability and to blame the stars. These ill-aligned stars come in many disguises: nature, ideologies, hostile foreign powers, chemicals, weapons, pollution, and global warming.

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina was blamed for the loss of life and property in Louisiana, without taking into consideration, as Hewitt points out, that hurricanes involve high winds, torrential rains, lightning, waterspouts, hail, and even tornadoes, and that therefore, death and destruction are the result of compound hazards. Furthermore, it was the pattern of vulnerability of the "disastered" subjects that was to blame, rather than the hurricane. In other words, economic and social situations, rather than the wrath of nature, created the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

More recently, two mass shootings that occurred in 2012, one in a cinema in Aurora, Colorado; another in an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut, have put a focus on gun control. Although the debates and the questions are of value, it could very well be that they camouflage more pressing societal issues, such as treatment of the mentally ill, citizens' rights, and preventive health insurance.

### **Disaster and Deception in the Dominican Republic**

The examples of disaster and the cultural politics of disaster are endless. A survey of different situations runs the risk of diminishing the impact of disaster and of blurring the connection between disaster and deception. Therefore, it will suffice

to focus only a specific event or hazard that led to disaster that, in turn, led to deception.

The Dominican Republic will serve as paradigm. It is a pertinent choice because it is a region of risk, not only geographically but also economically; it continues to be a developing nation with poverty and racial and societal issues. In other words, vulnerability was a pre-existing condition: The island was at the mercy of natural hazards, as well as political ones.

In the summer of 1930, a military coup followed by a fraudulent election had consolidated the power of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Then, a few weeks after the coup, on September 2 and 3, 1930, Hurricane San Zenón wreaked havoc on the island, causing unprecedented damage to the capital, Santo Domingo, killing thousands of people, and leaving a huge percentage of the population without shelter, food, or water.

It was an example of a natural hazard that led to a disaster of gigantic proportions that, in turn, coincided with the beginning of what would later be labeled the Era of Trujillo—and a disaster that consolidated Trujillo's power. According to scholar Mark Anderson, Trujillo responded to the disaster in a highly efficient manner by putting his military training to use on the relief efforts, and he used this response in the years that followed, “as a key trope in the narrative legitimizing his rule, which lasted from 1930 until his assassination in 1961.”

After the disaster, the country needed to be rebuilt and Trujillo proceeded to construct a New Patria or New Motherland. The moment could not have been more opportune: Here was a disaster-stricken nation, rendered all the more vulnerable by the forces of nature. In order to save this nation, Trujillo immediately declared a state of emergency and martial law. In other words, the dictator took advantage of the disaster-stricken subjects' vulnerability and appropriated the nation. The result was a loss of personal freedom and a rewriting of Dominican history through an astonishing act of renaming an entire country. Thus, the rebuilt capital ceased to be Santo Domingo (Holy Savior) and became Ciudad Trujillo.

As Anderson points out, Trujillo's rewriting impulse did not stop at the city limits, but “radiated forth to encompass the entire nation: Trujillo became the most common toponym in the

Dominican Republic, appearing from the capital to the Haitian border in private homes, and public parks, on street signs, bridges, public works projects, hillsides, and mountaintops. Two provinces were even rechristened in the family name.”

Relevant to 30 years of deception played out in the Dominican Republic (deception that is still being played out in every nation that has endured a disaster and is therefore starved for security), is the quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin, “Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both.” There are a few variants to this quote, so liberty can be taken. Hence, a new variant, “Any society deceived into giving up liberty to gain security . . .”

Beatrix Rivera-Barnes

Pennsylvania State, Worthington-Scranton

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Camouflage; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Lying as Exercise of Power; Nostradamus; Spin, Political.

### Further Readings

Anderson, Mark D. *Disaster Writing*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011.

Hewitt, Kenneth. *Regions of Risk*. London: Longman, 1997.

Hoffman, Susanna M. and Anthony Oliver-Smith, eds. *Catastrophe and Culture*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2002.

Varley, Ann, ed. *Disaster, Development, and Environment*. New York: Wiley, 1994.

---

## Disbelief, Suspension of

Poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge originated the phrase *suspension of disbelief* in the early 1800s, though the original phrase contained an additional word, “*willing* suspension of disbelief.” Coleridge's reference addressed how readers intentionally suspend particular beliefs and knowledge to allow their imaginations to enjoy what they know to be fictional accounts. This concept is used to explain why people want to hurl vile words at the villain, comfort the abused child, or

cry when the heroine dies at the end of the story, while knowing it is make-believe. Readers know that these are fictional characters but have willingly suspended their disbelief to better relate to the characters and plot. Key to the original usage of this phrase was its narrow application to readers of fictional accounts, which later expanded to audience members, thereby including the theater as well as written fictional accounts, and it is currently used for all fictional settings, including television, movies, video, and online games.

The word *willing* in the original phrase is crucial because it denotes the intentional nature of the individuals involved. Participants in every type of fictional activity knowingly suspend their disbelief to more fully enjoy the event. Coleridge made no mention of an unwilling or unknowing suspension of disbelief because this is an inconsequential concept to address via fictional works, but it is of utmost relevance when studying lying and deceit.

### **Suspension of Disbelief in Daily Life**

The willing suspension of disbelief is a typical aspect of life; everyone participates in daily fictional events, such as watching television and movies or reading. Most individuals have become quite adept at suspending disbelief because enjoyment of storytelling begins in early youth. Through this daily use from a young age, individuals have inadvertently been trained in the art of the suspension of disbelief, and in so doing obtained the ability to manipulate this tendency in others, to assist them to unknowingly suspend their disbelief.

One of the many key concepts encouraging others to suspend disbelief is to present a social situation as internally consistent (note the similar need in fictional stories to encourage the audience to suspend disbelief). For example, in an everyday situation in which people present themselves in a job interview as successful business persons, it would be best to present themselves in expensive brand-name apparel and accessories to encourage the interviewer to see them as successful, that is, to assist the interviewer to suspend disbelief, thereby not challenging the social role presented. If interviewees presented themselves in threadbare suits with inexpensive jewelry and beaten-up shoes and attaché cases, they would be presenting

themselves in a manner inconsistent with the social role of a successful business person, thereby encouraging the interviewer to disbelieve and challenge their social role.

Note this is only one aspect of an interviewee's social role. There also needs to be consistency in what is said in the interview, listed on the resume, and reported by references. This consistency needs to be within and across each aspect of the social situation/role, if the suspension of disbelief is to be encouraged. Remaining consistent sounds difficult, yet it is manageable because high numbers of individuals report effectively deceiving employment interviewers.

While the employment interview is only one example, the ability to assist others to unknowingly suspend disbelief is applicable to a variety of social situations in which deception is at play. Of importance to these situations is how the deceivers will attempt to achieve their goals while encouraging the other(s) to suspend disbelief, for otherwise disbelief could instigate a challenge to the presented social role/situation, potentially resulting in the discovery of the attempted deceit.

### **Social Roles and Situations**

Relevant concepts assisting others to suspend disbelief in everyday social situations may be altered from or entirely different than Coleridge's original meaning because of the difference in everyday social situations and fiction. First, was the concept of willingness (intentional suspension of disbelief) and unwillingness (unintentional suspension of disbelief), which is an altered meaning from Coleridge's initial definition. Another concept frequently discussed regarding fiction is the concept of plausibility.

For example, in modern times, people are willing to suspend disbelief and accept a Klingon character in the science-fiction show *Star Trek*. Yet, if a person presented himself or herself as a Klingon in a job interview for a public relations specialist, the interviewee would appropriately question the social situation and/or the person's social role. In regard to the social situation, the interviewer might ask the job seeker if someone is playing a prank or may verify that the open position is not to represent the *Star Trek* franchise. In regard to social role, the interviewee



may ask himself or herself if the interviewer is of sound mind or might need psychological assistance. Consistency and plausibility are merely two of the known concepts among a multitude of concepts combined together that create a believable social situation and/or social role. The fundamental aspect to remember is that individuals can assist others to suspend disbelief by presenting these concepts in a coherent manner in order to encourage the continued suspension of disbelief.

The potential for lying and deception resides within these complex issues. From youth, people learn the basis of the willing and unwilling suspension of disbelief, but the learning doesn't stop with just the rules; there is also the manipulation of the rules. The child who eats a cookie right before dinner, and when questioned replies, "No, I didn't," does not realize that the evidence is right on his face. Through consequences, the child learns about his lack of consistency when he is punished for lying and the family laughs about the smear of chocolate across his cheek. Teaching him to be honest has also taught him how to appear honest. The appearance of honesty without substance is one of the many ways to allow an individual to become effective with lying and deceit. Years of interaction create great communication repertoires and abilities in individuals, with only their morals to guide their choices as to whether they will assist another to unwillingly suspend disbelief.

The current usage of the phrase "suspension of disbelief" in the social sciences is derived from Coleridge's original meaning, with alterations for nonfictional everyday settings. The relevance of this concept is how individuals typically accept social situations as presented, unless aspects of the social situation suggest otherwise. A number of well-regarded social scientists also address this concept but with alternative terminology. In her book *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*, Sissela Bok discusses how society presumes that social situations are based in honesty, that is, the veracity principle. This means that individuals are presumed to be telling the truth unless an event or person enters the interaction to alert individuals to a lie. Note the similarity: If the assumption is that truth is occurring, then one need not suspend belief.

In many of his works, sociologist Erving Goffman discusses the compulsion that an individual feels to present a self that adheres to the social expectations of a particular social role in a specific social situation. When a person feels compelled to fulfill a particular role, deception may come into play, yet fulfilling the role may not in any way violate expectations, so once again this can encourage the suspension of disbelief.

Thus, the suspension of disbelief began as a literary concept in the arts, in which individuals chose to willingly suspend their disbelief, and is still addressed in this manner in the arts and humanities. In the social sciences, the underlying premises of this concept—that individuals readily accept situations and roles as presented, unless something occurs that violates expectations—allows researchers to further expand their ability to understand how lies, deception, and con men exist in society.

Susan A. Stearns

*Eastern Washington University*

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Con Man; Context; False Signals; Goffman, Erving; Impression; Marketing, Deceptive; Pilttdown Man; Self-Deception.

#### Further Readings

Bok, Sissela: *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein., "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70/5 (1996).

Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. Edinburgh, UK: Social Science Research Centre, 1956.

---

## Discovered Deception, Reactions to

The discovery of deception is generally presumed to be an intense, negative, emotional experience. In the classic novel *The Count of Monte Cristo*, for example, when Dantes deduces that his

imprisonment is due to the lies of people he considered friends and allies, his response is such an all-consuming anger that he swears (and subsequently pursues) unfettered vengeance against his antagonists. Such a reaction is not limited to historical literature. Tales of violent reprisals in the wake of discovered deception dominate theatrical storylines, television shows, and real-world headlines.

The presumption of a negative reaction to discovered deception is not surprising when one considers the cognitive, relational, and emotional disruption that such events should evoke. Consider cognition: As Charles R. Berger and Richard J. Calabrese described four decades ago in their uncertainty reduction theory, people place great importance on believing that others are predictable and explainable. When people behave in ways that defy such beliefs (such as when deception is discovered), enormous anxiety ensues. This uncertainty centers around two dilemmas that dovetail with a lost sense of predictive and explanatory power: “How did I not see this coming?” and “Why did this happen to me?”

On the relational side, individuals in close involvements typically believe that they understand their partners, that their partners would never lie to them, and that if their partners did lie to them, they would be able to tell. Discovery of deception directly compromises all three of these convictions; hence, it is a devastating relationship event.

In addition, modern theories of emotion posit that intensity of affective experience directly corresponds to the degree to which events are interruptive of organized action sequences that guide individuals’ daily behaviors, as well as higher-order goals and plans. Discovery of deception constitutes a radically interruptive event; consequently, it is intensely emotional.

### Studies of Reactions to Discovered Deception

Because of the degree to which discovered deception is a dominant historical and narrative theme, and the intensity of cognitive, relational, and emotional disruption that occurs in its wake, it is surprising that it has received comparatively scant empirical attention from scholars. In fact, only a handful of studies have directly or indirectly examined this important topic.

One of the first noteworthy commentaries on discovered deception was offered by philosopher Sisela Bok in her seminal work, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. She describes how individuals, upon discovering that they have been lied to, “are resentful, disappointed, suspicious. They feel wronged; they are wary of new overtures.” Soon thereafter, communication scholar Dale Hample examined liars’ self-reported consequences for having lied; he noted that because the social costs associated with discovery were high, liars will typically only lie when they feel that the rewards are certain and sizable.

Subsequent to Hample’s work, Sally Planalp and Jim Honeycutt explored uncertainty-increasing events, and their data underscored the indelible link between uncertainty and discovered deception. Planalp and Honeycutt surveyed 103 respondents, asking them to describe in detail an event “in which they learned something surprising about a friend, spouse, or romantic partner, and that information led them to question something basic to their relationship.” They then examined the impact of such events on four outcomes: relationship beliefs, emotional effects, communication, and relationship consequences.

Planalp and Honeycutt found that 90 percent of respondents could recall such an event. The third-most commonly reported uncertainty-increasing event was deception, including “instances of relational partners lying about where they were going, about drinking and smoking, about other relationships, and misleading respondents about their true feelings for them.” Not surprisingly, discovered deception had a substantial influence on beliefs about honesty (i.e., trust). Although they did not examine the impact of particular events on their outcome variables, uncertainty-increasing events in general negatively impacted emotional states, and frequently led to a reduction in relationship intimacy.

### Steven McCornack and Timothy Levine’s Study

The first study to exclusively focus on reactions to discovered deception was the work of Steven McCornack and Timothy R. Levine. Drawing upon Ellen Berscheid’s theory of emotion, as well as prior work in cognition and relational

deception, McCornack and Levine argued that relational intimacy, the importance of the information that is lied about, suspicion, and the degree to which lying is viewed as a transgression will impact emotional reactions to discovered deception. Analyzing the self-reports of several hundred respondents, McCornack and Levine found confirmation for their predictions.

However, they also found an interesting interaction between suspicion, information importance, and emotional intensity of reaction. For individuals who were suspicious at the time the lie was received—but for whom the information was unimportant—suspicion functioned to reduce intensity of reaction upon discovering that the statement was, indeed, false (i.e., “Yeah, I thought you were lying to me when you said that, but it’s no big deal anyway”). For information judged to be important, however, the opposite effect held true: The temporal downtime between receiving the lie and verifying its falsity functioned to enhance intensity of reaction (“This confirms exactly what I’ve been stewing on for weeks!”). McCornack and Levine labeled this “the stewing effect.”

McCornack and Levine also examined the impact of these variables upon relationship termination. They found that negativity and intensity of emotional reaction, and importance of the information, significantly predicted relationship termination, with the most influential factor being information importance. In 67.4 percent of the cases in which the relationship had ended, the discovery of deception was cited as the cause for the breakup.

### How Deception Is Discovered

Discussing reactions to discovered deception begs the question of how exactly such discoveries occur. Contrary to media depictions of such events (e.g., the television show *Lie to Me*) and conceptual perspectives implying that lies are detected on the spot through the strategic hypervigilance of listeners (e.g., interpersonal deception theory), the vast bulk of actual deception detection occurs through incidental discovery.

For example, Hee Sun Park, Timothy Levine, and their colleagues examined self-reports from more than 200 individuals who recently had discovered lies. Their data suggest that,

overwhelmingly, lies are discovered not through direct behavioral detection but, instead, through third-party information or the discovery of incriminating evidence. In only four instances in the entire dataset did participants report having detected a lie through verbal and nonverbal behaviors at the moment it was delivered.

### Deception Discovery Online

Recently, scholars have shifted their analytical focus to the impact that discovered deception has within online settings. For example, Zachary Birchmeier, Adam Joinson, and Beth Dietz-Uhler examined transcripts from an asynchronous, online community in which “DF”—a high-status, well-liked member—was discovered as having deceived members of the group by posting under an additional, false identity (as a purported single mother, “NowhereMom”).

DF went so far as to construct an online romance between himself and NowhereMom, and he then told members that NowhereMom and her (fictional) daughter had been killed in an accident. Community members created online memorials to express their grief at her “death,” only to have DF confess that NowhereMom was, in fact, a fiction. In the wake of his disclosure, members expressed shock and outrage at the deception, posting numerous condemnatory messages and eventually banning DF from the community.

Taken as a whole, these data suggest that reactions to discovered deception are typically intense and negative. Yet, people continue to lie. Why? Scholar Tim Cole, in his study of deception in romantic relationships, found that one of the major reasons that people lie to their partners is to avoid anticipated negative punishments associated with truth-telling.

Cole’s findings suggest a deep irony with regard to reactions to discovered deception. People commonly choose to lie to avoid costs. But their lies, once discovered, often net negative outcomes—in the form of emotional upheaval, condemnation, and relationship termination—that grossly outweigh the anticipated truth-telling costs that drove them to deceive in the first place.

Steven McCornack  
Michigan State University

**See Also:** Betrayal; Courtship, Deception in; Emotions; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lie Acceptability; Park, Hee Sun; Park-Levine Probability Model; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; Sock Puppetry.

### Further Readings

- Berger, C. R. and R. J. Calabrese. "Some Explorations in Initial Interactions and Beyond: Towards a Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication." *Human Communication Research*, v.1 (1975).
- Berscheid, E. "Emotion." In *Close Relationships*, H. H. Kelley et al., eds. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1983.
- Birchmeier, Z., A. N. Joinson, and B. Dietz-Uhler. "Storming and Forming a Normative Response to a Deception Revealed Online." *Social Science Computer Review*, v.23 (2005).
- Bok, S. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Bower, G. H. and P. R. Cohen. "Emotional Influences in Memory and Thinking: Data and Theory." In *Affect and Cognition*, M. S. Clark and S. T. Fiske, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982.
- Buller, D. B. "Deception by Strangers, Friends, and Intimates: Attributional Biases Due to Relational Development." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Boston, November 1988.
- Buller, D. B. and J. K. Burgoon. "Interpersonal Deception Theory." *Communication Theory*, v.6 (1996).
- Cole, T. "Lying to the One You Love: The Use of Deception in Romantic Relationships." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18 (2001).
- Dumas, A. *The Count of Monte Cristo*. Paris: Petion, 1844.
- Hample, D. "Purposes and Effects of Lying." *The Southern Speech Communication Journal*, v.46 (1980).
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- McCornack, S. A. and M. R. Parks. "Deception Detection Accuracy in Dating Relationships: The Other Side of Trust." In *Communication Yearbook* 9, M. L. McLaughlin, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1986.
- Park, H. S., T. R. Levine, S. A. McCornack, K. Morrison, and M. Ferrara. "How People Really Detect Lies." *Communication Monographs*, v.69 (2002).
- Planalp, S. and J. M. Honeycutt. "Events That Increase Uncertainty in Personal Relationships." *Human Communication Research*, v.11 (1985).
- Sillars, A. L., G. R. Pike, T. S. Jones, and M. A. Murphy. "Communication and Understanding in Marriage." *Human Communication Research*, v.10 (1984).

---

## Dishonesty

The term *dishonest* is used to characterize an action, statement, or person. Dishonesty involves obscuring information, providing untrue information, or withholding information that the other person has the right to hear. Actions can also be characterized as dishonest when they violate trust. The word *dishonest* is, etymologically speaking, an equivocal term; its usage merely suggests that the speaker or statement is without something (i.e., honesty) rather than possessing something (a will to discursive corruption, a characterization better realized by terms such as *lie* and *liar*). When an accusation is uncertain or comparatively lacking in vitriol, then the speaker is likely to say, "That is a dishonest statement," saving the term *lie* for circumstances more definitive or vicious.

Dishonesty can be performed as honesty, and must be so performed in order to be effective. This requires a salient capacity to emulate the tones, gestures, and rituals of the honest person and to repress the "tells" that typically arise when a person deliberately evades speaking truthfully. Similarly, honesty can be performed in such a way or under such circumstances that it is taken for dishonesty, as John Canty takes the words of the young prince, dressed as a pauper, in the famous Mark Twain novel. A competent social agent cultivates some capacity to detect dishonest people, as well as dishonesty in statements.

### Dishonesty in Statements

A dishonest statement is not one that is merely untrue, for untrue statements can be offered in



error. Rather, a dishonest statement is made when a speaker offers a statement that he knows to be counterfactual. To know that it is sunny and say that it is raining is to make a dishonest statement. Counterfactual statements about weather conditions offered when the audience is equally present to the same weather condition are not dishonest statements, however, they are absurdities. This is because the dishonest statement exploits the vulnerability of an uninformed audience by offering it untruths in the guise of truths.

Not all deliberately counterfactual statements would be labeled dishonest, however. Riddles, jokes, stories, myths, and fantasies all rely on the

counterfactual; it is not dishonest, for example, to tease someone, nor is it dishonest to tell a joke, and all such counterfactuals are distinct from dishonesty in that they are presented and coded as forms of play. In play, however, as George Herbert Mead explains, the sender of a message sends signals that the pretend event is playful. For a statement to be dishonest, then, it must be counterfactual and must be offered as if it were in earnest.

A compliment is not a dishonest act when it is principally offered to raise the spirits of the recipient. However, obsequiousness, excessive flattery, and other language forms used to ingratiate self to other via falsehood are dishonest acts.

### Dishonesty in Persons

It is both possible and common, based upon regular observations of another person's statements, to suggest that dishonesty is not just specific to a given person's statement, but also integral to that person's character. Those of dishonest character display dishonesty to others with marked regularity while giving honesty performances (with eye contact, facial gesture, and tone) and engaging in honesty rituals. Where dishonesty is attributed as a characteristic, the identified person is dishonored, and under normal circumstances, the person labeled dishonest is shunned. The statements of an individual labeled dishonest, even the statements that seem likely, are taken as suspicious; the individual's views are given lower valence in contesting (he said/she said) situations; and the individual is comparatively unattractive to others as a friend, coworker, and employee. To be given the identity of a dishonest person is thus to be discharged of social capital. Whereas dishonest people rely upon the cover of honesty to sell their wares, being labeled a dishonest person puts them out of business.

### Dishonesty and Secrecy

A secret is not the same thing as a lie, and it is not necessarily an act of dishonesty to withhold information from an audience. The social philosopher Georg Simmel, for example, condemned the lie, but regarded the secret as a social good. Nevertheless, it is customary to regard as dishonest secrets kept from people who have justified reason to know them; for example, it is dishonest to keep a previous marriage from a fiancé or a history



*"Tom's Meeting with the Prince," as illustrated in Mark Twain's The Prince and the Pauper (1881). Honesty can be performed in such a way or under such circumstances that it is taken for dishonesty, as John Canty does of the words of the young prince, dressed as a pauper, in the novel.*

of drug abuse from a political campaign. Part of the structure of social trust requires audiences to make normative assumptions about others; social agents do not interrogate everyone they meet, nor do they run credit checks on prospective lovers. Instead, they rely on the norms of disclosure specific to the nature of the relationship. A divorcé is not expected to announce this personal characteristic at the first handshake. Nevertheless, as intimacy increases, an appropriate disclosure period approaches, even without the interrogation of the other person. It is common to regard as dishonest those occasions when a person lets those periods slip by in silence.

### The Weight of Dishonesty

Because dishonesty causes weighable damage, dishonesty accusations are also weighted (i.e., some dishonesty charges are more forceful than others). To be labeled dishonest with pejorative moral force is to receive moral opprobrium because the emotive texture of the utterance brands an association between the receiver of the term and the emotional resonance of the term. When used to describe a person, the word *dishonesty* infects that person with its moral force. The impact of dishonesty varies as a result of the following factors, which also shift the odiousness of the phenomenon:

*Intimacy.* As relationships grow closer, mutual dependency increases. Dishonesty therefore becomes more egregious over time because the damage it can cause, in principle, increases.

*Relevance.* A dishonest matter increases in weight to the degree it bears impact on the life of the person hearing it. A dishonesty is more weighty when a mechanic falsely tells a customer that an engine change is needed in his car than if he says it about a stranger's car.

*Significance.* A dishonest matter increases in weight with the degree that the dishonesty affects the life of the person told. It is, for example, a weightier dishonesty to tell a man that his wife has cheated than it is to tell him that his shoelace is untied; and a man who untruthfully tells a prospective employer that he is an experienced dishwasher will not be labeled dishonest with the

same moral opprobrium as one who tells a potential employer that he is an experienced surgeon.

*Regularity.* As the pattern of dishonesty becomes more regular, the weight of the dishonesty increases. The greater the number of "fibs," the greater the moral force of the dishonesty charge, regardless the quality of the fibs. To a great extent, this is the process by which dishonest statements made by a person lead to the point when the person becomes known as a dishonest person.

*Injustice.* The degree of injustice specific to a dishonest remark impacts the weight of it. It is not particularly unjust, for example, to tell a prying salesman that one already has a full life insurance policy. But it is comparatively unjust to tell an applicant, falsely, that the deadline for a job application has already past; and it is considered a greater dishonesty to tell a sexual partner that one is disease-free than it is to say the same thing to a prying stranger.

In such ways, the degree of moral force specific to the accusation of dishonesty is thus assigned according to the weight of dishonesty attributed to the statement.

The moral force specific to the term *dishonest* is not so great as the moral force specific to the term *liar*. In part, this is due to the nature of the terms. Expressively, having only three letters and one syllable, the word *lie* is an ideal conveyor of vitriol, carrying emotive and therefore moral weight when it is uttered. One only needs to imaginatively compare oneself pilloried before an audience shouting, "Liar! Liar! Liar!" to the same thing in front of an audience shouting, "Dishonest person! Dishonest person! Dishonest person!" to recognize that there is a difference. All the same, it is damaging to be labeled dishonest, irrespective of the varying degrees of moral force fastened to the accusation.

### Recognizing and Performing Dishonesty

Human beings who perform dishonesty must do it under the cover of honesty in order to be successful, for this allows them to build the reputation and sincere attachment so important to successfully delivered, corrupt communication. This requires a talent for controlling vocal tone, facial expression, evidence, and other competencies in a

manner that makes a falsehood indistinguishable from a reality. Once those competencies are in place, it is extremely difficult for others to detect dishonesty.

Dishonest statements, by definition, provide information that audiences can only receive in a secondhand fashion, and people are immeasurably dependent upon that sort of communication in order to effectively function. Of course, dependence on the words of others makes audiences vulnerable to the effects of dishonesty. Consequently, socially successful persons work hard to gauge honesty, at least to assess the relative integrity of the people to whom they bond; this is a basic survival skill.

Prudent social actors must also work hard to determine whether the untrue statements or performances to which they are exposed are the result of accident or deliberate intent. Social actors must learn to detect erroneous statements made in the spirit of honesty, so that they do not abandon people who would have been honest but were in error, and so that they do not attach to people who merely calculate their honesty with respect to self-interest.

As was the case in *Hamlet*, dishonesty is most firmly established within the context of a trap. A person who believes that he is the patsy to a liar may choose to feign ignorance of a known topic, approaching the suspected liar with a request for information on that topic. When the suspected person comes back with a counterfactual statement, it is at least possible to identify the deliberate untruth, establishing both that the suspected liar tells untruths and the suspected liar does so intentionally. The art of catching out dishonesty is quite subtle, however, and timing is important. Even in such a trap, the suspected liar may recover using strategies aimed at managing dishonesty if the trap is sprung too soon. It is for good reason that the saying, "There was a crooked man and he did very well," is far better known than its creator, Eve Meriam. In general, a sophisticated, even visceral, grasp of language and semiotics is essential to both performing and recognizing dishonesty.

### Managing Dishonesty Failures

Typically, dishonesty is not charged until substantial evidence supporting the accusation exists.

However, circumstances often still favor the liar, even at so late an hour, because the accusation must be grounded in three observations: that the lie was given, that the lie was known to be counterfactual when it was given, and that the counterfactual was performed as a false offer of truth. The liar thus has three lines of approach in an effort to manage his discovered dishonesty: He can deny that he ever gave the counterfactual statement, suggesting that he was misunderstood by the accuser; he can claim that he was in error and believed the counterfactual when he offered it; or he can claim that he performed the counterfactual in a manner that indicated it was playful, not a serious untruth. Because recollection is imperfect, error is possible, and play signals may be overlooked, one cannot always make a dishonesty charge stick, even if one has patent evidence of an untruth, especially if the defendant has refined dishonesty skills. Consequently, dishonesty is managed with comparative success, even when it is initially discovered.

As accusations of dishonesty mount (many people accusing dishonesty with respect to one thing, or one person accusing dishonesty with respect to a series of things), it becomes much harder to sidestep the label, instead claiming misunderstanding, error, or playfulness. Moreover, the accumulation specific to the detection process increases the risk that, in the end, one will not merely be said to have made a dishonest statement, but one will be labeled a dishonest person. The presumption of honesty, once lost, is hard to regain. Ferreting out a dishonest person is not easy, and losses occur during the period that detection takes place. The tendency, therefore, is to presume that the dishonest person is characterologically dishonest, and to expect dishonesty in the future, rather than to provide an interminable series of second chances.

### Dishonesty in Complex Social Systems

Because of the relative dissociation of persons in complex societies, the prices and penalties associated with dishonesty are markedly reduced. In a complex society, expressions such as "take the money and run" make sense because there is, indeed, somewhere to run. The dishonest repairman need only see a customer once. The dishonest student might only have a teacher for one class and one year. Dissolution of a relationship, a real

concern with respect to dishonesty in communal life, matters much less in a complex social life in which the relationship is often ephemeral at best. Complex social life also provides more opportunities to isolate one aspect of life from another, facilitating deception. The dishonest spouse has countless opportunities to betray a partner.

Losses and gains are also mitigated in a complex society, reducing the importance of proving dishonesty. One may buy an inferior product, based on the claims of a dishonest seller. The loss of time and the labor required to prove the dishonesty and to gain compensation may simply be determined “not worth it.” When that occurs, the price paid for dishonest behavior is comparatively small and the gains of dishonesty are great.

For reasons such as these, dishonesty holds an ambivalent status in contemporary society. Is one honest or simply a fool for leaving a phone number on an automotive windshield after mildly denting that car’s door when getting out of one’s car? Is it reasonable to look down one’s nose at every millionaire who has made his millions, at least in part, through dishonest actions? Or is dishonesty the watermark of greatness?

Contemporary society would not be the first to find no easy answer to this question. Among the ancient Greeks, for example, nobility of character required role performances specific to one’s lot in life; and a great soldier was, therefore, expected to be cunning. Spartan boys, as they evolved into soldiers, were trained to steal, and only punished for being caught. Such acts of dishonesty are particular to an adversarial system that places dishonesty in its context with respect to justice—the enemy not due unqualified honesty.

### **The Power of Dishonesty**

Honest statements give audiences access to nonpresent places and times, allowing them to plan, create, imagine, and organize. Thus, honesty plays an immeasurable role in productive human relations. The honest transaction takes place within an exchange system that benefits the several parties involved in some comparatively anticipated fashion.

Should a woman, for example, borrow her neighbor’s car and scratch the bumper, she might honestly report what she has done and make restitution; in this case, the neighbor receives a minor

repair and the woman retains her esteem (and her personal sense of integrity), so that she might borrow the car again. In such cases, gain and loss is distributed in a manner that approaches a Habermasian ideal. The nature of dishonesty, however, allows the woman to maximize her gain at the other’s expense because she knows something that the other does not: She knows about the scratch and that she is responsible. Because she alone has this knowledge, she can manipulate it to her own advantage. She can, for example, spread mud over the scratch, leaving the neighbor uncertain when, and therefore how, the scratch occurred when the rain comes and washes away the camouflage. By doing so, she has maximized, economically speaking, her gain in the immediate situation.

The power of dishonesty, then, is that it allows its agents to maximize personal gain in a system in which gain and loss would be otherwise distributed. This is the nature of dishonesty in investment scandals, adulterous relationships, examination cheating, and the selling of cars that are “lemons.”

### **The Price of Dishonesty**

Dishonesty is motivated by self-interest, but this is self-interest narrowly conceived, governed by a notion of basic pleasure or immediate gain. Recognizing that there are greater treasures than either pleasure or gain, Josef Pieper refers to the dishonest person’s rationale of self-interest as “false prudence,” the sort of prudence that causes a person to wear a mask when staging a robbery. The idea is expressed by Christ in the Gospels when he says, “What good is it for a man to gain the whole world, and yet lose or forfeit his very self?” In such an interpretation, selfhood has value and therefore pays a price when it acts dishonestly.

Even for those who dismiss the value of a noble or virtuous self, a second potential price for dishonesty remains, which is the manageability of dishonest action over time. Each time one is dishonest to one’s neighbor, for example, one must keep a record of that dishonesty in order to manage future contexts in which the content of the lie might come up or be relevant. One must also manage the juxtaposition of people who do or do not know the lie, so that their paths never cross.



Successfully lying requires ongoing outputs of energy in the form of record keeping, social performances, and environments necessary to make lies thrive. The adulterer, for example, must pay for hotel rooms, make up for lost time, and create plausible stories.

Similar expectations exist for most, if not all, liars who habitually live in lie. The liar may be obliged to draw in confederates, turning an entire event into a theater of deception. These sorts of activities, and there are many more, exert a cost on the dishonest person in terms of stress, memory, foresight, and inventiveness. A dishonest person must also attend to the cumulative effect of deceptions. The law of parsimony predicts that a time will come when it will make more sense for the victim of dishonesty to switch paradigms, regarding past and present “coincidences” and “errors” as lies told by a dishonest person, rather than coincidences told by an honest one. At that point, the dishonest person may be ousted from the intimacy and exchange system already established. The victim may also report one’s dishonesty to others, damaging the liar’s community standing. For the person of narrow self-interest, dishonest action is a gamble, offering short-term rewards, but only for those willing to risk long-term consequences.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** Betrayal; Credibility; Daily Life, Lying in; Deception and Trust; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Honesty; Lying, Costs of; Reputation.

### Further Readings

Ariely Dan. *The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone—Especially Ourselves*. New York: Harper, 2012.

Bok, Sissela. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Chisholm, R. M. and T. D. Feehan. “The Intent to Deceive.” *Journal of Philosophy*, v.74/3 (1977).

Keyes, Ralph. *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004.

Rivera, Carla. “Seeds of Dishonesty Are Sown in Youth, Study Finds.” *Los Angeles Times* (October 29, 2009).

Rogers, R., ed. *Clinical Assessment of Malingering and Deception*. 3rd ed. New York: Guilford Press, 2012.

## Disinformation

Lying has long been the main topic in the study of deception. For instance, many philosophers discuss why it is wrong to lie, and psychologists study how to detect lying. However, in the information age, disinformation is a much more encompassing threat to individuals’ ability to acquire true beliefs and to avoid false beliefs about the world. Examples include government propaganda, deceptive advertising (political and otherwise), Internet frauds, doctored photographs, forged documents, deliberately falsified maps, and manipulated Wikipedia entries.

The term *misinformation* simply refers to information that is false. False information can mislead people (i.e., cause people to hold false beliefs) whether it results from an honest mistake, negligence, unconscious bias, or just overly subtle sarcasm. The term *disinformation* (coined during the Cold War) picks out a particularly dangerous subcategory of misinformation. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines disinformation as “the dissemination of deliberately false information, especially when supplied by a government or its agent to a foreign power or to the media, with the intention of influencing the policies or opinions of those who receive it; false information so supplied.” More generally, disinformation can be defined as information that has the function of misleading someone. In other words, it is information that is likely to cause people to hold false beliefs and has the function of doing so. In any event, disinformation poses a more serious threat than other types of misinformation because it comes from someone who is actively engaged in an attempt to mislead.

### Sources of Disinformation

As the OED suggests, disinformation is commonly associated with government or military activity. George Carlin quipped, “the government doesn’t lie, it engages in disinformation.” A standard example is a disinformation campaign known as



*U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Doug A. Baker listens to radio traffic during an operation conducted by Afghanistan National Army and U.S. forces to thwart a Taliban disinformation campaign in the Shigal Valley in eastern Afghanistan's Kunar province, March 18, 2011. Disinformation varies in how it reaches its target. It can be as technically sophisticated as a carefully planned military strategy, to something as simple as telling a lie. In addition, disinformation is often passed along and indirectly received.*

Operation Bodyguard during World War II, in which the Allies sent out fake radio transmissions and created fraudulent military reports to conceal the intended location of the D-Day invasion from the Germans.

However, many nongovernmental organizations, such as political campaigns and advertisers, also deliberately distribute false information. In fact, individuals are often the source of disinformation. For instance, reporters such as Jayson Blair of the *New York Times* and Janet Cooke of the *Washington Post*, have made up news stories that have misled their readers. There are also several high-profile cases of purported memoirs that turned out to be fiction, such as James Frey's *A Million Little Pieces*.

### **Targets of Disinformation**

In addition to having various types of sources, disinformation can have various kinds of targets.

It is often very widely distributed (to anyone with a newspaper subscription, a television, or Internet access). This is typically the case with government propaganda and deceptive advertising. However, disinformation can also be targeted at specific people or organizations. This is humorously illustrated in a cartoon by Jeff Danzinger (of the *Los Angeles Times*) that shows a couple working on their taxes. The caption is, "Mr. and Mrs. John Doe (not their real names) hard at work in their own little Office of Strategic Disinformation." Such disinformation is presumably aimed directly at the Internal Revenue Service.

While the intended victim of the deception is usually a person or a group of people, disinformation can also be targeted at a machine. For instance, as the information scientist Clifford Lynch points out, managers of Web sites sometimes try to fool the automated "crawlers" sent out by search engines to index the Internet.

Suppose that someone has just started selling product X, which competes with product Y. When an automated crawler asks for product X's Web page to add to its index, the salesperson for product X might send the crawler a copy of the Web page for product Y. That way, when someone uses the search engine to search for product Y, the search engine will return a link to product X's Web page.

### Formats of Disinformation

Disinformation also varies in the form that it takes. It is often written or verbal information, but not always. Mark Twain joked that, "by examination and mathematical computation I find that the proportion of the spoken lie to the other varieties is as 1 to 22,894." In particular, visual information can also be disinformation. For instance, Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong each had people who had fallen out of political favor removed from photographs. Similarly, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union deliberately falsified maps in an attempt to fool its enemies about where important sites were located.

In line with the OED definition, disinformation is typically false information. However, contrary to what philosophers such as James Fetzer and Luciano Floridi have suggested, even information that is true can sometimes be disinformation. For instance, when pursuers who did not recognize him asked, "Where is the traitor Athanasius?" Saint Athanasius replied, "Not far away." Although what he said was true, Athanasius misled his pursuers into thinking that he was not Athanasius. In the realm of politics, true statements that selectively emphasize facts that are advantageous to the speaker can be intentionally misleading and are typically referred to as "spin."

But not everything that is created in order to mislead someone counts as disinformation. For instance, in addition to the disinformation campaign during World War II's Operation Bodyguard, the Allies built tanks and airplanes out of rubber and canvas to give the false impression that a huge force was preparing to attack Calais, rather than Normandy. These fake tanks and airplanes are not examples of disinformation because they are material objects, rather than pieces of recorded or transmitted information.

### How Disinformation Finds Its Target

Disinformation also varies in how it finds its target. As with Operation Bodyguard, it is often the product of a carefully planned and technically sophisticated deceit. For instance, hackers have directly modified the Web sites of news services such as Yahoo! News and the *New York Times*. However, the dissemination of disinformation can also be as simple as telling a lie. In fact, even manipulating the contents of a Web site does not always require sophisticated hacking skills. Anyone can purposely (and anonymously) add inaccurate information to Wikipedia. For instance, the entry on the journalist John Seigenthaler was famously modified to falsely claim that he was involved in the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy.

In addition, one does not always directly receive disinformation from the organization or the individual who intends to deceive. For instance, news services have often been tricked into passing along false or misleading information created by someone else. A few years ago, a con man created a fraudulent press release stating that the chief executive officer of Emulex Corporation had just resigned. When this fraudulent press release was subsequently published by several reputable news services (including Bloomberg, *CBS Marketwatch*, and Dow Jones), Emulex stock lost over half its value in just a few hours.

Furthermore, disinformation is not always openly addressed to its target. It can be intended to fool someone who is expected to be eavesdropping on the transmission of the information. For instance, in William Shakespeare's *Much Ado About Nothing*, this is how Benedick's friends trick him into believing that Beatrice is in love with him. Similarly, the Germans were not aware that they were intended to receive the radio transmissions and the military reports that were part of Operation Bodyguard.

### The Mental State of the Source of Disinformation

In line with the OED definition, disinformation is typically intended to mislead someone. However, contrary to what philosophers such as Fetzer and Floridi have suggested, not all disinformation is disseminated with this goal in mind. For instance, fraudulent Web sites, such as one advertising a

town in Minnesota as a tropical paradise, have been created by educators to teach people how to identify false information on the Internet. In addition, researchers have posted false information on Wikipedia simply to see how long it takes for the information to be corrected. Such false and misleading information is intentionally produced, and it may easily mislead some people, but that is merely an unfortunate side effect of what these educators and researchers are doing.

While these educators and researchers foresee that people might be misled, the source of a piece of disinformation may not even be aware that the information is false or misleading. Certain animals and plants can systematically give a false impression. For instance, there are species of insects that have evolved to look like sticks or leaves. These insects do not consciously intend potential predators to believe that they are flora rather than fauna. However, it is no accident that potential predators are fooled. The deceptive camouflage gives these insects an adaptive advantage. In particular, they are less likely to be eaten. Thus, the deceptive camouflage is more likely to continue into the future (because the genes that create it will be passed on to future generations).

Although one might not want to refer to the deceptive appearance of an animal or a plant as disinformation, human beings can spread false and misleading information in an analogous way. For instance, some people promulgate conspiracy theories, such as the belief that the U.S. government was behind the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Many people also endorse certain stereotypes, such as describing Native Americans as “noble savages.” Because such people often believe what they are saying, they are not deliberately disseminating false information. Even so, such false and misleading information deserves the name *disinformation*.

There is a mechanism that reinforces the dissemination of this false and misleading information. Much like stick insects, people benefit from spreading stereotypes, conspiracy theories, and rumors. For instance, the promulgation of stereotypes helps the dominant cultural group maintain its dominance (and allows its members to maintain a positive self-image). These examples indicate that a conscious intention to mislead is only one of the ways in which a piece of

information can end up having the function of misleading people.

Don Fallis  
University of Arizona

**See Also:** Blair, Jayson; Conspiracies; Evolution and Natural Selection; False Advertising; Frey, James; Information Manipulation Theory 1; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Military Deception; Operation Bodyguard; Stalin, Josef; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Fallis, D. “Floridi on Disinformation.” *Etica & Politica*, v.13 (2011).
- Fetzer, J. H. “Disinformation: The Use of False Information.” *Minds and Machines*, v.14 (2004).
- Floridi, L. *The Philosophy of Information*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Jackson, B. K. H. Jamieson. *Unspun: Finding Facts in a World of Disinformation*. New York: Random House, 2007.
- Lynch, C. A. “When Documents Deceive: Trust and Provenance as New Factors for Information Retrieval in a Tangled Web.” *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, v.52 (2001).
- Mintz, A. P., ed. *Web of Deception*. Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2002.
- Twain, M. “My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It.” In *The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

## Distrust

If trust is the confident expectation that another has one’s best interests at heart and can be counted on to act on those interests, then distrust is the confident expectation that another person’s motives, intentions, and behaviors are more than likely harmful to one’s wellbeing. Distrust stems from a combination of fear of vulnerability and the subsequent desire to “get them before they get you.”

### Distrust in Childhood

Distrust can begin early in life, in some cases soon after birth. When an infant’s needs are not



consistently met on a regular basis, the child begins to doubt whether or not the adults in his or her life can be trusted. When caregivers are insensitive and unresponsive, children become distrustful of their caregivers and are unable to rely on them. In the face of insensitive caregiving, infants respond by either avoiding or clinging to caregivers. These unhealthy attachment behaviors can carry over into adulthood and permeate not only family relationships but also friendships and romantic and work relationships. Distrust that stems from early childhood experiences can also spill over into an adult's parenting practices. For example, in a type of self-fulfilling prophecy, a mother's profound distrust was related to more hostile, intrusive, and negative behaviors toward the infant. These behaviors can cycle through the infant's experience, resulting in distrusting or avoidant tendencies in the child.

### **Distrust in Intimate Relationships**

In close, intimate relationships, distrust is particularly divisive. The distrusting partner not only maintains constant vigilance over their partner's actions, but also any attempt by the offender to make legitimate reparation for the violation of trust will be perceived through a lens of suspicion and skepticism. This can be readily seen in the behavior of people with a fearful attachment style, who describe themselves as uncomfortable getting close to, trusting, or depending on others for fear of being hurt if they become too close. Individuals who are distrustful by nature experience higher levels of intimacy avoidance and often greater feelings of anxiety about being abandoned, resulting in them being less likely to engage in close relationships or to have relationships in which they do engage succeed.

While distrust can be damaging at an interpersonal level, there are functional aspects of distrust that cannot be discounted. For adults and children alike, distrust can prevent them from being blind to the failings of others or failing to perceive cues that point to others' untrustworthiness. A moderate amount of distrust also allows individuals to create boundaries with others, knowing when to trust and when to exercise caution, allowing for the possibility of building higher and deeper levels of trust or confirming that another person is not worthy of trust.

Regardless of whether or not distrust is examined from the perspective of children or adults, researchers agree that by and large distrust (and associated unhealthy attachment styles) is learned from individuals' experiences with others. This is good news, in the sense that it suggests that more positive, supportive, truthful experiences with others may be able to shape a distrustful person's perceptions of the world in more positive, hopeful, trusting directions.

### **Distrust at the Societal Level**

At a more global level, many aspects of society are based on an assumption that distrust is an important and valuable characteristic in its citizenry. Democratic states, for example, are premised on the idea that the people in power will be tempted to abuse it. For this reason, checks and balances are put in place to dissuade those in power from succumbing to those temptations. For example, in the U.S. Constitution, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are given the power to veto each other's decisions, while Canada's Constitution states that both the Senate and the House of Commons must separately approve bills in order for them to become law. These measures allow the citizenry the security of knowing that there is oversight on matters of public importance and that no single branch of government becomes too powerful.

Distrust also serves to involve citizens in the political arena. When people distrust institutions, believing that governments and corporations are corrupt, or at least potentially corruptible, they are more likely to actively engage in politics. This may manifest in increased voter turnout for elections, lobbying for causes, or protesting perceived or actual wrongdoings by those in power. These actions, although they are based in distrust, can serve to improve life for both those directly involved and those around them.

At the societal level, distrust can develop in at least one of two ways. In situations where valuable resources are scarce (e.g., food shortages and fuel crises), individuals are motivated to protect themselves and those closest to them before others. The motives of others trying to join the group are often questioned, and once in the group, the slightest indication of untrustworthiness will often result in expulsion and exclusion from these important

resources. Distrust can also develop in the face of concerns about social loafing. This refers to occasions when an individual or individuals in a group do not put forth maximum effort on a joint task, expecting the remaining group members to “pick up the slack.” In ways similar to the scarce resource scenario, social loafing is a sign that individuals cannot be trusted to keep the group’s greater good in mind, which violates the trust of others, presumably fully engaged group members. Social loafers who have violated the group’s trust will at best be carefully monitored and made accountable for their productivity or lack thereof, or will be expelled from the group entirely.

### The Impact of Distrust on the Individual

It would appear that distrust can be both dysfunctional and functional. Like most other aspects of life, too much distrust can be isolating, while too little can result in being taken advantage of by less scrupulous others. It would be a mistake to assume that trusting people are gullible, whereas distrusting people have better “trust radar.” In fact, distrusting individuals are worse judges of character because their negative experiences lead them to regard many or all people with suspicion, leaving them unable to accurately differentiate between those who are trustworthy and those who are not. This inability or unwillingness to extend the benefit of the doubt (in a world that is actually quite trustworthy) has been associated with lower life satisfaction, commitment, and motivation, and even a shorter life expectancy.

Though the vast majority of research details the negative impact that distrust has on both mental and physical health, there is at least one set of circumstances in which being distrustful may actually prolong life. Safe or defensive driving is premised on the idea that others on the road cannot be trusted. While trust may be placed in the systems that control traffic, such as traffic lights and road signs, trust should not be placed in other drivers, who almost certainly have a different agenda, schedule, and understanding of their place on the road than may be understood by others. The tendency to assume that other drivers can read minds and know that a vehicle is about to turn left (without the benefit of turning signals being used) has led to many automobile accidents. In these cases, distrust may actually be

life-extending for more than just the trust-wary individual.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
University of Prince Edward Island

**See Also:** Children, Lying In; Credibility; Deception and Trust; Government, Decline of Public Trust in.

### Further Readings

Hardin, Russel. *Distrust*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009.

Lewicki, Roy J. and Edward C. Tomlinson.

“Distrust.” In *Beyond Intractability*, Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds. Boulder: Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003.

Vanderbilt, Kimberly E., David Liu, and Gail D.

Heyman. “The Development of Distrust.” *Child Development*, v.82/5 (2011)

---

## Dog–Human Deception

Deception in dogs (*Canis familiaris*) is a relatively new topic in cognitive research, yet there has been considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that dogs are capable of deception. Dogs were overlooked in early research, perhaps because of their domestication, and perhaps because early “dog artists” tricked ethologists into believing that their dogs were capable of extraordinary abilities, such as counting, by giving the dog minute cues.

During the 20th century, however, dog ethology began to make a comeback and research to date has shown that dogs possess exceptional social cognitive abilities, particularly involving humans. Dogs make excellent candidates for deception research because of social cognitive skills gained through ancestral influence from wolves (*Canis lupus* subsp.), selection during their domestication, and their long history of living alongside humans. The research to date has focused on deception in play between dogs and humans and has provided evidence that dogs are deceptive. Little research, however, has looked at deception or its detection between dogs and humans in contexts other than play.

Wolves, the most likely ancestors of dogs, live in complex, dynamic social systems that greatly vary in size; packs of two to 42 individuals have been reported. A complex social system forces the evolution of skills that enable individual wolves to remember past interactions with others and to use this information to predict and possibly manipulate the behaviors of those around them. These adaptations for social living were likely passed on to dogs throughout their evolution.

Further pressure for social cognitive skills came from the domestication process, during which humans selected those dogs that had a better understanding of human communicative behavior, which was necessary for coexisting with, and especially working alongside, humans. Dogs typically outperform wolves in social cognitive tasks, supporting the notion that domestication has had a significant influence on dogs' understanding of human behavior.

Today, dogs are present in almost every human society worldwide and have the opportunity to learn from humans from a very young age. Even as puppies, they demonstrate a level of understanding of human gestures that is superior to wolves and most other animals. Dogs' exceptional capacity for utilizing human-given cues suggests that they have the skills necessary for exhibiting deception involving humans.

### Deception in Play

Dogs' understanding of human behavior is critical for deception to occur between the species because it allows them to use even the smallest cues to predict future actions. This happens especially in play. For example, if a human acts as though he or she is preparing to throw a ball far, the dog will turn around and sometimes move toward where it believes the ball will land. The deceptive human capitalizes on this behavior and only pretends to throw the ball, fooling the dog. The frequency with which deception occurs in play and the different deceptive behaviors exhibited by both dogs and humans have been most notably studied by Robert W. Mitchell and Nicholas S. Thompson.

Deception in play between dogs and humans, while possible because of the ease of predicting future actions, often occurs because each side has its preferred activity. Both dogs and humans attempt to manipulate the other in a way that shifts the

type of play closer to their ideal. Honest and dishonest versions of behaviors will be seen throughout play between any individuals, yet research has suggested that deceptions are more frequent when the dog and human are familiar with one another, perhaps because both are better able to predict the future actions of a familiar partner.

One way that dogs display deception is by bringing a toy near a person (either carrying it in their mouths or dropping it on the ground), and then taking it away as soon as the person reaches for it. In these situations, the dog would prefer to remain in control of the toy, but recognizing that the person will become bored and stop participating in the game, the dog manipulates the person into re-engaging in play. Similarly, dogs will sometimes run toward a person, and then change direction; getting close but remaining out of reach. This is often done when the dog wants



*One way that dogs display deception is by carrying or dropping a toy near a person and then snatching it away as soon as the person reaches for it. In these situations, the dog manipulates the person into acting in vain, thus re-engaging in play.*

to be chased, again attempting to engage the person in the activity. The goal of these behaviors is to cause the human to act in vain—reaching for the dog or an object that they will not be able to acquire.

People exhibit similar deceptive behaviors, and others, such as manipulatively petting a dog who has a toy in its mouth, causing it to relax its grip, allowing the person to steal the toy. The high frequency of deceptive versions of certain acts allows for easy recognition by both dogs and humans, yet even between familiar partners, the deceptions are successful most of the time. However, the ease of recognition of a manipulative behavior has caused both dogs and humans to develop counterdeceptive strategies to avoid being deceived. For example, dogs may avoid being fooled by the human pretending to throw a ball by watching until the ball has left his or her hand before turning around to chase it. This shows that dogs are capable of identifying and responding appropriately to deception in some cases.

The ability of dogs to detect deception outside of play has not been thoroughly investigated, and the little research that has been done has not yielded promising results. Although dogs appear to recognize when they are being misled, they still respond to deceptive cues, perhaps because of a strong need to obey. In any case, while the results from the research on play have supported the hypothesis that dogs understand deception, further research is needed to determine the extent of that understanding.

### Conclusion

Dogs make great candidates for deception research because of their social ancestors, selection for an understanding of human behavior during domestication, and their long history of living alongside humans. Much of the research to date has focused on dog–human deception in play and has yielded promising results, but further research is necessary to determine the true range of dogs' ability to deceive and resist deception.

Caitlin Homan  
*University of Portsmouth*

**See Also:** Animals; Cooperation; Darwin, Charles; Evolution and Natural Selection; Manipulation.

### Further Readings

- Miklósi, Á. "Dog Behaviour, Evolution, and Cognition." New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Mitchell, R. W. and N. S. Thompson. "Deception in Play Between Dogs and People." In *Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit*, R. W. Mitchell and N. S. Thompson, eds. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- Mitchell, R. W. and N. S. Thompson. "Familiarity and the Rarity of Deception: Two Theories and Their Relevance to Play Between Dogs (*Canis familiaris*) and Humans (*Homo sapiens*)."  
*Journal of Comparative Psychology*, v.107 (1993).

## Dot-Com Bubble

The dot-com bubble (also referred to as the Internet bubble) is the name given to the speculative bubble, lasting between 1995 and 2000, that centered on new Internet-based companies. For these years, "prefix investing" in companies beginning with "e-" or ending with ".com" resulted in soaring stock prices. The beginning of the bubble can be traced back to the introduction of the World Wide Web and the subsequent new market for Internet-related startups. Economies worldwide saw stock prices increase in Internet-related fields.

On March 10, 2000, the bubble reached its zenith with the NASDAQ Stock Market hitting 5132.52. Despite the resounding hype around the new industry, investor deception plagued the period of the bubble. Deceptive acts and behaviors, including investor self-deception, deceptive revenue models, and misleading sentiments on Wall Street were prevalent during the bubble.

### Market Bubbles

In general, market bubbles are characterized by an overmagnification of a particular market due to inflated confidence of its value by current buyers. This creates a hyperbolic disparity between the value at which companies are traded and their intrinsic worth. In the case of the dot-com bubble, company values were driven by investor interpretations of market sentiment, rather than traditional valuation techniques. For this reason,



market bubbles are generally not detected until market sentiment dramatically drops. The result of the impact of investor expectations, compounded with the fact that it is often difficult to place a hard numerical value on technology companies, was that Internet companies received valuations that far surpassed their true value. When the rising expectations turned downward in the spring of 2000, the dot-com bubble fell in line with the typical “bursting” trait of stock bubbles.

### **Investor Fraud**

Investors were frequently misled regarding alleged positive prospects of a company. Investors, eager to reap the potential rewards of high-growth equity investments, convinced themselves that these prospects would eventually come to fruition.

One example of investor deception was InfoSpace. At its height, InfoSpace was worth \$31 billion. Once the company deteriorated, an investigation attributed much of the company’s success to fraud and deception. The investigation sifted through company e-mails and confidential documents and discovered that revenue came from nonexistent transactions and accounting tricks. The higher-than-actual advertised revenue fooled everyone, from Wall Street traders to private investors.

A second example was Think Tools AG, a giant in the European dot-com space. In March 2000, Think Tools AG had a market valuation of CHF 2.5 billion. Founded as a consultancy company, Think Tools AG expanded to include a suite of product tools that ultimately was not capable of its promised and marketed features. Ad campaigns went as far as falsely citing Nelson Mandela for successfully using the tools. Consequently, the stock soared. Once misleading information was revealed, such as the fact that reference clients at the time of the company’s initial public offering did not even use the Think Tools Suite, the stock price plummeted.

### **Self-Deception and Stock Options**

Self-deception was also prevalent during the dot-com bubble. An important example of this self-deception was the operation of stock options. Because cash is not always available in Internet companies, stock options are offered as a form of payment. In some cases, stock options can convert

into a fortune. In many cases during the bubble, however, these options were meaningless.

Executives took advantage of the situation by compensating employees through coveted options that had a slim chance of garnering worth, let alone ever being exercised. During the bubble’s rise, these options worked. If the company did well, the founders made millions and the employees were paid. As the bubble began to burst, however, employees’ stock was worthless and founders bore no risk.

By replacing cash-based salaries with stock options, executives deceived their employees by creating a false sense of wealth that was predicated on the slim possibility that the company would succeed. Employees, in turn, spent outside of their means. InfoSpace chief Naveen Jain, for example, was known to give employees overly large stock-option packages. Although they sounded bountiful, 100,000 options eventually equated to a mere penny.

### **Risky Revenue Models**

Revenue models provided to investors during the bubble were frequently deceptive. Many Internet companies did not have accurate market metrics, such as price-to-earnings (P/E) or enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EV/EBITDA) ratios. Companies often did not have sufficient positive free cash flows to the firm (FCFF) to base future projections. Instead, companies offered claims around technological advances and early extraordinary stock performances. An emphasis on less traditional benchmarks, such as user acquisition, over more standard marks of success, such as revenue, became the norm. Companies filed initial public offerings on the basis of page views and user retention, which significantly differed from more traditional qualifiers, such as projected cash flows or weight average cost of capital (WACC).

With this focus and precedence placed on many factors above a financially profitable revenue model, many business models were inherently deceptive. Companies were able to give the illusion of success and the promise of profitability by producing highly scalable new metrics. Such metrics had a riskier and less documented conversion rate to financial gains.

### Lazy Susan Deals

Lazy Susan deals involve companies that invest in each other. For example, company X may invest \$10 million in company Y. Company Y would then turn around, like a lazy Susan, and invest \$10 million in company X. The value of the lazy Susan deal was that companies raising a round of financing were associated with bright prospects. The act of investors committing money to an idea was thought to positively correlate with success. In this case, companies deceived outsiders by making it seem as if they were procuring legitimate financing.

### Wall Street Speculation

Wall Street was a key driver of the inflation associated with the bubble. High stock prices set around initial public offerings and speculation leading to future skyrocketing prices defined the dot-com bubble. Analysts at large institutional banks wrote glowing reports and made overly optimistic comments about these new technology companies. Some of these reports, however, differed from the personal thoughts and beliefs of their authors.

In one example, Henry Blodget, one of the highest-ranking analysts at Merrill Lynch at the time, was cited for privately saying that InfoSpace was junk and potentially a major scam. However, in public, he gave the stock the highest rating possible. After a long investigation, Blodget's skepticisms were confirmed. Nevertheless, InfoSpace peaked at \$1,305 per share, which valued the company higher than Boeing. A year later, the price dropped to \$22 per share.

One sufferer of Blodget's false rankings, pediatrician Debasis Kanjilal, sued Merrill Lynch. In news coverage of the case, Kanjilal's lawyer, Jacob Zamansky, was quoted as saying, "The analysts have lied to the public investors. This case will make them accountable." Although the case was settled outside of court, this was the first major public case in which a Wall Street firm made a payment as reparation for an analyst's recommendation.

Wall Street bankers also convinced some of the technology companies to use their overvalued stock prices to increase their market share and power, which spread the risk to other sectors of the economy. One such merger was American Cable and Time Warner. In January 2000, only

months before the market crashed, American Cable acquired Time Warner for \$160 billion, the largest corporate transaction in history at the time. Instead of paying even a dollar, however, American Cable financed the entire purchase through the issuance of its stock to existing Time Warner stockholders. When the stock price of American Cable crashed months later, the recently issued stock lost billions of dollars in value in mere days. This transaction was later referred to as "the worst [merger] in history." The tragedies of the bubble continued with the unveiling of many fraudulent practices.

Abroad, Swiss public bank Vontobel was fined by the Swiss Federal Bank Commission for fraudulent acts related to Think Tools AG's initial public offering (IPO). In anticipation of a high post-IPO share price, Vontobel, which issued Think Tools AG's IPO, held on to a majority of the shares that should have been sold at the IPO. Vontobel hid these initial plans and then sold these shares once the stock price had risen. Such behaviors, both on Wall Street and internationally, prolonged the bubble by sustaining companies and keeping them "alive."

### After the Bubble Burst

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission fined many top investors, including Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, on the basis of fraud and deception to their investors. Specific abuses included favoritism and selective disclosure. Moreover, related industries, such as advertising and shipping, were forced to downsize as demand for their work significantly fell.

Some companies that had actual intrinsic value, such as Amazon and eBay, weathered the storm and proved their viability. Others, such as Google, emerged to become some of the strongest and most powerful companies in the world. Nevertheless, aside from these outlier success stories, the lies and deception of the bubble left lasting damage.

Morgan Beller  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Accounting; Bankruptcy; Business; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Enron; Financial Markets; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud.

### Further Readings

- Cassidy, John. *Dot.con: How America Lost Its Mind and Money in the Internet Era*. New York: Perennial, 2003.
- Chan, Sharon Pion. "Mansions, Cars, Yachts, Jewelry—Then the Bottom Dropped Out." *Seattle Times* (March 6–8, 2005).
- Heath, David and Sharon Pion Chan. "Dot-con Job: How InfoSpace Took Its Investors for a Ride." *Seattle Times* (March 6–8, 2005).
- Hegedus, Chris and Jehane Nujaim, directors. *Startup.com*. Noujaim Films and Pennebaker Hegedus Films, 2001.
- Lowenstein, Roger. *Origins of the Crash: The Great Bubble and Its Undoing*. New York: Penguin, 2005.

---

## Dreyfus Affair

The Dreyfus Affair is a political scandal that occurred in France at the turn of the 20th century. Involving allegations of anti-Semitism, nationalism, deception, forged documents, perjury, honor, and espionage, the debate over the Dreyfus Affair polarized France and shook the French military. Resolved after a dozen years, the Dreyfus Affair still engages those fascinated by group dynamics, conspiracies, discrimination, and devotion to hierarchy and order.

### Background

Alfred Dreyfus was born in 1859 in Mulhouse, located in the Alsace region of France. The son of a Jewish textile manufacturer, Dreyfus entered the École Polytechnique in 1882, ultimately deciding upon a career in the military. Promoted to the rank of captain in 1889, by 1894, Dreyfus was assigned to the War Ministry. At that time, Jean Conrad Sandherr, the chief of the army's counterintelligence unit, became aware that someone was passing information regarding the new French artillery system to an attaché of the German embassy. Dreyfus, who was a member of the French General Staff and had access to the information, soon fell under suspicion. Arrested and charged with treason, Dreyfus was soon brought to trial.

Dreyfus's trial was highly irregular, and he consistently maintained his innocence. Dreyfus was ultimately convicted, with his verdict based upon a letter procured from the German embassy by a French agent that indicated Dreyfus's involvement in the scheme. This letter was brought forth by Major Hubert Henry, who indicated that it had been written by Dreyfus in his own hand. The French newspapers generally supported Dreyfus's conviction, with strongly anti-Semitic editorials welcoming the verdict and indicating that Dreyfus's actions were representative of the alleged disloyalty of French Jews. Stripped of his military rank, Dreyfus was sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to Devil's Island, a penal colony located off the coast of French Guyana.

### Discovery of Dishonesty

Although the matter now seemed resolved, in 1896, Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart, the head of French military intelligence, began to doubt Dreyfus's guilt. Picquart uncovered evidence that suggested that Major Ferdinand Esterhazy was engaged in espionage on behalf of the Germans, and he had the same opportunity to divulge military secrets regarding the French artillery as had Dreyfus. Picquart suggested that the incriminating letter that had helped convict Dreyfus was actually written by Esterhazy.

In response, Picquart was suddenly removed from his position because his superiors were staunchly anti-Dreyfussards (those who supported Dreyfus's conviction). While Picquart had uncovered evidence demonstrating that another person had committed the crime, the military preferred Dreyfus as the villain because he was Jewish and Alsatian. Dreyfus's cause, however, was quickly gaining support in important quarters, including journalist and future premier Georges Clemenceau and Senator Auguste Scheurer-Kestner. As a result of these Dreyfussards (those who believed Dreyfus's innocence), Esterhazy was brought before a court martial because of Picquart's allegations.

Esterhazy's trial soon descended into chaos. Facing Picquart's charges, Esterhazy created new evidence for the court martial and spread a series of rumors that made their way into the newspapers, questioning the patriotism of those who supported Dreyfus. Henry, who had brought forth the original letter implicating Dreyfus,

now produced new, more recently forged documents. Esterhazy's trial, which took place on January 10 and 11, 1898, resulted in his acquittal and sparked a series of anti-Semitic riots in Paris. In response to the acquittal, novelist Émile Zola hastily wrote an essay, *J'accuse*, which was printed on January 13, 1898, on the front page of *Aurore*, Clemenceau's newspaper. In this essay, which sold over 200,000 copies of *Aurore* in one day, Zola accused the French government of anti-Semitism, proclaimed Dreyfus's innocence, and demanded a new trial.

Zola's essay inflamed the passions of the anti-Dreyfussards. Members of the French parliament were pushed to bring Zola to trial for libel, and he was tried in February 1898, found guilty, sentenced to a year's imprisonment, and fined 3,000 francs. Picquart was accused of forging some of the documents used at the second trial, and he was threatened with a court martial, at which time he resigned his commission.

Meanwhile, the Dreyfussards circulated a petition demanding a new trial for Dreyfus, collecting over 3,000 signatures and gaining the support of many French intellectuals. In August 1898, Henry committed suicide shortly after confessing to forging many of the documents that implicated Dreyfus, and Esterhazy fled to Belgium before ultimately settling in the United Kingdom. After Henry's confession, Dreyfus's appeal sped through the system, and it was inevitable that a new trial would be granted. Dreyfus was brought back from Devil's Island and retried before a military court. Because the French military found it embarrassing to admit that it had wrongly convicted Dreyfus, he was again found guilty. In an effort to resolve the matter, French president Émile Loubet pardoned Dreyfus. Despite this, Dreyfus was adamant that he was innocent, and he continued to work to prove his innocence.

### Resolution

In 1904, Dreyfus was granted a new trial, and in 1906, a civilian court heard his case for the first time. This time, Dreyfus was found not guilty, and all of his previous convictions were reversed. The French parliament reinstated Dreyfus in the army, restoring his rank, and he was made an officer of the Legion of Honor. Dreyfus was soon promoted to the rank of major and then retired, although

he returned to active service during World War I and was again promoted to lieutenant colonel. Dreyfus then retired again, and he died in 1935. Picquart's career was also rehabilitated, and he ultimately was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and later served as minister of war in Clemenceau's first cabinet.

The Dreyfus affair brought to a head the conflict between those who favored nationalism and respect for order and authority and those who sought to protect individual rights and sought the protection of diverse religious beliefs. The desire of the military and by extension the French government to adhere to untruths, rather than admit a mistake made many rethink the value of nationalistic behavior and blind adherence to authority. The speed with which the courts and the public were willing to assume Dreyfus's guilt as a result of his religious background also caused many to rethink the links between church and state in France.

Although the split between those who approved of Dreyfus's conviction and those who wished it overturned continued for decades, the Dreyfus Affair contributed to the 1905 passage of legislation separating church and state in France. Hungarian journalist Theodor Herzl, who had covered Dreyfus's original trial, became so disillusioned by the conviction that he founded the World Zionist Organization, which called for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Dreyfus Affair remains an important example of how individuals may suffer when faced with government officials who favor order over truth.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Knox College

**See Also:** Confession; Conspiracies; Espionage and Counterespionage; Government Propaganda; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Judaism; Lying as Exercise of Power; Military Deception; Perjury; Racism; Witness, False Testimony of.

### Further Readings

- Bredin, J. D. *The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus*. New York: George Braziller, 1986.
- Burns, M. *France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History*. New York: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 1998.



Read, P. P. *The Dreyfus Affair: The Scandal That Tore France in Two*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012.

---

## Drug Advertising

Deception in drug advertising has been documented in print, radio, and television, while deception has been exposed in scientific reports published in medical journals and conferences. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 governs the legality of deceptive or misleading ads published by the pharmaceutical industry. Several forms of deceptive advertising have been examined.

### Deception Aimed at Doctors

Both consumers and doctors can be deceived with drug advertising. One important form that targets doctors is deceptive reporting of drug testing. Drug companies that fund their own studies have been found to manipulate data in several deceptive ways that lead to misleading publications. One method is to not report results with negative implications for the drug. This approach deceives doctors because they are less likely to be aware of any potential negative side effects. Another method is to not report null results, which show no difference between the drug and a control condition.

Studies have revealed that the likelihood of a positive drug study being published is significantly higher than one in which the drug is shown to have no effect. This bias is deceptive because it can also mislead doctors into believing that the drug has a stronger effect than it actually does. Another tactic for biasing scientific perceptions of a drug involves overemphasizing a positive study's results. This is done by submitting the results multiple times under the guise of being numerous independent studies. The effect of this deception is that doctors and other health care professionals will read different articles assuming that the cited studies are based on different data, producing a deceptively positive view of the drug.

A related form of deceptive drug reporting is the use of ghostwriting in scientific reports. A

person reading an article by a prominent physician or researcher expects that the report reflects the opinions and findings of the person cited as the author. Specialized firms, however, are sometimes contracted to write positive reports about a drug. Scientists, physicians, and other researchers are then contacted and offered a sum of money to claim authorship of the article or review, without having actually written the endorsement of the drug. This results in published material from an apparent third party that can mislead other health care professionals.

### Deception Aimed at Consumers

Consumers can also be the targets of deceptive drug advertising. Until the 1980s, drug marketing was focused on medical professionals who controlled prescriptions. In 1981, the pharmaceutical industry successfully advocated to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that consumers needed to be informed about potential medication that could treat their illness. The government reversed the position taken in 1938 with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The FDA allowed pharmaceutical companies to market their drugs directly to the consumer. Since then, mass marketing and direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising has dramatically increased. Drug companies reportedly spend over one-third of their budgets on the advertising and marketing of prescription drugs.

DTC advertising, however, has been plagued with inaccuracies and deceptions since the practice was made legal. The FDA monitors drug advertisements and marketing material for signs of deception and misleading statements. Drug marketers are required by law to submit ads for approval prior to placing them in the public sphere; approval by the FDA allows an ad to run in the specific format that it was presented. Enforcement of this procedure has been relatively difficult and ineffective. For example, an advertisement may be placed in a journal without approval, but it can take up to 10 weeks before the FDA sees the advertisement.

Deception in consumer advertising typically involves the appearance of misleading statements or descriptions associated with off-label use. Off-label use is the promotion of a drug that is inconsistent with guidelines set forth by the FDA.

**"Really?"**

Yes... **desPLEX®**  
to prevent ABORTION, MISCARRIAGE and  
PREMATURE LABOR

recommended for routine prophylaxis  
in ALL pregnancies...

- 96 per cent live delivery with **desPLEX**  
in one series of 1200 patients\*—  
— bigger and stronger babies, too.<sup>1,2</sup>
- No gastric or other side effects with **desPLEX**  
— in either high or low dosage.<sup>3,4,5</sup>

(Each **desPLEX** tablet starts with 25 mg. of diethylstilbestrol, U.S.P., which is then ultramicrozoned to smooth and accelerate absorption and activity. A portion of this ultramicrozoned diethylstilbestrol is even included in the tablet coating to assure prompt help in emergencies. **desPLEX** tablets also contain vitamin C and certain members of the vitamin B complex to aid detoxification in pregnancy and the effectuation of estrogen.)

For further data and a generous  
trial supply of **desPLEX**, write to:  
Medical Director

REFERENCES

1. Canario, E. M., et al.: *Am. J. Obst. & Gynec.* 65:1296, 1953.
2. Gilman, L., and Kaplanwitz, A.: *N. Y. St. J. Med.* 50:2933, 1950.
3. Komake, K. J.: *South. M. J.* 45:1166, 1952.
4. Paine, E. J.: *Med. Times* 82:921, 1954; *Am. J. Surg.* 87:93, 1954.
5. Ross, J. W.: *J. Nat. M. A.* 42:20, 1951; 43:222, 1952.

**GRANT CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,** Brooklyn 26, N.Y.

*This advertisement for desPlex appeared in the June 1957 issue of the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Even though evidence of synthetic estrogen's serious harm to a fetus surfaced as early as 1953, it was heavily marketed to physicians for decades, who continued to rely on drug company information.*

When a pharmaceutical company develops a new drug, the FDA must approve it for specific treatments based on evidence that includes laboratory and clinical trials. A drug may not be marketed for any use that is not explicitly defined by the FDA. Examples of tactics that are used to mislead consumers include deceptive images, lack of warning about side effects, overexaggerating the effectiveness of the drug, and insinuating that the drug is the best available. Unless there are specific studies that can support the claims made by the ad, the ad is deemed misleading and is determined to be illegal.

Drug advertisements also tend to exaggerate the benefits of a product while downplaying the negative effects to a consumer. Deceptive tactics used by drug ads involve the use of large fonts touting the effectiveness of the drug, while side effects are relegated to small print that is hidden

in the corner of the page or as a small Web link that forces an individual to search for conflicting information.

Deceptive imagery is also a common method of misleading the consumer. Depicting a family in a drug ad, even though the drug is only approved for adults aged 18 years and up, can be deceptive, insinuating that the product is safe to use for the whole family. Ads tend to use spokespersons who endorse the drugmaker's claims about a drug's efficacy. For example, drug manufacturer Pfizer used Dr. Robert Jarvik as the spokesman for the drug Lipitor. In the television ad, Jarvik was introduced as the inventor of the artificial heart, depicting him as an authority on cardiovascular issues and medical advice. The advertisement, however, failed to mention that Jarvik was not licensed to practice medicine. The advertisement depicted Jarvik as a user of Lipitor, though he later admitted to using Lipitor only after he became a spokesman. In addition, the ad showed Jarvik rowing a boat, when in fact the man rowing was a body double. By presenting Jarvik as a physically fit individual, the ad might have misled consumers into believing that a drug may have additional positive side effects. The Lipitor ad was pulled from circulation after these facts came to light.

Another example is Johnson and Johnson's citation by the FDA for promoting off-label usage of Ertaczo. Ertaczo is an antifungal cream used to treat symptoms of athlete's foot and similar fungal infections. The wording of the Ertaczo advertisement used large, bold letters to emphasize the effectiveness of the drug. The drug claimed to "Crush. Kill. Destroy." This overstated the efficacy of the drug compared with the clinical trials that Johnson and Johnson presented to the FDA. The use of hyperbole was an attempt to mislead the consumer because the clinical study showed effectiveness in only 22.3 percent of patients. This ratio of success did not match the claims made by Johnson and Johnson in its advertising.

Web sites can also contain deceptive drug advertising. Allergan was cited for a misleading advertisement in the design of a Web site for the eyelash-enhancing product Latisse. Among the reasons cited, the FDA noted that even downplaying certain side effects amounts to deception

in advertising. The Latisse information on the Web site minimized the negative effects of the drug while exaggerating its beneficial effects. By not displaying adverse reactions as prominently as positive effects of the drug, the pharmaceutical company sought to mislead the consumer. The complaint against Allergan is important because it addresses multiple media outlets as part of a larger marketing campaign.

Finally, deceptive drug advertising can also involve counterfeit or adulterated drugs. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 sought to regulate pharmaceutical advertising and to ban the sale of counterfeit drugs. The law requires all advertising to be truthful and not misleading, based on clinical research and substantial evidence. This legislation was a result of the appearance of a grey market for prescription drugs that developed in the 1980s. Promotional practices such as coupons for free drugs were disallowed and the resale of wholesale drugs sold to health care entities was banned.

The main mechanism for prosecuting deceptive marketing by pharmaceutical companies is the False Claims Act. Because of the expansion of programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, the scope of recent legislation has been effective in prosecuting pharmaceutical fraud and deceptive practices. Regulation of the pharmaceutical industry under the umbrella of the False Claims Act and the intense marketing of drugs for off-label use has resulted in major settlements by pharmaceutical companies.

Deception in drug advertising is practiced in multiple forms and through a variety of media. Medical journals are a medium of deception targeted toward doctors and other health care professionals. Pharmaceutical companies mislead health care providers by manipulating and hiding the results of clinical research trials. DTC advertising, although regulated by the FDA, is a prominent form of deception in drug advertising in many media. Different media present challenges to the FDA in order to ensure compliance with the law.

The FDA enforces legislation related to deceptive practices used in drug advertising, but enforcement is difficult, and penalties are not immediately imposed. Pharmaceutical companies and the FDA will face increasing challenges as the avenues for

disseminating drug information to doctors and consumers change with new technology.

Ruwan Pallegedara  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Caveat Emptor; Consumer Protection Laws; Drugs; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Marketing, Deceptive; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Public Relations; Puffery; Tobacco Advertising.

### Further Readings

- Leffler, Keith B. "Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug Advertising." *Journal of Law and Economics*, v.24/1 (1981).  
 "Ten Misleading Drug Ads." *Forbes* (February 2, 2010). [http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/02/drug-advertising-lipitor-lifestyle-health-pharmaceuticals-safety\\_slide\\_2.html](http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/02/drug-advertising-lipitor-lifestyle-health-pharmaceuticals-safety_slide_2.html) (Accessed October 2012)  
 Shaeffer, John. "Prescription Drug Advertising: Should States Regulate What Is False and Misleading?" *Food and Drug Law Journal*, v.58/4 (2003).  
 Wilkes, Michael S., et al. "Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications." *Health Affairs*, v.19/2 (2000).

---

## Drugs

The term *drug* is typically used in the English language to colloquially refer to substances that interact with the human body or psyche, and as a class are generally divided between licit and illicit substances. The modern approval process for licit drugs has been critiqued as inherently biased, and thus antithetical to the spirit of scientific research that undergirds its legitimacy. For example, the beneficial impact of the drugs are sometimes overstated, while their attendant risks are minimized to increase sales and, in turn, shareholders' earnings. In addition, the process whereby physicians and pharmacists are offered incentives to show allegiance to particular brands or classes of drugs is coercive. Illicit substances (colloquially referred to by the generic moniker "drugs," and typically

psychoactive in nature) are often comingled with elements of lying and deception both in the form of (1) manufacturers, distributors, and users, who tend to do so clandestinely; and (2) law enforcement agencies, government institutions, and others, which seek to vilify both substance and user on the basis of dubious ideologically driven rationalizations.

### **Licit Drugs**

Organized medicine in the United States faces distinct challenges with regard to the declining public trust of its patrons because of publicized instances of deceptive, dishonest, and fraudulent practices. Consequently, dependent financial relationships and lapses in ethical decision making have allowed for an erosion of trust between drug companies, physicians, and patients. After a highly publicized U.S. National Institutes of Health-funded biomedical research scandal in the late 1970s, public attention prompted the government to increase its efforts at addressing scientific misconduct in the pharmaceutical industry. As a consequence, the government since the 1980s has taken a more active role in regulating the medical field.

Despite these efforts, outright fraud in the pharmaceutical industry remains commonplace and takes many forms. For example, in 2009, pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer was forced to pay \$2.3 billion for kickbacks and off-label marketing. “Off label marketing” refers to the marketing of a drug for use in conditions outside of those for which it was explicitly approved. After the global health care company Glaxo-SmithKline was charged with fraud for knowingly marketing contaminated medical products, the company was forced to pay \$750 million to settle the case in 2010. In July 2012, the same company had to pay \$3 billion under the False Claims Act for behavior ranging from the fabrication of scientific research, kickbacks to physicians, bribes, and the use of off-label marketing for several of its drugs, including Paxil, a popular and widely used antidepressant of questionable medical utility, particularly in light of its dangerous side effects. These examples, among a steady flow of other recent cases, serve as evidence that the regulatory framework of the pharmaceutical industry is inadequate.

Bringing a drug to market is an expensive, lengthy, opaque process, sometimes costing hundreds of millions of dollars from the moment of a drug’s conception until it can be prescribed by physicians. Most of the clinical trials conducted in the United States are funded by the pharmaceutical industry, and systematic analyses have shown that in some cases this process is fundamentally flawed. Medical journals have been reported to derive some (or most) of their revenue from corporate advertising, and these publications are not universally required to disclose any conflicts of interest among editorial board members. Some pharmaceutical researchers have been reported to hide or refuse the publication of studies that would negatively impact drugs under development. This basic conflict of interest undermines the ethicality of pharmaceutical research and calls into question the empirical validity of supporting studies.

Conflicts of interest also materialize in the direct influence that drug companies have on prescription-writing behavior. The most direct form of influence comes in the form of kickbacks—monetary incentives directly given to physicians for prescribing certain drugs. Gifting is a more common form of influence, and it involves pharmaceutical corporations awarding doctors gifts that vary from resort vacations to sporting event invitations and medical supplies. Despite being prohibited, the behavior has become normative. Another common (and widely accepted) form of industry influence occurs through its funding of medical organizations. In most cases, this type of funding is either unregulated or self-regulated, presumably to limit conflicts of interest or the appearance of such conflicts. However, many of these organizations would struggle to remain financially viable without industry funding, indicating the degree to which there is a vested interest in minimizing the appearance of potential conflicts of interest.

Pharmaceutical companies have also taken advantage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, which allows drugmakers to pay a fee to expedite the drug approval process. The initial push for this legislation occurred in the 1990s in response to the burgeoning global acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) pandemic, at a time when urgent demands for treatment were



hindered by a lengthy FDA approval process. Since then, many drug companies have capitalized on the act by pushing for the hasty approval of drugs that are not life-threatening, incrementally creating an environment in which drug companies are given increasing power to pressure the FDA approval process.

Lying and deception can also play a role in influencing perceptions of the pharmacological power of drugs. The pharmaceutical industry remains profitable because its drugs are purported to have a positive effect on some physiological anomaly, a condition undermined by the power of the placebo effect. One of many examples of placebo fraud is found within the psychiatric antidepressant industry. In one systematic analysis, it was shown that drug companies refused the publication of 40 percent of clinical trials that demonstrated little to no medicinal value with regard to their psychiatric drugs, while vigorously promoting the drugs as effective in marketing campaigns.

Dietary supplements represent perhaps the largest category of placebo fraud. Because this category of drugs is not subject to FDA approval, dietary supplements completely bypass the drug approval process and solely rely on the strengths of biased self-regulation to ensure the validity of research regarding their medicinal value and the truthfulness of marketing campaigns with regard to their efficacy. Consequently, the FDA has had to recall hundreds of these drugs on the basis of exaggerated claims of their medicinal value in controlling body weight, enhancing the physique, or increasing sexual vitality.

### Illicit Drugs

Illicit psychoactive substances are clandestinely manufactured, distributed, and used, and in postindustrial society, this phenomenon dates to the once burgeoning opium trade in Asia. Illicit psychoactive substances have served as the well-spring of clandestine enterprise (e.g., black market breweries and speakeasies during the era of alcohol prohibition), and the term *trafficking* has become accepted as a moniker of the clandestine drug trade. Similarly, other words in the English language have been co-opted as terms used within clandestine drug markets; for example, the terms *cooks*, *mules*, and *dealers* have been adopted to

deceptively reference the varying individuals who play a role in the manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs.

The use of illicit psychoactive drugs often involves elements of lying and deception, due primarily to the clandestine nature of engaging in socially prohibited behavior; however, this was not the case in previous historical epochs divested from the prohibition of these substances. Because of the illegal nature of these substances, entire industries have been developed that aim to conceal a user's involvement with illicit psychoactive drugs. For example, products are marketed that allow users to circumvent drug tests (typically administered by employers or formal authorities) that are designed to determine prior use of illicit psychoactive substances. Related to the clandestine use of illicit psychoactive substances is the primary reason for their concealment: the desire to prohibit possession and use of the substances by law enforcement agents, government institutions, and critics of illicit drug use.

With regard to the criminalization of illicit psychoactive drugs, individuals and institutions wishing to prohibit their use have often employed ideologically driven reductionistic arguments concerning the negative impacts of these substances—both personal and societal—in an effort to demonize and vilify both substance and user. The history of the prohibition of psychoactive drugs in Western society is related to the importation of opium from China, and some have likened that early movement—and its attendant rhetoric—to a form of xenophobia in condemning both Asians and the drug. Soon thereafter, a puritanical outlook on the use of psychoactive substances became the norm within Western societies, essentially positing that any use of psychoactive substances constituted an evil that was tantamount to a disease called “addiction,” for which there was ostensibly no cure.

Historically and contemporarily, the criminal justice approach to the control of illicit psychoactive substances is often predicated upon a rationale that also involves elements of deception and lying. There are many historical examples in which the findings of empirical research about the psychopharmacological impact of substances deemed illicit have been eschewed in lieu of adopting policy formulated on the basis of ideologically

driven, reductionistic arguments centered on either (1) the demonic effects of the substance on the body, or (2) xenophobic arguments centered on the deleterious social impact of a villainous drug-using population on the body politic.

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy has declared the purported negative effects of illicit psychoactive substances with little regard to (or often in defiance of) the findings of empirical peer-reviewed scholarship. At times, a policy of zero tolerance prohibiting the possession of any amount of illicit psychoactive substances has been adopted, which has occasionally resulted in grave injustice. For example, school children have been criminally charged with drug dealing for taking over-the-counter headache medicine into schools that had adopted a zero tolerance policy, and as a result, mitigating circumstances were disregarded. In defiance of historical evidence to the contrary, these actions are usually justified vis-à-vis nonfalsifiable metaphorical statements that having zero tolerance prevents society from falling down a “slippery slope” that leads to the destruction of social order.

Many myths have also been perpetrated with regard to the negative impact of illicit psychoactive substances. Emblematic of this phenomenon is the purported negative impact of one of the most widely used psychoactive substances—marijuana. There is perhaps no greater rift between the findings of empirical research (which tends to indicate the psychopharmacological benignity of the substance) and the statements of authorities (which tend to suggest that its use is tantamount to the end of human civilization) than where it concerns the personal and social impact of marijuana. Despite empirical evidence to the contrary, one of the most pervasively perpetuated myths surrounding the social impact of marijuana concerns its facilitation of the gateway effect, whereby it is alleged that use of marijuana inexorably leads to the use of more dangerous, harder drugs, for example opioids or cocaine. Other groundless myths habitually referenced by formal authorities and their supporters with regard to the effects of marijuana intoxication concern its impact on facilitating criminal behavior, its persistent negative impact on memory and cognition, and its chronic impairment of motivation and productivity.

The subtle processes that can influence drug policy—putting individuals and institutions seeking to prohibit their use in the position of supporting baseless perspectives on the impact of psychoactive substances—is illustrated by one of the largest systematic reviews of the empirical evidence concerning the social and psychopharmacological impacts of marijuana, conducted in Canada in 2002. After review of the evidence, the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs recommended decriminalization of the substance, arguing that most of the negative impact of marijuana stemmed from its criminalization, not from the psychopharmacological impact of the substance. However, the Canadian government had to forego its recommendation when it was subsequently determined that enacting such legislation would stymie cross-border trade with its largest trading partner—the United States—because of the United States’ puritanical stance on psychoactive substances. Thus, economic imperatives indirectly influenced by the ideologically driven war on drugs held a coercive influence over the sensible revision of criminal justice policy based upon the findings of empirical research.

Douglas J. Dallier  
Joseph R. Goulet  
*University of Maryland*

**See Also:** Academia; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Law and Law Enforcement; Marketing, Deceptive; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry.

### Further Readings

- Kirsch, I. *The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant Myth*. New York: Basic Books, 2007.
- Korn, D. “Financial Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medicine: Whence They Came, Where They Went.” *Indiana Health Law Review*, v.8/1 (2010).
- Robinson, Matthew B. and Renee G. Scherlen. *Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007.
- Wynia, M. and D. Boren. “Special Supplement: Dangerous Liaisons? Industry Relations With Health Professionals: Better Regulation of Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials Is Long Overdue.” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, v.37/410 (2009).

Zimmer, Lynn E. and John P. Morgan. *Marijuana Myths, Marijuana Facts: A Review of the Scientific Evidence*. New York: Lindesmith Center, 1997.

## Duchenne Smile

Smiling is a ubiquitous facial expression that begins in infancy and is widely understood to be a display of favorable emotions, such as pleasure. People who smile are viewed as trustworthy, friendly, and cooperative. The smile is a powerful social gesture that puts others at ease and convinces them that they are safe in the smiling person's presence. Those who take advantage of others through manipulation and deceit exploit this power by using a nongenuine smile to fool victims about their true intentions.

A genuine smile, known as the Duchenne smile, involves muscles around the eyes and mouth, whereas the fake smile, known as the non-Duchenne smile, only involves muscles around the mouth. People can differentiate between the two types of smiles; the cues that distinguish between the genuine and fake smile have also been quantified in a measurement tool and computer program.

A smile is a universal facial expression that is widely perceived as a conveyance of positive affect (emotion). People of all races, ethnicities, cultures, and religious affiliations interpret a smile as a gesture of friendliness, enjoyment, happiness, and amusement. A smile is displayed in the same manner across the globe. Even those born blind can spontaneously smile during pleasurable experiences. A precursor and successor to laughter, a smile can also reflect embarrassment, frustration, anxiety, and submissiveness, as well as a variety of other emotions ranging from sexual attraction and love to haughtiness, contempt, hostility, and vengefulness. Biologists conjecture that the smile has evolved in primates and humans as a primitive gesture of submissiveness, designed to placate potential enemies or predators. Known as the "fear grin," this protosmile involves neither a full baring nor clenching of teeth, which are signs of threat and aggression.

A wealth of research demonstrates the highly social nature of the smile. People who smile are

regarded as friendly, likeable, confident, trustworthy, and approachable. In addition, in various social situations, these people are more likely than nonsmiling people to receive positive responses to requests for assistance and cooperation. Hence, the smile has powerful and inherent communal currency. The act of smiling—even in the absence of other people—is associated with changes in the brain that can elevate mood and energy and reduce the body's responses to stress.



A genuine smile, known as the Duchenne smile, involves muscles around the eyes and mouth (as with Arizona Cardinals wide receiver Larry Fitzgerald, top), whereas the fake smile, known as the non-Duchenne smile, only involves muscles around the mouth (as with American singer and model Katrina Darrell, bottom).

The smile might also be essential to human survival. Infants' brains are wired to fixate their eyes on human faces and to mimic the expressions of others, including smiling. Appearing between 6 and 8 months of age, the smile is a powerful tool of communication for infants and their caretakers, helping to solidify bonds and prepare the infant for more sophisticated social interactions. The failure or inability to produce a smile or understand its meaning can signal the presence of developmental disabilities, sensory deficits, or autism.

Despite the universality of the smile, cultural norms differ with respect to the frequency of smiling and its interpretation, especially in public. For example, in Japan, people smile when they are angry or perplexed, or refrain altogether from public displays of emotion, such as smiling. In the United States, smiling in public is fairly common; in China, it is less so. In Russia, people regard smiling in public with suspicion. Therefore, perceptions of the citizens of these two countries about one another ("Americans are untrustworthy"; "Russians are unfriendly") have created longstanding views and misunderstandings, hampering relationships and fostering the "chill" of the Cold War era.

### Real Smiles and Fake Smiles

The production of a smile enlists muscles around the eyes (the orbicularis oculi) and mouth (the zygomatic major). The former lifts the cheeks and causes the eyes to squint, producing wrinkles known as "crow's feet" or "laugh lines," whereas the latter lifts the corners of the mouth, producing in its broadest expression a "toothy grin." A 19th-century French physician (neurologist) and scientist, Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne, was the first to distinguish between smiles that involve one or both types of muscles. Named in his honor, the Duchenne smile engages both types of muscles (the orbicularis oculi and the zygomatic major muscles), whereas the non-Duchenne smile engages only the zygomatic major. The former is accompanied by a slight dip of the eyebrows and is more likely to be symmetrical than the latter. In addition, the Duchenne smile is more fleeting (five seconds) than the non-Duchenne smile, but the former emerges more gradually than the latter.

Numerous studies have shown that the Duchenne smile (the felt or real smile) is related to self-reported pleasure and other measures of enjoyment. The non-Duchenne smile (the unfelt or fake smile) is unrelated to enjoyment or other favorable emotions. The real smile is reflexive, spontaneous, authentic, and instantaneous. The fake smile exhibits opposite qualities; for example, it is forced, deliberate, and artificial, and is seldom indicative of genuine enjoyment or friendliness.

However, the non-Duchenne smile can express civility and courtesy, for example, among passersby on the sidewalk, between a librarian and patron, or between cashier and customer. Employees in retail outlets, fast food establishments, and restaurants are encouraged (or trained) to smile in order to increase sales and patronage by eliciting the positive effects of smiling on others. The fake smile can alleviate tension in awkward social situations, accompanying an apology for an accidental step on the toe in the subway or an inadvertent jostling in a crowded elevator.

Although the differences between the Duchenne and non-Duchenne smile can be subtle, studies have shown that people perceive these nuances of expression and can distinguish one from the other. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even programmed a computer to accurately differentiate the real from the fake smile; such software could be applied in law enforcement investigations to detect signs of lying and in the marketing field to detect consumer preferences. Professor Paul Ekman of the University of California, San Francisco, developed the Facial Action Coding System as a quantitative measure that can be used by researchers to distinguish between a genuine and a fake smile.

The fake smile has been exercised to manipulate others for selfish and criminal gain. The deliberate use of the non-Duchenne smile to disarm enemies or potential victims is part of conventional wisdom and has been incorporated in popular culture. The villainous smile—as widely depicted in movies and animated features—belies the true intentions of the evil perpetrator. The power of the smile to disarm and confuse people regarding one's true malicious intentions likely stems from the communication value of the fear grin as a means to project submissiveness and harmlessness.



Easy to effectuate and associated with socially desirable meanings, the fake smile can be used in a variety of situations that entail deceit, fraud, and violence. For example, a lie coupled with a fake smile is intended to convey truthfulness. Con artists and scammers employ the fake smile to confuse victims about their true intentions. One who applies the smile as a deceptive tactic capitalizes on the fact that the smile is generally associated with kindness, affection, and trustworthiness. Smiling people are favorably viewed in terms of numerous personality traits that cast them in a positive and nonthreatening light. Serial killers, such as Ted Bundy, have lured their victims into traps through artifice that includes fake smiling, banter, and distraction. People who score high on the psychopathy scale use charm and superficiality (e.g., false friendliness, compliments, empty promises, and fake smiles) to manipulate and seduce victims in order to control them to accomplish nefarious and murderous ends.

Arthur J. Lurigio  
Loyola University Chicago

**See Also:** Betrayal; Bluffing; Con Man; Deception and Trust; Duping Delight; Ekman, Paul; Eye Contact; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Bachorowski, J. A. and M. J. Owren. "Not All Laughs Are Alike: Voiced But Not Unvoiced Laughter Readily Elicits Positive Affect." *Psychological Science*, v.12 (2001).
- Cialdini, R. B. *Influence: Science and Practice*. 3rd ed. New York: Harper Collins, 1993.
- Darwin, C. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. London: Murray, 1872.
- Ekman, P. "Strong Evidence for Universals in Facial Expressions: A Reply to Russell's Mistaken Critique." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.115 (1994).
- Frank, M. G., P. Ekman, and W. V. Friesen. "Behavioral Markers and Recognizability of the Smile of Enjoyment." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.64 (1993).
- Keltner, D. and G. A. Bonanno. "A Study of Laughter and Dissociation: Distinct Correlates of Laughter and Smiling During Bereavement." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.73 (1997).
- LaFrance, M. and M. A. Hecht. "Why Smiles Generate Leniency." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.21 (1995).
- Lakin, J. L., V. E. Jefferis, C. M. Cheng, and T. L. Chartrand. "The Chameleon Effect as Social Glue: Evidence for the Evolutionary Significance of Nonconscious Mimicry." *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, v.27 (2003).
- Owren, M. J. and J. A. Bachorowski. "The Evolution of Emotional Experience: A 'Selfish-Gene' Account of Smiling and Laughter in Early Hominids and Humans." In *Emotions: Current Issues and Future Directions*, G. A. Bonanno and T. J. Mayne, eds. New York: Guilford Press (2001).
- Provine, R. R. *Laughter: A Scientific Investigation*. New York: Viking, 2000.
- Provine, R. R. and K. R. Fischer. "Laughing, Smiling, and Talking: Relation to Sleeping and Social Context in Humans." *Ethology*, v.83 (1989).
- Radoane, K. "What Is Smiling Is Beautiful and Good." *European Journal of Social Psychology*, v.20 (1990).
- Ramachandran, V. S. "The Neurology and Evolution of Humor, Laughter, and Smiling: The False Alarm Theory." *Medical Hypotheses*, v.51 (1998).
- Sroufe, L. A. and J. C. Wunsch. "The Development of Laughter in the First Year of Life." *Child Development*, v.43 (1972).

---

## Duping Delight

The act of lying is often accompanied by negative emotions such as guilt or fear of detection. Yet, many experience positive emotions instead: excitement or a thrill at having successfully lied to another, "pulling the wool over their eyes" without them being any the wiser. Such positive feelings are known as "duping delight," a phenomenon first described by detection scientist Paul Ekman. The used car salesman who smiles when he assures a customer that the dealership makes no money on the warranty he just talked the customer into, the so-called financial planner who disguises his glee at having convinced an 85-year-old widow that life insurance is a great investment for her, and the pretty, popular girl at school who snickers slyly after "helpfully" revealing to

the naïve, unattractive new student that the handsome captain of the football team wants to ask her to the homecoming dance—all these liars are experiencing duping delight.

It is important to draw the distinction between duping delight and pathological lying. Also known as *pseudologia fantastica*, pathological lying is a feature of some psychological disorders, manifesting as persistent lying in the absence of reason, necessity, or reward. Pathological liars commonly experience little emotion, and their lies tend to be very transparent. In contrast, duping delight is an emotion of pleasure that can occur among both normal and abnormal populations of liars.

### Who Experiences Duping Delight?

Everyone lies, sometimes to benefit others (such as the “white lie” that spares another’s feelings), and often for personal benefit (such as an employee calling in sick when he or she really wants to go shopping or attend a sporting event instead). Everyone may experience duping delight. However, psychological research indicates that certain kinds of people and personality types are more prone to lying and experiencing duping delight. Individuals who are socially expressive actors, are manipulative, or score high on Machiavellianism are more likely than others to experience duping delight. Some individuals routinely lie out of a need for stimulation, novelty, or excitement and to escape the boredom they experience. They are also more likely to experience duping delight, and the higher the stakes or greater the possible adverse consequences for them, the bigger the thrill. Such motives and reactions to lying are common among psychopaths, sociopaths, and individuals exhibiting psychopathic tendencies.

Persons who are socially adroit, braggarts, or boasters, who lie comfortably and believe they are good at it (e.g., con men, criminals, some salesmen, and sweetheart swindlers), and individuals with antisocial or narcissistic personality disorders tend to feel duping delight more than the rest of the population. Similarly, politicians, attorneys, highly successful business people, chief executive officers (CEOs), and those who enjoy control and power also tend to experience greater than average duping delight. They

may view those they deceive as intellectually or morally inferior, or they may believe themselves above the law; (e.g., the lying politician at the podium whose smirk betrays his contempt for the masses).

### When is Duping Delight Most Likely?

Duping delight can be experienced when anticipating the challenge of deceiving someone, or during the moment of lying when success is not yet certain. Delight can also be elicited when one is pleased and relieved after telling a lie, takes pride in the success of the lie, or feels contempt toward the target. However, the strength of these emotions can greatly vary at each stage and may be fleeting or may indefinitely persist as the deceiver celebrates his or her success.

Even the most mundane deceptions can produce duping delight, such as when a teenager might successfully get the car keys “to go to the library” when actually going to a movie. Yet, for some liars, duping delight is only felt when there is a great risk of loss, as is the case for people who carry out fraudulent financial schemes. Duping delight may also be enhanced by lying to targets who are particularly challenging (difficult to fool), dangerous (raising likely costs of detection), or even trusting. Sweetheart swindlers, for example, target the trusting. They use romance to gain access to their victims’ bank and credit card accounts, stealing from them and leading them to financial ruin while displaying fake feelings of love and devotion. When the partner grows suspicious, continuing the deception often proves even more enticing. Duping delight can also be particularly intense when there is an appreciative audience to admire one’s cleverness, to share in the entertainment of the deception, and with whom one can gloat.

### Duping Delight and the Risk of Detection

It may be challenging for the liar to successfully deceive while experiencing such pleasure in doing so, particularly if the pleasure is intense, or if the deception requires incompatible emotional displays, such as concern or sadness. The liar may be content to keep the fact of deception and his emotions to himself. However, for many would-be deceivers, the intensity of the duping delight or of the need to gloat may undermine the basic

goal of successful deception, motivating them to risk detection by leaking clues to the deceit or by daring others, even authorities, to interrogate or question them. The liar experiencing duping delight may feel such pride in the accomplishment of successfully deceiving others, particularly in a high-stakes circumstance, that they will reveal their deception, often to their lie's original target. If the deceivers survive such challenges, they may feel increased pride in their deceptive prowess, growing contempt for those they have duped, and greater interest in future deception.

However, many will fail. The duping delight may be difficult to contain and conceal, even if one does not need to gloat. The underlying delight may reveal itself as a brief flash of a smile at the sheer pleasure of getting away with the lie. A skillful deceiver may be able to successfully disguise the motive behind the smile as apparent sympathy, warmth, and sincerity toward the target of the lie. However, an inexperienced liar may be caught. Immature adolescents, who are unsophisticated liars, are frequently betrayed by their inability to conceal their delight.

Though research in duping delight originated in the behavioral sciences, other fields have provided additional context for furthering investigation into deception, the emotions that accompany it, and the detection of deception. Law enforcement, politics, and antiterrorism initiatives drove this

research in the late 20th century, and are likely to continue that trend well into the 21st century.

Valarie J. Bell  
Matthew Ghiglieri  
Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Con Man; Deception and Trust; Emotions; Leakage; Lying as Ability or Skill; Lying as Exercise of Power; Manipulation; Narcissism; Pathological Lying; Relationships: Romantic.

### Further Readings

- Cooke, D. J. and C. Michie. "Refining the Construct of Psychopathy: Towards a Hierarchical Model." *Psychological Assessment*, v.13 (2001).
- Ekman, P. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1985.
- Ekman, P. "Truth-Telling, Lying, and Deception: Why We Don't Catch Liars." *Social Research*, v.63/3 (1996).
- Gozna, L. F., A. Vrij, and R. Bull. "The Impact of Individual Differences on Perceptions of Lying in Everyday Life and in a High Stake Situation." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.31 (2001).
- Taylor, R. and L. F. Gozna. *Deception: A Young Person's Life Skill?* New York: Psychology Press, 2010.





# E

## Edwards, John

When political scandals hit the American airwaves, stereotypical images fill the minds of viewers and listeners as they piece together the transgressions allegedly committed. Much like a soap opera, citizens assume that there will be a twisted plot with likeable protagonists and infuriating heels. While most scandals fail to live up to the initial media hype, between 2007 and 2010, John Edwards—former Democratic Senator from North Carolina and John Kerry running mate during the 2004 presidential election—gave Americans everything they expected: A torts attorney turned politician running through hotel hallways, trying to shield himself from an alleged affair on his wife—who was both nationally known and fighting cancer. In the end, it took an even more bizarre twist when Edwards was proven to be the father of a child with his mistress. While unfortunate for Edwards (both personally and politically), his escapades showed a key attribute of political sex scandals in the United States: the act may not matter, but second-order transgressions do.

In late 2007, the *National Enquirer* reported that Edwards was having an affair with Rielle Hunter. She had been hired in 2006 to film a series of short videos related to life behind the scenes of his presidential campaign. Given the lack of credibility associated with the *Enquirer*,

very little was publicly said about the story. Instead, it was brushed aside as typical grocery store aisle smut. Most troubling, however, was that the initial article stated that a child had been produced from the alleged affair. At the time of the story, Andrew Young was an Edwards campaign insider. According to *ABC News*, shortly after the *Enquirer* story, Young was asked by his candidate to find a doctor to create fake DNA results (a la the plot line in *Primary Colors*), and then steal one of the baby's diapers to find out the actual paternity. Young accounting claimed to be the child's father for a period of time. Publicly, both Edwards and Hunter vehemently denied any accusations.

### Media Frenzy

When the initial *Enquirer* story ran, most commentators publicly claimed that it must be fake and just a product of the negative environment of contemporary campaigns. Determined to prove the truthfulness behind their allegations, the *Enquirer* sent reporters to the Beverly Hilton Hotel in July 2008 for a suspected meeting between Edwards, Hunter, and the child. While Edwards was not listed as a guest of the hotel, the *Enquirer* staff found him in a hallway after midnight and chased him into a restroom. He stayed there—away from the paparazzi—until he was ushered out by security while attempting to shield



John Edwards and his wife, Elizabeth (behind him, left) host a healthcare forum in Manchester, New Hampshire, February 3, 2007. His affair, which was well underway by this time, was clouded with deceit from beginning to end as Edwards consistently lied for months about numerous aspects of his relationship with Rielle Hunter—including fathering her child.

his face. This would become the image most directly associated with the demise of Edwards.

Later that summer, many media sources (considered far more reputable than the *Enquirer*) began discussing the allegations in reference to Edwards's political future. Pundits were questioning whether the suspected affair would cost Edwards the opportunity to be Barack Obama's running mate. As the story continued to gain traction, Edwards sat down with Bob Woodruff of ABC on August 7 and admitted to having an extended affair with the videographer. Edwards's admission to Woodruff read:

In 2006, I made a serious error in judgment and conducted myself in a way that was disloyal to my family and to my core beliefs. I recognized

my mistake and I told my wife that I had a liaison with another woman, and I asked for her forgiveness. Although I was honest in every painful detail with my family, I did not tell the public. When a supermarket tabloid told a version of the story, I used the fact that the story contained many falsities to deny it. But being 99 percent honest is no longer enough.

When this announcement was made, Edwards's wife was recovering from breast cancer and had a favorable long-term prognosis. Yet, the affair was still occurring when the Edwards' later issued a statement about the recurrence of her cancer and the new revelation that she was terminally ill.

At the time of the initial admission, John Edwards still denied being the father Hunter's child. Not long after the confession, Rielle Hunter's sister publicly pressured Edwards to submit a DNA sample to determine whether he was the child's father—not Young. Edwards, however, already knew the answer, and consequently resisted such calls until January 2010, when he publicly admitted that he was the father of the young girl and that the *Enquirer* had also been correct on this point in 2007. Elizabeth announced that she was leaving Edwards and was planning to file for divorce. Matters were only made worse when a sex tape including Edwards and Hunter became available on the Internet. In less than a year, Edwards's wife was dead and his political career was ruined.

### Lies and Politics

Andrew Young originally had claimed to be the father Hunter's child, but would later state in his book, *The Politician*, that he knew he could not be the father. While this revelation was expected, Young divulged other details that helped demonstrate Edwards's level of deceit. In 2006, Young recalled Hunter calling John Edwards's cell phone and talking in a sexually provocative manner. However, Elizabeth—not John—had picked up the call. According to Young, in response, John lied and confessed to only a one-night stand, going as far as to call Hunter in front of Elizabeth to end the affair. He did not share who his affair was with at the time, and he even called Hunter back immediately to apologize for his harsh tone during the alleged breakup. The bigger deceit—and

more emotionally scarring—involved Edwards's confessed desires to leave his wife, only to realize that he could not because of the vote share that he would lose given Elizabeth's high popularity with key voting groups.

The Edwards scandal was ripe with lies and deceit. As with most sex scandals involving American politicians, the sexual act is not the primary sin that leads to political pariah status. If Edwards had come clean after the *Enquirer* story, apologized (or apologized and divorced), and avoided the entire Beverly Hills Hilton fiasco, he could have survived. Instead, he continued to deceive his wife and the American public. He continued the affair, even after the initial disclosure. He never showed true appreciation of the pain he brought to so many. What made the Edwards story even more poignant, however, was that he was deceiving a woman who had helped launch and guide his political career—and who happened to be battling a cancer that would take her life. When he ran for vice president in 2006, some pundits discussed Edwards exuding a somewhat sleazy aura; his scandal did nothing to disprove them.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Betrayal; Clinton, Bill; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Lying, Costs of; Men; Pathological Lying; Relationships: Sexual; Spin, Political.

### Further Readings

Edwards, Elizabeth. *Resilience*. New York: Crown Archetype, 2009.

Edwards, Elizabeth. *Saving Graces: Finding Solace and Strength From Friends*. New York: Broadway Books, 2007.

Young, Andrew. *The Politician: An Insider's Account of John Edwards's Pursuit of the Presidency and the Scandal That Brought Him Down*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010.

---

## Eisenhower, Dwight

Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower achieved fame as the supreme commander of the Allied forces in

World War II (1943–44), and as the 34th president of the United States (1953–61). In both positions, he used deception to good effect. Early in his life, his dishonesty hardly ranged beyond a love of poker and bridge, but deceptiveness came to be a decisive tool to winning World War II and a way of changing the world when he presided over the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) formative years. However, deception also nearly proved to be his downfall when mistakes made in North Africa became political and when the CIA's regime-building changes failed in Indonesia.

### Eisenhower and World War II

Eisenhower was introduced to military deception by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Meeting for the first time in 1942, the British leader briefed Eisenhower on many things, including the British network of “turned” German spies, the Manhattan Project, and Ultra. Keeping the secret of Ultra—that the Allies could read the Germans' secret code encryptions—was pivotal to the Allied victory.

Eisenhower was quick to recognize the usefulness of military deception, despite the U.S. Army's limited experience with codes and intelligence. His insistence on managing the nominally civilian Operation of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner to the CIA, as long as it was operating in his theater of war quickly taught him the riskier side of deception when the OSS tried to encourage, in vain, a French resistance in North Africa. Embarrassments caused by the OSS's lackluster work in finding a French leader and the agency's possible participation in an assassination nearly caused the end of Eisenhower's career early in the North African campaign.

Surviving the embarrassments caused by the OSS, Eisenhower continued to learn the art of deception. After the nearly successful German counterattack at Kasserine Pass, he realized that the best intelligence could not come from only one source. He left Africa sensitive to the weaknesses of both spying and signals intelligence, such as Ultra.

When prisoners revealed that the Nazis were able to read low-level Allied codes, Eisenhower recognized the counterintelligence value, telling General George S. Patton that it was better not to change the codes as long as information

transmitted was not too sensitive. Such deception encouraged German confidence in the accuracy of the decoded signals, a useful trust if Eisenhower ever needed to provide misdirection as to where an attack would come.

### Operation Fortitude

Nowhere was such misdirection more successful than in Operation Fortitude, which convinced the Germans that Eisenhower was in charge of a much larger landing force than he actually was, and that the force was aimed somewhere other than Normandy. Fortitude was possibly the greatest success of the war, and was certainly Eisenhower's greatest success with deception. As the supreme commander, he was in charge of veterans employed to create the radio chatter expected from a fake army, stagehands building fake landing equipment and bases, overseeing the information relayed through double agents, and multiple layers of security.

After his experiences in north Africa, Eisenhower was well aware that the Germans expected Patton to be in charge of the landings, and Fortitude provided confirmation of this through the German spies that the British had turned. Remaining personally involved in the multilayered deceptions that made up Fortitude, Eisenhower went so far as to reuse a strategy that he had learned earlier in the war of making the press feel like a part of each unit; he believed this sense of participation in the war effort made the press less likely to leak important secrets. He was more suspicious of civilians, though, and after a difficult fight, he managed to convince Churchill to have civilians moved away from staging areas.

Almost as soon as Eisenhower had gotten his invasion force underway, the German high command knew that a landing force was en route to Normandy. Operation Fortitude had issued the information through double agents in order to maintain German trust in their sources. This tactic aimed to keep German attention focused elsewhere when Fortitude continued to run in the months after the Normandy landing. The deception convinced the Germans that Normandy was but a small diversion, and that a much larger force was still coming to a location miles away. This was crucial for Eisenhower's success, for it kept strategic forces out of the fight long enough

for the Allies to establish their beachhead and hold it until their manufacturing advantage and greater material resources could simply overwhelm the besieged German army. After the stellar success at Normandy that was assured by Fortitude, Eisenhower's task was relatively straightforward.

### President Eisenhower

Eisenhower's use of deception as president is more debatable. As a politician, he is known for his carefully cultured image of being direct, but behind the scenes, he probably was more adept than he revealed. Even when fighting U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy's power, the president was forthright. Domestically, Eisenhower's use of deception was simple: For example, his bumbling style and apparent lack of knowledge in press conferences was almost certainly feigned to keep from making mistakes or to avoid delicate subjects on which he did not want to comment. In foreign affairs, however, deception was almost as invaluable as it had been during World War II.

With Allen Dulles heading the CIA, covert operations significantly expanded in the Eisenhower years. At one extreme, the president either authorized or allowed government-toppling operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia. Operation Ajax, the CIA's first attempt at changing other governments, was aimed at Iran and involved no less than the nephew of former president Franklin D. Roosevelt, though Eisenhower's deputies were careful to keep from introducing him to the president.

Always aware of the political ramifications of being involved with intelligence operations if something were to go wrong, Eisenhower's administration was careful to insulate the president. Select committees reviewed and assessed covert operations at a distance from Eisenhower. Other operations were less successful, and records indicate that Eisenhower was cautious in approving such deceptive enterprises before he felt extremely confident that they would succeed. This caution is sometimes cited as the cause of the Bay of Pigs disaster. Eisenhower had actually approved of raising and training Cuban exiles as a guerrilla force to retake the island from Fidel Castro, but the president appears to have held the force back because he doubted its effectiveness.



Eisenhower's successor, President John F. Kennedy, inherited this force and operation shortly after taking office, approving it with famously bad results.

Eisenhower's personal involvement in his administration's deceptive efforts is well illustrated by his control over every U-2 spy plane's flight plan. The aircraft was instrumental in providing Eisenhower with intelligence that made him comfortable presenting his arms limitations and open skies proposals, including the intelligence necessary to debunk the 1960 campaign claims from then-Senator Kennedy that there was a missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. Eisenhower's commitment to the U-2 deception, however, meant that he chose not to reveal the truth—despite Vice President Richard Nixon's conviction that revealing such knowledge could be instrumental in preventing a Democrat from winning the presidency.

While parts of Eisenhower's legacy involving deception are not always clear, the historical cases that are more certain indicate that he was generally successful in using deception. As both a president and a general, his uses of deception tended to achieve his desired ends, whether it was creating fake invading forces or displacing hostile regimes.

Tobias T. Gibson  
Christopher Givan  
*Westminster College*

**See Also:** Churchill, Winston; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Kennedy, John F.; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; World War II.

### Further Readings

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*. New York: Anchor Books, 2012.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum. "All About Ike: Abilene Years." [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all\\_about\\_ike/abilene\\_years.html](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/abilene_years.html) (Accessed February 2013).

Greenstein, Fred I. *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

## Ekman, Paul

Paul Ekman is one of the foremost researchers in nonverbal communication, intrapersonal deception, and lie detection. After completing his undergraduate studies at the University of Chicago and New York University, he earned a doctorate in clinical psychology from Adelphi College in 1958. He was a professor of psychology at the University of California, San Francisco, retiring from this position in 2004. Ekman has published over 100 articles, chapters, and books on topics including facial expression and deception.

His research has been funded by the National Institute of Mental Health for over four decades, and he has been featured on major television networks and in the popular press. One of his most notable achievements is his work in the area of lie detection. Through years of research, Ekman has developed techniques for identifying lies, and has taught these techniques to an array of professionals.

### Definitions of Lying and Deception

In order to appreciate Ekman's work, it is important to review his definitions of lying and deception. A clear definition of lying is important because people are expected to exhibit behavioral clues of deception only if they realize that they are lying. Persons who believe that they are telling the truth are unlikely to convey signs of lying. According to Ekman, lies have two characteristics that make them unique from other kinds of deception. First, lying is done with the intention to be misleading. This component distinguishes lies from false statements that are believed to be true by the liar. Second, lying occurs in situations in which the false statement is not expected. This distinguishes lies from storytelling and acting, in which the observer anticipates words and actions to be feigned for entertainment value.

Ekman has described several acts of deceit that constitute lying, such as making false claims when the truth is expected, concealing information that is expected to be disclosed, and telling half-truths. Often, lies are told in the hope of avoiding or escaping unpleasant events. People have lied to dodge punishment, physical harm, and threats to friends and family, and to escape uncomfortable emotions. People may also tell a

lie to protect their privacy. Lies are also used to acquire pleasant things. For example, people may lie to gain money and other profits, enhance their social status, and increase their power and influence over others.

Ekman notes that lies may be exposed for a variety of reasons, including the liar's nonverbal expressions. This type of failed lie tends to occur because the person has not prepared well for the lie, or because emotional expressions give the lie away. If the liar is not fully prepared and is caught off-guard, he or she may exhibit several behavioral reactions, such as changing eye contact, speaking less clearly, and pausing to think as he or she composes the lie. In other instances, the liar may forget the details of the lie and produce contradictory statements.

### Microexpressions and Emotions

Liars may also give a lie away by failing to fully conceal emotions. Many emotions are accompanied by automatic facial expressions and other gestures that may be difficult to control. These expressions—known as microexpressions—occur very quickly and without conscious control of the liar, making them difficult for the liar to perceive and for other people to detect. Certain microexpressions are linked to certain emotions. For example, a furrowed forehead, squinted eyes, compressed or quivering lips, quivering chin, and twitching corners of the mouth are microexpressions of nervousness. It is possible that someone who is lying may feel nervous and thus emit these microexpressions.

Ekman's work on microexpressions has led to the development of two coding systems: FACS (Facial Action Coding System) and F.A.C.E. (Facial Expression, Awareness, Compassion, Emotions). FACS is a self-instructional system designed to train people to read all human facial expressions. The training takes a minimum of approximately 100 hours to complete. F.A.C.E. is an instructional system designed to teach people how to read emotions from different facial expressions. It is composed of two parts: SETT (subtle expression training tool), and METT (micro expression training tool). The SETT and METT teach people how to detect microexpressions and the emotions that are associated with each type of microexpression.

Ekman has also found that some people are more accurate at detecting deception than others, indicating that some people may possess traits that allow them to detect lies. Ekman's work has shown that Secret Service agents are very accurate at detecting lies and concealed emotions; however, many other groups believed to be very accurate at lie detection (e.g., police officers and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Central Intelligence Agency ) are actually not.

Despite the popularity of Ekman's work, his research has been subject to significant scientific scrutiny. Notably, the screening passengers by observation technique (SPOT) was designed to identify terrorist threats to air travelers, but was not scientifically validated before it was used in airport security screenings. Some researchers report difficulty replicating his results. At times, he has also avoided the normal scientific peer-review process in an effort to prevent his lie detection techniques from being discovered and abused.

Dr. Ekman and his microexpression work has been highly influential in the area of lie detection. His work was also the inspiration for the FOX Network television show *Lie to Me*, for which Ekman was a scientific consultant.

James I. Gerhart  
Rush University Medical Center  
Carey J. Fitzgerald  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Deception, Characteristics of; Emotions; Eye Contact; *Lie to Me*; Linguistic Cues; Mental Effort in Lying; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

Ekman, P. "Deception, Lying, and Demeanor."

*In States of Mind: American and Post-Soviet Perspectives on Contemporary Issues in Psychology*, D. F. Halpern and A. E. Voiskounsky, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Ekman, P. "FACS vs. F.A.C.E." <http://www.paul-ekman.com/products/facs-vs-f-a-c-e> (Accessed September 2012).

Ekman, P. *Telling Lies*. New York: Times Books, 2009.

Ekman, P. and M. O'Sullivan, M. "Who Can Catch a Liar?" *American Psychologist*, v.46 (1991).

Weinberger, S. "Intent to Deceive?" <http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100526/pdf/465412a.pdf> (Accessed September 2012).

## Electroencephalography

Modern neuroscience techniques provide new leads for experts in the detection of deception. These techniques rely on internal data from inside the brain, rather than external data from speech or nonverbal behaviors. Modern deception detection techniques measure patterns of neurological activity, rather than the contents of verbal reports or facial expressions. One neuroscientific advancement—electroencephalography (EEG)—has been particularly useful in uncovering what occurs “inside” someone’s mind when he or she is lying and has significantly advanced the accuracy of lie detection.

### Defining Electroencephalography

EEG is a noninvasive brain-imaging technique that measures electrical activity. Researchers place sensors across different locations on a person’s scalp and record patterns of electrical activity. Electrical activity can be described by the place it occurs on the scalp, the time at which it occurs, its formation, and its voltage. Components of electrical activity described along these lines are referred to as event-related potentials (ERPs). For instance, the P300 component occurs 300 milliseconds (ms) after a stimulus appears with positive voltage. ERPs are associated with psychological processes, such as people’s ability to pay attention to objects or remember presented stimuli. ERPs are a measurement of neurological activity that can be used to suggest which psychological processes occur in response to stimuli.

### Use of the Procedure as Lie Detection

In the early 1990s, researchers began asking whether techniques of neuroscience, and EEG in particular, could be used to detect deception. Dr. Lawrence Farwell and his colleagues created one of the first paradigms that used neurological measurement to detect lies. First, they modeled their test after the oddball paradigm. In the

oddball paradigm, participants recognize a target word when it appears on a computer screen among other irrelevant distracter words that are presented in quick succession. Farwell adapted the oddball paradigm to create a test that could detect whether people were aware of “guilty knowledge,” or information considered significant to a particular scenario or event.

In the original guilty knowledge test, participants read one of two hypothetical scenarios and memorize specific details about it. For instance, participants might remember the clothing worn by people in the scenario. Participants next perform an oddball paradigm task. They identify when a target word that is not related to details of the scenario appears in a sequential display of other distracting words. Importantly, among the distracters are words related to details of the hypothetical scenario previously memorized. For instance, participants may see the word *coat*—a word considered relevant to the memorization task.

Farwell suggested that EEG could measure ERP components evoked in response to targets and relevant and irrelevant distracters during the guilty knowledge test. A P300 component appears when participants see a target word or relevant distracters that are considered guilty knowledge. Importantly, the P300 is not evoked for irrelevant distracter words. The presence of P300 components indicates that both the target words and guilty knowledge words receive heightened attentional processing. From these data, Farwell suggested that the presence of a P300 component could identify whether a person had knowledge of an event, like a crime scene, that he or she might not choose to verbally share. For instance, if a suspect accused of a murder perpetrated by a knife is given the guilty knowledge test, the word *knife* may evoke the P300. Farwell suggested that the P300 could indicate whether a person witnessed and remembered details of a crime, regardless of his or her attempts to claim ignorance.

While Farwell and colleagues originally tested this paradigm in the lab, he also tested the viability of EEG as a lie detector for use in court proceedings and legal decisions with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI concluded that when the P300 is combined with another negative voltage component to create a multifaceted electroencephalographic response (MERMER), EEG can

predict whether someone knows facts about an event with 99.9 percent accuracy. By combining multiple ERP components, the EEG has become increasingly more reliable in real-world settings.

### Use of the Procedure in Court

The EEG is increasingly used as evidence in court. Farwell's guilty knowledge test was admitted as evidence in the controversial murder trial of Terry Harrington, who was convicted of the crime in 1978, and was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harrington's performance during a guilty knowledge test suggested that he did not commit the murder for which he was convicted. In 1997, Harrington petitioned the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County for a new trial. However, the court decided that the evidence was not substantive enough to overturn Harrington's original conviction. Harrington appealed this decision and in 2001, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court maintained that Harrington had been denied access to evidence that could have helped his defense.

### Conclusion

EEG as a lie detection device is limited. One primary limitation is that the guilty knowledge test only detects whether an individual has information about an event or person, but cannot distinguish among the sources of that information. For instance, someone who committed a murder or someone who merely witnessed the murder may have the same knowledge. However, the ERP test results would likely indicate that both individuals had guilty knowledge.

EEG-based lie detection requires further testing. EEG is one of the first neuroscience technologies used to detect lies, and it has sparked interest in adapting other neuroscientific techniques for lie detection. As neuroscience technology continues to advance, the ability to look into someone's mind to detect lies may not be as far out of reach as was once thought.

William Brady  
Emily Balcetis  
New York University

**See Also:** Brain; Concealed Information Test; Deception and Technology; Deception Detection Accuracy; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging.

### Further Readings

Farwell, Lawrence and Emanuel Donchin. "The Truth Will Out: Interrogative Polygraphy ('Lie Detection') With Event-Related Brain Potentials." *Psychophysiology*, v.28 (1991).

Farwell, Lawrence, Drew Richardson, and Graham Richardson. "Brain Fingerprinting Field Studies Comparing P300-MERMER and P300 ERPs in the Detection of Concealed Information." *Psychophysiology*, v.48 (2011).

Polich, John. "Updating P300: An Integrative Theory of P3a and P3b." *Clinical Neurophysiology*, v.118 (2007).

## Emotions

The act of lying and emotion are intertwined. Lying is typically accompanied by feelings of negative affect, such as guilt, shame, and fear, as well as feelings of positive affect, such as excitement. Furthermore, individuals' reasons for lying are typically rooted in emotions. That is, lies are often told to protect the liar's emotions or to protect the emotions of another person. Furthermore, lying is often used as a means to mask one's true feelings.

### Emotions Experienced When Lying

According to Paul Ekman, who is well known for his separate lines of research on emotions and on lying, emotions play a role in lying in one of two ways. First, individuals sometimes lie to conceal their true emotions. However, lying to prevent another person from having his or her feelings hurt is also common, leading other researchers to distinguish two main types of lying: self-centered lies and other-oriented lies.

Self-centered lies are told to protect or bolster the liar's status. For example, in the context of emotions, individuals lie to avoid feelings of embarrassment, to regulate their feelings, to avoid having their feelings hurt, or to avoid feelings of negative affect, such as worry or conflict.



An individual may also lie about his or her current emotional state because he or she wishes to maintain a certain level of privacy. Other-oriented lies, in contrast, serve to protect or enhance other people. For instance, individuals will lie to protect another individual's feelings or to prevent feelings of negative affect, such as worry or conflict. Telling other-oriented lies (also known as white lies) is usually required to enhance and maintain close relationships.

Second, Ekman contends that regardless of the emotional content of the lie, liars generally experience specific emotions if their lie has high rather than low stakes. Stakes are higher if the liar fears getting caught in the lie; the liar possesses similar values to the individual that he or she is deceiving, causing the liar to feel guilty; or others bear witness to the liar deceiving another person, which can yield feelings of excitement. Inadvertent emotional cues that could reveal the lie (also known as leakage) are more likely to be displayed when the stakes are high, rather than low, because the liar will usually feel more intense emotions. In these situations, such nonverbal cues are likely to be more noticeable because the liar typically experiences negative affect, which in turn yields withdrawal behaviors. For example, if feeling guilty or ashamed, liars may be less likely to look the listener directly in the eyes. Furthermore, both fear and excitement can lead to higher levels of arousal, which can increase speech errors, stutters, hesitations, and voice pitch. Additionally, when a liar is excited, he or she is likely to display an increase in body movements and smiling.

### Stress and Lying

Lying is also a stress-inducing behavior because of emotions, specifically feelings of guilt about being dishonest and feelings of fear about being detected. When a liar feels guilty and the amount of guilt experienced is high, he or she will have difficulty concealing cues that he or she is lying. Moreover, feelings of guilt can often motivate an individual to confess in order to alleviate the negative emotion. Greater fear of being detected occurs when the recipient is perceived to be skilled at lie detection, rather than perceived as gullible. In contrast, greater excitement likely accompanies successful deception of a skilled versus unskilled lie detector. This feeling of excitement has been

termed “duping delight,” and it includes feelings of excitement in either the anticipation of telling the lie or the act of lying itself, followed by a feeling of pleasure, a sense of relief, pride for successful deception, and even disdain toward the recipient. When duping delight is extreme, behavioral cues may become apparent to others, indicating that deception is occurring.

### Nonverbal Displays

Although lying is typically thought of as occurring through verbal means (i.e., telling a direct lie to another individual), nonverbal lying can also occur. For instance, omission is considered to be a form of deception, even though the individual is not telling a falsehood per se, and individuals often feel compelled to lie about or mask their emotional state. They may verbally do so (telling another person that they are “fine” when they are not), or they may do so by controlling their nonverbal expressions (pretending to be happy when upset).

The latter can be labeled “masking” because the individual does not display any nonverbal



*When a liar feels a high level of guilt, he will have difficulty concealing stress cues that he is lying, such as increased body movements and a high voice. Feelings of guilt can often motivate an individual to confess in order to alleviate the negative emotion.*

cues related to the specific emotion, but instead displays the opposite emotion.

In certain situations, masking of either negative or positive emotions would be the social norm. For instance, in the workplace, the expression of negative emotions is less acceptable, and individuals are expected to mask negative emotions, particularly around their superiors. Controlling the display of specific emotions within the context of the workplace has been termed “emotional labor,” and although it is socially dictated, masking or engaging in emotional labor is related to poorer physical and psychological health.

In other situations, social rules dictate the masking of positive emotions. For example, when one is successful in a certain task or in a certain domain, but a close other is not, one often masks or at least dampens the expression of happiness out of consideration of the other person’s feelings.

Ultimately, emotions are a core component of many lies and the lying experience. The act of lying induces strong emotions in the liar, such as guilt, shame, and fear. Lying, however, can also be an exhilarating experience, leading to feelings of excitement and positive affect. In terms of the content of lies, many lies are emotion-related—such as lies that are told to protect the liar’s feelings or the feelings of another individual. Even when the lie is not emotional, a liar can experience heightened emotions when the stakes are high. Finally, nonverbal behaviors are often employed by individuals to mask their true emotions, and such deception is actually encouraged and expected in many social situations.

Madeleine T. D’Agata  
Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen’s University*

**See Also:** Crying; Duping Delight; Ekman, Paul; Guilt; Leakage; Nonverbal Cues; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy. “Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- Ekman, P. *Telling Lies: Cues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.

Frank, M. G. and P. Ekman. “The Ability to Detect Deceit Generalizes Across Different Types of High-Stake Lies.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.72 (1997).

Frank, M. G. and P. Ekman. “Appearing Truthful Generalizes Across Different Deception Situations.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.86 (2004).

Montgomery, A. J., E. Panagopolou, M. de Wildt, and E. Meenks. “Work-Family Interference, Emotional Labor and Burnout.” *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, v.21 (2006).

Saarni, C. and M. Lewis. “Deceit and Illusion in Human Affairs.” In *Lying and Deception in Everyday Life*, M. Lewis and C. Saarni, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.

Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.

---

## Enron

In less than a year, Enron went from one of the most innovative companies in the world to infamy for corporate scandal, deceit, and greed. Formed in 1985 by the merger of Houston Natural Gas and Internorth, Enron eventually became the largest seller of natural gas in North America by 1992. Part of the reason that Enron rose so quickly were the actions of its founder and chief executive officer (CEO), Kenneth Lay, who helped initiate the selling of electricity at market prices. Soon after, Congress deregulated the sale of natural gas, giving Enron the opportunity to sell energy at higher prices than ever before. Enron’s revenue and stock continued to climb throughout the 1990s because of the strategic maneuvers of its leaders. By the end of December 2000, Enron’s stock was priced at \$83.13, and it was named the most innovative large company in America in *Fortune* magazine’s “Most Admired Companies” survey. There was reason to be hopeful about the future of Enron.

Instead, the large and growing company was about to experience a scandal and downfall that would lead to bankruptcy, the loss of thousands of jobs, and the conviction of several Enron executives.

The scandal centered on the lack of transparency in Enron's financial statements. Because of the fairly complex structure of Enron, a near cult-like punitive corporate culture with unrealistically high expectations and a myriad of unethical practices, there was pressure to misrepresent earnings and portray favorable performance for the company. This pressure to always keep income up and liabilities off the books eventually led to bankruptcy. It would later surface that the majority of actions that led to Enron's downfall were perpetrated by Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow, and a few other high-level executives.

### Early Years to Bankruptcy

In its early years, the newly merged Enron faced a tremendous amount of debt and teetered on the verge of bankruptcy. The CEO at that time, Richard Kinder, emphasized accuracy in cash management, and would hold weekly meetings with business unit leaders to challenge their reported numbers. While he pushed for excellence, he did not accept unrealistic goals and would question overly optimistic proposals. Business was important, but he respected his employees and was described as people-oriented.

The appointment of Jeffrey Skilling as chief operating officer (COO) and later CEO marked the beginning of a new culture. Deregulation allowed Enron to break from the old system, be innovative, and become a leader in the industry. Executives seized upon this opportunity and encouraged aggressiveness and independence. Enron's contracts became increasingly diverse and complex as the company started to see rapid growth. Through the use of specific accounting maneuvers, profits from long-term deals were immediately recorded, and short-term results were emphasized.

In order to keep growing and keep investors excited, Enron began to borrow money to invest in new projects. Because this would make Enron's earnings look less impressive, the company created partnerships to keep the resulting debt off the books. Enron was able to hide hundreds of millions of dollars in debt through this practice, which made the company appear more profitable than it was. Enron also attracted big investors with promises of secret information about the company that was not made available to the public or government. Such secrecy violates laws in

place to protect all investors by ensuring that they have full access to accurate information about publicly traded companies.

There were signs of trouble for Enron as early as March 2001, when Bethany McLean, a *Fortune* magazine writer, published an article questioning how the company made its money. In August of that year, an employee sent an anonymous letter to the CEO at the time, Kenneth Lay, describing her worries over Enron's accounting practices. Lay sent e-mails to employees expressing his optimism that Enron's stock would rise. However, he sold his stock in the company. In October of that year, Enron announced a loss of \$638 million from a failed Internet investment, and the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Enron was under investigation. Enron later announced that it had overstated earnings by \$586 million and that it owed over \$6 billion in debt. Unable to pay back the money owed to creditors, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

### Corporate Culture of Deceit

The first question that many people were asking as the scandal began to unfold was: How could intelligent, educated individuals either directly falsify financial reports or know that this behavior was occurring and turn a blind eye? There are several factors that led to the culture of deceit that Enron embraced during its lifespan. One such factor is the expectation that Enron felt to keep stock prices on the rise and please investors. Enron executives felt driven to sustain the explosive growth that the company experienced in the late 1990s, when they knew that it was not possible. However, reporting negative earnings would have been a warning sign to investors, which could have driven the stock price down, and credit agencies would be forced to downgrade the company's credit rating. Trading partners might then lose faith in Enron and stop trading with the company. The company's very ability to generate cash flow would be greatly compromised.

Executives were willing to bend the rules and rationalize their behavior in order to avoid this scenario at all costs. The leadership style of several of the executives at the time, especially Jeffrey Skilling, also helped pave the road for a pattern of lying and deceit. For example, Skilling exerted control over almost all major operations

of the company, including accounting. Taking a rather Machiavellian approach to leading Enron, it seems Skilling was willing to do whatever was necessary to meet expectations and keep the reputation of the company on the rise. Everyone under him learned that this was the way that Enron conducted business.

Coinciding with the entrance of Skilling, Enron's culture saw a dramatic shift; however, the fall of Enron was due to the actions (and inactions) of multiple individuals. Under Skilling, an extreme performance-driven culture formed that held wealth and status in high prestige and tolerated rule breaking and deviant behavior, as long as the numbers were up. Employees, realizing that the risk was termination and the reward was a very large paycheck, learned to compete fiercely with each other while ignoring and even breaking ethical and legal boundaries. This created an environment in which employees did not feel comfortable or safe to question senior management. Once employees align with a corporate culture and become convinced of the wisdom of its leaders, they can begin to lose their sense of individual identity and rationalize attitudes and behaviors that they would have previously deplored.

Executives and lower-level employees had a significant amount to gain from participating in this continuous deception. As a leader, Skilling placed significant importance on rewards and status. On bonus day, upscale car dealers were set up around the Enron headquarters, showcasing the newest and most expensive car models. The culture that Skilling was building was difficult to avoid, and many employees were drawn to promises of increased monetary rewards and benefits. For executives, if profits and stock options significantly increased, they could then buy stock more quickly. For employees, Skilling rewarded traders who met their earnings targets with very large paychecks. These incentives were difficult to resist for many employees, which drove them to engage in actions that, in a less high-stakes setting, may have been very different. These actions, the scandal, and the resulting bankruptcy meant that corporate culture, influence, and executive behaviors had reason to be heavily scrutinized in the future.

The scandal at Enron affected more people than just those inside and invested in the company. The events led to the voluntary licensure

surrender of Arthur Andersen, once one of the "Big Five" accounting firms. The firm was found guilty of criminal charges relating to its handling of the Enron account. Even though the criminal charges were later overturned, the company's reputation would never fully recover from its close ties to Enron. Along with the other highly publicized corporate scandals at Tyco and WorldCom, the events that unfolded at Enron also led to the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a federal law that set enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, management, and public accounting firms. The act contains 11 titles, ranging from additional board responsibilities to criminal penalties.

## Conclusion

Ultimately, what individuals are encouraged to learn from the Enron scandal is that organizations receive and perpetuate the behavior that they reward. Many Enron employees witnessed unethical behavior and did nothing, or began participating in it themselves out of the perceived lack of risk and promise of payout. This happened because the culture not only allowed it to happen, but also rewarded it. When organizations reward their employees for honesty, appropriate whistleblowing, and engaging in ethical behaviors, examples of stronger corporate cultures are expected to flourish in the future.

Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*  
Amanda Blinberry  
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**See Also:** Attorneys; Bankruptcy; Business; Collusion; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud; Justice; Spin, Corporate.

## Further Readings

Free, C., N. Macintosh, and M. Stein. "Management Controls: The Organization Fraud Triangle of Leadership, Culture and Control in Enron." *Ivey Business Journal*, v./71/6 (2007).

Goldberg, Steven T. "Numbers Do Lie: Thanks to Enron, Investors Are Obsessing Over Misleading Accounting." *Kiplinger's Personal Finance* (April 1, 2002).



Sims, R. R. and J. Brinkmann. "Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More Than Codes)." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.45/3 (2003).

## Equivocation

The term *equivocation* is used in two different senses: as a logical fallacy and as communicative strategy.

The logical fallacy of equivocation occurs when a term is used with two or more different meanings within the same argument. For example, consider the following argument: A plane is a carpenter's tool, and the Boeing 737 is a plane, hence the Boeing 737 is a carpenter's tool. Here, the word *plane* in the first part of the sentence refers to a tool used by carpenters to shape wood, and in the second part of the sentence it means an airplane.

The other sense in which the term *equivocation* is used is as a communication strategy in which the speaker deliberately says something ambiguous, with two interpretations, and believes only one of them to be true, but wants the hearer to infer the false one. A frequently cited example is of an advertisement that says: "No heat costs less than oil heat." Here, one interpretation is that not using any heating costs less than heating using oil, and the other is that oil heating costs less than any other type of heating. The first interpretation is probably the one that the advertisers believed to be true, and the second is what they hoped the readers would infer.

### Equivocation and Psychological Conflicts

Research in interpersonal communication shows that equivocation results from psychological conflicts that result when a choice must be made between two undesirable alternatives in a conversational situation. They do not result from generally unpleasant situations, or conflicts that result when a choice must be made between two desirable alternatives.

The situation described in the heating oil example demonstrates a conflict in choosing between two undesirable alternatives. The advertisers would neither like to say that not using any heating costs less than heating using oil because that

would be against their interests, nor would they like to say that oil heating costs less than any other type of heating because that might not be entirely true. Both alternatives are undesirable, thus invoking the need to equivocate. The necessary condition for equivocation is a situation in which direct and clear responses are negative and need to be avoided.

During such conflicts, equivocations allow speakers to avoid being committed to any one alternative. In that sense, they allow speakers to plan ahead by reasoning and provide them with "plausible deniability" should it be needed later. They also help speakers assuage their sense of guilt because speakers can reassure themselves that there is some truth in what they are saying, at least at the utterance level.

### Strategic Use of Equivocation

The high rate at which people prefer equivocations when choosing between two undesirable alternatives indicates that they are strategically used by speakers to mislead the hearer, and cannot simply be explained by communicative errors like the speaker being honestly mistaken about the hearer's possible interpretation of his utterance. Equivocations are often used as a strategy by politicians. One reason for this is that politicians have to deal with a variety of audiences, and disagreements with even a fraction of them can often have very high costs. *Yes Minister*, the popular British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) comedy of the 1980s, has many examples of equivocations in such situations.

Consider another situation in which a professor is considering hiring Jones, a former student of a colleague, Smith, from a different institution. The professor asks Smith whether he would recommend Jones. Smith wants the professor to hire Jones because even though Jones is not very bright, Smith is very fond of him and knows that Jones desperately needs a job. On the other hand, Smith does not want to directly respond, because if he says yes, that would be a real commitment, and Smith does not want to damage his reputation by recommending a bad student. Smith says, "I can't recommend Jones highly enough." This could have two interpretations: "Jones is so good that there is no limit to how highly I can recommend him," or something more like

“Jones is not good enough for me to recommend him sufficiently highly to impress you.” The burden of getting to the truth is placed on the hearer, and in principle, it is possible for him to do that, but the speaker intentionally refrains from helping him.

Surveys show that in situations in which the unambiguous truthful response is a message that disagrees with the hearer, speakers are perceived to be more agreeable if they use equivocations than if they use a direct message. Several empirical studies have demonstrated that ambiguous messages are often distorted by the hearer to match his or her attitude. Equivocation tends to suppress incompatible meanings, and speakers are more positively judged when they equivocate than they would be judged if they delivered a clearly stated disagreeable message. A surprising finding is that this often holds true, even in cases in which the hearer is able to perceive the ambiguity of the message.

As opposed to those using direct language, equivocating speakers are given a high score on qualities like good-bad, reliable-unreliable, and just-unjust, which are quantified into a metric called “character score.” One reason for this is that unlike directly stating disagreements, equivocation prevents an immediate loss in appraisal. This is so because, at best, hearers interpret it favorably and, at worst, it provides them with the benefit of doubt. An example would be a case in which a woman asks her friend how she looks after getting ready for a party. The friend does not like her outfit, which is very bright, but he doesn’t want to say that, nor does he want to lie. So, he equivocates by saying, “You look striking,” which could be interpreted as either positive or negative.

There isn’t a consensus on whether equivocations are perceived as true or false. While a few studies place them midway between lies and truthful statements, others regard them in the same way as truthful statements, but unclear and ambiguous—thus deception by telling the truth. They are generated by manipulating the manner in which the speaker chooses to state his intentions, that is, by saying something that is perceived to be, at worst, ambiguous while causing the hearer to infer something false. Because of the generally positive perception of equivocation, it is

considered to be a safer deception strategy than other forms of dishonesty.

Swati Gupta  
Kayo Sakamoto

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Deniability; Lies, Types of; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Lying: Costs of; Mental Effort in Lying.

### Further Readings

- Bavelas, J. B., A. Black, N. Chovil, and J. Mullett. *Equivocal Communication*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990.
- Bolinger, D. “Truth Is a Linguistic Question.” *Language*, v.49/3 (1973).
- Goss, B. and M. L. Williams. “The Effects of Equivocation on Perceived Source Credibility.” *Central States Speech Journal*, v.24 (1973).
- Gupta, S., K. Sakamoto, and A. Ortony. “Telling It Like It Isn’t: A Comprehensive Approach to Analyzing Verbal Deception.” In *The Goals of Cognition: Festschrift for Cristiano Castelfranchi*, F. Paglieri, L. Tummolini, R. Falcone, and M. Miceli, eds. London: College Publications, 2012.
- McCornack, S. A. “Information Manipulation Theory.” *Communication Monographs*, v.59 (1992).
- Vincent, J. M. and C. Castelfranchi. “On the Art of Deception: How to Lie While Saying the Truth.” In *Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics: Proceedings of the Conference on Pragmatics, Urbino, Italy, July 8–14, 1979*, H. Parret, M. Sbisà, and J. Verschueren, eds. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1979.
- Williams, M. L. and B. Goss. “Equivocation: Character Insurance.” *Human Communication Research*, v.1 (1975).

---

## Espionage and Counterespionage

Often referred to as the world’s second-oldest profession, espionage is at least as old as the Bible, wherein the Book of Joshua refers to spies

sent by Joshua into Canaan before he led the Jewish people across the River Jordan. Espionage and counterespionage are loaded with lies and deception; arguably, they are their stock in trade. However, in addition to the types of lies and deceptions commonly portrayed in cloak-and-dagger novels and films, in which spies engage in games of cat and mouse, lying and deception are part of every stage of a broader game of espionage and counterespionage that are integrated into a process formally known as the intelligence cycle. Furthermore, lying and deception occur even within the ranks of well-meaning, patriotic members of the intelligence community and policymakers, or in tasks as seemingly benign as collaborations on routine intelligence reports.

### Requirements

As a policy-driven enterprise, requirements—the initial phase of the intelligence cycle—originate with policymakers who set the overarching national intelligence-gathering agenda. This includes identifying the intentions and deceptions of other actors (e.g., Does country X have chemical weapons, though it claims it does not? What banks are laundering money for terrorism financiers?). It also includes the need to guard one's intentions and deceptions. Guards against hostile agencies' human intelligence collection activities (versus, for example, satellite intelligence collections) are known as counterespionage. However, counterespionage is a subset of a much larger effort to guard one's intentions and deceptions, formally known as counterintelligence (CI).

### Counterintelligence

The requirement for counterintelligence is composed of actions to guard against threats from outside the intelligence community (agents from hostile organizations) and from inside it (moles). The CI mission is to conceal state secrets, including their sources and the means by which they were collected. In the process, CI officers must overcome the tendency to trust others—including those within their organizations who have passed security clearance screenings—to assume that virtually anyone can be a spy.

There are two safeguards present in all U.S. intelligence agencies to protect against CI. The

first is the process of personnel screening. This includes background checks of job applicants and current employees to weed out those whose allegiances are deemed too risky to be entrusted with state secrets. Often, these background checks involve questioning personnel with the use of a polygraph. However, the polygraph—which measures physiological changes—can be manipulated or defeated by interviewees. Aldrich Ames, among the most famous of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) moles, passed several polygraph interviews during his tenure, during which he fed voluminous amounts of intelligence to his Soviet handlers.

The second CI safeguard is the classification system whereby sensitive information is labeled (e.g., confidential, secret, or top secret) and securely compartmented according to the risks it poses, were it to be compromised. Even within a given classification tier, materials are further compartmentalized (e.g., in sensitive compartmented information facilities, or SCIFs), whereby access to information is granted on a need-to-know basis. The goal of this system is to reduce individuals' access to information, hence reducing the damage that could be done by any given source of information leakage. Critics of this system point out that it has been deceptively used to conceal from the public illegal activities and professional mistakes made by government personnel.

### Covert Action

Covert actions are actions that nations take to forward their policy-driven agendas in ways that allow nations to plausibly deny responsibility for their activities. These actions, aimed at a nation's adversaries, include such activities as paramilitary operations, planting false news reports, and spreading false rumors. If the deception is discovered by the adversary, it can result in dire military or diplomatic repercussions. At a minimum, the intelligence gains of a compromised covert action are limited insofar as the adversary is made aware of the breach in its system and may take steps to shore up its counterintelligence around such vulnerabilities.

### Collection

The second phase of the intelligence cycle—collection—is the phase most commonly associated with



*During a night raid on July 11, 2003, a soldier from the 101st Airborne Division enters a building of a former hostile Iraqi general who has been identified through intelligence gathering to be the main organizer of attacks against American forces, causing multiple casualties throughout Mosul, Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The raid was triggered by information gathered during the intelligence cycle, which includes covert action, collection, analysis, dissemination, and feedback.*

espionage. In this phase, government agents—formally known as “case officers”—assume one of two kinds of deceptive cover stories to explain their presence in a foreign nation. “Official cover” is a governmental posting, typically at an embassy. However, case officers maintaining this type of cover are likely to be suspected of connections to their government’s intelligence services. Therefore, there is a need for some case officers to have “non-official cover” (NOC, pronounced “knock”), whereby they masquerade in less suspicious occupations (though international law prohibits cover as clergy or members of the Peace Corps). One of the ideal NOCs is that of a journalist: someone who, by trade, has reasons for foreign travel and to meet with a wide range of people.

Once under cover, case officers begin recruiting and handling a network of spies—formally known as “agents”—during which time they remain sensitive to the possibility that their spies are deceiving them. An agent could be a “dangle”: bait held

out by a hostile intelligence service hoping to produce a double agent for itself. Alternatively, agents might fabricate or exaggerate the information that they disclose to case officers in the hope of continuing to profit (financially or emotionally) from their associations with them. Consequently, case officers perpetually question agents’ motives, how agents have access to information, and the accuracy of that information. Ultimately, case officers must balance risk to intelligence security with the risk of lost intelligence opportunities.

### **Analysis**

Information from the collection phase is not considered intelligence until it has been groomed for use, which often includes translating, decoding, or reviewing it in context with other information, as part of the third phase of the intelligence cycle—analysis. In rendering intelligence assessments, the United States uses a competitive analysis system, whereby different intelligence agencies, or



different teams within an agency, derive independent assessments that are later reconciled. Analysts' careers, if not their egos, depend to some degree both on "being right" and being noticed by their superiors for being right. Consequently, competing analytical groups will occasionally deceive one another by including false or weak analyses (so-called false hostages) in their initial draft reports: hostages that they concede to the opposing team in exchange for inclusion of their pet points in the final intelligence report.

Furthermore, in an effort to gain attention, analysts occasionally deceive policymakers by bending the truth or exaggerating the importance of their assessments. In the extreme, analysts warp their assessments to tell policymakers what they think they want to hear (known as "politicization"). Additionally, policymakers occasionally take information deliberately out of context from otherwise sound intelligence reports to deceive the public in ways that suit their agendas (known as "cherry-picking").

### Dissemination

In the fourth phase of the intelligence cycle, intelligence reports are disseminated to consumers within the government. These range from reports tailored for a specific user (e.g., the president's daily briefing) to those intended for broader governmental readership (e.g., the senior executive intelligence briefing) to those approved for release to the general public (certain national intelligence estimates). As a counterintelligence measure, each type of report is given a classification level and secured accordingly.

### Feedback

In the final phase of the intelligence cycle, policymakers ideally give feedback to the intelligence community regarding the extent to which their intelligence needs were met, including requests for additional intelligence. However, this is an imperfect system, one that opens the door for both the intelligence community and policymakers to succumb to self-deception. Policymakers deceive themselves when they wrongly assume that the intelligence community understands their intelligence needs. Likewise, the intelligence community deceives itself when it assumes that a lack of feedback from policy makers is indicative of

policymakers' comprehension, agreement, or satisfaction with the intelligence that they have received.

Michael J. Williams  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Deception Motives; Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment; Department of Defense, U.S.; Intelligence; Iran-Contra Affair; Military Deception; Polygraph; Terrorism; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

Hitz, Frederick. "The Truth of Espionage Is Stranger than Fiction." *Intelligence & National Security*, v.23/1 (2008).

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide." Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009. <http://archive.org/details/nationalintelligenceconsumersguide> (Accessed February 2013).

Pfaff, Tony and Jeffrey R. Tiel. "The Ethics of Espionage." *Journal of Military Ethics*, v.3/1 (2004).

---

## Ethnic Differences

An ethnic group is a group of people who share a common culture. Cultures differ in the incidence of deception, the evaluation of deception, and stereotypes about deception. These contribute to difficulties in cross-ethnic communication.

Researchers have studied cross-cultural differences in the incidence of deception. Historians contend that deception was unknown in many pre-Columbian Indian tribes, and that early Native Americans viewed Europeans' lies as a sign of mental illness. From archival evidence, anthropologists have made inferences about life in 186 preindustrial societies. In some of those societies, children were strongly socialized to be honest; in others, they were not.

Psychologists have done related human subject research. One researcher found ethnic differences in the tendency to give deceptive responses on personality tests. Among students in the United

States, those of Latino background were most likely to lie on personality tests, and those of Middle Eastern background were least likely to lie. Another team of investigators asked lifelong natives of 74 countries how often the typical person tells a lie. Responses varied from country to country. People from Algeria and Pakistan gave the highest estimates of the frequency of deception; those from Portugal and Taiwan gave the lowest estimates.

Cultural differences in deception may depend on the medium in which lies are told. In one study, Koreans reported higher levels of face-to-face deception than Americans. However, Koreans and Americans reported equal levels of deceit in computer-based communication.

Corruption is an institutional manifestation of deception. Transparency International, an organization based in Berlin, has assessed corruption annually since 1993. Its 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index provides a measure of the degree of corruption in each of 183 countries worldwide. By this index, the most corrupt countries in the world are Somalia and North Korea, whereas the least corrupt are New Zealand, Denmark, and Finland. In general, corrupt countries tend to be poor and pay their civil servants badly. Corrupt countries also tend to be collectivistic. In these cultures, the emphasis is on the group, rather than the individual.

### Cross-Cultural Experiments

There have been cross-cultural experiments on the use of deception. In one study, research participants were recruited from four collectivist countries (Japan, Greece, Korea, and Hong Kong) and four individualistic countries (the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, and Germany). Participants engaged in mock business negotiations, in which they could use various tactics to secure a lucrative contract. In this business setting, participants from the collectivist countries were more likely than their individualistic counterparts to tell lies and offer bribes. Outside the laboratory, people from collectivist cultures may have non-business motives for lying. Collectivist Samoans, for example, lie to protect family reputation.

There are ethnic differences in the evaluation of deception. In a 2007 study, residents of Ecuador rated lies as less acceptable than European

Americans. As part of an older world values survey, residents of 43 societies answered the question, “Is lying in your own interest ever justified?” Respondents from Bulgaria and South Korea were most likely to condemn self-interested lying. West German and Dutch respondents were most likely to say that this form of lying could be justified. In all of the 43 societies surveyed, the most highly educated respondents were more likely than their least educated counterparts to find self-interested lying justifiable. Education may reduce moral absolutism.

Not all lies are self-interested; some are altruistic. The Chinese view the latter, prosocial lies, as commendable when, for example, an anonymous donor denies having made a donation. Many Chinese adults do not regard altruistic untruths as “lies” at all. They reserve the term *lie* for falsehoods that are not prosocial. By contrast, a Western definition holds that a lie is any attempt to convince others of something that the liar considers false—even if the attempt is altruistically motivated.

### Beliefs About Deception

People have beliefs about deception, including about the way liars act. In a large-scale research study, lifelong native residents of 58 countries were asked the open-ended question, “How can you tell when people are lying?” Although respondents gave a variety of answers to this question, most often they said that they could tell when people are lying by eye contact. Most people believe that liars avoid looking at their conversational partners. Americans believe that liars avert gaze, and so do people in many other countries. In fact, eye contact was mentioned as a cue to deception more than twice as often as any other cue by the respondents in this worldwide sample. Liars act nervous and they have trouble speaking. These beliefs are also common throughout the world.

There are cultural differences in beliefs about deception. Although in general, people believe they can infer deception from gaze aversion, people from Muslim countries are less likely to express this belief than people from other countries. Similarly, people in most countries believe that liars act nervous. However, the residents of Muslim countries are less likely than others to express this belief.

There are also beliefs about demographic differences in deception. Worldwide, men believe that women lie more often than men; and women believe that men lie more often than women. These beliefs are related to cultural factors. They are most common in countries where there is high gender inequality. Residents of Muslim countries believe that they are more often deceived by acquaintances than strangers.

A large body of research shows that Americans are able to detect Americans' lies. They detect their compatriots' lies at levels slightly better than chance. This finding generalizes to other cultures, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and Spain. It also generalizes to some Asian countries. Thus, Jordanians can detect lies told by Jordanians, Indians can detect lies told by Indians, and natives of Japan can detect lies told by other natives of Japan. Within each of these countries, people show a modest ability to discriminate lies from truths.

### **Differences in Nonverbal Behavior and Language**

There are differences in nonverbal behavior across the world. Scholars have described some cultural dimensions that bear on these differences: immediacy, power distance, and context. Along the immediacy dimension, there are high-contact cultures (such as those in the Arabic world) and low-contact cultures (like many in Asia). People in high-contact cultures make more eye contact, stand closer to one another, and engage in more touching than people in low-contact cultures. Highly intense, former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein personified a high-contact culture.

Along the power distance dimension, there are vertical cultures (such as India) and horizontal cultures (such as Norway). In vertical cultures, status-based norms constrain nonverbal interactions by demanding respect to superiors. Downcast eyes, honorific tones, smiles of appeasement—these behaviors are prescribed in vertical cultures but might be seen as insincere by egalitarians. Cultures also differ in the extent to which communication depends on context. In high-context cultures (like Japan), meanings are inferred from interpersonal relationships and implicit nonverbal codes. In low-context cultures (like Germany), meanings are conveyed by the

content of verbal utterances—logical, explicit, and precise.

Nonverbal differences are also evident across ethnic groups in the United States. An early study in New York City found that Jewish and Italian immigrants used different gestures than native-born New Yorkers. Other research shows that African Americans make little eye contact and that Latino Americans stand close to one another when interacting. Ethnic differences in nonverbal behavior may be especially pronounced in cross-ethnic interactions. In an older study of mock employment interviews, Anglo American interviewers were cool and distant toward African American job applicants. In a second study, job applicants who were treated in a cool, distant manner made bad nonverbal impressions. Thus, the Anglo American interviewers' prophecies were self-fulfilling. In a similar way, people appear to be lying if they are telling the truth to others who think that they are lying.

Can lies be detected across cultures? Culturally based nonverbal differences might in principle frustrate attempts at international lie detection. Nonverbal differences would frustrate lie detection if lies are spotted by virtue of their deviation from a culture-specific communication baseline. Nonverbal differences might, on the other hand, have the opposite effect. They would facilitate international lie detection if people in different cultures infer deception from different nonverbal cues, and liars concentrate on controlling those cues that their compatriots associate with deceit. Then, attempts at international deception would be unveiled by cues that the liar did not bother to hide.

The members of a culture share a common language. Thus, interactions between cultures are often cross-language interactions. Although it stands to reason that language differences would affect cross-cultural attempts to detect lies, it is difficult to know a priori whether language differences would benefit the liar or the would-be lie detector. Perhaps a language barrier would give the liar an advantage by depriving the would-be detector of speech content that could cue deceit; on the other hand, speech content might be a useful vehicle for perpetrating deception, whose absence would force the detector to consider more reliable cues.

### Cultural Views of Foreigners

Nonverbal and language differences are objective features of cross-cultural interactions, but their interpretation depends on interactants' views of foreigners. Here, social psychological research is relevant in showing that most people prefer members of their group to members of other groups. In cross-cultural contexts, this preference may be fueled by uncertainty induced by the unfamiliar. Worldwide, a general suspicion of outsiders may predispose people to be leery of foreigners. Psychologically, it may be natural for people to not believe others who they cannot understand. If so, those who are foreign to a country may be subject to self-fulfilling prophecies and come to act in ways that would appear deceptive, even to their compatriots.

An early study tested for lie detection by students in the United States who were from Asia, Latin America, or the United States. Results showed that the U.S. and Latin American students were slightly better than Asians at detecting Americans' lies. This was not a large difference, however. In another study, Americans of European, Asian, and Latin descent tried to detect one another's lies. The Latin Americans were somewhat better at lie detection, although again the difference was small. A series of studies indicated that white Dutch police officers were vulnerable to misinterpreting the behavior of black Surinamese citizens of the Netherlands. The police saw the blacks' usual mannerisms as signs of deceit. In a more recent study, Australians were able to detect lies told by Colombians. Another study indicated that Americans, Jordanians, and Indians could detect one another's lies, albeit to a modest extent. They could detect lies across not only cultures but also languages. Thus, illiterate Indian farmworkers could detect Americans' English-language lies, even though they knew no English.

Interestingly, lies could not be detected across cultures if the lies were only judged from visual cues. Access to speech was needed. Although the research participants were able to detect lies across cultures, deception judgments of compatriots were more accurate. This study provided no evidence for a generalized suspicion of outsiders. The research participants gave foreigners the benefit of the doubt.

As judges of deception, people agree on who appears the most and least honest. There is agreement across cultures and languages. Thus, American university students and illiterate Indian farmworkers agree on which Jordanians sound honest. They reach significant agreement, even when they judge deception from an audio-only presentation of the Jordanians speaking in Arabic. They reach agreement, despite the fact that neither the American students nor the Indian farmworkers understand Arabic. Similar results are apparent in Jordanians' judgments of Malaysians' lies. Apparently, there are worldwide cues to deception judgment, and some are in the voice.

It is difficult to draw a single conclusion about ethnic differences in deception. Rather, the accumulated research literature reveals that certain ethnicities differ from other ethnicities in particular ways—in the incidence of deception, evaluations of deception, and beliefs about deception. Additional research on this topic would be welcome, particularly research that emanates from non-Western, nondeveloped cultures.

Charles Bond

*Texas Christian University*

**See Also:** African Americans; Asian Americans; Columbus, Christopher; Deception Detection Accuracy; Hispanic Americans; Honest Baseline Behaviors; Islam; Men; Middle East; Native Americans; Nonverbal Cues; Racism; Women.

### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F. Jr. and S. R. Rao. "Lies Travel: Mendacity in a Mobile World." In *Deception Detection in Forensic Contexts*, P. A. Granhag and Leif A. Strömwall, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Fu, G., K. Lee, C. A. Cameron, and F. Xu. "Chinese and Canadian Adults' Categorization and Evaluation of Lie- and Truth-Telling About Prosocial and Antisocial Behaviors." *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, v.32 (2001).
- Global Deception Research Team. "A World of Lies." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, v.37 (2006).
- Triandis, H. C., et al. "Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A Multi-Level Analysis." *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, v.1 (2001).



Vrij, A. and F. W. Winkel. "Cross-Cultural Police-Citizen Encounters: The Impact of Race, Beliefs, and Nonverbal Communication on Impression Formation." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.22 (1992).

## Evidence, Strategic Use of

Decades of research show that people's ability to detect lies is limited. A synthesis of the literature showed an average accuracy rate of 54 percent—far from impressive when a 50 percent accuracy rate can be expected by chance. Research suggests that the primary reason for this is that cues to deception are too weak to allow for accurate discrimination. The strategic use of evidence (SUE) technique is a method aimed at overcoming this problem. It is an investigative interview technique designed to produce different responses from liars and truth-tellers through systematic use of the available case information or evidence. The SUE technique exploits the strategies used by suspects, with the aim of producing implausible or inconsistent statements from liars. Research has shown that the SUE technique produces differences in the statements provided by liars and truth-tellers, and these differences can lead to higher accuracy rates in detecting deception.

### Counterinterrogation Strategies

The core premise of the SUE technique is that liars and truth-tellers have different strategies to convince, and these differences can be exploited in order to create cues to deception. These strategies, termed *counterinterrogation strategies*, have been examined in different ways. First, theoretical work has connected these strategies to basic behavioral approaches to cope with threatening situations.

Second, studies have empirically examined suspects' strategies during interrogations. The typical methodology of such studies is the mock crime approach, in which some participants are asked to commit a staged transgression, whereas

others engage in some innocuous act. For example, some participants (liars) may be asked to go to a room and steal an object, whereas others (truth-tellers) are asked to go to the same room to simply deliver an object. Then, they are all told that an object was stolen from that room, and their task is to deny involvement in the theft (some deceptively, others truthfully). Before their interview, participants are asked to report their primary strategy for convincing the interviewer of their innocence.

Studies on counterinterrogation strategies show that liars' and truth-tellers' strategies differ, particularly with regard to information management (i.e., the content of the story that they plan to provide). The strategy most frequently reported by innocent people is to simply tell the truth like it happened. This might seem trivial, but it makes sense from the perspective of psychological theory. In particular, the behavior of innocent people is in line with naïve beliefs about justice. The belief in a just world (BJW) sociopsychological theory posits that people have trust in the fairness in the world. They believe that bad things happen to bad people, and good things happen to good people. In other words, if individuals are innocent, they may believe that they have nothing to fear by being forthcoming because the world is ultimately a fair place.

In contrast, guilty suspects face more complicated considerations regarding what information to convey. Liars who aim to cover up some form of transgression must suppress the critical information about the commission of the act in question. However, in order to appear credible, they need to offer an account in place of the truth. Providing false information to conceal one's action (e.g., claiming that one never visited place X, when one in fact did) entails a risk; if the interviewer holds information that the suspect visited this place, the suspect's credibility is in jeopardy.

Striking the appropriate balance between concealing incriminating information and offering details in order to appear credible is a crucial consideration for liars. Studies on liars' counterinterrogation strategies show that their strategies are dominated by information management concerns, such as providing a simple and streamlined story while avoiding or denying incriminating information.

### First Test of SUE

As described above, the SUE technique exploits the fact that liars and truth-tellers differ in forthcomingness. In order to understand how this can be accomplished, consider the first test of the SUE principles. This study employed a mock crime paradigm, in which participants were randomly assigned to be either deceptive or truthful. Liars were instructed to go to a nearby store, find a briefcase in the corner of that store, and take a wallet from the briefcase. Truth-tellers were instructed to go to the same store and look for an object in the same corner. The situation was arranged in such a way that truth-tellers had to move the briefcase in order to look for the relevant object (however, they did not steal the wallet).

There were several pieces of evidence: First, a witness outside the store saw participants enter the store. Second, a store clerk observed participants in the corner of the store. Third, there was evidence that participants had handled the briefcase, because their fingerprints were found on it. This information was true for both liars and truth-tellers; that is, the information suggested, but did not conclusively prove, that participants may have been involved in the theft.

There were two types of interviews. In one condition, the evidence was disclosed in the beginning of the interview, after which the interviewer posed questions about the subjects' actions and whereabouts. In this early disclosure condition, truth-tellers and liars provided similar accounts, which tended to incorporate the evidence without admitting to the theft. For example, both liars and truth-tellers tended to say that they had been in the store and they had handled the briefcase while searching for an object (recall that this was true for some, but not all participants). Lie-catchers who viewed these interviews could not tell the difference between true and false accounts; their accuracy was at chance level.

In a second condition (the SUE condition), the evidence was withheld until the end of the interview while the interviewers asked a number of questions: First, they prompted the suspects to provide a free recall of their actions during the day. Second, they asked specific questions that addressed the evidence, but did not disclose it. For example, suspects were asked to describe the

locations they had visited during the day, whether they had visited the store in question, and if so, whether they had seen and handled a briefcase. The purpose of these specific questions was to highlight the difference in strategies between liars and truth-tellers; that is, to highlight truth-tellers' forthcomingness, and liars' strategies of avoidance and denial.

In this interview condition, the difference between liars and truth-tellers was marked. In response to the free recall prompt, liars often refrained from mentioning the store, and without exception avoided mentioning the briefcase. In contrast, truth-tellers' responses suggested forthcoming approaches: They frequently volunteered information relating to the evidence, such as having been in the store. For the specific questions, further signs of differences in strategy between liars and truth-tellers were obtained: Truth-tellers' responses were in line with the evidence, whereas liars' responses tended to be inconsistent with the evidence (e.g., when asked whether they had seen a briefcase, many liars denied). This difference is termed *statement-evidence consistency* and reflects discrepancies between the subjects' account and the information held. Lie-catchers who saw the interviews conducted in the SUE manner were significantly more accurate than chance in distinguishing between true and false statements.

### Further Research on SUE

Since this initial test, a number of studies have explored the principles of strategic evidence use. Some studies have focused on the optimal timing of evidence disclosure, showing that disclosure of evidence in later, rather than earlier, stages of an interview produces far more cues to deception. In light of these findings, it is noteworthy that early evidence and late disclosure is a common element of law enforcement practice, particularly in the United States.

In addition, research has examined the optimal manner of evidence disclosure. In order to understand different manners of disclosure, it must be recognized that a piece of evidence can be presented in various degrees of specificity. For example, evidence in the form of closed-circuit television camera (CCTV) footage showing a person at Grand Central Terminal in New York

City can, in its most specific way, be presented just as such (e.g., “We have CCTV footage showing that you visited Grand Central in New York recently”). However, the same piece of information can also be presented in a more general way (e.g., “We have information that you visited New York recently”).

Recent research has showed that presenting evidence in a gradual way, moving from more general to more specific framing, can produce internal inconsistencies in the stories of liars. Imagine that a liar, who did visit Grand Central but is motivated to conceal this information, has produced an account in which he denies being in the New York area. If he is presented with the most vague, general framing of the evidence (“We have information that you have actually been in New York”), he may revise his statement to include the information presented, but still aim to conceal the visit to Grand Central (e.g., “Now that you mention it, I did visit New York, but I forgot to tell you because I was never in Manhattan—I only went to Brooklyn.”). If he is then presented with more precise information about the evidence (e.g., that there is evidence that he was in Manhattan), he may be forced to revise his statement yet again. The point is, simply put, to “force” liars to change their statements as the evidence is presented in an increasingly specific form.

The SUE technique is based on theoretical and empirical work on liars’ and truth-tellers’ strategies. Based on these principles, research has developed a number of tactics aimed at exploiting suspects’ strategies in order to create cues to deception (and optimize the value of the evidence). A series of studies shows that strategic use of evidence improves the differences in the stories between liars and truth-tellers, and that these differences make it easier for lie-catchers to make judgments about veracity.

Maria Hartwig

*John Jay College of Criminal Justice*

Pär Anders Granhag

*University of Gothenburg*

**See Also:** Behavioral Analysis Interview; Concealed Information Test; Deception Detection Accuracy; Electroencephalography; Functional Magnetic

Resonance Imaging; Investigator Bias; Law and Law Enforcement; Linguistic Cues; Meta-Analysis; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Scientific Content Analysis; Statement Validity Assessment; Thermal Imaging; Vocal Stress Analysis; Wizards of Lie Detection.

### Further Readings

- Granhag, P. A. and M. Hartwig. “A New Theoretical Perspective on Deception Detection: On the Psychology of Instrumental Mind-Reading.” *Psychology, Crime and Law*, v.14 (2008).
- Granhag, P. A., L. A. Strömwall, R. Willén, and M. Hartwig. “Eliciting Cues to Deception by Tactical Disclosure of Evidence: The First Test of the Evidence Framing Matrix.” *Legal and Criminological Psychology* (April 16, 2012).
- Hartwig, M., P. A. Granhag, L. A. Strömwall, and A. Vrij. “Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence.” *Law and Human Behavior*, v.29 (2005).
- Hartwig, M., P. A. Granhag, and L. A. Strömwall. “Guilty and Innocent Suspects’ Strategies During Interrogations.” *Psychology, Crime, and Law*, v.13 (2007).
- Strömwall, L. A., M. Hartwig, and P. A. Granhag. “To Act Truthfully: Nonverbal Behaviour and Strategies During a Police Interrogation.” *Psychology, Crime and Law*, v.12 (2006).

## Evolution and Natural Selection

The value of applying an evolutionary perspective to the study of deception is suggested and supported by several well-documented findings. First, deception is found throughout the animal kingdom, in species ranging from insects to primates to humans. This pattern suggests a deep evolutionary history of deception. Deception is a cross-cultural universal. The following phenomena that are conceptually related to deception appear on Donald Brown’s list of human universals: language employed to manipulate others; misinform, or mislead; masking or modifying of facial expressions; language not a simple reflection of reality;

manipulation of social relations; and manipulation of self-image. Research in developmental psychology suggests that children start manipulating the truth and others at a very young age. Research in social psychology suggests that adults engage in some form of deception on a daily basis. Thus, the use of deception is ubiquitous across species, culture, age, and sex.

An evolutionary approach toward understanding deception focuses on several questions: What adaptive problems related to survival, mating, parenting, alliance formation, or status negotiation might have been solved, at least in part, by the use of deception? What different adaptive problems would men and women have recurrently faced over evolutionary history that could have led to the development of reliable sex differences in the deployment of deception? What are the statistically recurring costs and benefits associated with the use of deception?

### Evolution, Mating, and Deception

Any inherited mechanism or trait that enabled human ancestors to successfully deceive others would be selected for if (1) its use conferred a benefit that contributed to propagation of their genes, and (2) the benefits of its use, on average, outweighed its costs. From an evolutionary perspective, successful mating refers to mating that produces offspring that are likely to survive and thrive. In species that sexually reproduce each offspring carries 50 percent of each of its parents' genes. Thus, producing offspring is the most efficient way to replicate one's genes. Therefore, successful mating is one of the most important processes that drive evolution. However, successful mating requires the solving of a number of distinct adaptive problems. Some of these adaptive problems are similar for men and women; some are different.

In humans, gestation occurs internally within women. Therefore, whereas men can produce an offspring by investing only the time and energy required for a single act of copulation, women must invest substantially more time and energy because of an infant's nine-month gestational period. Because men and women invest different amounts of time and energy into producing a child, they have evolved somewhat different mating psychologies.

Successfully attracting a mate involves outcompeting same-sex rivals for a desired mate's attention. Attracting a mate can involve deception to the extent that one's looks, kindness, generosity, sexual chastity, loyalty, or social status are strategically misrepresented during courtship. Attracting a mate may also involve intentionally misrepresenting information about one's same-sex rivals.

Men have faced the adaptive problem of identifying women who are able to conceive and produce healthy offspring. Therefore, men's evolved mate preferences focus on a woman's physical appearance. Various physical features are considered universally attractive (e.g., smooth, clear, wrinkle-free skin; large, clear eyes; long, thick, lustrous hair; a low waist-to-hip ratio of approximately 0.7 to 0.8; symmetrical features; and firm, symmetrical breasts) because these features are reliable indicators of a woman's reproductive value. Therefore, women use a variety of products, techniques, and procedures (ranging from the use of makeup, push-up and padded bras, corsets and belts, and slimming clothing to diet and exercise and the extremes of plastic surgery) to misrepresent the extent to which they possess the features that men desire.

Men have also faced the problem of paternal uncertainty. This means that men can never know for sure (without a confirmed paternity test) if they are the biological father of putative offspring. Being cuckolded, investing in a competitor's offspring, rather than one's own, would have been and is extremely costly to men's fitness. Therefore, men's evolved mate preferences also focus upon a woman's chastity, sexual reputation, and trustworthiness. For this reason, during courtship, women may deceive potential mates by downplaying the number of sex partners that they have had and by exaggerating their agreeableness, loyalty, and fidelity. Additionally, women may spread false rumors about the attractiveness, character, or sexual histories of their same-sex competitors. Spreading negative information about other women's sexual promiscuity or genuineness can lead men to find these women less desirable as a long-term mate.

Because women incur the heavy costs of pregnancy and lactation, women's ability to raise healthy offspring has depended upon their ability to secure needed resources and protection from



a man. In other words, women face the adaptive problem of attracting a long-term mate who are able and willing to invest in and protect them and their children. Therefore, women's evolved mate preferences focus on physical and psychological traits that are reliably associated with a man's ability to accrue and share resources, along with his ability and willingness to offer protection. Thus, women from around the world generally find the following traits and characteristics desirable in a long-term mate: intelligence, high social status, slightly older age, the ability to dominate other men, kindness, generosity, commitment, love, above-average height, physical strength, athletic skill, courage, and bravery.


For these reasons, a man's use of deception during courtship focuses upon exaggerating his economic resources or his potential to acquire resources in the future, his kindness and generosity, his emotional commitment, and/or his athletic prowess. Additionally, men may spread false rumors about other men's sexual intentions (falsely suggest that another man is a womanizer who is not interested in long-term mating), intelligence (falsely claiming that another is dumb), ambition (falsely claiming that another is lazy or a loser), or health (falsely claiming that another is weak, prone to illness, or has a disease). Spreading negative information about other men's ability to acquire resources, share those resources, or health status can lead women to find these men less desirable as a long-term mate.

### Mate Poaching, Infidelity, and Adultery

For both women and men, attracting a long-term mate may involve mate poaching, the luring away of a mate from an existing courtship. This process involves deception to the extent that mate poaching is a process that is shrouded in secrecy and can involve strategic self-presentation aimed at making oneself appear more desirable than the desired person's current mate. Other aspects of mating that involve the strategic use of deception involve infidelity and adultery. Both women and men engage in infidelity and adultery, although men engage in these behaviors at higher rates.

Engaging in sexual relations with someone other than one's long-term partner, at least in certain contexts and with certain people, can confer fitness benefits to adulterers. For example, over

the long stretch of evolutionary history, before the advent of birth control, men who were able to maintain a long-term relationship while having sex with additional women would have fathered more children. A large and growing body of research evidence suggests an evolutionary history



*At the Minnesota Renaissance Festival in Shakopee on September 2, 2012, the Sisters of the Sahara perform a belly dance, which is thought to originate from ancient fertility rituals. Women use a variety of means to enhance the evolved mate preferences that men identify for producing offspring, such as firm breasts, a low waist-to-hip ratio, and large eyes.*

in which women strategically engaged in infidelity, when the benefits would have outweighed the risks. Almost by definition, adulterous relationships are maintained within an intricate web of secrets and lies.

Other examples that involve women and men using deception strategically within the context of mating include (1) having a “back-up mate,” someone who could readily replace one’s current mate if the relationship were to end (2) maintaining in secrecy one’s attractions to and fantasies about others, and (3) keeping one’s intentions to end a long-term relationship secret until the timing is ideal. These forms of deception, when employed successfully, would have been associated with evolutionary benefits.

### Conclusion

Evolutionary psychology posits that men and women will be expected to differ from each other in domains in which they recurrently face different adaptive problems. This logic has been successfully used to document how and when women and men use deception similarly and when they use it differently.

In addition to identifying the benefits associated with deception, an evolutionary analysis also highlights the costs associated with the use of deception. Being identified as a liar or an adulterer can be associated with the loss of valuable relationships, irreparable damage to one’s reputation, lowered social status, or ostracism. In the most serious cases, liars or cheaters may be physically harmed or murdered. All of these outcomes would reduce one’s likelihood of successfully propagating one’s genes.

That deception is a ubiquitous feature of human nature suggests that humans have evolved to be highly skilled deceivers and manipulators. However, when people lie and manipulate, they impose costs on the recipients of their deceptions. Thus, people would be expected to evolve solutions to the problem of being duped, namely an ability to detect deception. The evolution of the ability to deceive, along with the evolution of the ability to detect deception, is an example of a coevolutionary arms race. However, evidence suggests that people are fairly skilled at deceiving others while they are relatively unskilled at detecting deception.

This discrepancy suggests the possibility that on average, the benefits of deceiving others outweighs the costs of deceiving others, and the average benefit of detecting deceit may not exceed the average cost of failing to detect deception.

Recent theorizing within evolutionary psychology on the topic of self-deception suggests that being unaware of one’s intentions to dupe and deceive increases one’s ability to successfully deceive others. Thus, an evolutionary lens has been fruitfully applied to the topic of deception in humans. However, many questions about the evolution of deception, in its many forms, remain.

Anne K. Gordon

Patrick J. Nebl

Bowling Green State University

**See Also:** Animals; Birds; Butterflies; Camouflage; Courtship, Deception in; Darwin, Charles; Fireflies; Fish; Infidelity; Insects; Lying, Costs of; Mimicry; Primates; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Brown, D. *Human Universals*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
- Buss, D. M. *Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind*. 4th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2012.
- Dawkins, R. *The Selfish Gene*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Ekman, P. “Darwin, Deception, and Facial Expression.” In *Emotions Inside Out: 130 Years After Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, P. Ekman, J. J. Campos, R. J. Davidson, and F. B. M. de Waal, eds. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2003.
- Haselton, M. G., D. M. Buss, V. Oubaid, and A. Angleitner. “Sex, Lies, and Strategic Interference: The Psychology of Deception Between the Sexes.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.31/1 (2005).
- Keating, C. F. and K. R. Heltman. “Dominance and Deception in Children and Adults: Are Leaders the Best Misleaders?” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.54 (1991).

Smith, D. L. *Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004.

von Hippel, W. and R. Trivers. "The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, v.34 (2011).

---

## Exaggeration

Exaggeration has been a familiar part of society since at least the time of Aristotle. Whether it is exaggeration in literary form or in everyday life, exaggeration is a cognitive behavior to which society has become accustomed. Exaggeration may be as simple as representing the characteristic value of an item to be greater, better, or larger than it actually is.

The word *exaggerate* comes from the Latin word *exaggerare*, which translated means "to magnify." Because of the prevalence of exaggeration in everyday life, it could be argued that society has become immune and desensitized to this particular form of deceit. Some form of exaggeration can be found in every facet of daily activity, from literature and media to personal expressions of prowess, educational success, and even to the practice of law.

Part of the reason that exaggeration is so prevalent is that society is currently in what some scholars have termed "the trophy generation." As the trophy generation, everyone wants to be recognized and given the "most valuable player" status. The mentality is so strong and accepted by society that exaggeration has become a protected form of speech, further obscuring the lines between reasonable expectation of truthful disclosure and the commercial interest in relentless self-promotion.

The foundations for exaggeration go back in time to the dawn of man. In ancient Greece, the Alazon was one of the three fundamental characters of the comedic theater. The imposter who sees himself greater than he actually is becomes the repeated subject of plots to embarrass or destroy him and enjoys a continued implementation into modern-day television and movie scripts. Aristotle describes such individuals as "boasters" who

pretend to have distinguished qualities not actually possessed, or individuals who exaggerate the true nature of their being. First recorded in English-language writings during the 1560s, the term *exaggerate* may have originally been defined as "to pile up" or accumulate. Certainly throughout history it is not unforeseeable that the Alazons of real life often "pile up" the false recollections of otherwise truthful events, even to the point of intentional deceit.

### Exaggeration and Psychological Disorder

Cognitive distortions of events may be extremely damaging to social interaction for individuals and often lead to maladaptive behaviors that require enhanced therapy for coping. Exaggerated, irrational thoughts perpetuate many forms of psychological disorder. Although almost all have been guilty of "jumping to conclusions" at some point in life, the repetitive action of probability overestimation or exaggerating the likelihood of negative outcomes for an event often leads to obsessive-compulsive disorder, wherein no amount of repetitive hand washing can preclude the anticipation of sickness. Similarly, exaggerating the importance of events through catastrophizing a single negative event into a neverending pattern of defeat often spirals into self-reinforcing cycles of depression.

The narcissist exaggerates the true nature of their being into grandiose infallibility, and the psychosomatic exaggerates the perception of symptoms in belief that personal illness is ever impending. Such paranoia is not uncommon, and the psychology text books are replete with a variety of diagnosis wherein exaggeration of true events leads to negative outcomes for the aggrieved individual. The most extreme exaggeration may be seen in those afflicted with Munchausen syndrome, or worse still, Munchausen by proxy, wherein an individual deliberately exaggerates, or even fabricates, physical health problems for those in their care in an effort to fulfill their need for positive attention from others. An often misunderstood form of child abuse, Munchausen by proxy often results in the perpetrator receiving even greater reinforcement for the illness by assuming the heroic role of continued caregiver after the afflicted victim is attended to by a physician.



### Academic and Business Exaggeration

Scholastically, society has grown accustomed to the exaggeration of educational endeavors whereby the inflation of grade point averages (GPAs) across colleges and universities, while serving the need to encourage students to remain enrolled, has systematically deflated the value of knowledge acquired. The trophy generation values the accomplishment of the college degree, rather than the acquisition of true knowledge. The once coveted mark reserved for exalted student performance, the “A,” is now a commonplace occurrence. Exaggerated GPAs ultimately depreciate the value of a college degree, potentially promoting a culture of underachievement. Students have grown accustomed to demanding higher grades for merely satisfactory or even substandard work. Institutions have embraced the exaggeration of student effort for fear of diminution in enrollment and loss of the primary capital resource, the student. The resultant depreciating inventory of ingenuity is likely to one day reverse the role of exaggeration in education when faced with the reality of future demands for competitiveness in the enhanced global society. The systematic dumbing down of required efforts for exceptional acknowledgment has resulted in a reclassification of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for successful job performance, once graduated.

Although often perceived as most prominent in private life, exaggeration also carries negative connotations of implementation within the business community. The entrepreneur often exaggerates the size of the organization in an effort to bolster the value of the operation. The applicant exaggerates the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and abilities in hope of securing a sought-after employment position. Although not as prevalent today, prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, exaggeration of revenue through creative accounting of organizational debt elicited enhanced investor support where it was not warranted.

Exaggeration remains commonplace in business as executives often exaggerate their relative power within the organization through creative means, such as the use of an oversized desk, a locked file cabinet, or causing others to wait on standby for the satisfaction of an audience with the executive. Exaggeration of power may take

such simple form as utilization of a rectangular conference table, wherein the executive sits at the head of the table. Even the more common show of exaggerated relative worth through the display of personal assets, such as the car driven or the watch worn, is not only accepted but is expected among certain professions within the medical or legal fields.

Exaggeration has, in fact, become so prevalent in the practice of law that most state bar associations have adopted rules and regulations to moderate attorney behavior. Exaggeration in the practice of law is most prevalent in advertising and misrepresentations of a specific attorney's capability and legal prowess. Such abundance of exaggeration has led many states to specifically define where the line is drawn between acceptable puffery and false advertising that improperly influences the choice of legal counsel. While accurate and truthful self-promotion is allowed and encouraged within the practice of law, unchecked and overly exaggerated statements are dangerous for an attorney, and will often lead to disciplinary actions. Regardless of the reason for exaggeration, it is a dangerous tool for attorneys to use. The use of exaggerated claims and statements can result in legal malpractice suits and disciplinary actions by the bar association.

### Positive Exaggeration

Exaggeration in every form should not be viewed as completely inappropriate or harmful. The power of positive exaggeration can be the precursor to profound personal transformation. Every athlete at the time of competitive performance has been advised to envision the successful accomplishment of his or her goal. Such exaggeration or mental distortion of future events enhances the individual to a higher level of locus of control. Successful individuals often derive their achievement through positive utilization of their individual talents and the belief in the mastery of their outcome. Exaggeration may be a fundamental element of expressing great joy and excitement.

Exaggeration is often utilized through personal expressions within love relationships, because the normality of language usually falls short of adequate communication of such great feelings. Further, exaggeration is a powerful method of



indicating key points that would otherwise not receive appropriate concern by the recipient of such messages. Despite all shortcomings to the practice of overt exaggeration, this particular form of lying and deception is so ingrained in individuals that it will continue to influence society well into the future. Whether in the executive boardroom or the psychotherapist's office, or the student transcript, the subtle alteration of the true characteristics of an event through exaggeration is a common occurrence to be accounted for, rather than overlooked.

Webster B. Baker  
*Saint Leo University*

**See Also:** Caveat Emptor; Consumer Protection Laws; False Advertising; Puffery.

#### Further Readings

Azar, Beth. "All Puffed Up." *Monitor on Psychology*, v.38/6 (2007).

Fried, Jason. "Get Real: Don't Exaggerate Your Size." *Inc.*, v.32/6 (2011).

He, Ann. "Grade Inflation: Killing Innovation." *Huffington Post* (April 2, 2012). [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ann-he/grade-inflation-killing-i\\_b\\_1392527.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ann-he/grade-inflation-killing-i_b_1392527.html) (Accessed May 2013).

Korda, Michael. *Power! How to Get It, How to Use It*. New York: Random House, 1975.

Rizzardi, Keith. "Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?" *The Florida Bar Journal* v.79/7 (2005).

Spinoza, Benedict de. *Ethics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

communication. The eyes and the surrounding muscles play a huge role in providing meaning when communicating. It is believed that up to 55 percent of meaning comes from the eyes. Studies over the years have shown that eye contact during a typical conversation ranges from 30 to 60 percent, with longer eye contact indicating stronger interest in either the person or the topic. It is normal as adults to regularly scan interactional partners' eye behavior to receive important information about mood, mental state, confidence, dominance, and credibility. Meaning is conveyed through nonverbal behaviors, including facial expressions and eye contact.

Researchers and practitioners have been interested in the role that eye contact plays in detecting lies for decades. According to Aldert Vrij, a leading deception researcher, to date there is no evidence linking eye contact and eye behaviors to deception. However, there are several theories of deception that incorporate the role of the eyes in lying during interaction. M. Zuckerman's four-factor model of deception, B. M. DePaulo and S. E. Kirkendol's motivational impairment effect, and D. B. Buller and J. K. Burgoon's interpersonal deception theory all include eye behaviors when explaining deception.

#### Four-Factor Model of Deception

Zuckerman and his colleagues developed the four-factor model of deception, which states that when people tell lies, there are four underlying mechanisms at work: arousal, control, emotions, and cognitive factors. By studying visual, paralinguistic, and verbal cues, Zuckerman and others have identified how and when some behaviors are associated with deception.

Arousal includes both the psychological and physical arousal thought to be caused by an act of deception. When a person lies, his or her arousal is increased. This can be seen by an increase in pupil dilation and a reduction in blinking. The second factor, control, refers to the attempt made by liars to control the way in which deceit is leaked by nonverbal cues. This is often called "leakage." Research over the years has revealed that facial expressions are the least revealing because people are better at controlling their facial expressions. The third factor offered by Zuckerman is emotion. Deception is a

---

## Eye Contact

It is often said that the eyes are the windows to one's soul. In 1905, Sigmund Freud stated, "He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips. Betrayal oozes out of him at every pore." Researchers over the decades have documented that nonverbal behavior carries much communicative power, providing meaning during interpersonal

complex emotional phenomenon, which is made up of several emotions. When someone lies, his or her emotions change over the course of the deception. Micromotions in facial muscles can betray hidden emotions, which may affect the eyes. The final factor identified is cognitive factors, or thinking. One's thinking pattern changes when lying, and in order to remain coherent, more cognitive effort is required. Zuckerman and colleagues found that changes in cognitive effort influences speech patterns, which can alter pupil dilation; pupil dilation is one sign of deception.

### Motivational Impairment Effect

DePaulo and Kirkendol's motivational impairment effect theory states that a liar's behavior is altered by his or her overcontrol of their behavior. Behaviors are less natural and unscripted, and are more rigid and static. The change in behavior is noticed more in the hands and lower limbs because it is thought that liars are busy

controlling other movements, such as facial and eye movements. Research shows that eye contact is one of the most commonly used nonverbal cues for detecting deception. However, most liars do not avoid eye contact; rather, they may engage in more eye contact than when telling the truth.

### Interpersonal Deception Theory

In 1996, Buller and Burgoon introduced a communication theory to understand deception as an interactional process in which individuals are simultaneously encoding and decoding messages over time. The deceiver or liar attempts to manipulate messages in order to be untruthful. The communicative process of telling a lie may cause apprehension in the liar, allowing the lie to be leaked via cues. Interactional partners simultaneously try to detect the validity of the information that may cause suspicion. This process is like an interactional dance between the liar and the listener.



*Locked in eye contact, a couple engages in conversation at an outdoor festival in New Orleans, Louisiana, July 23, 2011. Several studies have shown that eye contact during a typical conversation ranges from 30 to 60 percent; the longer the eye contact, the stronger the interest in either the person or the topic. An estimated 55 percent of meaning comes from the eyes, and adults regularly scan interactional partners' eye behavior to receive important information about mood, mental state, confidence, dominance, and credibility.*

According to Burgoon and Buller, “liar behavior includes manipulating information, strategically controlling behavior and image management. Liars manipulate information so that they can extricate themselves if the message is found to be false. The liar uses vague generalizations and talks about other people. He strategically controls behavior so as to suppress signals that might indicate that he is lying.” There are three aspects of deceptive messages. The first aspect is the central deceptive message, which is usually the verbal lie. The second aspect is the ancillary message of the deception, which extends to include the nonverbal cues. Researchers maintain that it is often the nonverbal cues that reveal the truthfulness of a message. The final aspect is the inadvertent behaviors of the lie, which are almost always nonverbal. These inadvertent behaviors are intentionally leaked. Both the ancillary messages and the inadvertent behaviors may link to eye contact and eye behaviors.

According to this theory, liars are strategic in how they communicate, both verbally and non-verbally. Liars may try to strategically alter their facial experiences, such as smiling or nodding to make themselves look more credible. Burgoon and colleagues have found that liars continue to modify their behaviors, such as eye behavior, to appear more credible. For example, liars may withdraw their gazing less frequently, change their blinking rate, and dilate their pupils.

Individuals trust other people more when they look them in the eye; research shows that skilled liars know this and adjust their behavior. Eye

contact is an important nonverbal cue that provides meaning when communicating; however, liars may use eye contact in a manner that is the opposite of how people believe them to use it. Deception is a strategic communicative process, and eye contact is one of the easiest behaviors to control. If one suspects an interactional partner of deceit, he or she should watch for changes in rate of blinking, pupil dilation, and possibly increased eye contact.

Diane M. Monahan  
Saint Leo University

**See Also:** Communication; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lying as Ability or Skill; Microfacial Expressions; Motivational Impairment Effect; Nonverbal Cues.

#### Further Readings

- Buller, D. B. and J. K. Burgoon. “Interpersonal Deception Theory.” *Communication Theory*, v.6 (1996).
- Zuckerman, M., B. M. DePaulo, and R. Rosenthal. “Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication of Deception.” In *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology*, L. Berkowitz, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1981.
- Zuckerman, M. and R. E. Driver. “Telling Lies: Verbal and Nonverbal Correlates of Deception.” In *Multi-Channel Integrations of Non-Verbal Behavior*, A. W. Siegman and S. Feldstein, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1985.





# F

## Fairy Tales

Deception is often featured in popular fairy tales. Fairy tales can promote the moral that bad things happen when people lie, as in the story the “Boy Who Cried Wolf.” Fairy tales also highlight that only bad characters lie, suggesting that good people do not lie, a pattern found in fables such as “Little Red Riding Hood” and the “Three Little Pigs.” Finally, fairy tales can show a more nuanced and pragmatic theme of deception, that in which characters, both good and bad, lie to acquire what they want or need. In these stories, the lie is judged on the motivations for why the character lied. Examples of this can be seen in “Snow White,” “Hansel and Gretel,” and “Cinderella.”

### Tales in Which Bad Characters Lie

The “Boy Who Cried Wolf” is a famous Aesop’s fable about a shepherd boy who amused himself while watching the village sheep by falsely yelling, “Wolf! Wolf!” to make the villagers run up the hill to protect the flock. Both times that he yelled this, he was lying—there was no wolf. By the time a wolf actually came and the sheep needed protecting, the villagers did not come because they no longer believed the shepherd boy when he called. One of the villagers later explained to the boy his wrongdoings: “We’ll help you look for the lost

sheep in the morning. Nobody believes a liar . . . even when he is telling the truth.”

In this story, the moral is that bad things happen when people lie. Readers see the direct consequence to the boy’s credibility when he is discovered to be lying. The moral is stated at the end of the fable as, “Even when liars tell the truth, they are never believed. The liar will lie once, twice, and then perish when he tells the truth.” In other words, it does not take many lies to make a liar, and when someone is considered a liar, this person suffers the consequences. In this case, the shepherd boy is not initially portrayed as a “bad character,” just a bored, troublemaking boy. However, he pays the price for his lies—both in terms of losing the sheep and ruining his reputation.

The message that if characters lie, they are bad, is also common in other fairy tales. In “Little Red Riding Hood,” a girl encounters a wolf in the woods on the way to her grandmother’s house. She tells him where she is going, and he suggests that she pick some flowers to bring to her grandmother. While she does this, the wolf goes to the grandmother’s house, calls to the grandmother as if he was the little girl, and then eats her. The wolf then disguises himself as the grandmother, and when Little Red Riding Hood arrives at the house, he eats her too. Luckily, a passing woodsman saves the girl and her grandmother by cutting them out of the wolf.

In this story, the wolf lies on several occasions: He deceives the girl into thinking that he was just making a nice suggestion when he tells her that she should bring flowers, which gives him enough time to eat the grandmother; he pretends to be the girl when he knocks on the grandmother's door; and he disguises himself as the grandmother to lure the little girl in and eat her. One may argue that the wolf uses selective self-presentation in this story. He is concerned with the way the girl initially perceives him because he has ulterior motives and wants to lull her into a false sense of security. For this reason, he attempts to manage her first impression of him as a harmless, almost kind character—as seen when he suggests she stop to pick up some flowers for her grandmother. This is all part of the wolf's devious plan, but he succeeds in misleading the girl. As punishment for the wolf's deceit and crimes, the woodsman helps the girl and her grandmother fill the wolf's body with stones, so that when he wakes up, he can't move and falls down dead.

In the "Three Little Pigs," each pig builds a house: one of straw, one of wood, and one of brick. When the wolf comes, he lies to the pigs and tells them that he only wants to talk to them and that they should come out of their houses. He ends up blowing down the straw and the wooden houses. Luckily, the two other pigs escape to the third pig's house, which is built of brick. When the wolf tries to climb down the chimney, the pigs light a fire underneath him. The wolf is badly burned and runs away. The wolf's efforts to deceive the pigs results in punishment.

### **Lying for Both Good and Bad Reasons**

A different message emerges from tales in which both good and bad characters lie to acquire what they want or need. In these stories, bad characters' lies are motivated by selfishness and a desire or willingness to harm others in order to acquire what they want. In this more pragmatic form of understanding deception, good characters also lie, but they do so to protect themselves from harm by others, or to protect someone else.

"Snow White" is a classic example of this pattern of deception. The lies begin with a good character, the huntsman, who has been ordered by the queen to kill Snow White and bring back her lungs and liver. The huntsman takes pity on the girl and lets her live. He kills and returns with

parts of a wild boar instead, pretending to have followed orders.

Later, when the queen's magic mirror informs her that Snow White is alive, the queen tries to deceive the girl through disguise. She visits the dwarfs' house pretending to be a peddler selling silk bodices. When Snow White lets her in, the queen tightens Snow White's bodice, causing her to faint. The dwarves save her, and when the queen discovers she has failed, she dresses up again and returns with a poisonous comb. Once again, Snow White is fooled and lets the woman comb her hair, which causes her to faint. Snow White survives, so the queen makes a poisoned apple and disguises herself as a peasant. The queen only poisons part of the apple, so she offers to eat half, secretly giving Snow White the poisoned half. Upon biting into the apple, Snow White dies.

One day, a prince seeking shelter in the dwarfs' home sees the beautiful Snow White in a coffin and begs the dwarfs to let him keep it. As his servants carry the coffin out, one trips and this dislodges the piece of poison apple in Snow White's throat. She comes alive once again, and she and the prince live happily ever after.

In this story, the two main deceptive characters are the huntsman and the queen. The huntsman lies to save Snow White's life by betraying the queen, and this betrayal is portrayed as a heroic act. The queen is also deceitful throughout this story, but her lies are motivated by selfishness, and she goes out of her way to cause Snow White harm. Through the use of disguises, she fools Snow White multiple times into letting her in and tries to hurt her. People often do not want to believe that someone is lying to them because it is easier to live a trusting life than a suspicious one. There is also evidence of self-deception in this story, in that the queen continually misleads herself into thinking that it is she who deserves the title "fairest of them all."

In "Hansel and Gretel," two children's parents abandon them in the woods in order to avoid all four of them starving. Hansel and Gretel, however, find their way back because Hansel creates a path of stones that they follow. When there is again not enough food for the whole family, the parents drag the children so deep into the woods that the children cannot find their way back. In the forest, they find a house made of bread, cake,



*An illustration by Carl Offterdinger depicts Little Red Riding Hood questioning her "grandmother," whom the wolf has eaten. This fairy tale emphasizes that if characters lie, they are bad; the wolf uses deceit numerous times in the story, and he ends up dead.*

and sugar. An old woman living inside invites them for a meal and makes two beds for them. However, the woman is only pretending to be nice, and is actually a wicked witch who plans to capture, kill, cook, and eat the children. The witch opens the oven and tells Gretel to climb in to see if it is hot enough, but her intention is to close the oven and bake Gretel. Gretel knows what the witch is thinking and pretends that she does not know how to climb inside. The witch becomes frustrated and climbs into the oven to demonstrate. Gretel then shoves her into the oven and frees Hansel. The children then take pearls and precious stones from chests that the witch had been saving, find their way back to their parents' house, and live happily ever after.

In this story, all of the characters lie. The parents tell Hansel and Gretel that they will come

back for them, when they will not. They are selfish and motivated to deceive the children by their desire to keep the little food that they have to themselves. In the process of acquiring what they want, the parents allow Hansel and Gretel to fall in harm's way. The witch pretends to be nice and says that no harm will come to the children, when she actually plans to eat them. Gretel lies when she pretends not to understand the witch's orders to climb into the oven. Her lies are told in order to protect her and her brother from undue harm. Similar to the deception in "Snow White," Hansel and Gretel do not want to believe that they are being lied to—both by their parents and the witch. In the case of their parents, the children wanted to believe that their parents were being honest when they said they would come back for them. With the witch, the children wanted to believe that they were really getting food and a place to sleep because they were hungry and tired.

The story of "Cinderella" portrays a similar theme of good and evil characters lying for a reason. The evil stepmother deceives Cinderella when the girl asks to go to the ball to meet the prince. Over and over again, the stepmother gives her difficult chores to complete within an unfair time limit, and says that if Cinderella succeeds, she may go to the ball. Each time, when Cinderella does as she is told, the stepmother gives her another task. The stepmother ultimately tells Cinderella that she is ashamed of her, and forbids her from going to the ball. Because the stepmother is selfish and wants to give her own daughters the best chance to impress the prince without competition, she deceives and abuses Cinderella. Her tasks are difficult, and her words are hurtful—but she does not care about harming Cinderella; she is determined to get what she wants. Cinderella also lies in the story, pretending to have been asleep upon her stepfamily's return from the ball, although she had been at the ball against her stepmother's orders. She tells this lie to protect herself from harm, because she knows that if her stepmother and stepsisters find out that she was at the ball, they will unfairly abuse and punish her—a fate that she does not deserve.

### Conclusion

Deception is an important moral in many fairy tales, playing a role in plot development and the

message of the tale. There are at least three ways in which this deception presents itself throughout these stories. Deception in fairy tales can be used to teach that bad things happen when people lie, or that only bad people lie. A subtler message emerges in fairy tales that depict both good and bad characters using deception to achieve their goals, and the judgment of whether the lie is acceptable or not is determined by the goal, rather than simply the act of deception. The fairy tales included here are a small sample of stories in this genre that incorporate deception. It is also important to note that while the instances of deception in these tales are almost always the same as they are told and retold, each tale has several different versions as it has been passed from generation to generation and culture to culture.

Melissa Panasci  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect; Brer Rabbit; Cottingley Fairies; Myth; *New York Sun's* Moon Series; Santa Claus.

### Further Readings

- Ekman, Paul. "Why Don't We Catch Liars?" *Social Research*, v.63/3 (1996).
- Folklore and Mythology Electronic Texts. "Three Little Pigs." <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type0124.html> (Accessed September 2012).
- Grimm Brothers' Home Page. "Cinderella." <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/grimm021.html> (Accessed September 2012).
- Grimm Brothers' Home Page. "Hansel and Gretel." <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/grimm015.html> (Accessed September 2012).
- Grimm Brothers' Home Page. "Little Red Riding Hood." <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type0333.html#grimm> (Accessed September 2012).
- Grimm Brothers' Home Page. "Little Snow-White." <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/grimm053.html> (Accessed September 2012).
- Halpern, Diane F. and Alexander E. Voiskounsky. *States of Mind: American and Post-Soviet Perspectives on Contemporary Issues in Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Story Arts Institute Online. "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." <http://www.storyarts.org/library/aesops/stories/boy.html> (Accessed September 2012).

## False Advertising

False advertising, like many other forms of lying and deception, can involve the exaggeration of an item's characteristics. False advertising, however, goes beyond mere exaggeration, and often involves the intentional misrepresentation of a product for the purpose of financial gain.

Dating back to biblical times, deceiving a buyer by misrepresentation in furtherance of a sale is not a new concept. Statutory protection from such deception in the United States today only dates back to the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. Most every state has enacted some form of legislation against unfair and deceptive trade practices. Additionally, the very nature of commercial speech to which advertising rules would apply only enjoys limited protection of freedom under the First Amendment, obscuring the line between allowable puffery and harmful misrepresentation, which may only be resolved in the courtroom.

False advertising encompasses not only the overt expression of an inaccurate material characteristic, but more often includes the omission of a product characteristic, which a consumer would find material to the purchase decision. The latter form of false advertising is the most complicated to regulate because it may be impossible to substantiate the intent to defraud on the part of the seller.

### Federal and State Regulation

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is responsible in part for protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive practices, which are generally the result of improper advertising. The Bureau of Consumer Protection within the FTC is authorized to investigate and litigate cases that are alleged as deceptive or unfair to consumers. Important to note is that it is the Division of Marketing Practices within the Bureau of Competition of the FTC handles some aspects commonly thought of as directly related to consumers, such as fraudulent telemarketing schemes, 900-number programs, and franchise disclosures or business opportunities.

Despite inception of authority in 1914, it was not until the 1970s and pressure by consumer protection groups that the FTC took a more proactive role in regulating advertising and the



misrepresentations so often causing harm. Further enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975 and the establishment of restitution for damages exceeding a paltry \$5 prompted the FTC to set the enforcement of laws regarding false or misleading advertising as a top priority. Additionally, the agency may levy civil penalties of up to \$10,000 for each violation subsequent to an FTC order to cease and desist deceptive activities. The powers of the FTC as a federal agency are founded in interstate commerce, and as such, regulation and enforcement is limited when product vendors fall outside the classification of their jurisdiction.

False advertising and misleading representations for commercial enterprise is also regulated by several other federal agencies having more direct jurisdiction over the subject matter of the goods or service promoted. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was founded in 1934 to regulate broadcast communications, now encompassing radio, television, telephone, and telegraph industries, as well as more recent Internet and cable/satellite communications. While the FCC's primary means of control over false advertising is through the issuance or denial of licensure to broadcast, the power to purge improper ads also exists; close working relations with the FTC are maintained for litigious, prosecutorial measures.

Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction over the advertising of packaged foods and drugs, including labeling and ingredient listing. Founded in the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the FDA has become a more aggressive regulator in recent years, despite the limitations in authority over nutritional claims made in food advertising. The FDA continues to battle false advertising claims regarding commonly used descriptive terms such as "natural," "light," or "fat free," even when vendors defend such claims on the basis of mere puffery in promotion of their products.

The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) maintains control over the use of direct-response mailers involving deceptive or fraudulent advertising. More commonly, a violation under the jurisdiction of the USPS takes the form of utilization of the U.S. mail to receive orders and payments for such falsely advertised products, and many have been prosecuted by the USPS for such violations.

False advertising of products that are not shipped, sold, or promoted outside the geographical confines of a single state may likely fall outside the jurisdiction of federal regulatory control. Most states have enacted some form of uniform unfair and deceptive trade practices act to offer consumer protection under similar circumstances. Often, state statutes carry concurrent prosecutorial opportunities, and may even involve criminal penalties for overtly deceptive false advertising.

### **Characteristics of False Advertising**

Engaging in deceptive trade practices related to false advertising involves representing goods as new when they are deteriorated, altered or reconditioned; representing that goods or services are of a particular quality or grade when they are not; advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expected public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; making false or misleading statements of fact regarding the reason for, existence of, or amount of price reduction; or engaging in any other conduct that similarly creates the likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. False advertising violations are not merely reserved for corporate enterprise but may be perpetrated by any individual engaged in the transfer of goods or services for exchange or value, and this is where the power of state sanctions is likely derived. Individuals engaged in similar acts are equally liable for violations, despite often embraced defensive claims of First Amendment protections for free speech.

The extent to which claims of false advertising lead to violations of deceptive trade often pivots on claims of protected speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Advertising of all forms is done with the intent to generate a commercial transaction between two parties. Commercial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection under the First Amendment because advertising does not necessarily contribute to the democratic decision-making process, and thus is not entirely free to be spoken without restraint. Advertisements by nature are intended to induce a consumer in the utilization of specific goods or services, wherein overtly false advertising may be seen as fraud in the inducement on the part of the vendor. Individuals

engaged in commonplace transactions, such as private sale or personal barter, are equally subject to state restrictions regarding deceptive claims. Often not understood by individuals, the constitutional protections do not extend to misrepresentations, nor do they negate the individual's duty to disclose under some claims of caveat emptor. Misrepresentations of false advertising need not be reserved to overt expressions, but are often prosecuted predicated upon deception from omission of material information with intent to persuade the individual purchase or exchange.

### Omission and Implied False Advertising

The duty to disclose is well established when known defects are present; however, false advertising may also include omission of material

information likely to mislead a consumer. Such deception is punishable under the FTC and most state-derived protection laws. Unlike express representations, in which the deception may be easily determined through examination of the false advertisement, omission of material facts that mislead a consumer is likely to be determined only through extrinsic evidence from consumers that such omission rose to the level of false advertising.

Claims of implied false advertisement are difficult to prove. However, prosecution may be based upon the presumptions of a reasonable consumer that may be misled to his or her detriment from information not otherwise disclosed within the advertisement. A company is not liable for every interpretation that a consumer may derive from the advertisement, nor must the misleading interpretation of a reasonable consumer be the only one derived. When a seller's omission of information conveys more than one meaning to a reasonable consumer, one of which is false, the seller is liable for the misleading interpretation. Similarly, an interpretation will be presumed reasonable if it is the one that the seller intended to convey.

Key to the determination of false advertisement through failure to divulge information is that the nature of the omission must be material to the reasonable consumer's decision. A material characteristic of an advertisement would be useful to a similarly situated consumer when making a decision to purchase or exchange for the advertised goods or services. When knowledge of the omission might have caused the consumer to make a different decision, the failure to disclose such information can be found to constitute false advertising. Equally deceiving may be the implied portrayal of goods or services in a more positive character than they actually are. Claims of materially misleading false advertisement must be investigated by review of the totality of the advertisement as to whether the ad would deceive a reasonably prudent consumer at which the advertisement was targeted.

### Conclusion

False advertising is not a new form of lying and deception, having been around for as long as there have been transactional exchanges between two individuals. Modern regulation after the age of the Industrial Revolution has attempted to define



Around the turn of the 20th century, consumers were offered some "friends" for weight reduction: tapeworms! Even though this "easily swallowed," "sanitized," and "jar packed" product proved ineffective, the Federal Trade Commission did not really focus on deceptive advertising like this until the 1970s.

with specificity the representations of a seller that may otherwise be deceptive or misleading to a consumer. Federal as well as state legislative acts penalize sellers for making false advertisements. When the misrepresentations are derived from omission of material information, or implied portrayal of a product in a better light than in actuality, prosecution of false advertising heavily relies on the interpretation of the entire ad by a reasonable consumer to which the advertisement was directed. Despite the best efforts of regulatory officials, an individual engaged in any form of commercial trade or transaction should always assume some independent responsibility to heed the warning of buyer beware.

Webster B. Baker  
Saint Leo University

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Bible; Caveat Emptor; Colleges and Universities, For-Profit; Consumer Protection Laws; Drug Advertising; Exaggeration; Federal Trade Commission; Marketing, Deceptive; Puffery; Tobacco Advertising.

### Further Readings

- Belch, G. and M. Belch. *Advertising and Promotion: An Integrated Marketing Communications Perspective*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2004.
- Federal Trade Commission. "Policy Statement on Deception." 103 F.T.C. 174 (1984).
- Moriarty, S., et. al. *Advertising Principles and Practice*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2009.
- O'Guinn, T., et. al. *Advertising and Integrated Brand Promotion*. 5th ed. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009.
- Preston, Ivan "Unfairness Developments in FTC Advertising Cases." *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, v.14/2 (1995).
- Shirelle, Phelps, ed. "Consumer Issues." In *Encyclopedia of Everyday Law*. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2003.
- U.S. Congress. The Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §151 (2011).
- U.S. Congress. The Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (2011).
- U.S. Congress. The Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §1501 (2011).

- U.S. Congress. The Magnuson-Moss Act. 15 U.S.C. §2301 (2011).
- U.S. Congress. The Pure Food and Drug Act. 21 U.S.C. §§1-15 (1906).
- U.S. Government Printing Office. "§201. United States Postal Service." <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title39/html/USCODE-2009-title39-partI-chap2-sec201.htm> (Accessed August 2013).

## False Confessions

A false confession is obtained when a person admits or pleads guilty to a crime that he or she did not commit. Skeptics suggest that false confessions are statistically rare. However, when a confession is the primary evidence in a conviction, and the crime is re-examined with new forensic DNA evidence, 25 percent of the time the evidence indicates that the confessor could not have committed the crime.

False confessions have far-reaching consequences, tearing families apart, condemning the innocent to prison for crimes that they did not commit, and damaging the validity of the entire criminal judicial system. If the goals of legal systems are justice, convicting the guilty, and exonerating the innocent, the prevalence of false confessions is in direct contrast to those aims.

### Types of False Confessions

There are three main types of false confessions: voluntary, compliant and internalized false confessions. A voluntary false confession is one in which the suspect freely confesses, without any police interference. Sometimes, these voluntary false confessions are made in order to divert attention from the actual guilty party, such as a friend or relative. Other times, voluntary false confessions are made in order to gain notoriety and attention from the confession, if the crime is making news headlines.

A compliant false confession is given in order to end a stressful situation or police interrogation. The suspect often believes that if one confesses to the crime, one can prove his or her innocence later. Manipulation and coercion by the interrogator

often play a significant role in the attainment of a compliant false confession.

The last type of false confession is the internalized false confession. This type of false confession often requires the suspect to be easily impressionable, such as a child, an elderly person, a person in a heightened state of stress or grief, or someone who suffers from a psychological disorder or certain learning disabilities. In these cases, the interviewer implants the belief of guilt into the suspects' minds through sophisticated manipulation and persuasion in order to make the suspects at first question their memories and then come to accept the interrogators' version of events.

### **Reid Interrogation Technique**

Interrogation techniques that presume guilt initially confront suspects with what seems like insurmountable evidence of their guilt, and are structured to not allow the suspects to directly deny the crimes. Confessions obtained through this type of interrogation have been shown to increase the likelihood of false confessions in susceptible individuals. The work of Elizabeth Loftus on false memories delves into greater detail about the ways in which people can construct false memories, without even realizing that their memories are false. This creation of false memories often leads to false confessions during stressful interrogation.

In the United States, the Reid method of interrogation is the most popular type of police interview technique. While it is a step forward over the use of physical force and food/sleep deprivation, this technique still has flaws, including its susceptibility to false confessions. Critics claim that the Reid method is less concerned with the truth and more concerned with simply obtaining a confession. The Reid method is a two-stage process: Stage one is a nonaccusatory behavioral-analysis interview with the suspect in order to gain trust and rapport, obtain general background information, and determine whether or not the suspect is lying about his or her defense. If the suspect is deemed to be lying, then the interviewer continues to a more aggressive stage two, which consists of a nine-step accusatory-style approach in order to gain a confession.

The problem with the Reid technique, and the reason for the high false confession rate, is

that the approach is based on breaking down the suspects, pushing past their resistance and "denial" in order to gain a confession based on a presumption of guilt. The Reid method involves detaining and isolating the suspects in order to create heightened anxiety, thus weakening the resistance to admission. Though not officially an element of the Reid technique, interrogators have been known to present false incriminating evidence to suspects in order to trick them into believing their guilt.

In the confrontation phase of the interrogation, the interrogator has the ability to present falsified or unsubstantiated information to the suspects, convincing them that they must be guilty. Often, the interrogator will suggest to the suspect that he/she must have blacked out during the crime, which would explain why the suspect does not remember committing it. The unethical use of false evidence and the manipulative tactics often used in conjunction with the Reid interrogation method results in innocent people offering up a false confession as a way to end the long and exhausting interrogation process. If suspects are additionally susceptible, they may come to believe the version of events as presented during the questioning as their own memories.

### **PEACE Interrogation Model**

In other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the PEACE model of interrogation is in place. PEACE stands for Preparation and Planning, Engage and Explain, Account and Clarification, Closure, and Evaluation. This technique is grounded more in fairness, accountability, and the discovery of facts and truth, rather than merely obtaining a confession. The PEACE method does not heavily rely on presenting strong evidence in order to obtain a confession, which drastically reduces the likelihood of a false confession. The PEACE method reduces the number of false confessions that can result from unethical police interrogation tactics, such as lengthy interrogations.

After a suspect has been in an interrogation for 12, 24, or 48 hours, the rate of false confessions drastically increases because suspects are at or near their breaking points and they will do anything to end the interrogation. The PEACE model follows a more formalized and regulated methodical approach to interrogation, with the hope that



suspects will confess to a crime when guilty but will not feel pressured to do so if innocent. The PEACE method, while not as manipulative as the Reid approach, still yields a high confession rate, resulting in some false confessions.

A confession is often seen as very strong evidence and is often enough to convince a jury to convict. In the past, although physical samples were collected at the scene of the crime, science did not have the means to analyze DNA. Scientific advancements in DNA testing from crime scenes have reduced the need for confessions and have provided definitive evidence that false confessions are a problem in any justice system.

False confessions (though counterintuitive) more frequently occur than hoped, partly because of interrogation strategies and findings that individuals' memories are questionable when they are in a susceptible state. However, with modern advancements in science regarding DNA testing and DNA databases, and shifting to new interrogation techniques that do not presume guilt, it is expected that false confessions will become less likely, but still common enough to call into question some confessions' reliability and validity in a court of law.

Joel T. Nadler

Lauren Murphy

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Alibi; Attorneys; Credibility; Disinformation; False Memories; Guilt; Investigator Bias; Justice; Law and Law Enforcement; Manipulation; Perjury; Repressed Memories; Witness, False Testimony of.

### Further Readings

Gudjonsson, G. H. and J. Pearse. "Suspect Interviews and False Confessions." *Psychological Sciences*, v.20 (2011).

Kassin, S. M. "False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, v.17 (2008).

Klaver, Jessica R., Zina Lee, and V. Gordon Rose. "Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.13/1 (2008).

## False Memories

False memories are the difference between guilty and not guilty, reality and fabrication, what happened and what must have happened. False memories are episodic memories created by distortion, suggestion, and sometimes direct manipulation. Most research on false memories has focused on the effects of interrogation and intense counseling sessions. Individuals placed under pressure to recall details from ambiguous memories, or who are presented with strong evidence of an event occurring, may construct false memories that over time become increasingly believable.

How questions are asked can have a strong influence on the memories that are recalled. Strong suggestions or the tone of a question's wording may result in combining separate actual memories that were originally not associated and can even result in implanting completely false memories in an individual's mind. Individuals who have formed false memories are not intentionally lying or deceiving their audience; they truly believe that their memories are recollections of past events. However, there is evidence that individuals are sometimes purposefully deceived in order to facilitate the creation of false memories. False memories naturally occur through the reconstructive nature of memory in everyday life and are not limited to interrogation, experimental, and/or therapeutic settings.

### Creation of False Memories

Contrary to popular belief regarding the nature of memory, the creation of false memories is relatively simple. Studies by Elizabeth Loftus show that when asking questions, the accuracy of the answer and the resulting memory of the event can be strongly affected by the wording of the question. Changing as little as one word in a question can significantly alter the recall of events. Even changing the presupposition of the statement can create false memories. For example, when asking participants that had just watched a traffic video containing no stop sign, "Did you pass a stop sign," versus "Did you pass the stop sign?" memories varied. The participant who receives the question containing the word *the* is more likely to recall passing the stop sign. Additionally,

as time passes, the false memory became stronger and the participant became more confident that there was a stop sign. This occurs because the question implies a correct answer—that there was a stop sign.

Loftus's experiments have also shown that beyond the influence of question wording on memory, completely fabricated memories can be constructed through questioning and suggestion. These experiments start with an event that is known to not have happened and then present that event to the participant as if it were fact, such as a childhood memory. Examples of these implanted memories include having being lost in a shopping mall, being attacked by a wild animal, riding in a hot air balloon, or meeting Bugs Bunny at Disneyland. The participant not only believes that the event occurred, but as time goes on, vividly remembers the event in specific but inaccurate details. Although the events were presented as having happened, participants were never lost in a shopping mall, mauled by an animal, in a hot air balloon as a child, and did not meet Bugs Bunny at Disneyland. Regardless, once they had been convinced that their relatives remembered this happening to them, they would suddenly remember the events and fill in the details.

Memories of impossible events have also been studied using two experimental groups, a hypnotized group and a guided group. The participants in both groups were led to believe that they could remember events just days after they were born. Participants in both groups remembered things such as doctors, nurses, cribs, and hanging mobiles, with 49 percent of the participants believing that these memories were real and expressing confidence that they were accurate. Neurological studies are conclusive that such memories could not exist from this time period of development. Hypnosis was not needed to create false memories. Researchers have shown that wording and misinformation can easily create false memories in experimental settings. There is also ample evidence that false memories are often created during memory recovery therapy.

### **Memory Recovery Therapy**

Memory recovery therapy is controversial, and its critics suggest that all it does is create distorted

or false memories. Experimental investigation has found no increase in the accuracy or amount of information recalled about actual events when using memory recovery therapy. Practitioners using memory recovery therapy are likely to believe that they are serving their clients by helping them to recover lost real memories; however, controlled studies of memory recovery indicate that the creation of false memories is more likely. Clients have been reported to suddenly remember being sexually or physically abused as a child, partaking in satanic rituals, or participating in criminal acts.

Originally, memories recovered in this way were assumed to be real because they were vivid and detailed and the person was convinced the “recovered” memory was genuine. During the 1970s, an epidemic swept through the United States of adults who had attended memory recovery therapy and accused their parents of child sexual and physical abuse. As recovered memory therapy was more frequently used, the recovered memories became increasingly outrageous and more and more cases were found in which the memories could be proven impossible.

There have been several cases in which therapists have been found guilty of malpractice because of implanting provably false memories using recovered memory therapy, resulting in clients receiving monetary compensation. In one explicit case, a woman vividly “remembered” her father impregnating her and then aborting her fetus with a coat hanger; both events were not medically supported. The tragedy of false memories is that once created, they seem just as real and as hard to forget as real trauma.

The real test of memory recovery therapy is that implanting false memories is very easily achieved in experimental settings. Likewise, the presumption that memories can be easily repressed is not supported. Efforts to repress memories in laboratory settings have all failed. Additionally, those that are known to have suffered horrific traumas in real life do not report ever forgetting those experiences.

### **Eyewitness Testimony**

Eyewitness testimonies play a significant role in determining the guilt of those accused of crimes. Just as false childhood memories can be created,

false eyewitness testimonies can be created in a similar way. Questions and wording may mislead the witnesses into believing in false events. Not only can misinformation lead witnesses into recalling false information but there are other factors that can influence a witness's testimony, such as the presence of a weapon or other visual and auditory stimuli present during the crime. Depending on the witness, different aspects of the crime could be considered important. It is often difficult for an individual to successfully remember the entirety of an event while trying to remember both auditory and visual information. Therefore, the witness may put more effort into trying to focus on the perpetrator's appearance, rather than on what the perpetrator was saying during the crime. The visual and auditory stimuli can overlap and interfere with each other, resulting in false memories.

One study examined how accurately a witness recalled visual stimuli when hearing auditory stimuli with an accent. The researchers of this study found that, in fact, when the perpetrator had an accent, there were more errors found when remembering the perpetrator's appearance because the accent became the focus of the witness's perception. The witness focused more on trying to understand what the perpetrator was saying rather than focusing on visual stimuli, such as the appearance of the perpetrator or the presence of a weapon. After a witness has stated a memory once, each additional attempt at recall involves rebuilding their memory, including the information previously stated. This can cause information to become subtly distorted and result in the formation of false memories over time.

Memory recollection serves as a very powerful tool in many court case decisions. False memories can lead to false accusations, false trial outcomes, and false confessions. There have been several court cases in which an innocent individual has pled guilty because they were convinced by false memories that they had participated in the crime. Accused of sexually abusing his two daughters in 1988, Paul Ingram pleaded guilty to a crime of which he was not guilty because of the pressure that he received from his pastor, detectives, and his growing doubts of his memory. Soon after pleading guilty, his two daughters continued to recall events that became so farfetched that the

prosecutor no longer believed them and started to realize that all of the accusations were likely created from false memories. Unfortunately, it was too late for Ingram, who had already pled guilty to the previous false accusations.

Because of the frequency of false accusations, accused parents created the False Memory Foundation in 1992. The foundation is a support group for parents who have been falsely accused by their children because of false memories created during memory recovery therapy or through aggressive police interrogation techniques.

### Reality Versus Fabrication

It is nearly impossible for a person to differentiate between true and false memories once they are created and the individual accepts them as true. However, recent research on the differences between true and false memories has found differences in brain region activity. By examining the encoding phase of memory and then looking at the retrieval phase, researchers have found differences between real and false memories. True memories have been found to create activity in more regions of the brain than false memories. This difference in brain activity may be because of the actual processing of true memories. Higher amounts of activity are seen in the visual regions of the brain when studying true memories. In contrast, when looking at false memories, there is more brain activity in auditory regions of the brain. This suggests that the brain is processing what was actually seen in true memories, and the brain is processing the auditory misinformation it received to recreate false visual memories in false memories.

False memories can occur throughout everyday activities. The creation of false memories can be intentional or not, and they are often created through conversations with others, distortions of actual memories, recovered memory therapy, and intense interrogations. Experiments have found that false memories can be created from misinformation, misleading questions, changes in a question's wording, or the inability to focus on multiple senses during stressful events.

Joel T. Nadler  
Jordan Blackhurst  
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Alibi; Brain; Disinformation; False Confessions; Guilt; Law and Law Enforcement; Manipulation; Perjury; Repressed Memories; Witness, False Testimony of.

### Further Readings

- Loftus, Elizabeth. "Creating False Memories." *Scientific American*, v.277 (1997).
- Mook, D. G. *Classic Experiments in Psychology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004.
- Stark, C. E. L., Y. Okado, and E. F. Loftus. "Imaging in the Reconstruction of True and False Memories Using Sensory Reactivation and the Misinformation Paradigms." *Learning and Memory*, v.17 (2010).

## False Signals

Social situations create an opportunity for individuals to deceive others. False signals, nonverbal and verbal, are meant to deceive, manipulate, or misdirect other(s) in a social situation. There is an abundance of uses for false signals: Businesses illegally manipulate their balance sheets to look financially better than they are, thereby increasing stock prices; disinformation is employed by military systems to misdirect enemy military forces; married couples may snuggle next to each other during the holidays when observed by extended family members, yet file divorce papers a few days later; and children can dramatically clutch their stomachs and moan in pain after being reminded that they have a test at school that morning. False signals are used in a variety of situations, from large scale to dyadic interaction.

### Nonverbal Signals

Nonverbal signals accepted by a cultural group to have a particular meaning can be readily used as false signals. In the overarching American culture, there are many institutionalized nonverbal signals: white-tipped canes designate a blind or visually impaired person, blue lights flashing on a car mean that it is a law enforcement vehicle, and the wearing of scrubs in a hospital indicates that the wearer is an employee. Exhibiting any of these institutionalized signals infers a particular

attached meaning. Thus, a person impersonating a police detective can display a false badge, which in turn will assist another to believe this imposture. False signals assist in deception, particularly when the signal has an accepted meaning.


The usefulness of false signals depends on their reliable meaning to all individuals involved. In other words, the individual displaying the false signal assumes that the other individual(s) will interpret the meaning in a specific manner. This is a fundamental aspect of false signals: The person attempting to deceive another via the use of a false signal(s) will choose a signal he or she assumes will be interpreted in a particular manner. Thus, when shifting from noninstitutionalized signals to other nonverbal signals it is imperative to choose signals that exhibit the meaning desired.

Nonverbal signals are interpreted in a variety of ways; a well-chosen false signal is readily understood in the manner meant to assist with deception. For example, a person wanting a friend to think that she is too sad to continue a conversation may let tears slide down her cheeks until the other ends the conversation; the con artist who wants a potential victim to think that he is infatuated with her may move closer on the sofa until he is resting his leg alongside hers from hip to knee; and the little sister who wants mommy to think that big brother hit her may sit right next to her brother and begin loudly screaming. All of these nonverbal signals are likely to be interpreted as the deceiver desired.

### False Signals Sent Near-Simultaneously

A technique frequently used to solidify the meaning of a false signal is to near-simultaneously send a variety of false signals that agree with each other. To illustrate, note the false signals could be added to the above examples: The sad person would let the tears flow, grab for a tissue, put their hands to their face, and mix hiccups into their attempts at conversation; the con artist might sit close, lean in to the victim, put his arm around her waist, and rest his hand on the curve of her waist; and while the child screams, she might begin to cry while pointing at her brother. In each example, a near-simultaneous multitude of false signals is displayed by the deceiver, all in an attempt to encourage a particular interpretation of the social situation.





*Katie Holmes may have been projecting a false signal of closeness to husband Tom Cruise at the White House Correspondents Dinner, May 9, 2009; she was becoming unhappy with their marriage, which soon unraveled. Cruise, taken aback when Holmes filed for divorce in 2012, stated, "I did not expect that."*

This latter technique of using a multitude of false signals near-simultaneously is particularly important when each of the nonverbal signals has multiple meanings, as do most nonverbal signals. For instance, a person could be cold, angry, or just comfortable folding their arms across their chest; a person could be naturally loud, wanting someone in another room to hear them, or upset when their voice rises; and a person could be a vigorous gesturer, energetic, or furious when their hands wildly gesticulate. None of these nonverbal signals on their own allow another person to interpret them in one particular manner.

However, if a person sends a near-simultaneous multitude of signals, the nonverbal signals that individually could be interpreted in different ways instead coalesce into a particular meaning. If a

man wants to pretend that he is angry, he could begin by folding his arms across his chest, and as the interaction progresses, raise his voice and start wildly gesticulating. Together, these false signals combine to exhibit anger or frustration. This particular near-simultaneous technique allows a variety of nonverbal signals to be employed as false signals; there is no longer any necessity for each nonverbal signal to individually have a particular meaning; instead, the meaning is derived from a combination of nonverbal signals.

Sociologist Erving Goffman discusses a similar concept in his book *Stigma*: disidentifiers. Typically a coherent picture of a person's stigma is created from a variety of interpreted signals. When one or more disidentifiers—or false signals—are intermixed with truthful signals, it is difficult to develop a coherent picture of a person's stigma. People devalue individuals deemed to be stigmatized, thus Goffman claims that many people will attempt to pass as normal, that is, the term he uses to mean not stigmatized. Disidentifiers are one particular technique that individuals use to pass as normal. Thus, a blind person may wear a pair of attractive reading glasses or carry a popular pocket book; blind people do not visually read, so wearing distinctive reading glasses or carrying a printed book places disidentifiers into the mixture of signals that people interpret, making it more difficult to perceive the person as blind. Disidentifiers misdirect individuals from interpreting truthful signals.

### Verbal False Signals

A person can use verbal messages in addition to nonverbal signals. Claiming to be a single person when married, wealthy when poor, or a cat lover when one is not are all examples of verbal false signals. The key when using verbal false signals is similar to that of using nonverbal false signals: The signals should agree with each other, and with both the other verbal and nonverbal signals in the situation. Thus, the person claiming to be single needs to be without a wedding ring or a tan line from a wedding ring, and they shouldn't have an entry in their cell phone that says wife or husband. A woman who claims to be a cat lover, and during an interview for a house-sitting position never pets the cat rubbing against her legs, is sending mixed signals; her words say that she

loves cats but her lack of attention to the pet calling for her attention sends a contrary message. A coherent picture of a pet lover cannot be formed because the near-simultaneous signals fail to agree. Additionally, when verbal and nonverbal signals disagree, most individuals rely on nonverbal signals; there is no scientific evidence to support that nonverbal signals are more truthful than verbal signals, but there is research exhibiting individuals' perceptions of nonverbal signals as having more validity.

Thus, false signals are one of the many techniques used to deceive people with the ultimate goal of misleading, misdirection, deception, or manipulation. The consummate communicator orchestrates with precision a multitude of false signals to create coherent meaning, and in this instance, a meaning representing something other than truthfulness.

Susan A. Stearns  
Eastern Washington University

**See Also:** Accounting; Business; Childhood, Lying in; Con Artist; Disbelief, Suspension of; Goffman, Erving; Linguistic Cues; Lying, Intentionality of; Military Deception; Nonverbal Cues.

#### Further Readings

- Cunningham, Michael. "Is Beauty an Honest Signal or a False Symbol?" *Psycritiques*, v.48/3 (2003).  
Goffman, Erving. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963.  
Smith, Robin James. "Goffman's Interaction Order at the Margins: Stigma, Role, and Normalization in the Outreach Encounter." *Symbolic Interaction*, v.34/3 (2011).

sustaining an overactive imagination into adulthood—has been identified as the prime meridian from which numerous forms of deviance and delinquency stem; this includes the lying acumen and aptitude for deception necessary for a classification of psychopathy.

While a formal clinical or medical diagnosis of psychopathy cannot officially be made, it is a general classification often included in, or found to accompany, any number of contemporaneous personality or mental disorders. Most frequently, these disorders include elements of psychopathy such as antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder, as outlined in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (5th ed.). Psychopathy, which frequently includes these or other underlying disorders, is then generally characterized by conning, manipulative, and egocentric behavior, and is most frequently associated with predatory offenses of a compulsive or cyclical nature that reinforce an offender's need for control, including serial homicide and serial rape.

Building on this typology, Canadian psychologist Dr. Robert Hare, in developing his Hare psychopath checklist, revised (PCL-R), established a menu of 20 characteristics traversing four behavioral facets, from which a numerical score could be used to classify a subject as fitting within a spectrum of psychopathy. With a maximum score of 40, the PCL-R examines key personality traits and lifestyle patterns for evidence of psychopathy, and in theory, enables the forecasting of criminal activity based on the tabulated results. As a type of Myers-Briggs test for deviants, the PCL-R was developed from American psychologist Hervey Cleckley's Cleckley checklist, an index of 16 common characteristics of psychopaths, first published in 1941. Since the 1990s, however, Hare's checklist has prevailed as the leading method used for assessing psychopathy in institutional settings, such as prisons and psychiatric facilities.

Both the Cleckley and Hare checklists include, among other traits such as criminal versatility and habitual lying, categories specifically relating to grandiose self-imagery and being consumed by unrealistic, adolescent fantasies of power or control at the expense of realistic long-term goals. Further research, including interviews with criminal psychopaths studied during the development

## Fantasy and Imagination

Fantasy and imagination play an integral role in childhood social and neural development, and to some extent serve a person's interests across the life course, inspiring everything from research and innovation to the creation and cultivation of art and culture. However, fantasy run amuck—and

of the FBI's Mind Hunter Program (now the Behavioral Science Unit) that was developed during the 1980s by nascent profilers applying Cleckley and Hare's methods, as well as new academics working in what was fast becoming an interdisciplinary area, identified the development of and preoccupation with fantasy as the tipping point that turned conventional psychopaths into violent serial predators. It was determined—using case studies like Ted Bundy, who convincingly camouflaged his sadistic and murderous tendencies with a manufactured exterior persona—that lying and fantasy were mutually inclusive in the case of the most well-developed, and by extension the most dangerous, psychopaths.

While control-based fantasies need not always be accompanied by psychopathic behavior, nearly all cases of psychopathy involve some cultivation of fantasy or imagined relationships to people or places that eventually lead to harm. Lying and rehearsed deception are in turn the means by which the psychopath develops a social mask, and the means by which they conceal the dangerous nature of their fantasies and need to exert control and humiliate others. This explains in part why psychopaths make poor candidates for polygraph examinations, in that their baseline stress responses to lying are negligible, or in some cases are altogether absent because lying becomes a routine activity and a necessary mechanism to sustain their duplicitous identity.

With lying and deception as veritable survival skills of the psychopath, the fantasies of serial offenders typically go beyond mere imagination and mental rehearsal, and eventually take the form of what are known as paraphilia, or a type of prosthetic fantasy tied to bizarre sexual fetishes and objects, as well as nonconsenting participants. While the initial fantasies may or may not be overtly sexual in nature (e.g., of power, admiration, domination, fear, and respect), the paraphilic extensions and implications of those fantasies tend to take on a harmful sexual dimension once the psychopath acts on a particular fantasy—or begins to develop new ones. Common examples of paraphilia include preparatory paraphilia such as exhibitionism, voyeurism, or somnophilia, during which time the subject escalates behavior and intensifies the fantasy. Attack paraphilia include sadism, pyromania, or necrophilia, where

the subject brings the fantasy to climax through the cause of harm to someone or something.

### Dennis Rader

One of the most effective illustrations of the lying-fantasy-paraphilia triad in recent years, and one that underscored the role of the deviant imagination in inspiring serial offending, was that of Dennis Rader, the self-proclaimed Bind, Torture, Kill Strangler. Maintaining the façade of a family man, Lutheran church president, Boy Scout leader, and municipal bylaw enforcement officer, Rader's life was a contradiction, pervaded by snowballing lies as he sought to conceal his various paraphilia, acting them out through the murders of 10 people around Wichita, Kansas, between 1974 and 1991. As a city bureaucrat and community volunteer in his public life, and an elusive serial killer in his private life, Rader protracted his murderous fantasies and life of deception by sending taunting letters to the police and media, apparently inspired by the Zodiac killer who was active in California just prior to the time of Rader's first murders. After Rader's letter-writing scheme and need for attention eventually resulted in his arrest for the killings in 2005, he confessed to all 10 murders (which he dubbed "projects"), citing that in at least one 1977 attack, he admitted to the female victim before tying her up and strangling her that he had a problem in controlling his fantasies, and that he was required to act on them at her expense. In Rader's case, as with many criminal psychopaths, his victims were the only people with whom he was able, or at least willing, to be truthful.

Today, in a digital age defined by indulgence in fantasy, and where projecting an unrealistic and misleading persona is tied to establishing and maintaining social capital, the practice of clinging to malignant fantasies emblematic of psychopathy has become strangely tolerated. The nexus between social media, deception, and psychopathy is actually fairly straightforward, with considerable research already found on lying, conning, and paraphilia in the context of Internet dating and luring, but with little attention thus far paid to the intersection of social media, fantasy, and paraphilia.

As with the exaggerated or outright fabricated online profiles used in the early days of the

Internet, the current World Wide Web and its array of open-source and interactive platforms is ripe for the type of engineered public persona that defines the psychopath, in part because it presents a space where suitable guardianship is comparatively lacking, and where fantasy and imagination, however twisted or injurious, can be explored and experimented with through the anonymity of an imagined or fictitious persona. Identified paraphilia connected to devious fantasy development, such as Internet trolling and cyberbullying as digital forms of scatologia (the sending of insulting, harassing, or obscene communications in order to elicit a response), and the compulsive viewership of profiles or “creeping” as a digital version of both voyeurism and erotomania (sexual obsession with strangers as a precursor to stalking), complement everyday examples of fantasy achieved through the generally narcissistic and exhibitionistic architecture of social media.

### John Edward Robinson

Using the screen name Slavemaster when luring victims via Internet chat rooms during the early days of Web 1.0, John Edward Robinson epitomizes the means by which digital technologies can be exploited by paraphilic predators whose lying and deception had previously found comparatively benign outlets. As a seasoned con man, forger, fraudster, and professional liar, Robinson misrepresented his financial status, education, and occupation to gain the trust of victims looking for discreet online personal encounters, eventually becoming known as the Internet’s first serial killer. Having already obtained valuables and employment by artifice, Internet chat rooms as nascent social media sites afforded Robinson the opportunity to expand on his lies, and in turn, to act on criminal paraphilia that had been festering for some time, but lacked a conduit.

Taking what he learned from years of embezzling investors with Ponzi schemes and fraudulent shell companies, Robinson—whose significant criminal record showed no previous indications of violence—used his same manipulative tricks, honed through various financial scams, to procure a new type of victim in a bid for fantasy fulfillment. After victims arrived at his secluded farm expecting a job opportunity or a prearranged intimate encounter, Robinson tortured and beat

to death at least eight women between 1993 and 2000, before then stuffing their bodies into steel drums he stored across state lines. Following his conviction for three of these murders in 2003, Robinson confirmed that there were additional victims waiting to be found, but continued to indulge his fantasies from death row, reveling in ongoing attention by toying with authorities and victims’ families while refusing to divulge further details or locations of the bodies.

The Robinson case is noteworthy in terms of the slippery slope that virtual technologies present with respect to fantasy fulfillment among psychopaths, whose paraphilia had previously remained latent or idling in the preparatory phase. In examining crime records dating back to 1800, not only have over 96 percent of recorded serial killers like Robinson emerged in the United States and Canada since 1990, but the numbers also seem to be compounding. In fact, there have been more identified and arrested serial killers in the last 10 years than in the previous 25; this, in spite of the fact that the overall murder rate in both Canada and the United States is at a generational low.

The role of technological determinism—the influence of technology on human behavior and culture, and its ability to dictate events—is a significant factor in this unsettling trend. As in Robinson’s case, technology seems to parlay an existing aptitude for deception, and allows psychopaths to tap into deeper-seated and otherwise suppressed violent fantasies with extreme consequences that transcend the virtual world of the Internet. The convergence of social media and paraphilia in particular warrants additional scholarly exploration, and is bound to become an increasing area of saliency in the study of how degenerate fantasy-control impulses are enabled by the transparently deceptive nature of online social networks.

Michael Arntfield  
*University of Western Ontario*

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Deception and Technology; Fairy Tales; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Investment Fraud; Pathological Lying; Psychoanalysis; Reality Monitoring; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.



### Further Readings

- American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. 5th ed. Arlington, VA: APA, 2013.
- Douglas, J. E. *Inside the Mind of BTK: The True Story Behind the Thirty-Year Hunt for the Notorious Wichita Serial Killer*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008.
- Harrington, B., ed. *Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Hickey, E. W. *Serial Murderers and Their Victims*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2013.
- Schimek, J. G. *Memory, Myth, and Seduction: Unconscious Fantasy and Interpretative Process*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

---

## Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had its beginnings in 1903 as the Bureau of Corporations, established by President Theodore Roosevelt. The Clayton Antitrust Act officially established the FTC in 1914 in response to the increasing number of monopolies in the U.S. economy. It was not until 1938 that the FTC's authority expanded beyond antitrust efforts to include "unfair and deceptive acts or practices" in business and advertising. The FTC's authority further expanded in 1975 to include creation and enforcement of across-the-board trade regulations for industry segments.

A five-member commission heads the FTC. The president appoints commissioners for a seven-year term, following approval by the U.S. Senate. No more than three members of the commission may be from the same political party. The president selects a chairperson from the commission's five members. The chairperson appoints the executive director, who must then be confirmed by commission members. The executive director is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the FTC. There are three bureaus within the FTC: the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the Bureau of Competition, and the Bureau of Economics.

The public is most visibly affected by the Bureau of Consumer Protection, which oversees the FTC's consumer fraud and detection efforts. The Federal Trade Commission Act established the commission's authority over false advertising.

### False Advertising

The act defines deceptive advertising as "misleading in a material respect," which means that the average consumer would be misled by the advertising. The definition does not include all misconceptions that a person could have about an advertisement. For example, it is not deceptive to call a breakfast item "French toast," even though the toast was not made in France. The number of individuals who would be misled by the use of this phrase would be insignificant compared with the masses who understand that "French toast" does not mean the toast was made in France. Unreasonable interpretations by a small segment of the audience do not cause the ad to be considered "deceptive" by the FTC. It is when there is more than one meaning expressed to "reasonable" customers that are untrue that the advertisement can be deemed misleading.

Not only can ads be deceptive for what they say, but they can also be deceptive for what they omit. Failure to disclose salient information required by the average consumer can also be considered "deceptive." Omission cases are handled in a similar manner to cases involving stated deception. The standard of a "typical buyer" is used by the FTC and the federal courts to decide if the lack of disclosure was misleading.

The U.S. Supreme Court in 1977 upheld the FTC's authority to protect special audiences, such as children, older adults, and terminally ill patients. These subgroups may receive special consideration in fraud cases. The FTC uses the standard of the sophistication level of the audience in determining if advertising practices are fraudulent. Likewise, the standard for determining deception is lower if the audience has specialized knowledge, as in the case of medical professionals exposed to pharmaceutical advertising.

### FTC Action in Deception Cases

Deception cases brought before the FTC generally have three common elements. The first is a depiction, omission, or act that will likely mislead most

buyers. Some examples of this are deceptive price claims, bait-and-switch techniques, unsatisfied warranty claims, sales of hazardous or defective products, and misleading pyramid schemes. Most of these types of deceptions or omissions involve either written or oral falsifications. However, sales activities or practices are also taken into consideration by the FTC if they mislead consumers. Failing to provide services specified within a contract can also be considered deceptive.

The second element is the reasonability of the claim or sales activity through the eyes of an average consumer. If the average person would find the action or communication misleading, then the activity or advertisement would be considered deceptive by the FTC.

The third element is “materiality,” which means that the false practice or advertising significantly influenced the consumer’s purchase decision. If the consumer’s belief in the misrepresentation in turn brought some type of injury or loss, then the FTC considers the conduct or communication to be misleading or untruthful.

One aspect of materiality that has been a focus of the commission is substantiation of advertising claims. If ads make claims such as “studies show” or “doctors recommend,” the business entity is required to have validation of the claim prior to advertising. If that claim is found to be untrue and had a significant impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions, the FTC can seek penalties for the unsupported or untruthful advertising claim.

The FTC considers ads in their entirety to determine whether deception occurred. For example, if the headline of an ad is deceptive, but the truth is included in the fine print, then the FTC would consider the ad misleading because the average person would likely read the headline and not the fine print. Disclaimers may not protect companies from deceptive advertising claims. Expressed opinions can also be considered misleading if the qualifications of the person stating the opinion are misrepresented, causing the buyer to be influenced or consider the opinion to be fact.

The commission can issue cease-and-desist orders until such matters can be resolved through the judicial system; however, the accused has 60 days before the cease-and-desist order takes

effect. As a result, injunctions are typically filed through the court system because these become effective upon issuance. Because the commission lacks punitive powers, the FTC brings civil charges against offending businesses and industries, and it is up to the federal courts to assess the recommended penalties.

Punishments for violating truth in advertising regulations can be stiff. Google paid \$22.5 million in 2012 for placing cookies in the Apple Safari browser. Google previously said that it would not place tracking cookies in the Safari browser, nor would it place targeted ads for users. Scareware Scammer was hit with a \$163 million fine for fake software ads that it ran on the World Wide Web from 2000 to 2008.

In addition to its responsibility to police truth in advertising, the commission has the authority to issue industry-wide regulations. Some recent examples of this rule-making authority include the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, which allowed consumers to take themselves off telemarketing call lists, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, which prevented collection of personal information from children.

### Technology and the FTC

Technology changes the purview of the FTC. While once primarily interested in advertising, the FTC is now involved in online privacy issues, identity theft, robocalls, and Internet auction scams. Technology is also helping the FTC’s law enforcement efforts. The FTC operates the Consumer Sentinel, which is an online database available to more than 2,000 law enforcement agencies. This database provides information that helps local and state officials assist with finding individuals involved in fraudulent consumer activities.

Eilene Wollslager  
*University of Texas at San Antonio*

**See Also:** Advertising, Business; Consumer Products; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Consumer Protection Laws; False Advertising; Financial Markets; Greenspan, Alan; Justice; Law and Law Enforcement; Madoff, Bernard; Marketing, Deceptive; Spin, Corporate.

---

**Further Readings**

Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).

“Federal Trade Commission.” <http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/> (Accessed January 2013).

FTC Office of the General Counsel. “A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority” (2008). <http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrw.shtm> (Accessed January 2013).

Miller, James C. “FTC Policy Statement on Deception.” (October 14, 1983). <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm> (Accessed January 2013).

U.S. Congress. Federal Trade Commission Act, 717 (2009).

---

## Feigned Retreat

Feigned retreat is a strategic form of deception implemented as a tactic in military warfare. The enemy is manipulated to believe that the army is retreating, when in fact the enemy is being led into a more vulnerable position that allows the army to gain a competitive advantage. This military tactic has been employed as long as war conflicts have been recorded and is considered a complex method with high risk, as it entails a large number of disciplined soldiers to make the retreat appear genuine. Feigned retreat is an effective strategy that has played a role in the defeat of many empires and armies throughout history.

In Homer’s story *The Iliad* the Greeks were in a 10-year stalemate with the Trojans during the Trojan War (between 1260 and 1240 B.C.E.). To get behind Troy’s city walls, the Greeks constructed a large wooden horse, hid select men inside of it, and presented the gift to the Trojans while pretending to sail away and abandon the siege. This “peace offering” led the Trojans to believe the war was over. However, the Greek soldiers hiding within the horse opened the gate and finally were able to penetrate the indestructible walls of Troy to put an end to the war.

### Famous Battles Using Feigned Retreat

In the Battle of Thermopylae (480 B.C.E.), the Persian Empire of Xerxes I attempted to invade

Greece, but the Greek city-states formed an alliance, led by King Leonidas of Sparta, to stop the army. The Greek army, composed of 300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, and 400 Thebans, blocked the pass of Thermopylae from the Persian advance. The Spartans used the tactic of feigned retreat during the first day of the battle to break their formation and then turn and kill their pursuers.


The Roman defeat by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae (216 B.C.E.) is considered one of the greatest tactical feats in military history. The Roman army was composed of over 86,000 soldiers, while the Carthaginian army had roughly 40,000. During the battle, Hannibal remained in the center of his forces, where the strength of the army was the weakest. As the Roman army attacked, the infantry retreated. As it retreated, the Roman army slowly found itself positioned in a tight semicircle. The Roman troops in the front line chased the retreating troops, causing the troops in the middle to be pinched in. This pinching action reduced the space for the Roman troops to maneuver their weapons. Eventually the troops lost cohesion as the gap narrowed.

Although the Roman infantry was in a vulnerable position, Hannibal defeated the Romans by ordering the cavalry to attack at the rear. It is one of the earliest instances of a popular military strategy called the pincer movement. Feigned retreat is the fundamental tactic used in order for the pincer movement to work. The battle resulted in Hannibal’s victory and is one of the greatest defeats of the Roman army. To this day, the strategy represents the archetypal battle of annihilation.

The Mongolian empire, under Genghis Khan, frequently feigned retreat to conquer nearly all of Asia, the Middle East, and parts of eastern Europe. Most often during a battle the Mongols would pretend to panic and run away to draw the enemy out, only to turn around and attack. Eventually, frequent enemies of the Mongols learned this strategy. The Mongolians countered this by feigning retreat for days, even weeks, in order to convince the enemy that they were defeated. Once the enemy let its guard down or broke formation, the Mongols would then attack the weakened army.

The Battle of Kalka River (1223), between the Mongol Empire and the Rus’ army and its allies, is one noteworthy example of Mongolian





*The Bayeux Tapestry, thought to be commissioned in the 1070s by Bishop Odo of Bayeux, half-brother of William the Conqueror, depicts Norman knights and archers at the Battle of Hastings. During William the Conqueror's attack on the English in 1066, his army became overwhelmed and retreated down the hill. After being chased by the enemy, however, William was able to rally his troops and engage in a successful counterattack. As the retreat was unintentional, there are scholarly disagreements over whether it was truly a feigned retreat.*

fighting strategy. The Rus' army initially defeated the Mongol rearguard and the Mongols began to retreat. The Rus' pursued the Mongols, forcing their army to spread out over a large distance. Simultaneously, the Mongols made their formation at the Kalka River. The Rus' army did not wait for the rest of its troops to arrive and, as a result, was defeated. This caused confusion for the rest of the Rus's army and resulted in its surrender.

In rare cases, feigned retreat may occur accidentally. One such example is the Battle of Hastings (1066), which occurred during the Norman conquest of England. William the Conqueror was attacking the English, but the English had an advantageous position at the top of a hill and a shield wall that William's army was unable to penetrate. When victory seemed unlikely, the Breton division of William's army broke off and started fleeing down the hill. After the Breton division retreated, his Norman and Flemish divisions followed. The English chased the fleeing army, slaughtering as they went. During this time, William's horse was killed and many of his soldiers thought he had died, leading to an even greater

rout within the army. William took off his helmet to show his troops he was still alive and was able to rally the fleeing troops. The English, who were chasing after the army, broke their formation and did not realize they were in a counter-attack until it was too late. The battle turned to William's advantage, and he was able to achieve victory. It is arguable as to whether the feigned retreat was intentional or not. If intentional, the Normans successfully used feigned deception as a tactic to break the English formation. If it was unintentional, then the retreat was not feigned but accomplished the same effect given William's ability to rally his troops.

Feigned retreat relies on misleading an opposing army into falsely believing that the other army is retreating. The tactic of feigned retreat has a long history, from some of the earliest recorded battles, and continues to be deployed in modern warfare.

Andrew Bass  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Brian Mayer  
Cornell University



**See Also:** Camouflage; Civil War, U.S.; Department of Defense, U.S.; Military Deception; Mimicry; Trojan Horse.

### Further Readings

Alexander, Bevin. "Feigned Retreat." <http://bevinalexander.com/excerpts/early-wars/feigned-retreat.htm> (Accessed January 2013).

Davis, Paul K. *Masters of the Battlefield: Great Commanders From the Classical Age to Napoleonic Era*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.

## Fiction

Any imaginative tale that is composed of characters working their way through circumstances and events is a fiction; therefore, a fiction can be a lie, an observation that is in keeping with the term's derivation from French and Latin precursors whose meaning is closer to lying. Nevertheless, current use of the term *fiction* is more commonly associated with storytelling for entertainment; thus, bookstores abound with fiction and nonfiction.

The creation of fiction in this sense is not lying, because such stories are contextualized by signals of a sort described by George Herbert Mead, signals that indicate this is play and that the story being told is one that only exists in imaginative space for the sake of pleasure. Whenever an untruth is marked untrue in its telling, even if only through contextualizing actions and gestures (for example, by tickling the listener or winking while telling the tale), it is regarded by the receiver as an entertaining imaginative pleasure, not as a lie.

Nevertheless, the expression "pure fiction" may be used when characterizing a lie, and various stories told as true ultimately come to be regarded as elaborately framed misrepresentations or obfuscations of the truth, in effect lies. Robert Coles, for example, makes clear that Erik Erikson grew up under the fiction that Theodor Homburger was his father. Similarly, the Warren

Commission report, "Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy," has been regarded as a fiction by many who claim the assassination was a conspiracy. Characterizing such reports as fictions (instead of saying "lies") minimizes the defamation of the accusation while nevertheless asserting the existence of a deliberate inaccuracy.

It is uncommon and usually colloquial to refer to an isolated statement (for example, "The door is locked") as a fiction, although this usage may be appropriate if the statement referenced clearly sits within a more complex narrative, particularly if that narrative is literary (for example, "Orson Welles's radio announcement that Martians had landed in upstate New York was a fiction"). In any case, a fiction is not regularly, and certainly not exclusively, regarded as a lie.

### Forms and Values of Literary Fiction

Fiction is a term that loosely describes, then, that class of stories both imagined and invented outside the constraints of historical accuracy. While actual events may play roles in a fiction, as for example World War II plays a role in *The Danzig Trilogy* by Günter Grass, the primary tale in a fiction remains, necessarily, an invention. Thus, every made-up tale is a fiction; therefore, when one says that a tale is a fiction one hardly says anything at all. It is for this reason that, while the term *fiction* suffers this common usage, a more precise usage tends to exist within literary studies, in which fictions are discussed as if they are distinct from: (1) mythological inventions (for example, "Demeter and Persephone"), because they have not risen to archetypal status within the culture; (2) folk legends and fairy tales (for example, "King Arthur and His Knights" and "The Frog Prince"), because they did not participate in centuries of oral retellings broadly distributed across a culture; and (3) classics (for example, *Don Quixote*), because they have not been assigned a place among the masterpieces of human history.

Myths, legends, fairy tales, and classics could all be called fictions, just as mink coats, overalls, and a Santa Claus costume can all be called clothing. No tailor would fail to see the differences in type, however, nor would any avid reader fail to recognize the realms of fiction.

For this reason, the term *fiction* regularly finds itself attached to some significantly defining adjective, which provides a sense of whether one is looking at the works of a great and senior contemporary, such as Gabriel García Márquez, or the rambling, narrative vagaries of an eighth-grade student completing an English assignment. On occasion, therefore, a work of fiction may be referred to as “published fiction” or even a “magisterial work of fiction.” Another fiction may be characterized as pulp, as vulgar, or even pornographic. Still another might be characterized as masterful, a masterpiece, a soon-to-be classic. In all such cases, it remains fiction; yet it finds itself distinguished from the shredded leavings of half-wrought stories and homework assignments. An author thus manages to surpass the platitude that he has written a fiction when the work achieves “escape velocity,” that is, when it gathers a literary character and a literary force significant enough to break the gravitational pull of insignificance and historical irrelevance that attends the word *fiction* when it is used to identify the very bottom of the tale.

The exemplary critic Northrop Frye, who enjoyed and studied all forms of storytelling, offers time as the natural force that determines the value of a text; effectively, his claim is a comment regarding the erasability of a written work. Has, will, or can the work be eliminated from the literary canon without consequence? Consider, for example, the remarkable popularity of novelists such as Irwin Stone, Irving Wallace, and Herman Wouk during the mid-20th century. Will these authors persist in the fashion of Thomas Hardy, Charles Dickens, and Jane Austen in England; of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy, and Nikolai Gogol in Russia; of 19th-century writers Herman Melville, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Edgar Allan Poe in the United States, or their 20th-century American successors John Steinbeck, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and William Faulkner? It takes no clairvoyant to answer; these authors’ erasure is more than noticeable already.

Yet if disappearance in time is the phenomenon that gainsays a fiction’s mediocrity, then one has not discovered an explanation, merely a tautological assemblage. To further explore the erasability of literary fiction it is useful to examine the idea of latitudinarianism as described

and named by Kenneth Burke. A neologism best remembered as something to be forgotten, the term can, nevertheless, draw attention to the “stretchable”—the observation that words and phrases meaning one thing are inevitably stretched until they stand for something else altogether. Burke saw this in language, in morals, and in literary forms, and to that end he himself wrote elongated fiction of a sort—a fiction so experimental, so innovative, as to be virtually unreadable and unforgivably boring. A work of fiction reaches escape velocity only when it is vibrantly elastic, and while some fiction exercises some stretching upon the nature of storytelling, fiction should, in principle, do so in a manner that makes the experience of reading a better one, rather than a worse.

### Stretching Fiction

Fiction may be formally, structurally, normatively, or morally stretched. When it is formally stretched, the author struggles to surpass the literary customs associated with storytelling. Compare for example the classical opening, “Once upon a time” with James Joyce’s opening for *Finnegan’s Wake*: “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s,” a phrase that is needed to complete the last sentence of the book. Edgar Allan Poe also stretches the formal character of “The Tell-Tale Heart” by employing a madman as narrator, and Anna Sewall achieves a similar effect in *Black Beauty* by telling the tale through the eyes of a horse. In these formal stretches by virtue of narrative voice, one can see the evolution of new conventions; a tale told by a chicken will hardly cause a stir at this point in the development of literary form.

When a work is structurally stretched, the conventional logic of tale-telling is surpassed. One can see this sort of stretching in *A Christmas Carol* by Charles Dickens, in which the structural conventions of beginning, middle, and end are challenged because Scrooge is conveyed, in a single evening, through all the times in his life, across events that have already transpired. Effectively an exercise in memory as sense-making, *A Christmas Carol* thus transcends the structural conventions of plot. These conventions point in the direction of Marcel Proust’s *Remembrance of Things Past*, which replaces the chronological ordering of events, starting at the immediate,

with a retroactive synthesizing of memories into a totality of meaning. This method of storytelling is used to perfection, because of the economy of language, by Ernest Hemingway in his eclectic debut volume, *In Our Time*. In Hemingway, the seemingly disjointed passages and stories fall into a singularity when they are positioned through the moments of consciousness experienced by Nick as he fishes at the very end of the collection. Such stretching of structural conventions replaces the traditional pleasure of wondering what happens next with the pleasure of wondering how the various recollected experiences might be synthesized into a singularity of meaning.

When a work is normatively stretched, typical behavioral expectations organizing popular fiction are characteristically abandoned. This is the strategy of Tom Robbins (*Even Cowgirls Get the Blues*), John Irving (*The Hotel New Hampshire*), and J. D. Salinger (*Franny and Zooey*). Characters in such works are typified in ways that make it harder to identify with them (for example, Meursault in *The Stranger* by Albert Camus); they have objectives that audiences do not regard as typical (for example, the narrator's intent in Poe's "The Tell-Tale Heart" to kill the old man because he had an "evil eye"). The story may move to an ending that audiences would not anticipate as desirous. For example, the crushing of Anna's head in Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenina* or Raskolnikov's choice of prison as the context for his freedom in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*. Authors who would successfully stretch audiences toward such innovations must reach deeply within the fiction, beneath its surface character, and into the motivational apparatus that informs their work.

Thus, while Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea* seems to be about nothing more than catching a big fish, it is propelled by the quasi-Hegelian idea that the human spirit yearns to transform its essential and invisible truth into an object that others are compelled to acknowledge. The old man, Santiago, is driven to show the world what he is beneath the surface of his narrow and impoverished life, where dwells his implacable will. This is initially suggested when he recalls his all-night, arm-wrestling contest; but it is lived most fully in his struggle to catch and

bring home the largest marlin ever seen. Here, the reader is to identify with an aspect of human nature much deeper than the norms associated with fish and fishing—the impulse to form and to show to the world, from the realm of one's spirit, an objective correlative for what one is, in a work of art.

When a work is morally stretched, the moral logic of tale-telling is, to use Friedrich Nietzsche's term, *transvalued*, an objective commonly thought realized in the more recent Disney productions, which have struggled to appear racially and ethnically diverse. Diversity now being a convention, however, one might better refer to the novels of Thomas Hardy, which in their time issued such powerful challenges to the mores that he had to stop writing them, at his wife's request, lest the couple be completely excommunicated from society. Joris-Karl Huysmans, the French novelist of the late 19th century, can also be cited as an author who challenged conventions; his novel *Against the Grain* treated the issue of homoeroticism.

Whenever a work is stretched effectively, the innovation is not a burden; rather it increases audience pleasure, a notion that is critical to any understanding of escape velocity within the work. Vibrant elasticity is grounded in the notion that all the formal, structural, normative, and moral characteristics of literature can suffer the effect of saturation. Should that occur, the work no longer stimulates the imagination because the expectations specific to the narrative fall short of the audience's ability to anticipate them.

The principle is a simple yet critical one. At the age of 4, everyone appreciates "Ba Ba Black Sheep," but not so much at age 7, and certainly not at 17; while this illustrates only the relationship between standards as they change during the individual's development, it can equally be said of standards and the way they change as a culture develops. Vibrant elasticity gives to fiction its ever-renewing vitality and, to the individual works, the rationale for ascension.

A work of fiction that makes no effort to vitally stretch the possibilities of fiction is quite easy to write because it traffics in conventions that organize the process. A writer of conventional fiction cruises the highway of conventional literary logic; a writer of vibrantly elastic

fiction builds his or her own road. In any case, this is why liars can so easily make up fictions to cover their trails; their fictions are not concerned with the entertainment value of the story, and they only focus on narrative logic to the extent it will give them advantage in their relational context, making their fictions elementary in terms of innovation and structure.

One should not be impressed by a talent for such fictions, therefore, as it is a narrow one; the formal, structural, normative, and moral characteristics of mere fiction are as elementary, in their own fashion, as the regulations governing trivial rhyme. Literary fiction has an elaborate nature in which the author is serious, and it takes time to create. Mere fiction flows forth as little more than a juxtaposition of conventions; the tale, in effect, tells itself in its interminable repeatability. While it may delight its audiences because its conventions fit perfectly the conventions that they live, there is little else to recommend it.

Of course, there are exceptions. A person of romantic sensibility, for example, such as the young woman in Saki's "The Open Window" may delight in the literary weaving of a lie, and therefore craft it with delicacy. There are also remarkable fabrications, untruths of intricate complexity because they have been made up by collectives and across time. The various stories characterizing the death of John F. Kennedy are largely fictions of this sort. One of the stories, possibly the official story, might be regarded as the real story, but the rest, complex and innovative and shaped across the decades by numerous imaginations, are fictions so powerful that they have been, in some cases, put to paper or the screen.

### Role of Lying in Fiction

Lying itself can play a role in the content of a fictional work. For example, given that morality tales are common in fiction, the tale of the liar is one that is well known even to the youngest child who has been told the story of Chicken Little. The Sherwood Anderson short story "I'm a Fool" is an exemplary work of fiction in this form, being about a boy whose fortunes are ruined when he starts a relationship with others by lying. Similarly, Kurt Vonnegut's novel *Mother Night* traces the deceptions given and received by Howard W. Campbell, Jr., in a

manner that valorizes the moral claim that a life of lies leads to spiritual death.

Aside from morality tales organized around lying as a thematic center, there are countless liars in fictional works. Tellers of lies and deceivers include, for example, the comparatively benign and certainly lovable Tom Sawyer of the Mark Twain novels, the Machiavellian Wickham of Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*, and the slithering Uriah Heep of Dickens's *David Copperfield*. Among those deceptions specific to fiction are included deceptions of identity (for example, the pauper who acts as a prince in Twain's *The Prince and the Pauper*), deceptions of allegiance (for example, Iago creating the deception that he is an ally to Othello in William Shakespeare's play of that name), deceptions of intention (the Princess in the Brothers Grimm's "The Frog Prince" lying about her intention to love and care for the frog if he retrieves her golden ball from the well), and deceptions of attitude (for example, Uriah Heep's deception that he was humble and cared only to give good service, as presented in *David Copperfield*).

### Lying, Deception, and Plot Structure

Whereas plot typically relies upon the tension of irresolution, it needs structural features that drive apart characters and outcomes that "naturally" belong together. Misunderstanding of many forms can do this, but the lie and deception are exemplary because they arise out of forces of wickedness (as opposed to accident) within the text, theoretically increasing the yearning for resolution within the audience.

While it is impossible to offer a complete theory of fiction and the lie here, the elementary structure works as follows: (1) Characters and events are presented as they traverse a path that seems natural to them; (2) a deceiver or a liar creates falsehoods that shift these characters from the motivations of their primary path; (3) the characters travel along these improper paths, further driven into unnaturalness by misunderstanding, complications, additional deceptions, and lies; (4) the false pathway they have been set upon approaches a crisis, after which the natural pathway will no longer be available; (5) the deception that initiated the false pathway is discovered; (6) the characters retrace the



erroneous logic (including the discursive and generally performative corruptions) that have led them to their untenable positions and false destinies; (7) the characters reclaim their proper destinies through narrative processes that are specific to the genre; and (8) the wicked are punished and the good triumph.

Comedy and romance typically have this sort of ordering. In tragedy and irony, by contrast, events proceed of a piece up through the fourth stage, after which the deception, though it is discovered, brings on ruin (as exemplified by Shakespeare's characters King Lear, MacBeth, Hamlet, Romeo, and Juliet). Variants of this model can be found in stories ranging from those recorded by the Brothers Grimm to the novels of Cormac McCarthy.

Performative deception may also be used in a comedy of misunderstanding, as it was in the

18th-century Oliver Goldsmith play *She Stoops to Conquer*. Subversion as a literary innovation and delight has also led to the triumph of the lie and the liar as an ordering possibility in fictional form; Keyser Söze in *The Usual Suspects* and Mark Bellison in *The Invention of Lying* are cinematic examples of such characters. However, even children are taught the occasional necessity of deception (for example, The Wizard in *The Wizard of Oz*), as well as the lovability of the liar (for example, *Pinocchio*), and the fun that comes from being with a liar (e.g., *Pippi Longstocking*). The triumph of the lie was emblematic in the *Seinfeld* television series.

Fictions may be told within fictions, as was the classic story of Pyramus and Thisbe retold in comedic form within Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. In this light, one thinks of



The painting *Ask Me No More* (1906) by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema depicts Pyramus and Thisbe of Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. The nested story of the two tragic lovers is a fiction within a fiction, told in comedic form within the play. Shakespeare achieves the effect of confusing merely outward appearance and reality by constructing characters that use disguises to hide their true motivations from each other and the observer.

course of Hamlet's play within a play, and the famous lines, "The play's the thing with which I'll catch the conscience of the king."

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** Audience; "Boy Who Cried Wolf"; Brer Rabbit; Fairy Tales; *Great Gatsby*, *The*; Historical Narratives, False; Humor; Iago (Shakespeare's *Othello*) *Invention of Lying*, *The*; Memoirs; Movies, Lying in; Myth; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Pinocchio; Sawyer, Tom; Tall Tales; *War of the Worlds*.

### Further Readings

- LaBounty, David. "'Liar! Liar! Pants on Fire!' The Liar as Educator in Children's Literature." *The Looking Glass: New Perspectives on Children's Literature*, v.8/1 (2004). <http://www.the-looking-glass.net/index.php/tlg/article/view/189/188> (Accessed January 2013).
- Smyth, John Vignaux. *The Habit of Lying: Sacrificial Studies in Literature, Philosophy, and Fashion Theory*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Wood, James. *How Fiction Works*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008.
- Zunshine, Lisa. *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006.

## Financial Markets

Deception in financial markets involves the practice of influencing asset prices and bringing unfair market gains to the manipulator. Deception is often created by rigging information or prices to entice investors to buy or to sell. Methods for financial deception include repo transactions, Ponzi schemes, fraudulent financial statements, and false incentives to consumers and investors. Some of the most famous examples of financial deception are the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) fixing, the Enron Scandal of 2001, and the Lehman Brothers scandal of 2008. Financial regulations are designed to prevent deception in financial markets, although it is difficult to detect and prevent acts of financial deception.

### Lehman Brothers Scandal

In understanding financial deception, it is important to first look at the most prominent historic financial deceptions and understand how they occurred and how they were unveiled. An important historic example of these financial manipulations is that of the Lehman Brothers scandal. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, a global financial services firm, filed for bankruptcy with \$639 billion in assets and \$619 billion in debt on its company balance sheet, representing the largest bankruptcy filing in history. In 2003 and 2004, Lehman acquired five mortgage lenders that practiced Alt-A loans, which are loans made to borrowers without full documentation. Lehman was also securitizing subprime mortgages, which are mortgages made to borrowers with a low credit score. In February 2007, Lehman's stock reached a record high of \$86.18, which made its market value close to \$60 billion. (Market value is the quoted price at which an investor can buy or sell a share of a company at any given time.) This market value, however, was deceptive given that revenue was being generated by mortgages to borrowers without a full credit report and to investors with a low ability to make timely mortgage payments.

The mortgage market crash in March 2007 exposed Lehman's poor securitization practices. Lehman's chief financial officer, however, stated that the risks posed by rising home delinquencies were well contained and would have little to no impact on the firm's earnings; he added that he did not foresee a problem in the subprime market spreading to the rest of the housing market. As the credit crisis began to hit its peak in August 2007, Lehman's stock suffered a dramatic decline. The company eliminated 2,500 mortgage-related jobs and shut down its Alt-A lenders in three states. Lehman stated that these were major changes for the company, but it would remain stable in the hope of retaining investors.

Unfortunately, Lehman had taken on an unusually high ratio of debt to equity. This leverage, coupled with Lehman's high exposure to mortgages, an unstable asset class at the time, made the firm vulnerable to default, a possibility that was not publicized. Investors who believed Lehman's public statements that it was stable and not vulnerable to default ultimately faced significant

losses as the company stock dropped 77 percent in the first week of September 2008.

It is commonly believed that Lehman Brothers was deceptive in its attempts to hide the financial difficulties that the company was facing and in the firm's reliance on subprime mortgages as a revenue driver. This led to one of the largest bankruptcies in financial history, economic turmoil on a federal level, and many investors being unable to recover their initial investments.

### **Repo Transactions and the Enron Scandal**

There are numerous ways financial institutions commit acts of deception by presenting themselves as more stable than they are. One method is called a repo transaction. A repo transaction works by having one company transfer an asset to another company in exchange for short-term cash, with an agreement that the borrower will repay the value on a specific date. This cash goes on the balance sheet instead of troubled assets so that companies look more stable than they are. Repo transactions are described publicly as a sale rather than a loan, which makes the company look like it will never have to repay the money it borrowed. Lehman Brothers committed this act of fraud and was exposed when Citi and JP Morgan, lenders to Lehman, called for their money and Lehman was unable to pay.

Enron, a U.S. energy trading and utilities company, initiated one of the largest accounting frauds in financial history. Enron executives employed accounting practices and policies that falsely and deceptively inflated the company's revenues. By misrepresenting earnings reports while continuing to enjoy the revenue provided by the investors not privy to the true financial condition of Enron, corporate executives embezzled funds funneling in from investments while reporting fraudulent earnings to those investors. The company shares were trading at \$85 before the fraud was discovered, causing the shares to quickly plummet in value to only 30 cents. Once these fraudulent practices came to light on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Enron's collapse marked the beginning of a string of similar corporate scandals. Congress decided to intervene, and it created the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. This act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),

which was authorized to establish registration procedures for public accountants, create auditing standards, conduct inspections of public accountants, and hold disciplinary hearings. Other aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley state that senior management is required to certify the accuracy of their corporation's reported financial statements. There is also a mandate that management and auditors establish internal controls and reporting methods on the adequacy of those controls.

### **American Express Settlement**

Another act of financial deception committed by a reputable and powerful institution is that of American Express, a financial services corporation. In 2012, American Express paid \$112.5 million in refunds and fines to settle claims that it charged unlawful late fees and deceived customers to pressure them to pay off outstanding debts or to buy additional credit card services. The company refunded \$85 million to roughly 250,000 customers in addition to paying \$27.5 million in civil fines.

American Express is said to have violated federal laws prohibiting deceptive practices by using false statements to persuade customers to settle outstanding debts. This included false statements to customers that if they agreed to partially pay off their debt the remaining balance would be overlooked. Customers also reported being told that if they signed up for the company's Blue Sky credit card program they would receive \$300 in addition to bonus points. These rewards, however, were never attained.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Utah banking agency found out about these deceptive acts during a routine examination of the company's bank subsidiary. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau took over the investigations after that, and the Financial Overhaul Law was introduced in 2010 to protect consumers from excessive or hidden fees and other financial threats.

### **Ponzi Schemes**

A particularly devious form of financial deception is the Ponzi scheme. A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investing scam in which the promoter promises high rates of return with little to no risk to the investors. Returns are generated for earlier

investors by acquiring new investors, rather than from profit earned by the individual or organization running the operation. The scheme entices new investors with the promise of higher returns than other available investments, with short-term returns that are either abnormally high or unusually consistent. In order to keep the scheme going, new investors must constantly be brought in. This system ultimately fails because the scheme's earnings are less than its payments to investors. Often the high returns lead investors to leave their money in the scheme, allowing the promoter to pay out very little to investors. Instead the promoter sends statements to investors showing them how much they have earned. This enables the scheme to maintain the deception that it is a fund with high returns.

Promoters of the scheme try to minimize withdrawals by offering new plans to investors, and these plans often freeze money for a long period of time in exchange for a higher return. When an investor does wish to withdraw his or her money under the terms of the investment, the requests are typically processed quickly, which gives the illusion to all other investors that the fund is stable. One of the ways that a Ponzi scheme can be discovered is the promoter of the scheme vanishing and taking the remaining investment money. Also, because the scheme requires a continual stream of investments to fund higher returns, once investment slows down the scheme collapses because the promoter does not have enough incoming funds to pay the promised returns.

A famous Ponzi scheme was discovered in 2008 to be run by Bernie Madoff, former chairman of the NASDAQ Stock Market and founder of the market-making firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities. He was arrested on December 11, 2008, for running an extensive Ponzi scheme. While Madoff never pled guilty to these accusations, there was significant evidence to support the claims, and Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison, the maximum allowed under federal guidelines. Only a portion of the funds taken from investors was ever recovered.

### **LIBOR Scandal**

Another form of financial deception concerns the way that banks lend money to each other. In 2012, several financial institutions were found

to be fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). LIBOR is an average interest rate calculated through submissions of interest rates by major banks in London. The scandal surfaced when it was discovered that banks were falsely inflating or deflating their rates to profit from trades or to give the impression that they were more creditworthy than they actually were. Banks are expected to submit the actual interest rates they are paying or would expect to pay for borrowing from other banks. The LIBOR is intended to be an overall assessment of the health of the financial system because if the banks being polled feel confident about the state of the economy and their institutions, they report a low number. LIBOR is simply calculated through a survey of the member institutions. Barclays Bank was a lead perpetrator in this scandal.

### **History of Financial Regulatory Reform**

The financial industry has a history of regulatory reform. On December 23, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law. The Federal Reserve System consists of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 regional reserve banks, and a central banking system. This system allowed for governmental control over the monetary supply. This system is still in place today and provides a framework for regulating the nation's banks, credit, and money supply. This system aided in the creation of several financial regulations and systems that help control the financial system and attempt to deter deception and unethical behavior.

Stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, were created to regulate transactions in equity, bonds, and several other financial securities. These exchanges monitor all transactions and ensure that all parties fulfill the terms of each contract.

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in 1934 with a key task of protecting investors from fraudulent activity. The SEC was created by Congress to regulate the securities markets and protect investors. Additionally, it monitors corporate takeovers in the United States. The SEC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the president and approved by the U.S. Senate. The mission of the SEC is to promote full public disclosure and protect the



investing public against fraudulent and manipulative practices in the securities market.

Several other acts are related to minimizing deception in financial markets. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) sets the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP is a set of accounting principles that companies use to compile financial statements. GAAP sets a common standard for how to record and report accounting information and attempts to make financial statements transparent in an effort to make deceptive accounting practices more difficult.

After the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. This act gave the federal government the authority to seize large financial institutions that were in trouble. The act also established a council of federal regulators charged with monitoring threats to the financial system; this group also monitors the derivatives market. The act gave shareholders an advisory say in corporate executive compensation. These reforms are key components in federal efforts to combat financial deception and fraud, although reforms and revisions are continually implemented to achieve the most accurate and transparent financial system possible.

Deception in financial markets has received worldwide media attention for its role in several major scandals and the Great Recession. Deception in financial markets can take place with a variety of techniques, and these forms of deception can cause massive harm to companies, investors, employees, and ultimately the economy. For these reasons governments create organizations that can regulate financial markets and prevent and prosecute deceptive practices.

Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Brianna Fowler  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Accounting; Business; Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Dot-Com Bubble; Enron; Greenspan, Alan; Insider Trading; Madoff, Bernard; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

Coval, Joshua D., David A. Hirshleifer, and Siew Hong Teoh. "Deception and Self-Deception in

Capital Markets." In *Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis*, Caroline Gershlag, ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Heidhues, Paul, et al. "The Market for Deceptive Products." University of California, Berkeley. (2012). <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~botond/deception.pdf> (Accessed January 2013).

Komai, Alejandro, et al. "A Brief History of Regulations Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009." The National Bureau of Economic Research. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17443> (Accessed January 2013).

Sharp, Adam, et al. "Lehman Brothers Repo 105 Accounting Scandal 2010." *Wealth Daily*. <http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/lehman-brothers-enron-accounting-gimmicks/2375> (Accessed January 2013).

Sherman, Matthew, et. al, "A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States. Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2009. <http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf> (Accessed January 2103).

## Fireflies

Viewed from afar, the flickering and flashing of glowing fireflies can light up a dark night's sky. This quality, however, is for much more than mere entertainment, as the emission of light serves several functions. Firefly flashes are a source of protection, communication, and self-presentation. But the adults' glow is also used by some species for deceptive purposes.

The enzyme-driven chemical reaction that allows fireflies to produce light begins shortly after birth. Although the light might seem to attract the attention of predators, it may actually serve to deter attacks, as the enzymes that produce light in the larvae have a bitter and undesirable taste. Throughout the course of evolution, predators learned to associate the glow with this aversive flavor in nascent fireflies. The emission of light, then, serves as a warning signal and source of protection for the glowing larvae. Because of the light's protective function, fireflies' ability to glow does not disappear over the course of maturation.

In fact, many species of firefly evolved to retain the ability to produce light even as adults. As a result, the emission of light by adult fireflies now does more than discourage predator attacks; through evolutionary development and individual maturation, glowing serves multiple functions.

Male fireflies battle for female mates and use their glow in the fight. The females assess size and strength as males display dominance and superiority. Among the characteristics on exhibition during the mating rituals is a firefly's flashing ability. Male fireflies vying for the attention of potential female mates use their light as a form of communication and courtship. Males use varying, complex light patterns as a form of signaling. Males vary the time-delay within flash patterns. Ranging from multiple, fast pulses to fewer, long-lasting flashes, these flash patterns are species specific. The displayed light pattern allows females of some species to locate partners of their own kind and decipher their mating intentions. Females can then use their own pattern of flashes to return responses to their courting counterparts.

While the standards that females use to assess mate viability are yet to be fully understood, scientists believe that males' light signals may also serve as a determining factor for females in mate selection. That is to say, these complicated flashing patterns may allow females to discern which male will provide the most food to help nourish their eggs and afford them the greatest reproductive success. Packages of protein injected with the male's sperm during the mating process serve as sustenance for pregnant females. These bundles are referred to as "nuptial gifts" and are vital for a female firefly's survival during the procreation and birthing processes. Scientists believe that among the complicated patterns of glowing pulses are some indications from the males about their ability to provide this nourishment. In this way, the flash communication assists female fireflies in the imperative task of correctly identifying a well-providing partner. Furthermore, females return light displays to signal their interest to males they judge to be viable partners.

While the majority of female response flash signals are genuine communications of mating interest, at times the flash pattern is a deceptive one. Some species of female fireflies reply to courting males with light patterns that are

intended to mislead males. These females then use the deceived males in order to increase their own chances of survival.

Fireflies must defend themselves against predators, and one primary means of doing so is through chemical emission. The *Photinus* species of firefly produce a unique defensive chemical known as lucibufagin that deters natural predators. However not all species are capable of producing this protection themselves. One such chemically defenseless type of firefly, the female *Photuris* specie, is at risk for being poached. However, *Photuris* females reduce the risk through an evolved, deceptive practice that compensates for their inability to produce lucibufagins. Otherwise chemically defenseless female *Photuris* deceive and steal the chemical from the producing *Photinus* males.

To pilfer lucibufagins, *Photuris* females imitate the flash patterns of *Photinus* fireflies that are capable of naturally producing the chemical. The otherwise defenseless *Photuris* females mimic a particular light pattern that signals reproductive interest to male *Photinus* fireflies that produce the defensive, protective chemical compound. These chemically protected males see what appears to be the species-specific light signal of an interested female mate. The flash pattern deceitfully lures males closer to the female. Once the attracted males are within striking range, the otherwise defenseless female *Photuris* fireflies attack and kill the chemically protected males. After that, the females ingest the males' protective chemicals, thus earning their nickname of the femmes fatales of the firefly world. *Photuris* female fireflies deceive *Photinus* males in order to increase their own chances of survival.

Ultimately, such deception is not rare in nature. Rather, scientists are beginning to discover more and more cases of similar mimicry and trickery in the environment. Just as evolution allows for the development of better self-protection, self-presentation, communication, and sexual selection in nature, so too come varied and improved methods of deceit.

Matthew T. Riccio  
Columbia University  
Emily Balcetis  
New York University

**See Also:** Animals; Assassin Bugs; Butterflies; Camouflage; Darwin, Charles; Deception and Trust; Evolution and Natural Selection; Insects; Mimicry; Relationships: Romantic.

### Further Readings

Eisner, Goetz, et al. "Firefly 'Femmes Fatales' Acquire Defensive Steroids (Lucibufagins) From Their Firefly Prey." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, v.94 (1997).

Segelken, Roger. "By Firefly Light, Cornell Biologists Reveal Mimicry and Murder in the Night." *Cornell Chronicle*, v.29 (1997).

Zimmer, Carl. "Blink Twice if You Like Me." *New York Times* (June 30, 2009). <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/science/30firefly.html?pagewanted=all> (Accessed July 2012).

## Fish

All animals act in ways that increase their odds of survival, perpetuate their lineage, and protect their species. Fish and other creatures of the sea have particularly unique ways of doing so. They alter their own appearance, manipulate others' preferences, and work to create false reputations in the service of self-protection and self-advancement. These deceptive practices increase survival rates.

### Altering Physical Appearance

Sea creatures of varying species systematically alter their appearance to protect themselves. Stomatopods, commonly referred to as mantis shrimp, are a small sea creature found on ocean floors. They have distinctive means by which they protect themselves. Mantis shrimp are renowned for their folding forelegs, which they use to smash the hard shells of crabs or clams or spear soft bodies of fish. The smashing mantis shrimp needs less than one second to fully extend its claws and can strike with a force likened to a small caliber bullet. Although powerful given its size, the mantis shrimp is vulnerable and weak against a rival when it molts. After shedding the outer shell, mantis shrimp expose a soft underbody and lose their ability to smash or spear. Thus, they are far

more susceptible to injury if attacked by predators. To protect themselves during these vulnerable periods, mantis shrimp deceive predators by altering their physical appearance. To appear like a more dangerous threat, mantis shrimp elevate their heads and extend all of their appendages and scales, increasing their apparent size. They also expose brightly colored areas of their body, known as the meral spot. The meral spot is located on the inside of the striking appendage of the crustacean and is used as an indication of increased aggression by the signaler. Although without their protective shell and unable to follow through with any aggressive action, mantis shrimp attempt to deter and deceive predators about their physical stature.

Siamese fighting fish use physical battles to deceive competitors about their dominance. The aggressive combat of Siamese fighting fish can result in damage or even death to the weaker opponent. Given the dire consequences of some of the more violent battles, Siamese fish alter their appearance to deter competitors from waging war in the first place. To maintain a dominant guise, Siamese fighting fish pick fights with "losers" of previous physical encounters. They identify the weaker fish by eavesdropping on other battles. That is, they watch others' battles to determine the hierarchy of dominance.

When later approached for battle, the Siamese fighting fish choose to fight the weaker fish that previously lost a battle. Moreover, Siamese fighting fish increase such aggressive actions against weaker competitors when an audience is present, as if publicly displaying their dominance. Siamese fighting fish selectively pick opponents in fights in order to deceive competitors, maintain dominance, and increase survival rates.

### Manipulating Others' Preferences

Like many other species, fish go to great lengths to protect their young from predators, particularly when their young are most vulnerable. For instance, the three-spined stickleback fish use deceptive strategies that attempt to manipulate the preferences of predators. Male sticklebacks stand guard at the entrance to their nest while the eggs develop and hatch. If others approach, sticklebacks attempt to manipulate predators' preferences for food sources. Sticklebacks provide false



*A water balloon fish in Mactan Cebu, the Philippines. If successfully pursued, its backup defense mechanism is to fill its elastic stomach with water or air until it is much larger, deceiving its prey. Tetraodontidae is a family of fish that includes species variously called pufferfish, blowfish, bubblefish, globefish, swellfish, toadfish, and sea squab.*

information about the location of their nest. They may bury their own nest in sand. They use distraction displays to deflect predators from the nest. To suggest nutrition lies elsewhere, sticklebacks swim to a more remote area and feign feeding. If provided with the opportunity, stickleback fish might also feed or feign feeding on eggs from another nest to mislead predators about the location of their own young. Sticklebacks also act in ways that suggest they are eating their own young in order to manipulate predators' beliefs about the number of eggs that remain in that nest. Although these displays can be learned by the predators and may lead to the capture of eggs, the stickleback's deceptive tactics that aim to manipulate the preferences of predators increase survival rates of their young.

Atlantic mollies use deceptive tactics to manipulate the mating perceptions of other mollies. In

freshwater throughout northeastern Mexico and Central America, male mollies engage in mating rituals aimed at winning the affections of the largest female fish. The male molly will display his dorsal fin, thrust in a female's direction, and nibble at her body. However, the mating tactics of male mollies change in the presence of an audience. When another male fish is present, Atlantic male mollies reduce their efforts to attract the attention of and mate with large females. Instead, when other males are present, male mollies feign interest in smaller female fish. In attempting to deceptively manipulate the preferences of other males, Atlantic mollies increase the chances for their own mating success.

### **Deception for the Creation of a False Reputation**

Cleaner fish act in ways that appear service-oriented in order to create a false reputation and deceptively increase their own food supply. Cleaner fish nibble away dead skin and unhealthy bacteria from the bodies of other fish. They build up clientele by discarding deadly bacteria from clients and do so more intensely when in the presence of additional fish who may be seeking services. To increase the number of fish waiting to be served, cleaner fish often perform, but sometimes only feign, cleaning services. After having established a reputation as a cleaner and amassed a group of clients, cleaner fish turn their attention to the healthy, nutritious skin cells. To meet their own dietary needs, cleaner fish bite their host fish, feeding off the nutritious bacteria. But in so doing they risk losing a client who is dissatisfied with the aggressive service. The cleaner fish deceive clients about the quality of service they provide in order to increase their own chances of meeting personal nutritional needs.

### **Conclusion**

Like thousands of species, fish and crustaceans use deceptive strategies to increase survival. They manipulate their own physical appearance to protect themselves. They manipulate the preferences of other fish to protect their young and increase the chances for their own success at mating, and they attempt to establish false reputations to increase their own attempts at meeting their nutritional needs. These deceptive practices protect



those committing the acts and aid in survival of the individual, their genes, and their species.

Sana Sherali  
Emily Balcetis  
New York University

**See Also:** Animals; Camouflage; Darwin, Charles; Evolution and Natural Selection; Mimicry; Relationships: Sexual; Reputation; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Adams, E. S. and R. L. Caldwell. "Deceptive Communication in Asymmetric Fights of the Stomatopod Crustacean *Gonodactylus bredini*." *Animal Behaviour*, v.39/4 (1990).
- Bshary, R. "Biting Cleaner Fish Use Altruism to Deceive Image-Scoring Client Reef Fish." *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences*, v.269 (2002).
- Oliveira, R. F., P. K. McGregor, and C. Latruffe. "Know Thine Enemy: Fighting Fish Gather Information From Observing Conspecific Interactions." *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences*, v.265/1401 (1998).
- Plath, M., S. Richter, I. Schlupp, and R. Tiedemann. "Misleading Mollies: Surface—But Not Cave-Dwelling *Poecilia mexicana* Males Deceive Competitors About Mating Preferences." *Acta Ethologica*, v.13/1 (2010).
- Whoriskey, G. F. "Stickleback Distraction Displays: Sexual or Foraging Deception Against Egg Cannibalism?" *Animal Behavior*, v.41/6 (1991).

## Football

Deception is a key tactic for success in football. Deception is found throughout the game of football, as players and coaches try to gain an advantage over the competition on the field with misleading injury reports and the use of performance-enhancing drugs.

### Deception During Play

Deception on the field includes misleading actions and trick plays. Offensive players use misleading

actions to focus defensive players' attention away from where the ball is actually going. Distracting actions such as the pump fake, in which the quarterback completes a fake throwing motion toward a wide receiver, are completed multiple times per game. The thrower tries to lure defenders in one direction, only to throw the ball to the other side of the field or at a different time than what was perceived by the defender.

Another misleading action that uses deception to distract defensive players is the draw play. In a draw play the quarterback pretends to pass to lure defenders further away from the ball when actually the ball is given to a running back. The bootleg modifies the draw play with another layer of deception. In the bootleg the quarterback only pretends to hand the ball off to the running back, which draws the attention of the defenders to the running back and away from the quarterback.

Trick plays, in contrast, are used to confuse defenses and gain a temporary advantage in the form of an extra possession or scoring play over their opponent. A half-back pass play deceives defensive players into believing that a running back will run the ball, when in fact he will pass to a receiver. A Statue of Liberty play fools the defense into trying to stop a pass when actually the offense plans to execute a run. In the Statue of Liberty play the quarterback drops back to pass, while simultaneously switching the ball into his nonthrowing hand and faking a pass downfield. The running back then takes the ball from the quarterback hiding behind the larger offensive lineman and sprints toward the opposite direction of the field. In a 2007 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) bowl game, Boise State quarterback Jared Zabransky executed this play, which led his team to the game-winning score as time expired.

Offensive players can also deceive defensive players by running a hook and ladder play involving precise timing between the quarterback and two receivers. During a hook and ladder play one receiver runs downfield and turns back around to face the quarterback in order to catch a pass. As the receiver catches the pass and defenders swarm, the same player flips the ball behind to another receiver cutting in front of him to break away from the defenders and pick up additional yardage. In a 1982 National Football League (NFL)

playoff game, the Miami Dolphins implemented the hook and ladder when receiver Duriel Harris caught a pass from quarterback Don Strock and then passed the ball backward to Tony Nathan, who ran for the score.

The flea flicker play creates an additional illusion of a running play while a longpass play is executed. During a flea flicker, the quarterback hands the ball off to the running back in order to have defenders commit to stopping the runner. The running back, however, tosses the ball back to the quarterback, who passes the ball to a receiver downfield. In a 2009 NFL playoff game, quarterback Kurt Warner handed the ball off to running back Edgerrin James, who ran two yards before pitching the ball backward to Warner. Warner then threw the ball downfield to receiver Larry Fitzgerald for the first score of the game.

Deception has also been integrated into football during kicking or special teams plays. During a kickoff return in a 1999 NFL playoff game, Tennessee Titans' player Frank Wycheck began returning the kick on his right side of the field. As potential tacklers approached, Wycheck threw a backward pass to the left side of the field to teammate Kevin Dyson. Dyson ran up the left side of the field for a touchdown. The Titans won with this deceptive play as time expired, which became known as The Music City Miracle.

### **Misrepresenting Players' Injuries**

Deception also plays a role off the football field. For instance, coaches often use deception to disrupt other teams' preparation and game planning. Injury reports that list injured players have been used as a deceptive tool to disrupt an opposing team's preparation, with one team either under- or overstating injuries to deceive the opposing team. The NFL has taken measures to reduce pre-game deception in injury reports by threatening teams with lofty fines if they are caught hiding an individual's injury status.

Bill Belichick, head coach of the New England Patriots, is famous for misleading opposing coaches by putting Tom Brady, the team's star quarterback, on the injury report for all 16 games in a season. Belichick defended his deceitful act by claiming, "he [Tom Brady] is not 100 percent," despite playing in every game that season. In

2005, former Dallas Cowboys' coach Bill Parcells misled opposing coaches by stating that former running back Julius Jones was "limited" during practice and that the injury was not severe. When it came time to play the game, Jones did not participate given the severity of his injury. The deception led the opponent to prepare for Jones as an active player. When Jones ended up not playing, the other team had wasted time by focusing on a player who did not affect the game.

Team doctors sometimes play a role in misrepresenting injury information. In 2009, the NFL adopted stricter policies regarding injuries and revised its return-to-play policy by prohibiting players from returning to play after exhibiting any concussion-like symptoms. This policy attempts to diminish deception by forcing players to pass medical examinations conducted by outside officials, not just team doctors, before returning to the field.

### **Deceptive Interviews and Concussion Reports**

Player interviews can also involve misleading responses before or after a game. Players under contract meet with a public relations coordinator, coach, or general manager before engaging in a press conference or interview. Players are coached on how to articulate precise messages without giving away team strategy or secrets. These crafted responses may be used to deceive opponents by covering up, hiding, or omitting important information. Public relations officials closely monitor information within a franchise and control the extent to which it is shared publicly.

Recently, the NFL itself has come under scrutiny for deliberately masking the risks associated with brain damage to players experiencing concussions. From 1994 to 2007 the NFL employed a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) Committee to conceal the medical risks of head injuries. This NFL-funded committee was used to provide misleading information from studies and to deny the link between concussions and long-term brain consequences. In 1994, studies from the MTBI were compiled into pamphlets with many inaccuracies that were distributed to every football player. NFL players were misled into believing that head injuries would not cause any long-term health complications in the future.

## Performance-Enhancing Drugs

Deception in football can also be influenced by illegal or unethical activities in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage. Football players work hard to reach their full athletic potential by improving their strength, conditioning, and skill level. Some football players striving for better performance may turn to performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) or steroids. It is estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of football players use PEDs. Initial drug tests from the NFL gave players advance notice of the test, allowing for clean urine alternatives to be used. In a steroid-conscious world, drug testing in football has become randomized in order to minimize the rate of deception, but players have sought out other forms of PEDs that the NFL is currently unable to test for.

The incentives for deception in professional football are high. Because there are only 16 games played during a season (excluding play-offs), each game is important for a chance to compete in the championship. In 2007, New England Patriots' coach Belichick was caught having his staff videotape the New York Jets' defensive play signals during practice. This devious act, known as Spygate, gave Belichick's team an unfair competitive advantage over the opponent during the actual game. Similarly, in 2012 the New Orleans Saints were caught with a secret "pay for pain" bounty program, in which players were secretly awarded large amounts of money for injuring or removing an opposing player from the game. Football's incentives can lead teams to have a "win at all costs" mentality that in turn may lead players and coaches to engage in deception that goes beyond the deceptive actions on the field, which are an accepted and important part of the game.

Colin Dailey  
Jeff Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Baseball; Basketball; Children's Sports Teams; College Sports; High School Sports; Hockey; Soccer (Football).

## Further Readings

iSport.com "Football's Trick Plays." <http://amfootball.isport.com/amfootball-guides/footballs-trick-plays> (Accessed January 2013).

National Football League (NFL) Head Injury

Lawsuits Claims Center. "The NFL Concussion Cover Up: Concealing Brain Damage Risks."

<http://nflheadinjurylawsuits.com> (Accessed January 2013).

NBC Sports. "NFL Injury Reports, Deception Go Together." <http://nbcports.msnbc.com/id/9767556/ns/sports-nfl/> (Accessed January 2013).

New England Sports Network. "Bill Belichick, Patriots Got Off Easy Compared to Sean Payton, Saints."

<http://nesn.com/2012/03/bill-belichick-patriots-got-off-easy-with-spygate-punishment-in-comparison-to-sean-payton-saints-bou>

(Accessed January 2013).

Seattle Times. "NFL Drug Game Gets More Serious."

<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19911222&slug=1324478>

(Accessed January 2013).

Wise Geek. "In Football, What Is a Bootleg?" [http://www.wisegeek.com/in-football-what-is-a-bootleg](http://www.wisegeek.com/in-football-what-is-a-bootleg.htm)

.htm (Accessed January 2013).

# Forgery, Art

An art forgery is an object that was intentionally produced to deceive a purchaser as to its date and authorship. This is distinct from the manufacture of copies without the intent of fraud, as well as the imitation of works by art masters by their pupils and later followers, and misattributed works.

## History of Art Forgery

The forgery of works of art is as old as the market for collectors for such works. Accordingly, forgeries were produced even in antiquity. For instance, the ancient Roman writer Phaedrus mentioned in the prologue to his *Aesop's Fables* that sculptors would claim that works they produced were made by earlier famous artists, such as Praxiteles or Myron of Eleutherai, or that forged paintings were attributed to Zeuxis. Cypriot pottery, such as white slip milk bowls and *bilbils*, was a desired import during the Late Bronze Age in Palestine; although the remains of many actual imported vessels are regularly found in archaeological excavations, many locally produced imitations are also commonly found.

During the Renaissance, art historian Giorgio Vasari mentioned that artist Lorenzo Ghiberti made counterfeit Greek and Roman medals that appeared to be antiques. Vasari also reported on a marble Cupid, known as the *Sleeping Eros*, sculpted by Michelangelo Buonarroti who, after completing it, buried it in a vineyard to acquire a false antique look. Another Renaissance forgery was the painting by Luca Giordano of *Christ Healing a Lamé Man*, which he passed off as a work of his more famous contemporary Albrecht Durer.

During the 18th century, soon after the rediscovery of Pompeii and Herculaneum, Giuseppe Guerra was producing forged Roman paintings for sale to collectors. Also in the 18th century, William Sykes, an English forger, sold fakes of works supposedly painted by Jan van Eyck and other well-known masters.

### Art Museums and Forgery

Museums have often unknowingly purchased forgeries. The Louvre, for example, purchased the gold tiara of Saitapharnes, an inscribed headdress of solid gold that depicted scenes from the *Iliad*, and which was thought to date to the 3rd century B.C.E., until a forger from Odessa admitted early in the 20th century that he had made it. In 1935, the British Museum removed from exhibition what it had thought was an Etruscan sarcophagus from the 6th century B.C.E. The woman depicted on the sarcophagus was wearing undergarments typical of the 19th century C.E., and the male figure next to her was nude, unlike any other known examples from that period.

Between 1915 and 1921, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City purchased three purported large Etruscan terra-cotta warriors that were, in fact, created by Alfonso and Pio Riccardi and three of their six sons, with the assistance of Italian sculptor Alfredo Fioravanti, who in 1961 admitted how they had been made. After his admission, the museum finally announced that the statues were forgeries, which had been suggested by earlier chemical tests of the glazes, as well as by the extraordinarily even firing characteristics, which would have been very difficult for the ancient Etruscans to have achieved.

A few museums intentionally exhibit forgeries. For example, the Victoria and Albert Museum in

London has a separate gallery reserved for high-quality forgeries.

### Notorious Modern Art Forgers

Several modern art forgers in the late 19th and 20th centuries have gained notoriety for their fakes. Alceo Dossena (1878–1936) an Italian sculptor, could imitate and sell works accepted as Greek, Etruscan, medieval, and Renaissance originals. Icilio Federico Joni (1866–1946) was an Italian artist who fooled noted art historians, such as Bernard Berenson, with his numerous forgeries. Han van Meegeren (1889–1947) was a Dutch painter who is known to have painted and sold at least 14 forgeries attributed to 17th-century artists Johannes Vermeer and Pieter De Hooch. Several of van Meegeren's works won critical acclaim from art historians as newly found masterpieces; it is estimated that he earned the equivalent of over \$30 million for his forgeries. Theo van Wijn-gaaren (1874–1952) was another Dutch art forger who sometimes assisted van Meegeren.

Otto Wacker (1898–1970) put at least 33 fake Vincent van Gogh paintings on the market. Chang Sai-chien (1899–1983) was a Chinese artist and master forger of paintings by great Chinese masters. Elmyr de Hory (1905–76), a Spanish artist who had been a Jewish aristocrat before World War II reduced him to poverty, claimed to have painted thousands of forgeries, including those of artists such as Henri Matisse. Amedeo Modigliani, and Pablo Picasso. Lothar Malskard (1913–88) was commissioned to restore medieval frescoes in European cathedrals, but instead of engaging in restoration he simply whitewashed the walls and painted new images; however, several anachronisms in his works were eventually noticed. Malskard also made forgeries of more modern artists, including Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec and Marc Chagall.

Tom Keating (1917–84) was a British artist who created over 2,000 forgeries of works by 100 different artists. Eric Hebborn (1934–96) was a British artist who forged numerous drawings by great artists like Raphael, Peter Paul Rubens, Anthony van Dyck, Nicolas Poussin, and Giovanni Battista Tiepolo. John Myatt (b. 1945), a British artist, forged over 200 paintings of famous artists, such as Chagall, Georges Braque, and Benjamin Nicholson, which he was able to sell with the help of his



accomplice John Drewe (b. 1948), who arranged for false documentation as to their authenticity. Jean-Pierre Schecroun, a French artist, created about 80 works he claimed were by Picasso and other modern masters. Mark A. Landis (b. 1955), an American, created and donated over 100 forgeries to U.S. museums. Shaun Greenhalgh (b. 1961) created forged sculpture of diverse styles and periods, including purported Assyrian, Egyptian, and modern pieces.

Some forgers, after their notoriety is established, sell art works as their own creations. For instance, former forger John Myatt now sells works of art as his own reproductions. David Stein (1935–99) was an art dealer who mastered the artistic styles of several famous artists, such as Braque, Chagall, Matisse, Picasso, Jean Cocteau, Paul Klee, Joan Miró, and Georges Rouault, so that he could, and did, produce and sell forgeries as originals by these great artists; after being caught he then produced works of his own. Ken Perenyi is an American artist who, after years of selling forgeries, now produces works in the style of many noted artists, including Martin Johnson Heade, Francesco Guardi, John Peto, Miró, Modigliani, and Picasso.

### Techniques of Forgery and Deception

Art forgers utilize a vast array of techniques in attempting to perpetrate their fraud. Signs of aging are a common area of concern that forgers of older works of art must contend with. Many objects, particularly paintings and ceramics, form a dense pattern of cracking, known as craquelure, on their surface. This is the result of natural drying out, as the paint or other material ages over time and becomes less flexible and shrinks. Forgers attempt to imitate this craquelure by varied techniques, including rolling up a painting, baking it, or treating it with various chemicals, such as formaldehyde. Corrosion may be imitated by means of applying hydrochloric acid. Calcinations can be mimicked with the use of an oxy-hydrogen flame or by baking in an electric oven. Patinas on bronzes can be faked through the use of varnish, wine vinegar, nitric acid, copper acetate, ammonia salts, or by electrolytic methods. Provenance documentation, that is, the historical records of the ownership and display of works of art, can readily be falsified.

Art forgeries are generally initially detected by means of stylistic analysis and by historical detection, such as by identifying anachronisms in details or inconsistencies in iconography, but scientific techniques of analysis can also be useful in confirming the fraud. Microscopic inspection is a simple scientific technique, but it can reveal forgeries, such as those that have fake craquelure, false worm holes, or even modern grinding of pigments that may have been unavailable at the time the purported work was said to have been produced. Greater and more revealing magnification can be achieved by means of electron microscopes, using either scanning electron microscopy of a highly polished surface or transmission electron microscopy of a very thin cross section.



*The Faun, a sculpture acquired by the Art Institute of Chicago in 1997 and attributed to Paul Gauguin, was determined in 2007 to be a creative, well-researched forgery produced by the convicted Greenhalgh family from Bolton, England, who produced numerous fake art pieces. The documentation of the work's provenance is also believed to be counterfeit.*

Infrared photographs or ultraviolet radiation of the work in question may help reveal repaintings and other inappropriate modifications.

Ultraviolet light can reveal several indications of forgery, such as artificial patina on marble, oil paint recently applied to an earlier painted surface, and repairs to ancient metal objects. X-ray radiographs can be very revealing; for instance, they may help indicate if a forgery was constructed on a prepared suspect foundation, such as gesso. The elemental composition of an art object can be determined by various inspection methods, such as mass spectrometry, optical emission, and inductively coupled plasma spectrometry, or X-ray fluorescence and particle-induced emission spectrometry of inorganic materials, and assorted chromatography methods for organic materials.

An array of dating techniques is also used to date archaeological artifacts in order to determine if they are actually from the appropriate era. Radiocarbon 14 dating is one of the best-known dating techniques, but it is limited to objects created up to about 60,000 years ago and made of materials from living organisms, like wood, bone, textiles, parchment, and leather. Uranium-thorium dating is a related, but much less useful, dating technique. Dendrochronology uses tree ring patterns from wooden objects, like statues, wood panels, or frames, which are compared against a known and dated registry to establish when the tree was harvested. Thermoluminescence is a technique used to date ceramic artifacts by heating them up. Source analysis techniques can be used to determine where artifacts originated, such as using stable isotope analysis to determine the specific quarry from which stone was extracted. As forgers become more resourceful in producing their fakes, detection techniques will have to become equally sophisticated to catch these frauds.

Victor B. Stolberg  
*Essex County College*

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Cottingley Fairies; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; History of Deception: Medieval Period; History of Deception: Renaissance; Photographs, Altered; Plagiarism.

### Further Readings

- Art Institute of Chicago. "Art Institute's Statement Regarding Paul Gauguin's *The Faun*." (December 12, 2007). [http://www.artic.edu/sites/default/files/press\\_pdf/Gauguin\\_Statement.pdf](http://www.artic.edu/sites/default/files/press_pdf/Gauguin_Statement.pdf) (Accessed August 2013).
- Lenain, Thierry. *Art Forgery: The History of a Modern Obsession*. London: Reaktion Books, 2011.
- Lopez, Jonathan. *The Man Who Made Vermeers: Unvarnishing the Legend of Master Forger Han van Meegeren*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008.
- Perenyi, Ken. *Caveat Emptor: The Secret Life of an American Art Forger*. New York: Pegasus Books, 2012.
- Salisbury, Lancy and Aly Sujo. *Provenance: How a Con Man and a Forger Rewrote the History of Modern Art*. New York: Penguin Books, 2010.

---

## Frank, Mark

Mark G. Frank is a professor of communication and director of the Communication Science Center at the University at Buffalo in Buffalo, New York. A social psychologist by training, he is a well-known and respected deception researcher and an expert in the area of nonverbal communication. His work is characterized by an applied focus, especially as related to law enforcement, and by its association with the ideas of Paul Ekman.

Frank earned his Ph.D. in social psychology from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, in 1989. With a National Research Service Award from the National Institute of Mental Health, Frank did postdoctoral research in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of California at San Francisco Medical School, where he began his association with Ekman. In 1992, Frank accepted a position at the School of Psychology at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. In 1996, he joined the Department of Communication at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. In 2005, he accepted a position in the Communication Department at the University of Buffalo in New York, where he was promoted to the rank of full professor.

Frank has published numerous scholarly articles and book chapters on the topics of nonverbal communication, especially facial expressions, and deception detection. His most well-known works include collaborations with Ekman, Maureen O'Sullivan, and Thomas Feeley. In his research, Frank has advocated for the importance of studying high-stakes lies in deception detection and the idea that momentary facial expressions provide useful signals in lie detection. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Homeland Security.

One of Frank's best-known studies was published in *Psychological Science* in 1999. Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Frank compared people with a variety of occupations in terms of their skill at detecting lies. Federal officers did better than other groups on a lie detection task, and were 73 percent accurate, compared with sheriffs (67 percent), federal judges (62 percent), psychologists (58 percent to 68 percent), and law enforcement officers (51 percent). The finding of substantial occupational differences in deception detection ability, however, generally has not been replicated in the research literature as a whole, and therefore findings on occupational differences are controversial.

Frank and Ekman reported an informative experiment in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* in 2004. They had subjects lie or tell the truth in two different types of situations, a mock crime and an opinion about a current event. The truths and lies were then shown to a sample of raters who judged each for honesty. The main findings were that some people were much more believable than others, and that people who were believable in one situation tended to be believable in the other situations. This suggests that some people are much better liars than others.

A third example of Frank's work is an examination of research investigating the effectiveness of training people to detect lies. After examining 20 prior experiments, Frank and Feeley found that nonverbal training in deception detection skills improved accuracy from an average of 54 percent to an average of 58 percent. Nonverbal training appears to improve deception detection accuracy, but it does not seem to improve accuracy very much. Frank and Feeley discussed ways to improve the effectiveness of training.

Besides academic research, Frank is a consultant and trains law enforcement professionals around the world. He has worked with various local agencies as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Transportation Security Administration; Scotland Yard; and Australian Customs. He also has presented briefings to the U.S. Congress on deception and counterterrorism.

A leading authority on behavioral observation, Frank in 2013 worked with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to further develop and test the TSA's behavioral screening program, to be implemented in 40 major airports nationwide. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Homeland Security.

Frank has appeared in numerous media outlets, receiving notable coverage from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), National Public Radio (NPR), *The New Yorker*, the *New York Times*, the Learning Channel, the Discovery Channel, the National Geographic Channel, Cable News Network (CNN), FOX News Channel, and the television programs *Oprah*, *48 Hours*, and *Dateline NBC*.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Deception, Research on; Deception Detection Accuracy; Ekman, Paul; Lies, Types of; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Aamodt, M. G. and H. Custer. "Who Can Best Catch a Liar?" *Forensic Examiner*, v.15 (2006).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10 (2006).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).
- Ekman, P., M. O'Sullivan and M. G. Frank. "A Few Can Catch a Liar." *Psychological Science*, v.10 (1999).
- Frank, M. G. and P. Ekman. "Appearing Truthful Generalizes Across Different Deception Situations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.86 (2004).

- Frank, M. G. and T. H. Feeley. "To Catch a Liar: Challenges for Research in Lie Detection Training." *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, v.31 (2003).
- O'Sullivan, M., M. G. Frank, C. M. Hurley, and J. Tiwana. "Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.33 (2009).

## Frankfurt, Harry G.

Harry G. Frankfurt is an American analytic philosopher who taught at Princeton and Yale Universities. He is particularly known for his 2005 best seller *On Bullshit*, based on his 1986 paper of the same name. He also made significant contributions to the study of free will through his analysis of what came to be called Frankfurt Style Cases. Both of these contributions are relevant for the study of lying and deception. In the first case, Frankfurt argues that bullshit as a kind of lying, or disregard for the truth, is damagingly rampant in contemporary society. In the second case, Frankfurt relies on examples of possible deception or manipulation that nevertheless seem to include free will and are contrary to libertarian intuitions about freedom.

### **On Bullshit**

Frankfurt's purpose in his book *On Bullshit* is to clarify this concept, which he believes is common in contemporary society. He believes society is so full of bullshit that most people believe they can recognize it, and yet it remains undefined. Bullshit is different from lying. It is more akin to deception. Frankfurt believes that the liar is able to identify the truth and sets himself in opposition to it. By way of contrast, the person involved in bullshit may or may not be lying and may or may not be able to identify the truth. The person involved in bullshit might get his facts correct. The difference is that the "getting it correct" is not the aim of bullshit. Rather, the "bullshitter" is concerned with attaining his own personal end rather than communicating, or opposing, the truth per se.

Contemporary American culture encourages bullshit by encouraging sincerity. Sincerity is not the same as integrity. Sincerity is the honest

reporting of a person's current desires. Integrity is the concern for consistency between individuals' beliefs and between what they say and do. Sincerity does not include this concern for consistency but is merely concerned with current desires. Bullshit is a tool that sincere persons use to attain their desires and to convince others to help in attaining these desires. Thus, the bullshitter has a complete disregard for truth and instead elevates his desires as absolute. This elevation of desires is the person's current desires because desires change and fluctuate over time.

Frankfurt identifies the role of sincerity and bullshit as a feature of the postmodern world. Postmodernism rejects the one truth and emphasizes many truths, and these truths rooted in individual desires are then elevated as the absolute standard of right and wrong. This loss of appreciation for truth is directly proportional to the rise of bullshit. Frankfurt laments this societal condition but also notes that society is almost universally incriminated in its use. He does not provide a remedy for this situation beyond encouraging people to value what is objectively true. He also identifies a few preconditions that give rise to bullshit. While postmodernity is perhaps steeped in bullshit, bullshit is not unique or postmodern, and postmodernity may itself be a response to the bullshit of modernity.

Frankfurt maintains the first precondition for bullshit is that individuals elevate their current desires above a concern for truth. In so doing, they are by implication neglecting the rational sides of their natures. There need not be a dichotomy between reason and desire, rather there is a relationship between what individuals believe to be good and what they desire. Consequently, those who take for granted that their current desires are indeed aimed at what is truly good are neglecting the critical examination of their assumption; they are leading the unexamined life.

This leads to the second precondition, which is that such persons do not believe that they need to seek to know. Third, there is a misidentification of what is good, or a confusion of what is desired with what is good, or a disinclination to know (as opposed to have an opinion about) what is good. Finally, these preconditions can be summarized in saying that such persons do not fear ignorance about the good but only fear the failure to



appease their current desires. All of these preconditions involve self-deception about one's ignorance concerning the truth and the good. It is this unexamined life, neglect of seeking knowledge, confusion of desire and the good, and not fearing the failure to achieve what is good that are the fertile soil for bullshit.

### Frankfurt Style Cases

Frankfurt is also well known for what have come to be called Frankfurt Style Cases. These cases are a method of showing that libertarian assumptions about what it means to be free are incorrect. The libertarian view of free will says that a person is free only if he could have done otherwise. This has come to be articulated as the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP).

Frankfurt sets up thought experiments in which a person does not have this possibility, and yet other people nevertheless would want to say that this person is free. Part of the reason for this is that the person in these cases is doing what he wants, there is no restriction on his will (want), and therefore he has a free will. This is sometimes called a compatibilist view of free will, because in this view a free will is compatible with predetermination.

Frankfurt Style Cases can involve instances of possible deceit. For instance, a person has been hired to assassinate a government official. The evil scientist who hired the assassin wants to make sure he will go through with the assassination. In order to achieve this, the evil scientist implanted a device in the assassin's brain, so if the assassin begins to have second thoughts, the device will block these and enable the assassin to commit the murder. In actuality, the assassin does not have second thoughts and goes through with the murder. In this case, one would hold the assassin responsible for murder, even though he did not have alternative possibilities. Therefore, PAP is not a sufficient condition for free will. It can be concluded from this that a free will is an unrestricted will; it is doing what one wants.

Owen Anderson  
Arizona State University

**See Also:** Lying, Prevalence of; Paltering; Self-Deception; Truth.

### Further Readings

Frankfurt, Harry G. *On Bullshit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Frankfurt, Harry G. and Debra Satz, ed. *Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Hardcastle, Gary L. and George A. Reisch. *Bullshit and Philosophy: Guaranteed to Get Perfect Results Every Time*. Chicago: Open Court, 2006.

## Freud, Sigmund

Though he synthesized many pre-existing ideas, Sigmund Freud is rightly considered the founding father of psychoanalysis. The outlines of what is now recognized as psychoanalysis were in place by 1895, but Freud continually elaborated on them right up to his death in London in 1939. What was so revolutionary, and remains so controversial, about Freud's invention was its impact on Enlightenment conceptions of truth and thus of the nature of lying and deception. However, this impact is often measured by the very philosophical notion of truth that Freud displaced, thereby obscuring the roots of his psychoanalytic theory in his clinical practice.

*Studies on Hysteria*, which Freud co-wrote with fellow psychiatrist Josef Breuer, was published in 1895. In this work Freud was already seeking truth in unusual places. Whereas the philosophical tradition founded by Aristotle sought truth in the form of syllogistic propositions (statements such as "All men are mortal, Greeks are men, therefore Greeks are mortal"), and whereas subsequent philosophies of language tended to measure truth by the speaker's alleged intention, Freud's saw truth as hidden in speech rather than expressed by it and thus as intrinsically connected to deception. *Studies in Hysteria* viewed pathological symptoms as conveying, in a distorted form, a truth largely excluded from the hysteric's conscious speech. Moreover, as he developed a theory of sexual repression to explain these patient's symptoms, Freud came to view the hysteric's speech as akin to a lie that deceived the patient about the underlying (sexual) truth of his or her suffering.

The now famous “talking cure” allowed this lie to be unfolded through so-called free association: the unhindered production of speech on the part of the patient without regard for meaning or narrative. Yet it also allowed the psychoanalyst to interpret the resulting speech’s hidden truth. Thanks to the theory of repression, this led to a situation similar to the one William Shakespeare intimates when, in *Hamlet*, he has Queen Gertrude say, “the lady doth protest too much, methinks.” In other words, from a psychoanalytic perspective vehement denial can be evidence of resistance and therefore a displaced indication of the existence of what is denied. Conversely, even a heartfelt truth-claim can operate as a defensive concealment of its opposite. In this sense, lying and deception were not the same after the Freudian revolution.

*The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899) develops a structural model of the psyche that clarifies why earnest conviction cannot be the measure of the truth-content of a patient’s speech. Psychoanalytic truth is located not at the level of intention, in what Freud calls the “conscious” system, but in an entirely different region where the “speech” of a dream, but also speech in general, escapes the conscious control of the ego. This is clearest in the example of parapraxes, such as the famous “Freudian slip.” This is when a verbal mistake is said to reveal an unconscious motivation of which the speaker is completely unaware.

By the time Freud had published *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), in which he analyzed, among other things, memory and forgetting, he was able to group very diverse phenomena—from neurotic symptoms to dreams, from slips of the tongue to witticisms—under the same heading of “compromise formations.” In other words, these were all hybrid formations halfway between lies (egoic repression) and truths (the libidinal instincts of the unconscious). To a trained psychoanalyst then, these diverse phenomena could be interpreted to lay bare their latent truth.

Once Freud had established the main conceptual pillars of his new discipline, he audaciously moved on to anthropology, social theory, comparative religion, and group psychology with works like *Totem and Taboo* (1913), *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), and *Moses and Monotheism*

(1939), applying psychoanalysis to both micro- and macroscale epiphenomena.

### Criticism of Freud

Because of their impact on philosophical notions of truth as rational, intentional statements of verifiable fact, Freudian ideas have been the target of much philosophical ire. Karl Popper argued that psychoanalysis would never be a valid science because it fails the test of “falsifiability”: it cannot posit a scenario that would definitively disprove it. Jean-Paul Sartre criticized Freudian psychoanalysis for presenting an unconscious that determines individuals’ actions and curbs their freedom, providing an excuse for what Sartre called “bad faith,” meaning a socially enforced self-deception leading to an inauthentic existence. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari further attacked Freud’s tendency to universalize the Oedipus Complex (the phase in development that Freud posited between the ages of 3 and 5, when the boy is said to experience lustful feelings toward his mother and murderous feelings toward his father), without acknowledging how complicit this complex is with the renunciation of desire demanded by capitalist social formations. Freud has also been heavily criticized by many feminists for formulating a patriarchal or male-dominated concept of sexuality.

Many of these criticisms should be taken seriously. However, many also arguably impose a primarily philosophical concept of truth on to Freud’s work and then measure his alleged dogmatism from that standpoint. Freud, who regularly distanced himself from philosophy, always maintained that the concept of the unconscious was a working “hypothesis” whose real efficacy lay not in universal or global explanations of the human condition per se, but in the intimate setting of psychoanalytic therapy. It is in clinical practice, then, that “giving the lie” to a patient’s speech through interpretation can liberate another truth, that of the unconscious, from its deceptive appearance. As Freud’s clinical practice developed, interpretation became less and less about decoding an encrypted meaning to find a single underlying truth and more and more about intervening in the causes of suffering for a specific individual.

Colin Wright  
University of Nottingham

**See Also:** Consciousness; Crying; Denial; Eye Contact; Fantasy and Imagination; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Pathological Lying; Projection; Psychoanalysis; Relationships: Sexual; Repressed Memories; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

- Freud, Sigmund and Anthea Bell, trans. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. London: Penguin, 2002.
- Freud, Sigmund, Josef Breuer, and James and Alix Strachey, trans. *Studies on Hysteria*. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Freud, Sigmund and David McLintock, trans. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. London: Penguin, 2002.
- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *The Origins of Religion: Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism and Other Works*. London: Penguin, 1985.
- Guattari, Félix, Gilles Deleuze, and Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, trans. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. New York: Viking Press, 1977.
- Popper, Karl. *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1972.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul and Hazel E. Barnes, trans. *Being and Nothingness*. London: Routledge, 2006.

## Frey, James

American author James Frey wrote *A Million Little Pieces*, published by Doubleday in 2003. This memoir—about the author's struggle to overcome drug addiction—was selected by Oprah's Book Club in 2005 and appeared at the top of the *New York Times* paperback nonfiction best-sellers list. In 2006, The Smoking Gun, a Web site that uses legal documents to reveal scandals in the lives of famous people, published proof that Frey's book exaggerated, and even fabricated, important

details about several events. In the aftermath of this revelation, Oprah Winfrey confronted Frey on her television show, publishers offered refunds for the book's purchase price, and Frey was dropped by his literary manager. Later editions of *A Million Little Pieces* and its sequel, *My Friend Leonard* (2005), included an Author's Note explaining the falsified details. Other memoirs published before *A Million Little Pieces* were revealed as fully or partially untrue, but the controversy surrounding Frey's work particularly impacted reviewer and reader reception of memoirs and influenced scholarly work about life writing.

In *A Million Little Pieces*, Frey uses a minimalist, slangy style to trace his trajectory from recreational drug user to addict and to recount his experiences in a treatment center. The book's reviews were mixed, and some even questioned the memoir's veracity, but—thanks to the popularity of Oprah's Book Club—the book sold nearly two million copies in 2005. *A Million Little Pieces* might have remained just another best seller if journalists from The Smoking Gun had never discovered evidence that sections of the purportedly nonfiction book were fictionalized.

In a January 2006 article, The Smoking Gun reported several findings. Frey's claim in *A Million Little Pieces* that he spent a week in jail following his first driving-under-the-influence (DUI) arrest was untrue; records from Berrien County, Michigan, indicate that he was released to his parents on bond and paid a \$305 fine. While Frey tells a dramatic story about spending 90 days in jail after being arrested for hitting a police officer, disturbing the peace, and possessing a narcotic with intent to distribute, records from Licking County, Ohio, indicate that the author was never prosecuted or incarcerated for any of these crimes. In fact, he spent only five hours in custody, during which he received two traffic tickets and a summons for violating open container laws. (The fabricated Ohio episode also figures prominently in Frey's follow-up memoir, *My Friend Leonard*.)

The Smoking Gun was unable to find any Michigan or North Carolina records pertaining to Frey being wanted on charges of drug possession, even though these charges appear in the memoir and would, assumedly, appear in state paperwork. *The Smoking Gun* did succeed, however, in finding evidence undermining Frey's account of being

ostracized for his role in a fatal accident in his hometown. Interviews with the victims' families and with police officers indicated that Frey had no connection with the accident, which functions in the memoir as a symbol of Frey's feelings of alienation.

After *The Smoking Gun* published its exposé, Frey appeared on Cable News Network's (CNN) *Larry King Live* to discuss the allegations. Frey defended his book by repeatedly stating that a memoir is by nature subjective, reliant on the author's recollections rather than fully verifiable. Winfrey called the show to proclaim her support of Frey and to suggest that the book's message of redemption remained valuable despite questions about factual accuracy.

Winfrey's response later changed. During a January 2006 episode of her show, Winfrey confessed to feeling fooled by Frey, and she pressed the author to tell the truth. Frey stated that *The Smoking Gun*'s findings were correct and claimed that his fabrications were coping mechanisms, allowing him to create an alter ego when he felt vulnerable. (He also indicated that he exaggerated details in order to make the book more dramatic.) Winfrey confronted Frey about additional scenes in the book, including his girlfriend's alleged suicide by hanging (the victim actually slashed her wrists) and his story about undergoing two root canals without anesthesia (Frey could not verify).

In the short term, the controversy negatively impacted James Frey's career, although he has published two books since *A Million Little Pieces* and *My Friend Leonard*. Frey's literary manager dropped him from her roster. Frey also lost his contract with Riverhead Books, publisher of *My Friend Leonard*. His next book, the novel *Bright Shiny Morning* (2008), was picked up by HarperCollins, which gave him a three-book contract. Also, he and Jobie Hughes cowrote the Lorien Legacies young adult book series under the pseudonym Pittacus Lore; one book from the series, *I Am Number Four*, was adapted for film in 2011. Publicity for his most recent novel, *The Final Testament of the Holy Bible* (2011), depicts Frey as a rebel besieged by the media. One representative of said media—Winfrey herself—reconciled with Frey; he appeared on her show again in 2011.

Recent scholarship about life writing has addressed the Frey controversy. Leigh Gilmore

characterizes *A Million Little Pieces* as neoconfessional, a narrative (and aftermath) trafficking in tropes of confession, public shaming, and redemption to produce notoriety, celebrity, and even more confessional memoirs. Using Philippe Lejeune's concept of the autobiographical pact, Allan G. Borst notes similarities between Frey's book and other addiction memoirs, suggesting that a pact of fidelity to truth in life writing does not easily apply to autobiographical work addressing substance abuse, in which lines between truth and fiction are inevitably blurry. Mark Nunes focuses on the controversy's aftermath rather than the memoir itself, depicting online responses to Frey's lies as a communicative event challenging notions of narrative representation and authenticity.

Megan Brown  
Drake University

**See Also:** Blair, Jayson; Confession; Fiction; Glass, Stephen; Historical Narratives, False; Memoirs; Myth

#### Further Readings

- Borst, Allen G. "Managing the Crisis: James Frey's *A Million Little Pieces* and the Addict-Subject Confession." *Cultural Critique*, v.75/1 (2010).  
 Gilmore, Leigh. "American Neoconfessional: Memoir, Self-Help, and Redemption on Oprah's Couch." *Biography*, v.33/4 (2010).  
 Nunes, Mark. "A Million Little Blogs: Community, Narrative, and the James Frey Controversy." *The Journal of Popular Culture*, v.44/2 (2011).  
 Smoking Gun. "A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey's Fiction Addiction." <http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/celebrity/million-little-lies> (Accessed November 2012).

---

## Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is a medical imaging technique employing strong magnetic fields to produce three-dimensional, high-resolution images of the human body. Functional MRI (fMRI) differs from normal MRI used in medical



settings by the speed at which entire three-dimensional images of the brain are acquired. A typical fMRI scanner will take an image of a complete brain every few seconds, which permits the comparison of changes associated with cognitive activity in one part of the brain with that same part of the brain a few seconds later.

By far the most common approach to understanding cognitive processes is the use of the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal. The BOLD signal relies on the naturally occurring differences in the magnetic properties of various types of brain tissues and on the magnetic properties of oxygen-rich and oxygen-depleted hemoglobin. It is understood that the activity of brain cells and blood flow within the brain are closely related, but fMRI scans do not measure activity itself—rather, the relative changes in oxygenated blood flow over time, allowing researchers to infer activity in a specific region of the brain by virtue of its demand for oxygen-rich blood.

### Deception Experiments

Contrasting an experimental condition with a control condition is the principle by which cognitive neuroscientists try to understand which parts of the brain are active while performing a certain task. Researchers will try to design an experiment which comprises two tasks that are identical in every way except for one very specific variable of interest. When the patterns of brain activity are later overlaid and compared for each of the two conditions, any differences in activity are thought to be attributable to the difference in the variable of interest.

In the case of deception experiments, the standard comparison will be to overlay brain activation patterns seen when performing truthful trials of a task (considered to be a baseline, or control) with deceptive trials. The difference observed between the two can then be attributed to deception. The strength of this evidence depends heavily on the sound design of the experimental procedure.

It is important to be aware of the restrictions that fMRI-based research imposes on experimenters and the tasks that they employ with regard to deception. For a participant taking part in an fMRI study, inside the bore of the scanner can be a dark, cold, and noisy environment. Distortions caused by body motion inside the scanner are

common, and a great deal of time is spent making participants feel comfortable inside the scanner and training them to remain still throughout the experiment. Participants will usually be asked to make push-button responses on button boxes at their sides rather than speak, as the movement of the tongue and jaw (as well as air over the vocal chords) will introduce distortions into the scanning data because it upsets the carefully controlled magnetic fields within the scanner.


The types of experiments employed in fMRI studies vary greatly in terms of the scenarios in which the experiments are set. Some might employ a mock-crime scenario, in which one must plead innocence either truthfully or deceptively about a staged crime that was enacted prior to the scanning session; others might ask participants questions as to the nature of potentially embarrassing autobiographical information; and some experiments employ emotionally neutral information concealment scenarios, such as lying about a playing card in a hand of cards. Clearly these experimental scenarios will vary in their stakes—the risks or rewards associated with successful deception—as well as the extent to which they induce feelings such as fear of being found out or guilt.

Another important consideration with regard to experimental deception research (and fMRI experiments fall into this category) is the fact that deception is often “sanctioned” by the experimenter; after all, in the vast majority of experiments, participants are told when to lie and when to tell the truth. It is argued that a core feature of deception is that it is rarely, if ever, consented to or endorsed by the victim of the deceit.

Observations such as these have raised concerns over “ecological validity,” or how representative of everyday deception such experimental scenarios may be. This is of major importance once results from laboratory studies are translated to situations with serious consequences, such as within the judicial system or for use in clinical settings. For this reason, numerous researchers advocate carefully designed “clinical trials” before such technology can be considered credible in a court of law.

### Current and Future Uses of the Procedure

As indicated above, current understanding of how the brain shapes deception is based largely



*Duke University Medical Center researchers utilize functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine how a certain brain region drives selfish or unselfish motives. The technology has also been used in deception detection experiments, but it has limitations that have raised concerns over its validity.*

on studies with relatively low ecological validity, but as progress is made in designing experiments that are more similar to the types of deception seen in everyday life, a fuller and more detailed picture of the cognitive neurobiology of deception will emerge.

Researchers have been employing fMRI techniques to help understand the neural correlates of deception for over a decade, and already a number of companies have marketed fMRI lie detection technology based on such research, trying to establish an alternative to the polygraph. As noted above, a willing and compliant participant is crucial for current fMRI procedures in order to offer accurate pictures of brain activity, while research has recently illustrated fMRI lie

detection could potentially be rendered useless by a relatively simple countermeasure training process; thus, some fairly fundamental obstacles must be overcome before such technologies are ready for widespread use.

The technology of fMRI has been revolutionary in terms of understanding how the brain functions, and research on deception using the technology has greatly increased insight into this fascinating phenomenon. Given the potential impact of lie detection using fMRI technology, experts have begun to carefully consider the ethics and implications of such technology and whether fMRI-based lie detection is truly possible.

Gordon R. T. Wright  
Birkbeck, University of London  
Geoffrey Bird

*Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, London*

**See Also:** Brain; Deception and Technology; Electroencephalography; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Polygraph.

#### **Further Readings**

- Johnson, K. A., F. A. Kozel, S. J. Laken, and M. S. George. "The Neuroscience of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) for Deception Detection." *American Journal of Bioethics*, v.7/9 (2007).
- Langleben, D. D. "Detection of Deception With fMRI: Are We There Yet?" *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.13/1 (2008).
- Spence, S. A. "Playing Devil's Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.13/1 (2008).

# G

## Games, Children's

Children's games provide many developmental benefits in addition to offering recreational and entertaining experiences. Lying and deception play key roles in many types of children's games, with the opportunity to deceive one's peers an important strategy for defeating opponents and winning the contest. Some believe this exposure to lying and deception plays a role in adult reaction to such behaviors, while others maintain that the vast majority of children appreciate the lack of veracity required as part of the game. Few studies specifically examine how lying in games affects players' later socialization or actions.

### Background

"Play" has been defined in various ways. Most definitions, however, indicate that it is an activity that is engaged in both for its own sake and for the purpose of participating in the process of the play. While "winning" is often highly desired, in and of itself it offers few if any benefits to the child other than the ability to say one has bested one's peers. Such a definition contrasts play with exploration, which may occur when a child receives a new toy or other plaything.

Play is sometimes categorized into various types, including exercise play, object play, physical play, pretend play, and sociodramatic play.

Exercise play begins when children are toddlers, peaks at the early elementary school grades, and then decreases. This type of play involves periods when a child is running around and being active; exercise play is posited to assist with the physical training of muscles while also encouraging breaks from cognitive tasks. Object play begins in infancy and is thought to assist children in developing problem-solving skills, as studies have demonstrated that allowing children the opportunity to play with an object has as much impact as instruction when the same children are later asked to solve a problem. Physical play involves gross motor activity, such as those movements that include climbing, jumping, running, or other large muscle movement, including play fighting and chasing. Pretend play begins in children as young as 15 months old, often entails such behaviors as putting a stuffed toy "to bed" or feigning sleep, and is often first modeled to children by adults. Sociodramatic play involves social interaction with others and can often involve sustained role-playing along a narrative line. Sociodramatic play is often engaged in by children 3 years of age and older. Each type of play is important and sometimes evolves into games, which are essentially play with rules.

Children's games are those in which children play with some sort of goal or objective in mind. Although games are often taught to children by

their parents or other older individuals, sometimes children create the games on their own. Some games are unstructured, involving natural play and few rules, and are based chiefly upon imagination and fantasy. Other games are highly structured and are organized with set rules and definite goals and objectives. In ancient Greece children are known to have played a primitive form of jacks, with children tossing and catching five or more jackstones. Games such as swings, blindman's bluff, and a chase game in which teams of children would take turns chasing the other depending upon the toss of a coin, all existed 2,000 or more years ago. Games evolve to represent the cultures in which they are played. Certain games that were once popular, such as those that involved violence toward animals, have disappeared and been replaced by other, more socially acceptable alternatives.

Many types of games have traditionally involved balls or other objects that are thrown, caught, and used to rack up various types of scores if placed in a certain position. Technology has impacted the development of games and often changed how they are played. For instance, the discovery of rubber led to the production of balls made out of that substance. This new type of ball consequently led to an increase in the number and variety of games played with balls. Increasing trade between various nations also has changed the types of games with which children play; after Marco Polo opened trade with China, for example, kites became common in Europe for the first time. More recently, advances in computer and video technology have led to the development of many electronic games, which in turn has changed how some interaction with older games occurs.

Playing games is often perceived as a training exercise through which children develop skills that are useful in other spheres of their lives. Differences exist between child-created and officially sanctioned sports. On one hand, games children develop on their own often emphasize the need for little preparation, less specialized equipment, and any convenient playing area. Most sanctioned games, on the other hand, have fixed rules, specific equipment, and require carefully laid out playing spaces. The games children develop on their own often involve a great deal of catching,

chasing, and running, while variations of basic games that involve few resources, such as hopscotch, jump rope, and marbles, are popular throughout the world and across cultures. Certain games are played by both adults and children and include those that focus on guessing, strategy, coordination, and quizzes.

Although ubiquitous today, manufactured games date only from the 17th century. These games originally were intended as a means of instructing children on certain knowledge and information believed to be useful, and some of these evolved into games that are still used today. For example, map games that had children attempt to assemble wooden cut-outs of various countries led to the development of jigsaw puzzles and other similar games shortly thereafter. Prominent critics of games such as cards and billiards often criticized those pastimes that did not have some educational component that would illuminate or uplift those engaged in such play.

The first board game sold commercially, *The Mansion of Happiness*, was introduced in 1843 and was inspired by Christian views on morality, with players encountering various vices and virtues before ultimately reaching the Mansion of Happiness at trail's end. Many games that were first sold during the 19th century, such as *Authors*, *Chinese Checkers*, *Parcheesi*, *Snakes-and-Ladders*, and others, remain popular today. During the 20th century, many board games were introduced that became popular, including *Monopoly*, *The Game of Life*, *Clue*, *Risk*, and others. During the 1970s, war games, which were usually played by adults, became highly popular, as did *Dungeons & Dragons* as well as other role-playing games. Many games require some sort of lying or deception on the part of the players, and some believe that this behavior has long-term consequences for children who engage in such pastimes.

### **Deception as a Strategic Part of the Game**

Games can be based upon a variety of rules and ways of winning. Some games are based upon pure chance (such as rolling a pair of dice), pure strategy (chess), or a mixture of the two (poker or *Monopoly*). Most games involve this combination of both luck and strategy, although the precise mixture of luck or randomness as opposed to



skill involved varies greatly from game to game. A child playing Snakes-and-Ladders, for example, needs to make no decisions, as luck alone controls the pace and course of the game. Other games, however, such as Risk, involve a combination of skill and luck—a few poor die tosses will impede the play of any individual, but over many games the more skilled player will win more often than his or her less skilled counterpart.

The amount of game information available to players also heavily influences how a game is played. Games such as chess are sometimes referred to as “perfect information” games—each player has complete information regarding the state of the game at any given moment. Other games, such as poker, hide a certain amount of information from each player. While he or she can surmise certain information based upon the cards in his or her hand and knowledge of the cards already played, certain information is known only by the other player. This makes an ideal situation for one or more players to lie or “bluff” regarding the cards in their hands. While knowing only partial information about an opponent's hand makes determining the best move more difficult, it also assists the players who estimate the probabilities of certain possibilities, a skill that has value in other areas of life.

Some games also require the players to negotiate with each other, forcing them to use diplomacy in order to achieve a situation that is mutually advantageous. In Risk, for example, a strategic game in which players compete for world domination, two or more participants may choose to team up against one or more opponents. As a result, a major aspect of the game is convincing other players to join with him or her as opposed to others. More sophisticated games in which players engage in such negotiations, such as Diplomacy, sometimes require the making of complicated and sophisticated plans, and players must be wary of the possibility of betrayal. The skills of diplomacy may be combined with chance, as in those games in which players must also throw a die or dice or draw cards from a deck to determine their next move. Certain role-playing games require players to roll some sort of a counter to determine how a certain character fares in battle, and in some of these contests a player may engage in deception of some or all of the other players.

### **Effect of Engaging in Games on Players**

Socialization is the process through which children gain the knowledge, practices, standards, and values of the communities into which they will eventually become members. Enculturation is a two-way process, with adults certainly transmitting certain values and traditions to younger members of the group, but with children also playing a fundamental role in shaping their environments. Innate differences between different children in the same community, such as varying perceptions of their intelligence, temperament, and physical attractiveness, all play a role in children's enculturation. A child's socialization, however, is also influenced by those activities in which a child engages. As a result, some studies have explored how games that demand the players engage in lying or deception influence the development and perceptions of children who play them.

Some developmental psychologists believe that games influence children's cognitive and social development. This influence is perhaps greater for boys, whose facility with games focusing on balls or chases often is a strong predictor of their social competence with classmates. Playing games allows children to develop their cognitive and social capacities, and most children express pleasure when playing games, often choosing to engage in them in preference to other activities. Games require children to be knowledgeable about the rules of a game and to subordinate their own desires and opinions to the rules and their peers' positions in the game.

Children who are highly facile at games tend to become game leaders and play a dominant role in determining when games begin and end, as well as negotiating disagreements that may arise. Children who are less able to engage in tasks that involve lying and deception are frequently assisted by game leaders, who provide scaffolding and other support to help the less facile players obtain their goals. Children's ability to succeed at games played with peers often impacts their sense of efficacy with regard to overall school performance.

The ability to engage in deceptive behavior in games appears to also be correlated to a child's ability to engage in constructive relationships with teachers, parents, and other authority

figures. Leadership in chase and ball games often leads to leadership roles in the classroom for boys, but girls, who are more likely to engage in verbal or board games, do not see a similar transfer in leadership from games to the classroom. While a number of studies have been conducted on older games, such as chess and mancala, which show that knowledge of the game rather than anticipation of an opponent's possible moves most influence play, little research has been conducted on more modern board or role-playing games. As a result, little is known about how a player's facility with lying and deception affects the final results of a game.

Stephen T. Schroth

Jason A. Helfer

Sean D. Carter-Hopkins

Knox College

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Bluffing; Childhood, Lying in; Children's Sports Teams; College Sports; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Fairy Tales; High School Sports; Magic Tricks; Poker.

### Further Readings

Blanchford, P., R. Creeser, and A. Mooney.

"Playground Games and Playtime: The Children's View." *Educational Research*, v.32/3 (1990).

Brooks, D. *The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement*. New York: Random House, 2011.

Hovart, E. M., E. B. Weininger, and A. Lareau. "From Social Ties to Social Capital: Class Differences in the Relations Between Schools and Parent Networks." *American Educational Research Journal*, v.40/2 (2003).

Jost, J. T. "Toward a Wittgensteinian Social Psychology of Human Development." *Theory Psychology*, v.5/1 (1995).

Pellegrini, A. D., K. Kato, P. Blatchford, and E. Baines. "A Short-Term Longitudinal Study of Children's Playground Games Across the First Year of School: Implications for Social Competence and Adjustment to School." *American Educational Research Journal*, v.39/4 (2002).

Sax, L. *Boys Adrift: The Five Factors Driving the Growing Epidemic of Unmotivated Boys and Underachieving Young Men*. New York: Basic Books, 2007.

## Generalized Communicative Suspicion

Generalized communicative suspicion (GCS) is a predisposition toward believing that other people's messages are deceptive. GCS is conceptually different from state suspicion. A valid instrument was built to measure GCS. Contrary to expectations, GCS scores are not consistently related with deception judgments.

Generalized communicative suspicion was first defined by Timothy R. Levine and Steven McCornack, who established a distinction between GCS and situationally aroused (or state) suspicion. GCS was described as a predisposition toward believing that other people's messages are deceptive. It was conceived as a relatively enduring personality trait. On the contrary, state suspicion is aroused by situational cues that suggest that in a particular context, at a particular time, a particular communication of a particular person may be deceptive. Unlike GCS, state suspicion is transient. While GCS depends on the person, state suspicion depends on the situation.

Levine and McCornack created a scale to measure GCS with 14 Likert-type items. Several validation studies have been conducted. On most occasions, some items have been removed because of low-factor loadings, high cross-loadings, or a small contribution to total-scale reliability. The final scale has been shown to measure a unidimensional construct, with Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.71 to 0.82 depending on the particular study. The GCS scale has significant positive correlations with related constructs, such as lie acceptability, cynicism, negativism, and verbal aggressiveness, as well as significant negative correlations with trustworthiness, interpersonal trust, specific trust, and locus of control. The correlations are not as high as to suggest that the construct being measured is the same. These correlations make sense theoretically and support the construct validity of GCS. The original English-language scale was translated into Spanish (11 items, alpha equals 0.82) and German (with alphas ranging from 0.77 to 0.85).



*A West Midlands, United Kingdom, police officer gives a driver a breathalyzer test as part of a drunk driving crackdown in 2010. Police officers are repeatedly exposed to suspicion-arousing situations in which distrust is the norm, which may increase their tendency toward generalized communicative suspicion.*

Research has shown that state suspicion significantly increases the tendency to judge other people's messages as lies. GCS should have a similar effect; specifically, in comparison with low-GCS individuals, high-GCS individuals should have a stronger tendency to judge other people's messages as lies, or they should at least react more strongly to increases in state suspicion. Several studies have examined these issues.

Levine and McCornack showed that moderate- and high-GCS individuals were more likely to make deception judgments (judging the incoming messages as lies) than low-GCS individuals. This effect held when controlling for state suspicion. Additional analyses revealed that GCS and state suspicion influenced deception judgments in a nonadditive manner. Subsequent research, however, yielded less positive results. Another study by McCornack and Levine showed that whereas

state suspicion significantly influenced the number of deception judgments, neither GCS nor the GCS times state suspicion interaction did.

### **Studies of Prisoners and Police Officers**

Prisons are contexts in which situational suspicion is aroused. If people high in GCS are particularly sensitive to situational suspicion, then high-GCS inmates should make more deception judgments than low-GCS inmates. However, two studies conducted in U.S. prisons found no significant relation between inmates' GCS scores and their deception judgments. Perhaps the high level of state suspicion in prisons overshadows the influence of GCS; however, an additional study with both prisoners and nonprisoners found that (1) the former tended more strongly than the latter to make deception judgments, (2) prisoners had higher GCS scores than nonprisoners, yet (3) GCS scores did not predict deception judgments. Together these findings cast doubt on the usefulness of the GCS scale to predict deception judgments.

A separate line of research with police officers also points in this direction. Officers are often involved in suspicion-arousing situations in which distrust is the norm (for example, interrogations). Over the years, repeated exposure to situations of this kind might increase police officers' generalized suspicion, so that experienced officers may end up believing that people normally lie. This would explain why, when judging veracity, officers primarily search for evidence that the communication sender is lying and make more deception judgments than nonofficers.

Two studies conducted in Spain revealed that, as expected, veteran officers had higher GCS scores than both novice officers and college students (which did not differ). This shows that, as predicted, experience as an officer results in greater GCS and rules out the possibility that distrustful individuals tend to join the police force more readily than less distrustful individuals. In the second study, veracity judgments were examined in addition to GCS. Both veteran and novice officers displayed a significant tendency to make deception judgments, whereas students tended to make truth judgments. However, unexpectedly, no correlation was significant between GCS scores and deception judgments, neither across all

three samples or when considering each sample separately.

A more recent study conducted in Switzerland found that students and police recruits were more concerned about misjudging truths as lies than about misjudging lies as truths and tended to make truth judgments, while police officers were equally concerned about misjudging truths or lies and were neither truth nor lie biased. The correlations between GCS and error weighting (concern about misjudging truths versus lies) and deceptiveness judgments were significant in the students' sample but not in either police sample. However, in regression analyses in which error weighting, age, and GCS were entered as predictors of deception judgments, the effect of GCS was not significant for either sample. Thus, evidence in support of a link between GCS scores and deceptiveness judgments is, at best, mixed.

Researchers have also examined the influence of GCS on other measures. GCS has been shown to increase the intensity of emotional reaction to discovered deception among women. Specifically, among high-GCS individuals, women reported experiencing more intense emotional reactions than men after discovering that a friend or relational partner had lied to them. No sex difference emerged among low-GCS participants. Finally, in a study examining people's trust in the police, it was predicted that relative to low-GCS individuals, high-GCS individuals would show higher trust in officers who make a deception judgment. However, the correlations between GCS scores and trust were not significant.

## Conclusion

The conceptual distinction between GCS and situationally aroused suspicion is valuable, and the GCS scale has adequate properties and construct validity. However, studies conducted in several countries with college students, prisoners, and police officers question the value of GCS scores to predict deception judgments. GCS does increase emotional reaction to discovered deception among women but is unrelated to error weighting and trust in the police following a deception judgment.

Jaume Masip  
University of Salamanca

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Cheating; Deception Detection Accuracy; Distrust; Investigator Bias; Law and Law Enforcement; Lie Bias; McCornack, Steven; Truth Bias.

## Further Readings

- Bond, G. D. and A. Y. Lee. "The Darkest Side of Trust: Validating the Generalized Communication Suspicion Scale With Prison Inmates." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.38 (2005).
- Bond, G. D., D. M. Malloy, E. A. Arias, S. N. Nunn, and L. A. Thompson. "Lie-Biased Decision Making in Prison." *Communication Reports*, v.18 (2005).
- Bond, G. D., L. A. Thompson, and D. M. Malloy. "Vulnerability of Older Adults to Deception in Prison and Nonprison Contexts." *Psychology and Aging*, v.20 (2005).
- Hurst, M. and M. E. Oswald. "Mechanisms Underlying Response Bias in Deception Detection." *Psychology, Crime, and Law*, v.18 (2012).
- Hurst-Wagner, M. and M. E. Oswald. "Impact of Deception Detection Errors on Public's Trust in the Police." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.17 (2012).
- Levine, T. R. and S. A. McCornack. "The Dark Side of Trust: Conceptualizing and Measuring Types of Communicative Suspicion." *Communication Quarterly*, v.39 (1991).
- Levine, T. R., S. A. McCornack, and P. B. Avery. "Sex Differences in Emotional Reactions to Discovered Deception." *Communication Quarterly*, v.40 (1992).
- Masip, J., H. Alonso, E. Garrido, and C. Antón. "Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS) Among Police Officers: Accounting for the Investigator Bias Effect." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.35 (2005).
- Masip, J., H. Alonso, E. Garrido, and A. Barba. "Police Officers' Suspicion and Veracity Judgments." Paper presented at the 18th Conference of the European Association of Psychology and Law, Maastricht, the Netherlands, 2008.
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- Vrij, Aldert. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. Chichester, England: John Wiley, 2008.



## Glass, Stephen

In 1998, while working as journalist for *The New Republic* (TNR) and freelancing for other publications that included *George*, *Harper's*, *Vanity Fair*, the *New York Times Magazine*, *The New Yorker*, and *Rolling Stone*, 25-year-old Stephen Glass was found to be guilty of constructing a web of lies that had propelled him to the top of his field. Glass has since said that his deception began with making up a quotation to add a spark to an existing story, spread to coloring his articles with made-up details, and eventually grew to encompass stories made up entirely of whole cloth.

Glass knew how to get past fact-checkers at various publications because he had begun his career at TNR in that department. His deception was so complete that he invented official-sounding organizations and prepared fake notes of meetings that never took place. To bolster his stories, he provided phony letterheads, newsletters, business cards, and phone numbers, and even made up a fake Web site on his office computer. The discovery of Glass's fabrications sent TNR and all of the other publications for which Glass worked scurrying to check his "facts." TNR subsequently discovered that Glass had fabricated all or parts of 27 of the 41 stories written for the magazine, which had a nine-decade-long history of coming down hard on others for any missteps.

Years after the scandal involving Stephen Glass came to light, his name continues to be synonymous with lying in journalism. While his supporters believe he has accepted blame for his actions and reformed his character, his detractors continue to cast doubts on his reformation. Some observers believe that not all the fault for his deception lies with Glass himself. They point out that his deception was a response to the New Journalism in which writers are rewarded more for presenting a colorful story than for presenting actual facts. Psychologist Robert Reich has identified Glass as a "primary liar," one who lies to recreate a new sense of identity in order to make himself or herself look better in their own eyes. Journalist Chris Jozefowicz insists that Glass's editors and readers must also accept a share of the blame because of their thirst for sensational stories that go beyond a simple reporting of facts.

### Operation Broken Glass

The story that finally brought down Glass's web of deception was "Hack Heaven" (*The New Republic*, May 18, 1998), which described a greedy, youthful hacker who was being paid huge amounts by Junkt Micronics to refrain from destroying the company. The story sent up red flags for Adam Peneberg, the editor of the Forbes Digital Tool Web site, who was well versed in the world of hacking. After finding that none of the so-called facts in the story were verifiable, Peneberg contacted Glass's boss, Charles Lane. After intense grilling and being informed that security cameras could be produced to prove whether a fictional meeting had ever taken place, Glass confessed to his lies. When he was discovered trying to delete the fake Junkt Web site from his computer, he was fired.

*The New Republic* publicly acknowledged Glass's deception in its June 1, 1998, issue and apologized to its readers by announcing that starting in 1995 and continuing until he was fired, Glass had engaged in a pattern of fabricating details to embellish stories that eventually led him to turn out fiction rather than stories based on investigative journalism. The publication launched Operation Broken Glass to reexamine each fact provided in articles that Glass had written for TNR.

Some of the most blatant lies offered in Glass's TNR articles concerned an exposé of vendors in Rockville, Maryland, who sold political novelty items inspired by Monica Lewinsky, the White House intern who had had a sexual relationship with President Bill Clinton ("Monica Sells," April 13, 1998); a conservative plan to bring down Clinton ("Plotters," February 23, 1998); and an evangelical church that worshiped former president George H. W. Bush ("Peddling Poppy," June 9, 1987). Glass had even lied about DARE, the school drug-prevention program, and the organization filed a \$10 million libel suit that was eventually settled out of court. John F. Kennedy, Jr., the editor of *George*, personally apologized to Vernon Jordan, a Clinton aide whom Glass had falsely accused of lascivious behavior toward young women.

Rather than accepting responsibility for his own actions, Glass tried to shift the blame to his parents. He insisted that he had spent his entire life trying—and failing—to please his physician father and nurse mother, both of whom were

disappointed in him for being unable to succeed in his medical studies at the University of Pennsylvania. In 2000, Glass graduated magna cum laude from Georgetown University's Law Center. However, after passing the New York bar exam, it was made clear that he was unlikely to be accepted as a member of the New York State Bar because of doubts about his character.

### A New Start

Rather than fighting for admittance, Glass moved to California, seeking a new start. He met with similar results, but this time he chose to challenge the state bar, appealing the case all the way to the California Supreme Court. His supporters included 22 psychiatrists and law professors. Many remained unconvinced that Glass had changed. Carol Langford, a law professor and ethicist at the University of California at Berkeley insists he is a pathological liar. While awaiting a decision, Glass continued working as a paralegal.

In 2003, when Glass surfaced by fictionalizing his own story in *The Fabulist*, for which he received about \$200,000, he was soundly criticized by other journalists for again profiting from lying to his bosses, his colleagues, and the American public. Glass's deception was also fictionalized in the film *Shattered Glass*, which appeared that same year, with Hayden Christensen portraying Glass. On the positive side, the deception perpetrated by Glass caused both journalists and editors to accept more responsibility for checking facts before they are published.

Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Attorneys; Blair, Jayson; Clinton, Bill; Fiction; Frey, James; News Media: Print.

### Further Readings

Carson, Thomas. *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Glass, Stephen. *The Fabulist*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

Goldman, David. "Story Teller: Stephen Glass Makes Fact From Fiction." *Biography*, v.3/10 (1999).

Gordon, Leslie A. and Jill Schachner. "A Test of Character." *ABA Journal*, v.98/3 (2012).

Jozefowicz, Chris. "Liar, Liar." *Psychology Today*, v.36/5 (2003).

Shapiro, Ivor. "Why They Lie: Probing the Explanations for Journalistic Cheating." *Canadian Journal of Communication*, v.31/1 (2006).

"To Our Readers." *The New Republic*, v.218/22 (June 1, 1998).

"To Our Readers." *The New Republic*, v.218/26 (June 29, 1998).

Turner, Richard and Weston Kosova. "There's Enough Blame to Go Around." *Newsweek*, v.131/25 (1998).

## Goffman, Erving

Sociologist Erving Goffman was born in Mannville, Alberta, Canada, on June 22, 1911, the son of immigrant Ukranian Jews. His father, Max, was a shopkeeper, and his mother, Anne, was a homemaker. Goffmann received his education in both Canada and the United States, earning a B.A. at the University of Toronto in 1945, and then attending the University of Chicago, from which he received his M.A. in 1949 and his Ph.D. in 1953. Goffman became a full professor while employed at University of California, Berkley, in 1962 and became the Benjamin Franklin Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1968.

He married Angelica Choate in 1952, and his only child, Tom, was born in 1953. Goffman became a widower in 1964, when his wife, after years of struggling with mental illness, committed suicide. Goffman's prolific writings resulted in 11 books, numerous articles, and the posthumous publication of his 1982 presidential address to the American Sociological Society. He never personally delivered this speech because of his battle with stomach cancer, which resulted in his death in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on November 19, 1982.

### Goffman on Self-Presentation

Goffman is one of the top 10 most frequently cited social scientists. His work displays a unique view of the world that is of particular importance to those interested in lying and deception. Woven

throughout all of his work is the perspective that people present themselves in particular ways to adjust to the demands of society and the social situation; people do not necessarily represent their real selves, but in each particular situation present specific social roles. This perspective offers extensive potential for the examination of lying, deception, secrets, and impression creation and management.

Goffman's first and most acknowledged book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), for which he received the MacIver Award from the American Sociological Association, is most illustrative of his ideas about the presentation of self. In this book he described everyday life via the metaphor of the stage, delving into concepts such as front stage, back stage, and props, all related to the main purpose of individuals in particular microsocial systems of interaction—the endeavor to present a particular positive image, that is, social role, to others. Goffman used the metaphor of the stage, setting scenes, and playing particular roles, as an apropos comparison to social interaction. He recognized the similarity between fictional presentations on the stage and the impression management individuals continually partake of in their everyday lives.

This theme is continued throughout his publications. In *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963), Goffman discusses how stigmatized individuals are expected, by societal standards, to ease the tension of the “normals,” that is, individuals not stigmatized in a particular social situation. This text also discusses how the “discreditable,” that is, individuals who at any point in time may be revealed to be stigmatized, manage to control information so as to not alert normals to their stigma.

The book addresses the impressions individuals attempt to create in others' minds. For example, one method a discredited individual uses to ease tensions in normals is to present himself or herself as a “very good” sort of stigmatized person, for example, a very nice, very educated, very erudite, and very sophisticated pedophile. Discreditable individuals present themselves as normal, not admitting or leaking information, so as not to alert normals their real stigmatized societal status. Stigmatized and discreditable individuals present a social self that is other than the real self;

they attempt to create positive impressions in others' minds.

The presentation of self might be better labeled the presentation of selves, for it is the various selves one might present wherein the question of lying and deceit looms large. In some instances, it is a question. Is it lying or being socially polite to tell a woman “You look great in your new dress” when she doesn't? Situations like this or instances in which people hide their discreditable nature by not offering discrediting information give rise to the question of when lying and deceit actually begin. It is clear that when a man claims to be a medical doctor and is not, he is lying. But the question many have asked after examining Goffman's works is at what point presentation of self impression becomes creation and management, deceit, and/or lying? In many instances, there is no clear demarcation between honesty and deceit.

This theme of self and the impressions individuals socially manage illustrates the human ability to adapt to communicative social contexts, and individuals' ability via pretense, avoidance, secrets, or deceit to manipulate others' perceptions. This is why many researchers refer to the presentation of social roles as putting on a mask; they see this human ability as deceptive versus polite, socially appropriate, or mere sangfroid. Thus, much of Goffman's work is perceived as a way to study how individuals deceitfully manipulate others. Whether it is an everyday situation in which society demands that an individual express politeness rather than the furious anger he or she may feel, or if it is a swindler in the midst of a scam, individuals need to portray a consistent rendition of a trustworthy self to others. Hence, Goffman provides an all-abiding theoretical construction by which to study forms of lies, deceit, and misrepresentation.

Susan A. Stearns  
Eastern Washington University

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Con Man; Context; Disbelief, Suspension of; Impression.

### Further Readings

Goffman, Erving. *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Anchor, 1959.

- Goffman, Erving. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963.
- Jacobsen, Michael Hviid, ed. *The Contemporary Goffman*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Lemert, Charles and Ann Branaman, eds. *The Goffman Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997.
- Riggins, Stephen H., ed. *Beyond Goffman: Studies on Communication, Institution, and Social Interaction*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990.

## Gossip

Gossip is a name commonly given to certain ways of talking about human affairs, whether the talk is retrospective, contemporary, or anticipatory. Gossip exists in private life and public life, in whispers between friends and headlines in magazines. There are gossip columns in newspapers, gossip television programs, and entire magazines devoted to gossip, a form that is referred to as societal gossip. Yet gossip may also occur among schoolmates at recess, among co-workers at a water cooler, or between riders on a bus, all of which is called collegial gossip. In addition, the burgeoning dominance of digital communication bring rise—albeit in a cursory fashion—to virtual gossip. Gossip covers such a broad range of speech that it is impossible to fully mark its territory.

Gossip occurs along a continuum that offers a blend of two things to the group engaged in it: conviviality and compelling content. As an example of one extreme, pure conviviality, a group of closely bonded women knit while talking enthusiastically about the best way to replace missing buttons. At the other extreme, where content is compelling, two men talk about a neighbor's sex life.

The topics of gossip are typically exciting, drawing in listeners and often causing them to enter a highly energized participatory ritual in a state that sociologist Randall Collins calls "entrainment." In gossip sessions, speech is rapid, interrupted, intense, and generally invigorating. The sense of bond between gossipers can be intense, and this force also drives the practice of gossip.

The rigors of authoritative tale-telling (verifiability) came, for the most part, after the invention of

writing. Gossip functions much like entertainment and may be the earliest form of it through enchantment, the artful weaving of the other's imagination through speaking. Medieval troubadours traveled from village to village engaged in a musical gossip mongering, shortly followed by Boccaccio's *Decameron* (1350) and Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* (1475), both of which mirror the tale- and gossip-telling of the people of their era. Even the famous poem *Rape of the Lock* (1712) by Alexander Pope is, effectively, gossip, and it would be no stretch to detect a regular gossiping disposition in that poet, his foils, and his contemporaries. Certainly, there are gossip-like characteristics within folktales, legends, and even myths.

### Characteristics of Gossip

Gossip can be regarded as a performative art. In particular, the speaker of gossip performs the role of expert upon a given topic, the one universal characteristic of gossip. Gossip does have other characteristics, which vary from one performance to another; in particular, it fails to achieve the minimal expectations for warrantable speech about human affairs. Thus, gossip is speech that is some combination of the following: uninformed, unsayable, unverifiable, trivial, and lacking in accountability.

Where the speaker lacks substantial knowledge of the human affair discussed, the speech may be gossip because it is uninformed. For example, neighbors with no facts speculate about imminent construction in the neighborhood.

Where speech is unsayable, it may be gossip for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the speaker is unpermitted to speak on the subject and doing so gossips. This might occur when a man reports of stresses in a neighbor's marriage. When the speech is directed at people who should not be hearing it, it is indiscrete and often thereby gossip. For example, when a woman who laughingly describes, to her new boyfriend, the intimacy challenges faced by her last boyfriend, she is being indiscrete and therefore gossiping. Unsayability also governs speech that is unrespectable, the sort that upright people refuse to speak and refuse to hear, including content that is gathered illicitly or accidentally (e.g., "guess what I saw through my neighbor's window"), is speculative (e.g., "I bet she's the kind of girl that would . . ."), is injurious



to reputation (e.g., “you know he drinks heavily”), or is outrageous (e.g., “he is 45 and still wets his bed”).

Where the content of speech cannot be supported by other sources and evidence, it is unverifiable and therefore gossip or likely to be gossip. A group of neighbors discussing what goes on in the house with the darkened windows is likely to be gossiping unless they have means to gather information that supports their claims.

Gossip that principally bonds people tends to focus on trivial content. Thus, convivial gossip often focuses on trivia in sports, popular music, domestic activities, and so forth.

Speaking carries an ethical burden that magnifies coordinate with its content. Where speech lacks accountability in advance or after the fact, the speech may be regarded as gossip. A man who tells friends that a neighbor has a drinking problem based only on the time that person gets home is not speaking responsibly. Should it be later learned that the charge was both untrue and based on this weak evidence, the speaker may also be regarded as a gossip for irresponsibly making the original claim and shirking any duty to admit wrongdoing.

### Motivation to Gossip

Access to gossip is a profound sign of inclusion in groups; thus, the motivation to gossip is often peer driven, much like an adolescent's motivation to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes. Conviviality thus plays an instrumental role in gossip activities. Both the O. J. Simpson murder story and the President Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal were topically compelling, but they also advanced because of their effects on conviviality (i.e., the racial and political bonding and unbonding that occurred where the stories were popular). In general, motives to gossip are unconscious because gossips are only by degree aware of the meaning of their actions. Thus, gossip may be nonthematized, unconscious, spontaneous, or planned.

Not all gossip is preceded by a mental decision to do so, nor is it all followed by an awareness that it was done. Much of the time it occurs unreflectively in a nonthematized fashion—it just pops out, partially because of the company, the circumstances, or the direction of the conversation. This is true both for convivial gossip and

reportorial gossip. This was the sort of gossip used by Mrs. Bennet and Miss Bates in Jane Austen's *Emma* (1815).

The intent to gossip can also be motivated by forces that are deeper than conscious judgment, what various theories regard as unconscious motivation, such as Freud describes in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901). It is possible, for example, to feel envy for another without consciously knowing it and to do ruinous damage to that person through just letting something accidentally slip out, as the saying goes. In such a case, however, the argument of unconscious motivation would say, as did Freud, that there are no accidents.

Like an impromptu speech, gossip can arise from a spontaneous decision. When this occurs, the gossip talk momentarily deliberates on the possibility of gossiping and then decides to go forward. The moral significance of this decision varies according to the type of gossip delivered. Sometimes it is relatively harmless, as in Season 3, episode 21 of *Seinfeld*, when Elaine and George, as a way to relieve the awkwardness of being alone together, spontaneously gossip about the way Jerry gargles; the viewer's outrage is minimal because the gossip is trivial. On the other hand, in a case of malignant gossip, to reflect even momentarily in advance that the subject of the gossip could be damaged by it, and then to continue with the gossip regardless, is to engage in a morally offensive act.

If gossipers take their time, hours or days in advance, organizing or meditating upon the gossip, the gossip is planned. This organizational quality eliminates any opportunity for the gossip to reasonably later claim that the act was incidental in a manner that might minimize its perceived intent, as does the carrying of a gossip story from group to group, occasion to occasion. Such gossip may be social, collegial, or virtual. Where it harms or could harm, it is a deliberately ruinous act.

In the case of virtual malicious gossip, there are cases of adolescent suicide because of such planned attacks. This is grimly illustrated in the case of Rehtaeh Parsons, who attempted suicide—and later died—after online photos appeared of her being gang raped 17 months prior, in November 2011. The same phenomena can be viewed at

the other end of time, such as in the ancient tale *Psyche and Eros*, in which Psyche's sisters plot to destroy her and her relationship.

The damaging effects of planned gossip are so precise that a polished saboteur, well-studied in this form, can use it to control not only who is damaged but even the quality and degree of damage. Carefully selected gossip can make its subject appear ridiculous ("he has a toupee"), immature ("he picks his nose"), stupid ("he failed the same test twice"), weak ("he begged her to take him back"), inadequate ("they say he's impotent"), uninteresting ("he jabbers on and on"), dangerous ("I heard he hit his last girlfriend"), and so on. Such comments, true or not, can have remarkable and predictable outcomes. But not all gossip that is planned in advance is motivated by a will to harm, as seen more clearly in the examination of gossip types.

### Gossip Types

Gossip types must be recognized because the term *gossip*, by itself, leaves too vague an impression of what has been done. An illustration is the gossip conversation in the song, "Ode to Billy Joe" (1967) by Bobbie Gentry: "Billy Joe McAllister jumped off the Tallahatchie bridge" (verifiable and informative gossip); "Well, Billie Joe never had a lick of sense" (malignant gossip); "Mama said it was a shame about Billie Joe, anyhow" (compassionate gossip); "Nothing ever comes to no good up on Choctaw Ridge" (judgmental gossip); "Brother said he recollected when he and Tom and Billie Joe put a frog down my back" (nostalgic gossip); "Wasn't I talking to him after church last Sunday night?" (investigative gossip); "I saw him at the sawmill yesterday on Choctaw Ridge" (benign gossip); "He said he saw a girl that looked a lot like you up on Choctaw Ridge, and she and Billie



Women gossiping in a Washington, D.C., drugstore over cigarettes and cokes in 1943. The speaker of gossip performs the role of expert upon a given topic, the one universal characteristic of gossip. As another key characteristic of gossip is that it fails to achieve the minimal expectations for warrantable speech about human affairs, gossip therefore is some combination of the following: uninformed, unsayable, unverifiable, trivial, and lacking in accountability.

Joe was throwing something off the Tallahatchie Bridge” (repeated and investigative gossip).

Although the song is well known, few listeners will have thought of the lyrics as gossip, and fewer will have parsed the types of gossip despite the uncountable times they heard it. Most listeners have considered it a song about Billy Joe, or perhaps the singer, focusing on gossip’s content rather than its presence as a speech form. This is what often happens to gossip: The content becomes the focus, not the discursive form.

There are many other varieties of gossip. Variation of type can occur from sentence to sentence, as in the song, yet any one type can form the entire theme of a gossip ritual. Benevolent forms of gossip might include honoring gossip, idolizing gossip, compassionate gossip, and hopeful gossip. Harmful forms of gossip might include salacious gossip, contemptuous gossip, humiliating gossip, malignant gossip, and malicious gossip. Such terms represent possible descriptors for a gossip event and should not be used to establish a nosology; rather, they suggest that gossip should always be identified in at least a two-word form and that the person judging it should seek the most representative descriptor for the occasion.

Both benevolent gossip and harmful gossip can be performed strategically and as lies, which can harm the subject of the gossip.

### Lie Gossip

Where gossip is untrue, it is not always a lie. One can gossip untruths because one is in error, as occurs when one listens to and repeats false reports or comes to erroneous conclusions based on insufficient evidence. One can also be in error because circumstances change between the moment the gossipier gathers content and the moment that content is reported to others.

Gossip can also be untrue because it is embellished. In such cases, the gossip adds more to the story than the facts will support. This occurs when the gossip fabricates to weave together discordant story elements or to respond to audience comments. Embellishments can also occur to make the story (and its teller) more compelling, thereby heightening audience attention and interest. Embellishers may not fully intend to lie—they may simply get caught up in the story, be trapped in an awkward question, and so forth.

Gossip can also be untrue because the gossipier has decided to lie. Such lies run the gamut from harmless fibs to libelous falsehoods. In all such cases, lie-gossip is clearly a deliberate attempt to misrepresent. Planned, malignant gossip (gossip intentionally organized and delivered to bring harm) can be true, but it can also be a lie. Where gossip plans to bring harm through lying, the act is compoundedly heinous, because lie gossip—as a way of unjustly manipulating the status of others—amounts to status theft. In matters of law, the term *libel* is used to describe malicious gossip that exploits lies to cause its effects.

Aspersions to malign steal or ruin the social world’s most profound gifts: the status, opportunities, trust, friendship, and love that rightfully belong to the gossipier’s victim. Those who gossip in this manner are therefore ruiners, and when they ruin by lying in their gossip, they are thieves. In the middle ages, this tendency was a well-known vice with its own term, *peccatum derisionis*, which was regarded as the most grievous of offenses because it robbed a person of deserved honor or respectability, so important wherever one’s word was one’s bond.

The concept remains valuable in modern times, such as in embellished malignant gossip. At a collective workplace, for example, a man describes the comings and goings of an attractive co-worker who lives in his apartment building. To give the others present a sense that he has profound knowledge of this woman, he embellishes his tale, saying that she has a “revolving front door” where men are concerned. This gossip is malignant in that at the very least, it damages her reputation at work. Under any circumstances it would be morally problematic, but it is particularly heinous when it contains untruths that sacrifice the victim’s integrity for the sake of the gossip’s in-group status. By extension, if the gossip comments were made strategically to damage the woman’s status at work, then it would be lie-gossip of a distinctly malicious form.

Because gossip is performative art, it can also be examined in terms of associated deceptive behavior. In particular, the speaker can act (through gesture, tone, word choice, pauses, etc.) as if it was warrantable speech—as if the speech was informed, permitted, verifiable, discrete, significant, and responsible. Because reportorial

gossip is not all of these things, by definition, the performance can be regarded as deceptive.

### Impact of Gossiping on the Gossip

Research supports the common claim that the effect of gossip is to bring dishonor on the person who presents it. Nevertheless, not even the malicious gossip becomes an outcast. The gift-like character of gossip inhibits the tendency of the audience to take offense when it is proffered. Whereas gossip is also possible information, people are often quite interested in it and ready to pay the social price necessary to receive it. The moment they attend to the information, they fall into a conspiracy of gossip, or a gossip group, in which they are no longer in a position to cast downward glances on anyone else. In addition, the subject of the gossip is often in a poor position to retaliate, not knowing it exists or not knowing its source.

Even in cases in which the content and source are known, both justice and retaliation would require confrontation, a form of speech and action that is less well tolerated than gossip itself. Those present during situations of gossip might also fear, and wisely, the vengeful gossip outcomes that could arise as a result of standing up to a well-seasoned gossipier. Moreover, people often engage in such gossip as givers and getters without realizing they are gossiping. Gossip seldom announces itself and certainly does not identify itself as malignant or malicious, for example. As with other forms of discourse, there are few people who can function as analysts of gossip in the middle of experiencing it. Consequently, even a person who lie-gossips does so far more often and more successfully than justice might allow.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Deception Motives; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Relationships: Friends; Reputation; Rumor; Urban Legends.

### Further Readings

- Birchall, C. *Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to Gossip*. Oxford: Berg, 2006.
- Burt, R. S. and M. Knez. "Trust and Third Party Gossip." *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of*

*Theory and Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996.

Collins, R. *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Kurland, N. B. and L. H. Pelled. "Passing the Word: Toward a Model of Gossip and Power in the Workplace." *The Academy of Management Review*, v.25 (2000).

Rosnow, R. L. and G. A. Fine. *Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay*. London: Elsevier, 1976.

Spacks, Patricia Ann Meyer. *Gossip*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.

Ulanov, B. and A. Ulanov. *Cinderella and Her Sisters: The Envied and the Envyng*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983.

Westacott, E. *The Virtues of Our Vices: A Modest Defense of Gossip, Rudeness, and Other Bad Habits*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

## Government, Decline of Public Trust in

Public trust in government is critical to the maintenance of legitimacy and is particularly important to the legitimacy of democratic regimes. Trust enables governing elites to enact legislation and enable mass action without having to resort to either coercion or the use of force, which historically occurs within the domain of less representative political orders. Many scholars have noted a decline in the public's trust of government within modern and postmodern democratic regimes, particularly since the mid-1950s.

Within the context of the impact of lying and deception, this decline in public trust can be attributed to two general sources. The first is lying and/or deception on the part of ruling elites and/or governmental agents and agencies, which is often used to maintain legitimacy and obscure the government's incompetent performance. Additionally, decreasing trust not only reflects public dissatisfaction but may serve to increase future dissatisfaction, making effective governance more difficult. This is compatible with the



colloquialism that “trust leaves on horseback, yet returns on foot.” Second, lying and deception that serves to influence the decline of public trust in government may be attributable to extragovernmental organizations, for example, members of the news media. How the public is exposed to the media is purported to have an impact independent of media content.

### Perceptions of Trust and Government Legitimacy

There are generally two types of trust involving perceptions of the government. The first, “specific support,” refers to perceptions of trust in regard to political elites and the degree of satisfaction with the performance of government, often referred to as the delivery of governmental services. The second, “diffuse support,” refers to the public’s attitude with regard to the political order itself, or the type of regime in power, irrespective of the perception of performance. The reasons for the general decline of public trust in government throughout the 20th century vary, with scholars implicating a decline in levels of social capital, ineffectiveness in dealing with crime, prevalence of political scandals, ineptitude at managing the economy and delivering other governmental services, in addition to shifting societal values with regard to the role of government in society.

The maintenance of trust is important to those in power—both governmental actors and organizations—in that trust is an essential component of legitimacy. Legitimacy is generally defined as “the capacity for a society to hold those institutions in power as appropriate.” Without trust, legitimacy would be necessarily and fundamentally undermined, resulting in a condition whereby ruling elites may be precluded from enacting legislation or enabling action without resorting to tactics that undermine the very essence of representative, democratic, and/or egalitarian forms of government. Thus, while the use of deception and lying is certainly not confined to representative forms of government (and may, in fact, be more prominent in less egalitarian forms of government), trust is more essential to those egalitarian forms of organization, for authoritarian regimes need not be concerned with the negative implications of coercion and force in ensuring compliance.

### Government Propaganda

Lying and deception can occur on the part of governmental agents and agencies in an attempt to enhance the appearance of governmental efficacy with regard to policies and programs. Extreme forms may be colloquially referenced using the term *propaganda*, which, despite its lack of uniformity in terms of meaning, is generally defined as “a negative form of mass communication, most commonly employed by those in power to manipulate or influence public consciousness so as to increase or maintain their position of power.” Although the use of propaganda is not confined to those in positions of power, “negative propaganda” is most often associated with authoritarian political regimes. The term *propaganda* became popularized in describing the vitriolic effort within Nazi Germany aimed at vilifying and dehumanizing the Jewish people before World War II, a campaign that catalyzed the event now formally referred to as the Holocaust.

Within the context of American society, one of the most caustic uses of propaganda surrounds the infamous Joseph McCarthy anticommunist campaigns of the 1950s, wherein innocent Americans were accused of being communist spies and sympathizers, and many unsubstantiated and unfalsifiable claims were made with regard to the impact of communism as a form of economic organization. Propaganda was used heavily during the Cold War and its many “hot war” proxies; for example, propaganda was employed by both sides during the Vietnam War. In the early 21st century, propaganda in the United States (and throughout the Western world) has been used in the nebulous war on terrorism, with the label of terrorist being applied without consideration given to the relativistic nature of the term. The sociopsychological term *Islamophobia* was coined in reaction to the ubiquity of this phenomenon.

Another example of the use of propaganda, which some social historians have implicated in the erosion of trust in government within the United States, concerns the perpetuation of myths surrounding the psychopharmacological effects of illicit psychoactive substances. Many official campaigns aimed at curbing rates of drug use have been predicated upon empirically falsified myths and have been instrumental in justifying and perpetuating the long-standing War on Drugs

in American society (and throughout the world). In this context, the U.S. government has been accused of perpetuating a number of lies to vilify both substance and user in an effort to increase punitive measures against those who manufacture, distribute, and use illicit psychoactive substances. Most notable in this context is the perpetuation of myths surrounding the purported “gateway effect” of marijuana, which, despite the concept’s popularity in government-sponsored antidrug campaigns, has received no empirical support.

### **Government Performance and Trust**

Evaluations of governmental programs with regard to their efficacy, in addition to perceptions regarding the delivery of governmental services, have received much attention in the literature with regard to their impact on trust levels. Levels of distrust increase with decreasing evaluations of the government’s ability to deal with the problem of crime and managing the economy. There is much research examining the process whereby various agencies report on crime statistics, sometimes in ways that could be characterized as disingenuous. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy has been implicated in misrepresenting statistics, ostensibly to garner support for draconian policies aimed at curbing drug use. Additionally, perceptions of efficacy can be manipulated by oppositional political parties and their inherently biased supporters, and this partisan maneuvering impacts levels of trust and ostensibly legitimacy. Consequently, nonpartisan organizations are often called upon to gauge governmental efficacy in order to minimize partisan biases that would undermine the validity of such an accounting. In the United States, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office was created to evaluate the expenditure of federal funds, and the comptroller who oversees its operation is appointed to a 15-year term in order to minimize the impact of political influence.

### **Trust and the Mass Media**

The effect of extragovernmental organizations on levels of public trust in government has largely focused on the influence of the mass media. All representative forms of government are dependent upon an informed electorate, and

it is important to consider the degree to which the editorial process impacts the verisimilitude of media content. Much research has been devoted to understanding the impact of specific forms of media content on levels of trust in government, such as comparing the degree to which those watching television news programs differ from those who receive their news primarily from newspapers. While studies vary with regard to the direction and power of the effect, research suggests that socioeconomic status, ideology, and societal values may interact with media format to influence levels of specific distrust and diffuse support in government.

The “video malaise” thesis asserts that distrust of the government and the media tend to covary, in that those distrustful of one tend to be distrustful of the other. Although the results of empirical research tend to vary with regard to the impact of television (and nontraditional sources of news, such as talk radio) on trust in government, some studies indicate that the effect is conditioned by pre-existing political orientation and socioeconomic status. Despite this, heavily cited research found that those who rely on televised news content are most distrustful of the government. Research has also examined the influence of political and news-oriented comedy programming, which has been found to negatively influence both trust in government and perceptions of threat with regard to national security.

### **Conclusion**

Public trust in government has been in decline throughout the 20th century. While the etiology of this decline is inconclusive, the source of this decline has been attributed to a number of factors which range from satisfaction with government delivery of services to perception of the truthfulness of official government narratives to the influence of various forms of mass media. Both governmental actors and those outside the political process have power in determining how the public perceives these issues and in doing so influence trust in government and, more broadly considered, its claim to legitimacy.

Yuko Nagashima  
Douglas J. Dallier  
*University of Maryland*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Clinton, Bill; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Disasters; Drugs; Edwards, John; Government Propaganda; Greenspan, Alan; Iran-Contra Affair; Nazi Propaganda; News Media: Television and Radio; Nixon, Richard; Spin, Political; Stalin, Josef; Vietnam War; Watergate; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Becker, Lee B. and D. Charles Whitney. "Effects of Media Dependencies: Audience Assessment of Government." *Communication Research*, v.7/1 (1980).
- Bennett, Stephen Earl, S. L. Rhine, R. S. Flickinger, and Linda L. M. Bennett. "Video Malaise Revisited: Public Trust in the Media and Government." *Harvard International Journal of Press Politics*, v.4/1 (1999).
- Ellul, J. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.
- Gamson, W. A. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1968.
- Hetherington, Marc J. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *The American Political Science Review*, v.92/4 (1998).
- Johns C. J. *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.
- Keele, Luke. "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government." *American Journal of Political Science*, v.51/2 (2007).

## Government Propaganda

Government propaganda is a heterogeneous concept composed of a number of dimensions that relate both directly and indirectly to deception and lying. The word *propaganda* shares a common origin with the word *propagate* (Latin: *propagare*), with the emphasis on reproducing, disseminating, or spreading something (for example, plants). Prior to the 20th century, propaganda did not necessarily connote or entail deception, as when in 1627, the Catholic Church created the College of Propaganda in Rome for

the training of missionaries to spread the message of the church. In the United States, early governmental efforts, aimed at large-scale public education, were originally referred to as propaganda by the government itself.

The rise of mass communication and the centralization of government made the institutionalization of propaganda possible in the United States and elsewhere. The intent of the early educational campaigns was often to provide information (largely accurate) to the greatest number of people, with the intention of encouraging or changing specific behavior (for example, public health) for the betterment of society; even Thomas Edison was involved in such a campaign aimed at the prevention of tuberculosis. This initial governmental approach is what has come to be called "white propaganda," and the deception was largely in the emphasis or exaggeration of the message and in the omission of detail that might distract from the message or be misunderstood by the audience.

The term *government propaganda* would have seemed redundant initially, because the government was uniquely using the word *propaganda* to refer specifically to its own educational campaigns. The changes in the meaning of propaganda have corresponded to changes in the governmental practices related to it. World War I saw the application of advertising techniques to increase support for the war effort, but toward ends that were often either not helpful to the individual or were harmful. The contemporary meaning of propaganda is now inextricably linked to and associated with deception and lying. It is also important now to call it government propaganda to highlight its distinction from other forms of propaganda.

### Definition of Propaganda

V. O'Donnell and G. S. Jowett define propaganda as, "the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist." Deception and lying are used as the means of "shaping," "manipulating," and "directing." As suggested above, the role of deception in propaganda is on a spectrum that might include exaggeration or incomplete accounts (for example, lying by

omission) on one end, and outright lying (for example, the big lie or telling the same lie over and over) on the other. Jowett and O'Donnell developed the purpose model of propaganda that includes three levels of communication (sender, gatekeeper, and receiver), which is suggestive of where and how aspects of deception and lying might occur and be identified.

Propaganda is mediated communication and as such it involves several components: (1) The communication of a message that may be hyped, incomplete, misleading, or false but not appear so; (2) the dissemination of that message through the gatekeeper media, which provides the semblance of neutrality or objectivity; (3) the crafting of the message with the intention of influencing the thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and/or behaviors of a particular group or receiver; and (4) persuasion or influence on that receiver that is often achieved by appealing to emotions (for example, using the affect heuristic, which involves making decisions based on one's current emotional state) or biases and misperceptions, as opposed to logical or rational deliberation. Psychologists have largely focused on the last component: the impact of propaganda on the recipient or individual.

While propaganda was originally studied as a discrete concept, psychologists today study the components of propaganda, including persuasion, influence, communication theory, media influence, attitude and behavior change, group dynamics, politics of denial, and bias. Concerns about the utilization and influence of propaganda have expanded beyond its use by governments to include its uses for ideological or commercial purposes. In particular, Noam Chomsky has highlighted the recent growth of corporate propaganda, which he argues has often supplanted or has been integrated with government propaganda to protect or promote corporate interests and power over the needs of the public.

### Propaganda Versus Government Propaganda

One of the difficulties in determining whether something constitutes government propaganda, or propaganda more generally, is in knowing whether and to what degree false or distorted messages are intentionally crafted to produce a particular outcome. The clearest case for calling something government propaganda is when the

government can be shown to have consciously and strategically lied to cynically manipulate the perceptions or behavior of the public in a specific desired direction and often against the public's own best interest. However, it is often difficult to determine whether the distortions are outright lies or are actually to some degree self-serving beliefs or manifestations of denial on the part of those creating the propaganda. Research on groupthink indicates that powerful in-groups (who are often the ones crafting the propaganda) often believe part or all of their own messaging. There is also the phenomenon called "saying is believing," that is, articulating a position to others, even if it runs counter to one's own beliefs, can persuade oneself of the rightness of the belief.


The difficulty for psychologists to empirically determine whether a message was an utter lie versus a distortion versus a rationalization has likely led them to focus their attentions on phenomena related to propaganda that are more easily operationalized and quantified. The effect of the messaging on the recipients of the information in the form of influence and persuasion has been of particular research interest. To understand the scope of the process of propaganda, it is important to understand sender, gatekeeper, and recipient and the synergy among these components.

### The Sender

One level of deception can occur around the transparency of the source of the message. For propaganda to be successful, the credibility of the source must be vouchsafed. White propaganda involves a transparent source. Gray propaganda means the source is ambiguous, while in black propaganda the source is falsely attributed to another. White propaganda still has intent behind it, but the source is known and can be amplified or made more credible by the gatekeeping media. In gray propaganda, the credibility of the source cannot be accurately evaluated, so the message would seem to stand alone and often entails rhetorical devices (for example, straw man argument, diversion, *ad hominem* attacks) to make the message salient. The gatekeeper can bolster the credibility of gray propaganda by serving as a proxy for the source.

Black propaganda involves the greatest deception; the message is false because the attributed





Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, ruler of Libya for 42 years, reveled in a cult of personality that was supported by various forms of government propaganda promoting his agenda, including postage stamps (left) and the Green Book (right), as well as pop music, staged public events, and items such as watches and school satchels. Gaddafi propagated the lie that the public adored him, when in fact he was a cruel and hated dictator; his network of deception finally collapsed during his overthrow and eventual assassination on October 20, 2011.

source is false. Black propaganda appears to come from the out-group and comports with the intent of the propagandist. The message itself discredits the out-group (for example, reveals their malevolent intent), and the receiver of the message believes that his or her reaction is to the message of the out-group and not to the result of manipulation by the propagandist. Gatekeepers can again play a role in amplifying this deception if they fail to reveal the true source.

Another aspect of deception at the sender level is the nature of the message. Much of George Lakoff's recent work has focused on the use of false or misleading metaphors and frames in politics to mislead and influence others. Frank Lutz has made an art of identifying words or phrases, not those that most accurately capture a political position, but those that are most convincing to the public in the direction desired by politicians (for example, using the term *death tax* instead of *estate tax*). Senders might also use scapegoating, priming, stereotyping, rationalization, the rally effect and other potent symbolism, distinctions

between the in-group and the out-group, agenda control, half or selective truths, or classical conditioning (to name just a few) to convey deceptive or false information

### The Gatekeepers

As mediated communication, the gatekeepers play a critical role in amplifying or mitigating the efficacy of propaganda. W. Lance Bennett describes gatekeeper biases (the biasing tendencies of the individuals and groups who present the news) that result in varying degrees of deception. According to Bennett, there are four biases in news media: dramatization, personalization, fragmentation, and normalization.

Dramatization is the act of turning events into stories; natural disasters aren't communicated as meteorological or geological events resulting in loss of life and infrastructure, but rather human victims suffering, human agents causing or coming to the aid of the suffering, acting heroically or not acting heroically, and with an imminent resolution to the tragedy. In addition to the information

that is omitted by dramatized news stories, audiences' understanding of the topics is further hindered by the effects accompanying imagery can have on their cognitive processing of the information being presented. Michael Milburn and Anne McGrail found that when people view news stories with dramatic images, their ability to see the story from multiple perspectives, as well as to merge those perspectives into their own understanding of the event (a dimension called cognitive complexity), decreases.

Personalization is the process through which events are reduced from the products of interconnecting systems, like institutions and political parties, to stories about individual competition and cooperation. This process estranges the events from their context, so that audiences perceive them to have occurred spontaneously, making it difficult to understand and subsequently question the institutions which enabled them to occur.

Fragmentation takes this process further by packaging news stories into incoherent narratives of events with no recognizable relation to one another or historical context. News segments that move between interviews with reporters on the scene, experts in the studio, and descriptions of the event itself are fragmented; the linear, causal sequence of events is buried beneath subplots and opinions. They are difficult to draw conclusions from, and so the big picture is elusive.

The last of Bennett's content biases, normalization, refers to the means by which exceptional news stories are presented as normal and inevitable events that will soon be resolved. Wars are tragic but necessary; soon this one will be over, soldiers will return to their families, and things will be back to normal. Normalization presents avoidable, extreme events as unavoidable and routine, and as a consequence people begin to accept unacceptable atrocities as common occurrences.

Edward S. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model has suggested that government propaganda and corporate propaganda have merged in the modern era. The commercial media serve as the gatekeeper for political messages that correspond to the desires or needs of the sponsoring corporations, and industry provides financial and political support for politicians who articulate industry-serving messages; there is a feedback

loop between politicians and corporations shaping political propaganda that remains largely invisible to the receivers unless exposed by the gatekeeper media. In a more general sense, Herman and Chomsky's model asserts that the news industry's product is not news, but audiences. As news companies' primary source of revenue comes from advertisements, they are actually selling people to consume those ads and the products and services they describe to advertisers. As a result, the news industry's services are oriented toward the businesses that buy ad space, not the readers who purchase their papers or watch their television programs.

This relationship between the media and its patrons creates a paradigm in which the primary function of the news is not to inform but to sell, and this selling behavior is regulated by what Herman and Chomsky refer to as "filters." Filters are social mechanisms that function to determine which stories are told and how, which in turn determines which topics the public thinks about and the context in which they consider them. In *Manufacturing Consent*, the authors describe five types of filters.

The first filter they describe is the ownership filter. Because media outlets operate for profit, their stories are subject to the scrutiny of the wealthy members of the boards that direct them. Capitalist values indicate that those boards will insist on portrayals of events that are conducive to their agenda, which is the generation of profit from ad revenue. Stories that undermine the profitability of a media outlet's advertisers often result in retracted statements and public policies when they are run, but in most cases they are not run at all, and this is the result of the second filter: the advertising filter. All businesses must cater to their customers to ensure profitability, and perhaps one of the greatest works of propaganda in the United States is the perpetuation of the myth that the mass media's customer base is the public.

The third filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the source filter. The media depends on a steady flow of current events to lead the public to their advertisers, and the most efficient way to maintain that flow is by establishing reliable sources from whom to acquire the stories which perpetuate it. This process inevitably leads to sources who can provide the most dramatic news

in the greatest volume, becoming the primary sources for news stories and giving them concentrated and near-exclusive control over the information from which public opinion is formed.

News outlets that do not accommodate these three filters are subjected to the fourth filter, flak. The flak filter is composed of intentional, concerted punitive actions conducted against media organizations that contradict their ownership's ideology, create unfavorable market conditions for their advertisers, or challenge the credibility of their primary sources' information. Owners can terminate jobs, advertisers can pull ads, and primary sources can decline to furnish information to organizations that deviate from the status quo.

The final filter in the propaganda model is the anticommunism filter, although Chomsky has stated that, retrospectively, they would have included antiterrorism and other labeling mechanisms, the primary result of which is enemy generation. This filter capitalizes on the political myths that there are evil individuals in the world engaging in evil behaviors that threaten public safety. This allows the news industry to frighten the populace by presenting dangerous enemies, and by using generic labels to describe those enemies they can associate domestic individuals with similar characteristics (as when environmental activists become "terrorists"). Thus, the gatekeepers play a supportive or corrective role in the transmission of propaganda, but as both Chomsky and Bennett suggest the corporate media is increasingly making its own independent contribution through deception and obfuscation to propaganda.

### The Recipients

For propaganda to be believed, there needs to be a receptive audience. If a country's population is not willing to believe government statements, then any attempt at propaganda will immediately or ultimately fail. An important example of a government successfully using propaganda is the Nazi government in Germany, particularly in creating a cult of personality around Adolf Hitler, indoctrinating young Germans prior to World War II, resulting in fanatical young soldiers maintaining the fight near the end of the war, and in creating fear of the Allies' retribution and the destruction of Germany if they lost the war. An important

question is what factors contribute to the development of citizens who are willing to believe government propaganda.

As part of her review of Germanic child-rearing practices over a 200-year period and their relationship to the Holocaust, Alice Miller argued that child-rearing characterized by what she termed the "poisonous pedagogy" helped create a German population that was susceptible to propaganda. The child-rearing practices she identified include, for example, frequent use of physical punishment, punishing obstinacy with the goal of breaking the child's will, and denial of the child's emotions. This kind of child-rearing will develop a population that is receptive to being manipulated by propaganda since, Miller argues, these people are used to being manipulated by authority figures.

There is considerable evidence that childhood experiences characterized by frequent physical punishment and emotional abuse increase support for authoritarian beliefs and for punitive, conservative public policies like the death penalty and the use of military force, both policies with a large symbolic component of power, toughness, and retribution. This appears to be a result of the process of emotional displacement, in which emotions developed in response to one situation are internalized, carried, and displaced onto a different target in a different situation. There are numerous experimental studies showing that this process operates in the short term, as well as evidence indicating that this process is responsible for the relationship of childhood punishment and conservative political attitudes.

Related research has found that authoritarians are more vulnerable to persuasion by authority figures and will even change their initial opinion in the direction of the advocating authority. A clear implication of this is that authoritarians and conservatives should be more susceptible to the influence of government propaganda, especially when the government disseminating the information is seen as authoritative, for example, conservative. This was the case during the Iraq War that began in 2003, during which the Bush-Cheney administration presented as justification for the war that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had links to Al Qaeda. Despite both claims being without



foundation, a significant number of George W. Bush's supporters have continued to believe both these assertions.

For propaganda to be successful in its transmission and influence, the collusion of deception at all levels is required. The sender must engage in misleading or false messaging, and the source of this message may be enhanced or obscured. The gatekeepers must transmit the message in such a way that its credibility and believability is preserved or enhanced, and the recipients must be open to the misleading or false message.

Marcus Patterson  
Michael Milburn  
Christopher Monteiro  
*University of Massachusetts, Boston*

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Authoritarian States; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Disasters; Drugs; False Advertising; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Greenspan, Alan; Hitler, Adolf; Iraq War; Korean War; Nazi Propaganda; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Nixon, Richard; Spin, Political; Stalin, Josef; Watergate; Vietnam War; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Chomsky, Noam and Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel, eds. *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky*. New York: The New Press, 2002.
- Edelman, Murray. "Information and Cognition." In *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence*. Chicago: Markham, 1971.
- Finucane, M. L., A. Alhakami, P. Slovic, and S. M. Johnson. "The Affect Heuristic in Judgment of Risks and Benefits." *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, v.13/1 (2000).
- Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002.
- Lakoff, George. *Moral Politics*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Lasswell, Harold. *Psychopathology and Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
- McCann, Grace-Ellen. "Government Wartime Propaganda Posters: Communicators of Public Policy." *Behavioral & Social Sciences Librarian*, v.28/1 (2009).

- Milburn, Michael and Sheree Conrad. *The Politics of Denial*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
- Milburn, Michael and Anne McGrail. "Dramatic Television News and Cognitive Complexity." *Political Psychology*, v.13 (1992).
- Miller, Alice. *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Childhood and the Roots of Violence*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983.
- O'Donnell, V. and G. S. Jowett. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005.
- Pernick, M. S. "Thomas Edison's Tuberculosis Films: Mass Media and Health Propaganda." *Hastings Center Report*, v.8/3 (1978).
- Pratkanis, A. R. and E. Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Rev. ed. New York: W. H. Freeman, 2001.
- Shomer, R. W. and A. Rodrigues. "A Field Experiment in Interpersonal Persuasion Using Authoritative Influence." *Journal of Personality*, v.38 (1970).
- Stout, Michael. "The Effectiveness of Nazi Propaganda During World War II." Master's thesis. Ypsilanti: Eastern Michigan University, 2011.

---

## Great Gatsby, The

F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* has been widely hailed as the quintessential American novel, yet essence is precisely what proves elusive in Jay Gatsby and the supporting cast. Trusting their dreams more than their experiences, they trade the substance of reality for hollow representations of an ideal. According to literary critic Harold Bloom, Gatsby's "refusal to surrender to reality" destroys him, "yet it also gives him his peculiar greatness." An examination of self-deception in Jay Gatsby, Tom Buchanan, and Nick Carraway reveals distinct incongruities between belief and reality that shape the psychological core of the novel: hypocritical prejudice (Nick), base elitism (Tom), and grand delusions (Gatsby).

### Nick Carraway

Narrator Nick Carraway's language "is consistently seen to work against the demands of veracity," according to critic Barbara Will. While keenly attuned to duplicity in others, he is blind to his own shortcomings and biases. For



example, after starting a relationship with professional golfer Jordan Baker, Nick casually reveals a “vague understanding” with a girl back home that should be “tactfully broken off.” The reader connects this off-hand remark to his earlier—now suspicious—denial of an engagement. While lying to other characters and misleading the reader, the narrator takes pride in believing himself, “one of the few honest people [he has] ever known.”

Valuing sophistication over truth, Nick respects other liars who are convincing and ridicules those who are awkward. He admires the sister of Tom’s mistress for brazen lies displaying “a surprising amount of character” and appears similarly unconcerned when Jordan cheats at golf, musing that “dishonesty in a woman is a thing you never blame deeply.” In stark contrast, Nick scorns Jay Gatsby’s “threadbare” yarns, mocking his alleged ruby collection and Oxford education. The reader’s perception of the *Gatsby* characters is doubly clouded, first by their own falsity and second by the narrator’s distortions.

### Tom Buchanan

Nick’s college friend Tom Buchanan deceives himself in a more sinister way. A wealthy graduate of an elite university, he fancies himself a man of superior breeding, the defender of old-fashioned values. However, Tom’s racist, misogynistic rants display neither refinement nor morality, and beneath the shallow veneer of a gentleman, Tom is a brute who cheats on his wife, beats his mistress, and participates in a murder.

Tom’s “arrogant eyes” seek any opportunity for advantage, even when his wife, Daisy, accidentally runs over his mistress with her suitor Gatsby’s car. When Nick observes the married couple deep in conversation (“anybody would have said that they were conspiring together”), he infers that Tom precipitated Gatsby’s murder by manipulating the dead mistress’s armed and anguished husband. Like a petulant child whose toy has been broken, Tom views his actions as “entirely justified.”

### Jay Gatsby

The grandest delusions of all are reserved for Jay Gatsby, a “self-made man” in two senses. From humble beginnings (“Mr. Nobody from Nowhere”), he has amassed great wealth. He has

also reinvented his public persona, creating an identity so full of contradictions that even he cannot distinguish who he is from how he presents himself. Having changed his name from James Gatz to Jay Gatsby, he “sprang from his Platonic conception of himself.” As one Fitzgerald scholar has observed, “Jay Gatsby is the creation of James Gatz, a fictional identity or incognito which is at all times threatened by reality; yet in the end James Gatz comes to seem less real than Jay Gatsby.”

Gatsby appears as a magician cloaked in mystery, repeatedly “vanishing” from view, presiding over carnival-style “amusement park” fêtes, driving a “circus wagon,” and flashing cards and photographs linking him to prestige, money, and power. He is rumored to be a killer, an Oxford scholar, and a German spy. A party guest dubs him “a regular Belasco,” after the Broadway producer David Belasco, who used faux scenery praised for its realism. By drawing this comparison, Fitzgerald suggests the elaborate set of Gatsby’s mansion, and even his carefully cultivated life, are no more authentic than stagecraft.

In spurning truth as the descriptive reality of how things are, Gatsby devotes himself to the hopeless pursuit of truth as an ideal—how things could be. Before publishing the novel, Fitzgerald deleted a passage from Gatsby’s childhood, which he later wrote into the short story “Absolution.” The child protagonist in this story is described as one who, “like all those who habitually and instinctively lie,” has an “enormous respect and awe for the truth.”

As an adult, Gatsby has transformed his unbalanced esteem for the truth-as-ideal into an equally disproportionate obsession with Daisy. Daisy appears as a dream without substance, defined and redefined by the men who love her. If she leads Gatsby on, it is only by being too passive to shatter his delusion that she will leave Tom for him. His dash toward their unattainable future recalls, in its bittersweet purity, the pursuit of the American Dream.

The last step in Fitzgerald’s exploration of self-deception lies in the final reinvention of Gatsby as hero and comrade. Gatsby the fraud, the bootlegger and adulterer for whom Nick professed “an unaffected scorn,” has, in the narrator’s eyes, “turned out all right at the end.” Without any act of redemption, he becomes “worth the whole

damn bunch put together.” Nick illustrates this about-face dramatically when he erases an unspoken, obscene word scrawled on the steps of the late Gatsby’s mansion, embracing Gatsby’s fantasy. A sweeping nostalgia breathes this wishfulness into the reader, whom Nick invites to take Gatsby’s place, reaching for “the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter . . .” If Daisy is the elusive American Dream, Gatsby, according to Lionel Trilling, “comes inevitably to stand for America itself.”

Amanda Levis

Zoë Chance

*Yale School of Management*

**See Also:** Fiction; Infidelity; Magic Tricks; Men; Racism; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.

#### Further Readings:

Bloom, Harold, ed. *Bloom’s Modern Critical*

*Interpretations: F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby*. New York: Infobase, 2010.

Fitzgerald, F. Scott. “Absolution.” In *All the Sad Young Men*. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1926.

Fitzgerald, F. Scott. *The Great Gatsby*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925.

Parkinson, Kathleen. *Penguin Critical Studies: The Great Gatsby*. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Trilling, Lionel. “F. Scott Fitzgerald.” In *F. Scott Fitzgerald: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Arthur Mizener, ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Will, Barbara. “*The Great Gatsby* and the Obscene Word.” *College Literature*, 32/4 (2005).

White House visits varied depending on the sitting president’s political party. During Bill Clinton’s second term, Greenspan met with the Democratic president roughly 12 times per year; in George W. Bush’s first term, Greenspan met with the Republican president roughly 53 times per year. Greenspan’s discussions of and explanations about the health and direction of the economy were often confusing, and he was often accused of being deliberately ambiguous—an accusation that he did not try to refute.

As a young man, Greenspan set his sights on a career as a jazz musician, but his ability with mathematics and a fascination with the philosophy of Ayn Rand led him to graduate work in economics at New York University (NYU). He left NYU without submitting a dissertation in order to found Townsend-Greenspan, a consultancy firm he would preside over from 1954 to 1987. He chaired President Gerald Ford’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) from 1974 to 1977 and the National Commission on Social Security Reform from 1981 to 1983.

One of the key functions of the Federal Reserve chairman is to predict how the economy is going to perform. Greenspan, however, had never proven to be particularly adept at such forecasting. The following examples illustrate how Greenspan missed the target.

When the Federal Reserve ranked firms on their forecasting abilities, Townsend-Greenspan came in last.

In January 1973, four days before the Dow Jones began a two-year slide losing 46 percent of its value and throwing the country into a two-year recession, Greenspan confidently told the *New York Times* that investors could be particularly “bullish” in their approach to the stock market.

In 1985, two years before he was appointed to lead the Federal Reserve, Greenspan wrote a letter to federal regulators in support of Lincoln Savings and Loan. He argued that the savings and loan was being run in exemplary fashion by Charles Keating and that it was making sound investments. As such, it presented no risk to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). In reality, Lincoln was involved in massive fraud, was seized by regulators in 1989, and Keating was sent to prison.

## Greenspan, Alan

Alan Greenspan was chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from August 1987 until January 2006. A Republican and free market advocate, Greenspan was often accused of straying across the line of political neutrality that his predecessors had observed. Some referred to him as a “political hack” who put the interests of his party before those of the country. For example, Greenspan’s

During Greenspan's 1987 confirmation hearings as Federal Reserve Chairman, he was chided for the inaccuracy of his predictions while he was chairman of Ford's CEA. Senator William Proxmire pointed out that the predictions of the CEA were seriously flawed, the farthest off of any predictions made from 1976 to 1978.

### **Confronted With Errors, Responding With Evasion**

When confronted with his errors and failings, Greenspan's responses were evasive or unclear. For instance, when confronted with the inaccuracy of his predictions while chair of the CEA, Greenspan countered that he did not recall the predictions being that far off the mark. When presented the actual numbers, he shrugged them off, complaining that he was hampered from presenting an accurate picture because it was more difficult to forecast accurately from inside the government than it was from outside. Despite evidence of his inability to forecast accurately, Greenspan was confirmed as chairman of the Federal Reserve by a vote of 91 to 2.

Greenspan's style of speech has earned its own terminology: FedSpeak and Greenspeak. FedSpeak describes the language of the Federal Reserve in general, while Greenspeak describes Greenspan's speech in particular. Both terms represent language so dense and ambiguous that it often defied understanding. Students of Greenspeak contend that Greenspan was especially likely to use it when he was presented with questions he preferred not to answer. His response was filled with jargon and couched in tortured syntax that would last as long as five minutes. When the time was up, his questioner, totally befuddled, would simply move to the next question. Unchallenged, Greenspan continued to provide pseudo-answers to serious questions throughout his career. He was known to say that if listeners thought that they understood what he said, they were probably wrong. In *Maestro*, Bob Woodward quoted Greenspan as saying, "I'll just say a little bit this way and a little bit that way, and I'll completely confuse them so there'll be no story." He also contended that if, somehow, people understood what he said, that had not been his intention. According to Frank Partnoy, Greenspan occasionally worked at being purposefully misleading.

Greenspan spoke in public only when required, a strategy that helped deepen the mystery around him and strengthen his political power. He made every attempt to avoid journalists' questions and admitted to purposely confusing them in order to quash any stories. Greenspan, unlike previous Fed chairmen, was viewed as a political figure who often used his position to further Republican causes. Those like William Greider and Partnoy, who blame the problems of the current U.S. economy on him, argue that the economy was not his first priority, conservative ideology was. If so, then Greenspan may have purposely blurred his meaning about the economy in order to cover his true agenda.

Americans have become so inured to what government officials tell them that news that one of them might actually have lied hardly comes as a surprise. Few Americans pay close attention to national and international affairs. Subjects as complex as banking and the economy are perceived to be so beyond their ken that they expect the pronouncements of the Federal Reserve chairman to be unfathomable. It's easier to have faith that he knows what he's talking about.

However, when \$7 trillion disappears, and the economy is in a shambles, someone has to be held responsible. In 2007 and 2008, after publication of his autobiography, *The Age of Turbulence*, Greenspan went first on a nationwide and then on a worldwide tour promoting it. On the tour, he appeared to absolve himself of responsibility for the faltering world economy, something that was contested by economists throughout the world. In October 2008, testifying before Congress, Greenspan all but confessed that his view that the invisible hand of the marketplace would eventually lead markets to regulate themselves was simply incorrect, and it had led to the near collapse of the world financial system. While he is probably right, much of what he did and said while Fed chairman certainly contributed to the later economic malaise.

James Geistman  
*Siena Heights University*

**See Also:** Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception and Trust; Denial; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; History of

Deception: 1950 to the Present; Lie Acceptability; Lying, Intentionality of.

### Further Readings

- Greenspan, Alan. *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World*. New York: Penguin Press, 2007.
- Greider, William. "The One-Eyed Chairman: How Greenspan Has Pushed the Right's Agenda." *The Nation*, v. 281/8 (2005).
- Hartcher, Peter. *Bubble Man: Alan Greenspan and the Missing 7 Trillion Dollars*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.
- Martin, Justin. *Greenspan: The Man Behind Money*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2001.
- Partnoy, Frank. "The Case Against Alan Greenspan." *Euromoney*, v.36 (2005).
- Rachman, G. *Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.
- Rutherford, William D. "Greenspan Fiddled While the Economy Burned." *USA Today*, v.133/2712 (2004).
- Woodward, Bob. *Maestro*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

## Guilt

The emotion of guilt is a negative feeling that people can experience for a wrongdoing, such as being untruthful or deceptive to others. This differs from the legal meaning of guilt, which refers to a person's culpability for an offense that violates a particular law. It is also useful to distinguish guilt, which stems from a negative evaluation of a wrongful behavior, from shame, a related emotion that arises from a negative evaluation of the self. The capacity to experience guilt differs from person to person, with some individuals feeling guilty more often than others for a variety of interpersonal and private misdeeds. Individuals can feel guilty for offenses in the past, present, or that are anticipated in the future, as well as for violations committed by close others or by one's group. Overall, years of research evidence suggests that moderate feelings of guilt are adaptive and important for social functioning.

Feelings of guilt can occur following a focus on a specific action or nonaction that goes against

personal or societal standards. Lying, cheating, and stealing are some of the most common examples of acts that can elicit feelings of guilt. Guilt is considered to be a self-conscious and moral emotion because it involves an evaluation of the self, and it plays a crucial role in guiding moral behavior. Beyond feeling bad, guilt is also characterized by feelings of regret and tension. Moreover, guilt is sometimes described metaphorically as a heavy burden or weight on one's conscience.

### Guilt and Shame

Guilt is often confused with shame. People may refer to these emotions incorrectly or interchangeably; however, much evidence suggests that they are distinct. Similar to guilt, shame is an unpleasant feeling, but shame tends to be a more painful experience and is characterized by feeling



*Guilt is often confused with shame, which is associated with withdrawal behaviors such as avoiding others. Guilt is more often linked with repair behaviors, such as taking responsibility, apologizing, or putting in additional effort with others.*



worthless, exposed, and small. There are not reliable distinctions between the types of situations that can separately evoke guilt or shame, and it is possible to feel a certain level of both emotions after a misdeed or failure. For example, compared to shame, guilt more often arises from private rather than public wrongdoings; however, individuals can feel guilty for public misdeeds and feel shameful for private acts.

Instead of a particular context, guilt and shame can be distinguished by the negative evaluations that individuals make after lying or following some other harmful action. Negatively judging the self by focusing on what “I” did wrong can elicit shame, whereas negatively judging the wrongful behavior by focusing on what I “did” wrong can evoke guilt. Thus, it is perhaps easier to understand why guilt may feel less painful than shame, because guilt stems from a greater focus on a temporary act as “terrible” rather than a global evaluation of the self as a “terrible person.” Guilt and shame may also be distinguished by the type of behaviors following a wrongdoing. Shame tends to be associated with withdrawal behaviors such as avoiding others. Guilt is more often linked with repair behaviors, such as taking responsibility, apologizing, or putting in additional effort with others.

### **Guilt Proneness**

People vary markedly in their propensity to feel guilty. Across a number of situations involving perceived wrongdoing, some individuals will reliably experience guilt more often than others. That is, guilt proneness is a personality trait that occurs on a continuum, with individuals being more or less guilt-prone. This means that some people will feel intense guilt after being deceptive whereas others will feel little to no guilt following the same act. Guilt proneness is believed to decrease people’s frequency of engaging in unethical behaviors because guilt-prone individuals anticipate unpleasant guilty feelings for committing acts that they perceive to be wrong.

Although many measures of guilt proneness have been created, it has been more recently assessed by asking individuals to imagine brief scenarios of wrongdoing and indicate how likely they would respond in ways that are theoretically aligned with feelings of guilt. Those higher

in guilt proneness tend to self-report engaging in less unethical behavior than those lower in guilt proneness. There is also evidence from laboratory settings that guilt proneness predicts likelihood of lying or behaving dishonestly. For example, following a monetary incentive to lie to another person, 45 percent of those low on guilt proneness lied, compared to 20 percent of those high on guilt proneness. In workplace settings, more guilt-prone individuals are less likely to be counterproductive, or commit acts that harm others in their office or their organization. Higher scores of guilt proneness are also related to lower frequencies of delinquent behaviors, such as entering a venue without paying or calling in sick when healthy.

Such evidence from everyday life supports the view that guilt is adaptive because of its role in regulating moral behavior. Even among those in jail, a proclivity to feel guilty is related to committing less severe crimes and having fewer criminal convictions. An important distinction between clinically diagnosed psychopaths and those in the normal population is the ability to experience moral emotions, such as guilt. Consistent with this notion, infrequent feelings of guilt are associated with higher levels of psychopathy and antisocial personality, psychological conditions that are more common in prison populations.

The capacity to feel guilty for violations of personal or societal standards has links to other important psychological factors. In particular, individuals who feel guilty, whether it is for a specific event or a tendency in general, are also more likely to experience empathy. That is, stronger feelings of guilt are also related to a greater ability to take on other people’s perspectives, feel more compassion for others, and have a greater concern for one’s effect on others. This association is noteworthy because empathy is fundamental in promoting positive interpersonal relationships and prosocial behaviors and inhibiting aggression toward others. In addition to empathy, those who are guilt prone are also more likely to be agreeable and conscientious individuals.

A tendency to experience guilt is unrelated to levels of self-esteem, neuroticism, anxiety, rumination, and related psychological conditions. In other words, a propensity to feel guilty does not predict the occurrence of many common

psychological disorders; instead, the ability to feel a moderate amount of guilt appears to have healthy interpersonal consequences. In general, it may be beneficial to know individuals' degrees of guilt proneness, as it may be useful in predicting future patterns of unethical actions and interpersonal functioning. However, the results of research conducted on guilt proneness is better suited to describing groups of individuals across situations rather than a specific individual case, and current measures of guilt proneness may be susceptible to malingering. Thus, some caution is warranted when determining guilt proneness and applying the results of research.

### Collective Guilt

In addition to feeling guilty for personal wrongdoing, individuals can feel guilty for acts committed by close others or their group. Only limited research has examined vicarious guilt for the actions of those interpersonally close to an individual; however, there is relatively more known about collective guilt for harm committed by one's group. While the unpleasant experience of collective guilt can feel similar to personal guilt, collective guilt is distinct from guilt related to personal responsibility for wrongdoing. Individuals may feel collective guilt when they identify with members of a group that has committed harmful actions in the past, or plans to do harm in the future. Some examples of harmful group acts include lying, stealing, or perpetrating violence against another group.

Group members are often motivated to protect positive views of their group, and thus they may engage in a variety of protective psychological processes that prevent or assuage collective guilt. Such factors may partly explain why collective guilt is experienced less frequently than individual guilt. For instance, group members may be prone to minimize or "forget" harmful actions committed by their group. When the action cannot be denied, group members may be less likely to accept full responsibility for the harm or they may legitimize their group's wrongdoing. If, however, conditions lead to the acceptance of illegitimate harmful group actions and feelings of collective guilt, then this experience, in conjunction with other psychological factors, may play a role in support for reparations or fostering intergroup relations.

### Conclusion

Although feeling guilty is an unpleasant experience, it is an adaptive emotion that has a role in preventing destructive behavior and repairing harm committed, outcomes which have important implications for personal and societal functioning.

Martin V. Day  
Princeton University

**See Also:** Cheating; Dishonesty; Emotions; Lying, Prevalence of; Morals and Ethics.

### Further Readings

- Cohen, T. R., A. T. Panter, and N. Turan. "Guilt Proneness and Moral Character." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, v.21 (2012).
- Cohen, T. R., S. T. Wolf, A. T. Panter, and C. A. Insko. "Introducing the GASP Scale: A New Measure of Guilt and Shame Proneness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.100 (2011).
- Tangney, J. P. and R. L. Dearing. *Shame and Guilt*. New York: The Guilford Press, 2002.
- Tangney, J. P., J. Stuewig, and D. J. Mashek. "Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior." *Annual Review of Psychology*, v.58 (2007).
- Tangney, J. P., J. Stuewig, D. J. Mashek, and M. Hastings. "Assessing Jail Inmates' Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Feeling Bad About the Behavior and the Self?" *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, v.38 (2011).
- Wohl, M. J. A., N. R. Branscombe, and Y. Klar. "Collective Guilt: Emotional Reactions When One's Group Has Done or Been Wronged." *European Review of Social Psychology*, v.17 (2006).

---

## Gullibility

The term *gullibility* has numerous meanings, including foolishness, naiveté, unwarranted trust, belief despite little evidence or when there is evidence one should not believe, credulity, and susceptibility to manipulation and exploitation. Characteristics of gullibility include an enduring pattern of personality or a cognitive trait, and other times it is a product of temporary situational, emotional, or cognitive influences. Colloquially,

some refer to those duped on a single occasion as gullible persons. However, it is worth considering someone repeatedly taken advantage of by others to be gullible. Because of the important impact that gullibility can have on a person's decision making, research on gullibility spans a wide variety of topics and domains, including financial, legal, political, scientific, religious, interpersonal, and the workplace.

Historically, scholars and practitioners have been interested in gullibility as it relates to being taken advantage of, such as by snake-oil salesman or new religious movements. More recently, this topic is discussed within the context of high-profile financial scandals (for example, Ponzi schemes), false confessions in criminal cases, and an ever-increasing amount of online social interactions. This has important implications because research on gullibility has focused heavily on face-to-face interaction. As society moves toward increasingly frequent online interactions, it is less clear whether the causes of gullibility are specific to in-person interactions. It is likely that many cues that signal untrustworthiness are more difficult to recognize in online social situations.

Research suggests that gullibility relates to a high degree of trustworthiness in another person, group, or an institution. Research on interpersonal trust (a general expectation that people will be true to their word), conducted by Julian Rotter and colleagues, suggests such a relation between trust and gullibility is unlikely to be the case. Individuals who score above average on an index of interpersonal trust tend to be no more susceptible to being fooled or manipulated than those who score average trustworthiness. Evidence suggests that those who rate themselves as very trusting may in fact be less gullible, on average. One reason for this may be that the so-called high-trusters develop abilities to accurately identify untrustworthiness in others. In other words, high-trusters assume that other individuals are trustworthy; however, they are unlikely to be exploited because of their ability to detect untrustworthiness.

Copious research suggests that individuals frequently behave automatically, without conscious thought, relying on mental shortcuts (heuristics) to ease decision making. Rather than deciding if

someone is trustworthy, many individuals instead rely on intuitive cues about someone's trustworthiness. For instance, a person will believe someone who is known to have expertise, such as a medical doctor. However, it is relatively easy to manipulate trustworthiness cues, such as by wearing a uniform (for example, a lab coat), merely stating credentials (for example, M.D. or Ph.D.), or even speaking quickly; each signal trustworthiness that may in fact be unwarranted. For example, jurors sometimes find eyewitness testimony suspicious when a witness hesitates while recalling information verbally. While such cues have advantages in everyday judgments, they can expose a person to exploitation.

Numerous ordinary characteristics can increase gullibility, such as tiredness, distraction, emotional arousal, and uncertainty. For example, someone who is multitasking is less able to recognize crucial signals that someone else is acting untrustworthy; hence, gullibility increases. Similarly, stress and time pressure, novel and ambiguous situations, or lacking knowledge or expertise sometimes lead to gullibility. In unfamiliar situations, individuals rely on others for cues regarding appropriate behavior and open themselves to exploitation by others.

Research on the Barnum effect (the tendency to find personal meaning in statements that could apply to many people) suggests that individuals accept false personality feedback, even when the information is trivial or descriptive of many people. Similar to gullibility, the Barnum effect occurs because of a person's lack of statistical knowledge about standardized personality assessments and base rate information, among other things. An established empirical pattern suggests that gullibility is unrelated to intelligence. Even very intelligent individuals will sometimes be gullible. Individuals who do not rely on mental shortcuts are less prone to gullibility. In sum, although there are a variety of enduring characteristics that contribute to gullibility (e.g., emotional or cognitive styles, agreeableness), it is likely that many characteristics of gullibility are at least partially determined by situational characteristics.

Recent neuroscience research suggests that specific areas of the prefrontal cortex mediate gullibility and credulity. Individuals with brain

damage in such areas evidence a reduced ability to determine truth from lies in advertising and make unwise purchasing decisions. Such evidence is important because it supports findings related to changes in gullibility across the lifespan. Young individuals and the elderly tend to be the most gullible. Among the young, gullibility could stem from a lack of experience or knowledge. However, this research suggests that developmental changes in the prefrontal cortex over the lifespan may substantially influence occurrences of gullibility. In young individuals the prefrontal cortex is not fully developed, whereas for elderly individuals the prefrontal cortical cells may be in decline because of aging.

### Benefits to Gullibility

Although the term *gullibility* carries a negative connotation and suggests negative personal characteristics and actions, there are possible benefits to gullibility. For instance, interpersonal relationships sometimes benefit when at least one person behaves at least somewhat gullibly. Doing so may allow for trust to build between potential friends and romantic partners. Further, evolutionary psychology research suggests that, at least sometimes, in order for knowledge to transfer between individuals, individuals need to trust each other enough to accept what other people tell them as truthful. Gullibility may be an adaptive antecedent to interpersonal trust.

Evidence suggests that gullibility is multifaceted and it has many predictors and contextual influences. While comforting to view gullibility as a trait (that other people have), it is likely that gullible behaviors are the product of complex personal and situational interactions. Considering individual differences, the causes of gullibility likely vary. In other words, for some individuals the causes may be related to personality characteristics or cognitive style. For others, the causes may be entirely situational. For others still,

gullibility may be a combination of both personality and situational variables.

Sarah E. Wood  
University of Wisconsin, Stout  
Timothy D. Ritchie  
University of Limerick

**See Also:** Barnum, P. T.; Con Man; Deception Detection Accuracy; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Internet: Chat Rooms; Internet: E-Mail; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Madoff, Bernard; Self-Deception; Urban Legends.

### Further Readings

- Asp, Erik, Kenneth Manzel, Bryan Koestner, Catherine A. Cole, Natalie L. Denburg, and Daniel Tranel. "A Neuropsychological Test of Belief and Doubt: Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Increases Credulity for Misleading Advertising." *Frontiers of Neuroscience*, v.6 (2012).
- Cialdini, Robert. *Influence: Science and Practice*. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2008.
- Greenspan, Stephan. *Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get Duped and How to Avoid It*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009.
- Kurzban, Robert. "Representational Epidemiology: Skepticism and Gullibility." In *The Evolution of Mind: Fundamental Questions and Controversies*, Steve W. Gangestad and Jeffery A. Simpson, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 2007.
- Rotter, Julian. "Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility." *American Psychologist*, v.35/1 (1980).
- Standing, Lionel and Gregory Keays. "Do the Barnum Effect and Paranormal Belief Involve a General Gullibility Factor?" *Psychological Reports*, v.61/2 (1987).
- Yamagishi, Toshio, Masako Kikuchi, and Motoko Kosugi. "Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, v.2 (1999).



# H

## Half-Truths

The term *half-truth*, when used intentionally, refers to a communicative strategy used to manipulate the amount of truth in a statement in such a way that it causes the hearer to draw incorrect or incomplete conclusions and make false assumptions. Truth, here, does not mean the objective truth. It means some state of affairs that, correctly or not, the speaker believes to be true.

As the name indicates, half-truth is partial truth. The speaker reveals only part of the truth, while concealing another part that is important for the hearer to know, and the speaker is aware of this concealment. Consider an example in which a schoolgirl puts off doing her homework, even though she does not have much time, and goes out to play with her friends. It is chilly and damp outside, and when she gets back home she begins to feel feverish. The next day, her teacher asks her why her homework was not finished. The girl says, “I got sick yesterday, that’s why.” What she says is true, but it is not the whole truth. She discloses only part of what she considers to be a complete disclosure, while keeping the other relevant part concealed.

In cooperative communication, there is an assumption that speakers will frame their utterances such that they are complete, that is, they do not leave out any important information, they

are truthful, relevant to the context, and clear or unambiguous. Strategic use of half-truths exploits one of these hearer assumptions about the nature of a speaker’s utterance, as half-truths are not “complete” and exclude some potentially risky piece of information. It is the deliberate concealment of such important and relevant information, and not some trivia, to cause the hearer to make false assumptions that makes it a half-truth.

Half-truths are deceptive because in a conversation between two people, there is an implicit trust that if one knows something that they are aware the other would like to know, they would tell the other person. If they don’t, especially if the conversation is about the same context, it would be a violation of trust.

### Half-Truths That Modulate Whole Truths

Although the example of the schoolgirl is the most common interpretation of the term *half-truth*, another sense in which it is sometimes used is to modulate the magnitude of the whole truth and alter its emphasis. An example of this second category of half-truth is a situation in which a child has a stomachache, and his mother asks him to take some medicine. The child wants the mother to infer that he does not need any medicine and says, “My stomach already feels much better,” when his stomach is only slightly better. Here, the child is not leaving out any distinct piece of

information but is minimizing the emphasis or evaluation of the truth. This case is structurally different from the classic half-truth, but at times it is regarded as a half-truth because it is also generated by the violation of the hearer's expectation that what the speaker utters would be the complete truth.

A classic half-truth can be used both to conceal information and to propagate a falsehood. The half-truth in the schoolgirl example not only conceals the fact that the girl decided to go out and play with her friends instead of finishing her homework, but it can also cause the teacher to make a false inference that she is a responsible girl and it wasn't her fault that her homework was not done. A half-truth of the second category is generally used for propagation of falsehood, and not for concealment, because if the hearer has no belief pertaining to the information the speaker wants to conceal, it makes no sense for the speaker to understate that information because that might enable the hearer to infer that information, when in fact the hearer needs to be kept away from it.

### Maintenance and Detection

Half-truths do not involve uttering any falsehoods that require future maintenance and do not use any kind of ambiguous language that might require further clarification. Therefore, they usually do not have the same stress and guilt that arise while engaging in direct deception in high-stakes social situations and can be more readily associated with some other forms of deception, like fabrication or equivocation.

Half-truths are relatively more difficult to detect compared to many other forms of deception. This is so because while telling a half-truth, the speaker is only concealing something and not fabricating a story, as in the case of outright lies. So there is less cognitive load for "maintaining" this story because there are no new things that the speaker has to remember and less chance that the story might be contradicted. Moreover, there is no obvious surface level feature of a half-truth that might indicate that there is something fishy, as could be the case for equivocations, which are ambiguous statements and could make the hearer suspicious. However, when detected, half-truths are generally rated as unacceptable and result in a loss of a speaker's credibility. Half-truths may

have a high cost, depending upon the context in which they have been generated, and the relationship between the speaker and the hearer.

An important characteristic of half-truths is that they can be generated not only using words but also using numbers. Aspects of statistical data can be presented as half-truths in a manner that serves the interests of the presenter. For example, omitting the values from a y-axis in a bar graph when they are very small, and instead bloating the bars to highlight the relative difference between variables, might not mean much in absolute terms because of the small y-values. However, consider another example of statistical comparison in which the basis of comparison is not clearly stated. Suppose the value of an item increased from 10 percent to 15 percent. As a percentage change, it increased by 50 percent, but as a share of the total value it increased by 5 percent. So there is ambiguity here about whether it is a 50-percent or 5-percent increase. The usual assumption would be that it is a percentage change, unless the basis of comparison is explicitly stated as the total value of the item.

Swati Gupta

Kayo Sakamoto

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Information Manipulation Theory 1; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions.

### Further Readings

- Gupta, S., K. Sakamoto, and A. Ortony. "Telling It Like It Isn't: A Comprehensive Approach to Analyzing Verbal Deception." In *The Goals of Cognition: Festschrift for Cristiano Castelfranchi*, F. Paglieri, L. Tummolini, R. Falcone, and M. Miceli, eds. London: College Publications, 2013.
- Hopper, R. and R. A. Bell. "Broadening the Deception Construct." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, v.70 (1984).
- McCornack, S. A. "Information Manipulation Theory." *Communication Monographs*, v.59 (1992).
- Metts, S. "An Exploratory Investigation of Deception in Close Relationships." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.6 (1989).

Schild, M. "Statistical Prevarication: Telling Half Truths Using Statistics." Invited paper. 55th Session of the International Association of Statistical Educators, Sydney, Australia (April 5–12, 2005).

Turner, R. E., C. Edgley, and G. Olmstead. "Information Control in Conversations: Honesty is Not Always the Best Policy." *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, 11/1 (1975).

Vincent, J. M. and C. Castelfranchi. "On the Art of Deception: How to Lie While Saying the Truth." In *Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics: Proceedings of the Conference on Pragmatics, Urbino, Italy, July 8–14, 1979*, H. Parret, M. Sbisà, and J. Verschueren, eds. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1979.

## Hartzell, Oscar

Oscar Hartzell was one of the greatest con men of the early 20th century. He used a scam that had been around for hundreds of years, recruiting people to invest in a fraudulent lawsuit with the supposed goal of wresting the estate of the long-dead Sir Francis Drake from the British government. Hartzell used the Drake inheritance scam to swindle over a \$1 million from more than 10,000 investors.

Hartzell's scam had its roots in the Elizabethan Era soon after the death of Sir Francis Drake, the famous late 15th- to early 16th-century British buccaneer. Drake died on January 28, 1596, of dysentery off the coast of Puerto Rico, and it was assumed that he had amassed an enormous fortune in gold and other booty. Drake died without having fathered any children, and for hundreds of years his death has inspired scams that claim to search for supposed heirs to his purported fortune. However, no claimants were ever able to establish a direct lineage to Drake.

This swindle first appeared in the United States around 1835. In 1870, a Sir Frances Drake Association was established to settle the estate. Prospective investors were told that Drake left a large fortune, which by Hartzell's time had purportedly been held by the British government for over 300 years, collecting an enormous amount of interest. The

intended victims were told that, for a small contribution to cover the legal fees to settle the estate, they would get shares in the eventual proceeds.

### Hartzell and the Drake Scam

Oscar Merrill Hartzell was born in 1876, the son of a farmer from Madison County, Iowa. He grew up in the American Midwest during the late 19th century. He tried his hand at farming and worked for a while as a deputy sheriff.

In 1919, two con artists using the Drake scam, Milo F. Lewis and Sudie Whiteaker, made a pitch in Hartzell's family farmhouse in Madison County. Hartzell's mother decided to invest her life savings of \$6,000 in cash, which the duo promised would reap a return of \$6 million. Her two sons, Oscar and Canfield Hartzell, had overheard the pitch.

Oscar tracked Lewis and Whiteaker to Des Moines, Iowa, and confronted them. They admitted to bilking about \$65,000 from investors in Iowa during the previous two months. However, Hartzell convinced the pair that they were underestimating the full potential of the swindle, and they agreed to let him assist them in their schemes. Soon thereafter the three established a partnership, opening up an office for the Sir Frances Drake Association. They initially concentrated their recruitment efforts on Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri, contacting people with the last name of Drake. Eventually the Sir Frances Drake Association widened its sphere of operations and accepted investments from almost anyone.

Investors were promised that for every dollar invested in the plan, they would get back a return of \$500. However, Hartzell was aware of the laws pertaining to mail fraud, and initially he rigorously avoided using the mail. Nevertheless, the swindle took on momentum as it expanded and more accomplices were recruited.

Hartzell moved to England in 1934 and maintained an extravagant lifestyle paid for by the funds collected from his investors. He eventually claimed that he held the sole title to the Drake estate, as he had allegedly become engaged to the niece of Colonel Drexel Drake, who, wishing to keep the estate in the family, assigned all rights to Hartzell. Hartzell claimed he held the title Baron of Buckland, which he asserted had been confirmed as his by the King and Crown Commission when Colonel

Drake had assigned him the sole rights as heir. He described this actually nonexistent commission as the highest court in the United Kingdom.

Hartzell also said that King George V of England was engaged in transferring all rights and titles of the Drake estate to Hartzell until the king had become ill. Hartzell further claimed the British Parliament was in the process of conveying the tremendous assets of the fabled Drake estate to him, but before this could be completed and funds distributed to investors, complicated audits and complex accounting procedures had to be conducted, which, not surprisingly, would necessitate additional money up front.

### Prosecution and Conviction

A U.S. Postal Services inspector, John Sparks, collected enough evidence to finally have Hartzell deported from Great Britain as an undesirable alien in January 1933. As soon as he stepped foot on American soil, Hartzell was arrested. His trial began on October 23, 1933, in Sioux City, Iowa. The prosecutor in this trial, Harry Reed, later wrote of the unusually large and evangelistic support Hartzell received from his loyal followers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated and reported that Hartzell's scheme was all a hoax, as Drake's wife and brother had inherited the estate in 1597.

However, as soon as Hartzell was found guilty and released on bail, pending an appeal, he resumed his fraudulent investment plan. After the appeal was rejected, his conviction was upheld, and Hartzell was sentenced to 10 years in prison, which he began serving at Leavenworth Prison in November 1933. Hartzell's accomplices continued to solicit funds for his defense and release, and for this activity the accomplices and Hartzell were brought to trial in Chicago. By then it was obvious that Hartzell had become insane, believing his own long-told stories and insisting he was a billionaire. After a psychiatric examination was ordered in December 1936, he was found to be incompetent. He was accordingly transferred to the U.S. Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri, where he died on August 27, 1943.

### Why the Scam Succeeded

Hartzell was a confidence operator who was very effective at communicating with people

and capable of acting his part convincingly. He engaged in a form of confidence game known as the long con (as opposed to the short con), which is also referred to as the big con because of the elaborateness of the operation that begins with a buildup, uses numerous operators, and has a solid conclusion usually resulting in a significant amount of money taken from the victims. The long con typically concludes with a cooling-off process in which the confidence operator consoles the victims and helps them make the best of the situation. Hartzell was masterful in his ability to gain the trust of his victims, while at the same time keeping his professional theft operation going.

Those who became investors in Hartzell's Drake scam were referred to as Drakers and later as Donators. This group formed a broad social movement as the thousands of investors, mostly Midwestern farmers and shopkeepers, planned what they would do with their impending fortunes. Some planned to establish utopian communities, and this cause nearly became a holy crusade, with zealous believers protesting against the naysayers and doubters of Hartzell's mission.

The social feedback loops were very powerful among this collective group of investors, which included entire church congregations. In this regard, there was a story of a pastor who dared to question the authenticity of Hartzell and the Drake inheritance plan and who, as a consequence, was dismissed from his position. Once invested, of course, the Drakers would have to either accept the truth of their gullibility or else become fervent supporters of Hartzell, which many did do.

Victor B. Stolberg  
*Essex County College*

**See Also:** Con Man; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950.

### Further Readings

Farquhar, Michael. *A Treasury of Deception: Liars, Misleaders, Hoodwinkers, and the Extraordinary True Stories of History's Greatest Hoaxes, Fakes, and Frauds*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

Nash, Jay Robert. *Hustlers and Con Men: An Anecdotal History of the Confidence Man and His Game*. New York: M. Evans, 1976.



Rayner, Richard. *Drake's Fortune: The Fabulous True Story of the World's Greatest Confidence Artist*. New York: Doubleday, 2002.

## Hearst, William Randolph

At the end of the 1800s, when other forms of media were minimal, newspapers were a vital source of information. As a result, newspapers possessed an inordinate amount of power over public knowledge and opinion. William Randolph Hearst was a newspaper publisher who used his power to advance his own agenda. In attempts to win a fierce competition for readers with Joseph Pulitzer's newspaper, Hearst relied on two common deceptive tactics: sensationalism and fabrication. In fact, his acts of deception led some to coin the term and associate him with "yellow journalism." Yellow journalists deceive their readers by sensationalizing and fabricating news to increase circulation numbers. Hearst's acts of yellow journalism during the Spanish-American War in 1898 are among the most notoriously deceptive tactics in the history of journalism and are credited for pushing the United States into war with Spain.

### Sensationalism

*Sensationalism* is a term used to describe the exaggeration and dramatization of news stories to capture the attention of the reader, appeal to their emotions, and deceive them. Hearst sensationalized news from the beginning of his career. As the owner of the *San Francisco Examiner*, Hearst devoted over a third of his newspaper to stories of crime and corruption and framed them as dramatic moral dilemmas. He sensationalized provocative and everyday events beyond ethical journalistic standards. For instance, just two months after Hearst took over management of the *Examiner*, a fire occurred at a hotel. On the front page, Hearst printed the bold, two-inch-high headline, "Hungry, Frantic Flames. They Leap Madly Upon the Splendid Pleasure Palace by the Bay of Monterey." By sensationalizing stories

through emotional appeals, Hearst deceived his readers, increased readership, and outperformed other San Franciscan newspapers.


Hearst amplified his sensationalistic style when he acquired the *New York Morning Journal* and began directly competing with Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World*. One major competition came when reporting on civil uprisings in Cuba. In 1896, the Spanish government sent General Valeriano Weyler to quash a civil rebellion in Cuba. Weyler overran the Cubans with an overwhelming number of Spanish troops. He detained Cuban people in concentration camps that were devoid of basic necessities, resulting in numerous deaths.

While this was an egregious act, Hearst overdramatized accounts of Cuban conditions. In one edition, the bold headlines of the *Morning Journal* read "Cuban Babes Prey to Famine," "Thousands of Children of the Reconcentrados Perishing in Island Towns," and "Sights That Sicken Strong Men." These headlines were accompanied by unrealistic drawings of small children suffering from severe malnutrition. Soon after, the *New York World* began covering the events in Cuba in response to the *Morning Journal*. The fierce competition between the two papers escalated the level of sensationalism.

### Fabrication

"Fabrication" refers to the creation of false information to deceive readers, and Hearst used fabrication, particularly in his visual reports. Frederick Remington was an artist for Hearst's *Morning Journal*. He went to Cuba to illustrate events. He recounted in a telegraph to Hearst, ". . . there is no trouble here. There will be no war." Hearst is accused of replying with, "Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."

Both the *Morning Journal* and the *New York World* reported on battles between the Cubans and the Spanish that never took place. Spaniards reportedly committed highly gruesome acts of violence against innocent Cuban women and children. Even without a code of journalistic standards at the time, these stories were so extreme that other major newspapers heavily criticized the *Morning Journal* and the *New York World*. Hearst and Pulitzer became the most flagrant abusers of these deceitful practices. Coincidentally, these two newspapers ran a satiric cartoon



Hearst also distorted stories to pursue his own political agenda. In his attempts to incite American outrage at the Spanish, a reporter for Hearst's newspaper misrepresented the events of an interaction between Spanish police and a Cuban woman. The reporter witnessed people take a Cuban woman named Clemencia Arango into custody as she boarded a New York-bound ship in Cuba. She was suspected of carrying letters from Cuban rebels. The *Morning Journal* printed a headline in bold, fist-sized font that read, "Does Our Flag Shield Women?" The front page printed an illustration depicting three Spanish men on an American vessel searching a naked woman.

Hearst also fabricated stories about the sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* that some say finally pushed President William McKinley to declare war on Spain. On February 15, 1898, the U.S.S. *Maine* suffered a massive explosion and sank while patrolling the waters around Cuba. The *Morning Journal* reported that a Spanish mine produced the explosion. Hearst supported his claim

by printing a fabricated map of the minefield in Havana Harbor. The U.S. Navy's official investigation followed this report and concluded that the ship sank as the result of an external explosion. Further, the *Morning Journal* reported that the American soldiers who had died aboard the ship were not buried but were decaying in the harbor.

The cause of the explosion was unknown until a 1976 investigation provided evidence that the explosion occurred internally. Moreover, the Spanish actually buried the bodies shortly after the catastrophe. However, the resentment and anger about unburied bodies, the official yet erroneous conclusion that the ship sank by external explosion, and the public's anger finally pushed a hesitant McKinley to declare war on Spain in late April 1898. Some claim that Hearst effectively started the Spanish-American War.

### Conclusion

By utilizing deception in an age without other corroborative news sources, Hearst controlled public opinion. Hearst bolstered his empire, purchasing 28 papers across the country and expanding to books and magazines. However, this empire collapsed during the Great Depression, as his newspapers were not financially self-sufficient. They instead relied on income from other business ventures that floundered during the Depression. Although World War II helped Hearst's newspapers recover slightly, his days as a media magnate were over. Hearst died of a heart attack in 1951. However, his impact on journalism remains and informs modern-day journalistic ethics.

Stefan Huynh  
Emily Balcetis  
*New York University*

**See Also:** Business; Communication; Conspiracies; Consumer Protection Laws; Disinformation; Exaggeration; Morals and Ethics; News Media: Print; Source Credibility.

### Further Readings

Campbell, J. W. *Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

Procter, B. H. *William Randolph Hearst: The Early Years, 1863–1910*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Procter, B. H. *William Randolph Hearst: The Later Years, 1911–1951*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

## High School Sports

For many children participation in high school athletics is an enjoyable and essential aspect of their adolescence. There are rigorous rules governing the participation of individuals within a sport as well as the academic benchmarks necessary for entry and continued access to the sport at the high-school level. These rules and benchmarks, most often developed through state and national agencies of high school athletics, are meant to ensure fair gamesmanship, equity of access and opportunity, and most important, that the educational component of participation in high school athletics is able to be delivered to children. Although instilling the value of fair play and sportsmanship is always a primary goal of those involved, this is not always achieved. Lying and deception, whether intentional or inadvertent, may interfere with the goals of building sportsmanship and respect for truth. Certain situations suggest that a desire for high school sports teams to be successful has encouraged lying and deception on the part of coaches, student athletes, and parents.

### Goals of High School Sports

This educational component includes, but is not limited to, consideration of skill development, moral development, and social development (for example, interpersonal and intrapersonal development). Each of these developmental domains is fluid and results from a child's experiences in the world. For young children, the development of skills and morality and development of a sense of self and of others takes place primarily in and through the home and secondarily at school. As the child matures, the home, while still essential for a well-adjusted child, is no longer the centerpiece of development. Rather, the



child's peer group(s), often discovered and developed through experiences in schooling, becomes central.

Another area central to participation in high school athletics is the development of sportsmanship. The following five pillars ground how sportsmanship is taught:

1. Show respect for the opponent at all times
2. Show respect for the officials
3. Know, understand, and appreciate the rules of the contest
4. Maintain self-control at all times
5. Recognize and appreciate skill in performance

These pillars also serve to delineate the responsibilities for athletes, coaches, spectators, and others. As long as these goals are the focus of high school sports, the risk of lying or deception seemingly is no greater than in any other endeavor. When an increased emphasis is placed on winning, however, the payoff for lying and deception grows.

### Outcomes of High-School Sports

High school athletics are one of many avenues through which a child can develop skills, a sense of morality, a sense of self and others, and sportsmanship. Sports such as football, volleyball, baseball, softball, and basketball provide obvious elements of team and character building within the structure of regular practice (both during the on and offseason) as well as the triumphs and pitfalls of competition. Sports such as cross country, track and field, bowling, and tennis also provide these elements even though their scoring structure is different from more popular high school sports.

There are numerous opportunities to cheat or engage in deceptive (illegal) activities while engaged in practices and formal competition. Some of these opportunities are on the part of the student athlete or coach. These opportunities for cheating arise for various reasons. In some instances, young athletes may misinterpret the directives of their coaches, peers, or parents. In other instances, much less common, children are told that they must cheat for some reason tied

to their place on the team. Both of these general instances are challenging for young athletes to interpret, considering their ongoing moral and cognitive development during adolescence. Often, but not always, the athlete is not able to see the long-term consequences of his or her actions on himself or herself, their team, or their school. Similarly, coaches who seek to maintain their jobs or obtain a better position through achieving a winning record may be tempted to lie or deceive if they believe this will improve their chances.

### Consequences of Lying and Deceptive Practices

Cheating in high-school athletics, while unfortunate is, sadly, understandable. Professional athletes often serve as role models for student athletes. Cheating in professional sports, while not pervasive, is a part of competition on that level. A student athlete is sent mixed messages by sports figures like Barry Bonds, Lance Armstrong, Marion Jones, and others. This, coupled with the models in the media of local cheating scandals in high schools and the challenges of maturation, can create confusing contexts for the young athlete. Moreover, the notion of cheating as a moral wrong is not clear for athletes or coaches. For instance, intentional fouls in basketball or holding in football, or more generally pushing physical contact within a game to see if officials will call a penalty or foul, demonstrate that children are taught and expected to "play hard" up to the point of being called for a penalty or foul.

The problem of lying and deception in high-school athletics is complex. While punitive measures will result if a high-school athletic team is found to have cheated during competition, often resulting in forfeiture of a match or removing wins from a team, deception also occurs on the part of parents and teachers in regard to rules of eligibility. Eligibility entails which students may participate in sports and may involve lying and deception regarding a child's grades, place of residence, or level of ability. An athletic team in the western United States, for example, was guilty of the latter. In this case, a student athlete hid a lacrosse ball in his hand and tossed it into the goal. This act was caught on videotape. Another case



occurred in the southeastern United States, where parents falsified documents and provided false addresses so their children could play on specific high-school teams. In another instance, a school in the Midwest was under state and federal investigation for student athlete eligibility issues. The result of such a case could mean that the school would lose its state championships and, because of the tampering of student grades, some students would not be allowed to graduate.

Research in the area of moral development and high-school athletics suggests that most young athletes admire and trust their coaches and feel they are learning important life skills. There are gender differences insofar as females are much more likely to express a deeper commitment to honesty and fair play while involved in competition. While student athletes admire their coaches, many are confused because they have often observed their coaches engaging in less than admirable behaviors that are seen as “part of the game” (for example, yelling at officials). Further, data suggest that those individuals involved in high-school athletics have cheated more outside of competition than those who do not participate in a sport during high school.

Because of the complexity of cheating in high-school athletics, state, national, and advocacy organizations take seriously their charge to educate coaches in developmentally appropriate approaches to assisting student athletes in the development of skills and sportsmanship. Organizations such as the American Sports Education Program (ASEP) offer coaches coursework, seminars, and opportunities for certification in the coaching of specific sports. State organizations throughout the United States have coursework opportunities for coaches to learn best practices considering the developmental readiness level of student athletes.

The seriousness with which high schools and their advocacy groups take the prevalence of cheating and the importance of supporting the development of the whole child has also led to the work of multiple consortiums that emphasize the importance of adolescents being involved in activities, be they sports or the fine arts, that teach teamwork, cooperation, and sportsmanship as well as the development of skills. Creating more transparent expectations of the goals of

high school sports may reduce the temptation for coaches, athletes, or parents to engage in lying and deception.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Jason A. Helfer  
Robert J. Mueller III  
*Knox College*

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Baseball; Basketball; Cheating; College Sports; Drugs; Games, Children's; Hockey; Overconfidence; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

Clifford, C. and R. Freezell. *Sport and Character: Reclaiming the Principles of Sportsmanship*.

Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2009.

Hubner, J. *Applying Educational Psychology in Coaching Athletes*. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2013.

Josephson Institute of Ethics (JIE). *What Are Your Children Learning? The Impact of High School Sports on the Values and Ethics of High School Athletes*. Los Angeles: JIE, 2007.

National Federation of State High School Associations. *The Case for High School Activities*. Indianapolis, IN: NFSHSA, 2012.

---

## Hispanic Americans

Hispanic or Latino Americans are a diverse group who have in common their ancestral origins in Spain or Portugal and especially their self-identification with the Hispanic or Latino label. “Latino” specifically indicates someone whose Spanish or Portuguese ancestry comes via Latin America, though in practice the terms *Hispanic* and *Latino* tend to be interchangeable. *Latin America*, a term coined in the 19th century by the Pan-Latinism movement, refers to the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries of the Americas (that is, Ibero-America). In American usage it includes the Dutch-speaking Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and Suriname; French-speaking Haiti, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana; and English-speaking Belize, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Antigua



*Hispanic Americans and other supporters demonstrate at Lafayette Park in Washington, D.C., for immigration reform, May 2, 2010. Leaders were arrested for a sit-in at the railings in front of the White House in an act of civil disobedience. Implicit or explicit systems of reciprocity in the immigrant community—usually intended as a form of mutual assistance—is also a frequent barrier in criminal investigations and prosecutions, as individuals in the Hispanic community may be unwilling to “snitch” on community members.*

and Barbuda, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Bahamas. The American usage emphasizes the cultural and historical similarities in the region.

Hispanic American culture is influenced not only by a common cultural heritage but also by similar experiences in the United States, including the language and cultural fluency challenges faced by immigrants; the anti-Catholic, anti-Hispanic, and anti-immigrant sentiments encountered by Hispanic groups; and other factors. These common elements of the Hispanic experience have led to similar phenomena related to deception and lying throughout Hispanic American culture.

Hispanic Americans constitute about 16 percent of the American population, forming the second-largest ethnic group after non-Hispanic whites, and are growing at the fastest rate. Hispanicness is an ethnic identity which is usually held in addition to, not instead of, a more specific identity, such as Mexican American (more than

half of Hispanic Americans), Cuban American, Puerto Rican, Dominican American, Colombian American, or Salvadoran American, and so the category is ethnically as well as racially diverse. Only a small minority of Hispanic Americans are descended from Spanish immigrants to the United States; in fact, some actually have no Spanish ancestry at all.

### **Frauds Targeting Hispanics**

Several studies have focused on issues of fraud that impact the Hispanic American community. A 2005 study, for instance, found that low-income Hispanic immigrants are the most likely victim group of consumer fraud. Inexperience in the American market, which leads to difficulty in assessing the value or likely legality of a proposed exchange, conspires with low English proficiency. Such immigrants are often defrauded in automobile sales, the sale of counterfeit documents (including citizenship papers and other

legal documents), and prepaid calling cards or cell phones.

Language problems are also at the heart of the “notario fraud,” which is a problem throughout Hispanic American communities with large immigrant populations, particularly in New York City, the southwest, and Texas. The Spanish word *notario* is translated into English as notary. In many Latin American countries, a *notario*, or notary, is an attorney, while in other regions, the word is used for certain public offices. In both cases, the *notario* enjoys greater power and authority than a U.S.-based notary, who is not subject to significant testing or regulation and is simply empowered to witness and certify documents, signatures, and depositions. Fraudulent *notarios* may present legitimate credentials as notaries but convince their immigrant clients—or, in an attempt to escape prosecution, simply allow those clients to believe—that they are fully licensed attorneys whose services will assist with the immigration process or with other problems. *Notarios* often use a mix of genuine government forms and fictitious documents in order to create the illusion of activity performed on their client’s behalf. It may be years before the deception is discovered, and often the immigrant, believing they have been following the law under the advice of an attorney, is subject to legal penalties that may include fines, imprisonment, denial of visas or citizenship, or deportation.

Notario fraud has been a problem in the Spanish-speaking immigrant community since at least the 1960s but has been an especially fast-growing crime in the 21st century. The American Immigration Lawyers Association and other groups have launched public service announcement initiatives at raising awareness of notario fraud, while Arizona has passed a law requiring notary publics advertising in a non-English language to clearly state the nature of their work or face felony prosecution.

### Hispanic American Men on the “Down-Low”

About 4 percent of Hispanic Americans identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual in a 2012 Gallup survey, slightly more than the national average of 3.4 percent. This is especially interesting given the phenomenon of secretive bisexuality, or “being on the down-low,” in the

Hispanic community, which has been a topic of increasing study in the 21st century. The down-low, derived from the caution to “keep this on the down-low” (that is, keep this a secret), is a term originating in the African American community to refer to a growing subculture of men who self-identify as heterosexual but have sex with men, and who keep these homosexual encounters a secret from their female sexual partners, their families, and usually most of their social circles outside of the down-low. The down-low has received attention primarily as a black phenomenon, but it is also part of both black and nonblack Hispanic American culture, especially in parts of the country with both large Hispanic and large black populations. Much of the media attention has focused on the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) risk posed by the intentional deception of this subculture.

When it was still a primarily black phenomenon, the down-low referred to numerous forms of secretiveness and deception, not necessarily sexual; the term became more specific in response to the development of the subculture. As it has developed in the 2000s and 2010s, the down-low is not just a subculture or a habit but also a sexual identity found in the black and Hispanic American communities. Borne out of the priority placed on masculinity in these cultures, the down-low is a sexual identity which is not truly either homosexual or bisexual, an identity that does not map to the “Kinsey scale” described in white non-Hispanic culture. The down-low culture is a rejection not just of the limits of white heterosexuality but also of an American gay culture that is perceived as predominantly white and effeminate. While sex with men has always occurred in the male Hispanic community, this organized subculture has developed specifically in the late 1990s and especially the 2000s, aided in part by the Internet and cell phones.

Men on the down-low are usually young and often live in the inner cities. Given the disproportionate representation in prison populations of young inner-city Hispanic and black men, it seems likely that prison sexuality plays a role in the perception of sexual identity in the down-low culture. While sex between men is common in prison, it includes not only the prison rapes—physically forced or coerced by threats

or bribes—depicted in the media but also consensual relationships and encounters. It is widely accepted that while men may have sex with other men in prison, this does not challenge or undercut their claim to heterosexuality upon reentering society. Further, it is commonly accepted that men in such positions need not discuss their prison sexual history with female sexual partners. The main difference here is that the down-low lacks the special context of prison in which no other sexual outlet is available.

Most men on the down-low have relationships with women, even getting married and having children, and their reasons for doing so bear only a superficial resemblance to those of the closeted gay men of the 20th century. Sex between men rarely involves a relationship and anonymity is common. There are designated meet-up spots where sex is available. For these men, their masculinity is part of their ethnic identity, which may be why the down-low culture spread from the black community to the Hispanic community, with its history of “machismo.” The down-low’s combination of masculinity, heterosexual identification, and homosexual activity has been compared to the male sexuality of ancient Rome and Greece, where homosexual activity was common and the categories of “straight” and “gay” did not exist.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has suggested that bisexual men—defined here by their sexual activity with both men and women, not their sexual identity—are a significant bridge for transmission of HIV to women, and about 25 percent of such men report having unsafe sex with partners of both sexes. The CDC further reported that the greatest risk is posed when bisexual men do not disclose their sex with men to their female partners, although this claim has been challenged by the mainstream gay community. The CDC’s report may be specific to the black community, in which nondisclosing black men who have sex with both men and women have a 14 percent prevalence of HIV infection, which is not only much higher than heterosexuals or disclosing bisexuals but also larger than the prevalence experienced by nondisclosing bisexuals of all other races and ethnicities. It was not clear in the CDC report whether Hispanic blacks were included in the study.

### Truthfulness in Hispanic American Culture

Sociological and psychological studies have found that habits of lying vary from culture to culture, and those differing values may be brought with an immigrant group to a new country. By and large these studies have found that non-Hispanic, white American culture is more willing to lie, and to find the lies of others more acceptable, than Hispanic cultures. A 2007 study found that white Americans rated lies as more acceptable than Ecuadorians did in all six categories of lie included in the study: flattery, impression management, conflict avoidance, enhancement of others’ self-esteem, self-aggrandizement, and instrumental lies. Similarly, a study of Puerto Rican adolescents in 2012 found that lying to parents was infrequent across most categories, though slightly more common when lying about engaging in risky behavior. There was a strong correlation between an individual’s likelihood of telling his parents the truth and the trust he expressed in his parents.

In addition to the deception inherent in the down-low, there is a key exception to this general truthfulness in Hispanic American culture, which is a frequent unwillingness to speak out against members of the community in court or to law enforcement authorities. Again, this has an analogue in the African American community; for blacks living in the inner cities, “snitching” is a deeply held cultural taboo. However, in the Hispanic community this reluctance grows out of *confianza*, a term for the mutual reciprocity and mutual duty of members of the Hispanic American community.

Many immigrant communities have early histories of implicit or explicit systems of mutual reciprocity. These immigrants formed mutual benefit societies to assist each other, and those who came to power extended jobs, loans, and other help to those who had not. *Confianza* may have originated similarly, but it continues as a network of obligations to insiders, often difficult to articulate to outsiders. This has frequently been named as a barrier in criminal investigations and prosecutions, in which even when individuals know wrongdoing has been done, they may be unwilling to speak ill of another community member, or to contribute to their prosecution.

Bill Kte’pi  
*Independent Scholar*



**See Also:** African Americans; Anthropology, Cultural; Native Americans; Relationships, Sexual.

### Further Readings

- Boykin, Keith. *Beyond the Down Low: Sex, Lies, and Denial in Black America*. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006.
- Cisneros, Milagros. "H. B. 2659: Notorious Notaries: How Arizona is Curbing Notario Fraud in the Immigrant Community." *Arizona State Legal Journal*, v.32/287 (2000).
- Marlowe, Julia and Jorge H. Atilas. "Consumer Fraud and Latino Immigrant Consumers in the United States." *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, v.29/5 (September 2005).
- Mealy, Marisa, Walter Stephan, and Carolina Urrutia. "The Acceptability of Lies: A Comparison of Ecuadorians and Euro-Americans." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, v.31/6 (2007).
- Pitt, Richard N., Jr. "Downlow Mountain? De/Stigmatizing Bisexuality Through Pitying and Pejorative Discourses in Media." *Journal of Men's Studies*, v.14 (2006).
- Ross, Michael, B.R. Simon Rosser, Eli Coleman, and Rafael Mazin. "Misrepresentation on the Internet and in Real Life about Sex and HIV: A Study of Latino Men Who Have Sex With Men." *Culture, Health, and Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention, and Care*, v.8/2 (2006).
- Villalobos, Myriam and Judith G. Smetana. "Puerto Rican Adolescents' Disclosure and Lying to Parents About Peer and Risky Activities: Associations with Teens' Perceptions of Latino Values." *Journal of Adolescence*, v.35/4 (2012).

---

## Historical Narratives, False

Historical narratives reflect the way history has been and is written. Rather than representing past dealings and happenings directly, historical narratives represent how individual historians in the past have interpreted historical events. Historical narratives may be false because of a variety of causes. A historian may choose, of course, to purposefully compose a false historical narrative,

one in which he or she consciously creates facts or events in order to weave a different interpretation than that supported by the existing evidence. An assortment of other reasons, however, may make a historical narrative false that do not rise to the level of outright deception. A misunderstanding of the historical process, the choice of misleading language, intentional or unintentional omissions, misleading audiovisual cuing, or the use of spurious knowledge may cause a historical narrative to be false. As technological advances combine with increased scrutiny by members of the scholarly community, the assertion that certain historical narratives are false will most likely increase.

### Background

Traditionally, narrative was the chief rhetorical device used by historians, representing a way of writing history that followed certain recognized conventions. Historical narrative is organized in a chronological manner, so that events that occurred first in time are placed first in the recounting. In addition, historical narrative typically concentrates on the transmission of a single, coherent story. Eschewing the analytical for the descriptive, historical narratives present what has happened in a manner that explains how and why events occurred. Traditional historical narrative has focused on individuals and their actions, not abstract conditions or situations. Finally, historical narrative has focused on the particular and specific, as opposed to the communal and statistical.

Historic narratives for generations focused on diplomatic, economic, and political history. Beginning in the 1960s, history as a discipline began to move away from the traditional historical narrative and to embrace more of a social science model of analysis, which had its roots in the 19th-century German and French approach to the field. This new approach to history, referred to as *social history*, disdained the traditional approach and instead used demographic, statistical, and other information to craft its analysis. While the number of political historians typically made up approximately 50 percent of those in academic positions, recent estimates show this proportion has fallen to approximately 30 percent, while those identifying as social historians has increased to over 40 percent.

A variety of approaches fall under the term *social history*, including African American history, Chicano history, ethnic history, gender history, history of education, history of the family, history of medicine, labor history, rural history, and women's history. Rather than examining actors and events, social history focuses upon classes and movements, conflicts and revolutions, family and education, inequality, leisure and work, mobility and other such phenomena.

Rather than using narrative, social history instead emphasizes analytical approaches similar to other branches of the social sciences, focusing on quantifiable sources rather than examining events and heroes. In addition to those mentioned above, a variety of other historiographical approaches exist, including comparative history, environmental history, ethnohistory, history of religion, intellectual history, local history, oral history, public history, and quantitative history, among others.

Over the past three decades, cultural history has also become increasingly popular. Like social history, cultural history examines how popular cultural traditions and interpretations inform the historical perspective. Cultural history also examines records and other data sources to examine how the nonelite groups within a society fared, thought, and interacted during certain eras. Cultural history examines such themes as attitude, the body, class, culture, cultural identity, ideology, perception, power, race, and sexual orientation. Examining the manifestations of culture, cultural historians are very interested in how traditional culture adapts to mass media, and consequently there is great interest in print, film, radio, television, video games, the Internet, and other cultural evolutions of human relations.

Historiography examines a variety of topics to determine the veracity and reliability of a given historical narrative. Among the common themes examined are reliability, historiographical tradition, moral issues, interpretation, and historical metanarratives. In examining reliability, the historian's information sources, such as documents, persons, photos, or any other source, are examined in order to assess their trustworthiness within the context of their use. The historiographical tradition or framework indicates the historian's approach to his or her topic, which

might be political, Marxist, social, cultural, or the like, as this explains biases and assumptions in the work. Moral issues involve a resolution or determination of the relative praise or guilt assigned to various parties within the work. The interpretation pursued by a given piece might be orthodox, insofar that it keeps within the previous examinations undertaken, or revisionist, in which case it reinterprets previously accepted situations and occurrences. Finally, historical metanarratives amount to a narrative about narratives, often a postmodern approach that examines grand narratives, often with a good amount of skepticism. Through these examinations, determinations can be made regarding the veracity, or the falsity, of a given historical narrative.

### Misconstruing History

All history depends upon the interpretation of past events by examining information sources that may or may not be complete or comprehensive. As a result, the truth or falsity of any historical narrative is, to a certain degree, a matter of opinion and conjecture. That being said, adherence to principles of historiography increases the likelihood that other historians would be more inclined to accept a given interpretation as compelling, convincing, or at least not flagrantly false. Practices such as peer review, in which other scholars engage in a blind review of a work and indicate its trustworthiness before publication, are some of the other ways that the chance that a historical narrative is false can be reduced. Despite these safeguards, false historical narratives sometimes get published. The falsity of these historical narratives sometimes can be attributed to negligence, incompetence, false logic, omissions, misleading use of language or audiovisuals, or other causes, including intentional falsification.

Historians seek to reconstruct past human activities and to realize a more profound understanding of those activities. Unlike all the other arts and humanities, however, history is part of the human experience. History is a part of consciousness insofar that it represents one's memory of past events. The Greeks recognized this connection by describing Clio, the muse of history, as the daughter of memory. The earliest Western historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, knew that the simplest recitation of events had multiple

ramifications. The ancillary subject matter contained in history, concerning as it does sociology, anthropology, demography, and psychology, reaches to every realm of human existence. Thus history, when deliberately written, suggests general truths for all. To maintain the reliability of these truths, it is imperative that certain guidelines be adhered to as closely as possible.

In the last century, a great desire sprang up for social history, for economic history, and for the newest “new history,” which forsake political and diplomatic feats and motives in favor of great movements of ideas. This pressure was brought in part by the sciences, with their reliance on figures and statistics. Many other subjects compile figures and tables counting selected social acts. It is left to the historian, however, to discover the place and significance of such findings in an intelligible account of some portion of the past.

Some of the difficulties of the modern historian are caused by a rending of the social fabric. History has an empirical look and feel of its own that few other fields of study provide. History, at its best, involves a recital of events and a portrayal of participants. The writing of history requires a pattern because the human mind has difficulty fixing its attention on anything that does not present or suggest form. History thus presents incidents in clusters that follow rationally from one another. Historians often use time as a guide, roughly dividing it into reigns, centuries, and eras. In American history, decades and presidential terms are often used as such a guide. Historians create these classifications, and thus they always remain open to some criticism.

To be successful, a classification must fairly correspond to the mass of evidence and offer a graspable design to the beholder. Before and during the 1960s, historians became interested in groups that had been overlooked or ignored: African Americans, women, Native Americans, and Mexican Americans. In response to this, other groups, also ignored, began to be studied, such as the French, the Irish, and Scandinavians. Further subgroups began to be studied, such as women and music, women and the professions, and women and law. An abiding search for the truth above all governs the historian.

Often, however, the historian is faced with a report of suspicious nature in an otherwise

reliable source; what is to be done? A reasonable person might (1) accept the item because of the periodical's reputation, (2) reject the information as absurd, (3) suspend judgment pending more information, or (4) ignore the problem all together. The good historian would do none of the above but continue to investigate. Verification ranges from tasks as diverse as ensuring an author's name is cited correctly to ensuring that a document is genuine. Ultimately, the historian arrives at the truth through probability. In certain cases, only an expert has the knowledge to judge the authenticity of a source. Dumas Malone, a professor at the University of Virginia, was known for his observation that Thomas Jefferson's writing contained more radical wording when writing to younger men. This expertise came from years of study and work.

### Levels of Deception

Historians can mislead through a failure to tell the entire story. This deception can take place when the historian makes selective use of the evidence, including those portions that support his or her narrative but excluding those that do not. Similarly, a historian may choose to rely heavily on evidence that is little more than hearsay to the exclusion of other evidence that is more dispositive. Additionally, historians using transcripts or audiovisual material can manipulate the veracity of their narrative by omitting key portions of what they are presenting, such as leaving out key material that could show information in a different light. Even something as seemingly benign as selecting photographs can obfuscate the truth. This occurs when outright fraud is committed, such as when someone chooses to use a software program such as Photoshop to manipulate an image. Visual vilification may also occur, however, when a particular image is selected in an attempt to make the subject appear in an unflattering light.

A historical narrative can be made less reliable by other means that are more subtle, but no less damaging, to those interested in pursuing truth. Misleading use of language, or manipulation of certain passages, can also vitiate the veracity of a historical narrative. Far too many historians engage in loaded language, which predisposes readers to draw certain conclusions based upon

the choice of words. For example, speaking of Catholics in Northern Ireland as “terrorists” as opposed to the “Irish Republican Army” can provoke a very different response in readers. Problems and effects are sometimes overstated, as when discussions about gun ownership purport to establish certain levels of ownership that cannot be established.

A variety of conspiracy theories, faulty causation links, and guilt by association can also impugn a historical narrative’s veracity. Conspiracy theories, such as those regarding the John F. Kennedy assassination, certainly are of great interest but often rely upon the suspension of disbelief. Faulty causation links mistake correlation, in which two events occur simultaneously, for an underlying reason that made something happen. The two are quite different, but correlation is quite often mistaken for causation. Guilt by association may result in the condemnation of individuals or causes because of an awareness of or acquaintanceship with an evildoer, even though no evidence exists that the individual or cause accepted the positions of the other.

### Consequences of False Historical Narratives

Good historical narrative is based upon a truthful examination of various facts. The consequences for those who are found, or even suspected of, making false statements in a historical narrative can be severe, sometimes resulting in admonitions or censure, sometimes ending careers. Prominent historians such as Stephen Ambrose and Michael Bellesiles have had their reputations placed under severe attack as a result of allegations of intentional falsehoods in their work. Because so much stock is placed in the truthfulness of scholars, mere allegations of falsifications often result in damaging consequences and penalties.

Ambrose was a longtime professor of history at the University of New Orleans, and the recipient of the National Humanities Medal, the George Marshall Award, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, and various other honors. Ambrose, who wrote about the Civil War, Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II, and a variety of other topics, was highly popular with the general public, with many of his books becoming best sellers. The Home Box Office (HBO) series *Band of Brothers* was based upon

Ambrose’s book of the same name and won an Emmy Award from the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences.

After the great success of this and other projects, allegations came to light that Ambrose had plagiarized the work of other historians, with an investigation by *Forbes* magazine alleging that six of his books borrowed from the works of others. Later, Ambrose was also accused of falsifying details related to his relationship with Eisenhower, of whom he wrote the authorized biography, inflating the amount of time he had spent interviewing the former president and misstating facts in other works. Although he died shortly after these charges came to light, Ambrose’s reputation has never recovered.

Bellesiles was a professor at Emory University and was awarded the Bancroft Prize for his work *Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture*. The Bancroft Prize is awarded by Columbia University to the best book regarding diplomacy or American history, and it is considered highly prestigious. Bellesiles’s critically acclaimed book asserted that guns were uncommon in much of the United States’ peacetime history and only became common following the Civil War.

In part because the book supported the anti-gun lobby, Bellesiles was feted upon its publication. Investigations of his work, however, turned up numerous allegations of misrepresentations, inaccurate citations, and falsehoods. Certain San Francisco probate records Bellesiles claimed to have consulted, for example, turned out to have been destroyed in the earthquake of 1906, and he reported a mathematically impossible mean for gun ownership based upon probate records.

As a result of an investigation, Bellesiles was stripped of the Bancroft Prize and resigned from his professorship at Emory. Although he has since published another book, Bellesiles has not accepted another tenure track position. The consequences of false historical narratives are thus harsh, serving as a warning to others not to commit academic fraud or to be sloppy in establishing one’s citations or evidence.

Stephen T. Schroth  
Jason A. Helfer  
Knox College



**See Also:** Anderson, Anna (Anastasia); Barnum, P. T.; Beatles Hoax; Big Lie Technique; Columbus, Christopher; Deception in Research Design; Fiction; Frey, James; Memoirs; Napoleon Bonaparte; Urban Legends; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

- Barzun, J. and H. F. Graff. *The Modern Researcher*. 6th ed. Independence, KY: Cengage Learning, 2003.
- Breisach, E. *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern*. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Green, A. and K. Troup, eds. *The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century History and Theory*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Howell, M., and W. Prevenier. *From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

## History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations

Telling the truth and lying are as ancient as humanity. Beliefs that “it is wrong to lie” or “deception is evil” have been expressed in many ways through the ages.

In the ancient Middle East, King Hammurabi (1795–50 B.C.E.) issued his famous code. The code was preserved on a black stone monument that was recovered in 1901. Among the many laws it lists are two on bearing false witness. In a capital case a witness who could not establish the statements he has made was to be put to death. In other criminal cases a false witness would suffer the punishment that the perjurer had sought for the counterlitigant.

In a civil case, false witnesses were to pay the damages of the suit for their perjury. However, immoral acts, such as lying, using false weights, or other forms of deception, were not cases that were brought into court. Instead these acts were severely denounced in the Omen Tablets as likely to incur the wrath of the gods rather than the punishing hand of the king.

### Biblical Discussions of Deception

The Bible contains many cases of deception, from false weights used in measurements to outright lying. The Hebrew word for deception or falsehood is *seger*; the word for lie is *kazab*. In general, the biblical writers severely condemned lying, especially if the lie was used to perpetrate a fraud (Leviticus 6:2–3). Other biblical passages exhort believers not to lie, deceive one another, or “swear falsely” by the name of God (Leviticus 19:11–12). The prophets condemned lying as an expression of the principle of evil (Hosea 12:1), so it was condemned as unacceptable to the conscience of ancient Israel and above all as contrary to the divine nature.

The story of the emergence of evil into the human condition is found in Genesis 3:1–7, which tells how the Serpent lied to Eve by telling her that God’s ban on eating the forbidden fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil was not true. The Serpent lied about the ban, and the consequences of this lie involved Eve (and subsequently Adam) in a radical change in the human condition.

Another story of deception from Genesis (12:10–20) involves Abraham and his beautiful wife Sarah. Forced to go to Egypt because of famine, he persuaded her to tell the Egyptians that she was his sister in order to protect his life. Believing that she was a free woman, she was taken to the Pharaoh’s harem until the deception was revealed to the Pharaoh following an outbreak of plagues in his house.


Isaac, the son of Abraham, practiced a similar deception with the Philistines (Genesis 26:1–11) in order to protect his life. His lie that Rebecca, his wife, was his sister was revealed when he was seen fondling her. His deception was more than matched by his son Jacob, who deceived his nearly blind father in order to steal Esau’s (his brother) blessing from Isaac (Genesis 27:1–40). Jacob is himself deceived when he is given his beloved Rachel in marriage, only to discover that his wedding night has been spent with her crossed-eyed sister, Leah (Genesis 29:15–30). Rachel rewarded her father’s duplicity years later with her own. She stole her father’s household goods. When he searched her tent she sat on the goods and lied that she was menstruating, so she was not required to get up (Genesis 31:33–35).

The patriarch Jacob was deceived by his sons when he was shown the coat of many colors that belonged to his favorite son, Joseph. The sons lied that the torn and bloody coat was all that was left, when they knew that they had sold Joseph into slavery and he had been taken to Egypt (Genesis 37:1–36.). After this, one of Jacob's half brothers, Judah, was deceived by his daughter-in-law, Tamar (Genesis 38:1–30). Years later Joseph, who has become virtually the second-in-command in Egypt, hid his identity from his brothers until he could examine their loyalties (Genesis 43–45).

In Exodus (1:8–22), the service of Joseph to Egypt had been forgotten and the new Pharaoh, fearing the disloyalty of the Hebrews, tried to suppress their birth rate as a matter of national

security. He ordered the Hebrew midwives, Shiphrah and Puah, to engage in male infanticide. However, they disobeyed his orders and when questioned lied that the Hebrew women were so strong that they delivered before midwives could arrive. Their lying is not condemned biblically, but they are blessed.

The book of Judges describes the deception practiced by Ehud in the assassination of King Eglon. Ehud was a left-handed Benjamite who wore his sword on his right hip rather than the left side, as right-handed warriors would. Although searched on the left, his sword was not discovered when he came to King Eglon on the pretense of giving a gift. He left the gift and then acted as though he were leaving the palace but then suddenly came back and asked for a secret



In an 1860 painting, the Greek philosopher Diogenes (404–323 B.C.E.) sits in an earthenware tub in the Metroon, Athens, lighting the lamp with which he was to search for an honest man in daylight. The problem of truth as an aspect of knowledge became critical to Greek philosophy as Sophists attacked truth, claiming that “man is the measure of all things,” a principle that reduced truth to subjective whim.

audience with King Eglon. The private audience was granted. Ehud drew near to the king, pretending to whisper a message. Instead he drew his sword and drove it into Eglon's fat belly, which killed him. Ehud then escaped to rally the Israelites to battle.

While there are numerous examples of deception in the Bible, the Mosaic Law given in the Ten Commandments prohibits bearing false witnessing (Exodus 20:16 and Deuteronomy 5:20). Other sundry laws include giving false reports and engaging in other deceptive practices (Exodus 23:1–3). Wisdom literature denounced false swearing: Do not witness against your neighbor without cause (Proverbs 24:28); the Lord hates false witness (Proverbs 6:19); a false witness will not go unpunished (Proverbs 19:5); a false witness will perish (Proverbs 21:28); and a worthless witness makes a mockery of justice (Proverbs 19:28). The prophets frequently denounced fraud and deception: “those who by a word would make a man out to be guilty” (Isaiah 29:21); “the rogue ruins the poor, whose plea is just, with lying words” (Isaiah 32:7).

Deception in business practices is also denounced in many biblical passages. Some of these are part of the Law of Moses, such as “Do not have different sets of weights and measures” (Deuteronomy 25:13–15). Others are in the wisdom literature: Differing weights and measures are an abomination to the Lord (Proverbs 20:10); the Lord hates dishonest scales (Proverbs 11:1). Other passages are part of the prophetic literature: a trader with false balances (Hosea 12:7); cheating with dishonest scales (Amos 8:5; Micah 6:11); to make the *ephah* small and the *shekel* great (Amos 8:5); can I acquit the man with wicked scales and a bag of deceitful weights? (Micah 6:11); the scant measure that is cursed (Micah 6:10).

In the Gospels, passages report that false testimony was sought against Jesus by “the chief priests and Council” (Matthew 26:59), and “many false witnesses came forward against Jesus” (Matthew 26:60; Mark 14:56–7). In the Gospel according to John (8:44), Jesus declares that Satan is the father of lies. In the book of Acts (6:13), Stephen became the first Christian martyr because of false testimony. After Ananias and his wife Sophia lied about their self-promoting

donation, both subsequently dropped dead (Acts 5:1–11). The First Letter of John (1 John. 2:22) says that lying is the sin of the Antichrist. The book of Revelation (21:27) excludes all habitual liars from heaven as those who have forfeited eternal salvation.

### Lying in Other Ancient Cultures

In ancient Egypt, *maat*, the fundamental order of creation, was an organizing principle of behavior. The New Kingdom produced a work called “The Tale of Truth and Falsehood” (“The Blinding of Truth by Falsehood”), an allegory that transforms the conflict between Horus and Set. These gods are unlike the Mesopotamian trickster god Enki, who saves mankind. In the New Kingdom the scarab beetle came to symbolize the heart that would be judged after death. Scarab amulets were inscribed with spells to protect one from lying.

The Greek word for lying is *pseudos* and its cognates. Ancient Greek laws expressed concern for falsehood with statutes dealing with moving boundary markers. Greek mythology contributed many examples of deception: Odysseus built the Trojan horse and later deceived the Cyclops. The ancient Greeks also had their own spirit of deception, *Apate*, the goddess of deceit, guile, fraud, and lies. Her male consort was *Dolos*, the *daimon* of trickery. *Apate* was also the companion of *Pseudologoi* (lies), which was the opposite of the spirit of truth, *Aletheia*.

The problem of truth as an aspect of knowledge became critical to Greek philosophy in the face of the Sophist attacks on truth. The Socratic school struggled against Sophists, such as Protagoras, who claimed that “man is the measure of all things.” This principle basically reduced truth to subjective whim, which allowed deceit in the Sophist ethic of success. In Plato's dialogues, the *Craytalus*, *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, Plato's Socratic character struggled with the problem of falsehood. Aristotle wrote against sophistries in *De Sophisticis Elenchis* (*On Sophistical Refutations*). Diogenes the Cynic carried a lighted lantern around Athens in the bright noonday sun looking for an honest man. On Crete, Epimenides of Knossos paradoxically claimed, “All Cretans are liars.”

In China in the time of the Warring States (ca. 479–221 B.C.E) the School of Names (also



known as The Logicians or *Míngjia*) grew out of Mohism. This group's philosophy is believed to have been similar to that of the Sophists. Most of their works are no longer extant. In contrast, Confucius said in the *Analects* (2.22), "I do not see what use a man can be put to, whose word cannot be trusted." Also in the era of the Warring States, military authors, such as Sun Tzu, Sun Pin, and others, recommended the use of guile and duplicity and other forms of deceit in order to achieve military goals. They also urged the use of spies in order to know their opponents. The Chi'n armies led by Sun Pin followed the maxim, "be deceptive."

In India, the Laws of Manu condemned lying because it causes serious destruction. The bold statement about lying in *Manu* (4.256) was that all things are determined by speech; speech is their root, and from speech they proceed. Therefore, he who is dishonest with respect to speech is dishonest in everything. The Jain *Upasakadasanga Sutra* stated that falsehood implies the making of a wrong statement by one who is overwhelmed by intense passions.

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Aristotle; Bible; Inca Empire; Morals and Ethics; Myth; Oaths; Plato; Sun Tzu; Trojan Horse.

### Further Readings

- Campbell, Jeremy. *The Liar's Tale: A History of Falsehood*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
- Gill, Christopher and T. P. Wiseman, eds. *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993.
- Hesk, Jon. *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Plaza, Maria. *The Function of Humour in Roman Verse Satire: Laughing and Lying*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Sullivan, Evelin. *The Concise Book of Lying*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.
- Turner, Andrew, et al., eds. *Private and Public Lies: The Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010.

## History of Deception: Medieval Period

The death of Saint Augustine, bishop of Hippo, in north Africa in 430, has been used by historians to mark the end of the ancient world and the beginning of the Middle Ages. Augustine's teachings were to have a profound influence on the medieval Western world. His work *De Mendacio* (*On Lying*) continues to influence many people today.

### Saint Augustine's Views of Lying

Saint Augustine defined lying as having one thing in one's heart and uttering another with the intention to deceive. This definition from *On Lying* stresses that lying is intentionally seeking to deceive. In his work *Enchiridion*, the definition of lying is speaking the opposite of what liars have in their hearts with the purpose of deceiving others. For Augustine, a lie is also a sin, even if it is uttered in order to do a service to someone.

Augustine believes the problem of lying is best addressed by absolutely forbidding all lies. He rejects all forms of justified lying. This includes lying to enemies, to the sick or dying about their condition, or even to protect others.

Augustine taught that there is an eight-fold distinction between types of lies. The worst of all lies are those lies uttered in teaching of religion. The second type of lies are those that injure people unjustly. A third type is beneficial to one person and harmful to another. The fourth type is the "real lie," which is told solely for the pleasure of deceiving. The fifth type is told to please others in order to smooth conversations and relations. The sixth type of lie harms no one, but benefits someone (for example, the lie to protect someone from harm). The seventh type is the lie that harms no one, but protects someone from harm, such as a man sought for capital punishment. The least offensive lies are those that harm no one but save some people from physical defilement. In cases where lying saved people from harm, the lie can be pardoned and the good intentions praised. Augustine sees a lie that harms someone in order to protect someone from injury as a separate question of whether it is ever right to harm someone.



Augustine primarily opposes lying because it is contrary to the Divine purpose of human speech. His influence was enormous, because prior to his time Christian opinion was very divided. Many people, finding the many examples of deception in the Bible, saw them as permission for lying, but Augustine's stance opposed all lying. His absolute opposition was then worked out as the Middle Ages advanced. However, his absolute prohibition on lying was very hard to live by. Eventually three approaches to deception emerged: forgiveness for lying, cagey phrasing that denied it was lying, and the claim that some falsehoods did not count as lies.

### Ordeals to Determine Truth

Augustine's views reappeared in the early penitentials. For Christians to bear false witness in court was a very serious form of deception. The *Penitential of Cummean* required lengthy penances for acts of perjury. In England and other places, oaths in legal proceedings could be backed by some form of ordeal. One form of ordeal was the *iudicium aquae frigidae* (ordeal by cold water). Whether trial by water, combat, poison, or fire, the goal was to separate truth from error, especially the deliberate error. The ordeal was inherited by European societies during the Middle Ages, but it was used in many other places from Japan to Polynesia to Africa and Iceland. An example of ordeal by boiling water was recorded in the Viking epic *Poetic Edda*.

Charlemagne supported the ordeal as a method for separating lies from truth. In contrast to ordeals were oaths that were often not accepted as conveying a sufficient amount of penitence. However, some oaths, if sworn on holy relicts, were accepted. The growth of learning among the clergy would eventually lead to the abandonment of ordeals.

### Thomas Aquinas

Among the most learned of the clergy was Saint Thomas Aquinas. In his *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas dealt with the problem of lying in his discussion of "Whether Lies are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocular and Mischievous Lies?" Officious lies are told for some useful purpose. Jocular lies are told in order to make fun. Mischievous lies are told in order to inflict injury. Aquinas concludes that these are all real lies; however,

following Aristotle's *Ethics*, he sees lies as "boasting" and "irony." Boasting lies go beyond the truth, while ironic lies stop short of the truth.

Aquinas sees lying as sinful. It increases in sinfulness if it is intended to harm someone (mischievous lie). It decreases in sinfulness if it is intended to achieve some good (jocular lie), and it is an officious lie if it is intended to save or protect someone. In all, the greater the harm intended, the more grave the sinfulness of the lie, but in contrast the greater the good intended, the less grave the sinfulness of the lie.

### Logical Fallacies

With the renewal of learning after the Dark Ages, the study of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* led to the assignment of Latin names to many informal fallacies; most of them seek to deceive by illogically appealing to the emotions, manipulating language, or some other trick of thought. These informal fallacies, or *argumentum*, included *argumentum ad baculum* (threat), *ad crumenum* (appeal to money), *ad hominem* (attacking someone instead of refuting them), *ad ignorantiam* (appealing to the absence of evidence), *ad lapidem* (dismissing a statement as absurd without giving proof of its absurdity), *ad misericordiam* (appealing to pity), *ad novitatem* (new is better), *ad populum* (appeal to the people), *ad antiquitatem* (appealing to age), *ad lazarum* (appealing to poverty), *audiatur et altera pars* (jumping to conclusions), *cum hoc ergo propter hoc* (false cause), *non causa pro causa* (phantom false cause), *dicto simpliciter* (sweeping generalization), *non sequitur* (does not follow), *petitio principii* (loaded question), and *tu quoque* (appeal to hypocrisy).

Deceiving and lying to the enemy during a war is an ancient practice. It has been supported by generals and many others who have practiced as many tricks of deception as possible. The military tactics of camouflage, feinting movements, spies, disinformation, and other deceptions were used in the Middle Ages. Lies uttered in a crisis were also accepted. Byzantine diplomacy was noted for its duplicity.

### Lying in Non-European Cultures

In Arabia the religion of Islam emerged with the Koran saying that words and deeds should match: "O you who believe, wherefore do you say what you do not? Very hateful is it to God, that you say

what you do not” (Sura 61:2–3). Lying is unacceptable to Allah, and the Hadith (the collection of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings) note that hypocrites are liars who make false promises, act treacherously, and betray the trusting.

In India, the Dhammapada of Buddhism condemned speakers of falsehoods, who would reach purgatory, where they would lie about their misdeeds. There is no evil that cannot be done by the liar, who has transgressed the one law of truthfulness and who is indifferent to the world beyond.

The Maharatnakuta sutra, a Buddhist scripture, describes liars as people who lie to themselves as well to the gods. Lying is the origin of all evils according to the Bodhisattva Surata’s *Discourse*. Lying leads to reincarnation in the miserable planes of existence, to the breach of the pure precepts, and to corruption of the body.

The Mahabharata, which was finished around 400 C.E., is an epic poem that includes the great devotional hymn the Bhagavad Gita. It features the hero Arunga discussing life with Arjuna, his charioteer, who is actually Krishna. The stories of Krishna feature his childhood lies and other tricks; he is a trickster god. Examples of deceiving tricksters are found in many places.

For example, in African stories the trickster is a mythic character who lives deceptively by his wits. Characters include Ture of the Pygmies, Anansi the Spider, and the Hare (who became Brer Rabbit in the Uncle Remus stories). The African god Eshu was a trickster who would bring chaos. He is capable of changing shapes and of confusing people. Eshu is known as Legba in Nigeria. He is like the Norse god Loki, who practices deception in many myths.

The myths of Native Americans included many tricksters that were usually god animals. They were quite often malevolent and aggressively oversexed. Among the many tricksters are Raven (Haida of Queen Charlotte Islands), the coyote, and the rabbit. A piece of Mayan pottery pictures a rabbit stealing clothing. An Aztec trickster was Centzon Totochtin, whose name means “four hundred rabbits.”

The Popol Vuh tells of the Mayan twin gods, who are cultural heroes. They engage in numerous deceptions. Widespread in the American Southwest is Anasazi rock art, including pictographs or petroglyphs of Kokopelli, a hunchbacked figure

who is a deceiving and lecherous musician with a flute. The Lakota Sioux trickster was Iktomi, a spiderman, who was more of a trickster god than an animal spirit.

### Lying in Medieval Literature and Philosophy

Lying was addressed in many literary works of the Middle Ages, including those of Geoffrey Chaucer, William Langland, John Gower, and the Patience poet. These works examined a variety of types of speech, including political, social, and private speech, that was deceptive and sinful. Some works on courtly love also addressed lying.

A major issue for centuries was the double truth doctrine, which gained currency in Latin-speaking countries from *On the Harmony Between Religion and Philosophy*, written by the Arabian philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes). The double truth doctrine was central to the teachings of Siger Brabant, a French Scholastic and Latin Averroist of the 1200s. The key influence was ultimately from the neoplatonism that had entered Islamic philosophy, teaching a type of monism that was mistaken for monotheism. Viewing the divine as overflowing downward in a series of steps to humans, the double truth doctrine taught that theologians could use allegorical interpretation of scripture to hide their lack of faith while teaching a literalistic truth to the simple laity. In other words, it was possible for religion and philosophy to arrive at contradictory statements about the truth without any detriment.

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Aquinas, Thomas; Brer Rabbit; Catholic Church; Islam; Morals and Ethics; Native Americans; Nostradamus; Saint Augustine.

### Further Readings

Campbell, Jeremy. *The Liar’s Tale: A History of Falsehood*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

Craun, Edward David. *Lies, Slander and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature: Pastoral Rhetoric and the Deviant Speaker*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

- Huot, Sylvia. *Dreams of Lovers and Lies of Poets: Poetry, Knowledge, and Desire in the Roman de la Rose*. London: Legenda, 2010.
- Lerer, Seth. *Courtly Letters in the Age of Henry VIII: Literary Culture and the Arts of Deceit*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Ogden, Daniel. *In Search of the Sorcerer's Apprentice: The Traditional Tales of Lucian's Lover of Lies*. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007.
- Sullivan, Evelin. *The Concise Book of Lying*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

---

## History of Deception: Renaissance

The Renaissance (from the French for “rebirth”) was a cultural movement of invigorated activity and innovation in the arts, sciences, and humanities, which began in Italy in the late Middle Ages before being transmitted to the rest of Europe through the 17th century. It was simultaneously forward thinking, having been enabled in part by technological achievements like the printing press, and neoclassical, characterized by a new appreciation of the culture and cultural products of ancient Rome and Greece, made newly available thanks to contact with the Islamic world, which had preserved them in translation.

The Renaissance was a time obsessed with appearances and underlying realities, as the sciences became sophisticated enough to examine more than the naked eye could behold, or could reveal how the senses could deceive reason; as the works of Aristotle and Plato were rediscovered, and formal logic and mathematics were prized; as painters and sculptors brought a rigor to their art that made commonplace a level of realism that had not previously been attempted. The revitalization of humanism shifted focus from idealism, which considers things as they should be, to realism, which examines things as they actually are.

Further, it was a time when commerce, science, and politics created new realms of bureaucracy and clerical work, which in turn provided opportunities for counterfeiters, forgers, and unethical contracts. The concern with appearances in the

Renaissance wasn't just superficial. In an era late enough to develop something of a middle class and a non-noble upper class, but early enough that none of the modern means of proving creditworthiness existed, merchants used the appearance of a customer to gauge whether credit should be extended to them. For this reason, there are several historical cases and many more fictional cases of strangers arriving in town in expensive attire and, because of the illusion of wealth, being treated to a life of splendor and deference to which it turns out they are not entitled.

### Renaissance Politics

It was also a time of sophisticated politics, as the rise of artisan and merchant guilds created a private sector with political power, from which families like the Borgias and Medicis arose to dominate much of Italy. Modern notions of diplomacy and espionage originate in the Renaissance, and Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* made a science of manipulation and propaganda.

Late-medieval Italy was not a single political entity but rather a group of city-states and territories, notably Milan, Genoa, the Kingdom of Naples, the Republic of Florence, Venice, and the Papal States controlled by the pope and the Catholic Church. Italy was the most urbanized part of Europe, with densely populated cities among and on top of ancient Roman ruins. The Italian kingdoms transitioned out of feudalism into a political and social system in which there was a strong antimonarchial feeling, and most of the power was held by merchants. As culture flourished, first in Florence and then in the rest of Italy and Europe, virtues such as fairness and liberty were praised and were attributed to the region's political system, which held the avarices of both Church and Crown at bay.

Though government was responsive (with some democratic features, though that case should not be overstated), it was oligarchical, and intrigue, deception, and political maneuvering were the order of the day. This intrigue has sometimes been overdramatized; the accusations families and guilds leveled against each other should not be taken at face value. But certainly it was an age in which the spy and the diplomat became more valuable and more professional, their skills the subject of study and discussion.

It was in this context that Machiavelli wrote his book *The Prince*, a late example of the medieval genre called *specula principum*, meaning “mirrors for princes.” These were early self-help books aimed at rulers, prescribing advice for rulership and effective governance. Many early texts used history as an illustration, providing advice for how to avoid historical calamities and how to emulate historical successes. Machiavelli’s *The Prince* was written around 1513, though not distributed until 1532, after his death, and is one of the first works of modern political philosophy. Grounded not in moral instruction, the work emphasizes the need for realism in politics, the need to understand how people actually behave, and how they may be manipulated in order to achieve a desired goal. *The Prince* presents no ethical or political goals or values and in this broke tradition with political philosophy to that point.

### Art Forgeries and False Messiahs

While the medieval era had seen a boom period for trade in illegitimate holy relics, in the Renaissance era wealthy merchants and princes sought to amass collections of classical sculptures and statuary. This led to a market for forged classical art. The presence in the marketplace of forgeries led the new class of classical scholars to better their craft in order to discern the difference between the authentic item and the forgery, requiring examination at a level of detail for which there might not otherwise have been motive. This in turn also led to better forgeries. Some of the most successful forgers were scholars themselves, like the priest Giovanni Nanni, one of the fathers of critical tradition, who used his understanding of historical documents to create an expert forgery of ancient texts that exaggerated the importance of his own hometown, Viterbo.

Michelangelo himself, who would be remembered as one of the two greatest artists of the era, sold a Cupid sculpture he made when he was a young man, which he eroded with acidified dirt in order to make it appear older. Too unknown to earn significant money with his own work, he attempted to sell it as an antiquity—and when discovered, the cardinal who purchased the Cupid was so impressed by the quality, given Michelangelo’s youth, that he neither pressed charges nor demanded Michelangelo return the money.

It was an era of numerous imposters of various kinds. Portuguese mystic Solomon Molcho was burned at the stake in 1532 for declaring himself the Jewish Messiah. A German named Asher Lammlein proclaimed himself the forerunner to the Jewish Messiah in 1502 and made a series of prophecies which led to a popular movement for some months before he suddenly disappeared, his claims unfulfilled. The 15th-century Spanish scholar Moses Botarel also declared himself the Messiah, claiming that the prophet Elijah had appeared to him and anointed him.

### Pretenders to the Throne

Many impostors presented themselves as heirs to one throne or another. Tile Kolup claimed in 1284 to be the Emperor Frederick II, one of the most powerful rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, who had died in 1250, but whom rumor had suggested ever since was still alive. Kolup briefly found support in the town of Neuss (though it is not clear he was even old enough for the claim to be convincing), but after an unsuccessful siege on King Rudolph of Habsburg, he was captured and executed.

Perkin Warbeck presented himself as the rightful king of England in the late 15th century, claiming to be Richard, Duke of York, the younger son of Edward IV, and one of the “princes in the Tower” who were exiled to the Tower of London and presumed murdered when Richard, Duke of Gloucester, took the throne. Warbeck presented a serious threat to the reign of Henry VII, whose treasury was troubled enough without the expense of fending off a possible coup. Warbeck’s claim persisted from 1490 to 1497, at which point he was captured and imprisoned in the Tower of London. He was hanged two years later. Some historians believe he may have been an illegitimate son of Edward IV, given his strong resemblance. Henry VII had previously been forced to deal, two years into his reign in 1487, with Lambert Simnel, a 10-year-old boy sponsored by a priest, Richard Simon, who presented him as the Earl of Warwick, nephew of Edward IV. Simnel’s claim was brief-lived and used as an excuse by Yorkist rebels.

When the Russian czar Ivan the Terrible died, three different pretenders to the throne claimed to be his youngest son, Tsarevich Dmitry, who





A detail of a 17th-century engraving by Abraham Bosse features French actor Tabarin performing at a street fair. Tabarin (real name Anthoine Giraud) was the epitome of the “charlatan,” a term coined in Paris in the 16th century to describe men who combined street theater with fraud, using improvised stages to launch performances and sell quack medicines. Tabarin worked the Place Dauphine while dressed as a clown in the manner of Punch, selling snake-oil cures along with his brother, the “Docteur Mondor.”

had been assassinated in 1591. The first of these, False Dmitry I, who ruled as tsar of Russia from July 21, 1605, until May 17, 1606, does seem to have had a physical resemblance to the real Dmitry. He was able to gain the support of important nobles and church figures in order to oust Tsar Boris Godunov, who had ruled as regent since the death of Ivan’s son Feodor in 1598. False Dmitry was accepted by Maria Nagaya, the real Dmitry’s mother, and the Godunov family was executed, while powerful noble families whom the Godunovs had exiled were pardoned, giving the new tsar important allies. Rumors that Dmitry was going to reunite the Russian Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church garnered him enemies who succeeded in overthrowing him after 10 months.

The other false Dmitrys did not dispute False Dmitry I’s claim; rather, each of them claimed in fact to be Tsar Dmitry, having survived his assassination attempt. The first appeared in June 1607, a year after False Dmitry I’s death, and allegedly “confessed” under torture that he was Dmitry.

He was sponsored by Jerzy Mniszech, father of the False Dmitry I’s widow Marina, who publicly accepted False Dmitry II as her husband and privately married him in a secret ceremony in order to assuage her conscience. False Dmitry II never took the throne, despite several attacks on Moscow, and he was killed in 1610 by a young prince he had ordered punished. The final False Dmitry appeared a few months later in March 1611, proclaiming himself Dmitry Ivanovich in the town of Ivangorod. A year later, the Cossacks had acknowledged him, but before his support could grow, he was secretly executed by the Russian government on May 18, 1612.

### Charlatans

The word *charlatan* was coined in this era, in Paris in the 16th century, where the men who became known as charlatans combined street theater with fraud, erecting improvised stages on which they would both entertain and attempt to sell quack medicines. The most famous was Tabarin, real

name Anthoine Giraud, who worked the Place Dauphine, playing the hurdy-gurdy, dressed as a clown similar to Punch, and giving performances similar to those of the Italian commedia dell'arte. The patter, music, and entertainment drew crowds, to which Tabarin and his brother would sell their snake-oil cures, much as charlatans at medicine shows in the United States would do two centuries later.

Bill Kte'pi  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Catholic Church; Columbus, Christopher; History of Deception: Medieval Period; History of Deception: 1600–1700; Inca Empire; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Spanish-American Conquests.

#### Further Readings:

Beam, Sara. *Laughing Matters: Farce and the Making of Absolutism in France*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Groebner, Valentin. *Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Zone Books, 2007.

Mullaney, Steven. "Lying Like Truth: Riddle, Representation, and Treason in Renaissance England." *ELH*, v.47/1 (1980).

Wroe, Ann. *The Perfect Prince: Truth and Deception in Renaissance Europe*. New York: Random House, 2004.

## History of Deception: 1600 to 1700

Discussions of lying and deception can be found in the works of a number of philosophers in the 17th century. Many of these philosophers may be said to hold an absolutist position on lying and deception because they wrote that lying and deception were never morally permissible. Even those who apparently defend lying argued instead that permissible lies are not truly lies.

In his essay "On Truth" (1625), Francis Bacon (1561–1626) says that, "A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure." Here he would appear to

mount a defense of harmless lies that add color to people's lives:

Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of number of men poor and shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?"

However, further into the essay Bacon argues that even if lies can make things go more smoothly, they are to be resisted because lies remain shameful and base:

. . . clear and round dealing is the honor of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it . . . There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame, as to be found false and perfidious.

Taking a lie to be "a breach of faith," Bacon agrees with Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) that a liar "is brave towards God and a coward towards men."

#### Hugo Grotius

By far the most thorough discussion of lying and deception in the 17th century is to be found in *The Law of War and Peace* (1625), a treatise in just war theory, by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Book III of this work is devoted to questions of *jus in bello*, or justice in the conduct of war. Here Grotius asks the question of whether it is morally permissible to use a "ruse" in (just) war. He is not talking about making an insincere promise to an enemy, or *perfidy*, something that he holds is always morally impermissible, because in making a promise a promisor confers a right upon a promisee, and hence an insincere promise is always a violation of another person's right. He is also not talking about making insincere or false oaths, which he holds is also always morally impermissible because oaths are made to God.

Rather, Grotius is talking about deception in general and lies in particular. His answer to the question of whether it is morally permissible to

use a ruse in war depends, as he says, on “whether deceit belongs to the class of things that are always evil,” or whether “it is in the category of things which from their very nature are not at all times vicious but which may even happen to be good.”

Deceit “in a negative action,” or negative deception, by which he means merely concealing the truth, or keeping a secret, is morally permissible. This, he notes, is not even considered to be deceit by others. Deceit “in a positive action,” or positive deception, by which he means intentionally causing false beliefs, he divides into two kinds: nonlinguistic deception (of which there are two types) and linguistic deception. Anticipating Charles Sanders Pierce’s division of signs into icon, index, and symbol, Grotius distinguishes between deception that uses “signs” that work by “resemblance,” such as “hieroglyphic signs” (icons); deception that uses signs that are “acts,” such as what is “uttered by a person in grief” (indexes or natural signs); and deception that uses signs whose meanings are formed “by mere arbitrary convention,” which is “what is spoken, or written, or indicated by signs or gestures,” which includes “signs, as among dumb persons” (symbols).

The first kind of positive deception, that is, nonlinguistic deception, of either type, using resembling icons or naturally signifying indexes, is certainly morally permissible in war. He gives as examples, “the Romans who threw bread from the Capitol into the posts of the enemy that they might not be believed to be distressed by famine” and “a pretended flight” by an army. Because “flight itself has no significance by agreement, although an enemy may interpret it as a sign of fear,” it is not a case of “falsehood in the true sense.” Importantly, the use of “the weapons, standards, uniforms, and tents” of the enemies is also not considered a falsehood.

The second kind of positive deception, linguistic deception, using symbols, is “falsehood in the true sense,” or lying. According to Grotius, lying involves intentionally making untruthful statements: “that which is consciously uttered with a meaning that is at variance with the idea in the mind.” One is not lying if one is simply “ignorant” of the truth. However, one is lying so long as one believes that what one is saying is untrue, even if it is indeed true: “he does not lie who says

something untrue which he believes to be true, but he lies who says that which is indeed true but which he believes to be false.” Furthermore, lying must be unambiguous: what is said “cannot be understood otherwise than in a sense which differs from the thought of him who uses the means of expression.” Finally, although this is implicit in his account, lying must be deceptive.

It is at this point that Grotius introduces a “stricter meaning” for lying. Lying in the strict sense involves an infringement of a “right of him to whom the speech or sign is addressed,” where this right is “nothing else than the liberty of judgment.” Someone who possesses the liberty to judge for himself about matters has the right to be provided with the truth (or at least, what is believed to be the truth) from others when they address him. One can only lie to someone who possesses such liberty of judgment. To lie to someone is to intentionally make (unambiguous) (deceptive) untruthful statements to someone who has the right not to be addressed in this way. That is, lying in the strict sense always involves violating this right.

Furthermore, lying in the strict sense is “harmful.” Hence, to lie to someone is to intentionally make (unambiguous, deceptive) untruthful statements that harm with their deceit to someone who has the right not to be addressed in this way. Although Grotius sometimes talks of morally permissible lies or falsehoods, it seems that his position is that such permissible untruthful statements are not lies at all.

According to this account, one cannot lie to a “third party” eavesdropper “to whom the conversation is not addressed,” because there is no infringement of a right here, because they are not being addressed. One cannot lie to “infants and insane persons,” because they lack the liberty of judgment and hence lack the right to be truthfully addressed. One cannot lie to someone who has given “express consent” to be told untruths, because he has given up the right to be truthfully addressed. One cannot lie to someone who by “tacit consent” or “consent assumed on reasonable grounds” has given up the right to be truthfully addressed because “of some advantage that will follow” by being untruthfully addressed. One cannot lie to someone when the person’s right to be truthfully addressed is inferior to the superior



right that one has to address him untruthfully, such as the right that legitimate leaders and governments and deities have to untruthfully address those over whom they have authority for their “own good or for the public good.”

Finally, in cases where “the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance,” cannot be saved except by means of an untruthful address, or “another person can in no other way be diverted from the accomplishment of a wicked crime,” except by means of an untruthful address, Grotius says, “It is perhaps permissible to say what is false.” This is because the evildoer has forfeited the right not to be untruthfully addressed, and/or someone does not have a right to be addressed untruthfully as against the right of an innocent person not to be killed. Finally, it seems that one cannot lie (or it is morally permissible to lie) to “a public enemy.”

Grotius’s answer to the question of whether it is morally permissible to use a ruse in war, then, is that it is. However, it seems that such a ruse is never, strictly speaking, a lie. Hence, Grotius can still be said to hold that lying, in the strict sense, is always morally impermissible.

Grotius notes that Plato argues in the *Republic* that “falsehood is not becoming to a deity.” The idea that God never lies dates at least to Xenophanes, who criticized Homer and Hesiod for falsely depicting the gods as engaged in deception.

### René Descartes

In his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), René Descartes (1596–1650) makes the wrongness of deception the lynchpin of the work. He argues that if there is no God, and Descartes is a product of chance, then he may be mistaken in his reasoning. If there is a God, and if that God is a deceiver, then again Descartes may be mistaken in his reasoning. Only if there is a God who is not a deceiver can Descartes avoid being mistaken in his reasoning. God, however, cannot be a deceiver, because deception is always an imperfection.

Descartes advances the argument that deception is an imperfection in *Meditation* III:

By “God” I mean the very being the idea of whom is within me, that is, the possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp, but can

somehow reach in my thought, who is subject to no defects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this that he cannot be a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and deception depend on some defect.

Since “God” is the name of a being that has all perfections and no imperfections, and since deception is an imperfection, “God” cannot be the name of a being that deceives. That is, even if there were to exist nothing that corresponds to God (even if there were no God), God, that is, an all-perfect being, could not be a deceiver, since deception is an imperfection.

In *Meditation* IV, Descartes expands on the claim that deception is an imperfection:

It is impossible that God should ever deceive me. For in every case of trickery or deception some imperfection is to be found; and although the ability to deceive appears to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive is undoubtedly evidence of malice or weakness, and so cannot apply to God.

Descartes’s argument is that it is an imperfection in anyone to deceive, because deception is an imperfection in itself. Deception is an imperfection in itself because the will to deceive is malicious, and/or indicates weakness.

Descartes’s claim about deception was subjected to criticism. Marin Mersenne (1588–1648), in the second set of *Objections* to the *Meditations*, argued that paternalistic lies are beneficent lies, and are not malicious: “Cannot God treat men as a doctor treats the sick, or a father his children? In both cases there is frequent deception though it is always employed beneficially and with wisdom.”

In the fifth set of *Objections*, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) also argued that paternalistic lies are not harmful, indeed are beneficial, and so are not wrong:

The standard view is that doctors are not at fault if they deceive their patients for their health’s sake, and that fathers are not at fault if they deceive their children for their own good. For the crime of deception consists not in the falsity of what is said but in the harm done by the deceiver. M. Descartes should thus consider



the proposition “God can in no case deceive us” and see whether it is universally true.

Descartes responded to Mersenne by saying that deception is necessarily malicious, although there may be cases of “verbal expression of lies” that are not deceptive:

. . . in saying that God does not lie, and is not a deceiver, I think I am in agreement with all metaphysicians and theologians past and future. It is very clear from this that my remarks in the *Meditations* were concerned not with the verbal expression of lies, but only with malice in the formal sense, the internal malice which is involved in deception.

He also implies that the lies told by doctors, like the lies told by prophets in the Bible, are “free of malicious intent to deceive”: “I would not want to criticize those who allow that through the mouths of the prophets God can produce verbal untruths which, like the lies of the doctors who deceive their patients in order to cure them, are free of malicious intent to deceive.” However, this reply is ambiguous because of the claim that the lies of doctors are nondeceptive, which would be rejected by Mersenne and Hobbes, and the claim that the lies of doctors are deceptive and nonmalicious, which would seem to contradict his earlier claims.

Descartes’s final response to Hobbes seems to be that the intention to deceive is necessarily malicious: “All that I require is that we are not deceived in cases where our going wrong would suggest an intention to deceive on the part of God; for it is self-contradictory that God should have such an intention.”

### Baruch Spinoza

In Part IV, Proposition 72, of *The Ethics* (1677), which is devoted to freeing oneself from “the affects,” that is, the emotions, Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) says: “A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively.” That is, someone who is free of all affects and who only acts according to the dictates of reason never acts deceptively. By “acts deceptively” Spinoza appears to have in mind at least lying and making lying promises, since he says that “men . . . agree only in words,

and be contrary to one another in fact.” Because to act according to reason is to act virtuously, it follows that it is never virtuous to deceive or lie. Deception or lying is always vicious.

In the scholium to this proposition Spinoza considers the question, “What if a man could save himself from the present danger of death by treachery?” Spinoza’s response is that reason would never “recommend, without qualification” that someone be deceptive or lie.

There is controversy over what Spinoza is saying in Proposition 72. It may be that he is merely describing a free, rational, virtuous person, an ideal that is difficult or even impossible to attain, and saying that such a person never deceives or lies. Alternatively, it may be that Spinoza is recommending to all persons, even those who are not free, rational persons, that they should never deceive or lie. If the latter is true, then the question is whether Spinoza holds that it may be in a nonfree person’s self-interest on occasion to deceive, or whether he holds that, even in the case of a nonfree person, it is never in a person’s self-interest to deceive.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Bible; Catholic Church; Charles II Plot; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; Lying, Accusations of; Military Deception; Morals and Ethics; Myth; Plato.

### Further Readings

- Bacon, F. “Of Truth.” In *Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral*, in *Francis Bacon: The Major Works*, Brian Vickers, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Bauer, J. W. “Spinoza, Lying, and Acting in Good Faith.” *Parmenideum*, v.4 (2012).
- Descartes, R. and J. Cottingham, trans. “Meditations on First Philosophy.” In *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Garrett, D. “‘A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively’: Freedom and the Good in Spinoza’s Ethics.” In *Spinoza: Issues and Directions*, Edwin Curley and Pierre-François Moreau, eds. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990.

- Grotius, H. and F. W. Kelsey, trans and ed. *The Law of War and Peace*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1925.
- Montaigne, M. and D. M. Frame, trans. "Of Giving the Lie." In *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, D. M. Frame, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- Spinoza, B. and E. Curley, trans. *The Ethics*. In *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, E. Curley, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- "Xenophanes of Colophon." In *The Presocratic Philosophers*, G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

---

## History of Deception: 1700 to 1800

Fraud, corruption, and criminal behavior were rampant throughout society in the 18th century, an era characterized by upper-class material wealth and conspicuous consumption, little organized law enforcement or governmental regulation, and ambivalent attitudes toward lying and deception. Common types of lying and deception included fraudulent financial schemes, political corruption, and medical quackery. Common deceptive figures included confidence men, speculators, demagogues, gamblers, cardsharps, patent medicine salesmen, and forgers and counterfeiters. Newly developing forms of popular media such as pamphlets, newspapers, and novels were filled with both true and fictional stories involving lying and deception.

### Political and Economic Fraud

Financial speculation was popular as a path to quick fortune that often involved both business and government officials. The joint stock company emerged in the 18th century as a popular new method of speculation. While some of these companies were legitimately run investment opportunities, others employed deception to attract investors and heighten profits. The resulting speculative bubbles ruined fortunes and reputations, harmed the economy, and led

to government regulation, such as Britain's 1720 parliamentary act requiring all joint stock companies to incorporate. Other popular methods of financial speculation often employing deceptive tactics included the real estate market.

One of the most notorious 18th-century speculative disasters was the South Seas Bubble involving the South Sea Company, a British joint stock company formed in 1711. The company was able to successfully compete against the rival Bank of England for British parliamentary approval to assume ever-greater portions of the national debt through the exchange of government bonds for company stock. The company also received government promises for a British trade monopoly with its South American and South Seas islands possessions, expected to rise in value with anticipated Spanish trade concessions following the War of Spanish Succession. When these concessions did not materialize, the company made false claims of large profits.

The resulting speculative frenzy of 1720 would see company share prices rise from 128 pounds to 1,050 pounds. The bubble collapsed by the end of the year, however, resulting in a massive sell-off and bank failures. Investigations into the company's practices resulted in the prosecution of both company and government officials for deception and corruption.

A second notorious speculative venture of the period was the so-called Mississippi Bubble that further hurt an already weak French economy in the early 18th century. John Law, a Scottish emigrant who served as a financial advisor to the French regent, the Duke of Orleans, used his royal connections to launch his business plans. Law founded both the Bank Generale (renamed the Bank Royale) and the Compagnie d'Occident (renamed Compagnie des Indes), the latter commonly known throughout France as the Mississippi Company. Law attracted investors through promises of trade with North American colonies, such as Louisiana, whose unknown nature led to rumors of bullion trade.

The Mississippi Company first received exclusive control of trade between France and its North American colonies, which was later extended to include control of all trade between France and the non-European world. The company also helped settle the Louisiana colony, minted French

coins, and collected French national taxes. Stock shares, sold for cash and bonds, financed company ventures. In 1720, Law sought to halt declining share sales by deeming his bank's paper notes to be legal tender. His actions instead resulted in rising inflation and the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble. Scholars still debate the honesty of Law's motives.

A third well-known scheme of the period, the Diamond Necklace Affair that scandalized France in the years prior to the French Revolution, also combined economics and politics. The Comtesse de la Motte (née Jeane de Valois de St. Remy) used an illegitimate title and loose connection with the court of King Louis XVI to enhance her impoverished existence. She earned lasting notoriety through her scheme to fraudulently obtain a diamond necklace that had originally been produced for King Louis XV but never sold.

The comtesse hired a prostitute to pose as Queen Marie Antoinette in order to convince the royally disfavored Cardinal Prince Louis de Rohan of the queen's secret interest in the necklace. The necklace then passed from the jewelers to Rohan to the Comtesse de la Motte, with the belief it would be delivered to the queen. The Mottes, however, sold the diamonds in London and kept the profits for themselves. Although the queen had no knowledge of the scam, the public trial and its aftermath added to the public's negative image of her character.

### Science and Medicine

Eighteenth-century science and medicine were also rife with activities of questionable honesty. Lack of medical knowledge regarding diseases and the growth of advertising helped fuel the rise of medical quackery and the sale of medicines and devices with questionable medical claims. The sale of patent medicines by both small family and larger business enterprises began to rise in popularity in the 18th century. Patent medicines, such as Daffy's Elixir, first gained popularity in Britain, later arriving in Britain's North American colonies and other parts of the British Empire. Other European countries soon began producing their own patent medicines.

Patent medicines included a variety of ingredients and drug compounds, relying on the liberal use of alcohol, cocaine, morphine, or opium to

produce the desired effect. The exact combinations of ingredients, and in many cases the ingredients themselves, were closely guarded secrets, which was possible in the absence of government regulatory oversight or labeling requirements. Advertising made broad claims of the medicines' effectiveness to cure a wide variety of medical complaints for both sexes and all ages, ranging from indigestion, colic, and monthly "female complaints" to venereal diseases and cancer. Other commonly promoted uses included cures for baldness and sexual difficulties.

Signature bottles, colorful names and labels, and bold advertisements in newspapers attracted public attention. Patent medicine salesmen traveled their sales territory peddling their products with high-pressured sales tactics and questionable medical claims. Other consumers purchased the medicines from local merchants. Patent medicines, questioned at the time by some doctors concerned with their grandiose claims and likelihood of causing dependency, later became infamous for their fraudulent medical claims and sometimes harmful or fatal effects. The popularity of patent medicines and questionable medical devices would reach its zenith in the 19th century before increasing safety concerns, growing negative publicity, and stricter governmental regulations greatly slowed their sale.

Although beliefs in magic and the practice of alchemy were less prevalent by the 18th century because of the rise of the Enlightenment Age of Reason, practitioners still found benefactors and followers. Alchemists claimed the ability to transmute lesser metals into gold and silver. One such legendary 18th-century alchemist was Lascaris, reputed to have traveled throughout Germany giving various individuals he befriended alchemical powders with the power of transmutation. He never shared the secret behind the powder, and followers often ran into difficulties after running out of their supply. One follower was reputed to have been hanged as a fraud.

One of the most prominent figures in this field was Count Alessandro Cagliostro, who traveled throughout Europe with residences in London, St. Petersburg, Paris, and Rome, among other notable cities. He claimed extensive Middle Eastern and African travels, using the knowledge he gained to introduce the Egyptian Rite

into Freemasonry after joining the secret society in 1777. He attracted wealthy and aristocratic patrons and followers alike through demonstrations of healing and alchemical abilities as well as séances. Some celebrated his supernatural and healing abilities, while others denounced him as a fraud that bilked patrons and left a trail of financial debt in his wake. He was even falsely implicated in the Diamond Necklace Affair.


### Popular Culture, Entertainment, and the Arts

Popular cultural figures whose trade relied on deception included card and shell game masters, magicians, jugglers, and ventriloquists. Optical illusions were widely popular among both the general public and the scientific and philosophical communities. Popular devices for creating such illusions included magic lanterns, the camera obscura, and the zograscope. Early magic lanterns used fire to project images onto screens and are considered early forerunners of the slide projector. The camera obscura projected external images of the natural world into the camera, where they were placed on public view

or sketched by artists such as Jan Vermeer. The zograscope, also known as an optical diagonal machine or perspective glass, allowed the public to view color prints from a deceptively three-dimensional perspective.

The Mechanical Turk, a purported automaton that proved highly skilled at playing chess against human opponents, was a widely popular diversion before its exposure as a fraud. Viennese inventor and demonstrator Wolfgang von Kempelen and later demonstrator Johann Maelzel successfully toured the machine throughout Europe and North America. The use of a mechanical torso featuring a large mustache and Oriental attire, as well as numerous mechanical parts, added to the machine's exotic appeal, but a hidden compartment secreting a human operator allowed the hoax to work.

Artistic fakes and forgeries created numerous 18th-century scandals. One of the more infamous creators of fake Shakespearean works was the British teenager William Henry Ireland, who claimed to have found numerous lost works. His fraudulent play *Vortigern and Rowena* was even staged in London before controversy over the



Patent medicine bottles from the 1700s (from left, Dalby's Carminative, Daffy's Elixir, and Turlington's Balsam of Life) were adopted by many early quack and patent-medicine proprietors in Britain, who are depicted in Franz Anton Maulbertsch's *Der Quacksalber* ("The Quack"), circa 1785 (right). Dalby's Carminative (late 1770s) claimed to aid infants suffering from "wind" and "watery gripes." Daffy's Elixir (18th century) was originally designed for diseases of the stomach but was later marketed as a universal cure. Turlington's Balsam of Life (1744) was supposed to cure "the stone gravel, cholick, vomiting and spitting of blood, and other weaknesses and decays."



authenticity of his claims led to his exposure as a fraud. Other noted literary frauds of the era included James Macpherson and Tom Chatterton.

Many 18th-century audiences, scholars, and critics claimed that all fictional works were in fact fraudulent deceptions, while others argued that works clearly understood as fiction were not to be regarded as fraud. Even more questionable were those fictional works presented and advertised as true stories or popular nonfiction forms, such as travel narratives that routinely employed exaggerated descriptions of exotic lands and peoples, and memoirs filled with exaggerated tales of love conquests or other feats.

Eighteenth-century literature, both fiction and nonfiction, was replete with characters and themes centered on dishonesty, such as criminal biographies and fictional thieves and swindlers. One such legendary character was the rake, a term used to describe both historical personages and fictional characters. Rakes were known for their immoral conduct, often associated with wasted inheritances, lavish lifestyles, and the seduction, abandonment, and ruin of vulnerable young women. Rakes, formerly viewed as dashing figures, had acquired a more negative view reflecting the ambivalence surrounding their immorality. The central figure in William Hogarth's paintings *A Rake's Progress* is thus fated to insanity in Bedlam.

One of the most historically renowned 18th-century rakes and con artists was the Italian Giovanni Giacomo Casanova, whose name later became a synonym for a handsome, promiscuous but gallant playboy. Casanova was known for his good looks, intelligence, and charming manner. Casanova used these attributes to cultivate wealthy and influential supporters and to perpetrate various fraudulent schemes upon them. Casanova gained historical notoriety for his infamous memoir describing his many sexual pursuits as well as the 18th-century society in which he lived. His exploits had such a mythological aura that many began to view him as a larger-than-life fictional character.

### Attitudes Toward Lying and Deception

Religious, political, legal, philosophical, and cultural beliefs emphasized the importance of truth and the need to punish or eradicate various types

of lying and deception. The 18th-century proliferation of con artists, illusionists, and magicians was counterbalanced by the rise of philosophers and scientists seeking to expose their public deceptions. Meanwhile, the rise of science and reason centered in the Enlightenment challenged earlier beliefs in magic and alchemy.

Lying and deception in its various forms was seen as a threat to the maintenance of social order. Many religions, such as the Judeo-Christian religions, held truth to be a godly attribute, while lying and deception were commonly viewed as sins and a rejection of God. The cultural fascination with the various forms and figures of deception also challenged Enlightenment beliefs centered on the sensory acquisition of knowledge by showing that the senses could be both unintentionally and intentionally deceived.

Scholars and scientists also began paying closer attention to the physiological responses that accompany the act of deception, giving rise to early advances in the fields of criminal apprehension and lie detection. Some scientists observed how the stress brought on in some people by the practice of deception resulted in increased heart rate, rising blood pressure, and perspiration that would give away the deceiver. The public also became more cynical with regard to dishonest motivations.

The widespread acceptance and commonplace nature of lying was countered by views on the immorality of lying. Criminals employing deceptive practices faced harsh penalties. Businessmen and government officials implicated in fraudulent schemes faced public ridicule, ruined reputations, ended careers, and economic devastation. The questionable line between honest but misguided businessmen and dishonest con artists and swindlers or between the charming Casanova and the dissolute rake were exemplary of the century's ultimately ambivalent attitudes toward dishonesty.

Marcella Bush Trevino  
Barry University

**See Also:** Con Man; Courtship, Deception in; Fiction; Financial Markets; Investment Fraud; Jefferson, Thomas; Napoleon Bonaparte; Washington, George.

### Further Readings

- Loveman, Kate. *Reading Fictions, 1660–1740: Deception in English Literary and Popular Culture*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008.
- Lynch, Jack. *Deception and Detection in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008.
- McCalman, Ian. *The Last Alchemist: Count Cagliostro, Master of Magic in the Age of Reason*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.
- Moore, Lucy. *Con Men and Cutpurses: Scenes From the Hogarthian Underworld*. New York: Penguin Classics, 2004.
- Riffaterre, Michael. *Fictional Truth*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

## History of Deception: 1800 to 1900

Discussion of lies and deception in the 19th century was dominated by the question of whether they were morally wrong because of their bad consequences, as argued by the utilitarians, or because they violate a universal standard of what is right, as argued by nonutilitarians. No one defended an absolute prohibition on lying and deception, however.

In his *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1780; 1789; 1823), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) defended the principle of utility—“that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question”—as the basis for all law and ethics.

An action, such as telling the truth, is right if it conforms to the principle of utility, that is, if it has the tendency to increase the happiness of the community by a greater amount than any other action. An action, such as a lie, is wrong if it fails to conform to the principle of utility, that is, if it has the tendency to decrease the happiness of the community. Laws exist to prohibit types of actions that are wrong according to this principle. A violation or breach of a law is an offense.

In the section on the division of offenses, Bentham discusses different “offences by falsehood.”

He divides such offenses into four kinds: “1. Simple falsehoods. 2. Forgery. 3. Personation. 4. Perjury.” As an example of Personation he gives libel, (this is the written form of defamation; slander is the spoken form). What is common to all offenses by falsehood is that they cause, or at least attempt to cause, a false belief in another person, “whether by discourse or otherwise.”

When a falsehood is not accompanied by “certain special circumstances,” such as the “form in which the falsehood is uttered,” or the “circumstance of its relating or not relating to the identity of the person of him who utters it,” or the “solemnity of the occasion on which it is uttered,” then it “may be styled a simple falsehood.” It is here that Bentham makes his most famous claim about falsehoods:

Falsehood, taken by itself, consider it not as being accompanied by any other material circumstances, nor therefore productive of any other material effects, can never, upon the principle of utility, constitute any offense at all. Combined with other circumstances, there is scarce any sort of pernicious effect which it may not be instrumental in producing.

Bentham’s claim here is that a simple falsehood, or a simple lie, or more generally a simple act of (intending) deception, by itself, does not by its very nature constitute “an offence,” that is, crime. More generally, it is only when a lie or an act of deception produces effects that decrease happiness that it becomes an “offence.” Hence, a lie or an act of deception is only instrumentally wrong.

Bentham seems to expand “falsehood” to include any act of intending to deceive. In her *Illustrations of Lying in All Its Branches* (1825), Amelia Opie (1769–1853) defines a lie as “the intention to deceive” and argues that there can be “passive as well as active lying.” By passive lying she at least means withholding the truth, or not telling the whole truth, with an intention to deceive. By active lying she means telling a falsehood with the intention to deceive.

The utilitarian William Paley (1743–1805), in *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785), gives the example of a man who writes a book titled *A History of England*, but who “in his account of the reign of Charles the First, should

willfully suppress any evidence of that prince's despotick measures and designs." Such a historian, he says, "might be said to lie," in the sense of "lies of omission." Clearly, passive lying would extend to cover such a lie of omission. What is not clear is whether Opie's passive lying would extend to cover another case of a lie (to "act a lie") given by Paley: "when a tradesman shuts up his windows, to induce his creditors to believe that he is abroad." If this is also passive lying, then there is no difference between lying and intending to deceive.

### Antiutilitarian Argument: William Whewell

Bentham distinguishes between falsehoods and "offences against trust," and does not make mention of promises in his discussion of falsehoods, unlike Paley who held that "A lie is a breach of promise." The antiutilitarian William Whewell (1794–1866) discusses lies after discussing contracts in his *The Elements of Morality, Including Polity* (1845). Here he says, "Lies stand nearly on the same footing as promises; for a Lie is a violation of the general understanding among mankind, which the use of language implies." Whewell uses this point to limit what can count as a lie. Assertions "not literally true, may, by general Convention, cease to be lies." For example, "when I wish not to be interrupted by visitors, I write upon my door, Not at home, and if there be a common understanding to that effect; this is no more a lie than if I were to write, Not to be seen." Whewell rejects the extension of such a convention to lawyers advocating for their clients in court, however.

Whewell does not accept as an excuse for telling a lie in response to a question, when the questioner has no right to know the truth, that a secret must be kept. He insists that "the Questioner has a right not to be told a lie, for all men have such a Right." His claim that "all men have such a Right" not to be lied to might imply that an individual may not lie to murderers in order to save innocent lives. However, he does allow for so-called lies of necessity. These include lies told "for the purpose of saving one's life; or to avoid some other extreme peril" to oneself, which are "at least excusable, and allowable." Excusable and allowable self-defensive lies, however, are not admirable: "In such Cases of Necessity, we may excuse the act, but we cannot admire it."

Protective lies, "told for the sake of saving a friend from some great misfortune," receive even greater approval. Whewell goes further, and says that some lies, heroic lies, or lies told to save a friend that bring "some great foreseen calamity to the teller," are such that they "excite a still higher admiration." Here he instances "when Lucilius offers himself to the soldiers of Octavius to be killed, declaring himself to be Brutus."

Whewell does hold that "the Duty of Truth may be violated by silence," such as "selling defective wares, without notice of their faults," because of "the general understanding existing among Buyers and Sellers." He also considers a case from Cicero of a corn merchant who arrives in Rhodes, knowing that other ships laden with corn will arrive the next day. "If the merchant in question ask such an exorbitant price for his corn, as to imply that no further supply is probable, he falls under blame. On the other hand, he is not bound to sell his corn to-day for the price to which it may fall tomorrow, when the other vessels arrive."

### John Stuart Mill

In *On Liberty* (1859), the utilitarian John Stuart Mill (1806–73) included "falsehood or duplicity" as one of the "acts injurious to others," saying that they were "fit objects of moral reprobation, and in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment." Lies, that is, are harmful and are properly subject to moral criticism, and, in the most severe cases, can be punished by law. Not only lies themselves, "but the dispositions which lead to them," namely, "dissimulation and insincerity," are "properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence." Such dispositions to lie are "vices" and "constitute a bad and odious moral character."

In *Utilitarianism* (1861; 1863) Mill defends utilitarianism from the misapprehension that it is a philosophy of mere expediency "for the particular interest of the agent himself." Mill argues that utilitarianism is not concerned with the interest of any particular agent but with the good of mankind. As an example, Mill instances telling a lie; such an act may be in the self-interest of the agent, but it is contrary to the good of mankind because it weakens the trustworthiness of human assertion that is essential to social well-being and necessary for human happiness.

Mill held in *On Nature* (1874) that “savages are always liars,” and that he believed that habitual lying is “the natural state of those who were both uneducated and subjected.” However, it is possible to read such statements in the light of the utilitarian and evolutionary ethicist Herbert Spencer’s discussion of Veracity in his *The Principles of Ethics* (1892). After quoting from many authors complaining of the habitual lying of certain tribes, and contrasting it with reports about the commitment to truthfulness of other tribes who are both peaceful and bellicose, Spencer argues that what is common to all the tribes who are truthful is that “they are not subject to coercive rule.” Spencer’s conclusion is that “it is the presence or absence of despotic rule which leads to prevalent falsehood or prevalent truth.” Given that Mill talks about the habitual lying of those who are “subjected,” what he says may be consistent with Spencer’s conclusion. Mill does not argue that lies may never be told. The rule not to tell lies does have exceptions, such as protective lies to malefactors and paternalistic lies to those who are dangerously ill. Here Mill argues that the principle of utility, which he envisages as a second-order rule of morality, invoked only to decide between different possible first-order rules of morality, should be used to determine what the moral rule about lying should be:

But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.

### Leslie Stephen

Leslie Stephen (1832–1904), in *The Science of Ethics* (1882), a work of evolutionary ethics, argues that although “The rule of truthfulness . . . seems to possess the *a priori* quality of a mathematical axiom,” and although it seems that “Be truthful” means, “Speak the truth whatever the consequences, whether the teller or the hearer receives benefit or injury,” this is not how the rule of truthfulness is actually applied. As applied, there are the usual exceptions made to the rule.

However, Stephen argues that it is possible to distinguish between the external form of the rule of truthfulness, “Lie not,” and the internal form of the rule, “Be trustworthy.” In the exceptional cases, such as lying to malefactors or invalids or to those demanding information to which they have no right, the person actually maintains the trust that not lying normally preserves: “Truthfulness is the rule because in the vast majority of cases we trust a man insofar as he speaks the truth; in the exceptional cases, the mutual confidence would be violated when the truth, not the lie, is spoken.”

In such exceptional cases, Stephen maintains, it is a moral duty to lie:

If I were absolutely certain that a lie would do good, I should certainly hesitate before speaking the truth, and the certainty might be of such a kind as to make me think it a duty to lie. It has been said by moralists that the good man would not commit the most venial sin, even though the consequences of his virtuous action were the perishing of all mankind in torture. The statement is either shocking or meaningless. I can conceive of no action which would not be an abominable crime by the simple fact of its entailing such consequences, and of no crime which would not become an imperative duty if it evaded them.

### Henry Sidgwick

In the third edition of *The Methods of Ethics* (1884; first published in 1874), the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) takes issue with Stephen’s claim that the true exceptionless rule is “Be trustworthy.” A liar does not manifest trustworthiness to his victim when he lies, even if his lie is justified:

Even when the falsehood is in legitimate defence of others against attacks, we cannot say that the speaker manifests “trustworthiness” without qualification; for the deceived assailant trusts his veracity, otherwise he would not be deceived.

In his chapter on Veracity, Sidgwick argues that the utilitarian defense of lying in exceptional circumstances when it will produce a greater amount of utility does not necessarily conflict with the position of common sense morality. Common





Utilitarian John Stuart Mill, in his 1859 treatise *On Liberty*, included "falsehood or duplicity" as one of the "acts injurious to others," saying that they were "fit objects of moral reprobation, and in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment."

sense morality "does not seem to prohibit . . . decisively" lying if "lying will defend us better against a palpable invasion of our rights." Furthermore, common sense morality seems to permit paternalistic lies told to invalids and to children. It even appears to permit lawyers to lie on behalf of their clients. It seems that common sense morality does, ultimately, appeal to consequences:

But if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in any case be admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and by how far it is admissible, except by considerations of expediency; that is, by weighing the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment of mutual confidence involved in all violation of truth.

Sidgwick does entertain the objection that "if it were generally understood that lies were justifiable under certain circumstances, it would immediately become quite useless to tell the lies, because no

one would believe them." He has three replies to this. First, a complete breakdown in trust, under certain limited circumstances, "is not necessarily an evil," because it would mean that "falsehoods would no longer be told" in such circumstances. Second, knowledge that lies are justified in certain circumstances does not necessarily mean that lies are not believed in such circumstances (Sidgwick instances lawyers lying about the innocence of their clients). Finally, if it is among the circumstances that a person is in that (1) it is not generally accepted that a lie is justified in these circumstances, and (2) this lie will not tend to make it more generally accepted that a lie is justified in these circumstances, then, in these circumstances, the lie can succeed. Hence, it can be justified.

It may be argued that Sidgwick himself holds that "the vulgar" should believe that lies are never justified or are only possibly justified in exceptional circumstances, so that "an enlightened few" utilitarians, who know that lies are justified in many more circumstances, can lie for the greater good in those circumstances. As Sidgwick says:

. . . it may be desirable that Common Sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to confine to an enlightened few. And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally.

Utilitarianism might justify utilitarians lying to mankind generally that lies are never to be told.

Oscar Wilde (1854–1900) offered a very different defense of lying in his *The Decay of Lying: On Observation* (1889; 1891). There he argues that "the only form of lying that is absolutely beyond reproach is lying for its own sake," and that the highest form of lying for its own sake is art, or "the telling of beautiful untrue things."

James Edwin Mahon  
*Washington & Lee University*

**See Also:** Barnum, P. T.; Cardiff Giant; Cardinal Newman; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700; Jackson, Andrew; Lying, Accusations of; Morals and Ethics; *New York Sun's* Moon Series; Plato; Siege of Mafeking.

### Further Readings

- Bentham, J. and J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, eds. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- Korsgaard, C. "Two Arguments Against Lying." *Argumentation*, v.2 (1988).
- MacIntyre, A. "Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn From Mill and Kant?" In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Vol. 16, Grethe B. Peterson, ed. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995.
- Mill, J. S. *On Liberty*. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859.
- Mill, J. S. "On Nature." In *Three Essays on Religion: Nature, The Utility of Religion, Theism*. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1874.
- Mill, J. S. *Utilitarianism*. London: Parker, Son and Bourn, 1863.
- Opie, A. *Illustrations of Lying in All Its Branches*. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1825.
- Paley, W. *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*. London: R. Faulder, 1785.
- Sidgwick, H. "Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*." In *Essays on Ethics and Method*, Marcus G. Singer, ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
- Sidgwick, H. *Methods of Ethics*. London: Macmillan, 1874.
- Spencer, Herbert. *Principles of Ethics*. New York: D. Appleton, 1892–93.
- Stephen, Leslie. *The Science of Ethics*. London: Smith, Elder, 1882.
- Whewell, William. *The Elements of Morality, Including Polity*. London: James W. Parker, 1845.
- Wilde, O. *The Decay of Lying: An Observation. In Intentions*. London: James R. Osgood McIlvaine, 1891.

in theorizing about language also lead to important distinctions between lying and deceiving, and between lying and making false promises.

### G. E. Moore

In the chapter "Ethics in Relation to Conduct" of *Principia Ethica* (1903), G. E. Moore (1873–1958) advances a consequentialist ethics according to which "I am morally bound to perform this action" is identical with the assertion "This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe" (into the "infinite future"). The "good" in question consists of intrinsically valuable states of consciousness, such as "the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects."

Since people do not know which individual actions in any given circumstances will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the universe over time, "we cannot hope to discover which is the best possible alternative in any given circumstances." The question remains, however, whether individuals can "lay down any general rules to the effect that one among a few alternative actions will generally produce a greater total of good in the immediate future." Although "We can secure no title to assert that obedience to such commands as 'Thou shalt not lie,' or even 'Thou shalt do no murder,' is universally better than the alternatives of lying and murder," individuals can say that these rules are generally better than the alternative rules. For example, not lying will generally produce a greater total of good in the immediate future than lying.

This amounts to a defense of the moral rules of common sense, including, it seems, the rule "thou shalt not lie." Moore accepts that "in some cases the neglect of an established rule will probably be the best course of action possible." Nevertheless, an individual is never justified in breaking an established rule of common sense morality, because he or she is never justified in believing that this is one of these cases in which breaking the rule is the best course of action. "In short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it." If the rule of common sense about lying is "Thou shalt not lie," then this implies that the rule is never

---

## History of Deception: 1900 to 1950

Discussion of lying and deception in the first half of the 20th century is dominated by the question of whether there is an exceptionless moral rule to not lie, or whether lying is ever morally permissible, or even morally obligatory. Developments

to be broken, and a lie is never to be told. This argument appears to assume, however, that the rules of common sense morality in general are exceptionless rules like “Thou shalt not lie,” as opposed to rules with built-in exceptions, such as “Do not lie, except.”

### Hastings Rashdall

Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924), in the chapter of *The Theory of Good and Evil* (1907) titled “Ideal Utilitarianism,” advances a subjective version of the nonhedonistic consequentialist criterion for a right action: “The right action is always that which (so far as the agent has the means of knowing) will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole.” This “good” is such that it “includes, but is not limited to, pleasure,” and the criterion implies that “all goods or elements of the good are in some sense and for some purposes commensurable.”

In his discussion of veracity, Rashdall argues that “upon hedonistic assumptions the exceptions” to veracity “would be much more numerous . . . There would be no reason why we should resist that tendency to say (in matters of no importance), at any expense to Truth, what would be agreeable to the hearer.” His consequentialism, however, rejects this “minor lying,” as he explains in the following excerpt from *The Theory of Good and Evil*:

I believe that we do on reflection recognize something intrinsically fitting in the rule which prescribes that a rational being, endowed with faculties which enable him to pursue, to communicate, and to love the truth, should use those faculties in that way rather than for the purpose of making things appear otherwise than they are.

If reflection does not support harmless lying simply because it will increase the amount of pleasure in the world, reflection does not support an exceptionless rule against lying, either: “But, it is equally easy to show that to erect the principle of Veracity into a hard and fast rule admitting of no exceptions is out of harmony with the belief and the practice of most conscientious persons.” As examples of morally permitted exceptions, he states the following:

. . . deception practised by detectives, or by private persons towards a brigand inquiring about the whereabouts of his victim, or to the denial of bad news to sick persons, or to lies told for the preservation of important secrets, or to the employment of ancient formulae (a political oath, a declaration of faith imposed by some ancient Statute, or a confession of faith).

Such lies are morally permitted because they do not undermine veracity more generally:

Though they in some cases deceive for the moment the particular person to whom they are addressed, they do not to any important extent tend to weaken respect for truth, the habit of telling the truth, and the general confidence in other people’s statements.

Reflection morally permits these lies because “there are other goods besides truth-speaking and truth-loving.” He continues:

In each case we must decide which is of the greatest worth—the speaking of truth and the habit of speaking it which my lie would tend to discourage, or the life which my lie will save, the injustice that it will prevent, the practical good which it will enable me to do, the greater truth which it will enable me to diffuse.

Rashdall concludes that “even in the case of Veracity—the stronghold of popular Intuitionism—the case of an intuitively discerned rule of conduct, universally binding without any consideration of consequences” is not to be had. In place of an exceptionless rule against lying, morality consists in “reconciling the ‘intuitive’ basis of the virtue [of veracity] with the occurrence of exceptions based on consideration of consequences.”

### W. D. Ross

In *The Right and the Good* (1930), W. D. Ross (1877–1971) rejects both “the view of [Immanuel] Kant,” according to which there is a plurality of exceptionless perfect duties, all of which always take precedence over the plurality of imperfect duties, and “the view of . . . Professor Moore and Dr. Rashdall,” according to which is

only one exceptionless duty, namely, to produce the greatest amount of good.

Ross's position is that there is a plurality of irreducible self-evident basic moral "*prima facie* duties." These are the "perfect" duties of fidelity (keeping promises), of reparation (making amends), of gratitude, of justice (distributing goods according to merit), and of nonmaleficence (not harming others); and the "imperfect" duties of benevolence (helping others) and of self-improvement. These duties are *prima facie* because, although there is a ranking of these duties that is similar to that of Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duty, such that "perfect" *prima facie* duties take precedence over "imperfect" *prima facie* duties, all things being equal, perfect *prima facie* duties do not always take precedence over imperfect *prima facie* duties.

Sometimes, despite the greater stringency (in general) of a perfect *prima facie* duty over an imperfect *prima facie* duty, there can be an instance of fulfilling the perfect *prima facie* duty that is "trivial," and an instance of fulfilling the imperfect *prima facie* duty that is "serious." In such circumstances, one's "duty *sans phrase*," or actual or absolute duty, is to fulfill the imperfect *prima facie* duty, as he states in the following excerpt:

If I have promised to meet a friend at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I should certainly think myself justified in breaking my engagement if by doing so I could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one.

Precisely how one weighs the typically more stringent duties with their serious and trivial instances against the typically less stringent duties with their serious and trivial instance is a matter of "perception."

Whenever there is a conflict between two or more *prima facie* duties in some instance, and one duty is judged to be the most salient, the other duties remain; the person feels a "compunction" at not fulfilling them and has a duty to make up for not fulfilling them, even if not fulfilling them is his or her actual duty in this instance: As Ross describes it:

If, as almost all moralists except Kant are agreed, and as most plain men think, it is sometimes right to tell a lie or to break a promise, it must be maintained that there is a difference between *prima facie* duty and actual or absolute duty. When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease to recognize a *prima facie* duty to keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do; we recognize, further, that it is our duty to make up somehow to the promisee for the breaking of the promise.

Since the duty remains, it has been argued that Ross should have (following Rashdall) used "*pro tanto*" to qualify nonabsolute duty, instead of *prima facie*.

Ross does not hold that the perfect *prima facie* duty not to lie is a basic duty. Instead, he holds that the duty is derived from two other basic duties. The first is the perfect *prima facie* duty to keep promises. Whenever someone enters into a normal conversation or writes nonfiction, then he or she is implicitly promising that he or she is telling the truth and not lying:

. . . an implicit promise, such as the implicit undertaking not to tell lies which seems to be implied in the act of entering into conversation (at any rate by civilized men), or the writing of books that purport to be history and not fiction.

The second basic duty is the perfect *prima facie* of nonmaleficence. Lies typically harm those who believe them: "But even before the implicit undertaking to tell the truth was established I had a duty not to tell lies, since to tell lies is *prima facie* to do a positive injury to another person." Because of this, there remains a perfect *prima facie* not to lie even if an individual is in a situation in which he or she believes that the other person is breaking the implicit promise not to lie to them:

A man who has deceived me has destroyed what would have been the main reason for its being my duty to tell him the truth. But we



should probably hesitate to say that by his breach of the implicit understanding my duty to tell him the truth has been entirely destroyed . . . therefore while a person who has been deceived by another is justified in refusing to answer his questions, he is not justified in telling him lies.

Because of the perfect *prima facie* not to harm others, there remains a perfect *prima facie* not to lie even if an individual is in a situation in which he or she believes that there is no implicit promise not to lie, and the violation is less grave:

Yet that this [perfect *prima facie* not to harm others] forms only a small part of the stringency of the duty of truthfulness may be inferred from the leniency with which we should judge deceit, in a case in which no implicit undertaking to tell the truth has been established.

Because of the perfect *prima facie* duty to keep promises, Ross also holds, presumably, that there remains a perfect *prima facie* not to lie even if an individual is in a situation in which he or she believes that the other person will not be harmed by their lie, or will be benefitted by their lie.

Because the duty not to lie is a *prima facie* duty, it follows that there can be instances in which, despite the greater stringency (in general) of the perfect *prima facie* duty not to lie, a person's duty *sans phrase* is to lie, in order to fulfill an imperfect duty of beneficence. This can occur, presumably, when the lie is about something trivial and the harm of telling the lie is minor, but the benefit of telling the lie is considerable. However, it also seems that it can be one's duty *sans phrase* to lie in order to fulfill an imperfect duty of beneficence, even if the lie is about something important and the harm of telling the lie is major, when the benefit of telling the lie is enormous.

Finally, there may be instances in which there is no implicit promise not to lie, and no harm done by a lie. Such could be the case of lying in a game in which the objective is to tell a convincing lie on occasion in order to advance in the game. Here it would seem that the derived perfect *prima facie* duty not to lie would simply not apply, and there would be nothing morally wrong about lying.

### Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin

Another development in the analysis of lying and deception was made by Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) in *The Concept of Mind* (1949). In that work Ryle identified certain verbs as “performance-verbs” that “signify the occurrence not just of actions but of suitable or correct actions. They signify achievements.” As an example, Ryle offered “deceive.” Such performance-verbs “signify not merely that some performance has been gone through, but also that something has been brought off by the agent going through it. They are verbs of success.” To deceive someone is to succeed at bringing something off, namely, to succeed at engendering (or sustaining) a false belief in someone. By contrast, “lie” is not a success verb. To lie to someone is not necessarily to succeed at bringing something off. Someone can lie and can be disbelieved; this fact does not prevent the lie from being a lie. Lying, therefore, is not a type of deceiving. At most, lying is a type of attempting to deceive.

In lectures developed in the 1940s that were eventually delivered in 1955 and later published in 1962 as *How to Do Things With Words*, J. L. Austin (1911–60) made a contribution to the analysis of lying by distinguishing between lying and making false promises. Austin distinguishes between constative utterances, or utterances that may be appraised as true or false, such as assertions, and performative utterances, or utterances that may not be appraised as true or false. Promises are examples of performatives. Promises themselves cannot be said to be true or false. Promises can be said to be in bad faith (insincere), or in good faith (sincere), depending on whether there is an intention to keep the promise or not.

It follows that a false promise cannot be a lie, because a lie must be capable of being true or false: “His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement.” It is possible that, on the basis of an insincere promise, someone may be deceived about a person's intentions, however: “At most we might make out a case for saying that it implies or insinuates a falsehood or misstatement (to the effect that he does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter.”

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Cottingly Fairies; Deception, Definitions of; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Kant, Immanuel; Morals and Ethics; Nazi Propaganda; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; Piltown Man; Stalin, Josef; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Austin, J. L. *How to Do Things With Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Kagan, S. *The Limits of Morality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
- McNaughton, D. "An Unconnected Heap of Duties?" *Philosophical Quarterly*, v.46 (1996).
- Moore, G. E. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
- Rashdall, H. *The Theory of Good and Evil*. Vols. 1 and 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907.
- Ross, W. D. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson's Universal Library, 1949.

## History of Deception: 1950 to the Present

Lying and deception grew in importance as topics in philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. As Sissela Bok pointed out in her groundbreaking book *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life* (1978), the "major works of moral philosophy of this century . . . are silent on this subject" of "truth-telling and lying," and the eight-volume *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, published in 1967, "contains not one reference to lying or to deception, much less an entire article devoted to such questions."

Bok contributed to the revival of interest in lying and deception in philosophy that occurred from 1977 to 1978. Parallel to this, the work of psychologist Paul Ekman on deception began appearing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They inspired all psychologists writing on lying, including social psychologist Bella DePaulo in the 1990s, who engaged with Bok.

In the 1960s there had been some articles addressing these topics. Arnold Isenberg's article "Deontology and the Ethics of Lying" (1964) defended the following definition: "A lie is a statement made by one who does not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it." According to this definition there are three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for lying. The first is the statement condition, the condition that a statement is made. The second is a variation on the untruthfulness condition, the condition that the statement be believed to be false. The third is the intention to deceive condition, the condition that the liar intends that the dupe believe something false (here, the untruthful statement). Importantly, Isenberg rejected the falsity condition, the condition that the untruthful statement be false.

With this definition Isenberg attempted to limit the scope of lying, arguing that the statement in question may be too vague for the act to be called a lie; that the degree of belief and disbelief in the speaker can vary, and hence may preclude lying; and that the intention may be "strong or weak, definite or indefinite." The result of that final variation in intention is that an advertiser who boosted products, "knowing that everyone expects him to exaggerate," is "probably not to be called a liar." Isenberg also held that there is an awareness on the part of the liar of the "listener's mentality and cognitive situation," and that so-called polite lies, such as the words "*She is not at home*," delivered by a servant or relative at the door, are not lies at all, but merely euphemisms.

Frederick A. Siegler's most important article on the topic, "Lying," (1966), expanded upon the statement condition, arguing that the liar must be "conveying meaning through conventional signs," as opposed to natural signs (for example, faking a limp). Siegler also distinguished between lying and telling a lie. This led him to adopt two positions on the falsity condition: falsehood was not necessary for lying, but it was necessary for telling a lie.

However, Siegler's distinction between lying and telling a lie was rejected by subsequent writers, and Don Mannison argued that neither lying nor telling a lie required falsehood ("Lying and Lies," 1969). Mannison, drawing upon the speech act theory of J. L. Austin, added that an

act of lying is an illocutionary act and not a perlocutionary act, because, “The existence of an act of lying is not dependent upon the production of a particular response or state in an audience.” To use the terminology of Gilbert Ryle (*The Concept of Mind*, 1949), he argued that a “lie” is not a success verb. This makes “lie” importantly different from “deceive,” which is indeed a success verb and which Ryle included in his list of success verbs.

### Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan

Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan’s article “The Intent to Deceive” (1977) remains the most influential article from this period. This article addressed both deception and lying. Chisholm and Feehan argued that deception consisted in either deception by commission (doing) or deception by omission (allowing). The four types of deception by commission are contributing to the dupe’s acquiring a false belief, contributing to his or her continuing to hold a false belief, contributing to his or her ceasing to hold a true belief, and contributing to preventing him/her from acquiring a true belief.

The four types of deception by omission are allowing the dupe to acquire a false belief, allowing him/her to continue to hold a false belief, allowing him/her to cease to hold a true belief, and allowing him/her to continue without a true belief. This taxonomy of deception remains highly controversial, however. With respect to the four cases of negative deception, in which the person is made or allowed to lose a true belief or to fail to acquire a true belief but at no point has a false belief (as in the cases of positive deception), it has subsequently been argued that this is not a case of deception at all and is instead a matter of being kept in ignorance.

Perhaps the most important contribution that Chisholm and Feehan made was to argue that the statement condition and the intention to deceive condition be replaced by the assertion condition. In order to lie, it is necessary to make a statement. The statement-making has to be an assertion, however, because one can make a statement in play or irony. In the case of a liar (*L*), and an intended dupe (*D*), and a believed-false proposition (*p*), they say that the liar asserts *p*, and hence is lying, when: “*L* states *p* to *D* and does so under

conditions which, *L* believes, justify *D* in believing that he, *L*, not only accepts *p*, but also intends to contribute causally to *D*’s believing that he, *L*, accepts *p*.”

This account of lying has two implications, both of which are controversial. The first is that the liar only wishes the dupe to believe things about the liar’s beliefs and intentions and not necessarily to believe what the liar is saying. That is, the liar only necessarily wishes the recipient to believe that the liar is being honest, and that the liar is intending to be believed to be honest. The second implication is that if a person believes that the circumstances are such that the would-be dupe is not justified in believing that the speaker is being honest, then the person is not lying. For this reason, Chisholm and Feehan argue about an example taken from Immanuel Kant’s lectures that someone who is being mugged at knifepoint is not lying when he makes a false statement to the mugger, because the person cannot believe that the conditions are such that the mugger is justified in believing what he says. This means that the victim cannot make even a truthful assertion to the mugger about not having any money on her person. No assertion is possible.

Alan Donagan reached a similar conclusion about being unable to lie to aggressors in his *A Theory of Morality* (1977). He argued that lying must occur in conditions of free communication and must be between fully responsible and rational persons. Hence, it is not possible to lie to “children, madmen, or those whose minds have been impaired by age or illness,” and it is not possible to lie to “a would-be murderer who threatens your life if you will not tell him where his quarry has gone,” and in general to those who place you under duress, because in such circumstances your act of communication is not free.

Charles Fried, in the chapter titled “On Lying” in *Right and Wrong* (1978), argued, like Chisholm and Feehan, for an assertion condition for lying: “A person lies when he asserts a proposition he believes to be false.” To make an assertion, according to Fried, is to “give an assurance that the statement is true.” The institution of assertion is “that institution by which people, when they make statements to each other, invite belief, and not belief based on the evidence of the statement

so much as on the faith of the statement.” A lie, therefore, “invites belief” in something that the liar believes to be false. He rejected Chisholm and Feehan’s account of assertion as depending on whether the asserter believes that the circumstances justify belief in the asserter’s honesty.

### Why Lies are Morally Wrong

Many of these writers were also concerned with the moral question of why lies are morally wrong, and whether or not all lies are morally wrong. Isenberg considered the position of deontologists that in all lying there is an element of moral wrongness, which is constant. Even if there are circumstances in which lying is justified, lying is *pro tanto* wrong: the wrongness is overridden but not

removed. Isenberg agreed with the deontologists to the extent that although lies can be excused or justified, lies always stand in need of one or the other: “it is the normal thing to demand a reason for lying,” even if such a reason can be given.

On Chisholm and Feehan’s account of lies as untruthful assertions, “The liar would have his victim believe that, at the moment at least, the liar is someone in whom he may place his faith,” and hence the person who is lied to has had his or her right violated, because “*D* has the right to expect that *L* himself believes *p*.” Every lie is therefore a violation of a right. Because one cannot make an assertion to a mugger, the mugger has no such right to be violated.

Donagan’s narrow account of lying allowed him to argue for an absolute prohibition on all lying because making untruthful statements or assertions to those who, for example, threatened one, was not lying and was permitted. Fried, meanwhile, argued that a lie, which is always “a broken promise,” is wrong because it “violates the principle of respect, for I must affirm that the mind of another person is available to me in a way which I cannot agree my mind would be available to him.” Nevertheless, Fried thought that some lies were justified. In the case of a noninnocent who initiates an encounter (for example, asks one a question) and leaves one “with no choice but to lie or to yield a right,” such a noninnocent has “no right to the truth.” Lying to muggers and to would-be murderers is therefore justified lying.

### Sissela Bok

It was Bok, however, who approached the topics of lying and deception with a practical agenda. She did provide a definition of lying according to which a lie is “any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.” She thus rejected not only the falsity condition but also the untruthfulness condition. She reduced lying to any deception by means of a statement. Although Bok rejected the absolutist prohibition on lying, she defended a “principle of veracity,” according to which lies have an “initial negative weight.” Lying “requires explanation, whereas truth ordinarily does not.” Hence, there is always a “burden of proof” on the liar.

On this basis she argued for a three-step test for lies. First, a lie must be a “last resort.” In any situation in which a lie is a possible choice, one must



*Illusionist Riku Issakainen performs during Circus Festival 2010 in Kerava, Finland. This type of magic-show deception by consent is, according to psychologist Paul Ekman, generally distinguished from a lie, which is an intentional deception without prior notification. Ekman’s work on deception began appearing in the late 1960s and early 1970s.*



seek nonlying alternatives. Second, even when a lie is a last resort, all of the harms and benefits of the lie must be considered. Here Bok included not merely the harm to the dupe of the lie but also the harm done to the liar in terms of effort to cover up the lie and damage to credibility, and the damage to the overall level of trust in communication in society. Her point was that the liar was biased to underestimate the risk of discovery and overestimate the benefits of lying and to ignore the difference between lies that are truly isolated occurrences and lies that tend to become institutional practices. Third, in the light of all of these harms and benefits, the lie must be in principle justifiable if it were to be made public: “The test of publicity asks which lies, if any, would survive the appeal for justification to reasonable persons.” Her publicity test is based on the Golden Rule:

We must share the perspective of those affected by our choices, and ask how we would react if the lies we are contemplating were told to us. We must, then, adopt the perspective not only of liars but of all those lied to; and not only of particular persons but of all those affected by lies.

This three-step test allowed for an examination of many deceptive practices in society, including white lies, lies to children, lies to the sick and dying, paternalistic lies more generally, lies for the public good, lies in letters of recommendation, lies in social science research, and lies to protect clients and colleagues, as well as lies to liars and lies to enemies. Although lies told to would-be murderers to protect innocents, lies told to protect one’s life, and lies necessary to save groups against plague, invasion, or political or religious persecution can survive this test, few of the many lies told in society can survive this test.

### Writings on Lies Since the Late 1970s

Subsequent to 1977–78 there have been two broad developments in writing on lying and deception in philosophy. The first concerns the moral distinction between lying and being misled by truthful assertion (or paltering). Traditionally, those writing on lying have made a strict moral distinction between lying and being misled by truthful assertion. In the case of lying, Alasdair MacIntyre

argued that the responsibility for being deceived is entirely on the liar, whereas in the case of being misled, the dupe is in part responsible for making inferences to falsehoods; Chisholm and Feehan maintained there is a breach of faith in the case of lying, because the dupe has the right to expect truthfulness, whereas in the case of being misled, there is no breach of faith. Finally, according to Jonathan Adler, lying is a violation of a norm of conversation that truthfulness is more important with respect to what we say than what we otherwise convey.

However, recent writers have rejected this strict moral distinction and have argued that it is false that lying is morally worse than misleading by truthful assertion. In *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (2002), Bernard Williams, who has also accused previous writers of fetishizing assertion, rejects this preference for mere misleading over lying. In *Lying, Misleading, and the Role of What is Said* (2012), Jennifer Saul has attacked all of the past moral justifications for preferring merely misleading over lying. Finally, Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser have argued that merely misleading, or paltering, presents almost all of the same harms as lying but is more difficult to identify, harder to penalize, and hence may present a greater problem to society than lying.

The second development concerns the intention-to-deceive condition for lying. Traditionally, those writing on lying divided into those who held that lying involves an intention to deceive another person, and those who held lying may lack any intention to deceive. In the 20th century this latter position was very much in the minority. The 21st century, however, has seen a spate of articles devoted to defending the possibility of nondeceptive lying, including Thomas L. Carson’s “The Definition of Lying” (2006), Roy Sorensen’s “Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without The Intent to Deceive” (2007), Don Fallis’s “What Is Lying?” (2009), and Andreas Stokke’s “Lying and Asserting” (2013). According to these authors, putative examples of lies without any intention to deceive include those of a murder witness, scared for his life giving untruthful testimony on the stand with no intention to be believed by the jury, and a college student denying that he plagiarized a paper without any intention that the dean believe him

in order to avoid expulsion. These putative examples of lies have in turn been contested by J. E. Mahon (2008) and J. Lackey (2013). If lies can truly be divided up into deceptive and nondeceptive lies, it remains to be seen if arguments for the moral wrongfulness of lying can apply to nondeceptive lying, or if alternative arguments must be provided—if, indeed, there is anything morally wrong with nondeceptive lying.

### Writing on Lies in Psychology

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, psychologists Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen—inspired in part by the important work of Erving Goffman on how people unconsciously act and present themselves in everyday social interactions—examined nonverbal behavior in the specific context of intentional deception. They concluded that certain body movements and “micro” facial expressions, which are signs of emotions that are being suppressed or repressed, are produced when people intentionally deceive. The ability to detect such nonverbal “leakage” of emotions can enable people to detect attempts at deception, but such ability is rare without special training. Individuals who demonstrated the rare talent to detect such leakage, and hence lies, without special training were christened “truth wizards.” Claims about the inability of most people to detect lies due to their inability to detect leakage have recently been challenged by writers, such as Timothy R. Levine, who argue that nonverbal leakage by liars is the exception rather than the rule and that people normally detect lies on the basis of other factors, including prior factual knowledge and access to physical evidence.

Ekman also distinguished between lies and deception more generally, arguing that to lie is to intentionally (attempt to) deceive without prior notification. Lying was thus distinguished from simple error as well as deception by consent (for example, deception by magicians and poker players), but lying did not require the use of language (for example, concealment lies), and it was possible to lie by deceptively telling the truth (palterers).

Subsequent writers on lying, such as Mark Frank, have attempted to distinguish between active deception, or unauthorized intentional deception (i.e., lying) as well as authorized intentional deception, and passive deception, or

unintentional deception (for example, camouflage), and to consider the question of whether animals can lie.

Other psychologists, such as Bella DePaulo and Deborah Kashy, have paid more attention to the topics of how often people lie, different types of lies (self-centered lies versus other-centered lies), what people lie about (feelings and opinions versus plans versus achievements versus reasons for behavior), and the differences between men’s lies and women’s lies. Such writers also addressed the topic of the morality of lying, considering the difference between “serious” lies and nonserious lies and the question of whether altruistic lies, and harmless self-serving lies are justifiable, which led them to consider the arguments of Bok against lying.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Camouflage; DePaulo, Bella; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Evolution and Natural Selection; Frank, Mark; Goffman, Erving; Leakage; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Lying, Intentionality of; Men; Lying, Prevalence of; Microfacial Expressions; Morals and Ethics; Nonverbal Cues; Paltering; Transparent Liars; Wizards of Lie Detection; Women.

### Further Readings

- Bok, S. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Carson, T. L. “The Definition of Lying.” *Noûs*, v.40 (2006).
- Chisholm, R. M. and T. D. Feehan. “The Intent to Deceive.” *Journal of Philosophy*, v.74 (1977).
- DePaulo, B. M. “The Many Faces of Lies.” In *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*, A. G. Miller, ed. New York: Guilford Press, 2004.
- DePaulo, B. M., J. A. Epstein, and M. M. Wyer. “Sex Differences in Lying: How Men and Women Deal With the Dilemma of Deceit.” In *Lying and Deception in Everyday Life*, M. Lewis and C. Saarni, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.
- DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy. “Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. “Lying in Everyday Life.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).

- Donagan, A. *A Theory of Morality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Ekman, P. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Marriage and Politics*. New York: Norton, 1985.
- Ekman, P. and W. V. Friesen. "Detecting Deception from Body or Face." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.29 (1974).
- Ekman, P. and W. V. Friesen. "Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception." *Psychiatry*, v.32 (1969).
- Ekman, P. and M. O'Sullivan. "The Wizards of Deception Detection." In *The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts*, P. A. Granhag and L. A. Strömwall, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Fallis, D. "What Is Lying?" *Journal of Philosophy*, v.106 (2009).
- Frank, M. G. "Thoughts, Feelings, Deception." In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Fried, C. *Right and Wrong*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Goffman, E. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday, 1959.
- Isenberg, A. "Deontology and the Ethics of Lying." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, v.24 (1964).
- Lackey, J. "Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce." *Analysis*, v.73 (2013).
- Levine, T. R. "A Few Transparent Liars: Explaining 54 Percent Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments." *Communication Yearbook*, v.34 (2010).
- MacIntyre, A. "Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn From Mill and Kant?" In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Vol. 16. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995.
- Mahon, J. E. "A Definition of Deceiving." *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, v.21 (2007).
- Mahon, J. E. "Two Definitions of Lying." *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, v.22 (2008).
- Mannison, D. M. "Lying and Lies." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, v.47 (1969).
- Ryle, G. *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson, 1949.
- Saul, J. *Lying, Misleading, and the Role of What Is Said*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Schauer, F. and R. Zeckhauser. "Paltering." In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Siegler, F. A. "Lying." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, v.3 (1966).
- Sorensen, R. "Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, v.88 (2007).
- Stokke, A. "Lying and Asserting." *Journal of Philosophy*, v.110 (2013).
- Williams, B. *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

---

## Hitler, Adolf

Following the establishment of the National Socialism Movement and the ascendance of the Nazi Party in Germany in 1933, the name Adolf Hitler became irrevocably intertwined with the concept of lying. The environment within Germany was ripe for Hitler's utopian promises because the country was still reeling from its defeat in World War I, and its pride had been bruised by the punishment meted out in the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's entire career was founded on the principle that lies were justified if they allowed him to achieve his ends. Calling on the enormous resources at his command, Hitler waged a lengthy campaign of deception designed to undermine trust in one's own government, raise questions about the reliability of allies, convince the world that Germany was invincible, and assure the German population that his end goal was utopia for the German people. Because the web of deception was so extensive, it became almost impossible to sort out fact from propaganda within a Germany controlled by Hitler and the Nazi Party.

Adolf Hitler was born in 1889 in Braunau in Upper Austria but became a German citizen. Throughout his public life he had been known for his anti-Semitic views. By 1921, he had been officially named chairman of the Nazi Party. Hitler laid out his plans to make Germany the dominant world power in *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*) in 1927. He expressed his views on lying clearly

in what became known as the Big Lie, stating that lies should be big and simple, and he maintained that people would begin to believe any lie that was repeated often enough. He devoted two chapters of the book to propaganda.

Almost immediately upon attaining power, Hitler set up the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and installed Joseph Goebbels as its head. The ministry was assigned to direct and monitor the activities of art, music, theater, films, books, radio, education, and the press. It was also charged with keeping foreign media out of the hands of the German public. The overriding goal was always to protect the image of Hitler and the Nazi Party so that the German people did not rise up in revolt. Anyone who threatened that image was likely to be hunted down by German storm troopers or the Gestapo.

Identifying his major external enemies as Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Hitler was willing to use any means at his disposal to bring those enemies down. In August 1939, the news that Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact sent a ripple of surprise around the world. The pact paved the way for Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland on September 1, 1939, while allowing him to keep quiet about the possibility that, despite the alliance, Germany would later invade the Soviet Union. The invasion of Poland was allegedly justified by perceived mistreatment of Germans living in Poland. Records made available after Germany's fall have made it clear that by 1941, plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union were already underway. That invasion was timed to coincide with mass extermination of European Jews.

### **Campaign Against the Jews**

On the night of November 9, 1938, German storm troopers and Nazi officials blazed across Germany, Austria, and parts of Czechoslovakia in what became known as the Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass). The goal was to remove Jews from their homes and strip them of their property. In January 1939, Hitler delivered an address to top Nazi officials in which he proclaimed that European Jews were planning to wage war against Germany and informed party members that the Jews were responsible for Great Britain's defiance of Germany.

In January 1941, Hitler announced to Nazis attending the Wannsee Conference that he was instituting plans to engage in the widespread extermination of Jews. Euphemistically referred to as the Final Solution, the extermination plan was the culmination of a campaign that had begun in 1933 when Hitler rose to power. After experiencing almost a decade of anti-Semitic propaganda and legal discrimination against Jews, many Germans were willing to blame Jews rather than Hitler and the Nazis for all problems. The isolation of Jews into ghettos was seen as justifiable because of the success of Nazi propagandists in convincing Germans that Jews spread disease.

Within Germany, Hitler and the Nazi Party targeted any individual or group deemed to have potential for interfering with the goals of German domination and the creation of the perfect Aryan race. The chief target continued to be the Jewish people, and Hitler used his web of deception to convince other Germans that Jews were their enemies, warning them that Jews were bent on world domination. Over the course of the war, some six million European Jews were exterminated by the German war machine. In addition to the Jews, Hitler sought to eradicate the very existence of homosexuals, the handicapped, the Roma (Gypsy) population, Catholics, Poles, and Czechs. The last two groups were targeted because Germany had been forced to concede land to Poland and Czechoslovakia at the end of World War I.

In 1939, Hitler orchestrated the passage of the Special Wartime Penal Code, which gave judges the power to arbitrarily increase sentences of anyone deemed to be undermining Germany's war effort. The predictable result was that few people were willing to challenge the Nazis openly. Nevertheless, there were some individuals brave enough to risk exposure. One such individual was Otto Hampel, a factory worker who engaged in a campaign to distribute postcards in public places, informing other Germans of the truth behind Hitler's deceptions. He was betrayed by an informant, and he and his wife were executed in March 1943. It was not until 2009 that Hampel's story, which had been told in 1947 by Hans Fallada in *Every Man Dies Alone*, was translated into English for the first time.

By the spring of 1939, it had already become clear that the United States would be affected by



the gathering war clouds in a number of ways, despite its ostensible neutrality. Oswald Garrison Villard reported in his regular column for *The Nation* that travelers returning to the United States from Germany were contending that maintaining business relations with Hitler's Germany had become virtually impossible because contracts were being broken regularly. He noted that falsehoods and chicanery were the order of the day because serving German self-interests dominated all business dealings, and he announced that force was being used to achieve Hitler's goals. Villard also reported that "wholesale plundering of Jews" was underway and stated that Hitler was well on the way to raising a generation of children that were convinced that "might makes right."

Throughout World War II, one of Hitler's favorite tactics was exaggerating Allied losses and under-reporting those of his own forces. In August 1941, for instance, during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, official German reports stated that Germany had captured 895,000 enemy soldiers in addition to killing or wounding hundreds of thousands more. The reports also claimed that Germany had commandeered 13,145 enemy tanks, 10,388 pieces of artillery, and 9,082 aircraft. The Soviet government announced that these figures were comparable to an "Arabian fairy tale," insisting that their own losses were accurately recorded as 600,000 casualties, 5,000 tanks, 7,000 guns, and 4,000 planes.

Hitler also employed the tactic of using word-of-mouth propaganda to heighten Germany's reputation of invincibility. In France, he employed professional mourners who showed up in public places bemoaning the heavy losses to France. Other tactics involved using fortune-tellers to predict an ultimate German victory and spreading rumors of secret German weapons.

In "Divide and Conquer," a pamphlet put out in 1942 by the U.S. Office of Facts and Figures, the U.S. government attempted to educate the American public about Hitler's propaganda tactics. The pamphlet stated that Hitler's lies involved assurances that democracy was at risk, that the American military was incapable of standing up to Germany, that the Allies had already lost the war in the Pacific, that the American West Coast was extremely vulnerable to enemy attack, that

the British were decadent, and that war would bankrupt the United States.

In April 1945, Hitler secretly married his long-term mistress Eva Braun. Well aware that the end was near and that he would be called to account for his crimes and deceptions, on April 30, 1945, the pair committed suicide in an underground bunker.

Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Big Lie Technique; Government Propaganda; Nazi Propaganda; World War II.

### Further Readings

Bauer, Brad. "Defiance of the Lambs." *World War II*, v.27/5 (2013).

Fitzpatrick, Daniel Robert. *Divide and Conquer*. Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Facts and Figures, 1942.

Hitler, Adolf and John Chamberlin, et al., ed. *Mein Kampf: Complete and Unabridged*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939.

McDonough, Frank. *Hitler and the Rise of the Nazi Party*. London: Pearson/Longman, 2003.

Spielvogel, Jackson J. *Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1992.

Taylor, Edmond. *The Strategy of Terror: Europe's Inner Front*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Propaganda." <http://www.ushmm.org/propaganda> (Accessed February 2013).

Villard, Oswald Garrison. "Issues and Men." *The Nation*, v.148/19 (May 6, 1939).

---

## Hockey

Ice hockey is a competitive team sport in which opposing teams try to score on each other; a point is scored when a team advances the puck into the opponent's goal. Teams rely on physical traits, such as strength, agility, and fitness; on cognitive traits, such as intellect, planning, and creativity; on spatial-temporal reasoning; and on strategies to attack and defend collaboratively. Alongside

these assets are tactics such as the deke, diving, and vaguely handled interviews, each of which uses deception by presenting misleading information during or between games. These tactics are encoded in the lexicon of the game, and each has an analog in other competitive team sports.

### Deke

When facing a defender, a common tool of the puck-handler is the deke—a feigned motion of the body and arms intended to trick the defender into believing the puck-handler will move in a specific direction. If the defender is successfully tricked by the deke, he will commit his own momentum in the direction of the deke, away from the actual intended direction of the skater.

For example, a puck-handler who dekes left (that is, to the defender's right) performs the deke with a combination of body gestures, including turning his legs and skates, dropping one shoulder, and moving the stick and puck leftward. Should the defender believe the deke, he will move toward the puck-carrier's left, opening up space for the puck-carrier to proceed forward on the right.

The puck-handler may also be said to deke a goaltender by feigning a particular type of shot but moving to a different stroke before actually releasing the puck. For example, the puck-carrier may do a forehand-to-backhand deke—act as if he is about to shoot forehand, with his shooting hand (lower on the stick shaft) out to his side and the puck resting on the forward (concave) face of the stick blade. The goaltender may see this and commit himself to position against a forehand shot. The puck-handler can then deke by pulling the puck with his stick across the ice in front of himself to the opposite side of his body. He is now set for a backhand shot, with his shooting hand ahead of his body and the puck resting against the back (convex) face of the stick blade.

There is no analogous term for a feint made by the goaltender, but the goaltender may fake a shooter out in a similar fashion—by exposing one part of the goal, tempting the shooter to aim for that target, and quickly closing off the exposed area as the attacker handler shoots the puck.

The word *deke* is of Canadian-English origin, used as a noun or a verb, and is short for “decoy.” It is also used in other nations in the context of

ice hockey. Its association with a specialized lexical item indicates the extent to which this deceptive move is intrinsic to the skill set of the hockey player. Canadians use the term for similar acts in other sports, such as American or association football; elsewhere, the concept in other sports is expressed in different terms, such as “juke” in basketball or “fake” in American football.

### Diving

Another deceptive practice within hockey is diving, an action in which a player pretends to be hurt or illegally hit in an attempt to draw a penalty against the opposing team. Like other team sports, ice hockey has a set of rules that can be considered a code of behavior, and violations result in penalties assessed by the game referee against an individual or a team. Although some degree of physical contact between opponents is allowable, certain types of contact are explicitly disallowed. Such infractions result in the penalized player being sent off the ice, in most cases for two or five minutes. While serving the penalty, the violator's team plays with one fewer player, a scenario called a “power play” for the team with the one-man advantage.

Given the advantage that results from power-play situations, there is some motivation to make an opponent appear to have committed an infraction in order to receive a power play as a benefit. A player may fall as if tripped, or pretend to be hit illegally by an elbow, with the intent of having the referee call a penalty on the opposing player. Diving comprises these sorts of embellished behaviors and is certainly not unique to hockey; association football players also dive to incur penalties against opponents. Similar behavior occurs in basketball, where it is called “flopping.”

Diving as a strategy is not held in high regard in hockey, in contrast with other behavior that is technically against the rules but is tolerated and cheered. Ironically, diving itself is punishable, so that a player who is truly illegally hit but who also embellishes the effects ends up serving an offsetting penalty at the same time as his opponent, with neither team receiving a power play as a result. Thus, the behavior is salient enough that it is encoded within the rules of the game: There is a specific clause in the official rulebooks

of international and National Hockey League (NHL) hockey that forbids this behavior, and there is a standardized hand signal that the referee uses to indicate the call.

### Deception in Media Interviews

Another type of deceptive practice in hockey arises in interviews and press conferences, in which professional players or coaches respond to questions from journalists. These interviews often address strategies and mental states of the team before, during, and after a game. Interviewees typically maintain a relatively neutral stance by avoiding extremely positive or negative evaluations in their responses. Moreover, interviewees tend to avoid sharing too much strategy in order to ensure that upcoming opponents cannot use such information to aid their preparation.

A specific instance of this appears in how teams report injuries among their players. If a team member is unable to play, the team must explain the reasons for his absence to its fan base. Because of the physical nature of the sport, however, teams sometimes provide only minimal detail in order to prevent opposing teams from targeting players with recent injuries. Teams thus often report injuries in the vaguest possible terms, such as upper- or lower-body injuries. For example, if a player misses a game because of a knee injury, the team might only report it as a lower-body injury, for fear that a more honest report would invite opponents to target the player's still-healing knee upon his return.

The act of minimizing detail about strategy and injury presents a certain level of masking of truthful information by hedging and relatively vague responses. This behavior is not unique to interviews with hockey players and coaches; it arises in many professional sports.

While behaviors such as diving, dekes, and vague interviews do not involve directly false statements, all of them are deceptive in how they mask relevant details or falsely suggest through gesture that some action has taken place.

Robert Kennedy  
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**See Also:** Baseball; Basketball; Children's Sports Teams; College Sports; Football; Soccer (Football).

### Further Readings

- Caldwell, David. "'Working Your Words': Appraisal in the AFL Post-Match Interview." *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics*, v.32/2 (2009).
- Duplacey, James. *The Annotated Rules of Hockey*. New York: Lyons & Buford, 1996.
- Harari, P. J. and Dave Ominsky. *Ice Hockey Made Simple: A Spectator's Guide*. Los Angeles: First Base Sports, 1997.

## Honest Baseline Behaviors

When changes in behavior are the goal, either in the course of scientific research or in practice, accurate measurement of behavior is critical. A behavioral change is the difference between ongoing behavior in its normal, natural state and behavior following an intervention. In psychological research and practice, the behavior in the normal, natural state is called the baseline, while behavior following an intervention may be called treatment or experimental. While the reasons why accuracy is important for measuring behavior following an intervention are somewhat obvious—for example, to see if the intervention is effective—the accuracy of baseline measurements is equally, if not more, important.

In addition to serving as a starting point against which to measure behavioral changes after a manipulation, baseline measures are also used to determine whether or not an intervention is necessary. In clinical practice, baseline measures are used to determine treatment plans; for example, the frequency and amount of drug use partially informs the decision of whether inpatient or outpatient treatment is warranted. Inaccurate baseline measures may result in inadequate or unnecessary treatment of psychological problems.

Similarly, baseline behaviors can inform managers in business settings whether or not changes in working conditions are necessary. Inaccurate baseline measures in such situations could result in unnecessary or insufficient changes in processes. In all three cases—research, clinical practice, and making business decisions—the

assumption that behavior measured at baseline is an accurate representation of what an individual would normally do lies at the heart of any assessment of behavioral change. Identifying situations where an individual is likely to provide dishonest baseline behaviors and employing strategies to prevent such deception are critical for sound behavioral modification.

Baseline behavior is typically stable and predictable in the absence of manipulations. It is possible, however, for deviations in the baseline to occur. Deviations from a stable baseline—in the absence of manipulation—may indicate deception. Abrupt changes in behavior are unlikely to happen in the absence of an intervening event. Identifying these unlikely behaviors allows researchers to examine if the behaviors are deceitful. Thus, detecting deviations from the stable baseline can be utilized as a potential deception detection strategy. Additional threats to honest baseline measures, such as demand characteristics and observation effects, are also possible.

### **Demand Characteristics**

A common cause of dishonest baseline behaviors arises from the individual being aware of the reasons why his or her behavior is being measured. Often called demand characteristics, the individual's perception of the reasons for observation result in unconscious or unintentional alterations in behavior. Demand characteristics can manifest changes in baseline behavior in several ways and are often called the "good participant," the "bad participant," and the "apprehensive participant."

A "good participant" is an individual who behaves such that his or her perception of the experimenter's hypothesis is confirmed. This is not to be confused with the "faithful participant," one who exhibits honest baseline behavior. The "good participant" can cause an overestimation of a treatment effect by producing extreme baseline and treatment data, as the participant's behavior was partially controlled by his or her expectation. For example, a person participating in a study that is supposed to boost memory may feign poor baseline memory so that his or her memory is significantly higher (by comparison) in the treatment trials.

Alternatively, the individual may behave the opposite of his or her perception of a "good

participant" and instead act as a "bad participant" (sometimes referred to as a "negativistic participant"). Such participants provide inconsistent or contradictory data, which can result in underestimation of a treatment's effect. For instance, an assembly line worker who is reluctant to change practices may exhibit atypically high production during baseline measurements in order to prevent workflow changes from being initiated.

Finally, an individual's perception of the social implications of the behaviors being observed may result in the individual acting in a socially acceptable manner that is not indicative of his or her normal behavior; these people are known as "apprehensive participants." This type of inaccurate baseline behavior arises when the behavior being measured is either illegal, unethical, or deeply personal. Such behaviors include drug use, criminal activity, and sexual behavior. For example, college students tend to over-report alcohol consumption, as such consumption can be socially reinforced in the college environment. Alternatively, sexual behaviors—particularly deviant sexual behaviors—are sometimes under-reported, as social stigma is associated with these behaviors.

Many instruments used to measure such questionable behaviors include instructions for alleviating these concerns. Overall, demand characteristics are usually influenced simply by the participants' attitudes toward the experimenter (for example, participants who like the experimenter are more likely to act as "good participants"). All three types of demand characteristics can be minimized by the actions of the observer.

### **Observation Effects**

Sometimes inaccurate baseline data are gathered merely because the participants are aware that they are being observed. Such observation effects were most famously noted beginning in the 1950s in a long series of studies of worker productivity in a factory called the Hawthorne Works. Over the course of five years, numerous interventions were conducted to change worker productivity. No matter what the change was, from providing food and extra breaks throughout shifts to minute changes in lighting, production increased whenever the participants were made aware that they





*College students tend to over-report alcohol consumption, which can be socially reinforced in the college environment. This is an example of an “apprehensive participant,” someone who perceives the social implications of their observed behaviors, causing them to act in a more socially acceptable manner that is not indicative of their normal behavior.*

were being observed. Empirical support for what has been dubbed the Hawthorne effect has been found in medical and psychological research. For instance, mere observations of medical professionals increase their frequency of antibiotic prescribing, paramedic medication documentation, and antiseptic hand rub use. However, further studies have refuted the specific claims surrounding the Hawthorne effect.

Generally, the good participant and bad participant demand characteristics can be avoided by preventing participants from becoming aware of

research hypotheses. Although regulations requiring informed consent require at least some disclosure of study details, the reasons why observation is being conducted may usually be omitted or disguised. These designs may be referred to as “blind experiments” because the participants are unaware of—or blind to—certain aspects of the study. Akin to providing minimal details of the research, these two demand characteristics can be avoided by minimizing interaction between the observer and participant. Minimizing interaction prevents the formation of interpersonal relationships that could contribute to dishonest behavior and minimizes accidental disclosure of research hypotheses by the observer.

Deception on the part of the observer can also prevent demand characteristics by misleading or misdirecting participants’ perceptions of research hypotheses. This tactic is less appealing, as it can create further demand characteristics and is of questionable ethicality. If demand characteristics cannot be avoided by careful design, additional data can be gathered about the participants’ perceptions of the research hypothesis. Statistical procedures can also be used to evaluate whether demand characteristics were present and the extent to which they affected the data.

Other methods for collecting participant responses may be utilized if they provide a means for assessing behavior that cannot be feigned. For instance, psychologists may test cortisol levels (the stress hormone) in participants’ saliva along with recording written responses on questionnaires designed to measure stress. Although the responses on the questionnaire can easily be faked, rises in cortisol levels cannot.

The effects of observation on baseline behavior are similar to deception for social acceptance; they involve an artificial correction of behavior to a perceived appropriate level. The same strategies for avoiding inaccurate baseline data can be applied to both. To avoid observation effects or socially motivated dishonesty, observation should be as unobtrusive as possible. The use of technology, such as audio recording, video recording, or measurement devices built into equipment that automatically collect data, can be a means to unobtrusive observation. Care must be taken not to violate regulations of informed consent or other related laws. Although experimenter

deception (for example, lying about hypotheses, withholding information regarding the true nature of the study, or using unobtrusive means of measurement unbeknownst to the participants) may be necessary to eliminate dishonest baseline behavior, it must be kept as minimal as possible.

Dennis J. Hand  
*University of Vermont*  
 Carey J. Fitzgerald  
*Oakland University*

**See Also:** Behavioral Analysis Interview; Deception, Research on; Deception in Research Design; Investigator Bias; Leakage; Meta-Analysis; Statement Validity Assessment.

### Further Readings

- Cherry, K. "Hawthorne Effect." [http://psychology.about.com/od/hindex/g/def\\_hawthorn.htm](http://psychology.about.com/od/hindex/g/def_hawthorn.htm) (Accessed January 2013).
- Cherry, K. "What Is a Demand Characteristic?" <http://psychology.about.com/od/dindex/g/demanchar.htm> (Accessed January 2013).
- Hampton, C., B. Berkowitz, and K. Nagy. "Developing Baseline Measures of Behavior." [http://ctb.ku.edu/en/tablecontents/sub\\_section\\_main\\_1044.aspx](http://ctb.ku.edu/en/tablecontents/sub_section_main_1044.aspx) (Accessed January 2013).
- Nichols, A. L. and J. K. Maner. "The Good Subject Effect: Investigating Participant Demand Characteristics." *The Journal of General Psychology*, v.135 (2008).
- Orne, M. T. "On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications." *American Psychologist*, v.17 (1962).
- Rosenthal, R., R. L. Rosnow, and A. E. Kazdin. "Artifacts in Behavioral Research: Robert Rosenthal and Ralph Rosnow's Classic Books." Oxford: Oxford Press Scholarship Online, 2009.

example, George Washington's admission that he cut down the cherry tree was an honest statement. An honest action is one that adheres to the trust conditions within a relationship; for example, Abe Lincoln was honest when he walked miles to return a few pennies. An honest person is one who regularly makes honest statements and performs honest actions.

Typically, honesty is only attributed where the speaker or actor might have been motivated to do otherwise. Thus, a man is seldom credited with honesty for shouting "Bingo!" in the church basement, even if he has a winning card. The term is used instead to honor those true statements that are made at the risk of loss, because that is when truth-telling is challenged. This is equally true for honest actions. A cashier will not regard a man's action particularly honest if he takes \$20 from the tip jar because he was short changed. On the other hand, should he set \$20 on the counter because he was given too much change, the cashier would justifiably regard this an honest action.

Honesty is deeply rooted in fellowship, such as marriage, friendship, and group affiliation, and facilitates two fundamental human needs: (1) the practical need to participate in equitable productive units (e.g., the family, which produces a home, an income, children, and so forth) and (2) the need for a sense of mutual belonging with others. Dishonesty in such relationships can wreck both of these human expectations. Marital infidelity, as a dishonest act, for example, destroys the felt sense of mutual belonging and often leads to the destruction of the economic structure as well.

Where groups increase in complexity and fellowship diminishes, such as in the movement from community to society, competitive and adversarial forces become a common feature of the interactive fabric; consequently, the collective exists in a form of cooperative competition in which honesty is an occasional and strategic resource. The communitarian vision of Amitai Etzioni, the civil religion of Robert Bellah and his student Jeffrey Alexander, and the discursive rationality of Jurgen Habermas can all be understood as modest proposals for an alternative social order, grounded in honesty, communitarian rationality, and integrity.

## Honesty

Honesty is a quality that can be shown in statements, actions, and persons. An honest statement is one that deliberately reveals a truth; for

### Honesty as a Value and a Virtue

Through honestly reporting to each other, collaborators can expand their intellectual and creative power dramatically with respect to planning, imagining, building, and so forth. Consider the following statements, for example:

- “Vegetables at Pete’s Market are half the price of the chain stores.”
- “Traffic on Highway 70 will be delayed by an hour.”
- “The boss likes all reports submitted in duplicate.”
- “I’ll pick up the children from the mall at 3:00.”
- “Your fiancé has been cheating on you.”

Where these statements are spoken honestly, they may: (1) save the listener money, (2) save the listener time, (3) give the listener an advantage at work, (4) protect the listener’s children, and (5) keep the listener from making a horrible mistake. Correlatively, where the statements are not honest, they may take these things away.

By freely choosing to set before others what is the case, the truth-teller allows the listener to take up a rightful position in what will happen next. In engineering, for example, the delivery of materials of a grade lower than specified is a dishonest action that subverts the prior deliberations of the engineers, possibly leading to great loss of property and life. Honest statements from the manufacturer might thus prevent catastrophe because they would reintroduce the engineers’ judgment into the equation. It is for such reasons that the honest manufacturer is valuable to both the engineer and the end users, a practical illustration of why honesty is referred to as a value.

By the same token, the manufacturer cannot fill an order for 700 tons of “Grade A” steel if the plant only has “Grade B,” which could mean real economic loss to the plant. For the purpose of illustration, with the elimination of any chance of being caught, the manufacturer must weigh two values: the value of profit and the value of being honest. This is the other sense in which honesty is a value: As a quality of character possessed by persons, the belief that one is honest adds weight to the sense of self-worth, and this weight functions

as a restraint against a pure will to deceive for advantage.

For reasons such as these, honesty is an honoring term. This makes etymological sense as well, for honesty and honor come from the root word *honos*. Persons possessing honesty are said to possess a virtue, which comes from the Latin word *virtus*, meaning strength. It regularly appears in Jane Austen novels, for example, where the female protagonist prefers a man of virtue to a man of power or wealth because virtue itself was regarded as a power, a strength of character that could facilitate the building of stable relationship.

Even today most people value honesty. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is that liars must pretend they are honest in order to ply their trade.

Where honesty is attributed as a characteristic, the identified person is honored with a title of significant social worth. People identified as honest can expect a variety of positive outcomes: (1) their statements, even the ones that seem dubious, will be taken as sincere if not accurate; (2) their views will be given high valence in contesting (he said/she said) situations; and (3) they will be comparatively attractive to others as friends, co-workers, and employees. To be given the identity of an honest person is, thus, to be given a form of social capital.

Aristotle’s notion that virtues are cultivated as habits (*habitus*) is important to those interested in honesty. His claim suggests that failure to practice honesty makes honesty harder to practice, and the corollary.

### The Limits of Honesty

Even in intimate relationships, honesty is reasonably set aside at times, for while it is a virtue and a value, honesty has its limits. The only people more obnoxious than the ones who claim they are completely honest are the ones who actually are, as some honest statements are more properly regarded as brags, insults, fearmongerings, or cruelties. Virtuous honesty is, consequently, governed by Aristotle’s notion of the golden mean, and good judgment is required to exercise it properly.

Alongside questions of etiquette, decency, and compassion, there are other factors that limit honesty as well. For example, while one rightfully expects teammates to be honest with each other

when establishing strategy, no opponent expects or provides the same transparency. Many card games and competitive sports would be impossible if honesty were universal.

Honesty may also be withheld where conflict is experienced, especially under circumstances where profound loss is possible. Before leaving Germany, for example, Sigmund Freud was required to sign a document saying he had been well treated by the Nazis. Freud paused but a moment, then wrote “I heartily recommend the Gestapo to anyone,” and signed his name. Such prudence might easily find itself misused, overused, or abused, however. For example, a democratic society requires political honesty if citizens are to exercise their franchise. Within contemporary democracies, government deception and political misrepresentation may be characterized by practitioners as both prudent and necessary; nevertheless, such activities portend a shifting of the political forum away from the democratic (*demos* meaning people) and in the direction of the autocratic.

The performance of honesty may also be limited by aspects of human nature other than the will to exploit others. Human beings are not constant rational actors; they regularly speak untruths impulsively under momentary stresses and strains. A daughter, for example, may shout “I hate you!” at her mother—usually, such a statement should not be assessed on an honesty/dishonesty continuum. People are also uncertain with respect to mood states and feelings in general. Thus, a man may tell his doctor that he does not feel any work-related anxiety, a report that could be based more on unawareness than dishonesty. The limits of his honesty, in such a case, are the limits of his insight.

Rhetorical devices allow language to occur in strange places, with respect to honesty/dishonesty. One boy can say to another, “Cool sneakers,” and mean the opposite, and the other boy can know it. Honesty is not limited to literalness in speech.

### Managing Honesty Failures

Both when evaluating honesty failures and when pleading one’s case for an honesty failure, it is important to distinguish the honesty failure from a will to deceive or, where that is impossible, from a will to exploit.

Speech acts can be given in the spirit of honesty, even though they lack the qualities necessary to be characterized, in the end, as honest. Where that occurs, the speaker may repair the discursive violation through a common recalibrating device pointed out by Wittgenstein, which can be called the “I thought I” statement: “I thought I knew,” “I thought I felt,” “I thought I saw.” Through the “I thought I” locution, speakers rebrand their original (and ultimately inaccurate or untrue) statements as forgivable errors, even if they had adamantly denied at earlier points that a possibility of error existed. When the “I thought I . . .” locution is effective, the supplicant dissociates the honesty failure from any will to deceive; a technical error is admitted in order to remain morally unblemished. It is for this reason that when the executive branch of the federal government failed to provide evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it gracefully moved to the “I thought I” locution.

Where the “I thought I” locution cannot be instigated, honesty failures cannot fully elide the charge that they were motivated by a will to deceive. All the same, a full charge of malicious will can be avoided by rebranding the questionable statements, calling them compulsions brought on by mood swings. Thus, a marital partner may disqualify a charge of dishonesty by explaining some previous claim with the simple words, “I was upset.”

One might also explain an honesty failure by saying “I was afraid.” In such cases, moral weakness is admitted as a means of avoiding a charge of moral corruption.

The fact that people regularly accommodate failures in honesty, converting those failures into errors and mood-driven accidents, suggests the prevalence of honesty failures. By accommodating honesty failures, confederates preserve a host of relationships that can be no more perfect than the people who belong to them.

Robert Wade Kenny

*Mount Saint Vincent University*

**See Also:** Aristotle; Bluffing; Dishonesty; Half-Truths; Honest Baseline Behaviors; Plausibility; Relationships: Family; Truth; Truth Bias; Washington, George.



### Further Readings

- Ashton, Michael C., Kibeom Lee, and Chongnak Son. "Honesty as the Sixth Factor of Personality: Correlations with Machiavellianism, Primary Psychopathy, and Social Adroitness." *European Journal of Personality*, v.14 (2000).
- Bradshaw, J. *Reclaiming Virtue: How We Can Develop the Moral Intelligence to Do the Right Thing at the Right Time for the Right Reason*. New York: Bantam Books, 2009.
- Murphy, K. R. *Honesty in the Workplace*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1993.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. "Trust, Honesty, and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process." *European Journal of Sociology*, v.42 (2001).
- Sztompka, P. *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000).
- Turner, R. E., C. Edgley, and G. Olmstead. "Information Control in Conversations: Honesty Is Not Always the Best Policy." *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, v.11 (1975).
- Van Lange, P. A. M. and M. D. Kuhlman. "Social Value Orientations and Impressions of Partner's Honesty and Intelligence: A Test of the Might Versus Morality Effect." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.67 (1994).
- Weber, L. R. and A. I. Carter. *The Social Construction of Trust*. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.

## Humor

There are many different definitions of humor, but scholars who study humor have largely converged on the idea that humor involves the communication of multiple, incongruous meanings that are amusing in some manner. Humor is often associated with positive reactions like laughter and serves a variety of positive psychological and relational functions, such as coping with stress, increasing group cohesion, or helping to alleviate conflict. Humor can also serve negative functions when it is used to tease, humiliate, or deride another.

Several typologies of humor have tried to classify humor by its various forms, some of which classify humor as either positive or negative. More

complex taxonomies organize humor into over 20 types that speak to the form, function, and content of the humor. For example "telling funny stories" is distinguished from "unplanned humor," that is, spontaneous and naturally occurring. Certain types of humor clearly involve more deception than others. For example, comedians often tell a fictional anecdote but frame it as if it was something that really happened to them. Political cartoonists will often exaggerate the physical attributes of a famous person to make him or her instantly recognizable to the audience as well as invoke humor. Hoaxes, pranks, and even surprise parties involve both deception and humor to the extent they are designed to amuse but involve deceiving the target of the prank about the true nature of events.

### Humor and Deception

Humor is often associated with deception because it is based on incongruity. The work of D. E. Berlyne and others on incongruity theory and incongruity-resolution theory assumes that a surprise or contradiction is essential for humor. The theories assume a two-phase process in which the perceived incongruity must first be recognized and then accurately interpreted by the receiver in order for humor to be interpreted as funny. When people recognize and resolve the incongruity, they can understand a communication as humorous. One example of this is the use of sarcasm. Sarcasm involves using verbal and nonverbal cues that are incongruous with one another; for example, when someone says "great" while rolling his or her eyes and using a tone of voice that implies they mean the opposite.

Understanding sarcasm requires the understanding not only of the speaker's utterance but also the speaker's intent. The ability to presume another person's beliefs, feelings, intentions, or goals is termed *theory of mind*. Children often have a difficult time determining whether a statement that is contradictory to the facts is truthful (but wrong), sarcastic, or deceptive. Young children often accept the statement as sincere, whereas older children will assume that sarcastic comments are deceptive but may not understand the humor behind them. Even adults sometimes misunderstand sarcastic comments, especially if the joke is delivered through mediated channels.

Deception is a necessary part of most types of humor, especially sarcasm because of the incongruity between a speaker's statement and his or her intent.

However, humor is not always benign when associated with deception. Humor can be used to mask deceptive claims because it detracts attention from the content of the message and also generates feelings of well-being that cause the claims to be viewed positively, even if they are known to be untrue. Advertising that uses humor has been shown to be more effective than nonhumorous advertising, even when the audience knows the claims are false. Hoaxes, pranks, and cons are also examples of humor being used deceptively to trick others. Sometimes the purpose is to steal from or hurt others, but often the purpose is to gain notoriety, or simply to gain enjoyment out of fooling others.

One of the most famous hoaxes is the grainy photograph of the Loch Ness Monster taken in 1934 by Dr. Robert Wilson and known as the "surgeon's photograph." Wilson and his friend Marmaduke Wetherell later admitted to staging the photo, using a fake monster head attached to an 18-inch-long toy submarine, but the idea of the mysterious monster caught on, and many reputable scientists have spent considerable time and money trying to prove or disprove the existence of Nessie. Other hoaxes, such as the crop circles found in the English countryside starting in the 1970s and the 1995 Alien Autopsy video shown on the Fox Network and later circulated around the world, have garnered persistent believers even after the hoaxers admit to their fakery.

### Humor as a Mask

Humor can also be used to mask embarrassing or hurtful statements in interpersonal conflicts. Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson's politeness theory explains why it is difficult to be honest with a close relationship partner or family member when discussing embarrassing, sensitive, or hurtful topics. The ambiguity inherent in humor makes it a likely tool for obfuscating the truth about such topics. Research has found that lies may be told for a variety of reasons, including to avoid punishment and blame, to make oneself more desirable, to protect one's privacy, to attain one's own goals, to avoid conflict, to protect the

feelings of another, and to build or maintain the self-esteem of self or other.

Humor may be used in pursuit of any of these deceptive motivations to make them more believable or more palatable to one's partners. Research has suggested that one of the benefits of using humor to achieve these goals is the fact that an individual can always retract it. If individuals say something hurtful or damaging to another, or if they are caught in a lie, they can always claim they were "only joking." The ambiguity of humor adds to the complexity of discovering when someone's relationship partners are telling him or her the complete truth.

Is deception delivered humorously more difficult to detect? Because humor and laughter are used to release tension, it is reasonable to expect that under the strain of an interrogation both truth-tellers and deceivers might use laughter and humor to relieve stress and make their audience more comfortable or to turn the interview toward more friendly topics. Little empirical research has addressed this issue specifically, but because deception is very difficult to detect in the heat of the moment even under the most optimal circumstances, the ambiguity associated with humor might cloud a detector's ability to accurately distinguish truth from deception. As described above, humor could be used to mask the intent behind a message or to retract a statement if the lie is detected by saying, "I was only joking." It is likely that humor will make deception more difficult to detect, but more empirical study is needed.

Norah E. Dunbar  
*University of Oklahoma*

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Computer-Generated Images; Fairy Tales; Fiction; Lie Acceptability; Nonverbal Cues; Photographs, Altered; Sawyer, Tom; Theory of Mind.

### Further Readings

Banas, J., N. E. Dunbar, S. J. Liu, and D. Rodriguez.

"A Review of Humor in Educational Settings: Four Decades of Research." *Communication Education*, v.60 (2011).

Berlyne, D. E. *Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

- Bippus, A. M. "Humor Motives, Qualities, and Reactions in Recalled Conflict Episodes." *Western Journal of Communication*, v.67/4 (2003).
- Coville, C. "Five Myths That People Don't Realize are Admitted Hoaxes." [http://www.cracked.com/article/157\\_5-myths-that-people-dont-realize-are-admitted-hoaxes](http://www.cracked.com/article/157_5-myths-that-people-dont-realize-are-admitted-hoaxes) (Accessed October 2012).
- Demorest, A. "Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Understanding Deliberately False Remarks." *Child Development*, v.55/4 (1984).
- Knapp, M. L. *Lying and Deception in Human Interaction*. New York: Allyn & Bacon, 2008.
- Martin, R. A. *The Psychology of Humor: An Integrative Approach*. Oxford: Elsevier Academic Press, 2007.
- Shabbir, H. and D. Thwaites. "The Use of Humor to Mask Deceptive Advertising: It's No Laughing Matter." *Journal of Advertising*, v.36/2 (2007).
- Trivers, Robert. *The Folly of Fools*. New York: Basic, Books, 2011.
- Wanzer, M. B., A. B. Frymier, and J. Irwin. "An Explanation of the Relationship Between Instruction Humor and Student Learning: Instructional Humor Processing Theory." *Communication Education*, v.59 (2010).
- Young, S. L. and A. M. Bippus. "Does it Make a Difference if They Hurt You in a Funny Way? Humorously and Non-Humorously Phrased Hurtful Messages in Personal Relationships." *Communication Quarterly*, v.49/1 (2001).

Encyclopedia of  
**D E C E P T I O N**



Encyclopedia of  
**D E C E P T I O N**

VOLUME 2

**TIMOTHY R. LEVINE**

EDITOR

Korea University

 **SAGE** reference

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi  
Singapore | Washington DC

# I

## Iago (Shakespeare's *Othello*)

Iago is a central character in William Shakespeare's *Othello, the Moor of Venice* (written ca.1603–04): He is a high-ranking soldier in the Venetian army—Othello's "ensign" or standard-bearer—who manipulates various characters with dire consequences. He is generally regarded as the antagonist of his superior, Othello, although the scope of his malevolent subterfuge, within the complex plot structure of the play, extends far beyond this.

### The Plot of *Othello*

The drama opens with Iago exploiting the angry resentment of Roderigo, a wealthy bachelor in love with the well-born Venetian lady Desdemona, newly and secretly married to Othello. Roderigo had unsuccessfully sought her hand in marriage, and Iago contrives to stir ill feeling between him and Desdemona's new husband. The initial cause of Iago's own particular animus against Othello appears twofold. He expresses anger at Othello for promoting Cassio (a younger fellow officer) above him and also claims that Othello has been sleeping with his wife, Emilia.

The removal of the central players at this juncture from Venice to Cyprus, where the Venetian

military has been detailed to repel a Turkish attack, provides Iago with an open field of opportunity to indulge further and fully his zeal for disruption. His machinations begin in earnest when he drives a wedge between Roderigo and Cassio. During the celebrations arranged when the Turkish fleet is scuppered in a storm offshore, Iago persuades Roderigo and a drunken Cassio (whom he has been deliberately plying with alcohol) to brawl: Cassio is held responsible by Othello and is demoted.

Next, Iago sets out to make Othello jealous by having him believe that his wife, Desdemona has been unfaithful with Cassio. To this end Iago convinces Emilia to steal a dropped handkerchief that had been given to Desdemona by Othello. Iago plants it in Cassio's room and has Othello watch as Iago, sowing seeds of jealousy, interrogates Cassio about the handkerchief. Cassio is having an affair with a prostitute, Bianca, and utters her name. But he speaks indistinctly, and Othello falls into the trap of believing that Cassio is actually talking about Desdemona. Furthermore, Othello overhears Bianca herself blaming Cassio for giving her a secondhand gift. As Iago had planned, Othello is now convinced of his wife's guilt and Cassio's betrayal. Enraged, he strikes the distraught and uncomprehending Desdemona and asks Iago to kill Cassio.

Iago's malicious campaign of slur and rumor has been working well so far. His next move is

to convince Roderigo to kill Cassio. Iago assures Roderigo that this needs to happen because Cassio has been appointed governor of Cyprus: If Cassio takes up that position, Othello and his wife will leave the island and return to Venice, frustrating Roderigo's designs on Desdemona. Roderigo duly assaults Cassio in the street, and a disguised Iago takes advantage of the ensuing confusion to cut Cassio's leg. Bystanders come to Cassio's assistance, and Iago also pretends to help. When Cassio starts to accuse Roderigo of attacking him, Iago covertly stabs and kills Roderigo to prevent the truth from coming out. He then lays the blame for the attack on Cassio at Bianca's door.

That night, Othello smothers Desdemona. Emilia enters the room to be told by Othello that Desdemona had been committing adultery. After a shocked Emilia calls for help, the outgoing governor of Cyprus arrives, along with Iago, Cassio, and others. When Othello adduces the handkerchief as proof that Desdemona was cheating, Emilia suddenly understands with horror that Iago has set up the whole situation. She exposes Iago, and he kills her.

Othello, now realizing Desdemona's innocence, wounds Iago, proclaiming that he wants him to experience pain for the rest of his life. Lodovico, a Venetian nobleman, captures Iago and Othello, but before Othello can be taken into custody, he commits suicide. Iago is led away to face torture, refusing to speak, and supplying no excuse or mitigation for the trail of havoc he has wrought.


### Iago's Deception

Iago has been described as one of Shakespeare's most evil villains, due mainly to the lack of any clear motivation for his malign behavior. Scholarly discussions of his character have therefore concentrated on the confusions surrounding motive: what drives him? Iago does not seem to be absorbed by the overwhelming self-interest shown by characters in other Shakespearean tragedies. His own passion appears to be for discord itself. He enjoys engendering conflict for its own sake.

The play closes with Iago vowing silence, and questions ultimately remain about the reason for his manipulations. He stands to gain little from them personally, other than the perverse pleasure derived from targeting and playing upon the insecurities of others. These insecurities need have no

basis whatever in reality. There is no evidence, for example, that Othello has been sleeping with Iago's wife. Iago also stirs and exploits racial tensions: Desdemona is white, Othello black, and Iago makes much of this. Throughout, Iago has no hesitation in lying where he sees an opportunity he can use, and his insinuations make these lies real and present, allowing him to "play" protagonists against each other like chess pieces.

He opportunistically uses the potential of disagreement and discord in a number of developing situations in order to prey upon his victims, identifying weak spots and fomenting conflict—seemingly for his own private enjoyment—wherever possible. The compulsion to spread doubt, then stand back and watch as mayhem is created,



Actor Edwin Booth appeared in numerous New York performances as Iago in Shakespeare's *Othello*, the Moor of Venice, in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Iago, who has been described as one of Shakespeare's most evil villains, has no hesitation in lying where he sees an opportunity to use it.

constitutes the core of his character. He relentlessly exploits the trust that others place in him, as “honest Iago,” to draw them into mutual hostility.

This drive to engineer catastrophes and destroy relationships has led to the suggestion that Iago is impelled by motiveless malice. He does appear to embody a spirit of disinterested disruption. The spectacle of harmony is anathema to him: Any opportunity for upsetting equilibrium, for pitting character against character, and ruining reputations, is gleefully seized. His cold maneuvering of those around him, and related inability to regard them as anything but raw material for the playing out of his malevolent schemes, has appalled generations of theatergoers. Many spectators and commentators regard him as a psychopath. Others associate him with the concept of evil. The vow of silence which he makes before he is led off at the end of the drama guarantees that the suggestion of impenetrable motivation will continue to be troubling, no matter what advances are made in the psychology of deception.

Nicholas J. Crowe

*Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies*

Rachel M. Reznik

*Elmhurst College*

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Deception Motives; Fiction; Impression; Infidelity; Othello Effect; Pathological Lying.

### Further Readings

Bloom, Harold, ed. *Iago*. New York: Chelsea House, 1992.

Charney, Maurice. “Iago.” In *Shakespeare’s Villains*, Maurice Charney, ed. Lanham, MD: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2012.

Hyman, Stanley E. *Iago: Some Approaches to the Illusion of His Motivation*. New York: Atheneum, 1970.

Porter, Joseph A. “Complement Extern: Iago’s Speech Acts.” In *Othello: New Perspectives*, Virginia M. Vaughan and Kent Cartwright, eds. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1991.

Raatzsch, Richard. *The Apologetics of Evil: The Case of Iago*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Rand, F. P. “The Over-Garrulous Iago.” *Shakespeare Quarterly*, v.1/3 (1950).

Stoll, E. E. “Iago.” In *William Shakespeare’s “Othello”: A Sourcebook*, A. Hadfield, ed. London: Routledge, 2003.

West, F. “Iago the Psychopath.” *South Atlantic Bulletin*, v.43/2 (1978).

## Identity Theft

Identity theft has become a major crime in the United States, negatively affecting individuals and businesses alike. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that around 9 million victims are affected annually. According to the FTC, identity theft is the unauthorized use of an individual’s personal identification information, such as a person’s name, Social Security number, and credit card, by someone else with the intent of using this information to commit fraud or other crimes. Identity theft can cause major disruptions to a person’s health, business, finances, and life. Identity theft requires a great deal of time, energy, and resources for the victims to recover from this crime.

### How Identity Theft Occurs

While there is no record of the first case of identity theft, the Oxford English Dictionary notes that the phrase was first coined in 1964. Identity theft can happen in different ways. Thieves can use an individual’s name to rent housing, set up phone lines, or obtain a credit card. Unless individuals diligently monitor their credit reports, they might not know about the theft until a debt collector contacts them, or they receive bills for charges they did not make.

Identity theft has become a lucrative business and causes financial burdens for its victims. Some victims might have to pay hundreds of dollars and spend days recovering their credit and life from the theft. As a result of identity theft, some victims can also be denied housing or job opportunities, education loans, and other services.

Identity thieves have several ways to obtain an individual’s information. The FTC lists the following methods: dumpster diving, skimming, changing a person’s address, old-fashioned stealing, pretexting, and phishing. With dumpster



diving, identity thieves search through a person's garbage for bills and other documents containing personal information. Thieves can also extract information from credit or debit card numbers by skimming, which is the use of a special storage device to process their victims' cards. Thieves can change a victim's address to redirect his or her billing statements to a different location by filing a change of address form. They also use old-fashioned methods of stealing, including misappropriating wallets, purses, bank and credit card statements, pre-approved credit offers, new checks, or tax information. They can also steal personal records or bribe those with access to them. Pretexting takes place when thieves make false pretenses to acquire personal information from financial agencies, telephone companies, and other institutions.

### Phishing

Thieves who "phish" for personal identity data pretend to be representatives of financial institutions or businesses, sending their victims spam or pop-up messages via the Internet in order to get victims to give them personal information. Of all the methods employed by identity thieves, phishing, also known as "Web spoofing" or "carding," is the newest and is likely to be the most prevalent in the future given the large amount of Internet use and the wide range of business activities conducted online. Looking at client-side defense against Web-based identity theft, Neil Chou and his colleagues from the Computer Science Department at Stanford University predict that phishing will continue to be a problem in the years to come.

Web spoofing is a major form of Internet crime, affecting as many as thousands of individuals on a daily basis. Typically, a bulk e-mail will instigate the fraud, urging unsuspecting consumers to click on a link that leads them to a spoofed site. The consumer will then be asked to log in, and once the username and password are entered, the identity thieves can access the consumer's account, usually to make a withdrawal or to cause other harm.

Web spoofing demands special attention because phishing can become more sophisticated in the future, while nonexpert Internet users might not be up to speed with the new tactics employed by spoofers. There has been an exponential increase in the number of phishing cases

over the years. Agents of the U.S. Secret Service's San Francisco-based Electronic Crimes Task Force received over 75,000 complaints in 2002, three times the amount filed the previous year. The estimated monetary loss was \$54 million in 2002, compared with \$17 million in 2001. Most of the \$37 million increase in loss between the two years was attributed to Web spoofing.

### Use of Personal Information

After the thieves have stolen personal information, they can use it in a multitude of ways. Some of the most common ways include credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, bank or finance fraud, and government document fraud. In a credit card fraud, the thieves may open new credit cards in the cardholder's name and then refuse to pay the bills, resulting in delinquent accounts listed in the cardholder's credit report. They may change the billing address on a credit card and incur charges on the cardholder's account. Because the original cardholder no longer receives bills, he or she will not notice the problem for a while.

Phone or utilities fraud takes place when an account is open in a victim's name or when charges take place in an existing account without the account holder's knowledge. Thieves can use the account holder's name to sign up for utility services, such as electricity, heating, cable TV, and gas. Bank or finance frauds involve thieves creating counterfeit checks with a victim's name and account number or opening a bank account in the victim's name and writing bad checks. They might also clone a victim's automated teller machine (ATM) card or debit card and withdraw money from the victim's accounts or get a loan in the victim's name. In government document fraud, thieves can use personal information to get a driver's license or official identification card issued in their victim's name but with their own picture, in order to receive government benefits or file a fraudulent tax return.

Identity thieves may use personal information, including a victim's Social Security number, to get a job, rent a house, obtain medical services, or give a victim's personal information to the police during an arrest. When they fail to show up for their court date, the victim is issued a warrant for arrest.

Once someone suspects that they are a victim of identity theft, they need to investigate their credit

report. If this investigation indicates an identify theft may have occurred, the victim should place a fraud alert on his or her credit record.

### **Consumer Sentinel Network**

The FTC has created the Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN), a secure online database with millions of consumer complaints available only to law enforcement. Besides storing complaints received by the FTC, CSN also keeps tracks of complaints filed with the Internet Crime Complaint Center, Better Business Bureaus, Canada's PhoneBusters, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Identity Theft Assistance Center, and the National Fraud Information Center, among other agencies. Law enforcement agents throughout the world can access the database for investigations.

The CSN was set up in 1997 to collect fraud and identity theft complaints and since then has received more than 5.4 million complaints. In 2009 alone, the CSN received more than 1.3 million consumer complaints. Because the CSN also stores complaints transferred from other organizations, the total number of complaints is usually higher than that found in the initial annual reports.

### **President's Task Force**

In an effort to combat identity theft, former president George W. Bush established the President's Task Force on Identity Theft by Executive Order 13402 on May 10, 2006. The task force was authorized to spearhead the fight against identity theft and help ease the tremendous financial and emotional burdens of victims. The task force was to work with other governmental agencies to attempt to eradicate this crime.

The agency was charged with crafting a strategic plan in order to optimize the federal government's efforts to create awareness about, provide prevention against, instigate detection of, and carry out prosecution against identity thefts. The Task force is chaired by the U.S. attorney general and cochaired by the chairman of the FTC.

The task force focuses on various areas, including law enforcement, education, and government safeguards. In the area of law enforcement, the agency looks at the legal tools that can be used in preventing, investigating, and prosecuting identity theft crimes. The task force also examines ways to recover the proceeds of these crimes and to make

sure that the punishment of identity thieves is just and effective.

In the area of education, the task force reviews the educational efforts carried out by governmental agencies and the private sector to help individuals and businesses protect their personal information. In the area of government safeguards, the task force works in tandem with several federal agencies to determine how the government can augment regulations in order to maximize the security of personal data maintained by the government and private businesses.

The task force also engages in a wide range of activities to involve and inform the public in the fight against identity theft. The agency organizes meetings, talks with stakeholders, and solicits public comments on major issues pertaining to identity theft. Its strategic plan aims to strengthen efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; to inform individuals and businesses on how to deter, detect, and defend against identity theft; to aid law enforcement officers in capturing and prosecuting identity thieves; and to amplify the measures employed by federal agencies and the private sector to guard the personal data they hold.

The task force's Web site contains a "Guide for Assisting Identity Theft Victims," which the FTC developed to aid attorneys and victim service providers who work with pro bono clients.

### **Nongovernmental Assistance**

Several nongovernmental organizations have stepped in to help victims restore their identities. The Identity Theft Assistance Center (ITAC) is one of these organizations. Since 2004, the ITAC has helped tens of thousands of victims defend against identity theft. ITAC maintains it is not possible to eradicate identity theft, but it is possible to manage this form of fraud. A consumer advocate for victims of identity theft and a resource for the financial services industry, the ITAC is affiliated with the Financial Services Roundtable and supported by the financial services industry as a free service to its clients.

Members of ITAC provide the free victim assistance services to those who suspect their identity might have been stolen. ITAC minimizes the time to resolve a case by assigning a single point of contact to each suspected theft. A trained agent helps consumers recognize questionable transactions

and informs banks, credit companies, and other institutions about a victim's possible identity theft.

Despite the availability of services such as ITAC, the best defense for consumers is to have knowledge and awareness of identity theft. Consumers should also be aware of their rights in order to protect themselves and to take the proper actions toward eliminating fraudulent information from their credit reports.

Trangdai Glassey-Tranguyen  
*Stanford University*

**See Also:** Anderson, Anna (Anastasia); Bush, George W.; Internet: E-Mail Scams.

### Further Readings

Carnegie Mellon University. "My Secure Cyberspace: Identity Theft." <http://www.mysecurecyberspace.org/encyclopedia/index/identity-theft.html#misc.encyclopedia.identitytheft> (Accessed May 2013).

Chou, Neil, Robert Ledesman, Yuka Teraguchi, and John C. Mitchell. "Client-Side Defense Against Web-Based Identity Theft." <http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/04/proceedings/Papers/Chou.pdf> (Accessed May 2013).

Federal Trade Commission. "Identity Theft." <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/index.html> (Accessed May 2013).

Frank, Mari J. "Identity Theft Prevention and Survival." <http://www.identitytheft.org> (Accessed May 2013).

Identity Theft Assistance Center. <http://www.identitytheftassistance.org> (Accessed May 2013).

Identity Theft Resource Center. "Working to Resolve Identity Theft." <http://www.idtheftcenter.org> (Accessed May 2013).

President's Task Force on Identity Theft. "Resources From the Government." <http://www.idtheft.gov> (Accessed May 2013).

goals related to one's group membership. Second, ideology is a set of beliefs that a society reinforces to its members to maximize control over the status quo with minimal conflict. Lying and deception play a role here when an individual and/or a society attempts to uphold these sets of beliefs. The first concept is related to how an individual deceives oneself, whereas the latter is related to how a society deceives its members.

Self-deception based on the first definition of ideology is exercised through cognitive control of individuals, both at the perceptual and conceptual levels of social judgments. Mass deception based on the second definition of ideology is exercised by symbols and cultural practices orienting people's understanding in such a way that they accept the current way of doing things. Psychologists advance knowledge about relationships between ideology and self-deception, while sociologists develop understanding about the interconnectedness of ideology and mass deception.

### Self-Deception: Ideology as a Perceptual Filter Toward the Social World

Self-deception based on one's ideological bias can be found from basic perceptual judgments to sophisticated higher order reasoning. Recent research in cognitive psychology sees ideological bias as a failure of information processing. This bias consists of stereotyped reasoning in which new information is distorted in order to make it conform to existing beliefs. People are far from the detached information processors that normative models of human judgments would prescribe. The term *bounded rationality* means that people are prone to systematic predictable cognitive biases. People are prone to systematic and predictable errors in making judgments and decisions because of ideological links between target judgments and the group to which the people feel they belong—in other words, revealing their "ideology-bounded rationality." People appear to be motivated by various factors to reach conclusions that color the self in a favorable position, leaving one immersed in self-deception.

Group affiliation can bias people to perceive the same stimulus differently and to draw inferences that protect and promote the interests of their in-group, as people derive their self-esteem in part from the meaningful groups to which

## Ideology

Ideology can be defined as two interrelated concept at an individual and a social level. First, it represents a set of beliefs that an individual holds to maintain one's identity and goals, especially

they belong. A classic demonstration of this self-deception based on social categorization can be found in Albert Hastorf and Hadley Cantril's "They saw a game" study. In this study, although students at Dartmouth and Princeton Universities viewed the same film of their respective school's football teams on November 23, 1951, it seemed from the results that they had watched two different games. While Dartmouth students tended to see Princeton's rule violations and Dartmouth's appropriate responses, Princeton students saw a continuing pattern of Dartmouth's rough play and occasional Princeton reprisals. The students from the two schools saw their side as the hero and the other side as the villain, regardless of reality.

As mentioned above, self-deception based on one's own desirable state of mind (ideology) is not only found in higher order reasoning, such as the fairness of play in a football game, but can also be found in perceptual judgments. For example, Emily Balcetis and David Dunning found that thirsty undergraduates see a water bottle in front of them located closer than it actually is. In relation to political ideology, Eugene Caruso and his colleagues have demonstrated that during the 2008 presidential campaign, Democrats perceived the face of Barack Obama to be lighter, whereas strong Republicans tended to see Obama's skin tone as darker than did liberals. Visual representations of the candidate fit coherently with the desire to see one's own group members positively.

This self-deception is not only the case for competitive contexts such as sports or politics. In a study by Jonathon Schuldt and Norbert Schwarz, people who identified themselves as caring more about proenvironmental values thought Oreo cookies made with organic flour and sugar had fewer calories than normal Oreo cookies. Obviously, however, the two products in actuality contain the same number of calories.

Contrary to the truism "seeing is believing," what actually happens is that "believing is seeing." People see what they want to see or see how they want to see. Self-deception based on ideology goes well beyond visual perception or conceptual judgments based on visual representation. Emerging works in motivated social cognition suggest that this perceptual distortion can happen in hearing, tasting, and even smelling. For example, organic and/or fair-trade chocolate tastes better



*A customer contemplates her selections in a chocolate shop in Zurich, March 2010. Research in motivated social cognition suggest that perceptual distortion can occur in the senses. For example, supporters of organic and/or fair-trade chocolate report that their ideologically supported chocolate tastes better.*

to those who are supporters of fair-trade policies. Even in the face of simple perceptual facts, people often find themselves falling prey to just plain wrong ideas, exhibiting self-deception because of ideology.

Self-deception as a consequence of ideology produces a variety of social psychological by-products as well. Ideological bias can lead people to pluralistic ignorance—an erroneous perception of the relationship between one's own opinions and those of the majority. Misreading public opinion consistent with one's own opinion, an individual is actually in the majority but falsely believes he or she is in the minority. This self-deception of opinion climate because of one's ideology can also happen the other way around, producing false consensus. False consensus is the inaccurate perception that other's beliefs are similar to one's own belief, when they are not similar in reality.

Taking a step forward, false consensus also includes seeing one's judgments and behavioral



decisions as more socially desirable and commonly accepted, while considering alternatives as inadequate and deviant. Projecting one's own ideology (beliefs and values) in seeing other's social judgments leads people to hold these self-deceptions about generalized others in a society. The cases of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus are well witnessed in American history. For example, a series of studies in the 1970s—when the racial conflict was at its peak in the United States—reported that while college students overestimated the support for affirmative action on campus, people depicted most Caucasians as being against racial equality in their communities.

### **Mass Deception: Ideology as Construction in the Service of Power**

Mass deception based on a society's need to maintain the pre-existing order goes back to Greek mythology. Myths provide answers and explanations for everyday questions. However, myths are not necessarily true but actually are more often fictional stories created in order to maintain order in society. Among Joseph Campbell's four functions of myth—the mystical (awe-inspiring), cosmological (describing the nature of the universe), sociological (supporting or validating certain social orders), and pedagogical (providing models for living) functions—the relevance of myth here pertains to the latter two, not the former two.

In the modern era myth gives way to ideology. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels employ the generic term *ideology* in order to explain how cultures are structured in ways that enable a group in a society to maintain control. Ideology does not necessarily refer only to a process in which groups deliberately plan to oppress people or alter their understanding about how their interpretations of the social world should be. Ideology can be more broadly defined as any attempt to naturalize social practices that have a deep historical origin.

Dominant social classes or institutions in society use symbol systems and social entities such as values and attitudes in such a way as to legitimize the current state, order, or power structures and make them seem “natural.” For example, an argument like “men are better at math and science, whereas women are better at languages” can be a strategic effort to naturalize alleged differences between women and men, naturalizing

the superiority of one gender. The historical roots of social expectations about men and women are deleted here, and what is left is an historical stereotype of gender roles. This is also the case for racism. It endorses social practices reflecting the belief that human beings can be categorized into distinct biological groups called race, which assign a certain group of people with specific “natural” attributes.

In contemporary society, ideology permeates the general public as mass deception through various channels. One of those outlets in which individuals can easily find ideology is popular culture, such as soap operas, movies, and popular music. For example, the movie *Independence Day*, which had a huge box-office success, depicts a war against the aliens from outer space with naturalizing racial differences through action-packed spectacle and computer graphics. In the movie, the three main characters—the president of United States, a scientist, and a soldier—struggle against the attacking aliens. Here, the president who takes charge in the war against the aliens is played by a white Caucasian actor; the scientist who uses his brain to attack the aliens is depicted as Jewish; and the soldier who is shown in most of the physical engagements (hand-to-hand fighting) against the aliens is played by an African American actor. The roles played by these three characters/actors reiterate cultural stereotypes about race and ethnicity, strengthening this ideology to its audience members.

In addition to media content, various social institutions play a significant role in molding cognitive and affective interpretations of the social world consistent with ideologies. Louis Althusser dubbed these social institutions, such as schools, churches, and even families, the “ideological state apparatus.” According to Antonio Gramsci, these institutions combined with cultural practices, such as literature and media entertainment, to provide hegemony (legitimacy) to certain ideas (ideologies).

Historically, ideology has been a focal point of criticism. The first critic of ideology was Napoleon Bonaparte. Specifically, he criticized the “ideologues,” meaning a group of theorists at the time that provided arguments based on the human need for self-serving illusion as opposed to the need for political reality. At first, the criticism was mainly about a detachment of theory from

reality (the discrepancy between an idea and how the social world works). Later, Marx and Engels employed the term *ideology* as an agent of “false consciousness.”

What is interesting about ideology as mass deception is the fact that an ideology can be called out as an ideology only when it is discovered as unnatural. This notion can be exemplified by the popular anecdote appearing in the movie *The Matrix*. People in *The Matrix* (signifying a society with mass deception based on ideology) do not realize that they live in the Matrix. If one takes the blue pill and stays in the state of “ignorance is bliss,” one cannot realize that one is succumbing to ideology. It is only when one takes the red pill that one can see the bitter reality.

Critical theorists have long tried to identify ideologies. For example, Roland Barthes analyzed the operation of the mass deception process based on ideology (social order) in everyday life with an example of a photograph on the magazine cover of *Paris Match*. The photo displays a young soldier in a French colonial country. The soldier, wearing the military uniform of France, is shown giving a salute to the French flag. On the surface, it is a young soldier from a French colonial country in his uniform. But in closer analysis, what the photo means, according to Barthes, is the ideology that France is a great nation; France gives an equal opportunity to its colonial people with no racial discrimination. The reason why it is difficult to call this out as ideology is because people often overlook its meaning and see it as a mere magazine photo.

### Conclusion

Ideology plays a significant role in both self-deception and mass deception. Although the very definitions and mechanisms by which ideology works in deception vary in terms of the level of analysis, both psychological and sociological approaches to the role of ideology in self- and mass deception reveal a crucial implication: Deception based on ideology can change human history. The reason why people should pay attention to and reflect on their own ideology with constant vigilance lies here.

Sungjong Roh  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Manipulation; Movies, Lying in; Myth; Napoleon Bonaparte; Projection; Rationality; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

- Eagleton, T. *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso, 1991.
- Edelman, M. *The Symbolic Uses of Oolitics*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1964.
- Gilovich, T. *How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life*. New York: The Free Press, 1993.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson, M. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

## Impression

Like a footprint pressed into the sand, where there is an impression, something remains in presence by virtue of its mark, as if it were the very essence of the thing. Thus, there are good impressions, false impressions—frightening, awkward, and ridiculous impressions—all sorts of impressions that persist as traces of the people, locations, or events they represent. Nothing can present all facets and perspectives of itself at once; even a dot on a page looks completely different under a microscope. Thus, we have only limited knowledge of things, only impressions to go by. As Ginsberg famously said, “America, this is the impression I get from looking in the television set.”

With respect to persons, this is also true. Others cannot know everything about who a person is; they cannot even know this of themselves. Nevertheless, they often take up momentary impressions, as if this solves the puzzle of the other person.

Common expressions such as “first impressions last,” and “be sure to make a good impression” exist because where first impressions succeed, they persist, and where they fail, it is hard to recover from them. For example, Mr. Darcy of *Pride and Prejudice*, originally titled *First Impressions*, initially seemed “the proudest, most disagreeable man in the world.”

Self-consciousness arises when individuals realize that others will and do form impressions of

them. In the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, being gathered as an impression in the eyes of another is referred to as subjection to “the look,” and an intention to perform an impression for others, a cliché of oneself, is referred to as “bad faith.” It is a tendency well illustrated in the movie *Annie Hall*, when subtitles reveal the impression anxieties of Alvy and Annie as they speak to each other.

### Success and Impression

There is much evidence that people believe they succeed if they impress. In romance, for example, impressions have been created in newspaper ads, video date services, telephone matchmaking services, speed-dating groups, and the more recent Web-based matchmakers. For the sake of impression, a person will wash and wax a car before selling it, detail a house before putting it on the market, and spend a day at the beautician before a date. Cosmetic surgery, designer homes, beauty creams, name brands, high fashion, jewelry, luxury automobiles, chrome rims, cigars, wines, and other forms of ornamentation evidence the concern with impression. Women augment their breasts and men graft their hair because they believe that success, however they conceive it, is more likely if they can create a winning impression. Some acts of war are done to create impressions awesome enough to paralyze an enemy, such as America’s “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq.

All such impression mongering is shaped by cultural context. The *izixolwanas* necklace, worn by women of the Ndebele tribe, provides an example of culturally specific ornamentation to create a winning impression, as do the bound feet of traditional Chinese women, or the corseted women of the West.

### False Impressions

The expression “put your best foot forward” is grounded in important folk wisdom with respect to impression: it takes for granted the notion that one can positively shape one’s image without resorting to falsehood. All the same, it is difficult to decide whether false impressions are given by a plumber in a tuxedo or Cinderella at the ball—they are grey area performances best governed by the expression “fake it till you make it.” However, not all cases are grey. The guitarist carrying

a guitar gives an accurate impression, and the boy with a false ID at the liquor store gives a false impression.

The issue of falsified impressions is thoroughly discussed as early as Plato, in writings such as *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, and *The Sophist*. In the *Gorgias* (462–66), for example, Socrates claims that the wise person will commit to four things: nutrition, fitness, divine law, and justice. Others can be fooled, however, by false impressions of these things. The impression of nutrition can be falsely given by or misrecognized as haute cuisine, and the impression of fitness can be falsely given by or misrecognized as self-adornment. The impression of divine law can be falsely given by or misrecognized as authoritarian pronouncement, and one can be steered from reasoning with justice by its deficient cousin, persuasion. Socrates’s words are relevant to political campaigning, advertising, public relations, and propaganda; yet they are also on display in individual lives. All the same, Socrates and Plato take a harder line on impression making than that taken either before or after them. Even drama was castigated as the creator of false impressions by Plato, and he would equally oppose any games that involved deception, unless they were part of training for warfare.

Creating false impressions by misrepresentation or lying is not uncommon. Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen, who was the author of more than 20 religious books, as well as a famous television and radio celebrity, and who is now well on his way through the process of Catholic sainthood, began falsely adding a second doctoral degree (his was a Ph.D., but he illicitly added the theological doctorates, alternating between the S.T.D. and the D.D.) to his list of titles, though he did not have either. One may not only create a false impression for oneself but even others by lying, as Iago does for Desdemona in the Shakespearean play *Othello*.

A false impression may have a high level of functionality, so long as it remains undetected. Bigamists, for example, are able to raise two families thanks to false impressions. It is not easy for falsifiers to create such illusions, but they may be aided by others who develop strategic blindness with respect to the façade in order to preserve the functional unreality. This is a form of conspiring

to preserve an illusion, or collusion. Deceptive impressions are always on the verge of collapse, however, and when they do, the real world created by their falsehoods may fall as well. Some economists believe that this is currently the case with respect to the American economy.

A poorly contrived false impression does the performer more harm than good because it ads impostor or sham to whatever is the list of vices already noticed by others. In Dickens, the transparent false impression reaches its apotheosis in *Copperfield's* Uriah Heep, who rubs his hands in ambitious greed while pronouncing that he is "so 'umble."

### Sham and the Falsified Impression

Sham is said to exist when people give false impressions of who or what they are. Thus, the unexpected camera at Ron Brown's funeral gave President Clinton's grief there the quality of sham by catching him swing from lightheartedness to tearfulness when he spotted it.

Sham is also used to create false impressions of feelings or thoughts. One can sham warmth, concern, joy, judiciousness, impartiality, or indignity—one can perform any emotion, gentility, or consideration as present when it is not present. All the same, the sales clerk who says "May I help you?" may very well want to help. She will only move toward a sham performance of her role when a substantial gap arises between her impulse to spontaneously self-express what she feels and her need to falsify an appearance. If, for example, she thinks the customers in her store are all women who refuse to face the fact that they have grown old, but she works on commission, she may be shamming when she says that one of them looks "10 years younger in that dress."

Sham is also used to move things along while preserving social grace. Thus, one can receive or give sham congratulations, thanks, compliments, or concern. Such sham moments allow social agents to skate over the thin ice of false intimacy, without having to address every corruption they encounter. Where interest is shammed (e.g., "What a delightful story!"), its recipient is expected to say, "Thank you, but I've kept you far too long." Where welcome is shammed (e.g., "Won't you sit down?"), the recipient is expected to construct a reason to keep moving. Where

invitation is shammed (e.g., "You're certainly welcome to come too!") the recipient is expected to be busy on the occasion of the event.

Generally, it is considered tactless to unmask a sham performance, and there are cultural sanctions against doing so. Calling out sham (which Erving Goffman was known to do) therefore requires power, naïveté, or anger so great that caution is thrown to the wind.

Sham performances are deceptive and false, but they cannot be reduced to lies in any facile manner, for falsehoods of this kind are governed by a variant of the mutual understanding that play is occurring between the agents involved. Much like flirting, in which participants give a false impression of their availability or interest while signaling in more nuanced ways that the faux seduction is a game, sham participants also signal to each other that they are being theatrical, as if to say "Let's fake our way through this awkward moment rather than address the explosive truth." Effectively, then, sham is a social norm, one customary manner of facilitating social process. This is what Queen Elizabeth did when she artfully gave the impression of being oblivious to Rene Levesque's chain smoking as they stood face-to-face (she turned her head when he inhaled). Levesque, who could not be without a cigarette, also played his part in shamming propriety by hiding the cigarette when it was not in his mouth and covering it with his hand when it was. Their tactful sham strained the very limits of impression management; nevertheless, it prevented any discussion of the status relations that might exist between the queen of the empire and the leader of the French separatists in the Canadian province of Quebec.

### Black Sham

Living sham as if it is real can create havoc for both persons and communities. Unhappy couples may sham an impression of happiness, only to extend the time that they are miserable together. Parents may sham feelings toward their children, only to give their children a deep sense of life's hypocrisy. Such acts were identified as "black shams" by cultural anthropologist Jules Henry.

The term *black sham* is somewhat dated, but the idea it characterizes is quite alive. "Don't ask, don't tell," for example, repealed in 2010,



advocated shamming sexual reality in the military, thereby exacting an overwhelming burden on the identity of gay soldiers at both a psychological and social level. To be instructed to deceive by one's government as a condition for employment is dark in precisely the way Henry used the term. Yet, the institutionally mandated gay closet is but an example of how persons may suppress imminent selfhood to create a normative impression, and this can wreak havoc on identity. A person whose true self has been long hidden behind strategic impressions may say, "I am a sham."

Those who build their lives with sham are rewarded with sham lives. The pretend person lives in a pretend house, engages in pretend pleasures, has a pretend spouse, and socializes in pretend ways with pretend friends; in the midst of all this, there is no place for the real person already lost in the house of mirrors. This is the theme of Kurt Vonnegut's *Mother Night* and the meaning of his aphorism "We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be." To lose oneself in the middle of giving the impression one is something else—this is the poison of black sham.

Robert Wade Kenny  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Collusion; False Advertising; False Signals; Marketing, Deceptive; Othello Effect.

### Further Readings

- Bourdieu, P. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. New York: Routledge, 1979.  
Henry, J. *On Sham, Vulnerability, and Other Forms of Self-Deception*. New York: Random House, 1973.  
Reeves, T. C. *America's Bishop: The Life and Times of Fulton J. Sheen*. New York: Encounter Books, 2001.

## Inca Empire

Deception played a key role in the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. The conquistador Francisco Pizarro's dishonesty was an essential element

in the capture and execution of Atahualpa, the Inca emperor, in 1532. After the conquest, the mistrust between the Spanish and Inca people grew and deeply influenced their interactions.

### Pizarro's Deception

The Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire was led by Pizarro, who arrived in Peru in 1532 with 169 Spanish soldiers. During this time, the Inca Empire was in the midst of a war of succession. A civil war had broken out between two brothers, Atahualpa and Huáscar, which greatly weakened the empire by the time the Spanish conquest began. Atahualpa won the civil war and took Huáscar as a prisoner. Despite the empire's weakened state, Pizarro's forces were small, so careful planning on his part was necessary in order for his conquest to be successful.

Pizarro strategically deceived Atahualpa, the ruler, on more than one occasion in order to gain the upper hand. Upon hearing of Pizarro's arrival, Atahualpa was unsure as to whether he should consider the Spanish as thieves and murderers or as gods. Atahualpa avoided being deceived into believing Pizarro was a god when he heard scout reports of the violence that Pizarro's forces inflicted upon the local people. Atahualpa decided that he should trap and murder Pizarro.

At this point, Pizarro organized a meeting with Atahualpa. When they met, Atahualpa explained the reports he heard, which led to Pizarro's first significant act of deception: Pizarro denied the reports of his military actions. Because Atahualpa had no substantiated information, he decided to meet with Pizarro again in Cajamarca rather than execute his original plan to murder Pizarro. Whether or not Atahualpa trusted Pizarro at this point is unclear, but Pizarro's deception and denial of his actions was one of the main factors that kept him alive after their meeting.

The following day, Atahualpa entered Cajamarca with between 3,000 and 7,000 men, and approached the Spaniards with unarmed forces as a sign of goodwill. In contrast, Pizarro strategically placed his armed forces around the square where the meeting would take place. During their conversation, both sides grew impatient as neither side fully understood the other's requests. Eventually, Pizarro signaled his men to attack, which began the Battle of Cajamarca. Having

never seen horses or gunfire before, Atahualpa's men offered virtually no resistance against the Spanish cavalry charges, and Atahualpa was successfully captured. Pizarro's forces suffered very few casualties.

Once captured, Atahualpa was held in what became known as the ransom room in Cajamarca. Atahualpa offered to fill the room with gold and to give twice that amount in silver in exchange for his freedom. This is when Pizarro's next significant act of deception occurred. Pizarro accepted Atahualpa's offering, and received the payment in gold and silver, but did not release him. Some sources argue that Atahualpa's payments were not intended as a ransom payment but as an attempt to avoid being killed. Regardless, Pizarro deceived Atahualpa by falsely agreeing to fulfill his requests in exchange for the payments. Atahualpa was executed days later.

### Mistrust After the Conquest

After the conquest, mistrust between the Spanish and Inca people increased, and conflicts regarding record keeping arose. The Incas had developed their own system of maintaining records, known as *quipus*. These were simply bundles of cords, with knots made along the cords to record different things. Each community in the empire would appoint people as the record keepers, known as *quipucamayocs*, who would keep track of tribute payments, livestock, food, and any other item or activity that needed recording. The Incas placed great trust in the quipus, and quipucamayocs' testimonies and records were used in court trials.

This confidence deteriorated after the conquest because the Spanish did not understand how to read the quipus, and so they had to take the Inca record keepers' word about what the quipus said. At first, the Spanish were willing to listen to the quipucamayocs; however, the Spanish had their own bookkeeping methods, and these records began to conflict with those of the Incas. The Spanish became less willing to trust in the quipucamayocs and their records, and instances of deception arose in which the quipus played key roles.

Spanish chroniclers began to describe situations in which the local people demanded payments from Spanish governors for food they provided. The local people, however, were aware that

these demands for payments were usually met with compromises and that they would receive less than what they requested. As a result, Spanish chroniclers described how local people began to record larger payments in their quipus than what they were actually owed, so that when a compromise was reached with the governor, they would receive full payment.

There were also doubts regarding the accuracy of the Spanish notarial records. Even the Spanish monarch, Philip II, became aware of the lack of truthfulness in notarial records, and Spanish reports described how unqualified people were often appointed as notaries. Because of these conflicting reports, it is difficult to know for sure which side was initially deceitful in its accounting methods. However, regardless of who was to blame initially, the conflicts created by the quipus became important enough that in 1583, the Third Council of Lima ordered that all quipus be destroyed.

After the council's order, the quipus were used for a new, and often deceptive, purpose. Priests encouraged the local people to record their sins using quipus and to bring these records to confession. These quipus used cords and knots of different colors to represent different types of sins. This practice was encouraged at first, but the clergy soon realized that the local people were creating quipus and passing them along from one confessant to another, making it easier to lie about sins during confession. Once the priests realized this was happening, they devised methods of detecting this form of deception. They developed different interrogation techniques, such as asking the confessants more detailed questions about their sins in order to make sure that they were not being deceitful.

### Conclusion

Deception played an important role in the fall of the Inca Empire. The Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, led by Francisco Pizarro, involved the strategic use of deception that ultimately led to the emperor Atahualpa's capture and execution. After the conquest, the Spanish had to contend with Inca accounting methods. Unable to understand these techniques, the Spanish began to distrust the records kept by the local people. However, Spanish chroniclers report that

the Spanish notarial records were also untrustworthy. Deceit in record keeping from both the Spanish and the Inca people was a source of conflict that led to the elimination of quipus from official record keeping.

Juan Pablo Sarmiento  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Colonialism; History of Deception; Ancient Civilizations; Native Americans; Spanish-American Conquests.

### Further Readings

- Hemming, John. *The Conquest of the Incas*. Boston: Mariner Books, 2003.
- MacQuarrie, Kim. *The Last Days of the Incas*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.
- Means, Philip A. *Fall of the Inca Empire and the Spanish Rule in Peru*. New York: Gordian Press, 1964.
- Urton, Gary. "Tying the Truth in Knots." In *Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

## Infidelity

What constitutes an act of infidelity depends upon the exclusivity expectations within a relationship. Regardless of whether this act of cheating, adultery, or having an affair with someone other than one's partner refers to physical encounters, such as sexual intercourse or kissing, or a deep emotional attachment, deception is an integral part of infidelity. In order to successfully maintain an illicit affair, an individual must be able to keep the knowledge of his or her cheating away from the spouse or partner. The extent to which they are successful in doing so often decides the course and time span of the infidelity. While many people believe the worst part of infidelity is the physical or emotional cheating, individuals who have been cheated on often say that the hardest part of the situation to overcome is the lying and deception their partners' engage

in to hide the affair. The lies that accompany infidelity not only can shatter the trust between partners in a relationship, they can also shatter the victim's belief in his or her own ability to see people for who they really are and to know what is the "truth."

### The Lies Cheaters Tell

One of the things that makes recovering from lies told to hide an infidelity so challenging is that, when cheating occurs, self-protective lies are often told under the guise of protecting the relationship. Often the unfaithful spouse claims to have lied to their partner in order to protect him or her from being hurt. For example, most victims of cheating partners are told, "I didn't tell you because I didn't want to ruin our marriage and family." While this may not be completely untrue, much if not most of the motivation for lying about cheating stems from a desire to protect the self from censure for bad behavior and the accompanying punishment. If spouses truly desire to protect their marriage and family, they are unlikely to be engaged in an ongoing extradyadic affair. Even when the perpetrator truly believes that he or she is lying in order to protect the partner or relationship, at least part of their motivation is to downplay their own culpability and the seriousness of their actions, as if the partner not finding out about the affair somehow makes the affair itself less problematic. Most often though, the perpetrator is focused on trying to avoid as much conflict as possible while at the same time trying to maintain a self-image as a good person.

Second, lies told in romantic relationship situations are rarely one-offs. One of the problems with lying in these types of relationships is that once the individual starts lying, he or she has to keep up the pretense. The lies cheaters tell are complex and occur over a longer period of time than many other deception-related transgressions. In an ongoing affair, steps must be taken to hide the contact between the cheater and the extradyadic partner. E-mails, texts, phone calls, monetary expenditures, mysterious disappearances, and unexpected sightings by third parties must all be explained to the unsuspecting (or suspecting) relationship partner. These lies must build upon one another to form a cohesive story that will, the perpetrator hopes, protect the affair

from being discovered. The problem is that these lies frequently come back to haunt the teller, who must then remember the lie, repeat the lie, and likely tell even more lies to maintain the original deception. This is particularly true with complex lies in which the lies are being told in order to continue with a deceitful behavior, such as an ongoing infidelity.

Third, the lies people tell and deceptions people enact in courtship and relationship infidelity situations vary from those told to strangers and acquaintances in at least two other vital ways. While most research on lying treats this type of deception as an individual act committed by one person upon an unknowing party, there are some relational circumstances in which the receiver or target of the lie is directly involved in its perpetration.

The first type of jointly constructed lie is known as *connivance*. In these cases, for whatever reason, the target of the lie chooses to pretend that he or she does not know that deception is being practiced by his or her partner, when in fact he or she is acutely aware of the deception. This form of deception may arise for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which is that the victim cannot or will not leave the cheater and does not expect the cheater to change. A partner or spouse in this situation may choose to “ignore” the infidelity and the lies that accompany it, pretending to believe the stories being told by the cheater in order to avoid having to deal with the root causes of the infidelity or simply to avoid conflict and remain in the relationship. Connivance can also arise if a partner believes he or she is somehow to blame for the partner’s cheating behavior or that the cheating is somehow filling a gap in the relationship.

The second jointly constructed lie is known as *collusion*. In collusion, the teller and receiver of the lie agree in advance to collaborate in deception. In terms of infidelity, this type of collusion is thought to have occurred when one partner tells the other up front that if he or she has an affair, “do not tell me about it.” In essence this means, “If you have an affair I want you to lie to me about it.” This type of joint deception is often used when the punishment for telling the truth may well equal the punishment for lying about the action. In theory, collusion allows the victim

to remain ignorant not only of the infidelity but also of any problematic issues in the relationship. On the other hand, it essentially gives the cheater a license to cheat—as long as he or she does not get caught.

### Unmasking Infidelity

Contrary to the beliefs held by most cheaters entering into an affair, many infidelities are discovered. Complicated webs of lies are difficult to maintain over time, so often the finely tuned scenario implodes, leaving a partner betrayed. The method of discovery that leads to the least damage is one in which the cheating partner confesses to the affair without being caught or even accused. The shorter the amount of time that elapses between the cheating and the confessing, the better it is for the cheater and his or her spouse. This rarely happens, however. Most infidelities are discovered when the cheater confesses after being accused by his or her partner, when a third party observes the cheaters and reports this activity to the spouse/partner, or when the cheater is “caught in the act.” The latter modes of discovery, not surprisingly, result in the highest levels of damage to the relationship and drastically increase the difficulty of obtaining forgiveness and reconciliation.

When an infidelity is not uncovered, however, it is usually not because of a lack of clues, but because of the spouse engaging in truth bias. People generally believe that they are much better and more successful liars than their partners. When they aren’t sure if their partner is lying or not, they consistently err on the side of extending him or her the benefit of the doubt. This suggests that people are in essence good at recognizing the truth and poor at recognizing (or accepting) their partner’s attempts at deception.

When suspicious, however, the betrayed partner will often engage in deceptive acts in order to uncover their partner’s infidelity. Secretly hiring private investigators; surreptitiously checking the cheating partner’s e-mail, cell phone, and global positioning system (GPS); and following the partner in the hope of catching him or her “red-handed” are common tactics used by suspicious spouses who are motivated to uncover the truth about their partner’s faithfulness. The betrayed partner will often justify these covert actions as being less serious than the actions that



precipitated them, suggesting that by lying in the first place the cheating partner has forfeited his or her right to privacy. While many people would agree with this perspective, the reality is that many “snooping spouses” end up feeling bad about their undercover activities regardless of what information they are able to unearth.

### The Aftermath of Infidelity Discovery

Once an affair, sexual or emotional, has been discovered decisions must be made by the couple as to how to proceed. Infidelity was the impetus for approximately 50 percent of couples



*Contrary to the beliefs held by most cheaters who engage in an affair, many infidelities are discovered, such as when they are caught in the act. This mode of discovery results in one of the highest levels of damage to the relationship and drastically increases the difficulty of obtaining forgiveness and reconciliation.*

entering relationship counseling. Hurt feelings, negotiating the disclosure of further details, and issues with trust, communication, and intimacy must all be addressed if the couple has chosen to try and repair their relationship. One of the stumbling blocks many couples experience during this time is the systematic variation in the ways that perpetrators and victims view transgressions. Research has shown that victims tend to view transgressions of all types significantly more negatively than do the perpetrators of these transgressions.

Perpetrators often try to downplay the seriousness of their actions, an approach which victims of infidelity find particularly offensive. For example, while the common perpetrator refrain “it meant nothing to me” is intended to reassure the victim that the impact of the infidelity on the relationship was minimal, it often has the opposite effect of hurting the victim even more. Perpetrators will also try to isolate the incident, suggesting it was a one-time (or at least one-partner) aberration, or blame the affair on their spouse (“I wouldn’t have done it if you were nicer to me”) or the extradyadic (“She seduced me”).

Victims, on the other hand, are more likely to broaden the incident (“You’ve lied to me about other things in the past”), doubt the perpetrators’ truthfulness in claiming there have been and will be no other affairs, and be highly offended by the suggestion that they are somehow responsible for their partners’ unfaithfulness. Honesty and “the truth,” therefore, are very much in the eyes of the beholder, and perpetrators of infidelity can and should expect that their partner will be highly suspicious of any claims they make to positive or improving behaviors. Full and honest disclosure of pertinent information and future transparency of actions, thoughts, and issues are necessary components of recovery from the trauma of deception and infidelity.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
*University of Prince Edward Island*

**See Also:** Cheating; Collusion; Confession; Courtship, Deception in; Deception and Trust; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Distrust; Lies, Types of; Lying, Costs of; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual.

### Further Readings

- Firestone, R., L. Firestone, and J. Catlett. *Sex and Love in Intimate Relationships*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008.
- Glass, S. *Not "Just Friends": Rebuilding Trust and Recovering Your Sanity After Infidelity*. Toronto: Free Press, 2004.
- Olmstead, Spencer, Ryan Blick, and Lilbourne Mills. "Helping Couples Work Toward the Forgiveness of Marital Infidelity: Therapists' Perspectives." *The American Journal of Family Therapy*, v.37.1 (2009).

## Information Manipulation Theory 1

Information manipulation theory (IMT) is a theory of deception authored by Steven McCornack that describes the nature of deceptive message design and the inferential process through which deceivers dupe listeners. IMT suggests that when people mislead others, they play with or "manipulate" information along multiple dimensions in myriad ways. These information dimensions align with the conversational maxims proposed by philosopher Paul Grice as undergirding conversational sense-making and implicature generation.

IMT has its roots in McCornack's doctoral dissertation. For his data collection, McCornack had a sample of college students report situations in which they had lied to romantic partners. McCornack then edited these situations (replacing the original names with gender neutral names; changing the tense from past to present) and administered them to a different sample—asking participants to write what they actually would say if they were in that situation. Based on previous research involving recollected messages, McCornack presumed that his data would be easily codable as "truths," "lies," "concealments," and other descriptions. However, the message variation in his data defied extant taxonomies. This poorness of fit caused McCornack to rethink how deceptive messages can best be described. He concluded that deceptive messages should be

conceptualized multidimensionally rather than as categorical "types."

### Dimensions of Information Manipulation

McCornack argued that deceptive messages involve two broad dimensions of information manipulation: the amount of relevant information that is (or is not) disclosed, and whether the information that is disclosed is truthful or distorted. This two-dimensional model of deceptive message design (that is, Amount  $\times$  Type) was presented as a conference paper at the Speech Communication Association (SCA) conference in 1988, "The Logic of Lying: A Rational Approach to the Production of Deceptive Messages."

Subsequently, McCornack revised his two-dimensional model to include four dimensions of information manipulation, based on Grice's theory of conversational implicature. The revised model was presented at an SCA conference in 1990 ("Lying as a Pragmatic Phenomenon: A Theoretical Framework for Addressing Deceptive Message Design") and subsequently was published as "Information Manipulation Theory" (or "IMT") in *Communication Monographs* in 1992.

### Violations of Conversational Maxims

IMT argues that during everyday conversations, people orient to four "Gricean" maxims: quantity (the amount of relevant information that is shared), quality (the veracity of shared information), manner (the way in which disclosed information is expressed), and relation (the relevance of disclosed information). People expect that these maxims will be adhered to as a part of the broader norm governing rational and coherent human discourse, which Paul Grice labeled the cooperative principle (CP): "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."

In cases of deception, however, people exploit this expectation of cooperativeness. As McCornack describes, "It is the principal claim of information manipulation theory that messages that are commonly thought of as deceptive derive from covert violations of the conversational maxims. Because the speaker purposefully violates one (or more) of the maxims, s/he deviates from what can

be considered rational and cooperative behavior (i.e., behavior that adheres to the CP). Because the violation is not made apparent to the listener, the listener is misled by her/his assumption that the speaker is adhering to the CP and its maxims.”

The message-design implication of IMT is that people have at their disposal an indefinite number of ways they can play with or “manipulate” information in order to deceive others. As McCornack described in the conclusion, “Given that conversational interactants possess expectations regarding information quantity, quality, manner, and relevance, it is possible for speakers to violate any or all of these expectations in attempting to deceive listeners.”

Several additional implications for research and scholars in the field of deception derive from IMT. First, and arguably most important, natural discourse does not take the form of dichotomous “truths” and “lies.” Instead, most messages fall somewhere “in between” these two (comparatively rare) types, and most deceptive messages involve both truthful and false information elements. Second, people commonly deceive others through the presentation of messages composed entirely of truthful information—but that leave out key elements of relevant information (that is, quantity violations). Third, scholars of deception should abandon categorical coding schemes that force fit observed messages into “types” or that experimentally manipulate dichotomous characterizations of messages (for example, studies that pit “bald-faced truths” versus “bald-faced lies”). Instead, scholars should focus their analytical attention upon naturally occurring messages, then code these messages in terms of the multiple dimensions of information that flow within them.

### Critiques of Information Manipulation Theory

Immediately following the publication of “Information Manipulation Theory,” two sets of scholars offered substantial critiques. Scott Jacobs and his colleagues argued that IMT misrepresented Grice, in that deception isn’t caused by violations of Grice’s maxims per se but instead by the deceptive implicatures that such violations trigger. Dave Buller and Judee Burgoon suggested that rather than the four information dimensions conceptualized by Grice and embraced by IMT,

in fact five information dimensions exist along which deceivers manipulate information—the additional dimension being “immediacy.”

In 1997, McCornack offered his own critique of IMT, arguing that “IMT is not actually a theory at all: it provides no testable propositions or falsifiable hypotheses, hence, fails to meet the established criteria for viable social scientific theory.” In 2012, on the 20th anniversary of the publication of the original IMT, McCornack sought to rectify this shortcoming by presenting a propositional theory of deceptive discourse production rooted in the arguments of the original IMT, dubbed “IMT2.”

Steven McCornack  
Michigan State University

**See Also:** Information Manipulation Theory 2; McCornack, Steven; McCornack-Parks Model.

### Further Readings

- Buller, D. B. and J. K. Burgoon. “Interpersonal Deception Theory.” *Communication Theory*, v.6 (1996).
- Grice, H. P. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Jacobs, S., E. J. Dawson, and D. Brashers. “Information Manipulation Theory: A Replication and Assessment.” *Communication Monographs*, v.63 (1996).
- McCornack, S. A. “The Generation of Deceptive Messages: Laying the Groundwork for a Viable Theory of Interpersonal Deception.” In *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, J. O. Greene, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
- McCornack, S. A. “Information Manipulation Theory.” *Communication Monographs*, v.59 (1992).
- McCornack, S. A. “The Logic of Lying: A Rational Approach to the Production of Deceptive Messages.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans, LA, November 1988.
- McCornack, S. A. “Lying as a Pragmatic Phenomenon: A Theoretical Framework for Addressing Deceptive Message Design.” Paper presented at the 1990 meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Chicago, November 1990.

- McCornack, S. A. and K. Morrison. "Information Manipulation Theory 2: Explicating the Production Architecture Underlying Deceptive Discourse." Paper presented at the 2012 meeting of the National Communication Association, Orlando, FL, November 2012.
- Metts, S. and H. Chronis. "Relational Deception: An Exploratory Analysis." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, Chicago, May 1986.
- Turner, R. E., C. Edgley, and G. Olmstead. "Information Control in Conversations: Honesty Is Not Always the Best Policy." *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, v.11 (1975).

## Information Manipulation Theory 2

Information manipulation theory 2 (or IMT2) is a propositional theory of deceptive discourse production, originally presented at the National Communication Association conference in November 2012. Rooted in extant research and theory on cognitive science, speech production, and artificial intelligence models of problem solving, IMT2 explicates the production architecture underlying deceptive discourse and then presents a series of 15 testable propositions.

IMT2 is an elaboration of arguments presented by Steven McCornack in two previous works: his journal article "Information Manipulation Theory" and a chapter on deceptive message production written for *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, edited by John O. Greene. In his article on IMT, McCornack suggested that when deceiving others, people play with or "manipulate" information along multiple dimensions in myriad ways that align with the conversational maxims proposed by philosopher Paul Grice. However, because such manipulations are covert rather than overt, listeners are misled.

In his book chapter, McCornack proposed that the production of deceptive discourse can best be characterized as a process of opportunistic problem-solving in which individuals reason through difficult situations, and opt to manipulate information

as the most efficient solution for resolving gaps between current problematic states and desired end states. Similar to these earlier offerings, IMT2 conceptually frames deception as involving the covert manipulation of information along multiple dimensions, and as a contextual problem-solving activity driven by the desire for quick, efficient, and viable communicative solutions.

The cognitive discourse-production architecture posited by IMT2 derives from six sources: the theorizing of linguist George Zipf; the blackboard model of problem-solving suggested by H. Penny Nii; principles of design theory forwarded by Vinod Goel and Peter Pirolli; Bernard Baars's global workspace theory; Theo Herrmann's Mannheim model of speech production; and the work of Gary Dell, Franklin Chang, and Zenzi Griffin on lexical encoding patterns.

From these sources, six foundational premises about the nature of the mind, discourse production in general, and deception in particular undergird IMT2: (1) given its frequency, deceptive discourse must present cognitive efficiency advantages over truth-telling; (2) deception derives from opportunistic problem-solving; (3) message design decisions that guide communicative output are driven largely by memory retrieval, not top-down reasoning; (4) deceptive discourse—like all discourse—is not produced as discrete, unitary "messages" in a sequential, linear fashion, but instead results from a series of "microbursts" of mental activity, consisting of cyclical processing, as consciousness interacts with unconscious, modular subsystems including memory, motivations, and speech production; (5) discourse production begins with the construction of a cognitive representation of the situation, which activates relevant information in memory; and (6) the production of spoken discourse occurs incrementally, with the "front end" of utterances being spoken as the "tail ends" are still being designed.

Synthesizing these disparate influences into a coherent whole, IMT2 suggests a multistage architecture of deceptive discourse production. First, a cognitive representation of the "current state" is constructed that activates associated information within memory, in a spreading-activation fashion, feeding a "propositional base" of information potentially relevant for disclosure. Second, this situational representation is compared



against a desired end state, based upon conscious and unconscious goals, motives, and intentions. Third, an “action course” through the “problem space” is plotted, based largely on efficiency of solution. Fourth, truthful information within the propositional base that efficiently resolves current-state/end-state discrepancies is fed to speech production in the form of lemmas (nonphonological cognitive representations of words), that are then translated into phonological form and output as spoken discourse. Fifth, current-state/end-state discrepancies that cannot be resolved efficiently through disclosure of truthful information will be resolved by suppressing the information, veiling it through ambiguous word forms, or presenting false information. Sixth, in instances of false-information disclosure, information will be fed to speech production that is most easily accessible, based on memory activation deriving from the cognitive representation of the situation.

Most important, rather than being sequential, linear, and static, this entire process is cyclical, dynamic, and incremental. The cognitive constructs of “current state” and “current-state/end-state discrepancies” will be constantly shifting and evolving, based on changes in the context, listener feedback, and the speech being produced. Utterances are constructed incrementally, as cognition repeatedly cycles through sampling-activated information in memory, the contextual surrounds, and current-state/end-state discrepancies. Put differently, streams of truthful and deceptive discourse are not the result of a linear message production process; instead, this discourse is the result of a series of microbursts of cyclical mental activity among conjoined cognitive modules, the output of which is fed through consciousness incrementally to speech production.

### Propositions of IMT2

The 15 propositions that derive from this architecture range widely in focus. For example, Proposition 3 makes clear that “Because the same speech production system governs both truthful and deceptive discourse, no lexical differences exist between truthful and deceptive discourse.” Proposition 7 clarifies the following:

The comparative cognitive load associated with the production of truthful versus deceptive

discourse is not contingent upon the truth or falsity of the information units disclosed; but instead, is based upon the gap between information units activated within memory, the functional demands of the context, and the desired end state—that is, the difficulty of reasoning through the perceived problem space toward a viable solution.

Arguably, the three most controversial suppositions of IMT2 are the rejection of the widespread presumption that cognitive load is higher when deceiving than truth-telling; the notion that information difficulty (poorness of fit between truth and desired end states) drives deceptive discourse, rather than an a priori, top-down decision to deceive; and the rejection of “message” as a meaningful construct that exists anywhere in the production process.

IMT2 argues that in instances in which the truthful information is nonproblematic, truth-telling will generally occur. However, when truthful information is perceived as problematic, disclosing it in a way that achieves desired end-states will actually be more load-inducing than manipulating information. In fact, this is precisely why people manipulate information—because it is easier to do so. What’s more, the conscious “decision to deceive” actually occurs parallel to, or even after, the problem-solving module of the mind already has determined that the most efficient solution to the current context is manipulation of information. Finally, because incrementality in utterance construction is the norm for spoken discourse, at no time in the deceptive discourse production process does a unitary “message” (in toto) exist.

Although IMT2 did not posit specific hypotheses, the 15 propositions presented therein lent themselves to straightforward testing in ways that the authors judged to be self-evident. The authors currently are conducting a line of research testing these propositions.

Steven McCornack  
*Michigan State University*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Information Manipulation Theory 1; McCornack, Steven; McCornack-Parks Model; Mental Effort in Lying.

### Further Readings

- Baars, B. J. *A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Baars, B. J. “In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, a Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness.” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, v.4 (1997).
- Baars, B. J. and S. Franklin. “An Architectural Model of Conscious and Unconscious Brain Functions: Global Workspace Theory and IDA.” *Neural Networks*, v.20 (2007).
- Goel, V. and P. Pirolli. “The Structure of Design Problem Spaces.” *Cognitive Science*, v.16 (1992).
- Grice, H. P. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- McCornack, S. A. “The Generation of Deceptive Messages: Laying the Groundwork for a Viable Theory of Interpersonal Deception.” In *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, J. O. Greene, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
- McCornack, S. A. “Information Manipulation Theory.” *Communication Monographs*, v.59 (1992).
- Nii, H. P. “The Blackboard Model of Problem-Solving and the Evolution of Blackboard Architectures.” *Artificial Intelligence Magazine*, v.7/2 (1986).
- Nii, H. P. “Blackboard Systems.” In *The Handbook of Artificial Intelligence*, Vol. 4, A. Barr, P. R. Cohen, and E. A. Feigenbaum, eds. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989.
- Vrij, A., R. Fisher, S. Mann, and S. Leal. “A Cognitive Load Approach to Lie Detection.” *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*, v.5 (2008).
- Zipf, G. K. *Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1949.

In the insect world, the better the liar, the more likely that insect will live another day to survive, eat, and reproduce. In nature, lying and deception are essential to life.

Most often, deception requires higher cognitive processes than does honesty. According to P. Sadowski, deception necessitates an awareness of “other systems’ internal states.” In nature, however, deception most likely remains the result of natural selection and years of adaption instead of cognitive processes. In terms of natural selection, insects utilize deception as a form of defense for survival. Insects use deception in two main forms for survival and reproduction: camouflage and mimicry.

### Camouflage

Camouflage—also known as crypsis—provides insects the ability to blend in with their surroundings in order to protect themselves from predators. Various types of insects employ numerous methods of concealment and disguise based on their environment as well as natural selection. Some camouflage strategies include using markings to match the color and pattern of the background, while others require insects to change their color to match their background, allowing the organisms to blend in and remain hidden from predators.

While all camouflage serves to disguise insects from their prey, there are various and specific types of camouflage. According to M. Stevens and S. Merrilaita, there are six main types of camouflage: (1) background matching, in which the insect visually matches its surroundings; (2) self-shadow concealment, in which the creation of shadows is cancelled out by countershading; (3) obliterative shading, which obstructs an insect’s detection using a three-dimensional form; (4) disruptive coloration, in which the insect’s markings give the appearance of false edges and boundaries, which obstructs the recognition of an object’s true shape or form; (5) flicker-fusion camouflage, in which markings such as stripes confuse a predator by blurring the insect during motion and matching the insect’s surroundings; and (6) distractive markings, which direct the “attention” of the predator from traits that would give away the type of insect (such as the outline of the insect).

## Insects

From childhood on, society, storybooks, and fairy tales encourage children to “never tell a lie.” Young children and adults are taught to strive for trustworthiness through truth-telling and honesty and that lying results in distrust and hurt feelings. But in nature, a remarkably different story is told.

## Mimicry

While it is similar to camouflage, mimicry does not simply allow insects to hide from predators but instead allows the insect to look like another, less palatable insect or organism. According to *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, mimicry, by definition, is the insect's ability to imitate another organism or thing; it is a superficial resemblance of one organism to another, which provides protection from attack. For insects, mimicry serves as a swindle or a cheat to deter against predators.

Currently, there are three recognized types of mimicry: Batesian mimicry, Mullerian mimicry, and aggressive mimicry. In 1862, Henry Bates closely studied the phenomenon of insect mimicry and proposed that the model (the insect being mimicked) uses poisonous fluid or a stinger to deter prey. Bates posited that vulnerable or unprotected insects mimic potentially dangerous insects to deter and threaten predators, a concept more prominently known as Batesian mimicry.

Batesian mimicry holds that because of evolution, the insect that has the same shape or color as the toxic insect it is mimicking will deter predators because predators will have learned to avoid prey (through negative experience) that share the qualities of toxic or poisonous insects. For instance, *Cathedra serrate*, a saw-nosed plant hopper insect, will initially utilize camouflage and blend in with its surroundings, but if a predator persists in targeting its prey, the insect will reveal large red spots on its body that could be mistaken for the eyes of a larger animal, thus frightening the predator.

Another specific kind of mimicry known as Mullerian mimicry was coined by Fritz Müller in 1878. Mullerian mimicry exists when two or more poisonous species that may or may not be related mimic each other's warning signals. In this type of mimicry, all prey benefit because the predator needs only to be able to identify one type as unappetizing. This deception will then compel the predator to identify the rest of the mimicking insects as unappetizing as well because they all utilize the same color schemes and patterns.

Not only do insects use mimicry to deter predation, but adaptation has also allowed insects to practice mimicry in order to become better predators, a concept known as "aggressive


mimicry." With aggressive mimicry, insects share similar signals and traits as a harmless insect, which disguises them as harmless and unable to be correctly identified by their prey. Aggressive mimicry is in fact a direct contrast to defensive mimicry in that the insect strives to look innocent and harmless as opposed to toxic. Spiders (technically not insects), for example, are known for their displays of aggressive mimicry. Species such as *Argiope argentata* spin zig-zag patterns in the middle of their webs that reflect ultraviolet light, thus mimicking the pattern seen in many flowers. These patterns attract prey such as bees and other bugs.

Insects can also use similar forms of aggressive mimicry to avoid predation. Other forms of aggressive mimicry allow insects to attract a mate or to snag their next meal. For example, the female firefly of the genus *Photuris* will lure male fireflies by using flashing signals typical of other firefly species, luring the male closer to her in order to mate and subsequently devouring him. At the same time, the male species of this firefly has his own deceptive flashing technique with which he attracts the same females for mating.

Whether it is used to deter predators or attract mates, mimicry entails certain rules and guidelines. According to B. H. Purser, a mimicking insect must adhere to the following constraints in order to be effective: (1) The mimic must be more vulnerable than the model, (2) mimics and models must have easily identifiable color patterns and color schemes, (3) mimics and models must share the same habitat and region, and (4) models and mimics must possess similar behavioral patterns.

To mimic unpalatable prey, the mimic utilizes aposematic coloration, which includes blacks, yellows, reds, or oranges. These colors are often understood in nature as toxic or poisonous, which can deter predation. Moreover, it is important that mimics do not become overabundant in any given habitat because predators might not learn of their distaste for the insect, thus causing increased predation of mimic and model.

Insects not only use mimicry to visually imitate their model, but some insects have also developed the ability to audibly mimic their model as well. For instance, a syrphid fly not only looks like the yellow-jacket wasp that it mimics, but



The stick insect *Ctenomorpha chronus* (left), endemic to southern Australia, moves very little during the day, remaining in trees or bushes where they can barely be distinguished from the sticks surrounding them. A walking leaf insect in La Pura Vida, Costa Rica (right) mimics the shape and spots of the plants it eats. Mimicry allows the insect to look like another, less palatable insect or organism.

it can use its wings to mimic the sound of the yellow jacket's wings in flight. Additionally, Tiger moths are able to fool bats by tuning into the sounds that bats use to communicate and respond with their own ultrasonic sounds. The sounds that the Tiger moths emit might startle the bats as well as carry a message that deter bats from eating them.

According to B. H. Purser, clear differences arise when comparing insects that practice camouflage from insects that employ mimicry. For instance, insects such as grasshoppers, phasmids, and moths utilize camouflage because they spend most of their time in a sedentary state, while insects like flies and butterflies practice mimicry because they are often on the move. Sedentary insects must be able to blend in with their surroundings.

Some of the best examples of mimicry are exhibited by *Phasmatodea*, more commonly known as stick bugs. Stick bugs move very little during the day as they remain in trees or bushes where they can barely be detected or distinguished from the sticks surrounding them. Additionally, the walking leaf of Malaysia (*Phyllium giganteum*) uniquely mimics flora as it matches the shape and spots of the plants it eats. According to E. Bryce,

*Phyllium giganteum* has made very few changes for the past 47 million years and remains the largest of the leaf-like species.

Juliann C. Scholl  
Jacqueline Arnold  
Texas Tech University

**See Also:** Animals; Assassin Bugs; Butterflies; Camouflage; Evolution and Natural Selection; Fireflies; Mimicry; Plants.

### Further Readings

- Bryce, E. "Portrait of an Imposter." *Discover*, v.33/2 (2012).
- Capinera, J. L. *Encyclopedia of Entymology*. Gainesville, FL: Springer, 2008.
- Davies, N. B., J. R. Krebs, and S. A. West. *An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology*. The Atrium, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2012.
- Forbes, P. "Masters of Disguise." *Scientific American*, v.304/5 (2011).
- "Insect Masquerade." *Time*, v.79/13 (1962).
- Jolivet, P. *Interrelationship Between Insects and Plants*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1998.
- Manadal, F. B. *Textbook of Animal Behavior*. New Delhi: PHI Learning, 2010.



- “Mimicry.” National Geographic. <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/08/mimicry/angier-text/4> (Accessed February 2013).
- Pain, S. “What the Katydid Next.” *New Scientist*, v.203/2727 (2009).
- Pérez-de la Fuente, R., X. Delclòs, E. Peñalver, M. Speranza, J. Wierzbos, C. Ascaso, and M. S. Engel. “Early Evolution and Ecology of Camouflage in Insects.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, v.109/42 (2012).
- Purser, B. H. *Jungle Bugs: Masters of Camouflage and Mimicry*. Toronto: Firefly Books, 2003.
- Sadowski, P. “From Interaction to Symbol: A Systems View of the Evolutions of Signs and Communication.” Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2008.
- Stevens, M. and S. Merilaita. “Animal Camouflage: Current Issues and New Perspectives.” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, v.364/1516 (2009).
- Waldbauer, G. *How Not to Be Eaten: The Insects Fight Back*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
- Wickler, W. “Mimicry.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 15th ed. <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-11910>. (Accessed February 2013).
- Wickler, W. “Mimicry and the Evolution of Animal Communication.” *Nature*, v.208/5010 (1965).
- Yong, E. “Moths Mimic Each Others’ Sounds to Fool Hungry Bats.” *Discover*. <http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2009/05/02/moths-mimic-each-others-sounds-to-fool-hungry-bats> (Accessed February 2013).

## Insider Trading

Insider trading consists of the purchase or sale of a security, typically shares of corporate stock or options to buy or sell shares, while in possession of material, nonpublic information regarding that security. Although the precise legal definition of insider trading varies across different jurisdictions, in the United States the prohibition on insider trading generally encompasses only those transactions that involve a breach of a relationship of trust and confidence. For example, a corporate insider (such as an executive, employee,

lawyer, or accountant) who gains access to information that would significantly affect the value of the firm’s shares if made public would normally be under an obligation not to use that information to trade in the firm’s shares for personal gain.

Although not all transactions by corporate insiders in their firm’s shares are prohibited, those transactions that are not barred are typically heavily regulated and subject to specific disclosure requirements. In the United States, insider trading cases are generally prosecuted under the securities fraud laws. Thus, because deception sits at the conceptual core of what it means for conduct to be fraudulent, deception is often characterized as highly relevant to the concept of insider trading. However, this account—insider trading as a form of fraud—has been contested, in part because many forms of unlawful insider trading activities do not on their face seem to involve clear instances of deception. Consequently, some leading commentators have suggested that a property-rights account provides a more convincing justification for insider trading rules. A number of other scholars, meanwhile, have argued on economic grounds that the current ban on insider trading should be relaxed.

### Law and Legal Theories

The modern federal law of insider trading is complex. The law typically relied upon in most federal insider trading prosecutions is a general securities antifraud law, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 issued thereunder. Although the federal statute under which most insider trading prosecutions are brought dates to 1934, it was not until the 1960s that U.S. authorities began prosecuting insider trading claims in earnest. Rule 10b-5 prohibits “employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or perpetrating acts which “operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”

In the shadow of this very general prohibition, several different theories of unlawful insider trading have been recognized by the courts. First, there is what is known as the “classical theory” of insider trading. Under this theory, as articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Chiarella v. United States* (1980), a person commits unlawful insider trading if that person purchases or sells

securities in violation of a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of that corporation. Such a corporate insider is under an obligation either to disclose his information or to abstain from trading. Thus, when that person buys or sells shares for his own benefit while remaining silent, he has (in a sense) deceived the shareholders of the corporation.

A second theory of insider trading that has been recognized by courts is known as the “misappropriation” theory. Under the misappropriation theory, a fiduciary obligation to the investors with whom the insider trades is not required; instead, the insider trader need simply breach a fiduciary duty (or fiduciary-like relationship of trust and confidence) to a third party (e.g., the source of the relevant, material, nonpublic information). For example, a journalist who breaches a fiduciary obligation to his employer in order to trade on material nonpublic information regarding Company X might be subject to the insider trading prohibition, even though that journalist had no preexisting fiduciary duty to the shareholders of Company X.

In addition to Rule 10b-5, a number of other insider trading prohibitions also exist. When the material inside information in question relates to an upcoming tender offer, an SEC rule known as Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading on that information irrespective of the existence of a fiduciary duty. In addition, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires certain corporate insiders to disgorge profits resulting from short-term trading in their corporation’s shares. Acts that constitute violations of the federal ban on insider trading may also violate other federal laws, such as the mail fraud, wire fraud, tax, or conspiracy statutes, and could also constitute violations of various state law prohibitions on insider trading.

Finally, deceiving authorities in the context of an insider trading investigation can also represent an independent basis for criminal prosecution. This latter risk was vividly demonstrated during the Martha Stewart case of 2002–03. Stewart, under investigation for allegedly selling approximately \$230,000 worth of shares of ImClone Systems on the basis of nonpublic information, was indicted and subsequently convicted of lying to federal investigators. (A related civil suit, in which the SEC alleged insider trading by Stewart, was settled in 2006.)

## Insider Trading Enforcement

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission describes insider trading enforcement as an important area of focus for the agency, and the SEC has in recent years brought between approximately 40 and 60 insider trading enforcement actions per year. Moreover, in the last several years, both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC have undertaken a number of particularly high-profile enforcement actions: for example, a series of prosecutions begun in 2009 implicated a number of prominent figures, including Raj Rajaratnam (a billionaire former hedge fund manager) and Rajat Gupta (a former McKinsey & Company executive and Goldman Sachs board member).

A particularly controversial issue relating to insider trading enforcement in recent years relates to allegations of possible trading on insider information involving members of Congress, congressional staff, and other government officials. Partly in response to these allegations, and out of concern for the perceived abuse of trust that such insider trading represents, Congress explicitly outlawed such trading in 2012 with the passage of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act.

## Pros and Cons of Regulation

However, despite the current heightened enforcement climate, the desirability of insider trading laws as a policy matter has been vigorously contested. A number of prominent economists and legal scholars, beginning with Henry Manne in the 1960s, have suggested that the current ban on insider trading may not be justified on economic efficiency grounds. Manne’s critique of the ban on insider trading is twofold. First, Manne suggests that liberalizing insider trading rules should lead to more efficient securities pricing: permitting insider trading, it is argued, permits the market to discount all relevant information as soon as possible. A number of subsequent empirical analyses have supported this contention. Second, Manne argues that permitting insiders to trade on information might constitute an efficient mechanism for compensating those insiders. (This prong of Manne’s argument is somewhat more controversial and critics have raised a number of questions about its ability to be administered and other concerns.)

Other critics have suggested that aspects of the prohibition on insider trading are themselves deceitful—that notwithstanding its stated, public-regarding aims and goals, the ban on insider trading primarily benefits: (1) market professionals, who may be better situated to capitalize on share price movements when insider trading is banned, and (2) regulatory firms and agencies such as the SEC, which benefit from increased prestige and budgets as a result of the ban on insider trading.

As a general matter, a number of different justifications for insider trading regulations have been put forward. In early insider trading prosecutions, a theory of equal access to information was advanced. Under this theory, a key goal of insider trading regulations was understood to be ensuring that all participants in the stock market had relatively similar access to information; in effect, under such a theory, the goal was to prevent persons who engage in financial market transactions while in possession of material nonpublic information from profiting by “deceiving” trading counter-parties who might lack access to this information. By ensuring a “level playing field” among market participants, it was argued, basic fairness norms would be vindicated and investor confidence in the integrity of the financial markets would be promoted.

Yet this theory was criticized by some on the grounds that it was overinclusive and unrealistic: For example, in standard market transactions it is not necessarily required as a legal matter that both counter-parties have access to the exact same information, and the public generally does not regard it as inherently fraudulent conduct to fail to affirmatively disclose every conceivably relevant fact in certain other arms-length commercial transactions. Thus, even if one posited that the act of deception is in and of itself grounds for a ban on insider trading (irrespective of the consequentialist question whether insider trading harms others), in many cases it can be difficult to identify a clearly deceptive act in the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose on the part of the possessor of inside information. In part reflecting such concerns, the U.S. Supreme Court in two cases in the 1980s, *Chiarella v. United States* (1980) and *Dirks v. SEC* (1983), suggested that it disagreed with the notion that ensuring equal access to information among market participants

undergirded the insider trading prohibition. Instead, the court focused on whether the insider breached a preexisting fiduciary duty.

Other justifications for the ban on insider trading have focused on the harm that such trading can cause. Some accounts have focused on the potential role that insider trading might play in undermining investor confidence in securities markets. Critics of this argument have countered, however, by pointing to the experiences of certain foreign jurisdictions that combine highly successful securities markets with relatively low levels of insider trading enforcement. (Although the large majority of nations with developed securities markets ban at least some forms of insider trading, the level of insider trading enforcement varies significantly across different jurisdictions.)

Other commentators have defended the ban on insider trading by focusing on the potential harm of interference with corporate plans. For example, stock price movements that take place prior to an acquisition because of insider trading can consequently make the target more expensive and thus potentially frustrate those plans. A corporation that is attempting to assemble mineral interests that corporate insiders know to be particularly valuable might similarly find that the premature dissemination of that information via insider trading could frustrate those plans.

In addition, the deregulation of insider trading might, it has been suggested, create suboptimal incentives for managers: if insiders were permitted to trade on nonpublic information, those insiders might be incentivized to create more actionable information (including news that might adversely impact share prices) so as to maximize trading profits. Similarly, deregulating insider trading might create incentives for managers to keep information secret longer (thus increasing the window during which the manager might take advantage of trading on that information) rather than releasing that information to the investing public.

A final line of scholarly commentary suggests that deception—that is, fraud—should not be understood as sitting at the conceptual core of insider trading at all. Rather, it is suggested that protecting property rights in information should be the core justification for the ban on insider trading. In other words, insider trading should be

thought of as theft, not fraud. Thus, just as in the case of a ban on stealing trade secrets or infringing patents, the ban on insider trading might be understood as protecting efficient investment in information. Such an account has the benefit of explaining certain forms of prohibited insider trading in which the link to an affirmative act of deception might seem arguably tenuous.

Nicholas M. McLean  
Yale University

**See Also:** Business; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Financial Markets; Gossip; Investment Fraud; Law and Law Enforcement; Madoff, Bernie; Stewart, Martha.

### Further Readings

- Bainbridge, Stephen M., ed. *Insider Trading*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
- Bainbridge, Stephen M. *Research Handbook on Insider Trading*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
- Bainbridge, Stephen M. *Securities Law: Insider Trading*. New York: Foundation Press, 1999.
- Bhattacharya, Utpal and Hazem Daouk. "The World Price of Insider Trading." *Journal of Finance*, v.57 (2002).
- Brudney, Victor. "Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws." *Harvard Law Review*, v.93 (1979).
- Campbell, David. "Why Insider Dealing Is Wrong." *Legal Studies*, v.16 (1996).
- Carlton, Dennis W. and Daniel R. Fischel. "The Regulation of Insider Trading." *Stanford Law Review*, v.35 (1983).
- Haddock, David D. and Jonathan R. Macey. "Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation." *Journal of Law and Economics*, v.30 (1987).
- Hazen, Thomas Lee. *Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 2009.
- Leland, Hayne E. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?" *Journal of Political Economy*, v.100 (1992).
- Levmore, Saul. "In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading." *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, v.11 (1988).

Manne, Henry G. *Insider Trading and the Stock Market*. New York: Free Press, 1966.

Moore, Jennifer. "What Is Really Unethical About Insider Trading?" *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.9 (1990).

Nagy, Donna M. "Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles." *Iowa Law Review*, v.94 (2009).

Nagy, Donna M. "Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment." *Boston University Law Review*, v.91 (2011).

Prakash, Saikrishna. "Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime." *Columbia Law Review*, v.99 (1999).

Schotland, Roy A. "Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne 'Insider Trading and the Stock Market.'" *Virginia Law Review*, v.53 (1967).

Strudler, Alan and Eric W. Orts. "Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading." *Texas Law Review*, v.94 (1999).

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. "SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases." <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml> (Accessed February 2013).

Wang, William K. S. and Marc I. Steinberg. *Insider Trading*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

## Intelligence

*Intelligence* is a broad term that can be used to describe aptitude in any of a spectrum of competencies (for example, spatial, musical, or interpersonal). Intelligence and intellectual capacity have been conceptualized a number of different ways; however, there are three categories of intelligence in particular that widely influence the ability to deceive and to detect deception: general intelligence, emotional intelligence, and social intelligence.

### General Intelligence

General intelligence addresses the brain's executive functions: the ability to think abstractly, plan, reason, and solve problems, among others. This is the form of intelligence that many intelligence quotient (IQ) tests measure. The executive



functions are primarily governed by the neocortex area of the brain, and evidence suggests that this region is a primary enabler of deceptive ability.

Across animal species, the development of the neocortex is correlated with increasing abilities at deception. In human children, the neocortex develops later than the rest of the brain, at around 4 or 5 years of age, and its maturation is a critical step in children's acquisition of deception skills. In imaging studies of adult human brains, the neocortex is highly active during the production of lies.

The brain's executive functions are taxed during deception because, compared with truth-tellers, liars must engage in more cognitive effort to create an utterance. Liars must remain aware of, but suppress, the truth while simultaneously fabricating a deceptive account that is plausible. Various models of lying behavior, such as the interpersonal deception theory and the activation-decision-construction model of lying, converge on the proposition that lying is harder on the brain than truth-telling.

In particular, the generation of a lie relies on certain aspects of executive functioning: inhibitory control and working memory. Inhibitory control is used to suppress behaviors that would indicate the truth or not support the deception attempt. Working memory is engaged in order to maintain awareness of both reality and the details of the lie being constructed. Studies of children suggest that weak executive functioning inhibits the ability to deceive at all, much less deceive skillfully.

Generally, research on executive function in children and lying behavior has been mixed. Research on young children has shown that those with higher executive functions may deceive more frequently. However, this may simply indicate the inability of children with undeveloped minds to conceptualize deception. Results from research with children (ages 4 to 16) who are old enough to conceptualize deception is mixed, with only some studies finding positive correlations between executive function and lying rates. A study of 8- to 16-year-olds found that those with higher executive functioning created more sophisticated lies but did not lie more often.

Not all lies are equally taxing. Some lies, such as those involving complex descriptions of reality, require more cognitive effort. Similarly, liars who are questioned by the lie recipient face greater

burdens on their cognitive ability, as they may have to come up with information and sustain an increasingly complex account. However, "white lies" may require less cognitive effort, and deception based on omission or equivocation is also less demanding. Liars who have time to prepare ahead of time also generate more convincing lies, presumably because thinking ahead can lessen the cognitive load. In situations where there are fewer demands on a liar's mind during the production of the lie, general intelligence is likely to be less helpful.

Various approaches to deception detection rely on measuring signs of the increased cognitive load experienced by liars; for example, the language used by liars may be necessarily vague and they may offer less information or fewer details. Liars may also take longer to respond. Putting liars in situations that increase cognitive load, such as asking them to recount events backward, increases the number of cues to deception in their behavior. However, it has not been tested whether individuals with higher executive functioning experience less cognitive burden and show fewer cues to deception. Paul Ekman notes that liars who are not clever or inventive may provide more of these "thinking cues," indicating they are fabricating information, but little work has been done to connect general intelligence and cognitive load while lying.

### Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence (EI) involves skills related to emotional awareness and control. People with high EI are better than average at knowing and managing their own emotions. They are also able to read the emotions of others and make skillful displays of emotion.

Reports on those skilled in detecting lies suggest that the ability to accurately interpret others' emotions is a key part of their repertoire. High EI people working in professions in which lie detection is important, such as criminal investigation, perform better on tests of lie detection ability. High EI may enable better deception detection through increased aptitude in recognizing and interpreting partial or momentary expressions. These expressions occur as the by-product of emotions that liars, particularly in high-stakes situations, experience.

However, findings from laboratory studies linking emotional intelligence and deception detection are mixed. EI may increase the ability to detect and appropriately identify affective leakage, which can be interpreted as a sign that deception is occurring or even as a sign of the deceiver's true feelings. As such, studies have shown that high-EI individuals are better at detecting lies with an emotional component. Other research found that high EI was paradoxically associated with weaker deception detection skills in an emotional plea paradigm. This finding may be an artifact of the study design: high-EI participants may have attended to cues to deception, such as emotional turbulence and abbreviated statements, but misinterpreted them as signs of truth.

Emotional intelligence can be a useful tool in a deceiver's repertoire. The ability to display appropriate affect is important in lying for a number of reasons. An abundance of research on lie detection addresses nonverbal signals, particularly facial expressions, as hints to deception. Some of these nonverbal cues are under volitional control, and these in particular may be convincingly manipulated by high-EI individuals. While lying, high-EI individuals are able to feign emotions more convincingly than others. However, they are subject to baseline levels of emotional leakage. Other cues generated by liars, such as impressions of noninvolvement during discussion, may be managed by high-EI individuals through their superior control of expressiveness.

Emotion management is also important for deception skill. Emotions can overwhelm working memory and impair cognitive functioning. As noted earlier, certain situations and certain types of lies may be made more difficult with increased cognitive load. If high-EI individuals can manage the negative feelings associated with lying, they may have an easier time producing deception.

Display rules, which govern how people nonverbally express emotion, also involve elements of deception. Humans may need to minimize or exaggerate emotional expressions, mask them, or substitute one expression for another. The ability to skillfully present nonverbal emotional expressions may be of particular use when the nature of the deception is emotional (for example, feigning delight at a gift or jubilation at another's success). Being able to convincingly express false

emotion may also protect credibility. Court witnesses that display emotional expressions incongruous with their testimony are perceived as less credible.

### Social Intelligence

Although some definitions of emotional intelligence subsume social intelligence, it bears separate mention with respect to deception. A number of attempts have been made to measure social (or interpersonal) intelligence, for example, the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity or the Interpersonal Perception Task. Social intelligence is generally defined as an aptitude for understanding and interacting socially with other humans. It involves reading nonverbal behavior, relationships, and social situations accurately.



*Research on executive function in children and lying behavior has been mixed but has shown that among young children, those with higher executive functions may deceive more frequently.*

Some theories propose that human social intelligence is an adaptive trait that developed from deception and relationship management in primate groups. The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (also known as the social brain hypothesis) proposes that being able to skillfully manipulate and deceive other members of a group is an adaptive ability and, rather than tool usage or communication, is the primary evolutionary factor behind modern human intelligence. Research finds that primate species that have a larger neocortex, measured in volume relative to the rest of the brain, also engage in higher rates of intentional deception.

In human children, the development of the neocortex and associated executive functions coincides with the development of the social ability to understand other people's perspectives, which is sometimes called theory of mind (ToM). The development of ToM is a critical intellectual milestone for deception because it involves recognition of, and the ability to read, other people's mental states. Children with impaired cognitive and social functioning, such as fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, have serious difficulty in experimental tasks assessing ToM. In children with normal functioning, ToM is unrelated to general intelligence, but is associated with social intelligence.

According to models addressing interactivity in deception detection, such as interpersonal deception theory, social intelligence may allow for stronger performance by either the liar or recipient of the lie, particularly over time. As liars attempt to deceive, perceiving signs of suspicion, such as increased questioning on the part of the lie recipient, may lead to an adjustment in strategy. Other research positively correlates social skills with skill at lying in 11- to 16-year-olds, but this relationship attenuates with increased age in the study.

Nicholas A. Merola  
*University of Texas at Austin*

**See Also:** Brain; Cognitive Load; Emotions; Mental Effort in Lying; Psychoanalysis; Theory of Mind.

#### Further Readings

Burgoon, J. K., D. B. Buller, C. H. White, W. Afifi, and A. L. S. Buslig. "The Role of Conversational

Involvement in Deceptive Interpersonal Interactions." *The Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, v.25 (1999).

Carlson, S. M. and L. J. Moses. "Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and Children's Theory of Mind." *Child Development*, v.72 (2001).

Dunbar, R. I. M. "The Social Brain: Mind, Language and Society in Evolutionary Perspective." *Annual Review of Anthropology*, v.32 (2003).

Ekman, P., M. O'Sullivan, and M. Frank. "A Few Can Catch a Liar." *Psychological Science*, v.10 (1999).

Evans, A. D. and K. Lee. "Verbal Deception From Late Childhood to Middle Adolescence and Its Relation to Executive Functioning Skills." *Developmental Psychology*, v.47 (2011).

Feldman, R. S., J. C. Tomasian, and E. J. Coats. "Nonverbal Deception Abilities and Adolescent's Social Competence: Adolescents With Higher Social Skills Are Better Liars." *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, v.23 (1999).

Goleman, D. *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam, 1995.

Malone, B. E. and B. M. DePaulo. "Measuring Sensitivity to Deception." In *Interpersonal Sensitivity: Theory and Measurement*, J. A. Hall and F. J. Bernieri, eds. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2001.

Salovey, P. and D. Grewal. "The Science of Emotional Intelligence." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, v.14 (2005).

---

## Internet: Chat Rooms

Chat rooms are online conferencing environments in which multiple people are able to communicate with each other virtually. The broad use of the term *chat room* refers to both synchronous and asynchronous environments. For example, online forums or discussion boards are asynchronous virtual environments where people post messages at different times. Tools allow discussion threads to be extended indefinitely. Each person comments in response to the original posted comment and the other responses it has received. The dominant environment associated with chat rooms is a



synchronous online environment, in which conversation takes place in real time.

People “enter” and “leave” the virtual space of a chat as if walking in and out of a room. During a stay in a chat room, a person may participate in a conversation or simply “lurk.” Lurking involves reading other conversations but not joining in.

Chat rooms allow people to engage in focused discussion on a particular topic. The variety of topics is infinite. These can include support networks for medical or other personal concerns; real-time virtual worlds such as Moos, Muds, or digital gaming; social or political topics; or connecting with others in a social way. People from across the globe who share similar concerns, interests, and needs connect in these virtual spaces. Most people can find the tools necessary to create a chat to meet their needs if one does not already exist.

### **Security, Lying, and Deception in Chat Rooms**

People are typically required to register to join a chat room. However, some chat rooms may be exclusive and involve various levels of clearance. Some may require a mere sign-up with a nickname, e-mail, and password while others may require extensive verification of the person’s identity. In both synchronous and asynchronous environments, the rules of conduct are typically posted, and acknowledgment of agreement with these rules is required as part of registration. These rules are intended to promote civility in the appropriate cultural norms of the virtual environment as well as provide a sense of security for users.

Regardless of the level of purported security, people may mistakenly view their chat room experience as secure. The metaphor of a “room” used in the term *chat room* may bolster this mistaken sense of security. “Room” implies a misleading sense of privacy within an enclosed space away from the world outside; participants may feel secure because, while in a chat room, they are physically in an area of their choosing, often their own living space. Without the physical presence of others, there is a sense of anonymity afforded to online environments that produces a false sense of security. In addition, users are able to use monikers and avatars to hide their real identities. Therefore, despite the illusion of security, chat

rooms provide significant opportunity for deception and lying.

Discussion boards provide one such opportunity; the lurking aspect arises easily from the metaphor of “board” (i.e., blackboard). This idea suggests to the user that they can view posted information at their convenience. In contrast, synchronous, real-time chat rooms may be more conducive to lying and deception. Synchronous environments provide a voyeur-like opportunity for lurkers to read conversations without being visibly present to the others in the room.

Chat rooms are by their nature conducive to lying and deception. Chat rooms tend to involve strangers who may over time get to know each other better. However, they are not protected by the typical security of face-to-face communication networks. Even after long periods of time, people who have become virtual friends can be found to have lied about even the most basic information about themselves. Even seemingly obvious information such as age, home location, marital status, gender, or even the intent of a relationship can be fabricated when established virtually.

For example, love affairs occurring virtually through chat rooms can be found to be more complicated than face-to-face affairs. Unbeknownst to one of the people involved, these may eventually be found to be extramarital affairs, same-sex relationships, and relationships with considerable age disparities. In a chat room, the already fuzzy line between white lies and lies is blurred further. An innocent deduction of a person’s age in a face-to-face environment can be made more serious in a chat room because of the lack of external verification.

### **How Serious Is Lying and Deception in Chat Rooms?**

In some cases, lying in chat rooms is considered innocuous and commonplace. To solve the problem of a commonly used first name, people create inventive user names. In some cases, these are noticeable immediately as a lie. For example, someone might sign in as basketball star Jeremy Lin but, based on the content of his or her messages, obviously is not that person.

Other mild lying in chat rooms occurs when a user undertakes a new persona in the chat room environment, which the anonymity provided by



chat rooms enables people to do without being judged as severely as they would be in their non-virtual lives. In virtual world chat rooms, such as Moos and Muddst, creating a new identity is part of enculturation into the virtual world. In these environments, references to the world outside may yield negative attention from fellow members.

In other cases, researchers, journalists, and law enforcement professionals treading the ethical boundaries of their profession may lie about the reason for joining. For example, they may falsely claim a medical condition to join a medical chat. To justify their behavior, they might argue that they are entering the chat room for the greater good.

Trolling is a common practice in chat rooms. It involves the posting of deliberately provocative messages to a newsgroup or message board with the intention of causing maximum disruption and argument. Trolling involves deception if a person enters the chat room posing as someone other than they really are, such as a joiner with innocent intentions. For example, a troller may portray his or herself as holding an opinion consistent with the chat room but then make inflammatory comments against the goals of the group. In the most idealistic cases, trolling is undertaken to advance social, religious, or political causes. However, other users might view even this trolling as deceptive behavior.

In some cases, lying in chat rooms is considered more detrimental and consequential. It can even affect people outside of those virtual spaces. Lying in a chat room can be viewed as a violation of the norms of the group that can alter the emotional and social dynamics of the bonds created. Moreover, it can hinder the productivity of the group.

Criminal activity such as thievery and fraud are serious offenses that can begin with deception in chat rooms. Cybercrime costs billions of dollars each year. For example, romance scams involving chat rooms, dating sites, and social networking are reported to have incurred over \$50 million in losses in 2011, according to the Internet Crime Complaint Center. However, it is difficult to track and report cybercrimes, and cybercrime figures are said to be rough estimates at best.

Beyond the economic cost, however, is the human cost. Lying in chat rooms can result in aggressive and violent behavior that can extend

into nonvirtual space. Harassment, stalking, predatory behavior, child molestation, sex trafficking, and rape are among the most serious offenses that can also begin with deception in chat rooms. Predators use chat rooms to gain access to minors who might otherwise be inaccessible due to familial oversight. Bullying can involve fabricated stories about a victim and can extend beyond the virtual space. In some cases, bullying in chat rooms has led to suicide. On October 10, 2012, Amanda Todd, a 15-year-old Canadian girl, committed suicide after a disturbing Webcam chat with friends.

Internet privacy and protection acts often are limited by a narrow focus. This is especially the case for protections focusing on children (for example, the Child Online Protection Act and the Children's Internet Protection Act). Other protections have been the focus of objections on First Amendment grounds. Starting in 2004, Safer Internet Day has been celebrated each February. This provides a way to raise awareness about safety concerns and preventative strategies for Internet crime.

Anastacia Kurylo

*Fortified Communication Consulting*

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Courtship, Deception in; Identity Theft; Infidelity; Internet: E-Mail; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Internet: Online Dating; Lie Acceptability; Lying, Costs of; News Media: Internet; Relationships: Romantic; Sock Puppetry.

### Further Readings

Internet Crime Complaint Center. "2011 Internet Crime Report." [http://www.ic3.gov/media/annual-report/2011\\_IC3Report.pdf](http://www.ic3.gov/media/annual-report/2011_IC3Report.pdf) (Accessed December 2012).

Konecny, Stepan. "Virtual Environment and Lying: Perspective of Czech Adolescents and Young Adults." *Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace*, v.3/2 (2009).

Quayle, Ethel and Max Taylor. "Child Seduction and Self-Representation on the Internet." *Cyberpsychology & Behavior*, v.4 (2001).

Whitty, Monica T. "Liar, Liar! An Examination of How Open, Supportive, and Honest People Are in Chat Rooms." *Computers in Human Behavior*, v.18 (2000).

## Internet: E-Mail

Deception in e-mail can be divided into two broad categories: deception found in unsolicited e-mails, or spam, and deception in e-mail from known contacts, such as friends, family and colleagues. E-mail allows for some kinds of deception that are difficult in real life, but it also has properties that can make deception more easily detected.

### Spam

The most common form of deception in e-mail comes from unsolicited e-mails, or spam. Spam is often deceptive and involves a wide variety of scams designed to mislead the target of the e-mail. The most common deceptions involve misleading the targets to acquire their personal information and attempting to scam the targets into providing money. For example, one form of spam, called phishing, attempts to trick the target into believing that the e-mail is coming from a legitimate source, such as a bank. The target is then deceived into providing his or her account information. A common scam involving money is the 419 scam, in which a supposedly rich person, often from Nigeria, requests help from targets to get his or her fortune out of the country. In exchange for a small amount of money to help the person get out of the country, the targets are told they will get a large reward.

While deceptions that involve false identity representation in order to scam a target predate e-mail, e-mail has made it possible to attempt scams on a massive scale. The low cost of each e-mail makes the potential return for the spammer high and requires that only a fraction of targets actually respond to the e-mail.

### Deception in E-Mail Versus Other Media

E-mails from known contacts can also involve deception. One question that has been frequently examined is whether people lie more often in e-mail than in other forms of communication, such as the phone or face-to-face communication. One view is the social distance hypothesis, which argues that technologies like e-mail make people feel more socially distant from each other. This distance reduces negative feelings about lying, which should lead people to lie more in e-mails. A similar expectation focuses on the fact that

because there are fewer cues in e-mail, such as nonverbal and vocal cues, it should be easier for people to get away with lying.

Another view is to consider how specific features of e-mail affect the likelihood of deception. The Feature-Based Model points out three features that may change the frequency of lying in e-mail compared with face-to-face interaction: The synchronicity of the interaction refers to the degree to which messages are exchanged instantaneously and in real-time. A medium's recordability depends on the degree to which the interaction is automatically documented. The speaker and listener are distributed when they do not share the same physical space. E-mail is considered asynchronous: messages are not exchanged instantaneously; recordable: both parties retain a copy of the message; and distributed: people do not need to be physically near each other. Because of these properties of the Feature-Based Model, e-mail should have lower rates of deception in comparison with the telephone and face-to-face interactions.

Several studies have examined the question of whether e-mail changes how often people lie. The first study to compare e-mail with other media asked people to record all their lies over the course of a week. People reported lying at least as often in e-mail in comparison to telephone, instant messaging, and face-to-face interactions. The data pattern fit the predictions from the Feature-Based Model. In a follow-up study, e-mail again had the fewest lies, but e-mail contained the most explanation lies. Because of the asynchronous nature of e-mail, writers had more time to construct sound explanations that could withstand the potential scrutiny associated with a recordable medium.

Another study presented people with scenarios that required lying in a business context. People in the study chose which media they would be most likely to use to lie. Regardless of the severity of the lie or familiarity of the target, a face-to-face interaction was the first choice for executing the deception, followed by telephone and e-mail.

Other studies have examined how e-mail might affect deception with a stranger. Because the asynchronicity of e-mail allows a person to delay his or her replies, senders may be more inclined to lie about their feelings to strangers. One study examined the frequency of deception when getting to

know a stranger face-to-face or using text-based communication similar to e-mail. E-mails contained five times as many lies as people speaking face-to-face. This study highlights that when engaging strangers in an online context (for example, online dating), deception can occur more often than in face-to-face communication.

When e-mail was compared with pen-and-paper communication, a study found that people are more willing to lie when communicating via e-mail than via pen and paper. People felt more justified to lie online. In the pen-and-paper condition, participants had a common notion that written documents carried more permanence and legal consequences than e-mails. People also felt more anonymous online, even when it was not objectively the case. Features of e-mail can trigger different psychological cues concerning appropriate behavior and consequences.

The importance of the permanence of e-mails is illustrated in the case of a scandal involving General David Patraeus, in which Patraeus, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2012, was investigated for having an affair with his biographer Paula Broadwell. The investigation involved data from e-mail that Patraeus and Broadwell used to communicate with one another. They used a technique in which Patraeus would log into an e-mail account and write his message in a draft. Broadwell would later log into the same e-mail account, read the draft, and then delete it. In this way, no messages were technically sent. The draft, however, was cached and available for investigation.

The recordability of e-mails also makes it possible to analyze them to determine whether there are linguistic cues to deception in these messages. Several studies have found that deceptive e-mails have more words than truthful ones, perhaps because e-mail allows greater time for editing. Deceptive e-mails also include fewer self-references, like “I,” “me,” and “my,” but more other-references, like “you,” “he,” and “she.” Finally, deceptive statements in e-mail also contain heightened use of emotional words, especially words conveying negative emotions. These linguistic cues are not always indicative of deception, but are trends in the linguistic pattern of deception.

Deception in e-mail will continue to evolve as more people adapt and gain experience with

this medium. Deception in the form of spam is likely to persist, with deceptive tactics designed to acquire personal information, such as passwords, credit card details, and Social Security numbers. Deception in e-mail from known contacts is also likely to evolve over time. While it is difficult to gauge intent with linguistic analyses, researchers have been able to find several promising associations between language patterns in e-mail and deception.

Catherine Ho  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
David Markowitz  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Courtship, Deception in; Deception and Technology; Emotions; Identity Theft; Infidelity; Internet: Chat Rooms; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Internet: Online Dating; Lie Acceptability; Sock Puppetry.

#### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. “Cues to Deception.” *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Hancock, Jeffrey T. and Amy Gonzales. “Deception in CMC.” In *Handbook of Pragmatics of CMC*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2013.
- Hancock, Jeffrey T., J. Thom-Santelli, and T. Ritchie. “Deception and Design: The Impact of Communication Technologies on Lying Behavior.” *Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*. New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2004.
- Naquin, Charles E., Terri R. Kurtzberg, and Liuba Y. Belkin. “The Finer Points of Lying Online: E-Mail Versus Pen and Paper.” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, v.95/2 (2010).
- Zhou, L., J. K. Burgoon, J. F. Nunamaker, and D. Twitchell. “Automating Linguistics-Based Cues for Detecting Deception in Asynchronous Computer-Mediated Communications.” *Group Decision and Negotiation*, v.13 (2004).
- Zimbler, M. and R. Feldman. “Liar, Liar, Hard Drive on Fire: How Media Context Affects Lying Behavior.” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.41/10 (2011).

## Internet: E-Mail Scams

Several high-profile deceptions have used e-mail as a medium, including the Nigerian (419) scam and the advance fee scam. One of the most prevalent is phishing, which refers to an attempt by deceivers to solicit private information from individuals by posing as a legitimate company. The request is transmitted via a computer-mediated message (frequently e-mail) and often employs social engineering methods to dupe the message recipient. Security experts estimate that businesses and individuals experience over \$2 billion in losses a year globally because of phishing efforts.

### Phishing

The homonym “phishing” is a metaphor for a technique often used by deceivers, the “bait and hook” technique. In this context, the bait is the message itself. Most commonly, the message describes an urgent problem that the recipient must address by divulging private information, such as account usernames and passwords, credit card numbers, and Social Security numbers. The message supplies recipients with a hyperlink to a falsified Web site (the “hook”) that allows its visitors to enter the desired information, essentially resulting in identity theft. Some of the counterfeit Web sites are instructed to surreptitiously install spyware, like keystroke loggers, on the recipient’s computer.

Phishers engage in deceptive techniques in appearance, content, and architecture of their messages to improve their chance of success. The e-mail message and the associated Web site commonly contain elements that aid in their appearance of legitimacy, such as logos, slogans, and word marks used without the permission of the authentic company. The core of the e-mail message itself describes a fabricated problem or event, and it is often accompanied by deceptive phrasing intended to encourage the recipient to take a rash course of action. This includes social engineering tactics like adding an element of urgency needed for a response (in order to avoid dire consequences resulting from the fabricated problem), or promising the message receiver a prize for responding.


Finally, phishing Web sites tend to be extremely temporary in nature, only existing on a remote

Web server for a few days. Their fleeting nature necessitates a provisional uniform resource locator (URL) and fictitious return e-mail address. Phishing messages and Web sites tend to lack digital signatures or certificates of authentication, and Web sites are most likely to be registered using a “subdomain” hosting account, with the co-opted company name appearing beneath the top level domain in the URL hierarchy. In some instances, legitimate Web sites have been hacked and hijacked in order to exploit the Web site’s authenticity for URL-naming purposes.

In terms of the deceptive communication between the phisher and the target, phishing attacks are rarely accompanied by repeated or prolonged interaction. The attack is limited to a single message requesting a response, and phishers do not commonly reply to requests for more information about the problem. However, phishers are able to employ mass e-mailing (spamming) as a method for initiating contact with multitudes of people at no additional cost. Message recipients are chosen at random, either through lists of valid e-mail addresses that have been collected using automated search agents (spiders or Web crawlers), or by attempting to send messages to random strings of characters representing the e-mail usernames on a particular domain. Phishing attempts have been observed to target tens of thousands of potential recipients at a time.

While a number of technical countermeasures have been introduced to reduce the success rate of phishing attacks, such as network filtering and antiphishing toolbars for Web browsers, the decision to respond to a phishing message is ultimately in the hands of Internet users. Security consultants have advocated educating users on the methods employed by phishers and other online scam artists. Experienced Internet users have been observed to be better equipped at detecting phishing attempts, often by noticing suspicion-raising cues, from misspelled words and poor grammar that would be unexpected from legitimate companies to the implausible circumstances described in the message. Advocates suggest that e-mail users resist the urge to respond to any unexpected requests for information without first contacting the purported requestor independently.





An allegedly fraudulent check in an Internet scam, sent by a "buyer" (scammer) to a target (a seller of a piano on Craigslist) to buy the item plus moving expenses. The target deposits the check, thinking the money is in his or her account, then wires money to the supposed "movers" (the scammer's account). However, the check bounces, the "movers" never show, and the victim is cheated.

### Nigerian (419) Scam and Advance Fee Scam

The Nigerian (419) scam (so named for the International Exchange Code of the country from which many of these efforts originate) uses e-mail as the method to contact unsuspecting Internet users about rendering aid to an official of a foreign nation. The message usually describes a legal entanglement involving the now-deposed official who needs assistance in retrieving large amounts of money from his or her homeland, which is now beyond his or her reach. The message recipient is offered a percentage of the overall fortune in exchange for funding the legal fees required for withdrawal. The entire scenario is fabricated, with the target of the scam being victimized for the sum of all the fictitious fees. Unlike phishing, the 419 scam artists have repeated e-mail interactions with their victims, sometimes lasting for years.

Other deceptive scams using e-mail include the advance fee scam, which involves an e-mail touting an offer for a preapproved credit card, with the only caveat being an initial sign-up fee that the message recipient must pay in order to start the credit account. Lottery scams involve the message recipient being notified about winning a large monetary prize from an international lottery. Much like the 419 scam, the winnings can only be wired to the recipient following the advance of a fee needed to process the delivery. As with phishing, the detection of the deceptive nature of these

messages requires a methodical appraisal of the content by the recipient.

Kent Marett  
Mississippi State University

**See Also:** Communication; Deception and Technology; False Advertising; Identity Theft; Internet: E-Mail.

### Further Readings

- Berghel, Hal. "Phishing Mongers and Posers." *Communications of the ACM*, v49/4 (2006).
- Burrell, Jenna. "Problematic Empowerment: West African Internet Scams as Strategic Misrepresentation." *Information Technologies and International Development*, v.4/4 (2008).
- Mitnick, Kevin. *The Art of Deception*. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2002.
- Vishwanath, Arun, Teja Herath, Rui Chen, Jingguo Wang, and H. Raghav Rao. "Why Do People Get Phished? Testing Individual Differences in Phishing Vulnerability Within an Integrated Information Processing Model." *Decision Support Systems*, v51/3 (2011).
- Wright, Ryan and Kent Marett. "The Influence of Experiential and Dispositional Factors in Phishing: An Empirical Investigation of the Deceived." *Journal of Management Information Systems*, v27/1 (2010).

# Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites

Social media are defined by *Webster's Dictionary* (2012) as Internet-based forms of communication, such as Web sites for social networking and microblogging sites, through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (for example, photos and videos). Among the popular social media sites are social networking sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn, video-sharing sites like YouTube, and the microblogging site Twitter.

## Deception Online

Deception, defined as intentionally relaying messages to elicit an inaccurate belief, ranges from complete fabrication of information to concealment, partial truths, and vagueness. Large-scale studies have differed in the frequency of online deception. After observing text-based communication for several years, P. Curtis noted that individuals' misrepresentation online was uncommon. R. J. Rotunda and colleagues found that only 11 percent of participants in their sample lied about age, job, or gender on the Internet. Higher levels of online deception were reported by M. T. Whitty, including 65 percent of participants lying about their age, 49 percent lying about their occupation; 36 percent lying about income, 32.5 percent lying about their education, and 23 percent lying about their gender.

More recently, B. Cornwell and D. C. Lundgren found that among their participants, 27.5 percent misrepresented their physical attractiveness; 22.5 percent provided an inaccurate age; 17.5 percent provided incorrect background information regarding their education, occupation, and home life; and 15 percent distorted their hobbies and religious beliefs. However, because of the tendency for offline friendships to lead to Facebook friendships, the likelihood for deception in social networking is likely considerably lower relative to general online environments. This method of friendship acquisition via social networking creates accountability for the user, which lessens the likelihood of dishonesty in social media self-presentation.

## Self-Presentational Manipulation

Liars seek to meet a variety of goals by interacting deceptively with others. Most of these goals can be categorized as either overt or covert task goals. Overt goals comprise the self-presentation component of deception. This means that the intention is to publicly present a certain, desirable—albeit dishonest—image of oneself. Furthermore, according to R. S. Feldman and colleagues, a heightened sense of self-presentation resulted in more lying in order for individuals to accomplish that goal. Obtaining covert goals focuses individuals on the deception itself, and they usually hide their goals from the audience.

Regardless of the goal, those individuals who engage in deception will have a cognitive or affective response to the behavior. This reaction can range from guilt or discomfort to duping delight. Extending this research to social networking online, profile manipulation occurs when individuals alter their profiles to present a certain representation of themselves. These self-presentational behaviors can range from untagging unflattering pictures, to showcasing a more attractive version of an individual, to disclosing personal information tailored to portray the type of person the user wishes to be. Also, the mere utilization of privacy settings (for example, showing certain information to designated people) is a way of self-presenting in social networking and has been shown to influence viewers' perceptions of that user and lead them to make inferences about offline activity. Therefore, deception in social networking not only involves the crafting of information to create desired impressions but also the availability to access specific types of information the user allows.

A well-established point of view, referred to as idealized virtual-identity, holds that online social networking profiles are constructed to portray an idealized sense of self that is incongruent with the actual self. In direct opposition to this opinion is the extended real-life hypothesis, which maintains that online profiles are accurate extensions of a person's real life. This hypothesis is based on the difficulty with which one could deceive in an online social network. The lack of control in representing an idealized version of the self on social networking sites (for example, wall posts or comments on a photo), and the interactivity between

social networking users providing a sense of accountability, suggest that online profiles are indeed generally accurate extensions of a person.

M. D. Back and colleagues conducted a study to determine which of these perspectives were supported empirically. They examined self-reports of personality, friends' opinions of the participant's personality, and the Facebook profile of the participant in a sample of young Facebook users from the United States and Germany. Their results showed consistency in the three sets of measures and a lack of idealization in online portrayals of the self, which supports the extended real-life hypothesis. These results again support the notion that deception in Facebook and social networks is relatively low.

There are also notable gender and personality differences with regard to the type of deception individuals engage in, as well as the purpose. Although an equal number of men and women use Facebook, more men use the site for dating and acquiring new information than women. Research indicates that men tell more self-oriented lies than women. This supports the idea that men are more concerned with self-promoting in interaction, while women are preoccupied with affiliation motivations. Based on this, it is possible that men are more likely to engage in deception in online social networking because of their motives for use.

Despite many obstacles involved in self-presenting oneself more positively than the genuine self, narcissists tend to overlook the boundaries of accountability and deceive more on Facebook than others. Furthermore, Jolene Zywicki and James Danowski showed that introverts possessing low offline self-esteem attempted to manipulate their profiles to obtain greater popularity by untagging themselves in unflattering photos and carefully crafting their profiles to appear desirable and trendy. Thus, although deception in online social networking is not as prevalent as in other forms of online interaction, deception is employed by certain individuals who are motivated to do so.

Rosanna E. Guadagno  
National Science Foundation  
V. Skye Wingate  
Morehead State University

**See Also:** Audience; Context; Deception, Research on; Deception and Technology; Deception and Trust; Duping Delight; Internet: Chat Rooms; Internet: E-Mail; Internet: Online Dating; Sock Puppetry.

### Further Readings

- Ambady, N. and J. Skowronski, eds. *First Impressions*. New York: Guilford Press, 2008.
- Back, M. D., J. M. Stopfer, S. Vazire, S. Gaddis, S. C. Schmukle, B. Egloff, and S. D. Gosling. "Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization." *Psychological Science*, v.18 (2010).
- Burgoon, J. K., D. B. Buller, L. K. Guerrero, W. A. Afifi, and C. M. Feldman. "Interpersonal Deception XII: Information Management Dimensions Underlying Deceptive and Truthful Messages." *Communication Monographs*, v.63 (1996).
- Burgoon, J. K., G. M. Stoner, J. A. Bonito, and N. E. Dunbar. *Trust and Deception in Mediated Communication*. Paper presented at the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Hawai'i International Conference on Computers and System Science, Kona, Hawai'i, January 2003.
- Carlson, J. R., J. F. George, J. K. Burgoon, M. Adkins, and C. H. White. "Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication." *Group Decision and Negotiations*, v.13 (2004).
- Cornwell, B. and D. C. Lundgren. "Love on the Internet: Involvement and Misrepresentation in Romantic Relationships in Cyberspace Versus Realplace." *Computers in Human Behavior*, v.17 (2001).
- Curtis, P. "Mudding: Social Phenomena in Text-Based Virtual Realities." In *Proceedings on the 1992 Conference on Directions and Implications of Advanced Computing*. Berkeley, CA: DIAC, 1992.
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Ekman, P. and W. V. Friesen. "Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception." *Psychiatry*, v.32 (1969).
- Feldman, R. S., J. A. Forrest, and B. R. Happ. "Self-Presentation and Verbal Deception: Do Self-Presenters Lie More?" *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, v.24 (2002).
- Funder, D. C. *Personality Judgment: A Realistic Approach to Person Perception*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1999.

- Hall, J. A. and F. J. Bernieri, eds. *Interpersonal Sensitivity: Theory and Measurement*. New York: Erlbaum, 2001.
- Maccoby, E. E. "Gender and Relationships: A Developmental Account." *American Psychologist*, v.45 (1990).
- Manago, A. M., M. B. Graham, P. M. Greenfield, and G. Salimkhan. Self-Presentation and Gender on MySpace." *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, v.29 (2008).
- Muscannell, N. L. and R. E. Guadagno. "Make New Friends or Keep the Old: Gender and Personality Differences in Social Networking Use." *Computers in Human Behavior*, v.28 (2012).
- Muscannell, N. L., R. E. Guadagno, L. M. Rice, S. Murphy. "Don't It Make My Brown Eyes Green? An Analysis of Facebook Use and Romantic Jealousy." *CyberPsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, v.16/4 (April 2013).
- Rosenfeld, P., J. E. Edwards, and M. D. "Impression Management." In *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management*, 2nd ed., N. Nicholson, P. G. Audia, and M. Pillutla, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.
- Rotunda, R. J., S. J. Kass, M. A. Sutton, and D. T. Leon. "Internet Use and Misuse: Preliminary Findings From a New Assessment Instrument." *Behavior Modification*, v.27 (2003).
- Vazire, S. and S. D. Gosling. "E-Perceptions: Personality Impressions Based on Personal Websites." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.87 (2004).
- Whitty, M. T. "Liar, Liar! An Examination of How Open, Supportive, and Honest People Are in Chat Rooms." *Computers in Human Behavior*, v.18 (2002).
- Wilson, R. E., S. D. Gosling, and L. T. Graham. "A Review of Facebook Research in the Social Sciences." *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, v.7 (2013).

impressions among their audiences. For example, someone on a date may want to appear likeable and/or successful. A man may accomplish this by arriving on time, being well dressed, and carrying flowers for his date. When the communication mode changes to the text-based chat via the Internet (or computer-mediated communication [CMC]), other situational factors influence the ways individuals self-present. For instance, in a text-based situation (for example, e-mail), one's signature is the best way to convey status; the use of emoticons may be the best way to convey likeability. The combination of physical distance and relative anonymity available in CMC may foster more deceptive self-presentation.

### Deceptive Self-Presentation

People self-present and exaggerate or even fabricate traits or skills to create their desired impression. The probability of disingenuous self-presentation increases when the pressure to self-present is high. Interacting with a member of the opposite sex, particularly an attractive one, increases motivation to self-present.

These and other patterns of deceptive self-presentation have been observed in dating contexts. It is more common for men to self-present to desirable potential dates than it is for women, according to research by W. C. Rowatt and colleagues. Research also shows that men and women deceptively exaggerate different characteristics in the context of online dating. In research published in 1991, W. Took and L. Camire asked college students to indicate their willingness to attract a mate using deceptive self-presentation. Men were more willing to use deception to appear dominant, resourceful, and kind. Women were more willing to present their physical appearance as more desirable than it actually was. Overall, the research on dating deception indicates that both the situation and gender of the self-presenter impact the outcome.

## Internet: Online Dating

Self-presentation, also called impression management, is typically used to achieve specific goals. The self-presentation process is integral to lying and deception in online dating. Through this process, individuals attempt to create specific

### Deception Online

There are many differences between CMC and face-to-face (FTF) communication. These differences fit into four general categories: relative anonymity, reduced importance of physical appearance, attenuation of physical distance, and greater control over the time and pace of interactions.



The most relevant to a consideration of online dating deception is the relative anonymity present in many forms of CMC. Being relatively anonymous in an online social interaction can reduce accountability and may produce depersonalization and deindividuation in the online interactants. Thus, anonymity enhances the probability of behavior such as deception.

Also germane to online dating deception is the decreased importance of physical appearance online. This may also likely increase deception because people can claim to look like whomever they want. The decreased focus on nonverbal cues relative to FTF interactions may also facilitate greater use of deception, as the lack of nonverbal cues produce a feeling of anonymity in people. The greater control over the time and the pace of CMC interactions is also relevant to dating deception, as this feature of CMC enhances selective self-presentation online. Overall, the features of CMC reviewed above each contribute to a greater likelihood and opportunity for individuals to engage in deception in online situations such as dating.

### **Deceptive Self-Presentation in Online Dating**

Dating Web sites—Web sites specifically designed to match up people looking for romance—is rapidly increasing as a means of finding dates. To join a typical online dating Web site, a person registers and fills out a profile, including demographics, desired mate preferences, and sometimes personality measures. A photograph provided by the online dater can be included with the profile if she or he chooses. Initial contact between prospective daters occurs via messages sent by the dating Web site to ensure confidentiality. If initial conversations progress in a promising manner, telephone and/or face-to-face contact will follow.

Research on people using online dating Web sites shows that some online daters present unrealistic or deceptive profiles. G. J. Hitsch and colleagues found that online daters exaggerated in their profiles in a specific pattern: men emphasized their wealth and status, while women emphasized their physical attributes. Another study indicated that men reported they were taller, while women reported that they were thinner. Participants also

reported being accurate in the photographs and relationship details they provided. Overall, the emerging online dating research indicates that online daters will engage in deceptive self-presentation, but if they do, they balance their deception against the possible by the promise of a future interaction.

R. E. Guadagno, B. M. Okdie, and S. Kruse examined how differences in communication modes and expectations about meeting a prospective romantic partner impacted the degree of deceptive self-presentation displayed within the context of dating. To examine this, participants filled out personality measures at two time points. The first was to obtain baseline personality information. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of four anticipated meeting conditions: face-to-face, e-mail, no meeting, and a control condition with no pretense of dating. Compared with baseline measures, male participants increased the amount of exaggerated self-presentation when anticipating a future interaction with a prospective date, but women did not. Specifically, men emphasized their positive personality characteristics more if the meeting with the potential date was more anonymous (for example, a CMC meeting) compared with a less anonymous condition (for example, a FTF meeting) or the control conditions. Women did not exaggerate their characteristics between the two time points, regardless of condition.

The results of the study by Guadagno and colleagues fit well with the literature on mate selection. For instance, L. A. Jensen-Campbell, W. G. Graziano, and S. G. West found that women preferred to date men who were helpful, particularly when they were both helpful and dominant. Additionally, research on personality and mate preferences indicates that newly married women perceive their husbands as being very likeable. Thus, the limited evidence suggests that women may differentiate on personality more so than men when selecting a mate.

Second, the online dating research indicates that women get more contacts through online dating than do men. One study indicated that 57 percent of men versus 23 percent of women never got a single e-mail from a prospective date. This is likely because human mate selection is one of female choice, so men approach women through

these online dating sites more often than women approach men.

Rosanna E. Guadagno  
National Science Foundation

**See Also:** Audience; Context; Courtship, Deception in; Deception, Research on; Deception and Technology; Deception and Trust; Exaggeration; Evolution and Natural Selection; Goffman, Erving; Internet: Chat Rooms; Internet: E-Mail; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Lying, Intentionality of; Men; Relationships: Romantic; Women.

### Further Readings

- Bargh, J. A. and K. Y. A. McKenna. "The Internet and Social Life." *Annual Review Psychology*, v.55 (2004).
- Baumeister, R. F. "A Self-Presentational View of Social Phenomena." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.91 (1992).
- Botwin, Buss and T. K. Shackelford. "Personality and Mate Preferences: Five Factors in Mate Selection and Marital Satisfaction." *Journal of Personality*, v.65/1 (1997).
- Brym, R.J., and R. L. Lenton. "Love Online: A Report on Digital Dating in Canada." <http://www.nelson.com/nelson/harcourt/sociology/newsociety/3e/loveonline.pdf> (Accessed November 2012).
- Ellen, A. "The Recession. Isn't It Romantic?" *New York Times* (February 12, 2009).
- Ellison, N., R. Heino, and J. Gibbs. "Managing Impressions Online: Self-Presentation Process in the Online Dating Environment." *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, v.11/2 (2006).
- Feldman, R. S., J. A. Forrest, and B. R. Happ. "Self-Presentation and Verbal Deception: Do Self-Presenters Lie More?" *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, v.24 (2002).
- Finkel, E. J., P. W. Eastwick, B. R. Karney, H. R. Reis, and S. Sprecher. "Online Dating: A Critical Analysis of From the Perspective of Psychological Science." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.13 (2012).
- Gibbs, J. L., N. B. Ellison, and R. D. Heino. "Self-Presentation in Online Personals: The Role of Anticipated Future Interaction, Self-Disclosure, and Perceived Success in Internet Dating." *Communication Research*, v.33 (2006).
- Guadagno, R. E., B. M. Okdie, and S. Kruse. "Dating Deception: Gender, Online Dating, and Exaggerated Self-Presentation." *Computers in Human Behavior*, v.28 (2012).
- Hitsch, G. J., A. Hortaçsu, and D. Ariely. "What Makes You Click: An Empirical Analysis of Online Dating." Unpublished manuscript. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2009.
- Jensen-Campbell, L. A., W. G. Graziano, and S. G. West. "Dominance, Prosocial Orientation, and Female Preferences: Do Nice Guys Really Finish Last?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.68 (1996).
- Leary, M. R. *Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
- McKenna, K. Y. A. and J. A. Bargh. "Plan 9 From Cyberspace: The Implications of the Internet for the Personality and Social Psychology." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.4 (2000).
- Postmes, T., R. Spears, and M. Lea. "Intergroup Differentiation in Computer-Mediated Communication: Effects of Depersonalization." *Group Dynamics*, v.6 (2002).
- Rowatt, W. C., M. R. Cunningham, and P. B. Druen. "Deception to Get a Date." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.24 (1998).
- Rowatt, W. C., M. R. Cunningham, and P. B. Druen. "Lying to Get a Date: The Effect of Facial Physical Attractiveness on the Willingness to Deceive Prospective Dating Partners." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.16 (1999).
- Schmitt, D. P. "A Meta-Analysis of Sex Differences in Romantic Attraction: Do Rating Contexts Moderate Tactic Effectiveness Judgments?" *British Journal of Social Psychology*, v.41 (2002).
- Sproull, L. and S. Kiesler. "Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational Communication." *Management Sciences*, 32/11 (1985).
- Toma, C. L., J. T. Hancock, and N. B. Ellison. "Separating Fact From Fiction: An Examination of Deceptive Self-Presentation in Online Dating Profiles." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.34 (2008).
- Took, W. and L. Camire. "Patterns of Deception in Intersexual and Intrasexual Mating Strategies." *Ethology and Sociobiology*, v.12 (1991).
- Valkenburg, Patti M. and Jochen Peter. "Who Visits Online Dating Sites? Exploring Some Characteristics of Online Daters." *CyberPsychology & Behavior*, v.10/6 (2007).

## Interpersonal Deception Theory

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) is a mid-range theory developed by David Buller and Judee Burgoon to predict and explain the process of encoding and decoding deceptive messages in interpersonal encounters. In response to what the authors perceived as an overly psychological orientation in the social science literature on deception, Buller and Burgoon created an interpersonal communication perspective on deception. Their theoretical framework articulates assumptions about interpersonal communication and deception and empirically testable propositions about deception as a communicative activity. The original articulation of IDT included a network of general and interrelated propositions from which hypotheses could be generated. These general statements are meant to be probabilistic, in light of the multiple and sometimes offsetting factors that influence a given deceptive episode. Subsequent descriptions and revisions by Buller and Burgoon further clarified and reworded the relationships specified by the propositions.

The scope of the theory is confined to interpersonal interactions and ones in which communicator credibility is salient. Self-delusion, role-playing, unwitting or inadvertent transmission of false information, discoveries of another's deceit outside interpersonal encounters, and nonhuman deception all fall outside the intended scope of the theory. As defined within IDT, deception refers to messages or signals knowingly and intentionally transmitted to foster a false belief or conclusion by another. The emphasis on messages does not deny that humans and other species mislead conspecifics in myriad noncommunicative actions nor that regularities gleaned from noncommunicative actions and nonhuman signals may help inform the causal mechanisms undergirding interpersonal deception.

### Assumptions of IDT

Whereas many theories about deception focus on what an individual experiences or expresses, IDT as a communication theory emphasizes what happens between people rather than within people. Among the central communication-relevant assumptions of IDT are that communication is an

interdependent activity and that both sender and receiver are active parties to the construction of deceptive interchanges. Interdependence implies that receivers influence sender cognitions and behavior, and vice versa, making deceptive signals not just the product of what the sender is experiencing but also how an interlocutor's communication affects the sender. Receivers also are not passive recipients of whatever signals are expressed by senders but instead play an active role, such that their emotions, cognitions, and communication warrant as much attention as those of senders. Receiver suspicion is an important factor when analyzing deceptive exchanges.

Another assumption is that, like other forms of communication, deception and its detection are goal-driven and often strategic (deliberate); deceivers and receivers act to accomplish such goals as protecting self, fostering a favorable image, preserving the interpersonal relationship, creating a comfortable interaction, or achieving instrumental aims. Deceiver and receiver's verbal and nonverbal communication reflect strategies and tactics to achieve those ends, even though like other intentional but routinized communicative acts, they may be "run off" without much conscious awareness.

Telling ingratiating white lies is an example of deceit that is produced easily and satisfies multiple communication goals, from preserving the relationship and saving another's face to promoting liking. Receivers may similarly enact covert and nonobvious strategies to ascertain a sender's truthfulness so as to minimize sully the relationship with evident suspicion, or they may do the opposite, "ambushing" a sender with direct accusations to catch the person off guard and expose the truth. IDT assumes that many communication strategies and tactics are overlearned and performed relatively effortlessly. Deceit as a special case of interpersonal communication should therefore exhibit strategic activity.

However, overlaid atop the usual communication goals will also be the goal of avoiding detection, which may instigate additional strategies and tactics for gauging deceptive success. The additional communicative demands imposed by deceit or its detection may produce "nonstrategic" activity, actions that create disruptions of normal communicative patterns and betray emotional and

cognitive states different from what the sender or receiver intends to project. Thus, IDT makes some assumptions about deception itself, including that it may elevate arousal, activate certain emotional states, and place more demands on memory and cognitive processes, much as early psychological theories proposed.

For example, producing false and misleading messages requires first mentally accessing what is truthful, then mentally editing and reformulating that “reality” into untruths that meet criteria of plausibility, consistency with known facts, and consistency with previous messages. However, some truths are more difficult to tell than lies, not all deception creates negative arousal and emotions, and not all deception is challenging to produce. IDT thus does not subscribe to the view that deception inevitably differs from truth or produces telltale, involuntary signs. Also, by characterizing deception as a social rather than psychological phenomenon, IDT embraces the view that deception-induced emotions, mental challenges, and arousal can be masked, exaggerated, attenuated, and otherwise managed so that outward expressions lack a one-to-one correspondence with what is experienced internally and do not constitute clear signals of deception. The potential mismatch between what is felt and what is displayed remains a point of controversy in the research and theorizing about emotions.

One last assumption is that interpersonal deception is a dynamic activity such that behavioral patterns fluctuate over time as sender and receiver adapt to one another’s verbal and nonverbal messages and feedback. “Snapshots” of deception at one point in time may bear little resemblance to deception at subsequent junctures within the same interpersonal interaction or across interactions and cannot be validly generalized to them without knowing the context in which they appear and the behavior of other interlocutors.

The assumptions associated with IDT are not meant to be tested but instead act as theoretical primitives that provide the “glue” holding propositions together. What are tested are the hypotheses derived from the propositions themselves.

### IDT Propositions

Propositions are general statements that specify an interconnected system of relationships among

the key terms in the theory. Below are the updated, reordered, and merged propositions. A schematic of the theoretical model appears in Figure 1.

*Proposition 1.* Contextual features of deceptive interchanges that systematically influence sender and receiver cognitions and behaviors: two of superordinate importance are (1) the interactivity of the communication medium and (2) the demands of the communicative task. *Cognitions* is shorthand for internal states and encompasses emotions as well as thoughts. Both the internal states and externally manifested behaviors associated with deception are said to be influenced in predictable ways by salient features of the communication context and interpersonal relationship. Two that are proposed to be highly salient are whether the medium in which communication takes place is interactive or not and how demanding the communicative task is. Research evidence indicates that when sender and receiver carry on a back-and-forth dialogue, with more access to social cues and producing utterances on the fly, it benefits deceivers more so than receivers, whereas having to talk without benefit of receiver feedback (e.g., giving a lengthy monologue to a listener or using an asynchronous, computer-mediated communication medium like e-mail) can impair sender communication and make deception more detectable by receivers. Likewise, informal discussions are less demanding than formal interviews and benefit sender deception more than receiver detection.

*Proposition 2.* Relational features of deceptive interchanges systematically influence sender and receiver cognitions and behaviors; two of superordinate importance are relational (1) familiarity and (2) valence. Degree of acquaintanceship and positivity or negativity of the relationship can make deception easier or more difficult. The same is true for detection.

*Proposition 3.* Truthfulness and honesty are more expected with (1) more interactive contexts and (2) greater relational positivity between sender and receiver. People are more likely to be truth biased (overestimate others’ truthfulness) when interacting with, rather than observing, another or when communicating via noninteractive media, and when interacting with those they like and admire.




*Proposition 4.* A deceiver's fear of detection is positively influenced by (1) how familiar the receiver is with general deceptive behavior or (2) information about the sender; it is inversely related to (3) a receiver's expectations for truthfulness and (4) how relationally familiar (acquainted) the receiver is with the deceiver. Deceivers are less fearful of being detected if they think receivers expect them to be truthful and if receivers are strangers, lack knowledge about them, and/or are unfamiliar with the sender's usual communicative behavior and unfamiliar with deception signals.

*Proposition 5.* Over time, interactive contexts heighten strategic activity and lessen nonstrategic activity (arousal, negative or dampened affect, reduced involvement, and performance decrements). Much deception research has taken place in noninteractive contexts. IDT proposes that when deception occurs under interactive conditions, deceivers

will exhibit more strategic activity (e.g., improving message content and linguistic style, employing more believable and normal nonverbal behaviors, and fostering a more credible overall demeanor), especially over time, as they come to repair any initial missteps. At the same time, typical telltale signs of deception will be reduced.

*Proposition 6.* Target benefit alters strategic and nonstrategic activity during deception such that compared to deceiving for others' benefit, deceiving for self-gain (1) prompts more, and qualitatively different, strategic activity; and (2) prompts more nonstrategic behavior associated with concerns over detection and increased strategic activity to avoid detection. Deception can be undertaken for selfish or altruistic reasons. IDT proposes that when the deception benefits self, deceivers will exert more effort to control their verbal and nonverbal messages but will also show more telltale signs



**Figure 1** Model of interpersonal deception theory showing antecedent and interaction factors that affect the outcomes of perceived success and detection accuracy.

Source: Burgoon, J. K. and D. B. Buller. "Interpersonal Deception Theory. In *Readings in Persuasion, Social Influence and Compliance-Gaining*." J. S. Seiter and R. H. Gass, eds. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2004.

of deceit. When the deception benefits others, the communication will more closely resemble truth in that it will lack such strategic activity as overly detailed content, overly contained behavior, and inauthentic pleasantness as well as lack the nervousness, negative affect, and speech dysfluencies often associated with deceit.

*Proposition 7.* Deceiver motivation to behave strategically is (1) inversely related to projected receiver expectations for truthfulness, (2) positively related to relational familiarity with the receiver, and (3) positively related to deceiver skill. A deceiver will try harder to behave in a credible fashion if they think the receiver is suspicious of what they are saying. A deceiver will try less hard if they think the receiver expects them to be truthful. Motivation will also be higher if deceivers and receivers are well acquainted. Finally, motivation and strategic behavior are related to social skills. Some deceivers have more communication skills than others. More skilled individuals will attempt to exhibit more strategic activity and to suppress nonstrategic activity.

*Proposition 8.* A receiver is more likely to judge sender as credible when (1) the context is interactive, (2) sender is a skilled communicator, (3) receiver is truth biased, and (4) sender's communication conforms to expected patterns. In interactive contexts, communicators are more likely to establish common ground and give each other the benefit of the doubt, thus regarding each other as believable and truthful. More skilled senders will also be more believed, especially by truth-based receivers and when senders behave in expected ways.

*Proposition 9.* Receiver detection accuracy is directly related to (1) deviations of sender communication from expected patterns, (2) information familiarity, (3) behavioral familiarity, and (4) receiver decoding skills and inversely related to (1) context interactivity, (2) receiver truth biases, and (3) sender encoding skills. A receiver is more likely to detect deceit if the sender's communication is deviant (unexpected), the receiver has some relevant information about the sender, or the receiver knows either the sender's usual communication patterns or more general, reliable

clues to deception. A receiver is less likely to detect deceit to the extent that the communication context is interactive between sender, the receiver holds strong truth biases, or the sender is a skilled communicator. Although IDT proposed that receivers who are more skilled decoders should also be better at detecting deception, the empirical evidence has not supported this claim.

*Proposition 10.* Receiver suspicion produces changes in receiver strategic and nonstrategic behavior. Like senders, receivers may also adopt deliberate communication strategies (e.g., establishing rapport to take deceivers off guard) but may also inadvertently give off unintentional telltale signs of their skepticism.

*Propositions 11 and 12 (merged).* Senders perceive suspicion when receivers (1) are actually suspicious, (2) engage in communication that deviates from expected patterns, (3) signal disbelief or uncertainty, or (4) probe for further information. Senders often sense actual suspicion by receivers but also may perceive it to be present based on various communicative behaviors of receivers. Research evidence supports both.

*Proposition 13.* Suspicion (perceived or actual) evokes changes in both strategic and nonstrategic behavior by senders. Deceivers faced with real or imagined suspicion attempt to repair their performance through strategic activity but may also display inadvertent nonstrategic behaviors.

*Proposition 14.* Deception and suspicion displays change over time. In keeping with the assumption that deception is a dynamic enterprise, this proposition posits that the verbal and nonverbal displays of both deceptive senders and suspicious receivers should vary over the course of an interaction. Several studies have confirmed the deception part of this proposition; little research to date has looked at suspicion patterns over time.

*Proposition 15.* Reciprocity is the dominant interaction adaptation pattern between senders and receivers during interpersonal deception. Deceivers and their targets will primarily reciprocate one another's behavior, resulting in

interactions that look much like nondeceptive ones. This partially explains why deceivers are often successful in evading detection.

**Proposition 16.** Terminal judgments of sender credibility and receiver detection accuracy are a function of (1) most recent receiver cognitions (suspicion, truth biases); and (2) most recent sender behavioral displays. Given that deceptive episodes are dynamic events, with behaviors and cognitions fluctuating throughout, this proposition says that receivers' final judgments and detection accuracy are strongly influenced by their most recent cognitions and behaviors, that is, by recency rather than primacy effects.

**Proposition 17.** Senders' perceptions of deception success at the conclusion of a deceptive episode are a function of (1) whether receivers appear suspicious and (2) their most recent behavioral displays imply belief. Put differently, senders judge their own success by whether receivers' suspicions appear to be allayed and receiver behaviors imply they are accepting of senders' communication.

### Critiques of IDT

Early criticisms of IDT centered on the fact that it did not offer a single explanatory mechanism, that some of the propositions did not state directional relationships (for example, increasing or decreasing), that deception could instead be characterized as a persuasive activity, and that some of the experiments supporting IDT had flaws. Burgoon and Buller responded that the theory was not meant to advance a single explanatory mechanism but instead to fit a broad communicative perspective on the phenomenon and to include multiple causal mechanisms that fit a general interpersonal communication account of the process. They agreed that some propositions were nondirectional but intentionally so because they were meant to specify functional relationships. They also agreed that a persuasion account was consistent with their view of deception as a strategic activity.

The extent to which interactive deception differs from noninteractive deception and whether deceivers attempt to repair their communication in the face of suspicion remains contested. Newer self-presentation perspectives on deception embrace some of the strategic aspects of IDT, if not its other

tenets. Research testing many of the IDT propositions is ongoing and is extending it into mediated and human-computer interaction contexts.

Judee K. Burgoon  
University of Arizona

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Burgoon, Judee; Communication; Deception, Research on; Deception Detection Accuracy; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Buller, D. B. and J. K. Burgoon. "Interpersonal Deception Theory." *Communication Theory*, v.6 (1996).
- Burgoon, J. K. and D. B. Buller. "Interpersonal Deception Theory." In *Readings in Persuasion, Social Influence and Compliance-Gaining*, J. S. Seiter and R. H. Gass, eds. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2004.
- Burgoon, J. K. and D. B. Buller. "Interpersonal Deception Theory." In *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives*, L. A. Baxter and D. O. Braithwaite, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008.
- Burgoon, J. K. and D. B. Buller. "Reflections on the Nature of Theory Building and the Theoretical Status of Interpersonal Deception Theory." *Communication Theory*, v.6 (1996).
- Burgoon, J. K. and T. R. Levine. "Advances in Deception Detection." In *New Directions in Interpersonal Communication Research*, S. W. Smith and S. R. Wilson, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009.
- Kravis, Jeffrey and Mariam Zadeh. "Hunting for Deception in Mediation: Winning Cases by Understanding Body Language." Mediator.com. (June 2006). <http://www.mediate.com/articles/kravis17.cfm> (Accessed August 2013).

## Invention of Lying, The

*The Invention of Lying* is a 2009 comedy starring British comedian Ricky Gervais, who also cowrote, codirected, and coproduced the film. The movie presents a fantastical world in which Gervais's character is the first person with the

ability to lie and deceive others. The film is a morality play about the use of deception in the world. Some also consider it a proatheism story, as the world without lies also lacks religion until Gervais's character creates God through his lies. Though neither a critical nor commercial success, *The Invention of Lying* offered an innovative look at how lying affects everyday interactions.

### Plot Summary

Mark Bellison (Gervais) lives in a world in which no one has ever told a lie. He is short and chubby, and because everyone tells only the truth, people do not hesitate to remind him of his shortcomings. When he goes on a blind date with Anna (Jennifer Garner), she informs him that she is unimpressed with his lack of money and attractiveness and that she is out with him only as a favor to a friend. Some may find this brutal honesty refreshing, but others could see the benefits of white lies or chosen moments of silence.

Mark works as a screenwriter for a film studio. However, fiction does not exist because there is no lying, so all films are dull historical lectures. Mark is soon fired and he goes to the bank to pay his rent. The computers are down when the teller asks him how much is in his account. Mark says he has \$800, the first lie ever told. When the computer reboots and shows that he has only \$300, the teller presumes it must be a computer error. This lie to pay his rent leads to more lies: Mark gets a friend out of a driving-under-the influence (DUI) charge, wins a casino jackpot, and tells a woman that the world will end unless they have sex. He also pens the first fiction, adding aliens into his historical screenplay. The surprising film is a wild success and no one has reason to doubt Mark's veracity. Now rich and famous from his lying, Mark asks Anna out on another date. While happy for his success, she still expresses concern that his poor genes will give them undesirable "little fat kids with snub noses."

Mark's mother suffers a heart attack. She is petrified of death, so to console her Mark tells her that, after she dies, she will be with all the people she loves, feel no pain, and have her own mansion. The staff overhears Mark's depiction of a heaven and people soon flock to him to learn more about the afterlife. To appease everyone, Mark, serving as a variant of the biblical Moses,

creates a biblical story of a "Man in the Sky" God figure and presents 10 rules to live by. Still, while Mark single-handedly creates religion through his lies, he refuses to deceive Anna into marrying him instead of his rival Brad (Rob Lowe), and Anna almost marries Brad but does not.

### Commercial and Critical Reception

*The Invention of Lying* cost \$18.5 million to produce and made \$18.45 million in the United States. However, film studios split revenues with theater chains, and marketing and promotion budgets add additional costs to each film's bottom line. *The Invention of Lying* made an additional \$14 million on international screens, with \$9.8 million coming from Gervais's native country, the United Kingdom. The film ranked 113th in earnings of all 2009 films, three spots above Oscar winner *The Hurt Locker*. In January 2010, it debuted as the third-most popular DVD release.

While Gervais was nominated for the Peter Sellers Award for Comedy at the *Evening Standard's* British Film Awards, the film received no other critical accolades or nominations. Critics were mixed, as some enjoyed the comedy and the film's clever and unique premise, while others found the film filled with more romantic comedy clichés than truly comedic moments.

### Research Application

Lying is a part of everyday life. Research finds that both college students and community members admit to lying on a regular basis, and they do not consider their lies to be serious or worry about being caught. Though research finds that social interactions with lies are less pleasant, the film characters' blunt honesty toward Mark certainly could hurt positive social interaction as well. However, it is important to differentiate truth from manners, as a situation without lying does not necessitate harsh, offensive truths.

The film raises the question of whether all lies are necessarily bad, as some might be a normal part of the social world. People often consider white lies to be innocuous, whether they are altruistic white lies (to help others) or Pareto white lies (to help both others and the liar). However, recent research suggests that telling a white lie might lead to cognitive dissonance and negative affect. Additionally, clinical oncology research found



that concealing information from terminally ill patients was generally less stressful for clinicians than sharing the truth about the diagnosis. These research findings are seen in the film, as Mark lies about heaven to reduce the stress of the situation and help his mother on her deathbed. Then, as people believe the lie, Mark creates more elaborate religion-tinged lies to help those who believed the first lie.

Jason A. Cantone  
Federal Judicial Center  
Brandon Kuss  
Cerner Corporation

**See Also:** Bible; Daily Life, Lying in; Deception Motives; Fiction; Lies, Types of; Movies, Lying in; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Argo, J. J. and B. Shiv. "Are White Lies as Innocuous as We Think?" *Journal of Consumer Research*, v.38/6 (2012).
- BoxOfficeMojo.com. "The Invention of Lying." <http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=weekend&id=inventionoflying.htm> (Accessed October 2012).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, and M. M. Wyer. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70/5 (1996).
- Erat, S. and U. Gneezy. "White Lies." *Management Science*, v.58/4 (2012).
- Panagopoulou, E., G. Mintziori, A. Montgomery, D. Kapoukranidou, and A. Benos. "Concealment of Information in Clinical Practice: Is Lying Less Stressful Than Telling the Truth?" *Journal of Clinical Oncology*, v.26/7 (2008).

the tendency to judge other people's statements as deceptive and reduce confidence in the accuracy of judgments. Thus, trained or experienced investigators appear to be biased to see deception in the communications of others.

### Possible Reasons for Bias

The effects of training may be a consequence of training programs focusing on the detection of deception (not truthfulness). Jaume Masip and colleagues found that significantly more deception judgments were made after being trained to detect deception than before the training. Opposite results were found for truth-detection training, which increased truth judgments. The authors argued that after the training, trainees search actively for the learned cues, which may be displayed by both liars and truth-tellers (though with different frequency), and as soon as they believe they have noticed any of these cues they make their judgment. The perceived frequency of the cues predicted participants' judgments.

Concerning experience, the same researchers found that veteran police officers scored higher on a scale measuring generalized communicative suspicion (GCS), which is a predisposition toward believing that other people's messages are deceptive, than novice officers and nonofficers. Police officers' daily involvement in contexts in which distrust is salient might enhance their generalized suspicion. However, a follow-up study revealed that GCS scores were unrelated to veracity judgments and that novice officers made as many deception judgments as experienced officers. Anyhow, officers' interest in solving cases might bias them to search for deception rather than truthfulness cues.

### Guilt-Presumptive Questions

A danger of the investigator bias effect is that once the belief is formed that a particular suspect is lying, the investigator may ask only guilt-presumptive questions, displaying confirmation bias, a phenomenon that consists of selectively searching for information in support of one's beliefs or expectations, dismissing contradictory evidence, and interpreting ambiguous evidence as consistent with one's beliefs or expectations. This may in turn result in a self-fulfilling-prophecy effect if the guilt-presumptive interrogation generates

---

## Investigator Bias

The concept of investigator bias was coined by Christian Meissner and Saul Kassin, who found in a meta-analysis that neither deception-detection training nor experience in lie-detection-related jobs (for example, law enforcement) increase accuracy (that is, correct classification) in identifying truths and lies. Instead, training and experience increase

in the suspect objectively suspicious reactions—which are a consequence of the type of questioning rather than of the suspect's actual guilt or innocence. A number of studies have shown that confirmation bias and self-fulfilling-prophecy effects do occur in interrogation situations.

Saul Kassin and collaborators found that relative to interrogators in an innocent-expectation condition (induced to believe that the suspect was probably innocent), interrogators in a guilty-expectation condition (GEC) chose more guilt-presumptive questions when preparing the interrogation, used more different interrogation techniques at the onset of the interrogation, and tended more strongly to judge the interviewee as guilty. Observers blind to the experimental manipulations listened to the audiotaped interviews and rated interrogators in the GEC as more guilt-biased, exerting more pressure on the suspect, and trying harder to obtain a confession (in particular when interviewing innocent suspects) than interrogators in the other condition. These strategies resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy effect, as the observers perceived suspects questioned by interviewers in the GEC as more defensive and marginally more guilty than those questioned by interviewers in the innocent-expectation condition.

Similar results were reported by Carole Hill and her colleagues, who additionally found that guilty and innocent suspects interviewed with guilt-presumptive questions felt stronger pressure to confess (although actual confessions did not depend on the type of questioning but on actual guilt), and that participants who listened to only the suspects' responses rated suspects interviewed with guilt-presumptive questions as more defensive, nervous, and guilty than those interviewed with neutral questions. Among innocent suspects, the denials of those interviewed with guilt-presumptive questions were judged as less plausible than the denials of those interviewed with neutral questions.

An early judgment of deception or guilt influences not only the interrogator's behavior during the interview, but also the memory and interpretation of the facts, as well as the kind of additional evidence to be sought. Barbara O'Brien asked participants to read a police file with information about a case. The first half of the file contained

circumstantial evidence against a designated suspect, while the second half contained both more evidence against this suspect and new evidence that questioned his guilt. Unlike participants in the no-hypothesis condition, participants in the hypothesis condition had to name their primary suspect after reading the first half of the file (virtually all named the designated suspect). Later on, in comparison with the no-hypothesis condition participants, those in the hypothesis condition remembered facts as more consistent with the designated suspect's guilt, interpreted ambiguous or inconsistent information more in line with the designated suspect's guilt, requested more reports and advocated more lines of investigation focused on that suspect, and ultimately were marginally more likely to judge the designated suspect as the culprit.

In sum, trained or professional investigators are not particularly good truth- and lie-detectors; instead, they are biased toward making deception judgments and tend to judge suspects as guilty. This yields confirmation-bias and self-fulfilling-prophecy effects that ultimately reaffirm the investigators' belief in the suspect's guilt. What remedies can be taken?

### Alleviating Bias

It has been suggested that training programs oriented to detect the truth in addition to deception might compensate the biasing influence of lie-detection-oriented programs. However, it is uncertain whether this might work with professional investigators, who must detect liars (guilty individuals) rather than truth-tellers. Another strategy was suggested by J. Pete Blair, who found that providing information at the end of the training can create an undesirable lie bias; and if one is not sure about someone's truthfulness, it is better to indicate that this person is truthful, which counteracted the lie-biasing effect of training.

Finally, Barbara O'Brien tested two strategies to neutralize confirmation bias in criminal investigations in a study similar to the one described above but with two additional groups. The counterhypothesis group had to list reasons why the preferred suspect might be innocent, whereas the list-three group had to list three suspects and evidence for and against each of them. The

counterhypothesis manipulation was successful in neutralizing the confirmation bias, but the list-three manipulation was not successful—perhaps because of the relative ease with which participants generated a case against the designated suspect. Thus, searching for reasons why the primary suspect might be innocent can counteract the confirmation bias.

Jaume Masip  
*University of Salamanca*

**See Also:** Evidence, Strategic Use of; Eye Contact; False Confessions; Generalized Communicative Suspicion; Law and Law Enforcement; Lie Bias; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Blair, J. P. "From the Field: Can Detection of Deception Response Bias Be Manipulated?" *Journal of Crime and Justice*, v.29 (2006).
- Hill, C., A. Memon, and P. McGeorge. "The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.13 (2008).
- Kassin, S. M., C. C. Goldstein, and K. Savitsky. "Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.27 (2003).
- Masip, J., H. Alonso, E. Garrido, and C. Antón. "Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS) Among Police Officers: Accounting for the Investigator Bias Effect." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.35 (2005).
- Masip, J., H. Alonso, E. Garrido, and C. Herrero. "Training to Detect What? The Biasing Effects of Training on Veracity Judgments." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.23 (2009).
- Meissner, C. A. and S. M. Kassin. "'He's Guilty!' Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.26 (2002).
- Narchet, F. M., C. A. Meissner, and M. B. Russano. "Modelling the Influence of Investigator Bias on the Elicitation of True and False Confessions." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.35 (2011).
- O'Brien, B. "Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations." *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, v.15 (2009).

## Investment Fraud

Investment fraud involves theft by deception. Its victims are unwary individuals who purchase or sell securities or commodities with the expectation of a profit or return in the form of interest, dividends, or income. Investment fraud comes in many varieties. It can occur when scammers lie or fail to disclose information in order to manipulate the investment market, causing victims to incur losses while the fraudster makes profits. Or it can be accomplished in more direct ways, such as a Ponzi scheme, in which an investment broker takes an individual's money under the guise of investing it but makes no such transaction for the individual. It can also take place when corporation officers or investment bankers overstate their profits and assets, or understate losses and liabilities, in order to deceive shareholders into believing an entity appears to be healthier than it actually is.

Protections in place to safeguard investors from fraud include federal and state regulatory agencies and federal laws such as the Securities Act of 1933, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Investment Act of 1988, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act of 2010. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conducts administrative hearings and can file lawsuits resulting in injunctions (to stop a practice), fines, and disgorgements (forfeitures of profits). The SEC can also refer cases to the U.S. Department of Justice for the filing of criminal charges, resulting in fines, restitution, probation, and imprisonment. The burden of proof to obtain a conviction is greater in criminal cases, in which guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, than in civil actions, in which only a preponderance of evidence is required to obtain a finding.

### Illegal Market Manipulation

Since the very act of investing carries with it a risk of losing one's money, it is often difficult to detect if a fraudster was involved behind the scene of an investor's loss. Illegal market manipulation illustrates this point. It includes such unscrupulous practices as operating out of a boiler room, churning, front running, pump and dump, poop

and scoop, short and distort, and insider trading. A boiler room is a large room crammed full of high-pressure telemarketers making cold calls to dupe unsuspecting customers into buying often troubled microcap (for example, penny) stocks. If the potential customer could see the caller's surroundings, no deal would take place. But boiler rooms are charades and are often staffed by individuals pretending to be licensed brokers.

Churning is the practice of a broker excessively trading a client's stock for the primary purpose of earning commissions. Front running is the practice whereby a stock analyst buys shares in a company knowing that a brokerage is going to be strongly recommending the stock to others, or a broker buys shares in a company knowing that his client will be buying a large order of the same stock. This drives the price of the stock up, costing clients more, but allows the broker to make a profit when he sells the stock after its price has risen.

Pump and dump involves spreading lies to artificially inflate (pump) the price of a stock. Schemers circulate false or misleading information, producing hype and a rise in the stock's price as a large number of people buy it. At this point, the fraudster sells (dumps) his own stock at a profit, while the recent investors lose because the price falls back to where it was before the pump. Poop and scoop may be seen as the opposite of pump and dump. In this practice, a few investors spread fabricated harmful information or rumors about a company or its stock, so that they can then buy the stock (scoop it up) at a bargain price when it falls (poops) as a consequence of the smear.

Short and distort is a scheme that begins with a perfectly allowable strategy (known as a short sale or selling short), involving the sale of a security that is not owned by the seller, but is rented or borrowed for the purpose of selling it to someone else. For instance, a broker may lend a security to an investor from his own inventory. At some point, the investor has to "cover" by purchasing the same type of security to return what he had borrowed. If the price drops in the interim, the investor profits. It becomes a short and distort scheme when an individual engages in illegal manipulation of the market, such as spreading untruthful information (distorting) to cause the stock's price to fall.

### Insider Trading

Insider trading is a type of fraud committed by nondisclosure. If a seller or buyer of a publicly traded stock has acquired privileged information about that corporation, upon which he bases his trade, and if he fails to disclose to his counterparty that he has such information, he has defrauded his counterparty. Well-publicized cases centering on insider trading are those of Raj Rajaratnam, Sam Waksal and Martha Stewart, and Eugene Plotkin and David Pajcin.

Having founded and managed Galleon Group (one of the world's largest hedge funds), billionaire Rajaratnam is considered the most influential figure thus far to have been found guilty of insider trading. His 2011 conviction resulted in the longest sentence given, to date, for this type of offense. Additionally, he was ordered to pay close to \$160 million combined in criminal fines, disgorgement, and civil damages.

Sam Waksal, founder and former chief executive officer (CEO) of Imclone (a biotech company), and his friend, television celebrity Martha Stewart, were embroiled in allegations of insider trading. In 2004, Stewart was found guilty of obstruction of justice and lying to the government. Waksal had pled guilty to securities fraud the preceding year and received a seven-year prison sentence. He admittedly had tried to sell his Imclone shares after learning (before the public announcement) that the Food and Drug Administration was not going to approve the company's new cancer drug. He also transferred a large number of shares to his daughter and to his father, advising them to sell these shares. Waksal denied having told Stewart to sell her shares. She maintained she had a standing stop-loss order with her broker to sell the shares if the share price fell below \$60. After serving his prison sentence, Waksal publicly stated his regret for having involved his family members in his deception and said that he learned from the experience that one should never lie to SEC investigators.

A more complicated and widely orchestrated insider trading case was that involving bond researchers Eugene Plotkin and David Pajcin. They devised a plan that included obtaining advance copies of the "Inside Wall Street" column in *Business Week*, as well as using confidential information from coconspirator Stanislov Shpigelman,





*The President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board (from left, Vice President Joe Biden, President Barack Obama, Paul Volcker, and Mark Gallogly) meets in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, April 16, 2010. Before the meeting, Obama remarked on Wall Street reform by assuring that he would veto any legislation that did not bring the derivatives market under control. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act was signed into law three months later on July 21, 2010.*

who worked in the mergers and acquisitions department of Merrill Lynch, a global investment management company. Plotkin and Pajcin placed orders for themselves and for others before recommendations were published in *Business Week* and while Merrill Lynch was working on deals that had not been publicly disclosed.

The SEC's surveillance department takes note of sudden surges in the trading of a company's stock, especially within days of a merger between companies. That agency became suspicious when a 63-year-old retired seamstress in Croatia (Pajcin's aunt) came into a \$2 million windfall of earnings from her Reebok stock that she had bought just before Adidas acquired Reebok. She had utilized a call option (a contract allowing one to lock into a buying price before the contract's expiration date), and during a two-day period had made 17 times the amount of her initial call option. From the Reebok trading, as well as trading on advance information of a Gillette takeover by Proctor & Gamble, Plotkin and Pajcin's insider trading ring netted \$6.7 million. In addition to receiving fines and prison sentences in 2008, the two were ordered to forfeit their profits.

### **Ponzi Schemes**

Ponzi schemes derive their name from Charles Ponzi, who in 1920 in Boston was discovered to

have swindled more than 10,000 investors out of \$20 million within an eight-month period. He lured victims into an international postage stamp business opportunity with the promise of a 50 percent return within 90 days. He paid investors what appeared to be returns by using the newer investors' money, after keeping most of the money for himself. Thereafter, any scheme that paid earlier investors with money from recent investors became known as a Ponzi scheme.

This type of confidence game depends upon so-called songbirds—investors receiving returns who sing the praises of the investment opportunity to others, who then want to take part in it. When individuals realize that they are the victims of a Ponzi scheme, in addition to experiencing their own financial losses, they have to deal with the realization that they had encouraged others (for example, friends and relatives) to buy into the investment opportunity in which they had mistakenly put their trust. Ponzi schemes usually collapse when either authorities discover they are fake or when investors in large numbers need to withdraw their money (for example, during an economic downturn).

In Ponzi's case, someone became suspicious and figured out that there were only 27,000 International Reply Coupons in worldwide circulation, and Ponzi would have needed 160 million of

such postal coupons to succeed with his promised profit to his investors.

A Ponzi scheme receiving wide notoriety was that of Bernard Madoff, who was sentenced in 2009 to 150 years in prison. He had collected \$36 billion from 13,000 account holders, while paying out \$18 billion in returns. When one includes the amounts investors falsely were led to believe they had earned, Madoff's fraudulent activities totaled nearly \$65 billion. When the 2008 financial crisis occurred and a large number of investors needed their money, the scheme fell apart. It was at that time that Madoff's confession to his two sons took place, and they, in turn, notified authorities.

Although Madoff admitted to having run the scheme since the early 1990s, it may have been going on longer than that. He had gone undetected for so many years because he had a very good reputation in the financial community and had served as chairman of the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). Harry Markopolos, an analyst, had tried unsuccessfully on several occasions to convince the SEC that Madoff's figures were impossible to achieve.

Other lesser-known Ponzi schemes were exposed around the same time as Madoff's, but they were overshadowed by the media coverage surrounding Madoff. Approximately 190 Ponzi schemes reportedly collapsed between 2008 and 2009, when the economy was suffering. Five days before the public learned about Madoff, Marc Dreier was arrested for several crimes, including a \$380 million Ponzi scheme. The scheme involved selling bogus promissory notes to hedge funds and providing clients with fictitious financial statements of earnings. Dreier, who ran his own lucrative Manhattan law firm, led a lavish lifestyle. But as he later explained during an interview, he felt he had not achieved the level of success that he had hoped to reach. He received a 20-year prison sentence in 2009.

Nicholas Cosmo's \$400 million Ponzi scheme was also uncovered in 2009. Cosmo led 1,500 investors into believing they could earn a 50 percent annual return by backing commercial bridge loans (short-term interim loans pending longer-term financing). In actuality, only \$30 million of the money taken from investors was used for such loans. Unlike Madoff and Dreier, who catered to

wealthy clients, Cosmo tended to have working-class and middle-class clients, who lost their entire savings as a consequence of their involvement with him. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

### Corporate Fraud

Corporate fraud (for example, misleading shareholders) is exemplified by the cases of Enron and WorldCom. In 2001, it was discovered that Enron, an energy trading corporation, had been overstating assets through several accounting tricks, including the creation of partnerships that hid its debt. The sham partnerships were allowing Enron to show profits while it was losing money each year and was \$30 billion in debt. Irregularities in bookkeeping were ignored by accountants, who served both as auditors and paid consultants for the company. Additionally, Enron was underhandedly persuading analysts to recommend Enron stock to potential investors as a strong buy. Enron's overvalued stock gave the company an illusion of success.

After the fraud was exposed, the company's stock, which had once sold for almost \$90 per share, fell to 40 cents, and Enron, the country's seventh-largest corporation at the time, went bankrupt. Enron's investors lost over \$70 billion. The losses were not limited to outside investors, as Enron employees and retirees lost their pensions and 401(k) plans. Former CEO Jeff Skilling received a 24-year prison sentence, while former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow received a six-year sentence after pleading guilty and serving as the prosecution's chief witness against other company executives. Kenneth Lay, Enron's founder and chairman of the board, died before he could be sentenced.

The year after Enron's bankruptcy, WorldCom, a telecommunications corporation, experienced its own accounting scandal and bankruptcy. Instead of listing \$3.8 billion as expenses, the company listed that amount as long-term investments. CEO Bernie Ebbers had resigned amid questions about receiving \$366 million in personal loans from the company. He received a 25-year prison sentence for securities fraud. The company's stock that had sold for \$64 per share in 1999 had plummeted to 21 cents at the time of the bankruptcy.

As a consequence of the fraud committed at Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations

during the white-collar crime wave that occurred between 2000 and 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In an effort to safeguard the interests of investors who buy stocks in publicly traded companies, the act includes requirements that CEOs certify the accuracy of their company's books, analysts be independent of the companies they evaluate, personal loans from companies to their top executives be banned, and nonaudit functions of auditors for public companies be restricted to avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally, when selling their shares of the company's stock, top executives are required to take reasonable steps to disclose such activity to shareholders. Had such a rule been in place during the months preceding the fall of Enron, its shareholders could have had some warning when Enron's top decision makers were unloading their stocks.

### Mortgage-Backed Securities Fiasco

Investment banks have also been known to misrepresent their worth. This appears to be the case in the mortgage-backed securities fiasco of 2006–08. As of the beginning of 2013, there had been no criminal prosecutions alleging fraud by the issuers of mortgage-backed securities, because intent is difficult to establish. Problems began when lending institutions started granting subprime mortgage loans to very risky borrowers, then bundled those loans as derivatives, and sold trillions of dollars worth of these as mortgage-backed securities, to mostly institutional investors.

In defense of their subprime loans, lenders contended that there was reason to believe that even the riskiest borrower (with a limited income, large debt, or poor credit history) had the ability to pay back the loan by selling his home at a profit after it appreciated in value. But when the housing bubble burst because of the unusually large number of foreclosures and homes for sale, the plan fell apart. Investors lost their money in troubled mortgage-backed securities.

By late 2012, civil suits by the SEC and New York's attorney general were targeting J.P. Morgan, the country's largest bank, which was being held accountable for mortgage-backed securities that Bear Stearns, a major investment services firm, had engaged in prior to being acquired by J.P. Morgan. Additionally, in early 2013, the government brought a civil suit against the credit

rating agency Standard & Poor's for misleading investors into believing that mortgage-backed securities were safe.

### Conclusion

While investing is always a risk, it becomes riskier when others covertly work against the investor by engaging in lying, pretense, nondisclosure/omissions, misleading statements, or any other related form of dishonesty or guile that deprives the investor of fairness or honest services. Investment fraud may be committed by private investors, brokers, financial advisers, corporations, financial institutions, and other institutions and individuals. In the long run, the victims of investment fraud include the entire society whose members lose trust in fiduciaries and the overseers of financial markets. Widespread loss of confidence in the investment market can have serious consequences for the entire economy.

Joan Luxenburg  
*University of Central Oklahoma*

**See Also:** Bankruptcy; Con Man; Corporate Fraud; Enron; Federal Trade Commission; Financial Markets; Insider Trading; Madoff, Bernie; Stewart, Martha.

### Further Readings

- Henriques, Diana B. *The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust*. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2011.
- Lewis, Mervyn K. "New Dogs, Old Tricks. Why Do Ponzi Schemes Succeed?" *Accounting Forum*, v.36/4 (2012).
- Markopolos, Harry. *No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010.
- McLean, Bethany and Peter Elkind. *The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron*. New York: Portfolio, 2003.

## Iran-Contra Affair

Iran-Contra was a political scandal in the mid-1980s during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. From the beginning of his first term in office,

President Reagan and his administration had been supporting and funding rebel contras (counter-revolutionaries) in their fight against the Sandinistas for political power in Nicaragua. Partisan politics led Congress to pass the Boland Amendments, sponsored by Representative Edward Patrick Boland, a Democrat from Massachusetts. The amendments aimed to control American contributions to the contras. Congress also set a cap of \$24 million for the contras during 1983, and the Reagan administration was disappointed in the amount of money appropriated.

### **Alternative Funding Methods**

Robert McFarlane, Reagan's national security advisor, and William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), agreed that a way to fund the contras would be to find third-party countries that would be willing to donate to this group. Saudi Arabia agreed to give \$1 million per month, so McFarlane and Casey set up a private bank account to move the money from Saudi Arabia to the contras. When Congress decided against giving any money to the contras in 1984, Reagan entrusted McFarlane and Oliver North, deputy director of political-military affairs, to keep the contras' mission alive. After this cut in funding, the National Security Council (NSC) took over the contras case from the CIA.

North devised many ways to fund the contras, including private funding, foreign aid as a leverage for other countries to support the contras (specifically Honduras), and continuing to find third-party countries willing to donate. In 1985, Congress granted \$27 million in humanitarian aid to the contras with the stipulation that the State Department administer the aid. Reagan quickly created the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office (NHAO) in the State Department and demanded the funds be sent to Nicaragua immediately. North used NHAO to plant people in Nicaragua. At this time, Congress inquired as to the working relationship between the NSC and the contras, but the representatives lied on multiple occasions in order to cover up their secret operation.

Iran became a party to the scheme in the summer of 1985. In order to secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon, Israel sent U.S.-supplied weapons to Iran in return for Iran's help in releasing the hostages. Along with the

hostage situation, the United States was worried about Soviet influence in Iran. Over the next year, until November 1986, the United States worked with Mancher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian who said he could obtain the release of the hostages. The United States sent thousands of Hawk missiles and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command-link (TOW) missiles in order to gain release of the hostages.

This is precisely when North discovered how lucrative the selling of arms to Iran could be. North was able to purchase TOWs from the Department of Defense for \$3,700. In turn, he sold these TOWs to Iran, through Israel, for \$10,000 each, never disclosing the price difference. The proceeds from this price difference were then sent to aid the Nicaraguan contras. This diversion continued until November 1986, when the secret operations were leaked and what is now known as Iran-Contra became public.

### **Deception in Politics and Security Policy**

Deception in politics and security policy is an ongoing theme. President Reagan and his NSC were not the first government officials to use high levels of lying and deception in their work. For example, the Case-Zablocki Act was enacted in 1972 to stop the executive branch from entering into agreements with foreign countries without notifying Congress. This act required the president to notify Congress of any international agreements the executive branch made in which the United States was a party.

For similar reasons, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was enacted in order to reign in presidential military decisions that were made without the consent of Congress. This resolution was created after consecutive presidents bypassed congressional approval during the Vietnam War, and President Richard Nixon secretly authorized bombings in Cambodia and Laos. After these laws were adopted, presidents started using tactics such as "nonagreement" agreements and treaty reinterpretations to circumvent these restrictions. All of these agreements could be seen as a way for the executive branch to expand its power by deceiving Congress.

Similar types of deception are evident in the Iran-Contra scandal. The entire Iran-Contra situation was hidden under a blanket of deception.



On multiple occasions Congress inquired as to the activities of President Reagan and his role in helping the Nicaraguan contras. Different people involved in the situation repeatedly told Congress that they were not doing anything illegal. One of Reagan's national security advisors, John Poindexter, even went so far as to destroy a Presidential Finding that Reagan had signed, which said he knew about a Hawk missile shipment in November 1985 but was not aware it was an arms-for-hostages situation. Poindexter destroyed this finding because he believed that if the document was found by people not involved in Iran-Contra, it would be an embarrassment to the president. Moreover, once the scandal was leaked to the public, North destroyed multiple documents in order to hide his large role in the situation.

Lying and deception also was a factor in the prosecution of the people involved in Iran-Contra. North was tried on 11 charges, including aiding and abetting and obstruction of congressional inquiries in November 1986, destroying and falsifying official NSC documents, and receiving illegal gratuities. Throughout his entire trial, North claimed that he believed he had been acting under full support and approval of his superiors, including President Reagan. This would indicate that he had been deceived if he actually did not have presidential approval, or that he was deceiving members of Congress and the American public if he was working without presidential permission.

While the NSC and those involved used deception and lying as a large part of their cover-up of Iran-Contra, North was using these same techniques in order to receive a not guilty verdict in his prosecution. President Reagan escaped prosecution by saying he did not know the extent to which this situation had evolved. In a *New York Times* article published on November 26, 1986, Reagan said he had not been in charge of his administration's policy toward Iran and pointed the blame at North and Poindexter. It is still unclear to this day how much Reagan knew.

### Conclusion

Lying and deception have become a more public part of politics within the past few decades. Presidents have lied and deceived to bypass Congress in multiple arenas, including military affairs, foreign

policy, and fiscal decision making. In the Iran-Contra situation, lying and deception aided in the short-term expansion of the power of the executive branch and some of the agencies within it.

Alyssa Baker  
Tobias T. Gibson  
*Westminster College*

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Department of Defense, U.S.; History of Deception: 1950 to the Present; Military Deception; Nixon, Richard; Spin, Political; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair." Paper 2071. *Faculty Scholarship Series* (1988). [http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss\\_papers/2071](http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2071) (Accessed January 2013).

Kornbluh, Peter and Malcolm Byrne. *The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History*. New York: The New Press, 1993.

Weintraub, B. "Iran Payment Found Diverted to Contras; Reagan Security Advisor and Aide are Out." *New York Times* (November 26, 1986). <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1125.html> (Accessed January 2013).

---

## Iraq War

The United States was engaged in a war in Iraq from March 20, 2003, until December 18, 2011. The most notable incidents of lying and deception during the war involved (1) the United States' violation of the Geneva Conventions and the country's subsequent denial of its direct connection to prisoner abuse at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, the Abu Ghraib prisons, and other military sites; and (2) the United States' mischaracterization of Iraq as a country that possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Records from international organizations as well as several U.S. government agencies confirm the U.S. government had been cautioned of

its violation of the Geneva Conventions as early as January 2002. The George W. Bush administration disregarded these allegations until 2004, when photographs of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, leaked and the scandal went viral.

While there exist thousands of photographs and videos of the abuse in Abu Ghraib, only a handful of pictures circulated in the media. When these photographs became public, the U.S. government negated any awareness of prisoner maltreatment, exculpated senior officials who knew and took part in the organization of these acts, and attributed the incidents of abuse to a group of low-ranking soldiers stationed at Abu Ghraib.

Regarding the distortion of Iraq as a country armed with WMD, the U.S. and British governments accepted allegations provided by foreign intelligence that incriminated Iraq as possessing WMDs. These documents, later discovered to be false, stressed that since the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein had continued to develop WMD with the intentions to damage neighboring regions and disrupt the world's stability. By the time President Bush made his State of the Union address in 2003, an array of these claims had already been exposed as faulty, although the president's speech perpetuated the information as credible. Later in 2003, the lack of evidence against Iraq directed the White House to correct the widespread misconceptions by suggesting the real concern regarded Iraq's program for developing WMD and not the weapons themselves. Investigators from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) never found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

### **Defiance of Geneva Conventions**

An important government source that demystifies pervasive narratives regarding the Abu Ghraib scandals is the Levin-McCain report, released on December 11, 2008. This report summarizes investigations of various government "cover ups" and lists a timeline for the incidents of abuse. The Levin-McCain report explains how the incidents of prisoner maltreatment were not the actions of "a few bad apples," as mainstream media had depicted it, but rather a systematic practice of abuse passed from the top down.

This and other documents mark February 7, 2002, as an important date for understanding

the events that followed. On this day, President Bush announced that members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were not protected by the principles of the Third Geneva Convention, which affords war detainees prisoner of war (POW) status. This interpretation of the law prohibited Al Qaeda and Taliban affiliates from receiving the humane treatment mandated in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and enabled these members to be treated as "unlawful combatants" who were not entitled to the protection of international law. The Bush administration deemed the Geneva Conventions inapplicable in this war because Iraq was a "failed state." This reinterpretation of international law produced a new military policy that severely affected the treatment of Iraqi detainees under U.S. custody.

In December 2001, before the president adopted his new policy regarding the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel's Office requested information from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding detainee "exploitation." The JPRA is a government division that supervises military training to build resistance in soldiers in the event soldiers become prisoners. This agency bases training on illegal practices that violate the Geneva Conventions. The training includes building physical and psychological endurance against stress; being stripped of one's clothes; and being exposed to sleep deprivation, humiliation, waterboarding, and physical pain. In July 2002, the JPRA's deputy general counsel for intelligence confirmed the purpose of this request was to "reverse engineer" the endurance training.

Although most of the records between JPRA and the DoD remain classified, unclassified material brings attention to a number of senior officials who took part in JPRA meetings, debriefings, and correspondence regarding new interrogation techniques. Some of these senior officials include DoD General Counsel William Haynes II, JPRA Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, JPRA senior psychologist Bruce Jessen, Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council legal advisor John Bellinger, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

### Interrogation and Torture

In August 2002, Bybee wrote to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, describing options that attempted to redefine the meaning of torture. The first of the options explains that for an act to be considered torture it must include physical pain amounting to the equivalent in intensity of organ failure as well as psychological harm that lasts for months or even years. The second of the options remains classified. However, records relating to this document show that waterboarding was among the techniques listed and approved to gather intelligence in Iraq.

Having redefined the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and what constitutes torture, officials at the Guantanamo Naval Base requested that Rumsfeld give them permission to use stronger methods of interrogation. Rumsfeld approved 16 of the techniques, including the use of hooding, stress positions, stripping, and deprivation of light as methods to aid the interrogation process. Rumsfeld approved the techniques without further instructions as to how they should be overseen.

In addition to approving these interrogation techniques, Rumsfeld and Haynes created a working group to work out the legal details of the new interrogation tactics. The working group was finalized on March 2003, months after global humane organizations such as Human Right Watch, Amnesty International, and the Red Cross had raised concerns about the way American troops were treating detainees in custody. The interrogation techniques resemble reversed JPRA endurance training.

Memos of these and other interrogation techniques approved by Rumsfeld traveled from Guantanamo to Iraq. Although the U.S. government abandoned authority over the more aggressive interrogation techniques in January 2003, Rumsfeld's initial consent continued to influence the tactics for gathering intelligence.

Interrogation techniques that violated Geneva Conventions were widespread in many sites holding war detainees. Common practices included yelling at detainees, environmental manipulation, sleep deprivation, stripping detainees of their clothes, and 20-hour-long interrogations. These techniques eventually became standard operating procedures issued for all U.S. forces in Iraq. Abusive interrogation practices were not specific

to Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper, and Bagram Air Base, rank among the sites known for violent interrogation tactics.

### Pressure for Humane Treatment

In October 2003, increasing concern from humanitarian organizations began to induce a growing pressure regarding the humane treatment of detainees. In attempts to address these issues, U.S. forces eliminated previously authorized techniques; however, the new policies were confusing and ambiguous to the soldiers.

On January 31, 2004, the White House appointed Commanding General Antonio Taguba to carry out a formal investigation regarding allegations of abuse in the Abu Ghraib prisons. The Taguba Report showed that between October and December 2003, incidents of criminal abuse were inflicted on several detainees at Abu Ghraib. The report noted a long list of abuses, including physical infliction of pain, videotaping and photographing naked detainees, forcibly arranging detainees in sexually explicit positions, stripping detainees of their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time, forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed, placing a dog chain around a naked detainee's neck, and using working dogs without muzzles to intimidate detainees. Further, the Taguba Report brought attention to problems involving the chain of command at Abu Ghraib.

After the Abu Ghraib scandals became public, President Bush offered an apology to the Arab community for the "humiliation" of Iraqi prisoners. He referred to the practices of torture as "abhorrent" but kept Rumsfeld as part of his cabinet, noting that Rumsfeld was a good secretary of defense. The Bush administration blamed the acts of abuse on a few so-called sadistic soldiers. These soldiers were tried in military courts martial, convicted of the abuses, and received dishonorable discharges after serving time in prison; some of their superiors were demoted. Senior officials working for specialized government agencies and the White House did not face severe consequences.

### Weapons of Mass Destruction

As early as September 2002, CIA director George Tenet reassured President Bush that Saddam

Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. Almost a year before the debriefing, the U.S. government's leading nuclear experts maintained that it was extremely unlikely that Hussein was importing aluminum tubes to Iraq for developing nuclear centrifuges. The White House dismissed these claims and instead noted other allegations of WMD possession by Iraq as reasons for engaging war with the country.

The U.S. stance regarding Iraq's possession of WMD was largely supported by the UK government and Prime Minister Tony Blair, who released an evaluation of Iraq's alleged involvement with nuclear weapons since the Gulf War. "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government," also known as the "September Dossier," details a long list of claims about Iraq in relation to WMD. The document was released September 24, 2002. Among the most noted claims, the report accused Iraq of continuing to produce nuclear agents after the Gulf War, having military tactics for using WMD

against its own Shia population, having weapons that were deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them, developing mobile laboratories, illegally possessing missiles that were capable of carrying chemical and biological warheads, and building a new test stand for missiles that could reach the United Kingdom, the Sovereign Base in Cyprus, NATO affiliates in Greece and Turkey, and the people of Israel. Finally, based on information provided to the UK and the United States by the Italian military intelligence service known as Sismi, the accusations blamed Iraq for seeking to obtain significant quantities of uranium from Niger and accounted illegal earnings of \$3 billion to fund WMD in 2001.

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the case to the United Nations Security Council, bringing attention to these facts as well as the discovery of two trucks in Mosul, Iraq, which Powell used as proof that Iraq had mobile WMD. Later investigations revealed that the trucks had zero traces of biological agents and



*Two R-400A bombs, photographed by United Nations Special Commission inspectors near the Al Walid Airbase, Iraq, in late 1991, bear markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs had markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill. This evidence contradicted Iraq's declarations that it did not deploy biological weapons to operational airbases and that it destroyed them in July 1991; this claim was subsequently retracted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Iraq's long history of deception lent credence to Italian intelligence reports, later found to be false, claiming Iraq possessed nuclear weapons of mass destruction.*



that the documents warning of Nigerian yellowcake were forged by Italian spy and Sisimi director Rocco Martino. When questioned about the authenticity of the facts, Powell replied that the reports were accepted in “good faith.” The U.S. and British governments never addressed how their intelligence agents did not recognize that the evidence was fake.

Rachel Romero  
Texas State University

**See Also:** Bush, George W.; Leakage; Spin, Political; Terrorism; Torture; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

- Levin, Carl and John McCain. “Executive Summary and Conclusions of Report on Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody.” <http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf> (Accessed May 2013).
- Miller, David, eds. *Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq*. London: Pluto Press, 2003.
- Sciolino, Elaine and Elisabetta Povoledo. “Source of Forged Niger-Iraq Uranium Documents Identified.” *New York Times* (November 4, 2005). [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/04/international/europe/04\\_italy.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/04/international/europe/04_italy.html?_r=0) (Accessed July 2013).
- Taguba, Antonio M. “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade.” [http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison\\_abuse\\_report.pdf](http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf) (Accessed May 2013).

## Irving, Clifford

In the early 1970s, investigative journalist Clifford Michael Irving perpetrated one of the most famous hoaxes in the history of publishing when he delivered a manuscript to publisher McGraw-Hill that he claimed was based upon interviews he had conducted with reclusive American billionaire Howard Hughes, whom he had never met. Irving reported that he interviewed the notoriously private billionaire at retreats in the Bahamas, Florida, and Mexico. Originally, the book Irving pitched was conceived as an authorized

biography. However, the transcripts of the fully developed fake interviews he purportedly conducted with Hughes during the process of preparing the biography proved to be such compelling reading that it was decided they should be edited and released in the form of an autobiography. This alleged autobiography was scheduled to be published in 1972.

### Howard Hughes’s Fictional Autobiography

McGraw-Hill’s commercial interest in publishing Hughes’s autobiography was prompted by continued public fascination with Hughes because of his enormous wealth, fabled exploits, and unconventional lifestyle. In his prime, Hughes had earned a large fortune for his pioneering work in both films and aviation, and he invested his money wisely, resulting in Hughes becoming one of the world’s wealthiest people. The same work that made him rich also made him famous, as did his reputation as a womanizer who had dated such high-profile Hollywood stars as Bette Davis, Ava Gardner, Olivia de Havilland, Katharine Hepburn, and Ginger Rogers.

After decades of high profile celebrity Hughes then retired completely from public view, living in protected seclusion in a series of upscale hotel sanctuaries in Las Vegas, Beverly Hills, Boston, the Bahamas, and elsewhere. Hughes’s prolonged absence from public view after years of being a famous celebrity only served to increase interest in him, fueling rumors about his mental and physical health, his living conditions, and other details of his private life.

In perpetrating his hoax, Irving duped his publisher into believing that Hughes had written him a series of letters. These were forgeries written by Irving, who had developed skill at mimicking Hughes’s handwriting using as a template a sample that had been included in a *Newsweek* article. The forgeries were so skillfully done that handwriting experts authenticated them as genuine. In the letters, Irving had Hughes convey admiration for Irving’s previous work and express the desire to collaborate with him on a book about Hughes’s legendary life.

Cleverly, Irving also had Hughes demand as a condition of his participation in the biographical project that all correspondence be done exclusively through Irving, giving him complete

authorial and financial control over the process. When mounting doubts were raised regarding Irving's veracity regarding the letters, he took a polygraph test, the indeterminate results of which suggested at least the possibility that Irving was not lying.

Irving was aided in perpetrating his hoax by his friend, Richard "Dick" Suskind, and his fourth wife, Edith (née Sommer). Suskind helped conduct the meticulous research required to assure that publicly known facts about Hughes would not conflict with what the invented Hughes said in his interviews regarding what he did and when and where these activities took place. In preparing for the faux interviews, Irving and Suskind conducted extensive archival research, ranging from newspaper articles to unpublished manuscripts. In addition, when possible they sought out and interviewed Hughes's friends and acquaintances. This research provided rich details, some not publicly known, that lent the interviews and the fictional autobiography based upon them a high degree of credibility.

In order to process the money Irving's publisher thought it was sending to Hughes, Irving's wife Edith opened a Swiss bank account under the pseudonym Helga R. Hughes. She visited the bank in disguise to make cash withdrawals, much of which was hidden around the couple's property on the Spanish island of Ibiza.

Clifford and his accomplices were betting that the notoriously reclusive Hughes, who at that time had completely retired from public view for almost 15 years after decades of celebrity, would not come out of his seclusion in order to challenge them. They were wrong. On January 7, 1972, Hughes held an unconventional press conference from the Bahamian hotel where he was then staying, in which he spoke to seven reporters via a speaker placed on a stand and denounced Irving as a fraud and the "autobiography" as a fake. Two weeks later, as evidence against them mounted, Irving and his conspirators were no longer able to plausibly claim that their Hughes's autobiography was genuine. They confessed to the hoax on January 28, 1972, and were subsequently indicted, convicted of fraud in federal court, and then sentenced to prison.

Irving served 17 months of his two and a half year sentence. His wife Helga, who was sentenced

to two years, had most of her sentence suspended and spent just two months in prison. Suskind was sentenced to six months and released after serving only five because of good conduct. Irving returned most of the money he had obtained as a result of his hoax.

Irving's literary hoax has lived on in the imagination of American popular culture. He has written his own book about it, simply titled *The Hoax*. His literary fraud occupies a prominent place in Orson Welles's tongue-in-cheek 1974 documentary essay on artistic authenticity and duplicity, *F Is for Fake*. In 2006, Mirimax released *The Hoax*, a film treatment of the scandal, directed by Lasse Hallström and starring Richard Gere as Irving.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
College of Charleston

**See Also:** Fiction; Forgery, Art; Historical Narratives, False; News Media: Print; Polygraph.

#### Further Readings

Irving, C. *The Hoax*. New York: Hyperion Books, 2007.

Irving, C. *Howard Hughes: The Autobiography*. London: John Blake Publishing, 2008.

Sarris, Andrew. "H Is for Hoax: Tale of Irving's Hughes Scandal, With Smarmy, Smooth Gere, Disillusioned Davis." *New York Observer* (April 2, 2007). <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-161266444.html> (Accessed August 2013).

---

## Islam

According to Islamic theology, Islam is a monotheistic and Abrahamic religion, a message from God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel in the form of a book, the Holy Qur'an, in the 7th century C.E. This new Abrahamic religion was considered necessary because it was argued that the previous Abrahamic holy books (the Talmud and the Bible) had been modified several times and a new religion was a way to return to the truth. Thus, as happens with any religion and from the start of Islam, accusations of lying and deception have been traded and

debated regarding the authenticity of the newer religion and the accuracy of some information in the previous monotheistic ones.

In the modern world, some Muslims, especially in countries where Muslims are a minority, believe they are victims of lies and deception; in their view, their religion, and sometimes the Prophet, are misrepresented internationally due both to misinformation and to the actions of particular Muslims, who do not necessarily represent the faith. Their feelings of alienation and misrepresentation can lead to marginalization and extremism.

In addition, conflicts over authenticity and truthfulness exist within the various sects of Islam. These accusations and debates, which emerged early in the history of Islam, continue today and have serious international consequences. They sometimes become part of propaganda forming the context for war and contributing to moral disengagement; for example, selected passages of doctrine are used by members of one group to justify violent actions that are seen as a violation of fundamental Islamic principles by other groups. In addition, challenging the truthfulness of something held as true, and even as a fundamental part of identity, by the followers of a religion or sect can sometimes ignite strong emotional reactions.

### Islamic Teachings on Lying and Deception

The Qur'an is the main source of Islamic teachings and laws, along with the sayings of the Prophet, called Hadith, and his life style, called Sunnah. Muslims believe that the Holy Qur'an is the literal word of God and that it did not change in any way since the time of the Prophet. Through centuries, honest transmissions of the Qur'an and Hadith have been an essential part of the faith. Muslim scholars, centuries ago, established a whole field of inquiry that investigates the authenticity of a Hadith attributed to the Prophet by examining the moral characteristics of the people in the lineage of transmission of that Hadith in order to determine the likelihood that their reporting was inaccurate.

In addition, the Qur'an teaches that God has attributes and names, and among them is The Truth. In Islamic theology, devotion to the truth is part of the faith. Other attributes and names of God in Islam are The All Seeing and The All

Hearing, The Apparent, and The Hidden. The Qur'an teaches that God knows what is apparent and what is hidden, the secrets, and things that are even beyond secrets. According to the Qur'an, lying and deception might distort the perceptions of people, even of the person doing the deceiving, but they will not change the truth as it is known by God.

Islam forbids lying and deception in all their forms. It forbids lying in personal relations unless it is in the form of complimenting a loved one or reconciliation. It also forbids hypocrisy, falsely accusing someone of something they did not do, denying the power of something or of an event, denying reality or evidence, and denying the truth. It forbids lying about God, as in attributing messages, rules, or attributes to God that were not from God, and lying in religious matters (for example, in the form of sorcery and magic), in business dealings, and in international treaties.

However, Islam permits, with some limits, deception in war; also, according to some Muslim scholars, it allows lying to hide one's real beliefs in order to protect oneself from harm by oppressive powers. This exception is similar to the philosophical principle of choosing the less harmful option when faced with two harmful choices. This concept, known as *Taqqiya*, is a debated and controversial concept among Muslims and others.

### Levels of Lying

In Islam, lying can be carried out by speaking, behaving, or creating illusions in the heart. The Qur'an mentions three levels of lying. The first is lying to bring a benefit or prevent harm to one's self. The second and more serious is lying to harm, to accuse, or attribute something to someone else knowing that it is not the truth. The third and most serious is lying to confuse falsehood with the truth to the point of self-deception wherein one believes one's own lies.

Truth-telling is seen as a form of worship and constructive behavior that gets a person closer to God. Truth-telling in the form of advice is an essential component of Islamic law.

Al-Hasaba or religious authorities are seen, by Islamic law, as practicing truth-telling or advising society following the traditions of the prophets. The Prophet taught that among the closest people

to God in the afterlife is someone who tells the truth to an oppressive ruler. In addition, the word for friend in Arabic is *sadeq*, which means the one who tells another person the truth and believes the other person is truthful.

The Qur'an describes people in heaven as the truthful and honest ones who did not believe the deceptions of Satan. In addition, it talks about efforts by some people to hide or alter the truth by using language and says that some try to deceive God but they only deceive themselves. Thus, the Qur'an is seen by Islamic theology as an effort to free people from the deceptions surrounding them that were made by Satan, various powers, religious authorities, the way history was told, and traditions.

Majed A. Ashy  
Bay State College  
Kathleen Malley-Morrison  
Boston University

**See Also:** History of Deception: Medieval Period; Ideology; Judaism; Language; Middle East; Morals and Ethics.

#### Further Readings

- Al-Qardawi, Y. *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*. Cairo: Al Falah Foundation for Translation, 2001.
- Ashy, M. and K. Malley-Morrison. "Attitudes Towards War in the Middle East From an Extremism Model Perspective." *International Psychology Bulletin*, v.11/2 (2007).
- Barakat, H. *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Kelsay, J. *Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.
- Nasr, V. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.





# J

## Jackalope

Jackalopes are imaginary creatures with the body and head of a jackrabbit, topped incongruously with either the spiky antlers of a deer or the pronged horns of an antelope. Their alleged existence—especially in the states of the Rocky Mountain West, Great Plains, and northern midwest—is often the source of good-natured lying, in the tradition of fooling tourists and other persons seemingly susceptible to tall tales and exaggeration. Examples of other such creatures include the fur-bearing trout, hoop snake, and wild haggis, as well as the practical joke to hunt elusive snipe on moonless nights in the woods. These types of purely imaginary creatures are thus distinguished from the Loch Ness Monster, Abominable Snowman (or Yeti), and Bigfoot—all of which have both loyal believers and doubtful skeptics on the question of actual physical existence.

The origins of the jackalope are difficult to determine. According to an obituary in the *New York Times* (2003), the jackalope was created in the 1930s by two brothers who owned a taxidermy shop in Douglas, Wyoming. One day after returning from a hunting trip, Douglas Herrick and Ralph Herrick casually tossed the body of a jackrabbit onto their shop floor. When the rabbit's head serendipitously came to rest against a set of deer antlers, the brothers were inspired

to combine the two unrelated parts into a new hybrid creation. However, other sources maintain that the first jackalope was observed by either John Colter on the Lewis and Clark Expedition in 1807 or 1808 or by Wyoming trapper Roy Ball in 1829 (or in 1862, according to still other sources). Doubters of the Herricks' account also maintain that another store in Buffalo, Wyoming, featured a stuffed jackalope as early as the 1920s.

Other theories suggest that the American jackalope may derive in part from real European rabbits bearing horn-like appendages as early as the 16th century. One such rabbit, identified in German as *die gehörnten Hase* (the horned hare) and in Latin as *Lepus cornutus*, was illustrated in Konrad Gesner's *Thierbuch* (or *Animal Book*, 1563). Subsequent illustrations of rabbits with small horns growing out of their foreheads appeared in other printed volumes throughout the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. Wildlife biologists and naturalists have speculated that these rabbits were infected with the Shope papilloma virus, which causes large warts resembling horns to grow on the heads of rabbits. This same virus has also infected cottontail rabbits in the United States, particularly in the Midwest and Great Plains. Still another hypothesis tracing jackalopes to Europe is that immigrants to the United States may have brought with them knowledge of imaginary animals with antlers, wings, fangs, and a tail—all attached to

the body of a small mammal that resembles a rabbit or squirrel. In Bavaria, this composite creature is known as the *Wolpertinger*. In neighboring Austria, it is called the *Raurackl*.

Whatever its origins, the jackalope is now associated with a wide variety of exaggerated attributes. According to this lore, jackalopes are fierce and elusive creatures, capable of hopping at speeds greater than 65 miles per hour (which would place them second only to the cheetah among the world's fastest animals on land). Reputed to be highly intelligent and cunningly deceitful, jackalopes are supposedly able to mimic any sounds, including those of coyotes, crows, and humans, and even know how to project their voices like ventriloquists in order to fool hunters on their trail. There are also reports of jackalopes being able to imitate the sounds of crying babies, the accents of French speakers, and the lyrical ballads of cowboys and lumberjacks—albeit only on dark nights before an advancing thunderstorm. Additional lore maintains that the elaborate mating ritual of jackalopes occurs only amid flashes of lightning (according to one source), or during the fall migration, after the young have been kicked out of the nest and left to fend for themselves (according to another source).

The city of Douglas in eastern Wyoming—where the Herrick brothers lived and worked—calls itself “Home of the Jackalope” and claims more jackalope-related activities and enthusiasm than any other municipality. For instance, the annual Jackalope Days Celebration takes place there in early June; images of jackalopes adorn municipal structures and vehicles, and statues of jackalopes abound, including one that is eight-feet tall in Jackalope Square in the center of Douglas. (Other large jackalope statues are found in Red Lodge, Montana; Wall, South Dakota; and Fort Worth, Texas.) In both 2005 and 2013, the Wyoming House of Representatives passed bills to establish the jackalope as the state's official mythical creature, but the Wyoming Senate has not yet approved the legislation.

Throughout Wyoming and neighboring states, tourists have been able to purchase a variety of jackalope memorabilia for at least 70 years. These novelty items include tall-tale postcards featuring images of jackalopes (sometimes with humans riding astride them); mounted trophy heads of



*The jackalope, a humorous example of what folklorists have labeled “tales of lying,” is associated with a wide variety of exaggerated attributes such as hopping at speeds faster than 65 miles per hour, having the capacity for cunning deceit, and having the ability to mimic any sound.*

jackalopes; cans of jackalope milk; and nonresident permits for the hunting of jackalopes, albeit valid only one day each year, on June 31, between the hours of midnight and 2:00 A.M. (in some versions) or between sunrise and sunset (in other versions). Curiously, several of these permits require that jackalope hunters be absolutely truthful, except when questioned about their experiences with jackalopes.

Because the stories and claims about jackalopes are typically told with tongue firmly in cheek, they do not represent intentional lying or deception, any more than do the stories about Santa Claus or the tooth fairy. Nevertheless, the jackalope narratives are splendid examples of what folklorists

have labeled “tales of lying” or tall tales. Told either as first-person narratives or as second-hand accounts in which the narrator knows the individual(s) involved, tall tales are celebrated for their inventiveness and exaggeration, the more outlandish, the better, especially when related to great exploits of hunting and fishing. The best tall tales are often those that are circulated from person to person in oral tradition, which may help explain why there are so many varied accounts of jackalope history and lore.

James I. Deutsch  
*Smithsonian Institution*

**See Also:** Animals; Exaggeration; Fairy Tales; Humor; Tall Tales; Myth.

### Further Readings

Alexander, Bill. *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Jackalopes: But Didn't Think You Oughtta Ask*. Evanston, WY: Alexander Ragtime, 1980.

Dorson, Richard M. *Man and Beast in American Comic Legend*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Holliday, Chuck. “Jackalopes.” <http://sites.lafayette.edu/hollidac/links-for-fun/jackalopes> (Accessed February 2013).

Hoy, James F. “Jackalope.” In *American Folklore: An Encyclopedia*, Jan Harold Brunvand, ed. New York: Garland Publishing, 1996.

Martin, Douglas. “Douglas Herrick, 82, Dies; Father of West's Jackalope.” *New York Times* (January 19, 2003).

Rubin, Cynthia Elyce and Morgan Williams. *Larger Than Life: The American Tall-Tale Postcard*. New York: Abbeville Press, 1990.

Simberloff, Daniel S. “A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Taxidermist.” *Natural History*, v.96 (1987).

a successful military career, fought in duels, and became a wealthy lawyer. Jackson later entered into politics, rising from poverty to become the nation's first frontier president. His presidential legacy is a controversial one, stemming from his decision to remove five Native American tribes from their southeastern homes and relocate them in the western United States. Many contemporary historians refer to this policy as an “ethnic cleansing” of the tribes, and they denounce the deception with which Jackson and other federal officials forced Native Americans to abandon their homelands.

Jackson was born on March 15, 1767, to Scottish-Irish immigrants Andrew Jackson and Elizabeth Hutchinson Jackson in the Waxhaws border region between North and South Carolina. He was the couple's third child; however, Jackson's father died in an accident three weeks before his birth. Jackson received little formal education, entering into a local militia as a courier at the age of 13. During the Revolutionary War's Battle of Stono Ferry on June 20, 1779, Jackson's eldest brother Hugh died from heat exhaustion. Jackson and his brother Robert were captured by the British and held as prisoners, both contracting smallpox. Robert died before their mother could secure their release. She volunteered her time as a nurse to prisoners of war during outbreak of cholera. Elizabeth died from the disease, leaving Jackson an orphan.

Jackson blamed the British for the deaths of his mother and brothers. Jackson later moved to northeast Tennessee, beginning his legal career. In 1796, he was elected a delegate to the Tennessee constitutional convention and in the following year was elected a U.S. senator as a Democratic-Republican. Jackson later resigned from the Senate and was appointed judge of the Tennessee Supreme Court. In addition to his legal career, Jackson had a successful career in the military, eventually becoming a war hero to the nation. Jackson fought in the War of 1812, defeating the Creek Indians at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. He was appointed commander of the Tennessee militia, serving as major general. After the war, Jackson fought off British forces that were threatening New Orleans. He became a national hero because of his victory at the Battle of New Orleans, receiving a gold medal and thanks from Congress. In

---

## Jackson, Andrew

Nicknamed “Old Hickory” for his toughness and aggressive personality, Andrew Jackson was the seventh president of the United States. He had



December 1817, Jackson ordered an invasion of Florida. His troops captured Spanish posts, claiming the surrounding land for the United States.

### Seeking the Presidency

Jackson's popularity eventually led him to run for president in 1824. Although he won the popular vote, he did not become president. The election of 1824 was the first time in U.S. history that no presidential candidate received the majority of electoral votes, leaving the House of Representatives to decide among the candidates: Jackson, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, and Speaker of the House Henry Clay. Crawford was out of the race after suffering a stroke and becoming critically ill. Clay gave his support to Adams and later became Adams's secretary of state, an arrangement that Jackson's supporters dubbed the "corrupt bargain."

Jackson continued his quest for the presidency in 1828, defeating incumbent John Quincy Adams. During the campaign, there were several personal attacks made by opponents against Jackson and his wife, Rachel. Before his inauguration in 1829, Rachel suddenly died, leading Jackson to say that he would forgive those who insulted him but never forgive those who attacked his wife.

One of Jackson's accomplishments during his eight years as president was paying off the entire national debt. This was the first and only time in U.S. history that the debt had been eliminated. Jackson opposed the Electoral College and also encouraged the growth of the spoils system. He distrusted banks and believed they had too much power, leading him to shut down the Second Bank of the United States by vetoing its recharter Congress in 1832 and withdrawing funds from the bank the following year. The Nullification Crisis was also a period of contention in Jackson's presidency. South Carolina was against the Tariff Act of 1828, arguing that it was unconstitutional. Jackson declared that states did not have the right to nullify federal laws. Despite these accomplishments, Jackson's legacy remains tarnished by the policy he enacted against Native Americans.

### Native American Removal

In 1823, the U. S. Supreme Court handed down a decision that allowed Native Americans to

occupy their lands but to hold no title to them. Five Native American nations—the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles—were called the Five Civilized Tribes, using nonviolent means to resist white settlers' encroachment on their lands. Jackson, however, was a forceful proponent of Indian removal, negotiating nine out of the 11 treaties that stripped tribes in the southeastern United States of their homelands. As white settlers continued to move to this area, they pressured the federal government to acquire the homelands of the five tribes.

In 1827, the Cherokee nation adopted a written constitution, declaring themselves a sovereign nation in an attempt to safeguard their rights. The state of Georgia, however, did not recognize the tribe's sovereignty and passed a series of laws that denied the Cherokees their rights, hoping that these laws would encourage the tribe to leave the state. In 1830, the Cherokees asked the U.S. Supreme Court to issue an injunction, arguing that the state of Georgia had adopted laws aimed at "annihilating" the Cherokees as a "political society." The Cherokees claimed the court had the jurisdiction to hear the case because the tribe was a "foreign nation." In its ruling in *Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia* (1831), The Supreme Court denied the injunction, maintaining the Cherokees were not a "foreign nation" as defined by the U.S. Constitution and therefore the court lacked original jurisdiction to hear the tribe's case.

In 1830, President Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act, giving him the power to negotiate treaties with Native American tribes who would be removed to federal land west of the Mississippi River in exchange for abandoning their homelands. The removal was to be peaceful and voluntary, but these claims proved to be deceptive. In actuality, Jackson forced the southeast nations to leave after they resisted.

The Choctaws were the first to sign the land removal treaty, and for the next 28 years the government struggled to force the relocation of the remaining southeast nations. A small group of Seminoles was coerced into signing the treaty, causing the majority of the Seminoles to declare the treaty illegitimate. The Seminole's were finally paid to move west, following the Third Seminole War (1855–58).

The Creeks never signed the removal treaty, leading the secretary of war to order their removal in 1836. The Chickasaws signed the treaty in 1832, migrating to the west in the winter of 1837 to 1838. The Cherokees were tricked with an illegitimate treaty, and only a small group of Cherokees agreed to sign the agreement. The Cherokee nation was eventually given two years to voluntarily migrate, and by 1838 only 2,000 people were left in their original homeland. The U.S. government sent 7,000 troops to remove 16,000 Cherokees, who then marched to the west on what is now known as the Trail of Tears; 4,000 Cherokees died from hunger, cold, and disease during this journey.

By 1837, the Jackson administration was responsible for locating 46,000 Native Americans from their homelands to the west. According to historians, Jackson's role in these events continues to garner criticism. Jackson negotiated nine of the 11 treaties, which stated that the federal government would protect the tribes until they moved. However, the U.S. War Department backed down on their promise, leaving the tribes to fend for themselves against the onslaught of white settlers. Jackson described Native Americans as children in need of guidance, claiming the removal policy would be beneficial to them. Some Americans felt that the policies were deceptive, protesting that it was an excuse to justify an inhumane and brutal course of action. To date, the treatment of Native Americans by the Jackson administration remains a controversial and disheartening chapter in U.S. history.

Jackson died in Nashville, Tennessee on June 8, 1845, at age 78.

Jennifer Summary

*Southeast Missouri State University*

**See Also:** Betrayal; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Deception and Trust; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Native Americans.

### Further Readings

Brands, H. W. *Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times*. New York: Random House, 2005.

History.com. "Trail of Tears." <http://www.history.com/topics/trail-of-tears> (Accessed December 2012).

Meacham, Jon. *American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House*. New York: Random House, 2008.

Remini, Robert. *The Life of Andrew Jackson*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988.

## Jefferson, Thomas

The American experiment that had its genesis on July 4, 1776, gave birth not only to a unique nation but also to a unique collection of historically significant leaders known as the Founding Fathers. In the top tier of that group is Thomas Jefferson, master statesman and principal architect of the Declaration of Independence. In that benchmark document, Jefferson spoke of "Nature's God," the "Creator," and that "all men are created equal." From those famous words and other pieces of evidence, many have drawn the conclusion that Jefferson stood in the historic stream of Christianity and that the faith of all Founding Fathers was distinctly Christian and opposed to the practice of enslaving people. A new nation was created based on individual freedom and a democratic republic, but the Declaration did not extend "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" to all people; some were excluded. Embodied in Jefferson is a model of subtle deception rather than the more crass practice of lying. It is a dual deception involving faith and practice, perhaps more for political than personal reasons. Some of the Founding Fathers, of the same mind as Jefferson and seeking a measure of approval from the populace in order to achieve success in this new experiment, are cast in the same mold.

### A Deceptive Paradox

Arguably, the majority of the people living in the colonies were Calvinist Christians of one kind or another, as demonstrated by their respective state constitutions by the time of the American Revolution. However, some of the Founding Fathers, including Jefferson, were not Christians. They were Deists or Unitarians influenced by the European Enlightenment, who rejected as unreasonable the primary doctrines of the Christian faith. Jefferson rejected the Anglican Christian faith in which he

had been raised and declared himself to be a “free-thinker” and essentially in a religious category of his own making. He denounced the traditional theology of Anglicanism as blasphemous and rejected the historic Christian doctrine of the Trinity as an absurd impossibility that no rational man could accept. Even though Jefferson held Jesus in high regard as a moral teacher, he rejected him as the Savior God, which is the platform of Christianity. However, his rejection of the traditional Christian faith was not overtly antagonistic or public, which created a deceptive and persuasive paradox. Jefferson often identified himself as a Christian, which some historians, especially Evangelicals, point to today as proof that he was a Christian. Jefferson could comfortably refer to himself as a Christian as long as that self-identification was understood according to his own definition of what constituted the “real” Christian faith.

Consistent with his own personal dialectic involving faith and in concert with the majority of the Founding Fathers, Jefferson moved to the forefront in the movement that eliminated officially established ties between the newly formed government and all religious denominations. This tension was written into the First Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibited Congress from passing any law that establishes a certain religion, while at the same time allowing the free exercise of any and all religions. Later, in 1802, in a letter to the Connecticut Baptists, Jefferson famously explained the First Amendment as erecting “a wall of separation between church and state,” clarifying the intent that it was not to be understood as being hostile to religion but as guaranteeing the freedom of all religions by not favoring any particular one. The paradox of Jefferson’s personal faith finds a direct correlation in the debate over whether the intent of the Founding Fathers was to create a distinctly Christian nation—or not.

### Slavery Contradictions

In spite of Jefferson’s desire to nurture a public image as a morally upright Christian who declared that “all men are created equal,” his record on the issue of slavery could only be described as contradictory. At times he publicly opposed the slave trade and spoke of its destructive effects on society, yet throughout his life he owned over 200 slaves at any given time who labored on his

numerous plantations in Virginia, with about 130 at Monticello alone. In his entire span as a slave owner, Jefferson only freed a handful. In his original draft of the Declaration of Independence, he denounced slavery in the strongest terms, calling it a “cruel war” against mankind. His denunciations were later redacted, and a few short years later in the 1790s his emancipation efforts virtually ceased. He proposed federal legislation banning slavery in the new territories west of the colonies, yet he opposed the practice of slave masters freeing their own slaves by preventing a slave-freeing law (manumission) from being enacted in the Virginia Assembly in 1769. As president, he refused in 1804 to recognize Haiti as a new republic because it was established by a slave rebellion. Yet in 1807, he signed a bill prohibiting the United States from participating in the international slave trade.

An ancillary deception running parallel to the slavery issue involves the question whether Jefferson had fathered many out-of-wedlock children, a significant stain on one’s reputation at the time that was made more egregious if the woman was the father’s slave. This issue drew national attention, and apparently Jefferson denied the affair. A historian of the time published the claim of Jefferson’s grandson that it was another member of the family who fathered the children. Subsequent historians and the general public adopted that view for over 180 years. However, in 1998, the results of DNA analysis conducted at the University of Virginia were significant enough to conclude that Jefferson had indeed fathered several children with his slave Sally Hemings, thereby shifting the consensus away from believing the deceptive denial and placing Jefferson in a less favorable light.

Susan E. Waters  
*Auburn University*

**See Also:** Bible; Deception Motives; Historical Narratives, False; History of Deception: 1700 to 1800; Morals and Ethics; Racism; Washington, George.

### Further Readings

Appleby, Joyce Oldham and Arthur M. Schlesinger, ed. *Thomas Jefferson*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003.

- Adams, D. W., ed. *Jefferson's Extracts From the Gospels*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Greely, R. E. *Thomas Jefferson's Freethought Legacy: A Saying Per Day by the Sage of Monticello*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995.
- Holmes, D. L. *The Religion of the Founding Fathers*. Charlottesville, VA: Ash Lawn-Highland, 2003.
- Howe, Daniel Walker. *Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Ishida, Yoriko. *Modern and Postmodern Narratives of Race, Gender, and Identity: The Descendants of Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2010.
- Rodriquez, Junius P. *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997.
- Smith, G. S. *Faith and Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Smithsonian.com. "The Dark Side of Thomas Jefferson." <http://www.smithsonian.com/history-archaeology/The-Little-Known-Dark-Side-of-Thomas-Jefferson-169780996.html> (Accessed July 2013).
- Steiner, F. *The Religious Beliefs of Our Presidents: From Washington to F.D.R.* Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995.

## Johnson, Samuel

Samuel Johnson was one of the most significant literary figures in 18th-century English literature and indeed all of English literature. His justly celebrated *A Dictionary of the English Language*, published in 1755 and a product of nine years of work, is considered one of the great monuments to the language and a tremendous feat of scholarship. His seemingly humdrum life in London was immortalized by James Boswell, whose *The Life of Johnson* (1791) is both hugely entertaining and a source of citations of vintage "Johnsonia," that is, selections of quotes gleaned from conversations with the famous man and from his other intimates. While some scholars consider Boswell unreliable and prone to exaggeration

and self-promotion, his work remains among the most accessible points of entry to approaching and understanding Johnson and his era.

### Early Life

Johnson was born in Litchfield, England, in 1709 and came from a middle-class background. His father owned a bookstore, and Johnson's home was a highly literate household that had fallen on hard times. Johnson acquired a severe case of scrofula as a child, which left him scarred for life and demonstrating traits of depression. More visibly and personally distressing to the young Johnson was that he involuntarily made movements, gesticulations, and loud verbal tics that made some contemporaries think him "an idiot" or deranged. Twentieth-century scholars are relatively sure that these traits are manifestations of Tourette syndrome. However, this seemingly obvious diagnosis (from a modern point of view) was not made until 200 years after his death and was no help to Johnson in his lifetime. Consequently Johnson was often a figure of fun to children and street people as he traversed London on his many rambles.

Although Johnson's condition was disconcerting to those who met him, his powers of the mind and conversational skills were such that such prejudices were quickly banished. Though a fine student, lack of funds forced him to quit Pembroke College, at Oxford University, after only one year. After a failed stint as a teacher (he later admitted he had no facility for teaching) he became a tutor and tried his hand at writing.

In 1735 he married Elizabeth "Tetty" Potter, a wealthy widow who was over 20 years his senior. The marriage was not popular with her family, and the couple eventually lived apart for much of their relationship. His wife is alleged to have sunk into opiod addiction and alcoholism and took to her bed. Nonetheless, her early death in 1752 led Johnson to a sense of guilt and sadness, and he never remarried. In 1737 he moved to London, where he wrote biographies of famous literary figures, essays, and several famous poems, one memorializing his beloved London. He famously said that "if one tires of London, one tires of life."

### Fame

In 1746, a publisher and a group of literary figures petitioned Johnson to write an authoritative



dictionary. This task would take almost a decade, but it gained him fame and some economic benefits. After publishing his dictionary in 1755, he wrote hundreds of essays and a celebrated annotated collection of works by William Shakespeare. By the mid-1760s he was a celebrity, with London newspapers following his coming and goings and speculating on his next move. He became a much-desired dinner guest because of his fame, brilliant conversation, and pithy quotes. Although his literary output is impressive, he was famous in his own time for not enjoying writing, preferring to eat, drink, and converse with his intimates. He especially enjoyed the company of attractive women but was atypical among male contemporaries, as he was famously ethical and puritanical in his relations with them.

Receiving a generous pension in 1762 from King George III allowed Johnson more time to devote to finishing his encyclopedic edition of Shakespeare. In 1763, he formed The Club with several British worthies, including the painter Sir Joshua Reynolds, the politician Edmund Burke, the actor David Garrick, and writers Adam Smith and Edward Gibbon. This group met weekly at a pub where they enjoyed good drink, food, and, no doubt, stimulating conversation.

In 1765, he was introduced to the Thrale family, with whom he was to live for almost two decades. When Henry Thrale, a wealthy brewer, died in 1781, Johnson, who had been a widower for some time, may have hoped to marry his widow, Hester, but they became estranged when she became infatuated with an Italian music teacher whom she eventually married. Johnson was desolated by these developments. However, Hester Thrale's book and correspondence became critical sources for Johnson scholars.

Late in life, in 1773, an arduous trip to Scotland with his friend and biographer, Boswell, gave rise to *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland*. At this time, as a Tory and admirer of the king, Johnson vigorously defended British policy toward the restive North American colonies in a variety of pamphlets and in conversation with policy makers of the day. He also produced more literary works and supported a small household of intimates. He died in 1784 shortly after suffering a stroke.

### Johnson and Truth

Johnson was no stranger to deception. When first coming to London he manufactured debates in Parliament for a newspaper that were more eloquent than the words that were spoken by the real politicians. But thereafter he became a crusader against deception, fraud, and lying. His critique of falsehood and deceit was based on his posture as a debunker. However, Hester Thrale wrote that more fundamentally, "his ruling passion may be said to be a love of truth."

It was also noted that Johnson was honest in even the most trivial of situations. One writer says that his career amounted to "a prolonged assault on falsehood." Johnson believed that deception and fraud weaken society and faith. Most important he believed that fraud creates a distrust that destroys confidence and harms the collective tendency toward charity. That is, once faith in general is brought into question, reverence, trust, and generosity can never be fully restored.

In *The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia* (1759), Johnson states that, "All imposture weakens confidence and chills benevolence . . . The distrust, which he can never afterward wholly lay aside, may stop the voice of counsel, and close the hand of charity." More concretely, "Whoever commits a fraud is guilty not only of the particular injury to him whom he deceives, but of the diminution of that confidence which constitutes not only the basis but the existence of society."

He also famously attacked the contemporary literary fraud known as Ossian. In 1760, the author James MacPherson claimed to have gathered authentic oral literature and written sources for archaic Scots epic poetry. This claim was taken seriously by many literary lights and gave rise to nationalist poetry and epics throughout Europe. However, time has proven Johnson to be correct; Ossian was a creative fabrication, or "fakelore."

Francis Frederick Hawley  
Western Carolina University

**See Also:** History of Deception: 1700 to 1800; Morals and Ethics; Truth.

### Further Readings

Boswell, James, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*. New York: Modern Library, 1950.

- Johnson, Samuel. *Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Lynch, Jack. "Samuel Johnson's 'Love of Truth' and Literary Fraud." *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, v.42/3 (2002).
- Murray, T. "Dr Samuel Johnson's Movement Disorder." *British Medical Journal*, v.1/6718 (1979).
- Wain, John. *Samuel Johnson*. New York: Viking Press, 1974.

## Judaism

Judaism views honesty as crucial for both collective social function and individual moral integrity. Truthfulness is crucial within the Jewish legal system, in which dishonesty and deception is forbidden. Habitual lying and lying to children are also always forbidden. Dishonesty, however, is permitted, viewed favorably, and even required in certain situations. Jewish beliefs regarding truth (*emet*) and dishonesty are taken from the Torah and the Talmud as well as from Jewish tradition. Situations that allow for untruthfulness include the preservation of peace, respect for another person, and the protection of one's humility, modesty, property, and life.

The Torah comprises the written text of the first five books of the Bible, which God gave to Moses. The Talmud consists of the written compilation of oral commentary on the Torah given to Moses simultaneously with the written Torah, as well as historical rabbinic commentaries on the Torah. The Talmud and other Jewish commentaries discuss both Jewish legal matters (*Halakha*) and the broader Jewish tradition, including ethics and folklore. Scholarly religious commentaries, such as the Talmud, form an important component of the Jewish tradition, serving as guidelines linking eternal religious values such as truthfulness with everyday life.

The Talmud and post-Talmudic rabbinic commentaries interpret historical and biblical examples of lying and deception to extract scholarly interpretations of Jewish guidelines regarding truthfulness and lying. While truth is an essential

guiding principle within Jewish law, religion, and tradition, Judaic scholars acknowledge the commonality of dishonesty in everyday life. Judaic scholars recognize the need to make historical and biblical teachings on truth relevant to new generations and the realities of the modern world. They also struggle with situations in which truth comes into conflict with other, equally important Jewish values.

The Talmud emphasizes the importance of truth as a central attribute ascribed to God within the Torah, stating that the "seal of God is truth." Truth is a personal attribute to be emulated by God's people as a dynamic way of life rather than a universal value. Truth is an essential component of one's relationship to God and an essential component of the final judgment, when one must account for one's life. Liars, on the other hand, are categorized among those who are not worthy of God's presence. Truth also aids in the fulfillment of *tikkun olam*, the general belief in the restoration of the world through positive deeds and commandments known as *mitzvot*.

Judaism views truthfulness as more than simply the accurate statement of facts or the philosophical conflict between objective universal natural laws and mankind's subjective perception of the world. Truth is a dynamic, highly personal, all-encompassing guideline for living that shapes one's character and should inform all aspects of a person's life and decisions. The Talmud also emphasizes the importance of truth in everyday life, noting that habitual liars will quickly lose people's trust. Some scholars note that the Hebrew word for truth, *emet*, includes the first, middle, and last letters of that alphabet to highlight its all-encompassing nature.

The Torah contains several clear proscriptions against untruthfulness within the Jewish legal system, including the proscription to distance oneself from a false matter (Exodus 23:7), as well as prohibitions against bearing false witness (Exodus 20:16) and against theft, false denials, and lying (Leviticus 19:11). The applicability of these proscriptions to nonlegal matters, however, is debated. Scholarly commentaries also debate whether the Torah prohibits dishonesty that does not negatively affect another person. The Talmud recognizes that certain situations allow for or require dishonesty even if the proscription

to distance oneself from a false matter is taken to encompass all types of lies and not just those within the judicial system.

The act of lying has been interpreted as an attempt to seek favor with man as opposed to God and even as an outright rejection of God, whose seal is the truth. The Talmud further states that when a person enters the final judgment, the honesty of his or her interactions will be the first question they will have to answer. While the overall Judaic emphasis is on honesty as an imperative value within Jewish law and tradition that should be practiced as an integral part of Jewish life, scholars do acknowledge situational exceptions to this rule.

### Situations Allowing Deception

Judaic scholars have debated the meaning of the stories and commentaries regarding Jewish values such as honesty within the Torah and the Talmud for centuries. The Torah and Talmud both recognize that truth sometimes comes into conflict with other ethical values emphasized within the Jewish tradition, such as justice or peace. Even Judaic scholars that agree on the permissibility of lying in a given situation often debate whether there is a further obligation to lie or whether such a lie constitutes a *mitzvah* (positive deed). The Torah allows for lying when no harm to others is caused, while the Talmud forbids all types of lies with leniency in certain situations.

Permissible lies generally include those told with positive goals in mind, such as peace or comfort; those that protect modesty, humility, and dignity; those that will prevent harm or embarrassment to another; or those told when other options have been exhausted. Lying is also permissible in situations where there is no benefit to be realized in stating the truth, or when the person being lied to is unscrupulous and therefore an honest answer is not required. Some types of permissible lies are clearly defined while other situations are less clear and thus are subject to more varying interpretations within the commentaries.

One category of permissible lies includes those lies told in the interest of seeking or maintaining peace. The Talmud comments positively on a number of examples in which historical or biblical figures lied in order to preserve peace. One of the most well-known examples from the Torah

involves God deliberately changing the words spoken by Sarah noting the old age of her husband Abraham so Abraham will not learn the true nature of Sarah's remarks. Examples given from everyday life include that of a person separately informing people involved in a dispute that the other is sorry in order to facilitate reconciliation. There is disagreement as to whether lying in the interest of peace is simply permissible or is actually a requirement and/or a *mitzvah*. Lying to peacefully resolve a pre-existing situation is viewed more favorably, while lying to prevent a future problem from arising is more controversial.

It is also acceptable to lie in order to protect another person from harm, inconvenience, or embarrassment. A commonly cited and debated example is the argument over what is acceptable to say to a bride on her wedding day, when it is considered a *mitzvah* to make the bride happy. It is agreed that one should "dance before" (praise) the bride, but commentators dispute as to what exactly should be said. Other cited examples include downplaying a host's hospitality to prevent him from being overburdened by additional or unscrupulous guests; avoiding or concealing facts that will violate another's privacy or cause them embarrassment; or hiding the truth from the severely ill, whether regarding their own health or other matters that may upset them and thus further jeopardize their health.

Another category of acceptable motives for lying is that of the preservation of humility and modesty and the prevention of embarrassment. The Talmud presents a number of examples bearing the interpretation that rabbinic scholars may lie to deny knowledge of specific Talmudic tracts with which they are familiar or to deny marital sexual relations in the interest of humility and modesty. Other interpreters state that those who ask questions regarding marital relations are not scrupulous and are therefore undeserving of truth. Some commentators argue that these exceptions apply to all people and are not just exclusive to such scholars.

Lying to protect or recover one's property from the unscrupulous or illegitimate is considered permissible. A commonly cited example within the Talmud is telling thieves or unscrupulous tax collectors that one's produce is royal property or *terumah*, a special category of produce

that may only be consumed by priests, so they will not wish to seize it. Talmudic scholars also argue that unscrupulous people as a whole do not require truthful answers or dealings because of the dishonesty of their very nature. Commentaries are in less agreement with regard to other types of extenuating circumstances involving one's property, such as lying in order to recover money owed.

The Torah and Talmud also note other cases in which lying may be acceptable. These include the commonly practiced use of exaggeration, when it is quite clear to the listener that the statement is not literally true and the speaker's intent is not to deceive but to educate or emphasize a point. Some commentators argue that one may use lies such as the false attribution of a statement to a notable person if such dishonesty is viewed as the only way to gain support for a matter involving *halakha* (Jewish law) because of the importance of maintaining the Jewish legal tradition.

The Talmud also debates questions of honesty and deception within business. Examples of deceptive business practices include misleading descriptions of the quality of a good or service, making a business deal appear better or worse than it really is, lying about a good's cost to the merchant or the interest or price offered by another potential buyer, and the use of deceptive techniques to improve a good's appearance. More debate occurs when the situation involves a seller's change of an earlier verbal commitment to a purchase price at the time of actual sale. Some feel it is acceptable if there are certain extenuating circumstances, such as a change in market prices between the verbal commitment and actual sale, while others feel that an honest seller must stand by his earlier word.

One of the most serious situations involving uncertainty over the ability to lie in extenuating circumstances is the opportunity to save a life. There are three sins that a Jew may not commit in



*Legalman 2nd Class Justin M. Wiser reads from a prayer book during a Jewish Shabbat service in the chapel aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. George H. W. Bush, August 12, 2011. Jewish beliefs regarding truth (emet) and dishonesty are taken from the Torah and the Talmud as well as from Jewish tradition. While Jewish law forbids dishonesty and deception, and habitual lying and lying to children is always forbidden, dishonesty is called for in certain situations such as preservation of peace and respect for another person.*



order to save his or her life: murder, idolatry, or an illicit sexual relationship with a close relative. All other sins, including lying, may be committed when one's life is at stake. More controversial special circumstances of lying to save one's life that have received lengthy debate include the outright or implied denial of one's Jewish faith. It is generally permissible within Jewish law to commit a sin in order to save one's own life, but it is less clear as to whether this ability applies to opportunities to save another person's life.

The Talmud and other Jewish commentaries provide interpretations not just of situations in which dishonesty is acceptable or required, but also interpretations as to how to lie when confronted with such situations. Half-truths and vague or deceptive statements that have multiple interpretations are preferable to outright lies. Some commentators argue that an individual is not held responsible for another's misinterpretation, even if the individual's statements are deliberately misleading. Others argue that deliberately misleading a person violates proscriptions against the theft of another's mind.

Cases in which lying is acceptable come with their own sets of extenuating circumstances that further limit or direct permissible dishonesty. Situational lying is permissible, whereas habitual lying is proscribed, even within the boundaries of acceptable dishonesty. Lying when no one is harmed is permissible within the Torah but not within the Talmud unless an exceptional circumstance is present. The Torah allows for no lying in which personal financial benefit would be realized regardless of the extenuating circumstances.

There are also cases in Judaism in which one may never lie, regardless of the circumstances. One may not lie to a child regardless of the situation so as to avoid training the child to lie. The Torah and Talmud emphasize the importance of total honesty within the legal system. Thus, situational lying allowed within everyday matters is strictly prohibited within the legal system. One should also always remember the seriousness of lying and generally avoid dishonesty when the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, or in an unclear situation in which one doubts if the rules allowing situational lying are applicable.

Judaism views truth as a dynamic concept that should serve as a guiding principle within all

aspects of daily life and for all of one's decisions, whether expressed through words or deeds. Truth is one of God's key attributes, while dishonesty breeds distrust among others and distances one from God. Dishonesty, even in allowable circumstances, is not to be taken lightly. Fear of God's disapproval is seen as the best preventative measure of excessive leniency where the possibility of dishonesty is concerned.

Marcella Bush Trevino  
Barry University

**See Also:** Bible; Ideology; Islam; Middle East; Morals and Ethics.

### Further Readings

- Dratch, Mark. "Nothing but the Truth." *Judaism*, v.37/2 (1988). <http://www.agudathsholom.org/wrmd-nothingbutthetruth.htm> (Accessed June 2013).
- Friedman, Hershey. "Geneivat Da'at: The Prohibition Against Deception in Today's World." *Jewish Law* (2013). <http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/geneivatdaat.html> (Accessed June 2013).
- Friedman, Hershey and Abraham C. Weisel. "Should Moral Individuals Ever Lie? Insights From Jewish Law." *Jewish Law* (2003). [http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/hf\\_LyingPermissible.html](http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/hf_LyingPermissible.html). (Accessed June 2013).
- Frimer, Norman. "A Midrash on Morality or When is a Lie Permissible." *Tradition*, v.13 (1973).
- Jacobs, Louis. *The Jewish Religion: A Companion*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Zivotofsky, Ari. "Perspectives on Truthfulness in the Jewish Tradition." *Judaism*, v.42/2 (1993).

---

## Justice

Justice is a social judgment that cannot be defined in the same way as tangible objects such as a fruit or tree. It consists of social rules or norms concerning such issues as what is acceptable behavior, how people should treat one another, and how to make decisions affecting others. These rules, shared within a culture or group, facilitate social life and efforts to achieve personal and common

goals. While many think of justice in terms of formal legal institutions or distribution of resources within a country, scientists study the operations and perceptions of justice at levels as small as individual dyads and as large as whole countries, examining issues such as fair treatment of citizens within a society, the operation of formal legal systems, the treatment of members of social groups or businesses, or negotiations between friends or romantic partners.

Recent justice studies have even extended to relationships among animals. Referred to as “wild justice,” nonhuman social justice has attracted interest from a broad range of academic disciplines, such as biology, ethology, psychology, anthropology, and even philosophy. Primates in particular have been known to engage in social justice behaviors including reciprocity, conflict resolution, retribution, and punishment for cheaters and inequity.

The basic goal of justice is to promote social cooperation and success among individuals and the group as a whole. For social rules of justice to effectively guide social interaction between individuals and in groups, there must be consensus concerning principles of justice, participants must accept these principles as guides to social decision making, and the rules must be enforced by the relevant community. But where do these principles of justice come from?

### Justice Concepts and Religion

Some notions of justice may be hardwired by evolution, as may be suggested by studies of animal justice. But many of these ideas are taught and vary substantially between cultures. Religion often forms the basis of notions of justice, and religious doctrine is often intertwined within justice systems. Some countries use religious doctrine as a foundation for laws. In both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Sharia or Islamic law forms the foundation for justice systems. Sharia law is based upon the Qur'an; the Sunnah, or the writings of Muhammad; and the Hadith, the written form of the sayings of Muhammad.

Other countries use religious doctrine as a supplement to established judicial systems. For example, Pakistan's judicial system is based on English Common Law because it was once a part of British India, but it is also heavily influenced

by Islamic law because of the influence and pressure of Muslims in the country. Even westernized secular notions of justice, which try to define justice outside of religion, are nevertheless shaped by ideas from religion. In the United States, for example, much of the justice system has been shaped by Jewish and Christian beliefs.

### Types of Justice

In simple terms, justice might be considered a person “getting what he deserves.” But the philosophy and science of justice has taken a more nuanced approach, distinguishing between several specific types of justice. Moreover, the literature has widely addressed two fundamental issues. First, is the ideal of justice itself deceptive (or unattainable) given the role of flawed human agents in pursuing it? Second, what flawed procedures, deliberate deceptions, and biases and mistakes of judgment contribute to failures of justice? The following are five different types of justice:

*Retributive justice.* All social groups create rules, many in the form of laws, and enforce them by punishing those who violate them. The study of retributive justice concerns principles defining appropriate punishment for wrongdoing. Members of the community typically take action to enforce formal and informal group rules, even when not personally affected by a violator's behavior and often at the risk of personal sacrifice. The need for retribution is driven by the importance of social rules for successful cooperation and functioning of society and may serve the purposes of deterring future wrongdoing or incapacitating the perpetrator (such as by fines, imprisonment, or death). Acts that appear to show blatant disrespect for persons or societal rules or norms, and that threaten the goals of successful social functioning, are viewed as more reprehensible and tend to evoke harsher punishment. If an individual either lies or uses deception to avoid punishment, they would be considered to be behaving unjustly and to be obstructing justice.

*Restorative justice.* Reparations given to a victim of an injustice in the form of money or other benefits are referred to as restorative justice. Restorative justice does not typically involve harsh punishment of the offender. Instead, restorative

justice involves a balancing of “wealth” until the two parties are back in equilibrium. Restorative justice in many countries is litigated in civil courts, where the injured party may sue the injuring party for damages. In some cases, restorative justice is not possible because of the magnitude or type of injury. No amount of money, for example, may compensate for a death caused by the offender. But if the death were caused by noncriminal means, the perpetrator would remain within the civil court system, where compensation would be financial (restorative) rather than imprisonment (retributive).

*Distributive justice.* Rules of distributive justice indicate who should receive what and, as with other forms of justice, may vary considerably. Societies vary in the degree to which resources are available selectively to a privileged few rather than distributed equitably to all. Such inequalities can range from relatively minor financial disadvantage, to extreme disparities of wealth, to fundamental rights to life versus death. Inequalities may reflect differences in social power, or may reflect specific rules of distributive justice, such as when businesses may determine salary based on seniority versus merit or equality.

Scientific studies of justice arguably began with the study of relative deprivation, referring to perceptions of unfairness resulting when an individual or group is receiving less than a relevant reference group. This notion is central to theories addressing perceptions of fairness, satisfaction, and social actions, such as the development of labor unions, social and political protests, and job turnover. Modern theories of distributive justice assume that fairness is assessed by comparison of one's own outcomes to what one believes is “deserved” and offer principles by which deservingness tends to be determined.

One commonly endorsed principle of fair distribution is that of equity, whereby rewards are distributed according to the magnitude of one's efforts or the value of one's contribution relative to those of others. Other prominent principles are those of equality (each receives the same rewards) and need (each receives according to need). Which principle is chosen will depend in part upon whether the goal is to promote productivity, social harmony, or social welfare, respectively and

on relationship characteristics such as cooperativeness, power equality, formality, and whether the situation is social or task-oriented.

A surprising result of research on distributive justice has been the finding that both those who receive less and those who receive more than they deserve react negatively. The greatest satisfaction occurs among those who receive what they think is fair. Those who receive more often object, work harder to feel more deserving, pressure others to redistribute resources fairly, and incur material losses to promote fairness, even leaving a more profitable situation for one with fewer rewards but greater fairness. It appears that people prefer a balance between self-interest and social justice that will not put them at a disadvantage but will likewise not disadvantage others, provoke anger, and destabilize social relations. Relationship dissolution is indeed a risk of violations of distributive justice. People leave situations that violate perceptions of fairness, including jobs, clubs, friendships, and romantic relationships, among others. Unfortunately, such situations are common, because each person's evaluations of his or her own needs, contributions, and deservingness are likely to be self-deceptive and exaggerated by self-serving biases that can undermine agreement on who might deserve what.

*Procedural justice.* Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the process used in making decisions. Seven features are considered crucial to procedural fairness: (1) how the personnel involved are selected, (2) the establishment of ground rules, (3) how relevant information is collected, (4) the decision-making structure, (5) safeguards to ensure the integrity of the procedures, (6) appeal mechanisms, and (7) mechanisms of change. Procedural justice appears to trump distributive, retributive, and restorative justice in that when the procedures by which outcomes are determined are perceived as fair, unfair outcomes themselves are generally better tolerated. A sense of procedural justice allows people to accept decisions even when they do not get what they want.

Procedural and distributive justice have been widely shown to jointly affect perceptions of fairness, which in turn affect such outcomes as job or relationship satisfaction or turnover, among others. Procedural justice also affects perceptions

of the legitimacy of entities such as government, police, courts, or other groups, and behavioral reactions such as cooperation, adherence to agreements, compliance with the law or its agents, prison riots, revolt, or civil disobedience.

*Interactional justice.* Among the most important features of procedural justice, interactional justice refers to the dignity, ethics, and fairness with which group members are treated, and it is significantly related to perceptions of fairness, employee or member satisfaction, commitment, performance, and turnover. This and other forms of justice are important to people in part because they convey social messages concerning inclusion/exclusion, social standing and status, and respect from others. Being treated without justice violates individuals' most fundamental needs for acceptance and belonging. Not surprisingly, violations of personal acceptance and dignity are mentioned far more often than issues such as resource allocation or procedural issues when people talk about experiences with injustice.

While the procedures by which justice is carried out may occur in almost any social context involving two or more people, society is perhaps most well acquainted with the formal procedures of the legal system. Most legal systems are designed to incorporate the same six characteristics central to lay judgments of procedural fairness: (1) consistency (people should receive equivalent outcomes under similar circumstances); (2) bias suppression (prohibitions against "prejudicial" evidence, removal of likely biased jurors, strong advocates for both sides of the question, or prohibitions against conflicts of interest); (3) accuracy (the attempt to gather and present all relevant evidence); (4) correctability (the opportunity to appeal decisions); (5) representativeness (requirements of a representative jury pool, election of lawmakers); (6) and ethicality (strict ethical codes of conduct among decision makers).

Notwithstanding such protections, outcomes of formal legal proceedings can be unjust. Formal procedures for legal decision making may be flawed in ways that systematically bias outcomes. Human actors who must weigh evidence and decide the outcomes can be compromised by subjectivity, cognitive biases, or personal motivations

and conflicts of interest. Justice can sometimes be "bought," as when corporate dollars "buy" the politicians who make the law itself, police or judges are bribed, or one side of a dispute has significantly more power and ability to fund better and more comprehensive representation than the other. Evidence can be hidden, unavailable, or flawed when a murder weapon is destroyed, an eyewitness is mistaken, a witness lies, or a forensic test is contaminated, flawed, or faked.

Moreover, manipulative presentations of individual parties or attorneys can successfully deceive those who must judge as to the existence or meaning of available evidence. Individually and collectively, such mistakes can result in woefully unjust outcomes. Perhaps a greater indictment of the justice system than the many documented errors in outcomes is the fact that these errors are not randomly and fairly distributed. Though flaws inherent to the operation of the justice system can compromise justice for all, social research has shown that some groups are systematically disadvantaged, such as women, racial minorities, the mentally ill, and even the unattractive.

## Conclusion

Though significant disagreement exists between groups and individuals at all levels of social organization concerning what is just versus unjust, what actions should and should not be subject to formal and informal judgment, what procedures are most likely to produce just results, the specific outcomes that can be regarded as just, and even the degree in which justice is attainable (given the flaws inherent to any human justice system), there does seem to be universal agreement that the ideal and pursuit of justice are crucial to the conduct of human affairs. The desire for justice is one that pervades human existence. Unfortunately, ideals of the nature and attainability of these various forms of justice may be out of sync with reality. Some would argue that the very concept of justice is deceptive because, as enacted by less-than-perfect human agents, whether in legal, business, or personal settings, it can go seriously awry.

Matthew Ghiglieri

Valarie Bell

Deborah Davis

University of Nevada, Reno



**See Also:** Aristotle; Attorneys; Bible; Catholic Church; Islam; Judaism; Law and Law Enforcement; Morals and Ethics; Perjury.

### Further Readings

- Aristotle and T. Irwin, ed. *Nicomachean Ethics*. 2nd ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1999.
- Cahill, Lisa Sowle. *Global Justice, Christology, and Christian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Gau, Jacinta M., Nicholas Corsaro, Eric A. Stewart, and Rod K. Brunson. "Examining Macro Level Impacts on Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy." *Journal of Criminal Justice*, v.40/4 (2012).
- Gilliland, Stephen W., Daniel P. Skarlicki, and Dirk D. Steiner, eds. *Justice, Morality, and Social Issues*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publications, 2008.
- Gilliland, Stephen W., Dirk D. Steiner, and Daniel P. Skarlicki, eds. *Emerging Perspectives on Organizational Justice and Ethics*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publications, 2011.
- Heinze, Eric. *The Concept of Justice*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Lamont, Julian, ed. *Distributive Justice*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012.
- Plato and C. D. C. Reeve, ed. *Republic*. 10th ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1992.
- Poon, June M. L. "Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice, Affective Commitment, and Turnover Intention: A Mediation-Moderation Framework." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.42/6 (2012).
- Tyler, Tom R. "Justice." In *Group Processes*, John M. Levine, ed. New York: Psychology Press, 2013.
- Tyler, T. R., A. Braga, J. Fagan, T. Meares, R. Sampson, and C. Winship, ed. *Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007.

# K

## Kant, Immanuel

Immanuel Kant was one of the most prolific philosophers and thinkers of the 18th century. Some of his most popular ideas on morals are found in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785 *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*). Kant advocated choosing actions that are “universalisable,” actions that could be adopted by anyone at any time. Kant also advocated an imperative of duty, meaning that one should act as if one’s behaviors could be considered universally adopted principles. Many writers appeal to Kant’s moral philosophy to argue that deception is unacceptable.

Kant outlined a principle of morality that is referred to as the categorical imperative. According to this principle, any action one takes should be considered universally acceptable and should not contradict other universally accepted acts. The categorical imperative generally assumes that humans can arrive at moral principles in an *a priori* fashion. In other words, individuals should act out of a sense of duty to oneself and others as opposed to choosing certain actions based on their anticipated consequences or the promotion of self-interest. Kant’s philosophy is not one that necessarily embraces rules, but it argues in favor of rationalism, which means that morality must override self-interest or the conditions of the situation. In essence, the rule-based ethic implies that

the rule is sometimes nothing more than a guideline. Such a guideline would call for rational consistency, which stipulates that ideas about how to act should be applied unfailingly across contexts.

### Kant’s Formulas

The categorical imperative can be examined through its specific tenets, one of which is the Formula of Universal Law. This formula states that one should never engage in an act unless it can be accepted universally, and if one were to engage in an action, it should be expected that others will engage in it as well. Put another way, if one were to engage in deception, according to universal law, one would have to accept lying as a conventional behavior, and at times one would be deceived by others. By most standards, such a notion is impractical and undesirable; therefore, lying would be deemed unacceptable because it cannot be upheld as a universal law.

Kant uses the example of lying, or a universal law of lying promises (for example, promising to repay a loan when one does not intend to do so), to illustrate this tenet of the categorical imperative. Through his example, Kant argues that most people would not want to be told they were going to be paid back the money they loaned to someone else if this were not to be the case. Therefore, it would be universally immoral for one to make such an empty promise to others.

Another iteration of the categorical imperative is the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, which some philosophers argue is at the core of Kant's moral viewpoint. This formula stipulates that people should not be treated as a means to an end, but as ends in themselves. An individual should also acknowledge that other people have their own ends. The Kingdom of Ends means that individuals should treat other people based on others' inherent value, not solely on how individuals can use other people to get what they want. To adhere to this formula, individuals would respect that all people should have a choice in the actions they take, and these actions should show a respect for others' agency. This point is not contradictory to the idea that at times individuals treat each other as ends, such as hailing a cab driver to get where they need to go, or asking a colleague to read a writing sample to obtain helpful feedback.



*Immanuel Kant outlined a principle of morality, referred to as the categorical imperative, in which any action that is undertaken by a person should be considered universally acceptable and should not contradict other universally accepted acts.*

However, the categorical imperative stipulates against treating people merely as an end. The people an individual enlists to get the things he or she wants also have their own ends, as well as the agency to decide whether to help the individual get those desired things.

Based on the Kingdom of Ends, being truthful in communication with others is one way to respect the free choice or agency of others. It is through communication that humans find meaning in their circumstances and use reasoning to draw conclusions. Recognizing others' capacities to reason and choose their own actions means that they need accurate facts, perceptions, and information to make informed choices. Being truthful means not hiding one's intentions, while at the same time trying to garner the trust of the other person who is basing some of his or her decisions on the information being given.

When being dishonest, one might compromise others' rational agency by lying to them or giving them false impressions of reality, thus influencing the choices they make. Choices made under false pretenses might be different from those based on veracious and reliable information. According to Kant, lying compromises that communication and the trust among people. Moreover, if individuals accept that others might lie, they have no reason to trust what other people say and acknowledge that they are being treated as a mere end.

Some critics of Kant's viewpoint claim that the categorical imperative and the sense of duty it implies can be unreasonably inflexible and occasionally excessive. For example, adherence to the universal law of honesty might prevent an individual from adhering to another universal law, which might serve a higher purpose in a particular circumstance. To illustrate, a researcher conducting an important experiment on some aspect of human behavior might need to omit certain information about the study's purpose when explaining it to a research participant. Divulging all information about the study up front might unduly influence how the participant performs during the experiment and thus undermine the purpose of the research. One way to rectify this dilemma would be to wait until the conclusion of the experiment and then brief the participant completely on the purpose of the project. Another criticism is that Kant's philosophy overlooks the

pleasure individuals take in treating people as rational agents. People might engage in actions that benefit others out of love or altruism, and not out of a sense of duty.

Kant's moral viewpoint on deception is reflective of his overall stance on an ideal social morality. According to Kant, what helps society function is the adherence to an ethical guideline that stipulates that one engage in an action if and only if that action can be universally accepted and enacted by everyone else living in that society. For reasons articulated in Kant's categorical imperative, and specifically through universal law and the kingdom of ends, deception is never acceptable.

Juliann C. Scholl  
Texas Tech University

**See Also:** Communication; Deception and Trust; Dishonesty; Distrust; Honesty; Lie Acceptability; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Morals and Ethics; Rationality.

#### Further Readings

- Benn, P. *Ethics*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998.
- Bowen, S. A. "The Ethical Challenges of Pre-Crisis Communication." In *Pre-Crisis Planning, Communication, and Management: Preparing for the Inevitable*, B. A. Olaniran and D. E. Williams, eds. New York: Peter Lang, 2012.
- Brandt, R. B. *Facts, Values, and Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Chappell, T. *Ethics and Experience: Life Beyond Moral Theory*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009.
- Charvet, J. *The Idea of an Ethical Community*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- Kant, I., H. J. Paton, trans. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

43, he was the youngest person to be elected president. (At 42, Theodore Roosevelt was the youngest person to become president when he assumed office after the assassination of William McKinley.) Despite Kennedy's notable achievements as president, there is a lot of both real and alleged deception regarding his life and death.

#### Deception Regarding Kennedy's Life

In his book *The Dark Side of Camelot* (1997), investigative reporter Seymour M. Hersh provides a negative account of Kennedy's life. Many Americans view Kennedy as a respected and valiant president who brilliantly handled the Cuban Missile Crisis and dealt with Soviet enemies. A lot of the public's perceptions were based on print media and movies about Kennedy that glorified his actions.

Hersh found that the private life of Kennedy belied public perceptions. Kennedy had numerous sexual and extramarital affairs, lied a lot, and used his power for scrupulous and deliberate ends. It was said that Kennedy worked with the Mafia, communist spies, political fixers, and big, money-hungry corporations. Many of the books on Kennedy did not reveal a lot of information on his extramarital affairs, his ill health, and his involvement with notorious people because such information was not as readily available as it is now.

The report of the Senate Select Committee on Assassinations, released in 1975, contains some of the same facts that are found in Hersh's book. Similarly, six of the eight major "secrets" Hersh describes in his opening chapter—Kennedy's health problems, the covert plans for the Cuban Missile Crisis, the plans to relocate Cuban leader Fidel Castro, sexual and extramarital affairs, campaign finance alterations, and recordings in the White House—are also discussed in Richard Reeves's 1993 book *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*.

For a long time, the public had wondered if there was really an extramarital affair between Kennedy and actress Marilyn Monroe or if it was just celebrity gossip. Hersh found a letter written to Kennedy by a lawyer that acknowledged there was an affair. At the same time, Monroe needed to keep her silence about the affair in exchange for receiving a fund in her mother's name.

Hersh also argues that Kennedy was a bigamist. It was said that when Kennedy was an aspiring congressman, he eloped with Durie Malcom, a

## Kennedy, John F.

John F. "Jack" Kennedy was born on May 29, 1917, and assassinated on November 22, 1963. He was the 35th president of the United States. At



very attractive socialite, This marriage was never made public. However, Hersh spoke with Charles Spadling, who knew that the marriage had occurred but was told to eliminate any records of it. Hersh also discovered that Kennedy's brother, Robert F. Kennedy, had stated that Jack had married another woman before marrying Jacqueline "Jackie" Bouvier.

Sources report that Kennedy had been diagnosed with Addison's disease, an incurable illness that affects the adrenal glands. Kennedy and his staff sought to display his youth and vitality, but he was actually deceiving the public about his health. It has been said that if the public knew about his health issues, he might not have been elected president.

Kennedy's own physician, Dr. Janet Travell, declared the president did not have the disease. It was also known that Travell had been giving Kennedy procaine to deal with his back problems. Some who knew Kennedy said that he was addicted to these painkillers. Even though Kennedy had Addison's disease, he tricked others into thinking that his opponent for the presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson, was not strong enough for the office because of his 1955 heart attack.

Hersh also found that Kennedy's brother Robert tried to cover-up his brother's secrets, such as his under-the-table dealings with the Mafia. Robert knew that his brother's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files would tarnish his impeccable image as president. Hence, after the president was assassinated, Robert tried to destroy all files containing information that would be detrimental to Jack's reputation.

### **Deception Regarding Kennedy's Assassination**

In addition to alleged deception during his life, there have been numerous allegations that the actual facts of Kennedy's assassination have been deliberately hidden from the public. Kennedy's Secret Service officers were ordered to back away from the president while he was riding in a car through the streets of Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. Video images show that the Secret Service men were initially on both sides of the president and were able to protect him from a bullet. However, they were ordered to sit in a car behind the president's car.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations determined that Kennedy's assassination was fact a conspiracy, and not caused by a single gunman. The committee reached this conclusion on the basis of the gunshots heard on taped recordings of police radio reports. Seven shots were on the tapes, but because of budget constraints, only four of the gunshots were analyzed. Based on these results, the committee determined that the shots were too close together to be from one lone gunman. Recordings determined that at least one of the shots was from the grassy knoll area and not from the nearby building from which assassin Lee Harvey Oswald shot the president.

However, the Warren Commission, which also investigated the assassination, concluded that the president was killed by a single shooter. The commission reached its conclusions in secret meetings and then released 26 volumes recounting its findings about Kennedy's death. Some have argued that the volumes were misleading and incomplete. Many of the commission's files were sealed for 50 years.

The Freedom of Information Act, adopted in 1966, allows citizens access to information controlled by the U.S. government. Many researchers tried to gain access in order to understand Kennedy's assassination. Researcher Harold Weisberg asked for FBI analysis of the bullet fragments and Kennedy's clothes. He was denied access, and he believes that the president was not shot by a single bullet.

Director Oliver Stone provided a visual account of the assassination based on many books. In his movie, *JFK* (1991), Stone maintains that Kennedy's death was linked to Lyndon Johnson and New Orleans businessperson Clay Shaw. The movie illustrated the highly controversial conspiracy theory that Kennedy was killed because of his foreign policy in Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

In 1992, President Bill Clinton created a review board to re-evaluate the Kennedy assassination files. The board reviewed over one million pages of records and interviews. It discovered that U.S. Navy photographer Sandra Kay Spencer testified that pictures in the archives that were credited to her were in fact taken by other photographers. Moreover, autopsy photographer John Stringer similarly testified that the archival photos attributed to him were not the ones he took.

The files revealed many accounts of Oswald's vacation to Mexico City, medical evidence that had been tampered with, and Kennedy's planned foreign policy in Vietnam and Cuba. Many of these files are not classified and are open to the public, but there are some that still need to be processed and released. Despite the fact that Kennedy has been dead for some time, there are still many who believe the government was deceptive about the facts of his assassination.

Narissra Maria Punyanunt-Carter  
*Texas Tech University*

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Conspiracies; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Secrecy; Spin, Political; White House Press Secretaries.

#### Further Readings

Alford, Mimi. *Once Upon a Secret: My Affair With President John F. Kennedy and Its Aftermath*. New York: Random House, 2012.

Douglass, James W. *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters*. Mary Knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008.

Hersh, Seymour. *The Dark Side of Camelot*. Boston: Little Brown, 1997.

Reeves, Richard. *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

Stone, Oliver and Oliver Sklar. *JFK: The Book of the Film*. New York: Applause Books, 1992.

---

## Knapp, Mark

Mark L. Knapp, an internationally known scholar, is the Jesse H. Jones Centennial Professor Emeritus in Communication and Distinguished Teaching Professor Emeritus in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. Knapp earned his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University. His research has significantly contributed to the areas of interpersonal and human communication, investigating subjects such as deception through nonverbal communication and relationship development.

As a professor emeritus, Knapp continues to teach courses on lying and deception and

nonverbal communication along with his other activities in research, writing, and consulting. To date, Knapp has published over 10 textbooks in the field of communication and countless journal articles, and he has consulted, taught, and lectured to over 60 business organizations, government agencies, volunteer groups, and educational institutions. He has received numerous awards for teaching excellence and for distinguished scholarship in the communication discipline.

#### Distinguishing Liars From Truth-Tellers

Knapp's research provides crucial insight into several questions surrounding the nature of the act of lying. Layman and researchers alike have sought to identify behaviors that distinguish liars from truth-tellers. According to Knapp and his colleagues, it is difficult to pinpoint precise behaviors of those who are lying; it is easier to identify key emotional and cognitive processes that a liar experiences. The two processes that occur during lying are referred to as "arousal" and "cognitive difficulty."

Nonverbal arousals include the following behaviors: speech errors, a higher pitch in the voice, blinking, and pupil dilation. Verbal arousals from liars include extreme uses of language, defensive retorts, and ill-humored answers. Although liars and truth-tellers may both experience arousal, there is a difference in regard to the second process—cognitive difficulty. Liars have a tendency to experience more hesitancy in their responses, a lack of specific references, and incompatible verbal and nonverbal behaviors.

In his research Knapp discusses two other phenomena that are characteristically associated with those who engage in lying: attempted control and display of an affective state. Attempted control is defined as a rehearsed behavior, indirect responses to direct questions, and a lack of spontaneity when questioned. Affective states typically connected to lying are anxiety, fidgeting, speech stammering, and anger. Anger is one of the most common emotional states related to deception. Liars tend to provide negative and disaffiliative responses; however, there are liars who do express guilt by looking away for an extended period of time and/or placing their hands over their eyes. For those who find pleasure in lying, inappropriate smiles or smirks of contempt may occur at times during questioning.

### Knapp's Staircase

One cannot discuss Knapp without also mentioning his famous and widely studied model, often referred to as Knapp's Staircase. He developed a model of relationship development and deterioration, providing a detailed understanding of the complexity of relationships. The five stages in the process of relationship development from the escalation model: initiating, experimenting, intensifying, integrating, and bonding.

Knapp's model is one that can be used to describe several types of relationships, such as romantic couples, friendships, roommates, coworkers, and family dyads. Not all relationships reach each stage, and stages do not occur in consecutive order; relationships may repeatedly go back and forth between stages.

The first stage of the escalation model is initiating, which can last briefly or an extended amount of time. This is when the dyad focuses on making a positive impression, exchanging greetings and small talk. In this stage nonverbal communication is relied upon to assist with reducing the anxiety associated with knowing little or nothing about the other. Depending on the nature of the encounter, one may choose to provide deceptive or honest information about oneself. If the initial meeting is a successful one, the couple may progress to the next stage, experimenting.

During experimenting the dyad probes for more personal information, determining whether or not they desire to continue the relationship-development process. Probing questions are an attempt to find commonalities, such as hobbies, interests, and similar backgrounds in order to establish a connection.

Couples who make a connection tend to escalate to the third stage of relationship development known as intensifying. The dyad interacts in a less formal, comfortable manner, expressing nonverbally and/or verbally a level of commitment to their relationship. Self-disclosure is an important aspect for the couple to engage in during this stage, revealing one's secrets in hopes that the other will not divulge this private information to anyone.

The next stage, integrating, is when the individuals are an established couple, engaging as one in front of their friends, family, and coworkers. They share a relational identity, using the pronoun

"we" instead of "I" more often. This may or may not lead to the final stage in the escalation model, which is bonding. Bonding is a formal announcement, such as saying the two are "best friends," and marriages, commitment ceremonies, or contractual business agreements.

The other side of the staircase, referred to as the coming-apart stages, consist of differentiating, circumscribing, stagnating, avoiding, and terminating. Differentiating occurs when the dyad seeks more independence, often using the pronoun "I" more than "we," and engaging in activities without the partner.

Circumscribing is the stage in which the couple limits the time they spend together, avoiding conversation by switching topics or outright saying they do not want to talk about the subject. This may lead to the following stage—stagnating. Stagnating occurs when a relationship reaches a point where it is no longer growing; interaction between the couple becomes mundane and/or superficial. If this behavior continues, it inevitably leads to the fourth stage in the staircase, avoiding.

In this stage, deception tends to increase as a relationship breaks down. Dyads may avoid the truth because it is too difficult to face, and replacing it with lies is a way to avoid arguments and confrontations about underlying problem(s) within the relationship. Physically avoiding the other person or omitting parts of one's story are practices that essentially delay the final stage in the staircase, terminating. Terminating signifies that the relationship between the two people is over, whether by mutual agreement, divorce, or death.

In addition to his teaching and scholarship, Knapp has been an editor for the journal *Human Communication Research*, and he served as president of Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society, National Communication Association, and International Communication Association. Knapp has been the recipient of several awards, and the National Communication Association acknowledges his contributions with its prestigious Mark L. Knapp Award for Career Contributions to the Study of Interpersonal Communication, which is presented annually at the association's convention.

Jennifer J. Summary  
Southeast Missouri State University

**See Also:** Communication; Goffman, Erving; Guilt; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Nonverbal Cues; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Sexual.

### Further Readings

Knapp, Mark. *Lying and Deception in Human Interaction*. Boston: Pearson Education/Allyn & Bacon, 2008.

Knapp, Mark and Judith Hall. *Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction*. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006.

Knapp, Mark and Anita Vangelisti. *Interpersonal Communication and Human Relationships*. 6th ed. Boston: Pearson Education, 2009.

McGlone, Matthew and Mark Knapp. *The Interplay of Truth and Deception: New Agendas in Theory and Research*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

---

## Korean War

The Korean War was waged from June 1950 until July 1953 between the Republic of Korea (South Korea), backed by the United States, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), with the support of the People's Republic of China. The conflict resulted from the division of Korea by the Allied forces at the conclusion of World War II. Korea had been ruled by the Japanese empire from 1910 until the conclusion of fighting in the Pacific Theater during World War II in September 1945. At this time, the United States divided the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel. The United States occupied the southern part of the country, and the Soviet military operated the north. By the time the Korean War concluded, military forces had used tactics seen in World War I and World War II, including infantry attacks, air bombing, and ultimately trench warfare.

While both sides in the Korean War used tactics of lying and deceit throughout the conflict, these were not as popular as they had been during World War II or would later be during the Vietnam War. Like Operation Quicksilver during World War II, the most brazen use of deceit involved attempts to convince North Korean military officials of a

different time and place for a U.S. invasion than was actually intended. While South Korea and the United States planned to invade at Inchon in September 1950, the United Nations Command devised a campaign using leaflets to attempt to convince North Koreans that the amphibious landing would be happening in Kunsan, an area over 100 miles north of Inchon. The leaflets were dropped from the sky along the southwest coast and warned civilians to not go near the beaches or dock areas. At the same time, a United Nations naval task force and commando landing occurred at Kunsan.

### Deception to Justify U.S. Participation

Looking at the Korean War from a macroperspective, it can be noted that lying and deceit were used in the United States (to some degree) to justify the conflict from its beginning. Much of this information is still hotly contested among scholars and others, but it does demonstrate how presidential administrations can use deceit to encourage support for otherwise unpopular decisions. The deception began when a major lie was used to justify the need for American troops in Korea. The American public was told that the war was spurred by a surprise attack from North Korea, symbolizing a decision by the communists to become increasingly aggressive in efforts to regain control of the Korean Peninsula.

Prior to the beginning of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman was leaning toward not defending Taiwan against China. Many administration officials, however, were staunchly opposed to Truman's decision, arguing that the strengthening of China could later pose strategic and ideological threats to the United States and the West. John Foster Dulles—perhaps the State Department official most adamantly opposed to communism—worked with General Douglas MacArthur to create the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, which led to the United States choosing to help Taiwan after all. As the Korean War progressed, deceit and lies were used more frequently. MacArthur chose to deflect any attempts at peace accords by staging offensive actions and then exaggerating the estimates of Chinese forces he was fighting against. He went as far as sending forces toward the Yalu River and bombing both Chinese and Russian targets.



To many historians, the Korean War was used as a major tool of deceit in order to help convince Americans to rearm the nation and to fear the potential spread of communism throughout the European and Asian continents. As a result of the Korean War, the draft was reinstituted in the United States and expenditures that had been allocated toward domestic social programs were reapportioned for building the military. Along with the spending priorities, the war led to restrictions on personal liberties, less ability for citizens to criticize government, and less emphasis placed on citizen well-being.

### Claims of Biological Warfare

At another level, the governments of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China accused the United States of perpetrating biological warfare as part of U.S. efforts to eradicate communism from the region. In 1951, the communist bloc first began making these allegations, yet these charges were not strongly pursued at the time. They were ultimately publicized in a Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea authored by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. The reason China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union believed that biological weapons were being used against them was the rapid onset of various diseases among forces on the peninsula.

In January 1952, the Chinese army first received news that there was a smallpox outbreak near Inchon. Then, two months later, disease outbreaks were located in Chorwon, Manchuria, Kimhwa, and Pyongyang. After that, nearly 30 soldiers came down with cholera and the plague, while a number of deceased communist soldiers tested positive for meningitis. While there was no clear evidence, the communist side declared that the Americans must have been behind the spread of disease as part of their war efforts.

By February 1952, the North Koreans began making formal accusations against the United States of dropping insects onto the region that were infected by various diseases meant to harm soldiers and citizens alike. While the United States formally denied any such actions, the accusations were allegedly confirmed by an Australian reporter and several captured U.S. airmen. Likewise, the communists accused the United States of formally testing biological weapons for later use

against citizens in North Korea. Despite the formal allegations and claims of support, the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross both chose to publicly state that no biological weapons were being used.

As would be expected, the Chinese government responded with claims of a severe Western bias within both agencies and asked the World Peace Council to investigate the possible presence of biological weapons. The council's International Scientific Commission for the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in China and Korea found in September 1952 that the United States had been experimenting with biological weapons during the Korean War.

The responses to the World Peace Council's report varied. The U.S. government charged a journalist with sedition for reporting the results of the study. Formally, the U.S. government claimed the allegations were all a hoax and the alleged confessions had been received only after the American airmen had been subject to torture. Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett became a key character in the alleged deceit. Burchett, an alleged agent for the KGB (the Soviet security agency), was accused of concocting the whole story to help garner sympathies for the communist side. However, this claim was refuted on more than one occasion.

Regardless of who actually started the allegations and whether they were true or not, behavior indicates that both the North Koreans and Chinese believed they were true. Mao Zedong, for example, responded to initial concerns by asking Soviet experts for assistance on disease prevention. Likewise, the People's Army mobilized specially trained agents to handle antibiological warfare. Within Korea, antibiological warfare centers were created and housed millions of doses of vaccine and hundreds of thousands of gas masks. Both countries chose to inoculate citizens and set up quarantine stations to prevent the spread of disease. Further, they began citizen awareness campaigns aimed at getting citizens to begin killing any fleas, flies, or mosquitoes they saw in order to prevent the spread of any possible disease.

Historians have pinpointed other potential causes for the disease outbreaks in China and Korea in 1952. For one, the time of year in which



Brigadier General Courtney Whitney (left); Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of United Nations Far East Command, (center); and Major General Edward M. Almond (right) observe the shelling of Inchon from the U.S.S. Mt. McKinley in September 1950. The battle represents the most brazen use of deceit in the Korean War, in which Command devised a campaign using leaflets to convince North Koreans that the amphibious landing would happen in Kunsan, more than 100 miles north of the actual planned attack at Inchon.

the events occurred was typically the period in which other epidemics had arisen. Further, past years of warfare in both countries had led to a general demise of the health care system—especially in Korea. Combining a season typically known to produce epidemics with a weakened health infrastructure, it is not particularly surprising that there was widespread disease in the region at the time.

In opposition to the renewed claims, two scholars at the Cold War International History Project released a volume of primary documents gathered from Soviet and Chinese military officials by the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun*, clearly demonstrating that the North Korean claim was an intentional disinformation campaign aimed at encouraging North Koreans to support the war efforts as much as possible. It was a deceit launched against North Korea's own citizens to foster backing for what could have been an

otherwise unpopular war. Soviet advisors and Chinese commanders invented the scenario, and North Koreans perhaps went as far as to intentionally infect their citizens with disease to help make the claims seem more plausible.

From the perspective of the United States, there have been nothing but unwavering denials since the claims were first made. Following the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, Soviet officials realized that the lies about American biological weapons—which they had helped create and perpetrate—were actually undermining their own credibility. As a result, they stopped pushing the theory (despite never admitting its falsity).

Yet, for every individual with proof that something besides American forces caused the spread of disease, there is a historian still arguing that the United States is to blame. A book released in 1998, *The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets From the Early Cold War and Korea*, repeatedly

argued that the allegations launched by North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union were true and that Americans were prepared to launch attacks against citizens and soldiers alike. One Australian historian has continued to claim that an American usage of biological weapons was entirely plausible—though admittedly not likely. He points to the confession of Colonel Walker Mahurin, who was associated with a major American biological weapons research facility at Ft. Detrick, as evidence that such an attack was possible. Other historians have pointed to the willingness of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung to believe the possible attacks as evidence that they likely could have occurred. The Chinese government still continues to refute the claim, arguing that there was a serious threat of American biological weapons, and that China had reacted to prevent the epidemic from spreading.

### Conclusion

Ultimately, both sides in the Korean War used lies and deceit to help enhance strategy throughout the conflict. For the Americans, the deceit involved efforts to convince the North Korean, Soviet, and Chinese military leaders that their initial invasion would come at a different location than actually planned. On the opposite side of the coin, communist leaders created a scheme in which the United States would be accused of utilizing biological weapons in an effort to mobilize

opposition and limit support for American forces abroad. In the case of the Korean War, however, perhaps the greatest deceit was in the actual cause for the war and how it fit into the long-term military strategies of the world's clashing social systems at the time.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Department of Defense, U.S.; Espionage and Counterespionage; Government Propaganda; Military Deception; Operation Quicksilver; Stalin, Josef; Vietnam War; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Endicott, Stephen and Edward Hagerman. *The United States and Biological Warfare*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1998.
- International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China. "Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China." Peking: s.n., 1952.
- Kutler, Stanley I. *The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1982.

# L

## Language

The language people use when deceiving others is a topic of increasing interest in the social sciences. Research on language and deception focuses largely on the linguistic cues associated with deceptive speech and on the ways in which speakers utilize language to dissociate themselves from unpleasant topics or events. The most consistent linguistic characteristics associated with deception include increased word count, use of third-person pronouns, and markers of reduced cognitive complexity. Conflicting research findings on linguistic cues associated with deception hinder the ability to generalize findings beyond localized contexts, and emphasize the importance of situational factors when examining linguistic cues associated with deception.

A majority of recent research on language and deception utilizes computer programs to identify the linguistic characteristics of deceitful messages. Of these categories, an increase in word quantity is the most consistent linguistic cue associated with deception.

Language and deception research typically finds that deceivers talk more than truth-tellers. This effect is particularly strong when deceivers are discussing nonverifiable opinions. For example, a person attempting to convince their conversational partner that their favorite food is pizza,

rather than the truthful answer of quesadillas, is likely to expound for a longer period of time on the various reasons why pizza is their favorite food than would a truth-telling counterpart. Deceivers may talk more to manage information flow, to enhance mutuality with conversational partners, and to decrease the suspicions of conversational partners.

### Deciphering Linguistic Clues

Although most studies indicate that deceivers talk more than truth-tellers, empirical findings highlight the importance of task when analyzing linguistic cues associated with deception. When constructing a deception about a verifiable fact, for instance, deceivers offer fewer words than truth-tellers. Similarly, lies of commission associate with increased word count, but lies of omission associate with decreased words counts. Deceptive denials also tend to be shorter than truthful confessions, as deceivers give less detail when their stories contrast a verifiable event. A person lying about a verifiable event, such as their specific whereabouts on a certain night, is more likely to speak in shorter sentences that offer less detail. One way that deceivers offer fewer specific details than truth-tellers is through an increased use of abstract language.

Deceivers tend to use more abstract language in an attempt to conceal the truth from others. High





*Deceivers tend to use more abstract language in an attempt to conceal the truth from others. For example, a teen attempting to deceive her mother with this tactic would answer her question, "Where were you last night?" with something like, "Out with some friends," rather than "Watching the 9:20 movie Getaway at the Southdale 16 Theater with my friend Amanda."*

levels of abstraction in language describe events and actions in broad terms (for example, "fruit," "exercising") and thus obscure the specific details of a story. In contrast, low levels of abstraction in language offer specific details (for example, "navel orange," "Bikram yoga") and provide a more concrete description of the events for the receiver. Thus, a person trying to deceive the receiver of a message tends to speak in abstract generalities that obscure a receiver's specific understanding of the event. In answer to the question, "Where were you last night?" a deceiver is more likely to answer "Out with some friends," rather than "Watching the Mets game at the Eastside Bar and Grill with

my friend John." Deceivers' tendency to speak in abstract language is not without consequence, as the lack of detail and concrete language in deceivers' language often prompts increased questions from their conversational partner, thus inducing a greater number of conversational turns and total word count for deceivers.

Although deceivers tend to speak more than truth-tellers, deceivers' conversational turns are often shorter than truth-telling counterparts. That is, deceivers' total word counts are higher, but individual conversational turns are briefer. Deceivers offer fewer concrete details in their stories, prompting conversational partners to press deceivers for more information, thereby generating a greater number of conversational turns within their interaction.

The finding that deceivers use more words than truth-tellers has been found in both synchronous and asynchronous computer-mediated communication environments. Although existing research results do not differentiate between nonverifiable opinion deceptions (What is your favorite time of day to exercise?) and verifiable fact deceptions (Where were you on Monday?), findings indicate that deceivers talk more in both synchronous and asynchronous environments, albeit for different reasons. Deceivers in synchronous environments often talk more as a result of conversational partners' prompts for more information and detail, while deceivers in asynchronous environments take advantage of the increased time to plan and edit messages afforded by asynchronous communication environments, increasing the detail and subsequent word count of their messages.

Pronoun usage is an area of prominent focus in language and deception research. Findings on pronoun use in deceptive communication are inconsistent and dependent on context. However, a majority of studies indicate that deceivers typically use more third-person pronouns (for example, "she," "him," "they") and fewer first-person pronouns (for example, "I," "me," "my") in their speech. Third-person pronouns direct the focus of the conversation toward other people and away from the deceiver. Similarly, deceivers' reduced usage of first-person pronouns functions to remove the deceiver from the narrative. Deceivers' tendency to use more third-person

pronouns, and fewer first-person pronouns, may indicate a desire for deceivers to psychologically distance themselves from the deception, as they remove themselves from the narrative and focus on other individuals or groups in the story. The tendency for deceivers to psychologically distance themselves may reflect a desire to dissociate themselves from the deception because of feelings of guilt or negative emotion in relation to the deception, or may reflect a lack of authentic personal experience for the deceiver to discuss in relation to the event.

Conversational partners impact the language used by deceivers. Recent findings indicate that both senders and receivers of deceptive communication produce higher word counts than individuals in truthful interactions but use fewer words per conversational turn. The brevity of each conversational turn indicates shorter responses and increased interaction among deceptive senders and receivers.

Research indicates both sender and receiver utterances in deceptive communication are more syntactically complex but introduce less unique information during the conversation, resulting in increased redundancy and repetition of content from previous utterances. The increased syntactic complexity and redundancy of deceivers' language may reflect a tendency for deceivers to stall for time as they formulate deceptions. For instance, a deceiver may repeat their partner's question prior to answering, increasing linguistic redundancy and providing deceivers increased time to think before responding. When asked how they spent their day yesterday, a deceiver may stall for time by including extraneous details to their response that increase the syntactic complexity of their language, albeit without offering information relevant to the question, such as, "What did I do yesterday? Well, it was raining outside, so I stayed in and watched TV." The increased redundancy of deceivers' language may also indicate the desire to focus on simpler, more consistent themes within the conversation, leading to increased repetition of deceivers' responses.

Deceivers illustrate less cognitive complexity in their language than truth-tellers. Because deceivers are forced to keep track of what they have and have not said to avoid contradicting themselves later, deceivers' language often

contains fewer distinction markers, such as exclusive terms (for example, "except," "but," "without") and negations (for example, "no," "never," "not"). Exclusive terms reflect the cognitive complexity of the message as it functions to make distinctions between events, thus offering greater detail to the story. Similarly, deceivers may refrain from using negations in an attempt to avoid using specific language, allowing themselves flexibility in their narrative. At times, however, deceivers may elect to use more negation terms if they lack substantive support for their deceptive statement.

Speakers often use language that is ambiguous, indirect, or imprecise, but not necessarily with deceptive intent. Thus one might describe a neighbor as having a "bun in the oven," even though she has no inclination to do any baking; a politician may fear that public revelations about a plan will hinder his ability to conduct private negotiations and so is vague about its details; a software engineer may explain how a new program works in very general terms because her audience is not familiar with the technical vocabulary suited for a more specific account. In addition, sometimes individuals use language that superficially appears to be evasive but in fact is clear and up front in context. If someone asks, "What happened to my roast beef sandwich?" and someone else responds "Well, your dog looks happy," the semantics of this response may seem off-topic, but the pragmatic implicature it generates (that is, "I think your dog ate the sandwich") addresses the question quite candidly.

### Constructions

Although the examples above are unlikely to be interpreted as misleading, there are occasions when ambiguous or indirect linguistic constructions are attributed to deceptive intent. Unlike outright lies, these constructions can be used without the intent to falsely portray reality but nonetheless could be employed with this goal in mind. There are many "dual purpose" constructions of this sort, but the following are two of the most common:

*Euphemism.* People often use euphemisms to tell it like it isn't. People excuse themselves to "use the restroom" when they have no intention of

resting there, talk of ill acquaintances who eventually “bought the farm” without funds or agricultural experience, and slyly recommend an “adult entertainment” on late-night cable that is hardly mature and even less amusing. Linguists characterize euphemism as a lexical substitution strategy for representationally displacing topics that evoke negative affect (for example, substitution of “use the restroom” for “urinate”). This strategy may serve the ostensibly noble motive of sparing an addressee from communicative discomfort, but it may also serve the communicator’s self-presentational concerns as well. When source identity cues are eliminated from an interaction (for example, one corresponds anonymously with an addressee online), communicators’ use of euphemism has been shown to fall off sharply. Thus, in some circumstances people may be less inclined to use euphemisms to minimize the threat to an addressee’s face than to protect their own.

**Contextomy.** Contextomy refers to the strategic excerpting of words from their original linguistic context in a way that distorts the source’s intentions. One of the most familiar examples of contextomy is the ubiquitous “review blurb” in film advertising. To create these blurbs, studio promoters dissect multiple reviews of a film and then select the most positive comments for use in advertisements. Even when a review is negative overall, studios have few reservations about excerpting it in a way that misrepresents the critic’s opinion. For example, the ad copy for New Line Cinema’s 1995 thriller *Seven* attributed to Owen Gleiberman, a critic for *Entertainment Weekly*, the comment “a small masterpiece.” One might infer from the quote that Gleiberman’s review of the film was positive. In fact, his review was quite tepid. Why then did he use the words “a small masterpiece” in his review? Not to describe the film overall but merely its opening credits: “The credit sequence, with its jumpy frames and near-subliminal flashes of psychoparaphernalia, is a small masterpiece of dementia.” Contextomy can be used to create a false impression of a source’s attitudes in the service of motives as harmless as selling movie tickets or as harmful as character assassination, which is typical of its employment in political advertising.

The influence of situational factors complicates research attempts to assess the linguistic cues that indicate deceptive language. The situational influences on deceptive communication include motivated and unmotivated lies, high-stakes and low-stakes lies, lies of omission and commission, verifiable and nonverifiable deceptions, interactions and monologues, denials and confessions, and literal and metaphorical deceptions. The influence of these situational factors precludes the identification of a consistent set of linguistic behaviors that differentiate truthful and deceptive messages. It remains necessary, then, to consider situation and context when assessing the linguistic cues associated with deceptive communication.

## Conclusion

There are no straightforward answers with regard to linguistic cues associated with deception. The influence of situational factors trumps broad generalizations that connect specific linguistic cues to deceptive communication. Deceivers, in comparison to truth-tellers, typically have higher word counts, use more third-person pronouns, speak in higher levels of abstraction, and illustrate greater redundancy and less cognitive complexity in their language.

Joseph McGlynn III  
Matthew S. McGlone  
*University of Texas at Austin*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Communication; Confession; Courtship, Deception in; Deception, Characteristics of; Deception and Technology; Denial; Leakage; Linguistic Cues; Lying, Intentionality of; Nonverbal Cues.

## Further Readings

- Ali, M. and T. Levine. “The Language of Truthful and Deceptive Denials and Confessions.” *Communication Reports*, v.21 (2008).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. “Cues to Deception.” *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Duran, N. D., C. Hall, P. M. McCarthy, and D. S. McNamara. “The Linguistic Correlates of Conversational Deception: Comparing Natural

- Language Processing Technologies.” *Applied Psycholinguistics*, v.31 (2010).
- Hancock, J. T., L. E. Curry, S. Goorha, and M. Woodworth.. “On Lying and Being Lied To: A Linguistic Analysis of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication.” *Discourse Processes*, v.45 (2008).
- McGlone, M.S. and M. L. Knapp, eds. *The Interplay of Truth and Deception*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Newman, M. L, J. W. Pennebaker, D. S. Berry, and J. M. Richards. “Lying Words: Predicting Deception From Linguistic Styles.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.29 (2003).
- Zhou, L., J. K. Burgoon, J. F. Nunamaker, and D. Twichell. “Automating Linguistics-Based Cues for Detecting Deception in Text-Based Asynchronous Computer-Mediated Communication.” *Group Decision and Negotiation*, v.13 (2004).

---

## Law and Law Enforcement

The law itself, and the personnel and processes of law enforcement, are among the most interesting and paradoxical contexts for the use and misuse of deception. On one hand, they represent the standards of ethics and morality of society and the rules by which citizens aim to live. In addition, their goals are to enforce these standards among citizens. On the other, the law and law enforcement personnel themselves knowingly violate these standards of ethics and morality.

The law itself specifically condones actions of law enforcement that it specifically forbids other citizens. In turn, law enforcement personnel employ a wide variety of fundamentally deceptive practices to apprehend those they believe to be guilty of crimes; many of these crimes, such as fraud or illegal scams of various sorts, are committed through the use of the very same types of deception used by law enforcement to apprehend the perpetrators (such as misrepresenting crucial facts, or one’s identity). The fate of the accused is then contested by prosecutors and defense attorneys. Whether negotiating a plea agreement,

arguing trial motions to the judge, or presenting the case to juries, the attorneys may selectively present evidence (lying by omission), and knowingly mislead one another, judges, and juries regarding the nature and import of the evidence, all in an effort to achieve the best legal outcome for the state or the defendant.

The pervasive deceptive activities sanctioned by the law itself and entailed in the enforcement of the law raise a number of interesting psychological and ethical issues. Does the end of “justice” justify the means of deceptive or unethical practices? Are these practices unethical when serving the legitimate goals of law enforcement? Do deceptive practices actually serve the goals of truth-finding and justice, or do they unavoidably corrupt and misdirect them? Does use of deception by attorneys and law enforcement undermine public trust? Can police officers who routinely lie and deceive to apprehend criminals draw a bright line of distinction when they testify before juries, or does perjury seem like another justifiable means to an end? Does the process of deceiving others inevitably lead to deceiving oneself? Can attorneys maintain an objective view of the evidence when their goal is to convince others of a biased view, sometimes when they know it to be false (as when a defense attorney knows his client is actually guilty)? In the end, are those who deceive aware of their deceptions, or have they convinced themselves of the truth of their lies?

### Culture of Law Enforcement Officers

The culture of law enforcement officers provides an interesting context for examination of these issues. At one level, their training and culture explicitly endorses lying and deception as necessary means to achieve their goals of apprehending suspects and securing evidence to facilitate their conviction. Training concerning how to perform tasks such as crisis interventions, undercover work, or suspect interrogations not only instructs officers that they can and should lie to suspects and others but also provides specific deceptive strategies along with many concrete examples of individual lies to tell, many described in formal and publicly available training manuals. These formalized deceptive strategies are explicitly sanctioned by law and evolve over time to ensure their continuing acceptability by the courts.



Moreover, distinct sets of implicit rules about lying tend to be instilled and normalized within the law enforcement culture, encouraging and sanctioning particular forms of lying under some circumstances and rewarding the development of deceptive skills and practices. Lying is considered a part of what it takes to “get the job done,” and it is widely believed that one cannot police effectively without well-developed tools of deception. Lying and deception is further encouraged by a culture emphasizing strict control and secrecy and protecting officers from negative consequences for many forms of lying.

In contrast, other forms of lying are discouraged and looked down upon, such as committing perjury or fabricating evidence. Officers are expected—by their own institutions and by the public—to draw a line of distinction between permissible deceptive practices necessary to enforce the law, apprehend suspects, and gather valid evidence and impermissible contamination or fabrication in collection of evidence or presentations of that evidence to others. But it is all too easy for this line to blur and for the impermissible forms of deception to be viewed as just another justifiable means to achieve the goal of convicting a suspect the officer believes to be guilty. Some officers do cross this line and commit illegal forms of deception.

Many common permissible and impermissible practices can be illustrated through consideration of several widely discussed deceptive practices of law enforcement: undercover operations used to gather evidence or apprehend criminal suspects, snitches used to provide incriminating information against suspects, interrogation practices intended to elicit suspects’ confessions, and misleading evidence and testimony offered to secure convictions.

### **Undercover Operations**

Undercover operations represent the most comprehensively deceptive strategies of law enforcement. Particularly in deep undercover operations, those involved not only lie about many specific facts and issues but also must fabricate entire identities and personal histories to gain the confidence of criminal suspects and access to evidence of their criminal activities. These massive deceptions may be carried out over months or years,

and they may entail developing intimate relationships with suspects and even perpetration of criminal activities to maintain the charade.

Arguably, a particular form of undercover operation—the “sting”—could represent the most ethically questionable deceptive law enforcement technique, in that police target a person they believe to be involved in a particular type of criminal activity and pose as either other perpetrators (for example, drug wholesalers) or consumers (for example, drug buyers) to draw the suspect into committing the crime under circumstances where it will be documented. In essence, police officers create opportunities for suspects to participate in crimes for which suspects will then be captured and tried.

Proponents of sting operations point to several advantages of the technique over other methods. First, the sting operation may be cheaper than alternatives such as full-time surveillance (which has the additional disadvantage of posing legal issues regarding privacy). More important, sting operations can serve multiple deterrent functions. Individuals likely to have committed crimes had the operation not been implemented are captured before the crime occurs, and authorities may be able to identify other individuals likely to commit a crime in the near future. Moreover, “word on the street” that police traps may be disguised as criminal opportunities can help deter would-be offenders.

Opponents of sting operations claim that the method simply leads to the manufacturing of crimes and that many who “offended” through such operations may never have considered committing crimes in their absence. Perhaps more damning is the argument that when sting operations prevent the perpetration of the crime, they arguably become exercises of unjustified punishment for unsuspecting victims.

### **Use of Snitches**

A related method to gather evidence involves the use of informants—often low-level offenders—to obtain incriminating information against other suspects in exchange for legal leniency or other benefits to the informants. The informant may be incorporated into undercover operations, where he can perform deceptive functions similar to those of the undercover officers; may attempt

to elicit incriminating information from a suspect while both are in custody; or may simply provide information already (allegedly) known.

The use of such informants (colloquially known as “snitches”) has been the source of controversy among legal circles and the general public. Proponents of the technique claim that offering leniency to low-level offenders is a justifiable moral compromise, affording the legal system effective means of apprehending higher-level criminals.

Conversely, opponents of snitching deals argue that such deals represent an unjustified compromise of law enforcement ethics and justice principles, with undesirable effects outweighing potential benefits. They note that the clandestine and unregulated nature of snitching deals can lead to instances of unanticipated victimization of innocents, corruption, and other ethically questionable outcomes. Incentives offered to snitches can induce them to provide false information, purposely incriminating innocent persons solely to reap the benefits of the deal. Moreover, leniency offered in such deals can encourage criminal activity by allowing informants to escape repercussions of their own criminal activities.

### Interrogation Practices

Interrogation strategies, as practiced by American law enforcement, are arguably second only to undercover operations in deceptiveness. Although interrogators do not deceive at the level of their identity as law enforcement officers, they do so with virtually every other representation made during interrogation. The interrogator feigns good will toward the suspect, indicating that she or he thinks the suspect is a good person caught in a bad situation and stating that she or he would like to help the suspect get the best outcomes. Interrogators promote the illusion that they have the authority to affect whether and what charges are filed against the suspect (which is actually the province of prosecutors).

The interrogator also misrepresents the purpose of the interrogation as an opportunity for the suspect to help himself by “explaining” his side of the story, rather than as an attempt to secure the suspect’s conviction. The interrogator depicts often scant evidence of guilt as overwhelming, often claiming to have evidence such as DNA, fingerprints, failed polygraph tests, or

eyewitnesses that doesn’t actually exist. The overriding deceptive message of the interrogation is that confession is actually in the suspects’ best long-term legal interests, whereas refusal to confess will work against them. While such strategies are effective in eliciting true confessions, they have also been implicated in the elicitation of a growing number of documented false confessions to serious crimes, such as murder and rape.

Modern interrogation strategies were developed not only to deceive the suspects and induce them to confess against self-interest but also to mislead the courts. The importance of full confessions in securing convictions, along with the risk of false confessions raised by coercive interrogation practices, have led to the establishment of laws and regulations in the United States to protect suspects from use of physical violence, overt



*An officer from the Sandwell Police Department discovers a cannabis setup in Wednesbury, West Midlands, United Kingdom, after conducting a warrant at a residence on October 18, 2012. Undercover operations represent the most comprehensively deceptive strategies of law enforcement.*

threats, and false promises of leniency to elicit incriminating admissions. Interrogators acknowledge that suspects are unlikely to confess unless they believe it is in their own best interests.

Since explicit threats and promises regarding the consequences of confession are explicitly forbidden, interrogators have adopted strategies for conveying the incentives for confession without explicitly stating them. The success of these strategies in deceiving the courts is reflected in widespread refusal of the courts to recognize the clarity with which the strategies do convey threats and promises, widespread refusal to suppress confessions elicited through their use, and interrogators' simultaneous success in leading suspects to confess by convincing them it is in their best interest to do so.

### **Fabrication and Misrepresentation of Evidence**

The frustrations and failures of attempts to gather sufficient evidence against suspects inevitably provides the temptation to take shortcuts or to fill in the gaps through fabricating evidence. For example, though deceiving suspects in undercover operations is legally permissible, and arguably ethical, some practices cross the line to intentionally mislead attorneys, judges, and juries who try and judge the suspects. Undercover officers often surreptitiously record suspects in order to document incriminating activities and admissions. If they have difficulty getting sufficiently incriminating statements on tape, the officers may engage in deceptive practices to nevertheless give the appearance that suspects have self-incriminated. For example, the officer may talk about a crime that has taken place or that is being planned as if the suspect is still present when, unknown to the audience, he has actually left the room or walked out of earshot. The silence following the agent's taped statements can be considered "adoptive admissions" of guilt on the part of "silent" suspects.

An agent may talk about picking up some "speakers" (a term dope dealers sometimes use to refer to drugs) with a suspect who understands the term to mean audio speakers. If the suspect agrees to pick them up, observers can later be misled to assume he knew the term referred to drugs. Additional strategies used by undercover agents to artificially convey the notion that targets

have been involved in criminal activities include destroying or tampering with tapes (for example, introducing static to obscure parts of the discussion inconsistent with suspect guilt), interrupting or speaking on behalf of suspects, withholding information from suspects that would clarify what was being talked about (and perhaps lead to suspect denials), and outright scripting suspects so that the target audience ends up hearing, in sum, a recorded full confession in the suspects' own words.

Another of the few contexts in which deception is discouraged involves testifying in court settings. Research suggests, however, that some officers do cross this line. The term *testilying* was coined by New York City police officers to refer to "justified" perjury—ranging from lying about the circumstances surrounding a particular event to outright planting evidence at crime scenes—in a presumed effort to distinguish the practice from inexcusable dishonesty. Many officers who do lie under oath argue that such testilying is justifiable because it serves a greater good. That is, some accept testilying as a way to achieve the goals of justice, even if accomplished through questionable, and perhaps illegitimate, means.

Testilying is believed to be most frequently used to prevent the acquittal of guilty defendants. It has been speculated that one reason officers resort to lying during investigative, pretrial, and trial proceedings is their widespread belief that they are much more skilled at identifying suspects' culpability than judges, juries, and prosecutors. Therefore, it is up to officers themselves to ensure that guilty suspects are not wrongly released, through false testimony if necessary. Other personal reasons why officers sometimes resort to testilying are (1) attempts to cover up their own incompetence or participation in corruption or other illegal activities; (2) monetary gains, such as overtime pay obtained from the extra time it takes to process arrests and testifying in court; and (3) personal or departmental goals to increase conviction rates.

### **Conclusion**

Lying and deception among law officers is legally sanctioned and widely considered to be necessary for effective evidence-gathering, though all such deceptive practices are criticized by some as

unnecessary, ineffective, counterproductive and/or simply unethical—inevitably leading to inaccuracies, injustices, and even corruption. Establishing the legal and ethical boundaries of morally questionable law enforcement practices is a complex endeavor, as it involves weighing goals of efficiency against principles of justice.

J. Guillermo Villalobos

Michael J. Williams

Deborah Davis

*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Attorneys; Confession; Deception Motives; Drugs; Investigator Bias; Justice; Lying, Accusations of; Morals and Ethics; Perjury; Polygraph; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

Davis, Deborah. "Lies, Damned Lies, and the Path From Police Interrogation to Wrongful Conviction." In *The Scientist and the Humanist: A Festschrift in Honor of Elliot Aronson*, M. H. Gonzales, C. Tavis, and J. Aronson, eds. New York: Psychology Press, 2010.

Hay, Bruce. "Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment." *Missouri Law Review*, v.70 (2005).

Hunt, Jennifer and Peter K. Manning. "The Social Context of Police Lying." *Symbolic Interaction*, v.14 (1991).

Natapoff, Alexandra. *Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Erosion of American Justice*. New York: New York University Press, 2009.

Shuy, Roger W. *Creating Language Crimes: How Law Enforcement Uses (and Misuses) Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

their true states may be revealed without their conscious monitoring or control. Although they are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, a distinction can be made between leakage and more general deception cues. Specifically, leakage refers to behaviors or expressions that reveal a person's true states or feelings, whereas deception cues are those that reveal a person to be lying but give no indication as to the content of the lie. Deception cues are typically independent of context, whereas leakage cues are tied to specific situations. Emotion researchers, verbal and body language analysts, and lie detection experts have attempted to identify, with arguable success, specific and systematic leakage. The topic of leakage and deception has been widely studied in the psychological literature, as well as popularized in the media, over the past few decades.

One well-known event serves as a common example of leakage. In a now infamous 1998 White House press conference, then-president Bill Clinton looked directly at the video camera, shook his finger, and adamantly claimed he, "did not have sexual relations with that woman," a reference to White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, many Americans believed Clinton. In polls following his on-air denial, 91 percent of people expressed doubt that he had had an affair. His statement was, of course, later proven false as intimate details of an extended sexual relationship with Lewinsky came to light.

Although the American people were duped, body language and lie detection experts claimed to have easily seen Clinton's true feelings. For instance, they noted that during his press conference, Clinton engaged in several "microshrugs," tiny shoulder movements noticeable only in slow motion, that betrayed the certainty of his words. In addition, the words *that woman* raised alarms, as experts claimed it marked an attempt to psychologically distance himself from his lies. Others noticed an almost imperceptible softening of the volume of Clinton's words at the end of the sentence, indicating a lack of conviction in his statement. Alone, each cue may not have amounted to much; together, they leaked a set of "tells" that experts claim intimated Clinton's affair.

Indicators of deception leak out involuntarily when people lie. For example, a meta-analysis

---

## Leakage

Even when people are highly motivated to deceive others, their behaviors and expressions may betray them. Cues that indicate one's true feelings seep out involuntarily through verbal or nonverbal channels, known as "leakage." During instances of deception, as people try to mask what they really feel or think, information about



of 35 different studies found that deceptive tells include fidgety hand movements, increased blinking and enlarged pupils, frequent speech errors, increased speech hesitations, higher voice pitch, and discrepancies between verbal and nonverbal channels. Such cues to lying, however, are idiosyncratic to the person; for example, some people simply fidget more in everyday life compared to others, even when not attempting to deceive. Nonetheless, as Charles Darwin first suggested and Paul Ekman later popularized, many internal states cannot be completely masked because people are not aware of or voluntarily controlling the behavioral consequences of those states. As a result, even the most well-trained actors, or well-prepped politicians, may leak information about their true thoughts and feelings during deception. One notable exception to this is people with psychopathic disorders; because psychopaths do not typically feel strong genuine emotions, their emotional expressions are easier to mask and leakage is not as likely to occur.

### Five Channels of Leakage

Leakage primarily occurs through five channels—facial expressions, body language, voice, verbal style, and actual verbal statements. The most widely studied and popularly discussed of these channels is facial expressions. For instance, a controversial Canadian court ruling (*R. v N.S.*) required that a Muslim woman remove her *niqab*, a traditional veil covering the face, during her court testimony because facial expressions may provide the jury and cross-examiners with important information. Similarly, airport security officials are trained to scrutinize facial expressions in security screenings. Facial expressions may suggest people's internal states without their awareness or intention.

Facial expressions often leak information through brief involuntary movements, referred to as “microexpressions.” Microexpressions occur for only 1/25 to 1/5 of a second and are too brief for the average person to notice but long enough for well-trained observers to identify. Microexpressions provide valuable insight during high-stakes deception. For instance, researchers studied tens of thousands of frames of television clips depicting individuals pleading for the return of their missing loved ones. About half of the

individuals were later convicted of having murdered the missing persons. That is to say, half of the individuals were explicitly lying when directly appealing with supposed perpetrators to return loved ones. Analysis of facial expressions of “genuine pleaders” and “deceptive pleaders” revealed marked differences. For example, the genuine pleaders' muscles associated with grief, located around their eyebrows and between the chin and the corner of the lips, contracted more so than that of the deceptive pleaders'. In addition, the deceptive pleaders displayed a microexpression of a masked smile when they attempted to appear sad. Experts can identify microexpressions that may leak information about others' true thoughts and feelings when deceiving others.

### Why Leakage Occurs

Researchers suggest the primary reason why leakage occurs during deception is that lying is mentally tiring. During a lie, deceivers actively multitask. For example, they must inhibit their true emotional expressions, wrestle with guilt or worries about being caught in a lie, remember the lies and the facts, and monitor others' reactions. The cognitive juggling that takes place during a lie is mentally exhausting and cognitively taxing. As a result, some information goes unmonitored and leaks out. Research suggests leakage is especially likely to occur when the lie is complicated or the concealed emotions are strong. Because lying taxes limited cognitive resources, unintentional verbal and nonverbal slips may occur without deceivers' awareness.

People are aware that they may give away or leak information during a lie. Moreover, popular media and folk wisdom contribute to people's lay conceptions of the cues that they believe distinguish truth from lie. In a large study of over 63 countries, more than 70 percent of people believed that liars tend to avoid eye contact. People also believe that squirming, stuttering, touching one's face, and telling more detailed stories than is warranted are cues to lying. Because people have ideas about clues that might give away their lies, people often overcompensate during deception. For example, to avoid the appearance that they are not making eye contact, people may instead stare longer than usual. To avoid fidgeting, they may stand or sit in a more rigid manner. Efforts to control

leakage may instead backfire. Overcompensation may actually serve as a signal of deception.

Deception is rampant. On any given day, people hear anywhere from 10 to 200 lies. Strangers lie, on average, three times within the first 10 minutes of meeting each other. During these countless instances of deception, hidden cues to the truth behind the lies may be revealed through verbal and nonverbal leakage, at least for those who know where to look.

Shana Cole  
Emily Balcetis  
*New York University*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Deception Detection accuracy; Emotions; Linguistic Cues; Lying, Difficulty of; Lying, Prevalence of; Microexpressions; Nonverbal Cues; Transparent Liars; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Ekman, O. and W. V. Friesen. "Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception." *Psychiatry*, v.32 (1969).
- ten Brinke, L., S. Porter, and S. Baker. "Darwin the Detective: Observable Facial Expressions Reveal High-Stakes Lies." *Evolution and Human Behavior*, v.33 (2012).
- Zuckerman, M., B. M. DePaulo, and R. Rosenthal. "Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception." *Advances in Experimental Social Research*, v.14 (1981).

---

## Letters of Recommendation

A letter of recommendation is an official written document that is considered to be an "expert testimony" of an individual's ability to perform a task. Letters of recommendation may also contain information regarding an individual's work ethic, overall character, and accomplishments or professional experiences. The purpose of these letters is

to provide an informed evaluation and possible recommendation to those requesting the letter.

Letters of recommendation are most commonly used for academic selection purposes. Universities and other academic institutions often request multiple letters of recommendation from the professors or academic advisors of students who are applying for admittance. Businesses also utilize letters of recommendations or reference letters to make selection decisions. Organizations, including military branches, will typically request letters of recommendation when making hiring, promotion, and/or tenure decisions. Individuals applying for grants and awards may also need to provide letters of recommendation to ensure that they possess the needed knowledge, skills, and abilities to appropriately utilize a grant or award. In general, when any person or organization is tasked with making an important selection decision, a letter of recommendation may be requested.

Letters of recommendation, like most official documents, are susceptible to unethical activity, such as falsifying information or using information intended to deceive. Letters of recommendation are also susceptible to deception because of their purpose of being a selection tool. Individuals who deceive on letters of recommendation often do so to increase their chances of a favorable outcome, such as acceptance or promotion. Letters of recommendation and standardized reference forms are used because they are able to predict future performance, and applicants who understand this wish to portray the ideal candidate. Applicants who do not feel adequate may be inclined to engage in unethical activity to represent the ideal.

Other motives for using deception in letters may be to cover poor performance or fear of rejection from either the writer of the letter or the establishment making the decision based on the letter. Individuals who engage in social comparison may lie on their letters to make themselves seem more socially desirable. Letters may be forged completely because of the lack of available writers or because the applicants want to gain an edge on the competition and believe they are able to write the letter better than others.

When asked to write a letter of recommendation the writer has two options: to accept or decline the applicant's request. When approached by an

applicant, writers often accept the applicant's request when sometimes the more appropriate option would have been to decline. When writing a letter of recommendation, the writer may intentionally or unintentionally deceive the reader by exaggerating or omitting information. Deception in letters of recommendation is caused by a number of reasons, from legal and ethical concerns to a feeling of obligation to the applicant.

Applicants ask individuals they feel will provide them with the best professional and positive letters of recommendation. The writer often takes this request as an obligation to make the applicant sound exceptional. The pressure of obligation also causes writers to write letters for applicants who they may not know as well as they should in order to provide the readers with an accurate description of the applicant. Discrimination among applicants becomes impossible because every applicant is described by the writer as the best candidate. Research shows high percentages of highly rated applicants and very few average or below-average applicants. Out of 6,854 applicants in one study, only 0.23 percent, or 16 applicants, were found to be below average while 60.27 percent were rated as excellent and 35.94 percent were rated above average. Additionally, research shows that there are more similarities displayed in letters across candidates from one letter writer than there are between candidates with multiple letter writers. In other words, a letter of recommendation is often more of a representation of the writer than of the actual candidate.

### **Detecting and Preventing Deception**

While it may seem nearly impossible for readers to distinguish false information when reading a letter of recommendation about an applicant they do not know, readers can look for warning signs of a deceitful letter. First, readers can look at the relationship between the writer and the applicant. Have the applicant and the writer known each other for a long period of time? If so, then the reader can assume that the writer knows the applicant's weaknesses and strengths, both positive and negative information. If the writer includes only positive information, then the reader may suspect that the letter is inflating the candidate's abilities. Inflation may also occur if the writer does not know the applicant well enough or may

not have many experiences with the applicant and therefore believe they must exaggerate the few characteristics they do know.

Readers should also keep in mind that the letters are written by individuals the applicants trust will provide a strong, positive letter. Therefore, the applicants are going to choose a writer who possesses the least amount of insight into their limitations or weaknesses. Readers should also compare the letters of recommendation with the applicant's resume or curriculum vitae (CV) in order to determine if the information presented from both sources seems compatible. If the resume and CV appear to be in disagreement, then the reader should remain skeptical.

The best way to avoid adding false information in letters of recommendation is for the writers to be able to differentiate when they should and should not provide a letter of recommendation. If the writers know they must fabricate or omit information in order to make the applicant sound desirable to the reader, then the writers should politely decline writing the letter. The writers should also provide criticism and solutions for the applicant's limitations. The reader must also take into consideration that no applicant is perfect. Providing honest praise and criticism is more beneficial to all parties involved than only providing exaggerated positive information.

### **Conclusion**

Letters of recommendation are an important contribution to the decision-making process of an organization or academic institution. It is equally important to understand that these letters are susceptible to fraudulent and unethical activity by all parties involved. Individuals educated in this type of deception will be able to better identify and prevent unethical opportunities and events, while also informing those around them. With an educated staff, these organizations and institutions will be better prepared to examine letters of recommendation and be able to utilize the letters more efficiently.

Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*  
Jordan Blackhurst  
Jordan Zurowski

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Academia; Business; Corporations; Exaggeration; Résumés.

### Further Readings

- McCarthy, J. M. and R. D. Goffin. "Improving the Validity of Letters of Recommendation: An Investigation of Three Standardized Reference Forms." *Military Psychology*, v.13 (2001).
- Nicklin, J. M. and S. G. Roch, "Letters of Recommendation: Controversy and Consensus From Expert Perspectives." *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, v.17/1 (2009).
- Zink, D. L. and A. Gutman. "Job References: Some Legal Considerations." In *References and Recommendation Letters: Psychometric, Ethical, Legal, and Practical Issues*, M. G. Aamodt, chair. Symposium conducted at the 25th Annual Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Conference, Los Angeles, 2005.

## Libel and Slander

Libel and slander are two types of defamation claims that involve lies and/or intentional deception. They are both torts (that is, civil wrongs concerning behavior that has caused another harm) that involve defamation, that is, the communication of false information about a person, group, or entity (for example, organization), which results in damages to the victim's reputation. Libel concerns information communicated via a fixed medium, such as newspapers, magazines, and movies. Slander, on the other hand, involves transitory statements, usually oral in nature.

When an individual claims to be the victim of libel or slander, he or she must provide evidence of four elements to be successful. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant communicated a defamatory message. This means that at least one other person understood the message to have a disparaging meaning that could negatively damage the victim's reputation. Second, the plaintiff must show that he or she can be easily identified as the target of the statement, which was made to a third party without the plaintiff's consent. Situations in which someone overhears a message

conveyed in a manner that should prevent others from hearing it are not considered to be libel or slander. In other words, intent to harm must be a motivating factor, and statements of opinion during private conversations or communications are not subject to a libel or slander label. Also safe from accusations of defamation are distributors of material who have no knowledge of the information they are distributing (for example, mail carriers).

Third, to be defamatory in nature the statement must have been a false statement of fact. Fourth, the plaintiff must show fault, which ranges in restrictiveness depending on whether the plaintiff is a public figure or private citizen. Private citizens have fewer restrictions on building a libel or slander case, as they only need to show that the defendant was negligent. Public figures such as government officials or elected officers bear a higher burden of proof; they must show that the defendant shared information known to be false or with a reckless disregard for whether the information was true or false.

### Common Forms

There are two types of defamation: defamation per se and defamation per quod. Defamation per se is libel or slander that is obvious and completely evident. Composed of four categories, defamation per se includes falsely (1) accusing someone of a crime, (2) accusing someone of having a disease, (3) communicating conclusions about an individual's fitness to conduct his or her business, and (4) implying that an individual has engaged in a serious sexual offense.

Defamation per quod, meaning libel or slander because of circumstance, is not as overt. This type of defamation arises from statements that may seem harmless without considering the circumstances. However, when taken within the context of certain situational factors, the statements become defamatory. Extrinsic evidence is required to prove injurious nature in a defamation per quod suit.

An important distinction between defamation per se and per quod is that, with the former, it is not the plaintiff's responsibility to show damages, because they are readily evident. With the latter, however, the plaintiff must show how the defamation was damaging.



### Defenses Against Defamation Claims

There are a number of defenses available to individuals accused of libel or slander. The first three are called complete defenses because they completely absolve the defendant from any responsibility. The first, the truth defense, involves proving that the defamatory statement was substantially true. This means that even if some of the facts communicated by the defendant are false, if the overall meaning behind the statements is true, then typically defamation has not occurred. Another complete defense is consent. If the defendant can prove that the plaintiff actually consented to the distribution of the statement, then there is no support for the allegations of libel or slander.

The final complete defense is absolute privilege. There are actually two types of privilege defenses, absolute and conditional. Absolute privilege refers to immunity from charges of defamation

based on the defendant's position or status. Absolute privilege applies to judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, executive proceedings, and statements about a third party to one's spouse. In these situations, officials are not subject to liability for the charges against them, even if their statements were untrue and/or had malicious intent. Conditional privileges, on the other hand, are not based on a person's status or position, but rather arise from the situation during which the statement was made. Unlike absolute privilege, in these cases defendants must prove that they believed the statement was true and that they had reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.

Perhaps the most common defense is claiming that the defamatory statement was stated as opinion rather than fact, although not all jurisdictions recognize the difference between fact and opinion. The success of such a claim typically depends upon whether the person making the statement is in a position to know whether the claim is true or false. Similar to opinion is the defense claiming fair comment on a matter of public interest. In other words, some claim that the press is free to discuss matters of public interest, given that any statements are not made with the intention to harm.

Another line of defense is to claim that the victim of the defamatory statements already had a poor reputation. This defense aims to reduce claims for damages resulting from the statements. A final defense, innocent dissemination, involves claiming that the accused was unaware of the content he or she was disseminating (for example, the post office cannot be held responsible for the contents of letters).

### U.S. Versus International Law

Although there are no federal criminal defamation laws, as previously mentioned, libel and slander in the United States are subject to state criminal defamation laws, although not all states have them. However, even the states without criminal defamation laws have civil laws about defamation. Although only about half of the U.S. states have criminal defamation laws, they are fairly common in other countries, although the specifics of the laws, the punishments for breaking them, and the defenses available to the accused vary. One large disparity between the United States and many European nations regarding defamation is



*Lydia Cacho Ribeiro (left) waits offstage with Kendra Ward (right) before receiving the One Humanity Award at the 2009 PEN Canada event, November 20, 2009. Cacho is a Mexican journalist and human rights activist who was jailed in Cancun in 2005 on libel and slander charges over her 2004 exposé, *Los Demonios del Edén*, which accused prominent businessmen and politicians of running a pedophilia ring. She took the case of her arrest to the Mexican Supreme Court and won in 2007.*

on whom lies the burden of proof. In the United States, it is typically up to the plaintiff to prove that defamation did in fact occur, while in many European countries defamatory statements are assumed to be false unless the defendant can prove them to be true.

### Famous Cases

There are a number of cases that have helped shape current laws regarding libel and slander. One constant battle concerning these cases is deciding where to draw the line between damages caused by defamatory statements and the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In other words, does a plaintiff's claim that a defamatory statement has been made interfere with a defendant's right to freedom of speech and/or freedom of press?

The most oft-cited defamation case is *New York Times v. Sullivan* (1964), as this case was the first to offer direction in terms of who may successfully claim damages due to defamation. In the case, Sullivan, a police official, sued the *New York Times* for printing allegedly false information about his mistreatment of civil rights activists. Although the Alabama state court initially ruled in favor of Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its decision. According to the First Amendment, the freedom to openly debate public officials must be protected, even when the debate includes scathing or offensive comments. To protect this freedom, the court decided that all public officials hoping to collect damages for defamation must prove actual malice (that is, knowing that information is untrue or failing to properly investigate the truthfulness of a statement before making it). In other words, it is up to the public official to prove that the defendant who communicated the information was fully aware that his or her statement was either false or likely false. Because public officials have a higher burden of proof when it comes to proving libel or slander, it is more difficult for them to successfully win their cases than private citizens.

One reason why the courts decided to distinguish between public officials and private citizens in cases of defamation is that public officials willingly place themselves in situations and/or positions inviting close inspection and criticism, thus relinquishing to some degree the complete

protection of their reputation. Private citizens, on the other hand, typically do not wish to be the subject of public scrutiny, and so long as they do not place themselves in situations calling for it, they have the right to protect their reputations. Furthermore, public officials are better able to counteract false statements about them, be it through the media or other connections, whereas private citizens often do not have equal means for doing so. For these reasons, the privacy and reputation of private citizens trumps freedom of speech in most cases.

Considering that the Sullivan ruling applied to public officials, later cases sought to determine who exactly is considered a public official, expanding the definition to include nonelected government employees with control over the conduct of public affairs and candidates for public office. Later, the actual-malice requirement established in *New York Times v. Sullivan* was extended to include public figures outside of the government, such as football coaches and retired U.S. Army generals.

While it is still somewhat unclear what constitutes a public figure, cases such as *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.* (1974) have offered some definition. According to this case, any person who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy" should be considered a public figure for certain issues. This basically means that an individual can become a public figure voluntarily by speaking publicly about a controversial topic, or involuntarily by being accused of committing a high profile crime. Furthermore, an individual may be a public figure for all purposes (that is, those who are familiar to almost everyone) or for limited purposes (that is, someone who becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues).

### How Organizations Can Protect Against Libel

Using the rulings from previous court decisions, organizations can devise methods to protect against libel and slander. For one, organizations should provide training about defamation so employees know their rights and what they are or are not allowed to say about others. Certain situations are protected from libel and slander, provided employees do not cross the boundaries of these situations into unprotected territory. For

instance, when conducting performance appraisals, individuals are allowed to share information about others provided a legitimate need to know the information exists; if a supervisor shares performance ratings or negative information about an employee's conduct to upper management, such a communication cannot be considered defamatory so long as upper management had a justified need to know the information.

Organizations should also exercise caution concerning information posted to the organization's Web site. If information is posted about competing organizations, great care should be taken to present only verified facts. Even if the individual facts themselves are true, if they imply something damaging when taken as a whole, the implied meaning may be cause for a defamation case. Colorful language should be avoided, as its use may result in the communication of unintended meanings by way of misinterpretations. Not only should the organization monitor the statements of its own employees, but it is also the organization's responsibility to review what others external to the organization post on the company Web site, because the organization is liable for these comments as well.

Many organizations readily participate in online social media outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Web sites, forums, and message groups, without taking the proper precautions to ensure that both their reputation, the image of their clients, and the reputation of other similar companies is upheld. If there are any forums or message boards open to the public, a review team should be in place within the organization to frequently review the Web site for potentially defamatory statements made by others and to promptly remove such statements.

To further protect against claims of libel and slander, organizations should be scrupulous in their retention of all records supporting the truth of statements. This may mean keeping records of phone conversations, interviews, and other meetings. An organization should make sure to acknowledge all sides of an issue and thoroughly investigate sources of information to ensure they are reliable and trustworthy. Finally, an organization should consider employing a legal team to review its Web site, literature, and other information it releases to protect against libel and slander.

## Conclusion

Libel and slander continue to be relevant, especially considering increases in ease of communication via technology and the Internet. The definition and boundaries for these two types of defamation continue to evolve as more defamation court decisions are made. It is important that individuals and organizations stay up-to-date on important decisions and work to understand the civil and/or criminal laws of their representative state or country so that they are better able to avoid libelous and slanderous behavior.

Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*  
 Heather Heimbaugh  
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**See Also:** Business; Cardinal Newman; Corporations; Dreyfus Affair; Glass, Stephen; Gossip; Internet; Facebook and Social Media Sites; Law and Law Enforcement; Perjury; Public Relations.

## Further Readings

- Associated Press v. Walker*, 389 U.S. 28 (1967).  
*Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).  
 First Amendment Project. "An Environmental Advocate's Guide to Avoiding Defamation and Other Publication Lawsuits." <http://www.thefirstamendment.org/environmental-defamation.pdf> (Accessed October 2012).  
*Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
 Larson, A. "Defamation, Libel, and Slander Law." [http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal\\_injury/defamation.html](http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal_injury/defamation.html) (Accessed October 2012).  
*Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy*, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).  
*New York Times v. Sullivan*, 367 U.S. 254 (1964).  
*Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).

## Lie Acceptability

Despite maxims such as "Honesty is the best policy," lying is ubiquitous. Many studies suggest that lying is a communication tool that is adaptive and crucial for social life. People often agree that some lies are acceptable, while others are not.

### Lie Acceptability as Attitude

Because of the evaluative dimensions along which people judge whether a lie is or is not permissible, the acceptability of lying is often defined as one's attitude toward the practice of lying. If a person considers it acceptable to lie (given a specific situation), he or she tends to view the act of lying as one of several options for achieving a social or personal goal. This person is more likely to lie, with less remorse, than another person, who sees the act of lying as unacceptable. The person who views the lie as acceptable will also be less critical and more understanding of another person who lies in that same situation. On the other hand, an individual who considers lying in this situation to be morally and ethically unacceptable would view lying as something to be both avoided and discouraged. It would be unlikely for this individual to lie because he or she would experience guilt by doing so. Likewise, this individual would get upset if others employed the lie against him or her.

### Lie Acceptability as Personality Trait

Another definition views lie acceptability as a trait of an individual's personality: a generalized attitude of an individual toward lying behavior. Measured along a scale, individuals with a high score would see lying as plausible and strategic for social and personal goals. Not only do they lie more frequently, they are also more generous toward others' lies. On the other hand, if they had a low score, they will lie less, experience more guilt, and judge those who lie negatively. Most people fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Of these two definitions, the definition of lie acceptability as one's attitude toward the practice of lying is more common than the definition of lie acceptability as a personality trait.

### How to Study Lie Acceptability

Research has been conducted to learn more about people's attitudes toward lie accessibility. Mainstream studies on the acceptability of lying, especially psychology and communication studies, aim to clarify what determines whether a lie is acceptable or not. In most of these studies, experimenters create scenarios in which participants are asked to evaluate how acceptable or unacceptable it is to lie. The scenarios are manipulated to introduce variations in factors such as the liar's

motivation and the nature of relationships. Analysis is done by comparing scenario variations against participant characteristics such as gender, age, or other demographic groupings.

Some other studies require participants to recall and evaluate actual past episodes; others ask participants to evaluate the acceptability of synonyms for "lie" taken from a dictionary. But scenario-based studies are more common because factors can be controlled more easily.

### Characteristics of a Lie as a Factor for Acceptability

In a simple, moralistic model of lying, the act of misrepresentation is always reprehensible, and a lie becomes more unacceptable as it gets further from the truth. However, outright forms of lying (for example, fabrication) are not necessarily more unacceptable than more subtle forms (for example, misleading statements, distortions). Studies show that the context in which a lie is made has a stronger impact on its acceptability than the lie's form. Some of the conclusions of these studies are as follows:

*Motivation.* The liar's motivation is a powerful determinant of a lie's acceptability. Psychology and communication studies suggest that acceptability is affected by motivation factors, such as the kind of benefit the liar stands to gain, and whether the lie causes harm or good to others. Generally, lies that benefit the liar are less acceptable than those that benefit others. Measured along this dimension, the acceptability of a lie is ranked, in decreasing order, as (1) lies that are beneficial both to the lie-teller and others, (2) lies that benefit the teller but do no harm to others, and (3) lies that benefit the teller while also doing others harm. In addition, lies that are created to avoid losses are generally less acceptable than those made for profit or gain.

*Severity of consequence.* Lying that causes a severe consequence is generally less acceptable than an inconsequential lie. But if the lie benefits the listener, acceptability tends to be high regardless of the situation's importance.

*Relationship between liar and listener.* The closeness of the relationship between the liar and the listener seems to influence the acceptability of a



lie; that is, lies between strangers are more acceptable than lies to a spouse. However, this is not always true; there are cases in which the acceptability of lies between strangers falls somewhere between lying between spouses and lying to a friend. Studies have also found an interaction between relationship and motivation factors.

Characteristics of lie perceivers also influence the acceptance of lying in general, as well as the acceptance specific types of lies. The characteristics of perceiver that are factors for lie acceptability are as follows:

**Culture.** People from different cultures sometimes show different preferences in the acceptability of lies with different motivations. For example, people in China (a collectivist culture) display a different tendency from people in the United States (an individualist culture).

**Personality.** Another important perceiver characteristic that affects the acceptability of lying is personality. There have been no consistent results that show how personalities affect lie acceptance, but subjects with specific personality profiles are more likely to accept certain motivations for lying.

**Other characteristics.** Perspectives also affect the acceptance of lying. In general, people are more generous with themselves than with others when telling the same lie. Some studies show that age and gender have an effect on the acceptance of lies. However, these factors seem to correlate with motivation: only lies made with specific motivations appear to be influenced by age and gender.

Kayo Sakamoto  
Swati Gupta

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception Motives; Lies, Types of; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends.

### Further Readings

Backbier, E., J. Hoogstraten, and K. M. Terwogt-Kouwenhoven. "Situational Determinants of the Acceptability of Telling Lies." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.27/12 (1997).

Hopper, R. and R. A. Bell. "Broadening the Deception Construct." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, v.70 (1984).

Lindskold, S. and P. S. Walters. "Categories for Acceptability of Lies." *Journal of Social Psychology*, v.120 (1983).

McLeod, B. A. and R. L. Genereux. "Predicting the Acceptability and Likelihood of Lying: The Interaction of Personality With Type of Lie." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.45 (2008).

Oliveira, C. M. and T. R. Levine. "Lie Acceptability: A Construct and Measure." *Communication Research Reports*, v.25/4 (2008).

Seiter, J. S., J. Bruschke, and C. Bai. "The Acceptability of Deception as a Function of Perceivers' Culture, Deceiver's Intention, and Deceiver-Deceived Relationship." *Western Journal of Communication*, v.66/2 (2002).

## Lie Bias

A lie bias is the tendency to more commonly believe that witness and suspect statements are deceptive rather than truthful. The psychological research literature has repeatedly shown that there is a tendency for the general public to judge others as truthful. However, research shows that police and "professional lie catchers" may be more prone to exhibit a lie bias. This is likely because of the high-suspicion environments in which they work, as offenders also display a lie bias.

There are several explanations for the truth bias, such as that social conventions discourage the challenging of suspected deception and thus allow for poor feedback regarding whether suspected deception did in fact occur. However, the dominant explanation for the truth bias is the availability heuristic: the concept that individuals presume information they hear is truthful, as they are more frequently exposed to truthful information than to lies in their everyday life.

### Police Officers and Lie Bias

If the truth bias is due to the frequency of exposure to truths, it may be expected that in a highly deceptive situation and occupation a lie bias may occur. Therefore, research has examined whether

the frequent exposure to suspects encourages police officers to be more suspicious and thus exhibit a lie bias. There is evidence to show that police officers have a tendency toward more commonly judging statements to be deceptive than truthful. Moreover, when compared with members of the public, police officers more frequently judge statements as deceptive. It appears that increased training and experience among police officers enhances deception detection confidence but has no effect upon actual accuracy.

Thus, the research illustrates that police officers have similarly poor lie detection performance to laypersons. This may be because of the lack of accurate outcome feedback that police officers receive on their deception judgments. If suspects believed to be deceptive are prosecuted, the officer's belief that he or she is good at detecting deception judgment is supported. However, an acquittal can be seen as resulting from legal technicalities and poor juror decision making rather than indicative of poor deception detection ability.

As with members of the public, police officers rely on inaccurate cues to deception, such as decreased eye gaze and increased movements. Lie bias is increased when deception detectors focus solely upon the nonverbal components of suspect interview behavior. Police officers who watched videos of actual suspect interviews were more likely to show a lie bias than officers provided with the accompanying interview audio and those given a combination of visual and audio material. This strongly supports the concept that the cues commonly but mistakenly associated with deception—gaze aversion and fidgeting—are actually more likely to occur in truthful suspects.

Research has shown that participants who were offered a financial reward for good deception detection performance actually performed worse than participants who were not offered a financial incentive. Furthermore, the motivated participants made more false detections (that is, falsely stated that innocent people were deceptive) than the low-motivation individuals. The possible reason for this is that motivated individuals tried harder and so paid more attention to the erroneous nonverbal cues often falsely associated with deception, rather than focusing on the actual content of deceivers' speech. Although conducted with student participants, this research suggests

that the high motivation of the police to identify guilty suspects and thus detect lies may actually impair their deception detection ability.

### **Behavioral Confirmation Bias**

Associated with this is the tendency for pre-existing belief to bias attention to and interpretation of later information, known as the behavioral confirmation bias. The impact of behavioral confirmation bias has been demonstrated to have a negative effect upon the interviewing of police suspects. Officers who believe that their suspect is guilty at the outset of the interview fail to re-evaluate this belief, even when the suspect repeatedly and strenuously denies his or her guilt. This may therefore account for lie bias among police officers.

This behavioral confirmation bias can lead interviewers to fail to acknowledge the innocence of suspects with plausible alibis. This is problematic for two reasons. First, concentrating investigations on an innocent offender removes police focus from tracing the actual offender. Second, the Reid technique advises that investigators ignore the denials from suspects believed to be guilty and instead continue to insist on their guilt. Police insistence on suspects' guilt has been demonstrated to lead to false confessions among vulnerable suspects. However, this supposed validation of the police suspicion of lying may serve to reinforce the lie bias. For these reasons, the United Kingdom does not subscribe to the Reid technique.

Although the lie bias has the potential for serious negative consequences, there is some suggestion that it may be overcome. Lie detection performance feedback can, to some extent, mitigate the impairment caused by a high motivation to detect deception. This effect appears regardless of whether the feedback is accurate or inaccurate, which is useful considering the difficulty in establishing the ground truth in criminal investigations.

### **Offenders and Lie Bias**

The fact that offenders may frequently engage in deception to avoid conviction may make them more sensitive to accurate detection of lies. Moreover, offenders may believe that others lie at the same high frequency as they and thus make them more likely to presume deception than nonoffenders. Finally, the experience of successful and

failed lying in interviews relating to their previous offending could provide offenders with the positive outcome feedback necessary to successfully deceive others. Some support for this suggestion has been found in that prison inmates are less likely than the general public to believe that the inaccurate behaviors of gaze aversion and fidgeting are cues to deception. Moreover, the work of Hartwig and colleagues shows a pronounced lie bias among prison inmates viewing video footage of truthful and deceptive mock eyewitness accounts.

### Conclusion

Whereas the general public consistently shows a truth bias, police and offenders seem to exhibit a lie bias. Research suggests this may be because of greater exposure to lies, more belief in the accuracy of nonverbal cues to deception, and greater involvement in high-suspicion contexts. Although the lie bias has the potential to hinder the proper administration of justice, by reducing motivation to detect deception and encouraging an open-minded approach to suspect interviews, the lie bias may be reduced.

Hannah E. Fawcett

*Manchester Metropolitan University*

**See Also:** False Confession; Lying, Accusations of; Lying, Prevalence of; Nonverbal Cues; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Hartwig, Maria, Pär Anders Granhag, Leif A. Strömwall, and Lars Andersson. "Suspicious Minds: Criminals' Ability to Detect Deception." *Psychology, Crime & Law*, v.10 (2004).
- Inbau, Fred, John Reid, Joseph Buckley, and Brian Jayne. *Essentials of the Reid Technique: Criminal Interrogations and Confessions*. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2005.
- Mann, Samantha, Aldert Vrij, and Ray Bull. "Detecting True Lies: Police Officers' Ability to Detect Suspects' Lies." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, v.89 (2004).
- Porter, Stephen, Sean McCabe, Michael Woodworth, and Kristine A Peace. "'Genius is 1% Inspiration and 99% Perspiration' . . . or is It? An Investigation of the Impact of Motivation and Feedback on Deception Detection." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.12 (2007).

## Lie to Me

A procedural genre crime drama, *Lie to Me* portrays a psychological researcher investigating and solving crimes by using his knowledge of emotion and human expression to become a "human lie detector." Lie detection methods used in this television show are based on the theoretical work of Paul Ekman, and the fictional Lightman Group is loosely modeled on Ekman's training and consulting practice. The program ran on the Fox Network in the United States from 2009 to 2011 (49 episodes) and has been aired internationally in more than 65 countries. The program was generally well received by audiences but has generated controversy among scholars for promoting a single detection perspective in light of unsettled theory.

The principal character of *Lie to Me* is Dr. Cal Lightman (British actor Tim Roth) who, patterned after Ekman, is an expert at detecting deception by reading facial microexpressions and body language. To analyze suspects, Lightman employs the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) developed by Ekman and colleague Wallace Friesen in the 1970s. Lightman's character is brilliant but abrasive and frequently lies to achieve his objectives. Business partner and moral foil Dr. Gillian Foster (actress Kelli Williams) is based on Ekman's former research associate Maureen O'Sullivan. Assistant Eli Loker (actor Brendan Hines) may be based on nonverbal deception researcher Mark Frank, who did postdoctoral work with Ekman. Loker practices "radical honesty," demonstrating that without the social lubricant of white lies individuals often appear insensitive or rude.

In the first episode, Lightman adds Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport security agent Ria Torres (actress Monica Raymund) to his team. Lightman recognizes her as a natural deception detector and hires her as his protégé. Her background and ability are patterned on characteristics described by Ekman and O'Sullivan in their research on truth wizards.

A typical *Lie to Me* episode includes intersecting plot lines in which the Lightman Group is hired by a law enforcement agency to help solve a murder, investigate threats, catch a thief or spy, find a missing person, or untangle a forensic mystery.

Lightman and his colleagues interview and videotape witnesses and informants in the field or bring them to a laboratory equipped with extensive audio and video recording devices. The dramatic development of an episode often has Lightman using his lie detection skills to determine that someone other than the suspect is lying in order to hide his or her motives or throw off the investigation. The procedural element involves reviewing and analyzing recordings to find the microexpressions, gestures, and other behaviors that will reveal the liar. These reviews are presented in a manner intended to instruct the audience on how to read affective cues. For emphasis, the procedural review of a story character is juxtaposed with media images of familiar politicians, celebrities, or criminals exhibiting the same expressions and behaviors.

### Grounded in Leakage Theory

The science portrayed in *Lie to Me* is grounded in Ekman's leakage theory. Leakage theory holds that the face is a dual system producing involuntary expressions of felt emotion and voluntarily controlled actions that allow people to interfere with felt emotions. The theory posits that most people learn to manage their facial actions using voluntary, deliberate, false expressions; however, involuntary, spontaneous, emotional expressions may leak true feelings despite the liar's attempts to conceal them. According to Ekman, the face can show which emotion is felt, whether multiple emotions are blended, and the strength of the felt emotion. From the earliest years of development, people learn display rules for controlling expressions and concealing true feelings that become ingrained habits operating automatically.

Leakage theory suggests successful deception detection can be achieved by recognizing the complex interactions of voluntary and involuntary expressions as well as vocal cues and other emblematic behaviors, such as a wink or a head nod; noting inconsistencies can also reveal deception. Microexpressions that briefly flash on and off reveal concealed emotion and are considered a primary source of facial leakage. Because of their short duration—less than one-quarter of a second—these clues to deceit are frequently missed. But, consistent with Ekman's research methods, in the *Lie to Me* episodes Lightman and

his colleagues study videotaped images to capture these valuable clues and identify the lies.

The Fox Network employed social media as an integrative means of marketing *Lie to Me*. In addition to offering recent episodes for online viewing and providing cast, crew, and story information, the Fox *Lie to Me* Web site allowed viewers to interact with each other, read a blog by Ekman ("The Truth *Behind Lie to Me*"), test their deception detection abilities online, and contact the Paul Ekman Group for more information. Social media applications create impressions of authenticity and were intended to add credibility to the scientific themes of *Lie to Me*.

### Criticisms of the Show

Criticisms regarding the dramatic portrayal of deception detection in *Lie to Me* relate to the accuracy of how leakage theory is presented. Ekman consulted with the writers and producers of *Lie to Me* and reviewed the scripts, but he has acknowledged that the television program is fictional, and for dramatic effect some of the methods, actor representations, and analyses diverged from his theory. Before or after commercial breaks, viewers also saw billboarded "facts" about lying and deception. These were usually presented without context or citations. Viewers who read the Web site were able to get more information from the Ekman blog, but those who only viewed the program may have been misled regarding the accuracy of information and effectiveness of the techniques presented. An experiment conducted to test the hypothesis that viewers might form misconceptions found that, after watching an episode, *Lie to Me* viewers became less truth biased and more suspicious of people who were telling the truth but no more accurate when looking for lies and deception.

Some deception researchers also question the program's treatment of leakage as the prevailing, accepted theory of detection. At least three other theories offer explanations for how deception is detected. Miron Zuckerman, Bella DePaulo, and Robert Rosenthal's four-factor theory of emotion and nonverbal behavior; David B. Buller and Judee K. Burgoon's interpersonal detection theory; and Timothy R. Levine's truth default theory are considered current alternatives. Each has generated a substantial body of deception detection research



employing different methods than those portrayed in the *Lie to Me* plot lines.

Kim B. Serota  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Frank, Mark; Leakage; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues; Truth Bias; Wizards of Lie Detection.

### Further Readings

- Conkle, Ann. "Science is the Story in 'Lie to Me.'" *APS Observer*, v.22 (2009).
- DePaulo, Bella. "If You Watch 'Lie to Me,' Will You Become More Successful at Detecting Lies?" *Psychology Today* (June 13, 2011). <http://www.psychologytoday.com/node/66635> (Accessed December 2012).
- Ekman, Paul. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
- Ekman, Paul and Wallace Friesen. "Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception." *Psychiatry*, v.32 (1969).
- Ekman, Paul, Wallace Friesen, and Joseph Hager, eds. *Facial Action Coding System*. Salt Lake City, UT: Research Nexus, 2002.
- Fox Network. "Lie to Me." [http://web.archive.org/web/20090408154718/http://www.fox.com/lie\\_tome](http://web.archive.org/web/20090408154718/http://www.fox.com/lie_tome) (Accessed December 2012).
- Levine, Timothy, Kim Serota, and Hillary Shulman. "The Impact of 'Lie to Me' on Viewers' Actual Ability to Detect Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.37 (2010).
- O'Sullivan, Maureen and Paul Ekman. "The Wizards of Deception Detection." In *The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts*, P. A. Granhag and L. Strömwell, eds. London: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

on factors such as the target of the lie, whether the lie is one of commission or omission, the goal for the lie, and the stakes involved in the lie being discovered.

### The Target: Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Lying

Most often when people refer to lies they are talking about untruths or prevarications directed toward another person. This target may be a complete stranger, a casual friend, or a close intimate, but regardless of the exact relationship between the liar and the target, lying in this sense is certainly an interpersonal experience. It is, however, also possible for lying to be an intrapersonal process, one in which the liar is actually lying to himself or herself. Inter- and intrapersonal lying have a great deal in common.

### Lies of Commission and Lies of Omission

When lying is interpersonal, involving another person as the target, both lies of commission and lies of omission can occur. Lies of commission are what people traditionally think of as lies—untruths deliberately told to others with the intent of misleading, misdirecting, or altering the target's perception of reality. A lie of commission requires communication between the liar and the target, a sharing of untrue or distorted information. This type of lying can be verbal, written, or communicated from the liar to the target through a third party, as is often the case with gossip, for example.

Interpersonal lies can also involve withholding of truthful information that the target would need in order to have a more realistic view of his or her own life experience. These are known as lies of omission. In these cases, a lack of communication is essential for the lying process to occur, with the liar choosing to actively withhold information from the target. For example, when a couple is having financial difficulties a common lie of omission occurs when one partner makes an unplanned purchase and deliberately does not tell his or her spouse.

The lines between lies of commission and omission are quite clear from an interpersonal standpoint, but the correlates for those intrapersonal lies, in which the liar and the target are one in the same person, are less obvious and less researched.

## Lies, Types of

An examination of the research on lying suggests that there are many varied approaches to categorizing lies, with no one typology being universally accepted. Most commonly, lies are differentiated

The correlate of lies of omission, when the self is both the liar and the target of the lie, is selective attention and/or directed information search. When people lie to themselves often it is because the reality in which they live is in some way unpalatable. In order to bring their actual reality in line with their desired reality, they pay attention only to information that supports their preferred view of life. For example, people who are having difficulty with their jobs may only acknowledge to themselves the positive and productive things they do at work, while ignoring their failures or weaknesses. In addition, people will often actively seek out information that only supports their preferred worldview. For employees struggling at work, this would entail seeking out feedback only from those coworkers who will say they are doing a good job.

When people cannot ignore information that is in front of them, their next option is to engage in lies of commission directed inwardly toward themselves—a reinterpretation of reality to fit

their desired worldview. These lies of commission often involve the very human tendency to reinterpret events in self-serving, face-saving, or ego-protective ways. For example, having missed an important work-related deadline because of deliberate procrastination, people tell themselves the self-protective lie that the fault for this non-performance actually falls on the employer for setting such an unreasonably short deadline.

### Goals of Lying

In addition to the target of the lie and whether the lie manifested as the giving or withholding of information, the goals of lying can also serve as a way to categorize untruths. There are at least four goals for lying: protecting others, protecting the self, promoting the self, and deliberately hurting others.

*Protecting others.* Ingrained in many societies is the need to be polite. From this social imperative



*When people lie to themselves, it is often because they are dissatisfied with the reality in which they live. Therefore, paying attention only to information that supports their preferred view of life brings their actual reality in line with their desired reality. For example, a worker who is having difficulty with his job may only acknowledge to himself the positive and productive things he does at work while ignoring his failures or weaknesses; he will also seek out feedback only from those coworkers who will say he is doing a good job.*

comes polite lies. These “little lies” are intended to be tactful and are usually known to be untrue by both parties. For example, from a young age, children are taught that the correct answer to the question “How are you?” is “Fine, thank you,” regardless of whether they are in reality feeling fine. In many ways these rhetorical questions are designed to elicit a nonresponse or at least a response that will not require further exploration. Socially acceptable lies such as “That was a great party,” or “Thank you, I love fruitcake,” forestall any further discussion and give the questioners the opportunity to feel positively about themselves, their event, or their gift. In many societies the punishment for not telling these socially sanctioned lies, usually social ostracism, is more harsh than the consequences for those telling the polite lie who are then found out.

Other lies are focused on the belief that the target must be protected, helped, or benefitted by the lie. These are known as benevolent or altruistic lies. Praising a person’s effort to give him or her more confidence, or to tell someone they look great with the intent of making them feel good, would be examples of prosocial lies. Another type of prosocial lie would be lying to someone who intends to harm others. If, for example, a loved one is being abused by their spouse, and someone else knows where the spouse is hiding out, most people with this knowledge would lie to the suspected abuser, saying they don’t know where the victim is staying. As with polite lies, these types of lies would be expected in most societies, and to not lie to protect another would place some of the responsibility for any harm done as a result of an individual telling the truth squarely on the truth-teller’s shoulders.

*Protecting the self.* Not all lies are intended to protect others. Often people lie for the purposes of self-enhancement, or to increase the likelihood of social acceptance. People lie to save face, to avoid embarrassment or disapproval, to avoid conflict with others, and to avert punishment for their own wrongdoing. What each of these situations have in common is a poor choice or unintended negative experience that the person feels compelled to hide or explain in such a way that their positive sense of self is protected. For example, when people are facing a potential conflict

with a friend, one which they realize they have little hope of winning, people often lie to avoid the conflict, either by pretending to go along with the friend’s belief or by conjuring up a plausible, though still untrue, version of the story that will allow them to hold their own in the conflict.

In order to avoid punishment for wrongdoing, people will often resort to lying about what they did (for example, “It wasn’t me who broke it”) or put a more positive spin on why it happened (for example, “It got broken when I was trying to stop the dog from choking on a bone”). Trying to make an intentional wrongdoing appear as though it were an accident or an unexpected by-product of a more positively intentioned act is one of the biggest lies people tell in order to protect their sense of themselves as good people and to avoid the consequences should their actions be found to be deliberate or careless.

*Promoting the self.* Not only can people lie to protect themselves, they also are more than capable of lying in order to promote themselves. This is particularly common in the business world and in closer intimate relationships. Most scholars agree that making a good first impression is a vital part of any successful relationship, be it personal or professional. The key is to make that impression based on the reality of who an individual really is. Many times people will create a false, albeit positive, impression of themselves in order to gain the favor and approval of others.

For example, during the first weeks in a new job, people tend to “put their best foot forward,” taking on projects for which they claim to be prepared to complete but which may in fact be beyond their current scope. The confidence they project may not be tied to any actual capability but serves to give the impression that they were the right hire for the job. Similarly, in online dating advertisements, people tend to lie about their physical appearance, suggesting they are taller or shorter, lighter or heavier, darker or blonder, younger or older than they actually are in real life. All of these lies, which are easily uncovered over time by the target, are designed to create a more positive impression of the self than the individual believes reality promotes.

This type of self-promotional lie is usually tied to an increase in the individual’s positive

self-regard. There is also the potential for self-promotion to result in the acquisition of some form of external benefit for the self, for example, material gain in the form of a raise at work, or relational gain such as a more attractive romantic partner or friend. The dual consequences of improved self-perception and the acquiring of external rewards makes self-promotional lies commonplace in modern society.

*Deliberately hurting others.* Antisocial or malicious lies are the most serious and intentionally hurtful form of lying. These untruths are used by the liar to deliberately hurt the target. While the liar may derive some pleasure from the pain inflicted on the target, the primary goal of this type of lie is to deliberately cause the hurt. Often these malicious lies stem from jealousy or a sense of inadequacy on the part of the liar. For example, someone may tell a wife that her husband has been cheating on her, when indeed he has not. The point of this lie is to cause the wife to become suspicious of her husband's activities, instilling stress in the marriage and potentially leading to the dissolution of the relationship entirely. This need to hurt may stem from dissatisfaction in the liar's own relationships, jealousy over what the target has which the liar does not, or may be used as revenge to right a perceived wrong, such as when a woman's sexual advances have been rebuffed by another woman's faithful husband. Whatever the ultimate reason for the lie, the goal is the same—deliberately causing hurt by sharing untruths.

### The Colors of Lying: The Stakes of Getting Caught

The outcomes of all of these goals have one thing in common: there are stakes involved in getting caught in a lie. Polite lies are often referred to as “white lies,” suggesting they are somewhat innocent and that the stakes involved in telling one and getting caught are relatively minimal. The consequence for someone who lies by saying they like fruitcake when they really don't could actually be positive if discovered because the giver would be less likely to give the offending food as a gift in future.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the “black lies,” those which, if found out, can have profound and long-lasting negative consequences

for the liar and/or the target. Lies that were designed to be deliberately hurtful, self-protective lies that place blame for negative behaviors on others, and even some prosocial lies can result in negative outcomes ranging from loss of reputation, to loss of job or relationship, or even loss of life. Take, for example, a situation in which a person tells a seemingly prosocial lie suggesting that a family member's death was an accident, when indeed it was suicide. This lie was likely told in order to avoid increasing the pain, suffering, and grief faced by the target, who has just lost a loved one. However, should this individual find out that this was a lie, the “good intentions” of the liar are likely to boomerang, resulting in loss of trust in the relationship, increased grief and suffering, and insult that the liar did not believe the target could emotionally handle the truth. In these situations, there is no winner and good intentions go bad very quickly and sometimes irrevocably.

For the most part, however, the colors of lies more closely resemble shades of gray. Self-promotional lies, some self-protective lies, and many prosocial lies in particular are ambiguous in terms of the consequences of their discovery. The target may understand, or may not. The target may appreciate the need for lie, or may not. The target may initially be angry or disappointed but get over it in time, or may not. These are the lies that can wreak the most havoc in individuals' lives. These lies are the gamble people take when they choose to tell an untruth or to withhold important information from others. The ratio of benefit to potential harm is but one way to decide if, when, and to whom people will lie when they cannot anticipate with any amount of certainty how the target will react if found out.

Stacey L. MacKinnon  
*University of Prince Edward Island*

**See Also:** Confession; Daily Life, Lying in; Deception Motives; Distrust; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem; Self-Justification; White Lies.

### Further Readings

DePaulo, Bella M. “The Many Faces of Lies.” In *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*, Arthur G. Miller, ed. New York: Guilford Press, 2004.



Graham-Scott, Gini. *The Truth About Lying: Why and How We All Do It and What to Do About It*. Lincoln, NE: ASJA Press, 2006.

McLeod, Beverly A. and Randy L. Genereux.

“Predicting the Acceptability and Likelihood of Lying: The Interaction of Personality With Type of Lie.” *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.45/7 (2008).

## Linguistic Cues

Initial research on deception focused on nonverbal cues associated with deceptive speech, like fidgeting that could accompany anxiety. The leakage hypothesis stated that deception is arousing and engenders apprehension, guilt, and anxiety, which are then leaked through nonverbal behavior. However, research since the 1990s has started to focus on linguistic cues to deception and often uses computer applications to analyze texts for certain categories of words that are hypothesized to be related to deception. The underlying assumption is that senders engaging in deception change their language both strategically and nonstrategically compared with senders telling the truth.

Two theories that posit linguistic differences between truthful and false memories are criteria-based content analysis and reality monitoring theory. Criteria-based content analysis theorizes that there are 18 linguistic cues associated with truthfulness. These include a greater amount of logical coherency, more quotes, and more corrections. Reality monitoring theory also examines linguistic differences between truthful memories versus fabricated memories. Fabricated memories are hypothesized to contain less detail, especially sense-based, perceptual, and contextual detail because someone relating a truthful memory would have more access to this information.

Research using computer applications to detect linguistic differences has predominately used two software programs, Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) and Coh-Metrix. These computer programs assign words to psychological (that is, negative-emotion words) or semantic (that is, first-person pronouns) categories. LIWC compares every word in the transcript to its internal

dictionary, and it evaluates over 70 different word categories and identifies language indicative of emotional and psychological phenomena and parts of speech. Coh-Metrix also is a natural-language-processing algorithm. Although originally used to examine linguistic features related to the cohesion of a text, research has also applied Coh-Metrix to detect differences between truthful and deceptive text. Coh-Metrix has a larger number of linguistic indices than LIWC (over 700) and integrates more semantic analysis and parts of speech classifiers.

Some linguistic differences may reflect strategic choices deceivers make to reduce the likelihood of detecting their lie. One area in which deceivers may strategically change their language is through the amount of words. Some research has found that deceivers use more words than truth-tellers in order to craft a more believable lie or to control the interaction with the receiver. This has been termed the Pinocchio Effect. However, other research has found that deceivers use fewer words than truth-tellers, possibly to avoid contradicting themselves or to conceal information they do not want to disclose to the receiver.

One moderating variable may be the detectability of the lie. For lies where there is a verifiable fact that the sender could possibly compare with the lie the deceiver may strategically use fewer words to conceal and avoid contradiction with a knowable reality. However, when the receiver is not able to verify the lie (that is, the sender is lying about a nonverifiable opinion), the liar may strategically add more justifications and details to create a plausible story. In addition, some research has found that liars use more causation words (for example, “because”) for similar reasons of construction of a coherent and plausible lie. Other research has found that liars tend to use more words than truth-tellers in computer-mediated communication, where they have more time for strategic lie construction and editing than in face-to-face communication.

### Newman-Pennebaker Model

Other linguistic differences may reflect emotional or cognitive differences between deceivers and truth-tellers that deceivers cannot control or do not know how to control. This research applies the leakage hypothesis to language rather

than nonverbal behavior. For example, function words like pronouns or conjunctions can be difficult for the speaker to control. This research is driven by the Newman-Pennebaker model. This model predicts that liars should use fewer first-person pronouns (for example, “I”) and more third-person pronouns because liars try to psychologically distance themselves from their lies. Psychological distancing may also manifest itself through more use of negations (for example, “never” or “not”) that express a lack of commitment to the lie. Liars should have less complex speech because it is difficult to maintain consistency and create a coherent story when lying, and liars have a higher cognitive load. This reduced complexity of speech should be reflected by the use of fewer exclusion words (for example, “but”). Liars should have more guilt and anxiety because lying conflicts with their self-image. This should be reflected in greater use of negative-emotion words (for example, “sad”), and, finally, liars should use more motion verbs (for example, “go”) because they are concrete and require fewer cognitive resources to retrieve.

Research has found support for this model. For example, researchers examining 500,000 Enron e-mails used the linguistic cues of first-person pronouns and exclusion words to identify deceptive e-mails written by employees of this corporation. Researchers examining deceptive statements made by the George W. Bush administration about invading Iraq found that first-person pronouns, exclusion words, and negative-emotion words could be used to correctly classify a majority of the statements as true or false. Other research has found that linguistic cues are more accurate at distinguishing truth from lies than human coders.

However, other research has found contradictory results or has replicated some linguistic cues to deception but not others. Much of the relationship between deception and linguistic cues may depend on the context of the interaction (for example, synchronous versus asynchronous; face-to-face versus computer-mediated; cultural differences of lie acceptability) and the goals of the deceiver. For example, research examining deceptive online dating profiles found that deceptive profiles contained fewer negative-emotion words than truthful profiles, in contrast to the

predictions of the Newman-Pennebaker model. Within this context, negative-emotion words may strategically be avoided to portray the online dater in a more positive light. Because online dating profiles are asynchronous and editable, deceptive online daters may spend more time strategically editing their profiles, and their speech may be less nonconsciously influenced by emotions. Other research has failed to replicate greater use of negations among liars.

### **Less Complex Speech and Redundancy**

Additional research has examined the less complex speech of liars with shorter and less complex sentences and less lexical and content diversity of words. For example, research with Coh-Metrix found that liars used more concrete words that are more highly associated with other words, are easier to retrieve, and require less cognitive processing. Coh-Metrix results also find that deceivers have more redundancy in their sentences compared with truth-tellers. This is based on latent semantic analysis (LSA) of sentences. Sentences that are redundant with past sentences have similar patterns of words with similar meanings. Deceivers repeat themes and focus on a limited number of semantic focal points. This may be a strategic choice to avoid self-incrimination by limiting the focus to a limited number of topics. It also could be because deceivers are not retrieving information from actual memory and real experiences and, therefore, have fewer remembered details and fewer topics that can be activated. Rather, deceivers are using the context of the conversation for what information can be fabricated, and this leads to greater redundancy within the conversation.

Although the focus of much less research, researchers have also examined linguistic differences between receivers interacting with a lying or truthful sender. This research has found that receivers were more likely to match the linguistic style of deceptive partners than truthful partners but also found that receivers were not able to detect deception at levels above chance.

Research on linguistic cues to deception has predominantly been done on native-English speakers. Whether similar linguistic differences can be found in other languages or cultures is an empirical question for future research. For example, in

other languages, psychological distancing from lies may be manifested by other linguistic cues than pronouns.

Lyn M. Van Swol  
University of Wisconsin, Madison

**See Also:** Emotions; Guilt; Language; Leakage; Nonverbal Cues; Reality Monitoring.

### Further Readings

- Duran, N. D., C. Hall, P. M. McCarthy, and D. S. McNamara. "The Linguistic Correlates of Conversational Deception: Comparing Natural Language Processing Technologies." *Applied Psycholinguistics*, v.31 (2010).
- Hancock, J. T., L. E. Curry, S. Goorha, and M. Woodworth. "On Lying and Being Lied To: A Linguistic Analysis of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication." *Discourse Processes*, v.45 (2008).
- Newman, M. L., J. W. Pennebaker, D. S. Berry, and J. M. Richards. "Lying Words: Predicting Deception From Linguistic Styles." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.29 (2003).
- Toma, C. L. and J. T. Hancock. "What Lies Beneath: The Linguistic Traces of Deception in Online Dating Profiles." *Journal of Communication*, v.62 (2012).
- Van Swol, L. M., M. T. Braun, and D. Malhotra. "Evidence for the Pinocchio Effect: Linguistic Differences Between Lies, Deception by Omission, and Truth." *Discourse Processes*, v.49 (2012).
- Zhou, L., J. K. Burgoon, J. F. Nunamaker Jr., and D. Twitchell. "Automating Linguistics-Based Cues for Detecting Deception in Text-Based Asynchronous Computer-Mediated Communication." *Group Decision and Negotiation*, v.13 (2004).

like "good" or "right" or "evil," that only evaluate. "Lie" both describes a certain kind of action, and evaluates that action negatively. To characterize an action as a lie, as opposed to characterizing it as a misstatement, or even a falsehood, is not only to single it out as an intentional action but is also to condemn it. This is because a lie has what Sissela Bok has called an "initial negative weight." To accuse someone of lying, to accuse someone of being a liar, is to accuse that person of acting in a way that violates ethical rules. To accuse someone of being a liar is to accuse him or her of wrongdoing.

Such is the negative weight attached to telling lies that it has traditionally been considered the worst form of insult to be accused of being a liar. As Michel de Montaigne said in the following:

Thus I have often considered what could be the source of that custom, which we observe so religiously, of feeling more bitterly offended when reproached with this vice, which is so common among us, than with any other; and that it should be the worst insult that can be given us in words, to reproach us with lying.

Immanuel Kant invoked an article by Richard Steele in issue number 6 of *The Spectator* when he wrote that, "The English *Spectator* maintains that no more insulting reproach could be made to a man than if he is considered a liar." This is presumably the reason why, in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, no member is allowed to call another member a liar; it is considered unparliamentary language.

In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire* (1942) declared that "insulting or 'fighting words,'" that is, "those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," belong to the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" that are not protected by the First Amendment's prohibition on the abridgment of free speech. "Fighting words" can be prevented and punished by law, even if they are true. As the court said, "The English language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight."

## Lying, Accusations of

As Bernard Williams has pointed out, "lie" is a thick ethical concept, like "coward" or "kind" or "cruel." A thick ethical concept both describes and evaluates. Thick ethical concepts are unlike thin descriptive concepts, such as "walk" or "water," that only describe, and thin evaluative concepts,

The old New Hampshire statute at issue in this Supreme Court case harkened back to 19th-century attempts to ban American gentlemen from engaging in duels, which were brought on by insults to a man's honor, including accusing a man of being a liar. As Joanne B. Freeman has noted:

Coward, liar, rascal, scoundrel, and puppy all demanded an immediate challenge, for they struck at the core elements of manliness and gentility. Any man who uttered them in a dispute was declaring his intention to engage in an affair of honor.

Accusing a man of being a liar, even if it were true, would have provoked a 19th-century gentleman to insist on fighting a duel. Hence, "You're a liar," could be considered fighting words.

Even in present-day negative political campaigns, politicians are loath to accuse each other of being a liar. They prefer to use alternative language, such as accusing their opponents of making "misleading" or "inaccurate" statements. Such language has less negative weight, or uses entirely thin descriptive concepts.

### Accusatory Reluctance

Although accusing someone of being a liar may no longer lead to fighting a duel, and may even no longer be considered fighting words, it remains the case that it is a serious accusation. If the accusation turns out to be false, then the accuser risks a social penalty. As Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser point out, "it is considered bad form to mistakenly accuse someone of being less than honest." As a result, people refrain from accusing others of being liars, even when such accusations are merited. According to Schauer and Zeckhauser, this fact is known to liars, who take advantage of it:

This is well known to students who ask for extensions on final papers for reasons of computer failure, death of a grandparent, and the like. Although the student knows that the story is false . . . and knows that the teacher knows that the story is likely false, the student also knows that the penalties to the accuser for making a false accusation of dishonesty are high.

Few teachers want to accuse the student of dishonesty only to be presented with a death certificate for the student's deceased grandmother, or the dated repair bill for the computer, or the verified record of a genuine medical emergency. Thus under conditions of uncertainty, even suspicious conditions, we often do not accuse when an accusation is merited.

For many years psychologists have written that the average person's ability to detect lies is poor—just slightly greater than chance. Various explanations have been offered to explain this experimental result. One partial explanation that has been advanced is accusatory reluctance: people are reluctant to accuse other people of being liars. According to Maureen O'Sullivan, although subjects in experiments with lie detection are quite willing to rate the people they view in videos as being uncomfortable (which is correlated with lying), or as thinking harder (which is also correlated with lying), both of which are thin descriptive concepts, they resist accusing them of being liars: "Thus observers have no trouble labeling liars as less comfortable or as thinking harder than truth-tellers, but when it comes to applying the term *liar*, observers show a surprising amount of accusatory reluctance."

One explanation for accusatory reluctance is that the rules of social courtesy and the parameters of social life restrict people from accusing others of lying. Erving Goffman maintained that people have been reared to be polite in their social interactions, and this can extend to refraining from accusing each other of being liars.

### Ekman on Accusations of Lying

Paul Ekman was one of the first psychologists to write about why people are generally unable to accurately judge from other people's demeanor whether or not they are lying, granted that there is no human equivalent of a "Pinocchio response"—a behavioral sign or constellation of signs that, across every person, in all situations, indicates that someone is lying. Even if, as Ekman contends, evolutionary history has not prepared people to be sensitive to the behavioral clues relevant to lying, this still does not explain why people might not learn this detection skill during their own lifetimes. He offers three possible explanations.





*Serena Williams, in her match against Caroline Garcia of France in the 2013 French Open, appears calm before the line judge, May 29, 2013. However, in a U.S. Open semifinal match against Kim Clijsters on September 12, 2009, she launched into a now-famous profane outburst as she accused a line judge of lying over a foot fault. The negative weight attached to lying has earned its standing as one of the worst forms of insult. In the 19th century, accusations of lying would even be grounds for initiating a duel.*

Ekman's first possible explanation is that parents socialize their children into not accusing their parents of being liars and, more generally, teach their children not to identify lies:

Their privacy may often require that they mislead their children about just what they are doing, when they are doing it, and why they are doing it. While sexual activity is one obvious focus of such lies, there might well be other activities that parents want to conceal from their children.

Ekman's second possible explanation is that in general, accusing people of being liars makes life more unpleasant for the accuser and can undermine the possibility of establishing close relationships:

. . . we generally prefer not to catch liars, because a trusting rather than a suspicious

stance enriches life, despite the possible costs. To always doubt, to make false accusations, is not only unpleasant for the doubter, but undermines much chance of establishing intimacy in mating, friendships, or ongoing work relationships. One cannot afford to disbelieve one's friend, child, or spouse when he or she is actually telling the truth, and so one errs on the side of believing the liar. Trusting others is not only required, but it makes life easier to live. What matter if the cost is not detecting some who take advantage of that trust?—and one might not even need to know about it. Only the paranoid who forgoes such peace of mind—and those whose lives are actually at some risk if they are not constantly alert to betrayal.

If one comes to believe that someone in one's social circle is a liar, then, Ekman argues, one's likely response is to cease interacting with that person, rather than to accuse that person of

being a liar and determine if one is correct: “If you were to decide that your friend had lied to you, how would you determine if you were correct? Most often, I expect, you would simply stop seeing the friend.”

This reluctance to accuse someone of lying when one has a suspicion that he or she is lying means that there are many missed opportunities for people to learn the truth about whether or not they have been lied to and to develop their skills at detecting lies: Ekman maintains, “The failure to definitively check your judgment against an independent criterion of truthfulness is probably quite common and responsible for people generally not learning from mistaken judgments.”

### Collusion With Liars

A third possible explanation is that people may be reluctant to accuse others of being liars because of collusion with the liar. This collusion, however, can take at least two forms: current collusion with the liar and retrospective collusion with the liar.

Accusing others of lying while being lied to could bring the lying to an end, which may not be desired. In some cases, people wish to be lied to, for their own benefit. For example, those who invested their money in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities—before Madoff finally admitted that, “It’s all just one big lie”—never accused him of lying, despite the fact that he delivered such high returns in good and bad markets, because this might bring their own profits to an end.

Accusing another of lying, after having been deceived, could also lead to being exposed as a dupe who should have known better. Sociologist Brooke Harrington surveyed investors who lost half or more of their savings because of financial deception by large companies, such as Enron, in the 1990s. She was surprised to find that many investors did not accuse these companies of deceiving them but rather considered themselves as participants in the deception, even though they were in no way involved with the companies’ fraudulent schemes: “Many spoke of a sense of complicity in the decline of the bull market, as though their actions contributed to falsified accounting statements or to corrupt auditing and governance practices.”

This retroactive collusion with liars is a phenomenon Goffman has described as adaptation

to failure. For the victim of a con, the loss of money is less distressing than the loss of identity as a competent, intelligent individual who could see through the lie. Refusing to accuse another of having lied to one is a way of refusing to face up to the reality of having been duped, with its attendant humiliation.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Collusion; Corporate Fraud; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Dot-Com Bubble; Ekman, Paul; Enron; Financial Markets; Goffman, Erving; Gullibility; Kant, Immanuel; Madoff, Bernie; Morals and Ethics; Pinocchio; Reputation; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Bok, S. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
- Freeman, J. B. *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the “New Republic.”* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Goffman, E. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Goffman, E. “On Calling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure.” *Psychiatry*, v.15 (1952).
- Harrington, B. “Responding to Deception: The Case of Fraud in Financial Markets.” In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Montaigne, M. “Of Giving the Lie.” In *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, D. M. Frame, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- O’Sullivan, M. “Why Most People Parse Palters, Fibs, Lies, Whoppers, and Other Deceptions Poorly.” In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Schauer, F. and R. Zeckhauser. “Paltering.” In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Williams, B. *Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

## Lying, Costs of

Lying is an expensive act. Planning, performing, and maintaining a lie is extremely tiring. Moreover, when the lie is detected, it subjects the liar to punishment, disrepute, or awkwardness. Thus, studying how much lying costs provides insights into how to politically, economically, or personally deal with this tempting but socially inappropriate act. Studies on cognitively expensive lying are a new type of lie detection tool; studies on emotionally expensive lying shed light on the nature of people who do not lie enough.

### Cost of Lying as Cognitive Load

Many psychology studies suggest that lying requires greater mental effort than telling the truth. Compared with producing truthful speech, deceptive speech generates characteristic behavioral cues that indicate the increased cognitive effort: longer response latencies; more speech hesitations; pupil dilations; less hand, facial, and eye movements; gaze aversion; and higher skin conductance levels. The increased cognitive effort is mainly relevant to two components of the lie-production process.

The first component of the lie production process is to construct a false message. The liar must handle automatically activated social-cognitive and contextual knowledge. They must suppress harmful (but true) elements of the message, while producing plausible (though false) alternative elements, so that their false message aligns with the remaining truthful elements as well as the target's knowledge.

The second component of the process is to monitor one's outward behavior and the target's reaction, to assess whether he or she is successful in the lie. The liar can then adjust his behavior based on his assessment, avoiding the target's suspicion.

These two components of lie production are deeply relevant to the executive functions—the effortful, deliberative, and conscious cognitive functions, such as attention, metacognition, working memory, and inhibition. These same functions play a central role in planning, decision making, problem solving and other complex cognitive tasks.

Some recent studies suggest that making use of the cognitive load of lying can help in the development of lie detection tools. Albert Vrij and his

colleagues conducted an experiment in which participants reported their stories in reverse chronological order. Liars showed less plausible and less detailed responses than truth-tellers. In another experiment, Jeff Walczyk and his colleagues tracked eye movements and other cognitive cues of participants. Liars showed longer response time, less consistent response, and fewer eye movements.

These studies demonstrate that when additional cognitive load is imposed (for example, by reverse-chronological-order report or by eye-gazing), liars get too tired to maintain their “truthful” appearance and give away behavioral cues, such as less plausible and less detailed reports, longer response time, or fewer eye movements. These behaviors are exclusive to people who are lying; truth-tellers do not exhibit these behaviors because they are not busy with the extra cognitive effort involved in lying.

However, other researchers suggest that telling the truth can be cognitively expensive too. In Steven McCornack's information manipulation theory 2, the information (whether truthful or false) that efficiently resolves the discrepancy between current-state and desired end-state is activated more and is more easily fed to the speech realization system. In fact, if the truth doesn't resolve the discrepancy, the truthful information would be rather suppressed and would require a greater cognitive load to realize into speech. In other words, it is easier to lie in such a situation.

### Cost of Lying as Disincentives and Countermotives

Lying is also studied in the field of behavioral economics. For example, Gary Becker has used his Simple Model of Rational Crime (SMORC) to study the impact of rational choice on unethical behavior. Based on his model, people commit crimes on the basis of cost-benefit calculation: they simply compare the possible positive outcomes with the possible negative outcomes of committing a crime. In the context of lying, liars can quickly estimate how much money they can gain from lying, what punishment they will receive if caught, and how likely it is that they will be caught. If total benefits exceed the total costs, they will lie; if being honest is more beneficial, they will tell the truth.

The SMORC presents a straightforward solution to decreasing dishonesty in society: Society should simply raise the cost of lying in terms of disincentives, such as setting expensive fines for lying, or should increase the probability of detection by monitoring people's words and behavior in order to detect their lying. When the cost of lying is greater than the benefit, in most situations people will remain honest.

However, there is a greater variety of lying costs than just the punishment and risk detection suggested by SMORC. Morality violation, for example, can be seen as another cost of lying. Taking the extreme position of Immanuel Kant, who believed that lies were prohibited under all circumstances (even if faced with a would-be murderer), the cost of morality violation incurred by lying would be infinite. However, morality is too vague a construct to measure as a cost, and several studies have examined more quantifiable costs of lying.

### **Additional Costs of Lying**

Beyond Becker's SMORC, several researchers have investigated the psychological costs of lying.

*Others' loss.* Behavioral researcher Uri Gneezy investigated how people behaved toward monetary incentives when there were no economic costs to lying, no risk of detection, and no punishment for detection. He used a sender-receiver game, in which the sender knows the payoff for two alternative options, and the receiver has to select one of the options. One option paid the sender more than the receiver, while the other paid the receiver more than the sender. The sender could communicate with the receiver before he made a decision, that is, told the receiver that option A paid the receiver more, when in fact it was option B. There is no risk of being caught for the sender, because even after payment is made to these two players, the receiver doesn't know about the payoff for the unselected option.

The SMORC model, which assumes that all actors are rational, predicts that all the senders would tell the receiver a lie. However, Gneezy found that not all the senders lied. More significantly, when faced with a large decrease in the receiver's payoff, less than 20 percent of the senders lied. This result suggests that the target's loss

can be considered a type of cost that discourages potential liars.

*Lying aversion.* Another study by Gneezy and researcher Sanjiv Erat suggested that the act of lying itself incurs a cost. This research project used a modified version of the sender-receiver game in which the option was determined by the receiver's guess about the outcome of rolled dice, and the sender knew the outcome as well as the payoffs for the alternative options. When the receiver guessed the right number of the dice roll, this option did not benefit either of the players. The sender could communicate the actual number of the dice roll to the receiver, but in order to let the receiver choose the option that would benefit both sender and receiver, the sender needed to tell the receiver the wrong number. If a sender chose not to lie to the receiver, it indicated a counter-acting tendency against telling a lie, even without the economic or social costs obtained from the receiver's loss. The result was that 35 percent of the senders did not lie, which means that the act of lying itself incurs a cost for some people.

*Size of lying.* Researcher Tobias Lundquist and colleagues suggested additional characteristics of lying aversion by designing a game similar to the sender-receiver game. They observed that the likelihood of the sender lying decreased as the lie got further from the truth.

Researcher Dan Ariely and colleagues investigated the size of lying in a task achievement report. Participants were asked to solve 20 math problems within five minutes and then report their achievements. By comparing the students' reports with the actual achievements obtain from secretly collected answer sheets, researchers calculated the size of the students' cheating. They found that the students on average reported solving two more problems than they actually performed. This number was stable even when the experimenters raised the payment for solving each problem. The results indicated that people did not like to tell lies that were exaggerated beyond their comfort zone, even when a bigger lie had a larger monetary incentive.

Ariely concluded that liars kept their lies within a range in which they could keep a reasonably honest self-image. In other words, the extent



of lying was neither economically oriented nor socially referenced, but self-referenced.

*Distance from commitment for lying.* In a variation of his experiment, Ariely compared two methods of participant reporting. In one method, participants reported with the template, “I solved X tasks. Please give me X dollars.” In the other, participants followed another template, “I solved X tasks. Please give me X tokens.” Even though the tokens were immediately exchanged for cash, the token option resulted in twice as much lying as the cash option. In other words, when the payment was one step removed from receiving actual money, the amount of lying increased. This finding suggests that as the distance from commitment for lying decreases, the cost of lying increases, because people can still lie and feel good about themselves.

These study results provide many hints for creating easier and less rigorous solutions to regulate dishonesty in society rather than increasing punishment or monitoring. Considering the psychological costs of lying, people cheat less than the SMORC suggests—and this is good news.

Kayo Sakamoto

Swati Gupta

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Infidelity; Kant, Immanuel; Leakage; Rationality.

### Further Readings

Ariely, D. *The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty*.

New York: HarperCollins, 2012.

Becker, G. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” *The Journal of Political Economy*, v.76 (1968).

Erat, Sanjiv and Uri Gneezy. “White Lies.” *Management Science*, v.58/4 (2012).

Gneezy, Uri. “Deception: The Role of Consequences.” *American Economic Review*, v.95/1 (2005).

Gombos, V. A. “The Cognition of Deception: The Role of Executive Processes in Producing Lies.” *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs*, v.132/3 (2006).

Kant, I. and Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, trans. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*. (1785). <http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/metaphys-of-morals.txt> Accessed October 2012).

Lundquist, T., T. Ellingsen, E. Gribbe, and M. Johannesson. “The Aversion to Lying.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, v.70/1-2 (2009).

McCornack, S., and K. Morrison. “Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2): Expiring the Production Architecture Underlying Deceptive Discourse.” *Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association (NCA)*, November 2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. Washington, DC: NCA, 2012.

Vrij, A., S. Leal, S. Mann, and R. Fisher. “Imposing Cognitive Load to Elicit Cues to Deceit: Inducing the Reverse Order Technique Naturally.” *Psychology, Crime, and Law*, v.18/6 (2012).

Walczyk, J. J., D. A. Griffith, R. Yates, B. Simoneaux, and L. L. Harris. “Lie Detection by Inducing Cognitive Load: Eye Movements and Other Cues to the False Answers of ‘Witnesses’ to Crimes.” *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, v.39/7 (2012).

Walczyk, J. J., K. S. Roper, E. Seemann, and A. M. Humphrey. “Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Lying to Questions: Response Time as a Cue to Deception.” *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.17 (2003).

## Lying, Difficulty of

A truism within folklore and lay belief is that lying is harder than truth-telling. Parents and pastors alike entreat their children and followers to “be honest,” in part because “it’s easier to just tell the truth.” Correspondingly, literary, film, and online depictions of lying routinely emphasize the difficulty of its production: liars are characterized as distracted, nervous, and occasionally overwhelmed by the cognitive task of being duplicitous.

Deception scholars are similarly enamored with this belief. Lying is considered to evoke “greater cognitive load” (i.e., more mental effort) than truth-telling, for several reasons. First, the production process associated with lying is presumed to be very different from truth-telling. Lies have to be “made up from scratch” or “manufactured,” whereas truth is thought to be streamed effortlessly from memory to mouth. Second, scholars emphasize that liars need to “be believable,”

“maintain logical consistency” in their messages, and “remember their lies,” whereas these considerations are thought to be absent (or effortless) for truth-tellers. Third, liars are thought to be preoccupied with the possibility of detection; hence, constant vigilance and effort is needed as they strategically adapt their behaviors in order to be believed.

### **Are Nonverbal Cues and Cognitive Load Really Indicative of Deception?**

Scholarly belief in the difficulty of lying is foundational to past and current theoretical models and research programs of deception detection. Because lying is believed to evoke greater cognitive load, scholars have long suggested using load-related behavioral cues as indicators of deception. For instance, increases in cognitive load often result in longer response latencies (i.e., delays before responding to questions), longer pauses while speaking, increases in speech errors, and increases in the number of filled pauses (including “umm” and “ah”). Because lying generates greater cognitive load than truth-telling, scholars presume that these behavioral indicators should accurately distinguish liars from truth-tellers, thus allowing for detection.

Empirical research, however, has failed to document that nonverbal behaviors indicative of cognitive load differentiate honest and deceptive communication. In fact, behavioral signatures relevant to cognitive difficulty for truth-tellers and liars appear to be quite similar; therefore, such signatures are not useful for lie detection.

Given that behavioral cues signaling cognitive load do not reliably differentiate truths and lies, some researchers now suggest that increasing load beyond what would be “normal” for liars and truth-tellers constitutes an efficacious way of detecting deception. The reasoning is twofold: if lying can be made too difficult, then people will either (1) just be honest or (2) give themselves away. Strategies used by these researchers for increasing the cognitive load of liars include asking unexpected questions and asking people to provide information in reverse chronological order.

A small subset of scholars, however, has begun to challenge the orthodoxy that lying is intrinsically harder than truth-telling. Bella DePaulo's work in the late 1990s was seminal in this

regard. She had respondents record in a diary the everyday lies they told in conversations. Contrary to lies being planned, arousing, involving, and effortful, she found that the average lie was unplanned, casual, and (importantly) involved minimal cognitive effort. Subsequent to this work, Steven McCornack offered a scathing indictment of what he called the “cognitive load hypothesis” (i.e., the argument that lying always evokes high cognitive load), noting that lying within many contexts involves cognitive efficiency advantages over truth-telling.

More recently, McCornack, in his information manipulation theory 2, identifies the cognitive mechanisms underlying the production of lying versus truth-telling and concludes that the two forms of discourse borrow on largely the same speech-production processes. That is, during both lying and truth-telling, speakers stream information straight from working and long-term memory to speech production, guided by the simple imperative, “what's the most efficient way to deal with this situation?” Because lying and truth-telling involve similar production processes, no differences in load between them should be observable, in general. Data supportive of McCornack's arguments have been found in cognitive neuroscience. Professor Giorgio Ganis recently reviewed findings from several dozen studies involving the brain scans of liars and truth-tellers and found no consistent, discernible differences in the brain functioning of the two groups.

Critics of the cognitive load hypothesis do admit, however, that lying should be more taxing than truth-telling when three factors are present: the truthful information one possesses is contextually unproblematic, the truthful information is easily accessible within memory (i.e., involves data that recently were uploaded to working memory), and any false information that might be used to construct the lie is difficult to retrieve from long-term memory. However, there is a “catch” to this particular intersection of antecedents: in situations such as this, people do not lie. That is, when the truth isn't difficult to disclose (because it's easily accessible to the conscious mind and is contextually palatable), people disclose it.

When do people lie? When they judge the truthful information as being so problematic that it can't be disclosed. And why do they lie?

Because it is less load intensive to construct a message based on situationally appropriate, false information than trying to package the problematic, truthful information into face-maintaining linguistic form.

### The Importance of Context and Strategic Evidence

The fact that cognitive load is largely determined by context and not by the act of lying per se is borne out by the research of communication scholar Kelly Morrison. She had respondents imagine that they had contracted a sexually transmitted infection through an act of infidelity. She then tasked them with generating messages to romantic partners encouraging them to get tested. Subjects who lied in their messages reported substantially less load than those who told the truth. Morrison also asked respondents to identify what would have been the “easiest thing to say.” Consistently, people reported lying as the “easiest” option.

Although lying isn’t intrinsically more difficult than truth-telling for most people, certain persons find lying challenging. In fact, Timothy R. Levine has observed that a small percentage of the population finds it almost impossible to credibly lie; he has dubbed these lie-challenged individuals “transparent liars.” Transparent liars, when they attempt deception, consistently give themselves away by blushing uncontrollably, giggling, or displaying other indicators that make their lie obvious to almost anyone observing. These people typically are aware of their inability to lie; consequently, they are less practiced at lying than most people, worry more about giving themselves away, and tend not to lie in general.

It also appears that skilled interrogators can make lying more difficult than truth-telling through the kinds of questions they ask. Skilled interrogators pay careful attention to what is said and seek to trap liars in their lies by careful attention to the consistency of statements and the strategic use of evidence, which involves initially withholding factual knowledge and then confronting a liar with that evidence only after the liar has lied. Information might also be fact checked later. Effectively lying in situations where there is careful scrutiny to everything said, prior and subsequent fact checking, and skilled questioning

is substantially more difficult than either honest communication or everyday lies.

Steven A. McCornack  
Michigan State University  
Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Content in Context; Deception Detection Accuracy; DePaulo, Bella; Duchenne Smile; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Lie Bias; Lying as Ability or Skill; Meta-Analysis; Nonverbal Cues; Transparent Liars; Truth Bias; Wizards of Lie Detection.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. “Lying in Everyday Life.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Levine, T. R. “A Few Transparent Liars.” In *Communication Yearbook 34*, C. Salmon, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010.
- McCornack, S. A. “The Generation of Deceptive Messages: Laying the Groundwork for a Viable Theory of Interpersonal Deception.” In *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, J. O. Greene, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
- Morrison, K., M. Ferrara, K. Klein, and M. Bisson. “‘The Truth Shall Set You Free’: Exploring the Difficulty in Generating Truthful and Deceptive Messages.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 2004.
- Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, and S. B. Porter. “Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection.” *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.11 (2010).

## Lying, Intentionality of

Most people agree that lying is intentional, that is, performed with a specific purpose of deceiving. Brain and nonverbal studies suggest that telling the truth is an automatic response and that engaging in lying is deliberate and requires higher brain

processes, including inhibiting the truth response, constructing new information, and taking perspective of the other person's mental states. There is some evidence, however, that lying can occur without intention. Young children lie before they understand that by expressing false statements, they can create false beliefs in another person's mind. Furthermore, research has showed that when people do not have the capacity to engage in deliberate thought, lying still occurs when the act of lying serves the self. So, lying often occurs intentionally, but some lies may not be expressed with the intention to create a false belief in another person's mind.

### Intentional Lying

Most definitions of lying provided by deception experts and dictionaries include the information that lying occurs intentionally, that is, lying is deliberately making an untruthful statement to deceive. The general conception is that truth-telling is the automatic response and that people only lie when they have a reason to do so, for instance, when they want to present themselves more favorably to attain a goal or when they want to avoid hurting another person.

When in a situation in which lying might be more beneficial than truth-telling, people often deliberately think about what is the best response given the circumstances. Neuroimaging and event-related-potential studies confirm this idea by showing that when people lie, there is more activity in brain areas involved in executive functioning. This suggests that people engage in processes that regulate, control, and manage cognitive processing, like inhibition, planning, working memory, and initiation and monitoring of actions. So enhanced cognitive processing involved in lying is due to: (1) deliberate thinking about whether to lie or tell the truth, and (2) cognitive processing when telling the lie (for instance, taking perspective of the mental states of the people being lied to), which occurs regardless of whether the lie is intentional.

Studies on nonverbal aspects of lying are in line with the idea that the truth is an automatic response that is inhibited when lying. These studies showed that liars are more likely to speak slowly, have more speech disturbances, and take longer speech pauses than truth-tellers. Liars also show

fewer body movements. Finally, people respond faster when their response is truthful compared with a lie. Research on ethical decision making also suggests that people intuitively respond ethically but are more likely to lie when they engage in deliberate thinking.

Thus, there is ample evidence suggesting that lying occurs intentionally. When an untruthful statement is made without intention to deceive, this is often not regarded as real lying, as is the case when someone lets another person know their statement is false by joking or teasing. A person can also express an untruthful statement but not know that the statement is false if he or she was not provided with accurate information or if a memory error occurred.



*At the age of 2, children are able to grasp the distinction between reality and a false belief and will therefore engage in denial when asked if they did something naughty (when in fact they did). It is still unclear, however, whether lying at the age of 2 or 3 is true deception or just wordplay or wish fulfillment.*



### Unintentional Lying

There are a few instances, however, in which an untruthful statement is regarded as a lie and does not seem to be expressed with the intention to create a false belief in another. This occurs in young children, in people who have a chronic self-serving goal, and in pathological liars.

Young children start to lie even before they understand the intentionality of lying, which suggests that lying can occur unintentionally. At the age of 2, children engage in denial when asked if they did something bad, when in fact they did. They are able to make a false statement at the age of 2 because they are able to grasp the distinction between reality and a false belief. Children at this age, however, do not yet understand that their own thoughts can be different from others and, thus, they do not understand that they can express a statement that they know is false and know another person will regard as true.

It is still unclear whether lying at the age of 2 or 3 is true deception or just wordplay or wish fulfillment. It is possible that when children use denial to avoid being punished, they are engaging in a rudimentary form of intentional lying to protect the self: children want to protect the self from punishment, which may occur without a real intention to create a false belief in another person's mind. Between ages 10 and 12, children are fully able to grasp the intention of the lie.

In a similar way, adults seem to lie without deliberating about the consequences this lie brings to another person. Research shows that people have an automatic (that is, without deliberate thought) tendency to act upon their self-interest, even if this means they have to lie. This implies that people's automatic tendency is to lie if engaging in lying is beneficial for the self. People who are depleted or under time pressure, and thus are not able to deliberate on what to do and why, are more likely to lie when this serves the self. This suggests that lying can occur without deliberate thought. Responding automatically implies not deliberately thinking about the purpose for reacting the way they do (that is, unintentionally). Although in this case people do not deliberately think about whether and why they should lie, people can have a chronic goal which leads them to lie automatically, for instance, when people have an automatic goal of serving the self.

Finally, another example in which lying seems to occur unintentionally is when a person is a pathological liar. Pathological liars lie with the purpose of lying, not necessarily intended to create a false belief in another person. Their lie response is an automatic response and is made without deliberately thinking about the consequences of the lie.

### Automatic Lying

Experts on lying debate about whether automatic lying, which sometimes has an additional effect that liars create false beliefs in other people, necessarily implies that automatic liars intend to deceive another person. These lies are expressed not with the means to create a false belief in another person but with the means to serve the self or to deceive as an end.

Taken together, lying often occurs intentionally: people generally engage in deliberate thought before they decide to lie and have reasons for lying. Lying, however, can also occur automatically. When the lie response is automatic, one can question to what extent people lie with a real intent to deceive others, as it might be an unforeseen byproduct of achieving their goal.

Mariëlle Stel  
Anna E. van 't Veer  
Chris H.J. Hartgerink  
Tilburg University

**See Also:** Brain; Children, Development of Deception in; Deception, Definitions of; Lies: Types of; Pathological Lying.

### Further Readings

- Shalvi, S., O. Eldar, and Y. Bereby-Meyer. "Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications)." *Psychological Science*, v.23 (2012).
- Spence S. A., et al. "A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging." *Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society of London B*, v.359 (2004).
- Sorensen, Roy. "Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, v.88/2 (2007).
- Talwar, V. and A. Crossman. "From Little White Lies to Filthy Liars: The Evolution of Honesty and Deception in Young Children." *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*, v.40 (2011).

## Lying, Prevalence of

Prevalence refers to the extent or commonness with which something occurs in a population. In deception, the prevalence of lying is taken to mean the proportion of a population that engages in lying behaviors. Many scholars consider lying ubiquitous; that is, everybody lies. A related concept is the incidence of lying: incidence is the rate at which a behavior occurs in the population during a specific interval of time. Research in the United States suggests that people lie at the rate of one or two lies per day.

Estimates of prevalence and incidence depend on how broadly or narrowly the behavior is defined. When applied to all types of lies, prevalence and incidence are likely to be greater than when applied to more narrowly defined classes such as white lies, paltering, or exaggeration. The extent of lying also varies across subpopulations. Studies have shown that younger people lie more than older people, and men or women lie more than members of the other gender depending upon the circumstances. Within a population, low-incidence liars, including those who do not lie on a daily basis, may be classified as everyday liars, while those who lie on a daily basis and with great frequency are considered prolific liars.

Prevalence is an important aspect of scientific inquiry in many disciplines. Examining prevalence—and the related measures of event incidence, frequency of events, and intensity of events—is most common in epidemiology and provides a statistical basis for studying health risk factors and disease transmission. It is also used frequently in the examination of antisocial and socially undesirable behaviors such as alcohol and drug abuse, sexual deviance, prostitution, rape, and murder. In these areas entire publications, such as the *Journal of Substance Abuse*, are devoted to establishing the extent and nature of a phenomenon. Although lying and deception are societal norm violations and part of the class of behaviors considered to be socially undesirable, the presumption of ubiquitousness appears to have precluded much serious investigation into the extent to which people engage in lying or how the prevalence and incidence of lying may vary across subpopulations.

The antecedents of human deceptive behavior strongly support the view that lying is

ubiquitous. Charles Darwin noted that deception and the ability to detect deception are an important part of natural selection in the evolution of plants and animals. The traits of deception and the ability to perceive deception are adaptations of information processing skills that enhance the survival likelihood of an organism. At the cellular level, cancer cells mimic healthy cells in ways that allow them to be accepted by the host. Plants create camouflage in order to avoid being consumed, and most animals used a variety of deception strategies in order to evade predators, capture prey, mate successfully, and promote the well-being of the species.

Humans have inherited similar deception abilities as one component of their biological imperative and, with the acquisition of language, have refined deception and detection as social interaction and communication skills. Despite the moral and ethical concerns of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, who declared all lying wrong, and Sissela Bok, who described lying as the essence of a dysfunctional society, nearly all humans utilize lies as a social lubricant to avoid conflict. For many people lies are also purposeful behaviors, used when it appears that telling the truth will not help them to achieve their goals.

### Studies of Prevalence and Incidence

Until recently, documenting the prevalence and incidence of lying has been quite limited. Biological antecedents and philosophical investigations of the morality of truth and lies have led deception scholars to the assumption of ubiquitousness. Individual life experiences have reinforced this belief. In the social sciences, a single study reported in 1996 by Bella DePaulo and her associates has served as the primary citation that lying is part of everyday life and that most people tell one to two lies per day. Two samples, a group of students and a group of nonstudent adults, kept diaries of their social interactions that included a record of the lies told. DePaulo reported that adult subjects recorded lying on average one time per day while college students recorded lying two times per day. Overall, 99 percent of the students and 91 percent of the adult subjects reported at least one lie during the week-long diary record-keeping; these results provide support for the assumption of ubiquitousness.

Beginning in 2010, large-scale studies of lying frequency were conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This research has added empirical support to the idea that lying is widespread. In the United States, a cross-sectional survey of 1,000 adults found that on average people tell 1.65 lies per day, but only 40 percent reported lies in a given 24-hour period. The U.S. research also showed that in the course of a week more than 90 percent of the population tells at least one lie; study results confirmed that prevalence increases as the duration of the measurement interval increases.

In the United Kingdom (UK) study of nearly 3,000 adults, the average was calculated as 2.08 lies per day, with 76 percent reporting lying behavior on an average day. Within the UK, the only major geographic deviation was that of Northern Ireland, where subjects reported 3.50 lies per day and 84 percent reported lying on an average day. In the Netherlands, an experimental study involving 527 university students revealed an average of 2.04 lies per day, with 59 percent reporting lying behavior in a 24-hour period.

The elements of prevalence and incidence, as applied to lying behavior, are frequently confused. Average incidence reports of one to two lies per day suggest that every person tells one or two lies each day. This interpretation is reinforced by the assumption of ubiquitousness. Although researchers recognize that these estimates are derived from sampling data and accept that actual behavior may vary by individual, the common assumption has been that the estimates represent individual response that are normally distributed around the calculated means.

Data from the large-scale surveys and reanalysis of several smaller diary studies have revealed that the results do not have the normal bell-shaped curve distribution. Rather, data from all of the studies reporting incidences are positively skewed and asymptotic. When the number or percentage of subjects (Y-axis) is plotted over the number of lies told (X-axis) the shape of the distribution has a long tail that approaches zero only as the number of lies told grows large. The majority of subjects in these samples reported telling few or no lies per day, but a few subjects told more than the average number of lies. The larger the sample size, the more likely that at least a few of these

individuals will report telling substantially more lies than average.

### **Prolific Liars and Everyday Liars**

The few liars who tell lies with much greater frequency than the rest of the population have been referred to as prolific liars. These prolific liars are distinctly aggressive with their lying behaviors. In the study of U.S. adults, 5 percent of the subjects told more than 50 percent of all of the lies in a 24-hour period. Over time, most people will tell a few lies even if they do not lie every day. The everyday liars are more prevalent in the population but account for a much lower incidence of lying.

Statistical analysis of the distribution of lies suggests that prolific liars are a different subpopulation than everyday liars. When lying data for a specific population are examined, most of the subjects sampled report lying frequency in a narrow range from zero to a few lies. The data are Poisson-distributed; that is, the mean and variance are equal and the number reporting lying behavior drops off rapidly as the frequency of lies increases. Prolific liars are outliers of the Poisson distribution. Data for the prolific liars tends to be asymptotic and have been described with a power function. While the mean of the overall distribution provides a measure of average incidence, the break point between the Poisson and power functions serves as an indicator of the upper boundary for normal lying behavior.

Comparison of the large U.S. and UK studies suggest that in the United States up to two lies per day is considered normal and acceptable for everyday lying behavior. In the United Kingdom up to four lies per day is the normal and acceptable limit for everyday lies. When the frequency of lying exceeds these levels, the number of lies told is considered prolific and beyond the limit of normative behavior for the population being described.

Lying is prevalent. Though widely practiced it occurs with substantial variation of incidence across individuals. This holds several implications for research and for society as a whole. Because lying is nearly ubiquitous, some amount of lying is considered normal but only to the point that it does not exceed the standard for a population. Generally, the number of lies told on

a given day is likely to be a small proportion of the total communication in which people engage. This is both a positive and a negative. Limiting lying behavior reinforces societal norms, but it also means that most people use and expect truthfulness, making them more susceptible to being deceived by skillful liars.

For researchers, the presence of wide variations in individual differences, especially the differences between everyday and prolific liars, means that correlating the extent of lying with other characteristics is important. It also means that it is not sufficient to assume that lying is ubiquitous when studying individual behavior. For accuracy, deception research needs to control and account for individual differences in the production of lies.

Kim B. Serota  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Bok, Sissela; Childhood, Lying in; Children, Development of Deception in; Daily Life, Lying in; DePaulo, Bella; Dishonesty; Exaggeration; Half-Truths; Lies, Types of; Paltering; Pathological Lying; Santa Claus; Truth; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Bok, Sissela. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Vintage, 1999.
- DePaulo, Bella, Deborah Kashy, Susan Kirkendol, Melissa Wyer, and Jennifer Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Ford, Charles, Bryan King, and Mark Hollender. "Lies and Liars: Psychiatric Aspects of Prevarication." *American Journal of Psychiatry*, v.145 (1988).
- Halevy, Rony, Bruno Verschuere, and Shaul Shalvi. "Being Honest About Dishonesty: Correlating Self Reports and Actual Lying." *Human Communication Research* (in press).
- Knapp, Mark. *Lying and Deception in Human Interaction*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2008.
- Schneier, Bruce. *Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust That Society Needs to Survive*. Indianapolis, IN: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
- Serota, Kim B., Timothy R. Levine, and Franklin J. Boster. "The Prevalence of Lying in America:

Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

Serota, Kim B., Timothy R. Levine, and Aaron W. Burns. "A Few Prolific Liars: Variation in the Prevalence of Lying." *Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association, November 2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012*. Washington, DC: NCA, 2012.

## Lying as Ability or Skill

Although there is an extensive literature on the detection of lying, the literature on lying as an ability or skill is substantially smaller. The ability to lie skillfully for successful social interactions (the so-called white lies) as well as for interpersonal manipulation and personal gain would seem to be a valuable skill with an evolutionary history. Children begin to lie at an early age and become more skilled at lying as they mature. Adults tell lies to obtain employment and to impress potential sexual and romantic partners. Convincing lying seems to be a cognitively demanding task that requires inhibition, memory (to keep track of one's lies), attention, and the monitoring of one's own verbal and nonverbal behavior as well as the reaction of the listener.

### Development of Lying Ability

Children begin spontaneously telling lies very early, but the lies of 2-year-olds are remarkably unconvincing. Young children have difficulty maintaining lies and will often reveal information that clearly exposes the falsehood. As children get older, they become more skilled at keeping truth and lies straight and can produce answers to follow-up questions that are consistent with the original lie.

There is some evidence that, in regard to children's lying, practice helps. Children in harsh, punitive environments quickly learn to use lying as a means of avoiding punishment, so it is no surprise that they lie more frequently than other children; however, they also tell more sophisticated lies than their same-age peers, demonstrating greater ability to maintain their falsehoods in response to questioning.





*Young children have difficulty maintaining lies and will often reveal information that clearly exposes their falsehood. Children become more skilled at keeping truth and lies straight as they get older, producing answers to follow-up questions that are consistent with the original lie.*

In addition to practice, one reason that children get better at lying with age seems to be that the skills of inhibition, memory, and theory of mind (the awareness that others have intentions and desires that are different from one's own) improve with development. In general, lies can be broken into three components: primary (untrue statement), secondary (taking the other person's lack of knowledge into account), and tertiary (maintaining the lie with other statements). While inhibition is likely important for the primary aspect—the initial false statement and withholding of truth—theory of mind is important for the secondary aspect and working memory for the tertiary aspect. Given that most people are not particularly good at the detection of simple lies,

it may be that skills at the secondary and tertiary stages are most important to successful lying. If the deceiver cannot maintain the lie successfully and keep track of what the deceived person does and does not know, the falsehood is more likely to be detected.

Among older children and adolescents, these skills continue to be important. Older adolescents tend to be more effective at telling lies than younger adolescents, and adolescents rated as more socially competent tend to show greater lying skill than those rated as less socially competent. Cumulatively, this evidence suggests that lying, like other skills and abilities, improves with development and practice.

### **Cognitive and Neurological Correlates of Lying**

Executive functions (that is, the cognitive processes involved in planning, attention, working memory, and inhibition) are likely to be important in lying. Research has shown that the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with the executive functions, is activated when people lie. In general, telling lies seems to be more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. The lie-teller must formulate a lie, suppress the truth, monitor his or her own verbal and nonverbal behavior, and also monitor the other person's reactions to the lie. The important role of planning for successful lying can also be inferred from the fact that lying takes longer than truth-telling, and that hesitation or uncertainty can be a clue to deception. Those who are quick thinkers may, therefore, be superior liars as well.

Furthermore, when people tell lies in cognitively demanding situations (in research contexts, for example, people might be asked to tell their story in chronologically reverse order), they tend to contradict themselves more, use less detail, and tell less plausible stories than when they are able to devote greater cognitive resources toward lying. This finding suggests that having stronger executive functioning ability may counteract these potential "tells," allowing liars to maintain credibility even in stressful or otherwise cognitively demanding situations.

Recent neuroimaging studies have also implicated the amygdala, a limbic system structure known to be involved in emotional processing, as playing a role in deception. This makes sense,

given that control of emotion, planning, and memory are required in the successful telling of lies.

### **Verbal and Nonverbal Indicators of Lying**

It is often assumed that “twitchiness” and lack of eye contact is indicative of lying. However, research has identified a rather different pattern of behaviors associated with lying. For example, a recent meta-analysis on nonverbal indicators of lying found that blinking, eye contact, and postural shifts were unrelated to lying. Instead, lying was associated with reduced levels of hand movements, foot/leg movements, and nodding.

In terms of verbal behavior, research has indicated that lying is associated with changes in the pacing of speech (typically deceleration). Also, telling a lie generally takes longer than telling the truth. When lying, people tend to use a higher pitch of voice, take longer to respond, and make more grammatical errors and false starts in their stories.

Finally, the level of detail in a lie does not seem to be important to believability (assuming it is not inaccurate detail that alerts the other person to the deception). Planning, however, does seem to make a difference. When people are induced to lie without time to plan (that is, taken by surprise about the need to lie), they are less convincing regardless of the level of detail they include in the lie.

### **Individual Differences and Lying**

The tendency to be dishonest, which includes lying and other forms of interpersonal deception, can be seen as a relatively stable, trait-like characteristic. Both dishonesty in general, and the propensity to lie in particular, show evidence of substantial heritability that is in keeping with that of other personality traits.

Individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits (for example, interpersonal manipulation, callousness, lack of empathy, irresponsibility) believe themselves to be skillful liars. In a sample of corporate professionals, psychopathic traits were positively correlated with communication skills, as rated by colleagues. This finding suggests that chronically deceitful tendencies are not detected by coworkers or, if they are, these tendencies are not seen as indicative of poor communication. Also, in a study in which participants responded to emotionally evocative images with deceptive facial expressions, high levels of

interpersonal manipulation were related to less emotional “leakage” of genuine emotions, suggesting that manipulative traits might be related to success in some aspects of lying.

In keeping with this finding, individuals who are more manipulative tend to experience less guilt when lying, find lying easier, and feel more confident about their ability to deceive. Conversely, those who are anxious or self-conscious feel more guilt when lying, and find it more difficult to lie. Confidence and ease of lying appear to translate to skill, as people who are more expressive, extroverted, and have greater social control are better deceivers than those who are socially anxious. In fact, such expressive and socially skilled individuals seem to be more believable and better-liked whether they are telling the truth or lying, suggesting that possessing good social skills may facilitate believability in general.

People who lie frequently tend to believe their own lies to a greater extent than infrequent liars, which may enhance the skillfulness of these lies. When people believe their own lies, they reduce the cognitive load of the lie. They no longer need to monitor their own lies and monitor the reaction of the other person. Also, the guilt and anxiety associated with lying is diminished when the liar concurrently self-deceives, and the liar may be better able to avoid any telltale verbal or nonverbal cues associated with deception.

In one study, the ability to lie successfully was associated with the tendency to be able to successfully detect lies, leading the authors to propose the existence of an evolved general deception ability, rather than independent lying and lie-detection abilities. In this same study, there was no relationship between lying success and general intelligence. This finding warrants replication, as most specific cognitive abilities are intercorrelated and tap into a common factor of general intelligence. It would be of scientific interest to learn whether lying ability is or is not associated with either verbal ability or general cognitive ability.

### **Assessment of Lying Skill or Ability**

One possible explanation for the paucity of research on lying ability is the difficulty of assessing adults' lying. A typical research paradigm has participants video-recorded while telling both lies and truths, with others evaluating the truthfulness

of the statements. Quite often, these lies are of the “low stakes” variety and are lacking in ecological validity. Participants might be lying under instruction from the experimenter, thus greatly reducing the anxiety typically associated with social deception. Some paradigms involve a confederate asking the participant to lie, presumably inducing some guilt and anxiety in the participant who believes the experimenter is being deceived. Researchers studying children’s lying, on the other hand, often create situations in which children are motivated to lie to hide a transgression (for example, peeking at a toy after being instructed not to).

Another issue is having others rating the truthfulness of the stories. Research has shown that people are notoriously poor (often little better than chance) at detecting lies. Thus, some researchers have chosen to analyze more objective indicators of lying skill, such as the ability to retain a speech pattern that is consistent between lies and truths. Given the small effect sizes of verbal and nonverbal indicators of deception, this method would also seem to have drawbacks.

Some studies have incorporated self-report measures of lying ability. Although there appears to be some relationship between confidence in lying and success in lying, there is little reason to assume that self-report lying ability is a proxy for actual lying ability.

Beth A. Visser

Spencer Haze

*Trent University Oshawa*

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Deception Detection Accuracy; Evolution and Natural Selection; Memory; Mental Effort in Lying; White Lies.

#### Further Readings:

Ford, C. V. *Lies! Lies! Lies!!! The Psychology of Deceit*. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996.

Lee, K. “Little Liars: Development of Verbal Deception in Children.” *Child Development Perspective*, v.7/2 (2013).

Wright, G. R. T., C. J. Berry, and G. Bird. “‘You Can’t Kid a Kidder’: Association Between Production and Detection of Deception in an Interactive Deception Task.” *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, v.6 (2012).

## Lying as Exercise of Power

Power is the ability to influence others and is based in structural, cultural, or societal sources of power, such as one’s class, sex, occupation, or position, or personal characteristics, such as charisma, social skills, poise, and dynamism. Leaders often possess these personal qualities as well as the structural sources of power, which gives them a great deal of influence over others. Leaders may use their power to deceive or may use deception as a tool in their persuasive repertoire more than those who lack the structural or personal sources of power. Research into deception and power has studied a variety of power relationships, including those in the workplace, educational settings, law enforcement, politics, and health care, among others.

Power should be differentiated from other related constructs such as dominance, leadership, authority, control, or influence. Generally, power is seen as the ability to exert influence on another person, but it is not always exercised in every situation. There are many different sources of power, including the legitimate status one has, the ability to reward or punish others, and the information or resources that one has access to. Powerful people do not always dominate others, because the situation or context determines what course of action is appropriate. In addition, having power in one context does not equate to power in all contexts because power is relationship and context dependent. Thus, when examining lying as an exercise of power, it must be examined with the context in mind in order to understand the motivations of deceivers and to understand what purpose their deception might serve.

Power is often associated with dominance and leadership, and some research suggests that deception is used differently by those on different rungs of the power ladder. Thus, powerful people may be more believable when they are lying not only because their status confers credibility but also because they look poised and confident when they are lying and have the social skills to weave deception and truth together. This combination of credibility and a skilled performance makes their deceptiveness very difficult to detect, especially when lies and truths are embedded together.

### High-Power Versus Low-Power Individuals

It may also be seen as more acceptable for high-power individuals to lie than low-power individuals because they may have access to information the low-power parties do not. For example, it might be seen as permissible for an employer to avoid telling his or her employees about an upcoming merger or even lie about knowledge of the merger because of the legal ramifications associated with the secrecy of the deal. It may also be seen as more acceptable for a doctor to mislead a patient about the certainty of smoking-related health effects than for a patient to lie to the doctor about how many cigarettes he or she smokes. Of course, different cultures have different interpretations of lie acceptability as well as different understandings of power, and so the cultural context should always be considered when discussing power and the social acceptance of deception.

Deception is often used as a bargaining tactic, and the power position of the parties may determine what strategies are used during negotiations. For example, because deception is often seen as unethical, it might be reserved as a tactic of last resort or may be seen as permissible only when the ends justify the means. Some research suggests that the power level of the negotiator influences the type of deception that is employed. Most people equate deception with falsification, or deliberately creating misleading statements, but other kinds of deceptions, such as vagueness, exaggerations, concealments, or omissions, are also available strategies. Omissions are deceptions in which certain facts are concealed and tend to be used less often by high-power individuals than low-power individuals. Powerful people are also more likely to question the lies of others, especially low-power individuals, because they do not face the same chilling effect or fear of repercussions as those in low-power positions face.

When deceiving, people have the choice whether to adopt a “fight” or “flight” approach. If deceivers choose to be aggressive or dominant, then they would likely try to convince others that they are being truthful. They would attempt to display certainty, confidence, and dominance and might use long narrative utterances that explain their position. In addition, if others display suspicion or disbelief, deceivers may become more

adamant and perhaps even combative in their reaction. This style would be interpreted as more powerful by observers because of its dominant style.

On the other hand, deceivers could choose a more passive approach. In this case, they might choose vagueness or concealment as the appropriate approach to avoid scrutiny and evade detection. This would appear to outsiders to be a more submissive communication style and thus, appear less powerful. Which style a communicator chooses will depend on his or her situational and relational goals. If their primary goal is to evade detection, they might choose a passive approach. If their primary goal is to persuade others of something that is untrue, they might choose a more aggressive and dominant approach.

In addition, the motivations behind deception are often different depending on the relative difference in power level of communicators. There are many reasons why someone would choose to lie rather than tell the truth, including preserving one's status, protecting the feelings of others, gaining financial or other tangible benefits, avoiding confrontation, or maintaining one's privacy. High-power individuals may be more likely to have motivations that protect their position and maintain their credibility, while low-power individuals may be more likely to have motivations that protect them from harm and/or equalize their power position if they find it to be unfair. For example, both teachers and students may lie to one another when they are late to class and both are trying to protect their credibility in front of the other. However, the teacher may be more concerned with preserving his or her image in front of the students, while the student may be more interested in avoiding punishment for tardiness.

### Deception as an Empowering Act

So, while it is likely that power makes deception more difficult to detect and more acceptable to perpetrate, it is possible that the link between power and deception also goes another way. Deception also confers power on the liar by the virtue that deception itself is an empowering act. Power comes from a variety of sources, but one source is having information that others are lacking. Investigations studying why patients lie to their physicians suggest that patients may



be trying to restore some of their lost power because of the invasions of privacy and the lower power level that are inherent for patients in the doctor-patient relationship. Keeping information from their doctors may give patients a sense of empowerment that they are lacking in the relationship. Recent investigations on the empowerment gained through deception suggest that the very act of deception, either because it is an act of defiance of social mores or because it simply means the deceiver knows something his or her partner does not, is in and of itself a source of power. Thus, deception may be both a source of power and evidence of underlying power structures within society simultaneously.

Norah E. Dunbar  
University of Oklahoma

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Business; Deception Detection Accuracy; Exaggeration; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Government Propaganda; Narcissism; Pathological Lying.

#### Further Readings

- Aquino, K. and T. E. Becker. "Lying in Negotiations: How Individual and Situational Factors Influence the Use of Neutralization Strategies." *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, v.26 (2005).
- Blair, Tina M., Eileen S. Nelson, and Priscilla K. Coleman. "Deception, Power, and Self-Differentiation in College Students' Romantic Relationships: An Exploratory Study." *Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy*, v.27/1 (2001).
- Bugental, Daphne Blunt, William Shennum, Mark Frank, and Paul Ekman. "'True Lies': Children's Abuse History and Power Attributions as Influences on Deception Detection." In *Attribution, Communication Behavior, and Close Relationships*, Valerie Manusov and John H. Harvey, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Buller, David B., Judee K. Burgoon, Cindy White, and Amy Ebesu. "Interpersonal Deception: VII. Behavioral Profiles of Falsification, Equivocation and Concealment." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, v.13/4 (1994).
- Burgoon, J. K. and N. E. Dunbar. "An Interactionist Perspective on Dominance-Submission: Interpersonal Dominance as a Dynamic, Situationally Contingent Social Skill." *Communication Monographs*, v.67/1 (2000).
- Dunbar, Norah E., Matthew L. Jensen, Elena Bessarabova, Judee K. Burgoon, Daniel R. Bernard, Kylie J. Harrison, Katherine M. Kelley, Bradley Adame, and Jacqueline M. Eckstein. "Empowered by Persuasive Deception: The Effects of Power and Deception on Interactional Dominance, Credibility, and Decision-Making." *Communication Research*, v.39 (2012).
- Fainzang, Sylvie. "Lying, Secrecy and Power Within the Doctor-Patient Relationship." *Anthropology & Medicine*, v.9/2 (2002).
- Jensen, Matthew L., Elena Bessarabova, Bradley Adame, Judee K. Burgoon, and Stanley M. Slowik. "Deceptive Language by Innocent and Guilty Criminal Suspects: The Influence of Dominance, Question, and Guilt on Interview Responses." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, v.30/4 (2011).
- Keating, C. F. and K. R. Heltman. "Dominance and Deception in Children and Adults: Are Leaders the Best Misleaders?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.20/3 (1994).
- Koning, Lukas, Wolfgang Steinel, Ilja van Beest, and Eric van Dijk. "Power and Deception in Ultimatum Bargaining." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.115/1 (2011).
- Lindsey, Lisa M., Norah E. Dunbar, and Jessica Russell. "Risky Business or Managed Event? Perceptions of Power and Deception in the Workplace." *Journal of Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict*, v.15/1 (2011).
- Olekalns, Mara and Philip L. Smith. "Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.85/3 (2009).

---

## Lying as Norm in Social Interactions

The acceptability of lying has been, and remains, an intensely debated philosophical and moral issue; however, there is nonetheless a growing body of research supporting the idea that lying is indeed a part of everyday life and social

interactions. Deception prevalence studies with college student and community member participants have reported that people lie about one to two times a day. Lying is like other communication behaviors in that it is often goal-oriented, and people lie in everyday life for many reasons and to achieve various goals. One prevalent reason lying is a norm in North American society is because politeness is generally an upheld value. Thus, people are even encouraged to lie in certain situations in order to protect others' feelings and to be polite. Although some may view any and all lies as immoral, others argue that telling only the truth, and nothing but the truth, can incur great harm to oneself and others.

One might ask, "Is deception really a norm in social interactions?" One way to answer this question is to determine how often people lie during social interactions in daily life. The most-cited deception prevalence study was conducted by Bella DePaulo and her colleagues and was first published in 1996. In this study, 77 college students and 70 people recruited from the community completed a diary entry every time they lied to another person. Overall, the study found that college students lied about twice a day, which was about once in every three social interactions. The community members lied about once a day, which was about once in every five social interactions.

Since this hallmark study, social scientific studies regarding the prevalence of deception in social life typically also ask participants to complete diary entries in a small book or electronic device every time they lie to another person. The participants are also usually asked to include details regarding the context of the lie, such as to whom the lie was told, the nature of the relationship, the topic of the lie, and/or their motive for telling the lie. Numerous other studies have addressed the prevalence of lying in social interaction and have generally found similar results. However, Kim B. Serota, Timothy R. Levine, and Franklin J. Boster's reanalysis of numerous deception studies found that on average, people tend to lie one to two times a day, but most people tell few or no lies a day and a few people tell more lies per day. Accordingly, while individual differences affect rates of lying per day, deception does appear to be a part of social interaction.

### **Motives for Lying**

While many value honesty as personal and relational attributes, people may nevertheless lie when they feel that lying will serve their goals better than honesty. Lying, like many communication behaviors, is often used to fulfill some type of goal. If one can achieve a certain goal through honesty, the person will more than likely be honest in that situation. Conversely, if a person believes that complete honesty will not achieve a goal, then he or she may lie in order to achieve that goal. As in many other "honest" social interactions, people may lie in order to make a good impression, regulate conversations, support others, or persuade.

There are many other reasons people lie, such as to entertain, protect their privacy, protect others' feelings, or excuse their own behavior. Accordingly, some scholars categorize lies by "high-stakes" lies versus "low-stakes" lies. High-stakes lies, such as perjury or fraud, have greater personal, social, and/or legal repercussions than low-stakes lies. Generally, white lies, or lies with low stakes, are more acceptable than high-stakes lies because the consequences of the lie or of the truth being revealed are not as severe.

In addition, scholars further categorize lies based on motives—whether the lie was told to serve the liar's interest or to serve the interest of the person who was told the lie. Generally, altruistic lies, or lies that benefit another, are more acceptable than self-serving lies because the goal of the liar is to somehow benefit the other person. However, identifying motives for one's behavior can be difficult; even if a liar believes the lie was meant to benefit another, the person who was lied to may not agree.

### **Lying as a Social Lubricant**

Regardless, some white lies may be considered permissible in North American society, and white lies are even encouraged in some situations. The value of politeness plays a large role in the acceptability of white lies. For example, many parents teach their children that lying is even the right thing to do in some circumstances. Before birthdays or holiday events, parents may tell their children that they should thank someone for a gift and tell the giver they like the gift even if they do not because it is the polite thing

to do. Children are also socialized to censor their opinions because true statements could cause awkward situations or hurt a person's feelings. In other words, children are taught that telling the truth can be rude or hurtful and should be avoided in some situations; thus, lying is sometimes the right thing to do in order to protect others' feelings.

As adults, people also frequently use deception in order to be polite to others. If a close friend is seeking comfort after an unfortunate haircut, a person may lie to the friend in order to give them reassurance and support. To complicate the issue, the friend may not even want to hear the truth: "Yes, that haircut looks horrible, but there is nothing you can do about it now except let it grow back." In these cases, is it a societal norm to even expect to be lied to in some circumstances? For some, a lie may be far more comforting than the truth. Truth can sometimes be a bitter pill to swallow so, as a society, people are socialized to lie in some cases because it may be considered the right thing to do.

These types of lies act as a type of social lubricant because lying helps one avoid awkward situations, hurt feelings, insult, or conflict. Lies may even protect a person's need for privacy in some matters. For example, if a person hears terrible news from a family member on the phone and then immediately crosses paths with a coworker who asks, "Are you okay?" an expected response may be to lie in order to maintain a sense of privacy. An acquaintance who asks, "How are you?" might even find a truthful response of "Awful" to be inappropriate and unwarranted. Again, although honesty is generally an upheld value, lying can function as an expected and acceptable part of everyday interactions, even if the truth of this statement is unsettling. People may not want to view themselves as liars, but complete and incessant honesty could lead to various negative personal, relational, and social consequences.

For example, A. J. Jacobs, an editor at *Esquire* magazine and author of three *New York Times* bestsellers, decided to try living a life of "radical honesty" as part of a book project that placed him in various life "experiments." Jacobs tried to be completely honest for a one-month period. He did not succeed at being completely honest and

even wrote in his book, *The Guinea Pig Diaries*, that the experiment to practice radical honesty was "probably the worst month of my life." He wrote that his experience was fraught with the ups and downs of complete honesty—from the exhilaration of authenticity and having others reciprocate to the embarrassment, conflict, and even borderline sexual harassment that ensued from telling the whole truth. Jacobs wrote that if he had indeed been brutally honest about what he was thinking and feeling all the time, he would probably have "gotten beaten up, fired, and divorced."

### Lying for Protection

Another reason lying could be considered a norm in society is that sometimes the information covered by the lie may be more damaging than the lie itself. If an employee is late to work because she overslept, she might tell her boss she was stuck in traffic. If a friend asks another friend out for dinner but he would rather not go because he finds the friend to be boring, he might say he has another engagement. If a sibling asks her brother if he likes her new painting, he may say he does even if he does not. In these cases, one might argue that the truth may be more damaging to the relationships than lying would be. The employee is excused from being late while the friend and sibling are saved from having their feelings hurt. Conversely, others might argue that people should take responsibility for their actions, be honest about their feelings, or that it might even be compassionate to give honest, yet potentially hurtful feedback to others in order to better help them. Regardless, these types of lies are common in society because sometimes it is simply easier to lie than to face the repercussions of the truth.

Some philosophers and writers, such as Sissela Bok, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Immanuel Kant, believe that lying is immoral and has devastating consequences for the liar, the ones being lied to, and perhaps even society. Conversely, others might argue that lying is only immoral when it causes more harm than good. Others, such as DePaulo, argue that telling the complete truth all the time may not even be possible, and if it were, it may not be the desirable choice for those involved. Others argue that lying is a necessary

part of life or even the moral thing to do in some circumstances. Regardless of one's attitudes about lying, it is indeed a norm in everyday interactions.

Jennifer A. Guthrie  
*University of Nevada, Las Vegas*  
 Adrienne Kunkel  
*University of Kansas*

**See Also:** Bok, Sissela; Communication; Daily Life, Lying in; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception in Different Contexts; Deception Motives; DePaulo, Bella; Honesty; Lie Acceptability; Lying, Prevalence of; Morals and Ethics; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Bok, Sissela. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
- Buller, David B. and Judee K. Burgoon. "Deception: Strategic and Nonstrategic Communication." In *Strategic Interpersonal Communication*, John A. Daly and John M. Wiemann, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994.
- DePaulo, Bella M. and Deborah A. Kashy. "Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- DePaulo, Bella M., Deborah A. Kashy, Susan E. Kirkendol, Melissa M. Wyer, and Jennifer A. Epstein. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- George, Joey F. and Alastair Robb. "Deception and Computer-Mediated Communication in Daily Life." *Communication Reports*, v.21 (2008).
- Guthrie, Jennifer and Adrienne Kunkel. "Tell Me Sweet (and Not-So-Sweet) Little Lies: Deception in Romantic Relationships." *Communication Studies*, v.64 (2013).
- Horan, Sean, M. and Melanie B. Booth-Butterfield. "Understanding Deceptive Affection: A Diary Investigation of How and Why We Lovingly Deceive Romantic Partners." *Communication Quarterly*, v.61/2 (April 2013).
- Jacobs, A. J. *The Guinea Pig Diaries*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.
- Knapp, Mark L. "Lying and Deception in Close Relationships." In *The Cambridge Handbook of Personal Relationships*, Anita L. Vangelisti and Daniel Perlman, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Serota, Kim B., Timothy R. Levine, and Franklin J. Boster. "The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).





# M

## Machiavelli, Niccolò

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an Italian political theorist, philosopher, and diplomat, whose life and works have acquired for him a reputation as a master in the dark arts of deceit and manipulation. His writings were wide-ranging, addressing many of the concerns of the Renaissance, and encompassed history, poetry, and drama. But it is as a foundational writer in modern political science that he is most renowned. The best-known and most influential of his works is a treatise titled *The Prince* (published posthumously in 1532, although notorious in manuscript form for 20 years before then). Largely as a result of this book, commentators and critics began to adopt the adjective *Machiavellian*, which has become a byword for the description of plotting, scheming, double-dealing, and subterfuge—usually in a political context. Whether this reputation is fair, however, given the subtlety of Machiavelli’s numerous works and their wide-ranging content, has been the subject of much revisionist speculation, particularly in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Machiavelli believed that—if possible—citizens should have a role in deciding their own form of government, and his writings taken as a whole suggest various modes of governance as appropriate to differing political climates. He took his own civic and official responsibilities seriously,

and served the Florentine Republic for 14 years in a number of roles, including chief of the Florentine militia and superintendent of its defence forces.

Throughout this period he was a supporter of the Borgias, a powerful dynastic clan, and historic enemies of the Medici, celebrated Renaissance patrons of art. In 1512 the Medici family returned to power in Florence and Venice and undertook a program of revenge against their foes, the Borgias among them. Machiavelli, suspected of plotting against the Medici, was imprisoned and subjected to torture. Following his release, he was excluded from public life and retired to his farm outside Florence, where he wrote his most influential works, *The Prince* and *The Discourses on Livy*. Machiavelli’s exclusion from the exhilarating turbulence of political life led to loneliness and dejection, although he was able thereby to gain the perspective on concepts of authority and power that informed his writings with the enduring relevance they retain today.


Much of Machiavelli’s reputation (if not notoriety) rests on the statements about power that he makes in *The Prince*. His preoccupation is with how to achieve and then maintain authority, considered a good end in itself, and his ideas are couched in the form of advice to a hypothetical “new prince”; that is, one who is striving for authority through political planning rather than

inheritance or entitlement. In this context he became famous for promoting the concept that “the ends justify the means.” The suggestion is that a leader can and must do whatever is necessary, by any means possible, in order to lead. This has consequences that caused outrage during Machiavelli’s lifetime and which have continued to be problematic ever since.

For example, many of the decisions a prince would have to make, following Machiavelli’s recommendations, are in contradiction to received standards of ethics and morality: indeed, in certain situations a prince would be obligated to act immorally. Machiavelli sanctions this behavior so long as stability and order are upheld. The ideal leader, for him, must construct an identity, or persona, guaranteed to command respect. According to *The Prince*, there will be cases in which a leader should strive to be feared, and this may

entail tyrannous or cruel behavior. In other cases, however, it may better suit a leader to show mercy and compassion.

What is uppermost is the need for a prince to retain popular respect, so that he can govern unimpeded. If this requires lying and deception, then so be it. Machiavelli does not, in other words, seem to adhere to the standards of absolute morality—unmoving principles of right and wrong—which are generally referenced in treatises of this kind. Instead, his advice is to act according to the changing circumstances of fortune or fate: when those circumstances alter, so must the action taken by a leader. This constituted a blatant challenge to the doctrines of the church, in which ethical principles were held to be absolute, but Machiavelli’s answer would always be that he is merely showing human beings as they really are, rather than as they think they are.



Stefano Ussi’s *Niccolò Machiavelli in His Study* (1894). Machiavelli, an Italian political theorist, philosopher, and diplomat, is most known for his foundational writings in modern political science. His best-known and most influential work is *The Prince*, widely circulated in the early 16th century and published posthumously in 1532, in which he focuses on the means to achieve and maintain authority. In this context, he became famous for promoting the concept that “the ends justify the means,” which includes deception.

His appeal is to honesty about the human condition, rather than transcendent or supernatural standards of ethics. To some, this fluid code of conduct has appeared to advocate totalitarianism and autocracy, seeming not only undemocratic but also antidemocratic, with Machiavelli as a slippery “operator” who is impossible to pin down. Machiavelli himself, near the end of his life, was quoted as writing, “I have never said what I believe or believed what I said,” and that “if indeed I do sometimes tell the truth, I hide it behind so many lies that it is hard to find.”

This view, however, does not paint a complete portrait. Other readers of Machiavelli have been positively influenced by his assumption that morality—especially in the political arena—is a human, not a divine, construction, and must therefore take account of the real motivations of humans, which are often murky or ambiguous and always prone to error. They claim that his focus on deception is concerned not merely with the desire to deceive but also with the necessity of recognizing that one may become the victim of deception oneself. In this sense, Machiavelli is an advocate of what much later came to be known as *realpolitik*—the politics of brinkmanship, power, and pragmatics, rather than fixed ideology.

Defenders of Machiavelli also point out that his worldview must not be identified solely with *The Prince*. In his longer work, *The Discourses on Livy* (posthumously published in 1531), Machiavelli selects examples from the history of ancient Rome to argue the case for republican, rather than princely, leadership, proposing that a well-regulated republic may in some situations actually offer a safer and more just form of governance than the principdom advocated in *The Prince*. Both these works suppose that models of government drawn from historical or contemporary political circumstances are more likely to succeed than models generated by idealism or unrealistic expectations, and that requiring politicians and populations alike to confront realities, rather than insecure ideals, will secure human dignity and help dispel illusion and false hope.

Nicholas J. Crowe  
Centre for Medieval & Renaissance Studies, Oxford  
Rachel M. Reznik  
Elmhurst College

**See Also:** Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Lying as Exercise of Power; Machiavellianism; Manipulation.

### Further Readings

- Dietz, M. G. “Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception.” *The American Political Science Review*, v.80/3 (1986).
- Donskis, L., ed. *Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue*. New York: Rodopi, 2011.
- Geis, F. L. and T. H. Moon. “Machiavellianism and Deception.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.41/4 (1981).
- King, Ross. *Machiavelli: Philosopher of Power*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2009.
- Najemy, John M., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Unger, M. *Machiavelli: A Biography*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.
- Viroli, Maurizio. *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- White, Michael. *Machiavelli: A Man Misunderstood*. London: Abacus, 2005.

## Machiavellianism

Niccolò Machiavelli was an Italian philosopher, statesman, and political theorist. He is well known for his treatise *The Prince* (published in 1532, although known in its manuscript form for 20 years before that), in which he advocated that a ruler be exploitive, manipulative, and deceitful in order to gain success in a socially competitive and status-oriented society. The main intent of *The Prince* was an evaluation of traditional moral norms regarding power, with Machiavelli maintaining that a ruler should disregard moral norms and only be concerned with gaining power and authority.

Machiavellianism, as addressed here, is a term used in the social behavioral sciences to describe an individual's tendency to be emotionally cool and detached, which enables an individual to disengage from morality, making it easier to deceive and manipulate others. Essentially, Machiavellianism is synonymous with deceit and lying.



Machiavelli believed it was necessary to deceive in an imperfect world in order to rise to the top. When a truth is unlikely to serve one's purpose, a lie is used instead.

### Personality Traits of Machiavellianism

The concept of Machiavellianism in the social behavioral sciences comes from R. Christie and R. L. Geis's seminal work from 1970. Using the philosophy and forms of manipulation described in *The Prince* and also in Machiavelli's *The Discourses on Livy* (1531), they created a 20-item personality measure called the MACH-IV test (there is also a MACH-V measure, which is a forced choice version of the MACH-IV). People scoring high on the scale (high Machs) would be likely to agree with the item, "Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so." An individual scoring low on the scale (low Machs) would be likely to agree with the item, "There is no excuse for lying to someone else."

Individuals high in Machiavellianism tend to manipulate more, win more, and persuade others better through deception. In addition, those high in Machiavellianism tend to be better liars and feel less anxiety when lying. Interestingly, there is no association between the liars' disposition and intellectual ability. Machiavellianism also has been found to be linked to specific Big Five personality traits, for example, being negatively correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness, and positively correlated with neuroticism.

### Dark Triad of Traits

Research on Machiavellianism was fruitful from the 1970s through the 1990s. However, in the 21st century there has been a growing application of Machiavellianism as part of the Dark Triad of traits, which includes three socially undesirable dispositions: narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Narcissism is seen as a subclinical or "normal" construct, which includes characteristics of grandiosity, entitlement, dominance, and superiority. "Normal" or subclinical psychopathy includes elements of high impulsivity, thrill-seeking, low empathy, and anxiety. Together, these three traits can be seen as a short-term exploitive social strategy that has evolved to be advantageous in social situations.

The elements of the Dark Triad share a number of features. The three dispositions are seen as socially negative with tendencies toward aggressiveness, emotional detachment, and self-promotion. In general, individuals with these traits are more self-serving and less involved emotionally and empathetically toward others, which facilitates the manipulation of others for their own gain with minimal remorse.

Research on the Dark Triad has found that those high in Machiavellianism are associated with an open, promiscuous, and hostile set of sexual attitudes. They were also associated with self-serving and deceptive sexual tactics, such as cheating, divulging sexual secrets, and faking love to secure sex. Narcissists and psychopaths have also been found to be noncommittal and prefer short-term mating strategies. Those higher in these dispositions were also found to have more sex partners, an unrestricted sociosexuality, and a greater preference for short-term partners using exploitive and deceptive tactics.

The Dark Triad of traits and Machiavellianism have also been investigated in the workplace setting, with individuals high in Machiavellianism more likely to use charm and manipulative behaviors in the workplace. In addition, individuals high overall in the Dark Triad of traits use forceful, aggressive, and other hard tactics of social influence in the workplace in order to gain success.

A standardized measure was developed by P. K. Jonason and G. D. Webster to assess the Dark Triad (called the Dirty Dozen) consisting of 12 items, four for each trait. A Machiavellianism item asks individuals to indicate how much they agree with the following statement: "I tend to exploit others towards my own end." Machiavellianism can be seen as a socially undesirable personality trait or disposition, with deceit and manipulation at its core. Researchers have done extensive studies on how this trait can be adaptive in both the workplace and in relationships. Not only do individuals with this trait tend to lie and deceive more, they lack the empathetic and remorseful response that an individual would normally feel, making it easier to manipulate and lie.

William D. Marelich  
Erin Crecelius

California State University, Fullerton

**See Also:** Deception, Attitudes Toward; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Manipulation; Narcissism; Pathological Lying.

### Further Readings

- Christie, R. and R. L. Geis. *Studies in Machiavellianism*. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Geis, F. L. and T. H. Moon. "Machiavellianism and Deception." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.41 (1981).
- Jonason, P. K., S. Slomski, and J. Partyka. "The Dark Triad at Work: How Toxic Employees Get Their Way." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.52 (2012).
- Machiavelli, Niccolò and P. Bondanella, trans. *The Prince*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Paulhus, D. L. and K. M. Williams. "The Dark Triad of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy." *Journal of Research in Personality*, v.36 (2002).
- Snyder, M. and W. Ickes. "Personality and Social Behavior." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, 3rd ed., G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds. New York: Random House, 1985.

---

## Madoff, Bernard

Bernard Madoff, founder and former chairperson of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, ran a Ponzi scheme that caused its investors to lose an estimated \$17 billion to \$20 billion. Journalists, pundits, and finance experts have called the Madoff case one of the most extensive financial frauds in the history of the United States. After pleading guilty to 11 felonies, including securities fraud and money laundering, Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison.

A New York native, Madoff started Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities in 1960. The firm was not a member of the New York Stock Exchange, instead functioning as a third-market provider and investment advisor. (A third-market provider allows individual investors or institutions to trade securities over the counter, rather than within a traditional stock exchange. For example, online trading is a third-market

transaction.) Madoff's firm grew in prestige when it contributed to developing technology allowing investors to buy and sell stocks electronically. This new technology later became the world's first electronic stock market, NASDAQ, which went live in 1971. Over time, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities became increasingly influential in the Wall Street world. Madoff himself was praised for his innovation and consistent success. Many members of his family joined the firm, including his sons, Mark and Andrew, and his younger brother, Peter.

In a Ponzi scheme like the one operated by Madoff, funds contributed by new investors are used to pay returns to previous investors, thereby making the investments appear to be profitable. As long as the operator is able to find participants, the scheme—which earns little or no money without new investors—can stay afloat. Madoff focused on attracting wealthy clientele, particularly among the upper-class, Jewish individuals and groups he encountered at New York country clubs and philanthropic events. He found many charitable organizations willing to invest—and these were attractive targets because they were unlikely to withdraw funds. Some of the charities eventually had to close when Madoff was arrested and the scheme collapsed.

While many Ponzi scheme operators win new investors by touting low-risk, high-return investment opportunities, Madoff eschewed such extremes, instead creating fake account statements showing consistent and good, rather than excellent, returns. In this way, he was able to avoid suspicion for a longer time than he might otherwise have done. When investors wanted to withdraw funds during the 2008 market downturn, they discovered Madoff's fraud. In December 2008, Madoff confessed to the scheme when he realized that he could not return a requested \$7 billion in redemptions. He was arrested shortly thereafter. His clients, victims of the fraud, included individual investors, hedge funds, public pensions, universities, banks, and charities. Madoff's 162-page clientele list also featured several well-known names, such as Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel, film director Steven Spielberg, and Hall of Fame baseball pitcher Sandy Koufax.

Some financial analysts and business journalists suspected Madoff's wrongdoing long before his

eventual downfall, leaving many to wonder if the increasingly abstract and complex culture of Wall Street enables such frauds, and if the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was too lax in enforcing existing regulations. Fraud investigator Harry Markopolos amassed nearly a decade's worth of evidence against Madoff, but his early warnings were not heeded by the SEC. Madoff's firm was investigated by regulators several times, but their findings were minor and never resulted in significant changes to the firm's business practices. Madoff's well-known secrecy—he even told investors that he would not answer questions because his methods were beyond their comprehension—may have helped him to avoid earlier exposure.

In 2013, Madoff was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Butner Medium in North Carolina. His combined assets (approximately \$826 million) were frozen. In 2009, the SEC banned him from ever working in the securities industry again; that same year, the SEC conducted an internal investigation of its conduct in an effort to discover why the agency failed to stop Madoff earlier. (Eight SEC workers were disciplined and none was fired.) The Madoff Family Foundation, a philanthropic institution he co-managed with his wife, Ruth Madoff, had its assets frozen. Mark Madoff committed suicide in 2010.

As of September 2012, about \$3.625 billion was returned to victims of the fraud—slightly more than half the amount Madoff stole from them.

Megan Brown  
Drake University

**See Also:** Accounting; Bankruptcy; Business; Financial Markets; Investment Fraud.

### Further Readings

Arvedlund, Erin. *Too Good to Be True: The Rise and Fall of Bernie Madoff*. New York: Penguin Group, 2009.

Henriques, Diana B. *The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust*. New York: Times Books, 2011.

Markopolos, Harry. *No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Books, 2011.

## Magic Tricks

There are few forms of lying and deception as harmless and entertaining as magic tricks. From Dedi's animal "resurrections" in Egypt in 2600 B.C.E. to Harry Houdini's escapology and David Copperfield's illusions, magicians have been astonishing audiences for centuries, in a bidirectional relationship of performance and appreciation, entertainment and escapism, in exchange for willing credulity. What differentiates magic tricks from many forms of lying and deception is that deceit is not hidden. It is not malicious and typically not unethical. It is an agreement, part of a game accepted as a given for the sake of innocuous diversion.

### Magic Performance as a Form of Social Interaction

A magic performance can be considered a special case of social interaction in which performers and audiences implicitly and willingly agree to be the deceivers and the deceived, respectively. This social agreement defines the difference between what might be considered magic versus a scam or crime. Many illusions, for example, deceive the audience as to the location of an object, such as a coin, or even the magician himself. Such location illusions are likely to be labeled as "magic" when occurring at a Las Vegas showroom but as a "scam" when part of a street game of three-card monte designed to separate an unwitting victim from his money. Similarly, an audience may howl with glee when a stage magician strips a willing volunteer of his money, watch, and other detachables; whereas if a street thief uses exactly the same techniques for the same purpose, it is no longer magic or funny, but rather a crime.

Once the context has been established as a magic performance, the magician must enact his role as master of the seemingly impossible, confronting the audience with unexpected and incomprehensible actions and outcomes to evoke surprise and wonder. Though expecting (and even wanting) to be misled and tricked, audiences nevertheless attempt to unmask the mysteries and uncover the magician's secrets. How, then, have magicians so effectively deceived and entertained (even one another) for hundreds of years?

### **Magic as a Cognitive Process**

Master magicians have, for centuries, intuitively grasped at least six fundamental principles of perception and cognition that modern neuroscience has only belatedly come to understand. First, some things, though directly in a person's line of sight, are not perceptible at all. Second, people do not consciously perceive everything that can be perceived. Third, what is consciously perceived depends upon attention. Individuals will fail to see even what is in their direct line of sight or fail to feel an easily perceptible touch if their attention is elsewhere. Fourth, people sometimes misinterpret what they perceive. Fifth, individuals' memories fail in ways that permit changes to occur before their eyes that they do not consciously perceive. Sixth, these failures can be regularly and lawfully produced by specific manipulations of individuals' perceptual and sensory systems. Magicians use these basic principles of perception and cognition to determine what the audience does and (does not) perceive and how this perception is interpreted, employing manipulations of mind and objects to blur and misrepresent reality with literal and figurative "smoke and mirrors."

As science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke famously noted, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." Magic only seems like magic when people don't understand the mechanism. This is true for every trick from the famous cups and balls demonstration to the night David Copperfield made the Statue of Liberty disappear. The greater the apparent violation of laws of physics and causality, and the less understandable the mechanism of the trick, the bigger the magic. The goal of the magician, then, is to perform the seemingly impossible while completely obscuring the mechanism by which it is accomplished.

### **Using the Imperceptible**

The simplest level at which the mechanism of a trick may be obscured is to cause it to be imperceptible. This occurs, for example, when the magician may pass his cape over the mechanism of action, cut a body in half that appears to be mostly inside a box, place the box over a hidden passageway, or use smoke and mirrors to obscure or deflect the line of sight.

Even if the line of sight is not blocked, the mechanism of action may nevertheless be imperceptible when the magician makes use of principles of perception to render part of the visual field invisible. A rather stunning class of illusions known as Black Art uses the principle of "perceptual contrast" to obscure the bodies and actions of the performers. Such illusions make use of a black stage with black backing, against which black objects (including persons dressed in black and in blackface) will be imperceptible, and light-colored objects will stand out. The performers dressed in black can create illusions by carrying out a number of actions invisible to the audience, but performed in front of their eyes. Objects may be carried across the stage even as they appear to float unaided; or may suddenly appear when black covers are removed by the invisible black agents. Though Black Art has been used for over 100 years, modern Black Arts magicians have added the use of black light to enhance their illusions. The magician may appear to paint an object into existence when he is actually painting an existing black object with a substance rendering it colorful under black light.

The magician's actions can also be obscured when an audience is made momentarily blind by sudden changes in lighting. For a few moments after such changes, the audience cannot see until "light adaptation" or "dark adaptation" allows their eyes to adjust. During those moments the magician can execute the mechanism of a trick directly in the line of sight of the audience without it being seen.

### **Attention and Misdirection**

Magic is perhaps even more impressive when the mechanism of action is not blocked from perception and instead is performed in a manner that could be perceived, if only the person were to attend to the right place at the right time. Nothing blocks the perceptions, but the magician successfully prevents the audience from perceiving. This is perhaps the most pervasive mechanism of magic: "misdirection," defined as any act or stimulus that will take the audience's attention away from the means of the trick. Misdirection relies on natural instincts to look where the eyes are directed (either by auditory or visual prompts); to orient to the onset of new stimuli (such as a flash



of light, the entry of a new person, or a touch); to respond, often subconsciously, to emotional stimuli; to attribute viable meaning to the movements of others; or to give way to carefully placed suggestion.

A successful magic trick will divert the audience's attention at just the right moment from the critical maneuver to an unrelated or confounding event. The magician may supplement distractions at the moment of the trick with subtle suggestions leading the audience to expect a different mechanism of the trick and thereby to attend to actions related to the incorrect mechanism. The magician may even go so far as to divert attention to the wrong trick. Master pickpocket Apollo Robbins was asked for a demonstration of his pickpocketing skills by master magician Penn Jillette. Robbins refused but offered to perform a different trick instead: instructing Jillette to first place his ring on the table and trace its outline with his pen. Jillette began to comply, only to discover that Robbins had pilfered the cartridge of his pen while his attention was diverted to the new trick.

Unlike most magicians, Robbins has widely discussed the mechanisms of his tricks, noting that he must be both master reader and master manipulator of the target's attention. He may first draw attention to an object such as a map or coin so that he can slip without resistance into the target's personal zone, where he now has access to the target's body, pockets, or purse. He then makes use of an arsenal of common tools of misdirection while he steals everything detachable without detection. These tools include distracting patter, eye contact, directing his own gaze away from the thefts (drawing the target's in the process), diverting gestures or touches, or asking questions that direct attention to certain actions or areas of the body. He may place his arm somewhere for one apparent purpose, when he is really blocking the target's view of a theft, restricting the target's movement, or temporarily stashing a stolen object before secreting it in his own pocket.

As he works, Robbins continually reads where the target's attention is directed, whether it needs redirection, and whether he can yet perform the theft. As Robbins explains, "It's all about the choreography of people's attention. Attention is like

water. It flows. It's liquid. You create channels to divert it, and you hope that it flows the right way."

### **Managed Misinterpretation**

Crucial to the magician's art is the ability to control audiences' interpretations of what they perceive. This ability is crucial, for example, to successful pickpocketing. Robbins explains that to prevent the target from recognizing that the magician's hand is in his pocket, the magician may give the target another apparent explanation for what he feels by brushing his own leg against the area of the target's pant pocket.

Much of the magician's managed misinterpretation relies on the power of expectations to shape perceptions. Even as the eyes physically see what has actually occurred, the brain can be led to "see" something entirely different. In the disappearing ball illusion, for example, the magician tosses a ball into the air and catches it several times before the final toss, when the ball appears to disappear into the air. The magician creates the expectation that the ball is tossed through his arm movement and by following the (presumably) rising ball with his head and eyes as he has on the other tosses. But through the use of eye-tracking technology, neuroscientists' scientific studies of this trick have shown that even though the audience members report having "seen" the ball tossed up, they actually do look at, and technically see, the magician transfer the ball to his other hand before the apparent toss. The strong expectations generated by the magician's actions appear to override the audience's physical perceptions.

### **Change Blindness**

Recall that a fifth mechanism of magic relies on fallacies of memory. Two are particularly important. First, people often do not encode sufficient detail into memory to allow them to reliably discriminate between similar people and objects. Second, individuals often fail to remember the detail they do encode long enough to compare it to things they see (even seconds) later. These two failures underlie a phenomenon cognitive scientists refer to as "change blindness," which is the failure to notice large changes that occur within one's visual field.

Change blindness underlies the success of a computerized "mind-reading" illusion by Clifford



*An illusionist demonstrates a card trick at the media preview of "Magic, the Science of Wonder" at the Houston Museum of Natural Science, February 27, 2010. Much of a magician's managed misinterpretation relies on the power of expectations to shape perceptions. Even as the eyes are viewing what is actually occurring, the brain can be led to "see" something entirely different.*

Pickover, which appears on his Web site, Pickover.com. Visitors to the Web site are asked to pick a card from an array of six face cards, stare at the card, and commit it well to memory. They are told the computer will be able to determine (psychically of course) which card visitors have picked, even though they have not clicked on it or otherwise indicated which one. When ready, visitors will click on a symbol, whereupon they see a five-card array from which they are told their card has been removed. The card for every visitor is no longer present, giving the illusion that somehow the computer knew which card the visitor had picked.

But the illusion relies on change blindness aided by expectation and misdirection. In fact, all cards from the original array were removed and different face cards were substituted. But the changes in other cards are not noticed. The visitors expected that their card would be removed, not that all of the cards would be removed, and when viewing the original array they were directed to stare at their own card, not the others, thereby enhancing their natural tendencies not to notice the change of all cards.

## Conclusion

The magic tricks described here are only a few of the countless mechanisms of perception and cognition used by master magicians. In many ways, these magicians have put cognitive scientists to shame—discovering, mastering, and using a great wealth of knowledge of the workings of the human mind centuries before scientists dreamed of investigating it.

J. Guillermo Villalobos  
Ololade O. Ogundimu  
Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Audience; Barnum, P. T.; Brain; Fantasy and Imagination; Gullibility; Manipulation; Neurophysiology.

## Further Readings

Demacheva, I., M. Ladouceur, E. Steinberg, G. Pogossova, and A. Raz. "The Applied Cognitive Psychology of Attention: A Step Closer to Understanding Magic Tricks." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.26 (2012).

- Green, A. "A Pickpocket's Tale: The Spectacular Thefts of Apollo Robbins." *The New Yorker* (January 7, 2013). [http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/01/07/130107fa\\_fact\\_green](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/01/07/130107fa_fact_green) (Accessed March 2013).
- Macknik, S. L., S. Martinez-Conde, and S. Blakeslee. *Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Everyday Deceptions*. New York: Henry Holt, 2010.
- Maskelyne, J. N. and David Devant. *Our Magic: The Art of Magic, the Theory of Magic, the Practice of Magic*. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Fleming, 1946.
- Nardi, Peter M. "Toward a Social Psychology of Entertainment Magic (Conjuring)." *Symbolic Interaction*, v.7/1 (1984).
- Pickover, Clifford. "ESP Experiment." <http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/pickover/esp.html> (Accessed March 2013).
- The Science of Magic. <http://www.scienceofmagic.org> (Accessed March 2013).
- YouTube. "Omar Pasha (Black Art): The Most Amazing Magic Show." <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsvvM3e4IEU> (Accessed March 2013).

---

## Malingering

Malingering is the falsification or exaggeration of physiological and/or psychological illness symptoms with the intention of receiving some sort of compensation or reward. Malingering is classified in two degrees: partial malingering, which is the extreme exaggeration of present symptoms, and full malingering, which is the complete fabrication of symptoms. As of 2002, approximately 29 percent of personal injury claims, 30 percent of disability claims, as well as 31 percent of cases regarding chronic pain and 8 percent of clinical disorder cases involved partial or full malingering.

Malingering has also been observed throughout history. The Greek physician Galen, who lived in the 2nd century C.E., noted patients feigning symptoms to avoid engaging in an unwanted activity. For instance, one slave faked a knee injury in order to avoid having to take a long trip with his master. Malingering was also very common in the Soviet Union. In fact, so many people

malingered as a means of escaping political and physical coercion that the government limited the number of allotted medical excuses that physicians could give to patients.

### Motivations for Malingering

It is important to emphasize that a malingerer is intentionally attempting to deceive others and is motivated by external gain, so as not to confuse malingering with other disorders involving deceptive presentation of illness symptoms. Malingering can be easily confused with Factitious Disorder, which is the intentional feigning of a disorder or illness with the intent of receiving medical treatment. Malingerers intentionally feign an illness or a disorder, but they do not do it to receive medical treatment. They do it as a means of gaining some benefit or reward, such as insurance money, or to appear unable to work or incapable of fulfilling other obligations. For example, there have been many accounts of people malingering post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). U.S. veterans with PTSD are able to receive many financial benefits (for example, Social Security disability benefits and financial compensation from the Department of Veterans' Affairs) to aid them in their coping process. Thus, many people who do not have PTSD have attempted malingering of the symptoms as a means of receiving this monetary compensation.

Malingering is considered an offense in the U.S. military, punishable by dishonorable discharge and incarceration of up to 10 years. Malingering is also considered illegal when it is done in order to fraudulently gain compensation. For instance, in January 2012, a woman from Virginia was charged with medical fraud after she claimed to have cancer in order to raise money from sympathetic supporters. There have been many other cases in which people have feigned having cancer or some other terminal disorder for personal gain, such as getting extra sick days from work, gaining money from charities, getting a free trip to Disney World, and getting one's lavish dream wedding for free (by having it paid for by sympathetic friends and family members).

Malingerers have also been known to go beyond simply feigning symptoms. For instance, malingerers who are seeking to increase their temperatures to exaggerate their symptoms (that is,

fever) may go so far as to heat their thermometer by using a lamp. Some may even alter their urine sample by adding sand to it, which increases the difficulty of gaining an accurate diagnosis.

### Models of Malingering

To date, there are three explanatory models regarding why people choose to malingering: pathogenic, criminological, and adaptational. The pathogenic model refers to people who already have an underlying abnormal psychological condition that causes them to malingering. This does not mean the patient is malingering symptoms of his or her underlying disorder; he or she is malingering symptoms of an illness or disorder as a means of gaining some personal benefit, such as money or sympathy. In other words, these patients may be unable to control their malingering in a way that is similar to how kleptomania patients cannot control their thievery.

The criminological model states that some people may malingering simply because they do not care about the legal or social ramifications of their actions and thus malingering as a means of gaining an undeserved reward or benefit. The adaptational model suggests that some people may malingering as a means of getting ahead in a highly competitive environment. In these cases, one may malingering in order to gain special treatment from his or her boss (for example, sympathy in the form of extended deadlines and/or not being fired for insubordination). Empirical support has been found for all three of these models.

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) has been revised to include malingering subscales in order to detect malingering of psychological disorders. Specifically, the Infrequency-Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale was developed with PTSD patients who had been exposed to military combat. It has helped detect the malingering of PTSD symptoms in civilian and military patients. Another subscale, known as the Malingered Mood Disorder Scale, was created and tested in 2008. It is successful at detecting malingering in personal injury and disability claims.

### Guidelines for Detecting Malingerers

Malingering can cause abuse within the medical system because these patients receive many unnecessary tests, and they waste the physician's

time when it could be used for patients who are legitimately ill. In order to help detect and reduce malingering, *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-IV) provides four guidelines to determine when to suspect malingering of mental disorders. Suspicion should occur when (1) the diagnostic evaluation occurs in some legal context, (2) there is a discrepancy between the patient's claim and the scientific/objective findings, (3) the patient is uncooperative during the evaluation and refuses to comply with the prescribed treatment, and (4) the patient has antisocial personality disorder.

If a patient satisfies these criteria, he or she may be malingering. However, many critics have argued that these criteria are overly broad and may lead to the overdiagnosis of malingering. Although using these criteria leads to detecting approximately two-thirds of malingerers, it is estimated that about 80 percent of people with a true mental disorder will meet at least two of the four criteria.

Because malingering is not a disorder, there is no treatment for it. However, malingerers tend to stop malingering when they get their desired reward, or when they realize that malingering will not get them what they want.

Carey J. Fitzgerald  
Kimberly M. Danner  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Behavioral Analysis Interview; Brain; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Freud, Sigmund; Lying as Ability or Skill; Lying, Intentionality of; Manipulation; Neurophysiology; Pathological Lying; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Dingley, A. "It's All in Your Head." [http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/riverview/psychology\\_articles/all\\_in\\_head.html](http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/riverview/psychology_articles/all_in_head.html) (Accessed October 2012).
- Elhai, J. D., J. A. Naifeh, I. S. Zucker, S. N. Gold, S. E. Deitsch, and B. C. Frueh. "Discriminating Malingered From Genuine Civilian Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Validation of Three MMPI-2 Infrequency Scales (F, Fp, Fptsd)." *Assessment*, v.11 (2004).
- Henry, G. K., R. L. Heilbronner, W. Mittenberg, C. Enders, and C. M. Roberts. "The 15-Item



- Malingered Mood Disorder Scale (MMDS).” *Clinical Neuropsychologist*, v.22 (2008).
- “Malingering.” *Psychology Today* <http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/malingering> (Accessed September 2012).
- Mittenberg, W., C. Patton, E. M. Canyock, and D. C. Condit. “Base Rates of Malingering and Symptom Exaggeration.” *Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology*, v.24 (2002).
- Rogers, R., K. W. Sewell, and A. M. Goldstein. “Explanatory Models of Malingering: A Prototypical Analysis.” *Law and Human Behavior*, v.18 (1994).

---

## Manipulation

Manipulation typically involves deception to obtain a planned goal with lack of regard for another’s interests. A plethora of concepts are discussed in relation to manipulation: threat, constraining options, seduction, bullying, bribery, conditioning another, conning another, and conquering and dividing a group of individuals, to name a few. While manipulation may occur unintentionally, intentional manipulation, with all its moral overtones, is of the most interest to researchers simply because manipulation violates the trust between individuals and impinges on an individual’s free will; that is, individuals have goals and the manipulator’s deceptive practices limit or redirect the choices of the individual. The fact that there are no contextual or situational limits (that is, boundaries) for when a person can be manipulated explains the ubiquitous nature of manipulation and why almost everyone has a story to tell when asked if they have ever been manipulated.

A key issue involved in manipulation is ambiguity, in a variety of forms. This includes ambiguity as to whether the perceived manipulator is truly uninterested in the individual’s goals and desires, or merely misunderstanding and therefore pushing their own goals and desires. There is also ambiguity as to the perceived rationale for the manipulation: Is the supervisor merely managing for the good of the company, or is the teacher motivating the students to learn? There can also

be ambiguity as to whether another is actually manipulating an individual; because deception is involved in most instances of ambiguity, a manipulator does not typically admit to their manipulation and may deny it if confronted.

In each of these types of ambiguity, and in other forms not mentioned, doubt is introduced to the individual’s understanding of the situation, which can influence the individual in a variety of ways, such as causing the individual to withdraw from the interaction to the extent possible; to probe the situation searching for signals as to the legitimacy of any claims made by the potential manipulator; to remain tentative and refuse to challenge the possible manipulation, because there is no surety that manipulation is occurring; or to assume the other’s motives are acceptable and allow the manipulation to occur. These possibilities and more exist because of the doubt introduced with ambiguity, and yet these options only exist if the individual involved questions whether manipulation is occurring.

Manipulation is a complex topic on which knowledgeable persons, such as researchers and philosophers, do not agree. For philosophers it is a moral issue, while for researchers manipulation is embedded in all social situations between people, and the term may be used in a morally neutral manner. Others argue that all communication is persuasive and that manipulation is a form of persuasion, not meant to imply positive or negative morality; thus, the definition of manipulation is broadened dramatically. While this definition is a minority view, it is mentioned here to emphasize the complexity of understanding the concept of manipulation.

Furthermore, there are manipulative situations in which not all individuals involved are deceived, and yet they are still manipulated. For example, Jane wants to claim credit for work she did not do, so she asks Mary if she can join the team that performed the work after the majority of the work is complete. Mary denies Jane’s request. Jane responds by saying she will force Mary to make Jane a member of the team. Jane then goes to her uncle, the president of the company, and tells him about all the work she did and how she is not receiving due credit. The president lists Jane as a member of the team and publicly thanks her for all of her work and effort. Jane deceptively

manipulated the president and transparently manipulated Mary. The other team members are somewhere on a continuum from undeceived to deceived. Thus, not all forms of manipulation require that everyone manipulated is deceived.

Failed attempts at manipulation and/or overt manipulation (that is, when individuals are aware of the manipulation but have no recourse but to accept the situation) can result in resentment and suspicion of the manipulator; the victim may experience feelings of remorse, anger, fear, guilt, or shame. Interestingly enough, while coercion is one of the harsher forms of manipulation, the victim's response may differ. A victim may feel extreme levels of guilt and shame for allowing manipulative behavior, but when the manipulation becomes coercion (that is, by force), the victim may not feel the same level of responsibility or remorse.

Thus, there are different levels and types of manipulation, and not everyone agrees as to when a situation is manipulative. Individuals can and do idiosyncratically determine for themselves when they perceive manipulation and respond accordingly. But society also has boundaries which deem manipulative behavior unacceptable. Medical and psychological researchers list manipulation as a key characteristic in a variety of psychological diseases: borderline personality disorder, psychopathy, and antisocial personality disorder, to name a few. Criminal justice and business researchers frequently examine types of manipulative behavior that can lead to criminal charges; for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a branch of government specifically charged with determining what level of stock market manipulation is illegal, such as spreading false rumors causing stock prices to change or ordering a vast number of shares without the intention of purchasing, leading others to think the stock is more viable than it is. Placing a stigmatized label, such as felon or mentally ill, on individuals who manipulate excessively or in a particular manner demarcates between what society will tolerate and what it will cease to countenance and attempt to hinder through penalties.

Finally, no account of manipulation would be complete without mentioning the times when manipulation is more likely. When individuals' choices are highly limited by the power of

others, it may be expected that the individuals will respond with manipulation. Incarcerated criminals, citizens under harsh and cruel regimes, and children raised with parenting styles that are highly restrictive, are but a few examples of these individuals. Situations that call forth a higher frequency of manipulation need further investigation; currently, these situations appear as asides to other studies with only infrequent mention in studies on manipulation.

Manipulation when used successfully goes unnoticed by those influenced by the manipulator. But when an individual becomes aware of manipulation and attributes the manipulator with self-serving motives, anger, shame, fear, and other emotions can occur. Thus, depending on the type of manipulation and the motives attributed to it, a manipulator may live with unexpected consequences from the individual he or she attempted to manipulate.

Susan A. Stearns

*Eastern Washington University*

**See Also:** Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception Motives; Lying as Exercise of Power; Magic Tricks; Malingering.

### Further Readings

Bowers, L. "Manipulation: Description, Identification, and Ambiguity." *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing*, v.10 (2003).

Fosnaugh, Jessica, Andrew L. Geers, and Justin A. Wellman. "Giving Off a Rosy Glow: The Manipulation of an Optimistic Orientation." *The Journal of Social Psychology*, v.149/3 (2009).


Greenspan, P. "The Problem With Manipulation." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, v.40 (2003).

---

## Marketing, Deceptive

Deceptive marketing is a subset of deceptive business practices that occur, according to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), when there is "a misrepresentation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably

in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." Marketing deception is legally distinct from other forms of deception because it focuses on injury to the consumer as a result of the lie or deception, regardless of intent. In the United States and most countries with consumer protection laws, the specific meanings of "deceptive practices" and "injury" are not spelled out in statutory form. Rather, the legal interpretation of



Exploiting the public's concern over vitamin deficiency as America entered World War II, the Doughnut Corporation unsuccessfully sought the endorsement of the Nutrition Division of the War Food Administration for "Vitamin Donuts." The Food and Drug Administration, also skeptical of these types of claims, eventually developed a rational program for food enrichment.

marketing deception comes from case law and the principle of *stare decisis*, precedents from prior decisions that are adhered to in future legal cases.

Marketing is the subset of business practices that affect consumers directly through exchange between buyer and seller. Consumer value, or utility, is created when the exchange satisfies the consumer's wants and needs. Producer value, or profit, is derived from receiving compensation. Marketing consists of a mix of activities involving product, price, promotion, and distribution (place). While marketing deception is most often associated with advertising and promotion, other forms of material influence occur when a product does not perform as expected, prices are unfairly manipulated, or products are not available as represented. Marketing deception occurs when the producer or seller uses deceptive practices in any of these marketing activities in order to gain an unfair advantage over competitors or consumers.

In commercial exchange, the free flow of information is viewed as essential to helping the consumer know the prices and choose between products. Marketing deception must be legally defined because First Amendment rights have been extended by the courts to advertising and other forms of speech that promote commercial transactions. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that only truthful commercial speech is protected. False, misleading, or deceptive advertising or other forms of promotion are not protected by the law.

A consumer or buyer is considered to have been injured when a misrepresentation, omission, or deceptive practice is a material one. In the legal environment, material means that a consumer's actions or decisions are affected in ways that are different from what would have occurred had the consumer not been deceived. For example, aspirin is a specific pain-killing compound that is identical in all products called aspirin. If Brand A claims that its aspirin product is more effective than aspirin from Brand B, and consumers then choose Brand A because of this claim, a material deception has occurred.

Deceptive advertising can be explicitly false, or it may make misleading claims that are true but lead consumers into making false or incorrect inferences. Inferences of meaning are difficult to

regulate. There may be considerable doubt about what has occurred in the mind of an individual consumer and whether or not the implication has misled the consumer. Advertising or other sales presentations may use “puffery,” praising the product with vague and general subjective opinions, superlatives, or exaggerations but without stating specific facts. Legally, this is often treated as allowable exaggeration, the FTC position being that consumers expect inflated claims in advertising, recognize it, and do not believe it. The Uniform Commercial Code of 1996 upheld the right of advertisers to use puffery, placing the burden of proof that the buyer was misled on the buyer.

Individual ability to interpret implicating statements may also vary, leaving the question of how many consumers have to be misled in order to consider the implication deceptive. The FTC may prohibit a representation as deceptive or unfair if it implies something to a substantial portion of the population that is different from the material facts about the product. Both case law and evolving legislation have shifted from regulating literal statements, which are readily defined, to addressing implications that are misleading and injurious. The prescriptive nature of case law means that establishing when an implication is ambiguous, misleading, or materially false has resulted in few successful prosecutions.

### Legal Approach to Deceptive Marketing

The legal approach to marketing deception is rooted in protecting competition rather than consumerism. Through the 19th century and with the expansion of economic activity, legal systems favored commercial over individual interests and were lenient in treating advertising as matters of opinion. Prior to the rise of mass media, product claims were often outrageous but little was recorded that could be challenged. *Caveat emptor* (buyer beware) guided the consumer; the buyer was expected to be skeptical of claims, examine goods before purchasing, and make an informed decision.

Defining deceptive marketing evolved slowly. The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) were among the earliest legislation to deal with unfair business practices. Both were intended to prevent anticompetitive

practices that would increase costs to the consumer. The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the FTC to enforce the Clayton Antitrust Act and provided additional legal guidelines, including those against “deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The act did not specifically address the use of false or misleading advertising. In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an FTC interpretation that false advertising is a form of unfair competition. A subsequent ruling (1931) limited the ability of the FTC to protect consumers; the court determined false advertising could not be prohibited unless there was evidence of injury to a competitor.

The Wheeler-Lea Amendment (1938) to the FTC Act declared “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” unlawful and gave the FTC injunctive power over false advertising of food, drugs, cosmetics, and therapeutic devices when that advertising was deemed to cause injury to the public. The Lanham Act of 1947 (amended by the Trademark Revision Law of 1988) gave additional guidance about the scope of deception. Misrepresenting competitors’ products was also treated as deceptive marketing when claims materially damage the competitor through the loss of sales or goodwill. Injury to competition most often occurs in comparative advertising.

### Consumer Rights and Deceptive Marketing

In March 1962, President John F. Kennedy launched the era of consumerism with a speech to Congress outlining consumer rights. Legislation such as the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (1966) and the Truth in Lending Act (1969) provided specific injunctions against deceptions directed to consumers. FTC authority expanded dramatically throughout the 1970s and focused on the issue of what constitutes unfair advertising. In 1972, the FTC Act was amended to extend its power to any product if false advertising represented a threat to public health and safety.

The terms *unfairness* and *deceptive* are undefined by the FTC Act. An FTC response to the U.S. Senate following passage of the FTC Improvement Act of 1980 clarified that consumer injury is the central issue in cases alleging unfairness. A three-part test was established for consumer injury: (1) the injury must be substantial, (2) it



must not be outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. The third part of the test alludes to deception, such as the withholding of information (omission) or the misrepresentation of information needed to comparison shop or make purchase decisions.

A prescriptive definition of deception was created in October 1983, in a Policy Statement on Deception given to the U.S. House of Representatives by FTC Chairman James Miller III. The statement included three essential elements. First, the misrepresentation, omission, or practice must be likely to mislead the consumer. “Misrepresentation” means a statement is contrary to fact. “Omission” is the failure to disclose qualifying information that would prevent a practice, claim, representation, or reasonable belief from being misleading. “Practices” are seller’s actions; examples of misleading actions include applying false quality seals, bait-and-switch appeals, playing on consumer fears, or creating impressions that the consumer has won a prize or is getting something for free.

Second, the practice must be considered from the perspective of a reasonable consumer. The FTC considers who the message is targeting and takes into account factors such as age, education, intellect, and frame of mind. For example, advertising targeted to children will be evaluated differently from marketing appeals directed to typical adults. Third, the deception must have materiality. A material misrepresentation means the information or practice is important to consumers and will affect their choice or actions with regard to a purchase decision. If the deception would not cause a reasonable consumer to alter his or her purchase decision, the misrepresentation is not considered material. FTC-related legislation subsequent to the 1983 policy statement has focused on disclosure, substantiation, corrective advertising, and regulation and enforcement issues, but definitions of unfairness and deception have not significantly changed.

### Foreign Laws Regulating Deception

Laws prohibiting false advertising and marketing deception are found in many countries. For example, in the Australian Competition and Consumer

Act 2010, definitions are similar to those in the United States. The act states the following:

If the overall impression left by an advertisement, promotion, quotation, statement or other representation made by a business creates a misleading impression—such as to the price, value or the quality of any goods and services—then the conduct is likely to breach the law.

Australian law notes that deception may not be the same for all audiences, and it requires that deception must be material to be illegal. Explicitly in Australian law intent has no consequence; deception is judged by how business practices affect consumer thoughts and beliefs.

In China, conversely, the Advertisement Law adopted in 1995 is primarily instructive. The law states, “An advertisement shall be true to facts, lawful, and in compliance with the requirements of raising socialist cultural and ideological progress. An advertisement may not contain any false and deceiving information, and may not cheat or misguide consumers.” Advertisers are expected to “adhere to the principles of fairness and trustworthiness.”

Kim B. Serota  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Audience; Business; *Caveat Emptor*; Consumer Protection Laws; Credibility; Disbelief, Suspension of; Drug Advertising; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; History of Deception: 1950 to the Present; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Lie Acceptability; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry; Public Relations; Puffery; Spin, Corporate; Tobacco Advertising.

### Further Readings

Belch, George and Michael Belch. *Advertising and Promotion*. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2007.

Boush, David, Marian Friestad, and Peter Wright. *Deception in the Marketplace*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Federal Trade Commission. “Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (as Amended 2006).”

- <http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/ftcact.shtm> (Accessed January 2013).
- Federal Trade Commission. "Policy Statement on Deception." (1983). <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policy/stmt/ad-decept.htm> (Accessed December 2012).
- Gardner, David. "Deception in Advertising: A Conceptual Approach." *Journal of Marketing*, v.39 (1975).
- Preston, Ivan. "The FTC's Handling of Puffery and Other Selling Claims Made by 'Implication.'" *Journal of Business Research*, v.5 (1977).
- Reichman, Courtland and M. Melissa Cannady. "False Advertising Under the Lanham Act." *Franchise Law Journal*, v.21 (2002).
- Richards, Jef and Ivan Preston. "Proving and Disproving Materiality of Deceptive Advertising Claims." *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, v.11 (1992).

## McCornack, Steven

Steven McCornack is one of the most cited deception researchers in the communication discipline, with over 1,100 citations of his work. His research career in deception began with his undergraduate thesis at the University of Washington. In this research, conducted under the supervision of Malcolm R. Parks, McCornack and Parks proposed the term *truth bias*, which is now one of the most researched and robust findings in the deception literature.

McCornack and Parks also put forward a model of Relational Deception. Included in the model was the examination of relational closeness, confidence in the ability to discern truth versus lies spoken by relational partners, truth bias, and accuracy of deception detection. With the model, they proposed that relational closeness or involvement with a partner led to increased confidence in one's ability to detect deception. As confidence increased, so, too, would truth bias. Truth bias was believed to have a negative effect on detection accuracy. So, as relational partners became more involved and relationships developed, ultimately the truth bias would increase, and partners would be less able to detect each other's deception. This model was tested by McCornack and Parks and

retested by McCornack and Timothy R. Levine, who found support for the model and that it also was generalizable across low, moderate, and high levels of aroused suspicion. A meta-analysis demonstrated further support for the model.

### Information Manipulation Theory

As McCornack began work on his Ph.D., he began collecting data from college students whom he asked to report on a lie told to a romantic partner. From this data he created scenarios with gender-neutral names like "Chris," and then asked research participants to write down what they thought they would say in response to the scenarios. He discovered violations of Paul Grice's maxims, or the cooperative principle, in the messages participants created. Thus, information manipulation theory (IMT) was born.

McCornack created IMT to better understand the deceptive messages that individuals create, and he posited that messages can be manipulated along dimensions of each of Grice's maxims. Thus, a message may vary in ambiguity (manner violation), how much relevant information it contains (relevance violation), in its veracity (how much false information it includes or quality violation), and in the amount of relevant information it contains (quantity violation). McCornack is clear, however, that the violations on which IMT is based are not to be used to create a typology, as any deceptive messages can vary along each of the four dimensions, and not just along one of the dimensions.

Much of the research on IMT has used the violations to understand perceptions of deception and how these perceptions influence perceived competence of deceptive messages. For example, messages that tend to contain more quality violations, or more complete dishonesty, have in some situations been found to be less competent than messages that do not contain as much distorted information. IMT, although disputed even by McCornack if it meets all the criteria necessary to be considered a theory, has proved to have strong heuristic power. It has stimulated much research, including comparing individualistic and collectivistic perceptions of messages, self-construal and locus of control and perceptions of deceptive messages, and the organizational situations and perceptions of deceptive messages in response to these situations.

Information manipulation theory 2 (IMT2) is a combination of the original IMT and McCornack's chapter on deceptive message production published in John O. Greene's *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*. IMT2 is a comprehensive theory which includes 15 propositions on deceptive message construction. Deception, according to IMT and IMT2, is the covert manipulation of information along the four dimensions that represent violations of Grice's maxims. McCornack adds to this in IMT2 by claiming that lying behavior may be easier at times than telling the truth, which changes much of what is believed about deception causing arousal and thus potential leakage cues. Also, lying may require memory retrieval and not the construction of new information to be used in a message. IMT2 adds to the deception literature in that it may challenge much of the previous research on message production, intention, and arousal theories.

### Aroused Suspicion

Aroused suspicion is another of McCornack's contributions to deception literature. In an effort to find out why previous researchers could not improve lie detection accuracy through induction of suspicion, he and colleagues proposed that a dichotomous (low and high) manipulation of suspicion may be the cause of the no or mixed results. To address this, McCornack and colleagues induced suspicion at three levels: low or no suspicion, moderate, and high levels of suspicion. They found a curvilinear relationship between romantic partners such that detection accuracy increased at moderate levels of suspicion but decreased at low or high levels of suspicion. Levine later retested this model with strangers and found a linear effect for suspicion in that it incrementally increased lie detection accuracy as suspicion increased; at the highest levels of induced suspicion, strangers were the most accurate at detecting lies.

McCornack also added to the aroused suspicion literature by explicating and testing two different types of suspicion—state and trait suspicion. State suspicion is the suspicion that would be induced in an experiment, and trait suspicion he called Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS). GCS is the predisposition of an individual to be suspicious; an individual may be more

inclined to be suspicious of all information. McCornack and colleagues found that individuals who were already highly suspicious (high level of GCS), and who received a moderate induction of suspicion, demonstrated a higher than average ability (70 percent) to accurately detect deception. They also found that GCS moderates the relationship between state suspicion and lie bias. Further, they found that women who had high levels of GCS had the strongest emotional reactions to discovered deception when compared to men. Tests of the GCS measure have demonstrated support for dimensionality, construct validity, and for predictive utility of the measure.

McCornack has also contributed to the deception literature by training individuals to detect deception, the probing effect, lie acceptability, discovered deception, and the veracity effect. His work in deception has evolved from the messages created to understanding the creation of deceptive messages, and his research is the foundation of much of the deception research in the communication discipline.

Anne P. Hubbell

New Mexico State University

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Information Manipulation Theory 1; Information Manipulation Theory 2; Lie Bias; Probing Effect; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

- Levine, Timothy R. and Steven A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).
- Levine, Timothy R. and Steven A. McCornack. "The Dark Side of Trust: Conceptualizing and Measuring Types of Communicative Suspicion." *Communication Quarterly*, v.39/4 (1991).
- McCornack, Steven A. "The Generation of Deceptive Messages: Laying the Groundwork for a Viable Theory of Interpersonal Deception. In *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, John. O. Greene, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
- McCornack, Steven A. "Information Manipulation Theory." *Communication Monographs*, v.59 (1992).

McCornack, Steven A. and Malcolm Parks.  
“Deception Detection and Relationship  
Development: The Other Side of Trust.” In  
*Communication Yearbook* 9, M. L. McLaughlin,  
ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1986.

---

## McCornack-Parks Model

The McCornack-Parks Model is a model of deception detection conceptualized by communication scholars Steven McCornack and Malcolm R. Parks. Broadly described, the model posits that increases in relational intimacy lead to decreases in deception detection ability. However, the relationship between these variables is argued to be indirect, mediated by confidence in detection ability and truth bias.

The model derives from work McCornack conducted as a part of his senior honors thesis at the University of Washington, under the supervision of Parks. McCornack was interested in exploring the impact that increases in romantic intimacy had upon accuracy in deception detection. At that point in time (the early 1980s), only a handful of previous studies had explored the effects of intimacy upon accuracy—with mixed results. One line of research, authored by Randy Brandt and his colleagues, had investigated the detection abilities of strangers, manipulating “familiarity” through repeated exposure to the truthful behaviors of message sources. They found a curvilinear effect for such familiarity on detection accuracy, such that increases in the number of exposures to truthful source behavior increased accuracy in detecting deception to a certain point, after which additional exposures resulted in decreased accuracy.

Other scholars had examined actual relational partners, comparing accuracy across different types of involvements. Mark Comadena, for example, had studied the comparative detection accuracy of marital spouses versus friends, finding that spouses had higher accuracy. In contrast, Gerald Miller and his colleagues found little difference in detection accuracy between spouses, close friends, and strangers.

McCornack and Parks argued that one reason for the conflicting findings was that the

relationship between familiarity and accuracy was indirect, mediated by two variables. The first of these was confidence in detection ability. The second was a variable that would come to be widely studied and cited within the field of deception: a bias toward consistently perceiving a partner as truthful, that McCornack and Parks labeled “truth bias.”

McCornack and Parks concluded that these variables likely were causally interdependent. Specifically, they reasoned that increases in relational intimacy would lead partners to believe that they could, in fact, detect their partners’ lies (that is, confidence in detection ability). At the same time, this increase in confidence would be associated directly with an increased belief that their partners would never lie. McCornack and Parks argued that if individuals believe they can always catch their partners’ lies, they are more likely to process partners’ communication heuristically and presume associated positive beliefs, such as “my partner is always telling me the truth” (that is, truth bias).

Truth bias, in turn, should be directly negatively related to accuracy in detecting deception. That is, if people believe that their partners never lie, they will not detect their partners’ lies when they do occur. The practical implication of the proposed model, in toto, is that individuals involved in romantic relationships should believe that they can detect their partners’ lies, should believe that their partners would never lie to them, and should have decidedly low deception detection accuracy.

Using partial correlations, McCornack and Parks tested this causal string in data they collected from 60 romantically involved college dating couples. Their results confirmed their proposed model. A conference paper based on their results subsequently won Top Paper in the Interpersonal Division of the International Communication Association and was published the following year in *Communication Yearbook* 9.

In 1990, McCornack and Timothy R. Levine replicated the McCornack-Parks study within a larger sample, using path analysis to test the causal model. The McCornack-Parks Model provided the best fit to their data. Subsequently, psychologist Bella DePaulo and her colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of studies examining



confidence and detection accuracy. As a part of their meta-analysis, they tested the McCornack-Parks Model, finding strong support for the proposed causal string. Thus, the McCornack-Parks model appears to be robust.

Steve McCornack  
Michigan State University

**See Also:** Deception and Trust; Deception Detection Accuracy; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Brandt, D. R., G. R. Miller, and J. E. Hocking. "Effects of Self-Monitoring and Familiarity on Deception Detection." *Communication Quarterly*, v.28 (1980).
- Brandt, D. R., G. R. Miller, and J. E. Hocking. "Familiarity and Lie Detection: A Replication and Extension." *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, v.46 (1982).
- Brandt, D. R., G. R. Miller, and J. E. Hocking. "The Truth-Deception Attribution: Effects of Familiarity on the Ability of Observers to Detect Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.6 (1980).
- Comadena, M. E. "Accuracy in Detecting Deception: Intimate and Friendship Relationships." In *Communication Yearbook 6*, M. Burgoon, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1982.
- DePaulo, B. M., K. Charlton, H. Cooper, J. J. Lindsay, and L. Muhlenbruck. "The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.1 (1997).
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- McCornack, S. A. and M. R. Parks. "Deception Detection Accuracy in Dating Relationships: The Other Side of Trust." In *Communication Yearbook 9*, M. L. McLaughlin, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1986.
- Miller, G. R., J. E. Bauchner, J. E. Hocking, N. E. Fontes, E. P. Kaminski, and D. R. Brandt. "...And Nothing But the Truth: How Well Can Observers Detect Deceptive Testimony?" In *Perspectives in Law and Psychology. The Jury, Judicial, and Trial Process*, Vol. 2, B. D. Sales, ed. New York: Plenum, 1981.

## Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry

The medicine and pharmaceutical industry is one of the most lucrative businesses in the United States. In 2010, approximately \$2.6 trillion was spent on health care, or \$8,402 per person. As the average consumer pays only about 6 percent of their income on health care, the federal government assumes a large share of the cost. In 2010, half of U.S. government revenues were spent on health care. Of this amount, 12 percent was paid by individuals, and insurance, both public and private, paid the remainder. With this much money invested in health care, it is not surprising that there are many opportunities for deception and fraud.

In an effort to prevent deceptive and fraudulent behaviors, expectations, or codes of conduct, for the behavior of medical professionals as well as pharmaceutical companies have been developed. The American Medical Association states in its Code of Ethics that "A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities."

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which represents the leading pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in the United States, also has a code of conduct created as a means of self-regulating the industry. The code states that when a pharmaceutical representative speaks with a health care professional they must act as follows: Promotional materials provided to health care professionals by or on behalf of a company should: (1) be accurate and not misleading, (2) make claims about a product only when properly substantiated, (3) reflect the balance between risks and benefits, and (4) be consistent with all other Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements governing such communications.

### Deception by Pharmaceutical Companies

Although there are codes of conduct and expectations of ethical behavior, there are many examples of deceptive and unethical behavior by

pharmaceutical companies. One area in which pharmaceutical companies deceive physicians and other health care professionals is through sponsored clinical trials. For example, in 2008, the *New England Journal of Medicine* published a review of antidepressant efficacy studies. Of the studies examined in the review, 38 had positive results, and most of these had been published. The remainder showed negative results. Of those with negative findings, 22 had not been published and 11 had been published to seem as though the results were positive. Only three of the studies with negative results were accurately reported in medical journals.

Another method of deception utilized by pharmaceutical companies are seeding trials. Seeding trials are clinical experiments supported by pharmaceutical companies that include multiple centers and physicians. Seeding trials take place after a new product has been introduced and appear to represent a scientific trial of the new medicine. Instead, however, they are a marketing effort to encourage physicians to try the new product and become accustomed to prescribing it to patients.

In the past, pharmaceutical companies used Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs as marketing tools and were able to send physicians on resort excursions where they could have discussions with other physicians and attend programs about the drugs being promoted by the company. These vacations, and expensive meals for physicians and other health care professionals, have been curtailed to some extent, and now CME programs are expected to focus on disease states and not on pharmaceutical products. In addition, the money that pharmaceutical companies spend on physicians has to be reasonable, not part of a recreational or entertainment event, and company activities must be appropriately conducted so as to promote professional and/or informational communication. Pharmaceutical sales representatives, once called detail representatives or detail people, may now spend less money on meals or entertainment for physicians, but their companies have compensated for this by employing overlapping sales forces and multiple companies marketing the same product. These tactics are used to inundate physicians with information and reminders about pharmaceutical products.



*An X-ray from a medical case report published in October 2008 shows a bottle fragment that a patient claimed was broken off in his body cavity during an assault; doctors discovered that he had secretly inserted it himself. Munchausen syndrome, which is the pretense of having a serious illness, was diagnosed in this case. It is one way that patients attempt to deceive physicians.*

Another method of deception is the promotion of off-label uses of pharmaceutical products. The Food and Drug Administration approves medicines for specific treatments, dosages, and other criteria based on laboratory and clinical trials; off-label uses occur when drugs are prescribed for conditions, patients, and in ways that have not been FDA-approved. Physicians are allowed to use their knowledge and experience to determine when it is appropriate to use a medicine for an off-label purpose. Pharmaceutical sales representatives and companies, however, are not allowed to market these uses. There is a temptation to do so, however, because it is expensive and time-consuming for companies to complete the testing necessary to obtain FDA approval for multiple

uses of a product. Thus, a drug company may strive for one or more approved uses, and then talk to physicians about unapproved uses of the medicine.

### **Deception Aimed at Consumers**

Pharmaceutical companies also misrepresent information to consumers or patients. One method for doing this is through video news releases about products. These video news releases look like a regular news program or news story, yet they are carefully created by pharmaceutical companies to look this way. They can range from straightforward information communicated by a seeming "journalist" to being highly sophisticated in their delivery of information, such that news agencies can insert their own reporters asking scripted questions and then presumably have these questions "answered" by the video of an expert responding to the question.

Another method of consumer deception is direct-to-consumer advertising on television and other media. At times this can be extreme, such as when Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation marketed Retin-A, an acne medication, for the reduction of wrinkles and skin discolorations. Retin-A, however, was not approved for the treatment of wrinkles and skin discolorations. In an effort to hide their marketing of this unapproved use of their product, employees of Ortho Pharmaceutical shredded documents and destroyed videotapes. However, papers detailing their efforts still existed and were subpoenaed, uncovering the fraudulent marketing program.

### **Deception by Health Care Professionals**

Not only are physicians and patients deceived, but there also are times when health care professionals, including physicians, may themselves feel pressure or an obligation to lie. When a patient is terminally ill, physicians often struggle with telling the patient that he or she has little time left. In fact, research shows that physicians consistently overestimate how much time patients have until they will die, and this propensity increases the closer they are to the patient. When patients are asked, however, if they want the complete truth, the majority of them report that they do. They want the opportunity to understand what is happening to them, and without this knowledge their

degrading health and lack of understanding can create more anxiety for the patients, not less.

Physicians and other health care professionals may also be willing to use deception when dealing with insurance companies or third-party payers. Health care fraud through incorrect, or deceptive, billing is a pervasive practice. Another method of deception is called "gaming," which occurs when health care professionals deceptively persuade third-party payers to pay for patients' care.

The introduction of the Internet created still more methods of deception. One technique is the use of "spamnals," which appear to be legitimate online scientific journals. Spamnals invite physicians to submit articles, which the online journals publish after the physician or scientist pays the journal a small fee. There are many legitimate journals with true peer review, but spamnals are not legitimate and may publish poorly conducted research, which may then be misleading to physicians, patients, and other health care professionals.

Even legitimate journals may publish work that is later retracted for inaccuracies or other issues. It would seem that this would happen randomly, but this is not always the case. In an analysis of retracted medical and scientific articles, R. Grant Steen found that, "Retractions tend to appear in journals with an impact factor significantly above average . . . (they) are also significantly clustered in a specific subset of journals and are written by a specific subset of 'repeat offenders.'"

### **Patient Deception**

Finally, even patients lie. Munchausen syndrome, or the pretense of having a serious disease or of having a disease by proxy, as when parents make their children appear to have serious illnesses, is an example of how patients may effectively deceive physicians in order to receive health care services they do not need. With experience it would seem that physicians would become better at detecting deception when, in fact, they are not. Research that investigated physicians' ability to tell when they were treating actors and not real patients found that physicians were relatively unable to determine when they were treating an actor instead of an actual patient.

Anne P. Hubbell  
*New Mexico State University*

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Consumer Protection Laws; Corporate Fraud; Deception in Research Design; Drug Advertising; Drugs; Federal Trade Commission; Malingerings; Marketing, Deceptive; Stewart, Martha.

### Further Readings

- American Medical Association. "Principles of Medical Ethics." <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page> (Accessed November 2012).
- Bleidt, Barry. "Recent Issues and Concerns About Pharmaceutical Industry Promotional Efforts." *Journal of Drug Issues*, v.22 (1992).
- Carley, William M. "Court Papers Detail Ortho's Retin-A Deception." *Wall Street Journal* (March 1, 1995).
- Davies, James. "The Deceptions of the Pharmaceutical Industry." *Therapy Today*, v.23 (2012).
- Fallowfield, Lesley, J. and H. A. Beveridge. "Truth May Hurt but Deceit Hurts More: Communication in Palliative Care." *Palliative Medicine*, v.16 (2002).
- Gilhooley, Margaret. "Commercial Speech and Off-Label Drug Uses: What Role for Wide Acceptance, General Recognition, and Research Incentives." *American Journal of Law and Medicine*, v.37 (2011).
- Green, Michael J. and Benjamin H. Levi. "The Truth About Lying." *American Journal of Bioethics*, v.4 (2004).
- Huddle, Thomas S. "Honesty Is an Internal Norm of Medical Practice and the Best Policy." *American Journal of Bioethics*, v.12 (2012).
- Jung, Beth and Marcus M. Reidenberg. "Physicians Being Deceived." *Pain Medicine*, v.8 (2007).
- Launer, John. "Scams and Spams." *Postgraduate Medical Journal*, v.88 (2012).
- Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. "Code on Interactions With Healthcare Professionals." <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page> (Accessed November 2012).
- Steen, R. Grant. "Retractions in the Medical Literature: Who is Responsible for Scientific Integrity?" *American Medical Writers Association Journal*, v.26 (2011).

Wilson, Katherine B. "Health Care Costs 101."

California Health Care Foundation. <http://www.chcf.org/publications/2012/08/health-care-costs-101#ixzz2DjWnWK2w> (Accessed November 2012).

## Memoirs

A memoir is a category of autobiography that focuses on an author's experience rather than his or her entire life. They have been a challenge for literary critics for centuries because memoirs can push the boundaries of literary truth and deception. Many memoirs have been revealed to contain only partial truths, and in some cases, little truth at all. The controversial nature of truth in memoirs has prompted critics to propose another genre for memoirs: creative nonfiction.

Memoirs are a type of autobiographical writing, distinct from autobiography in the scope of experience. The word *memoir* is derived from the French word *mémoire*, which translates to memory or reminiscence. While the words *autobiography* and *memoir* are used almost interchangeably in the marketing of books, autobiographies tend to focus on an author's entire life, with attention to chronological order and verifiable facts. Memoirs, on the other hand, have a much narrower scope and focus on specific, transformative moments in an author's life.

*Confessions*, written in 371 C.E. by Saint Augustine, was one of the first recorded memoirs. The book describes Augustine's theft of a few pears and its effect on his transformation from a larcenous, promiscuous teenager into a faith-driven adult. Xenophon's *Anabasis*, written in the 4th century B.C.E., prior to Saint Augustine's memoir, recounts how he and his troops managed to make their way back to safety after getting trapped behind enemy lines. Earlier memoirs likely exist, but written records are sparse around this time period. These early autobiographical examples are distinctively memoirs, as they focus on pivotal, transcendent, or spiritual experiences that subsequently develop the central character's personality, beliefs, or eventual lifestyles.

Because memoirs are experiences written from memory—which can be fallible—literary critics



have argued whether memoirs with false information are actually deceptive or simply erroneous and whether they should still be classified as nonfiction works. A common definition of deception is the act of deliberately misleading another without permission to do so. Under this definition, memoirs may not be deceptive, as the authors are unintentionally misremembering details and not deliberately misleading readers. However, other definitions emphasize that any falsehood that benefits the communicator is deceptive. Under this definition memoirs with unintentionally exaggerated or misrepresented facts may be deceptive.

### Hoaxes of 2003

The authenticity of memoirs has come under substantial scrutiny and fact-checking, and some of these investigations have revealed memoirs that are deceptive regardless of the definition. In 2003, three memoir hoaxes were unveiled roughly around the same time, sometimes referred to as a Triple Crown of hoaxes. The most notable of these was the James Frey scandal. Frey published a memoir titled *A Million Little Pieces* (2003), in which a 23-year-old man overcomes drug addiction and alcohol abuse through treatment and willpower. The book was featured in Oprah Winfrey's book club and acclaimed by Winfrey to be "like nothing you've ever read before." However, problems with core elements of Frey's story were uncovered, including the fact that he had not actually lived a life of illicit drug use. Winfrey invited Frey back on her show with Nan A. Talese, the head of the Doubleday publishing company, to publicly scold Frey for his fraud and Talese for her failure to promote honesty and truth in publishing.

Another hoax unveiled in 2003 involved an entirely constructed identity and life story. J. T. LeRoy, author of *Sarah* (1999), *The Heart Is Deceitful Above All Things* (1999), *Harold's End* (2005), and *Labour* (2007), covered LeRoy's life of drug addiction, sexual and physical abuse, prostitution, and vagrancy. LeRoy's stories developed a cult following until 2003 when LeRoy's identity was revealed as a fabrication created by author Laura Victoria Albert. She kept LeRoy's identity secret by claiming he had extreme shyness and issued statements saying he had insecurities about being a transgendered author. Eventually,

Albert's partner, Geoffrey Knoop, revealed that LeRoy was a literary hoax. In 2007, Albert was convicted of fraud because she signed legal documents with her fictional character's name.

The third 2003 hoax involved the popular author Nasdijj, pen name of Timothy Patrick Barus, who published three "memoirs": *The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams* (2000), *The Boy and the Dog Are Sleeping* (2003), and *Geronimo's Bones: A Memoir of My Brother and Me* (2004). Nasdijj claimed to be Navajo with two adopted sons, one who had fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) and another who was human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive. He also claimed that "Nasdijj" was the Navajo word for "to become again," but according to Ivan Morris, professor of Navajo studies at Dine College, no such word exists in the Navajo language. Nasdijj's essay "The Blood Runs Like a River Through My Dreams" detailed his son's death induced by FAS, for which Nasdijj was a finalist in the National Magazine Awards. His identity was questioned when Nasdijj was accused of plagiarizing other Native American authors. When Morris was asked to review his book, he uncovered many discrepancies with facts and suspected Nasdijj was actually an imposter.

### Use of Deception

Some authors claimed to use deception to make a point. The memoir *Love and Consequences: A Memoir of Hope and Survival* (2008) was written by Margaret Seltzer under the name of Margaret B. Jones. Seltzer claimed to be half-Native American and wrote about life as a foster child adopted by African American parents and as a Bloods gang member. Seltzer was discovered to actually be fully white, with no Native American ancestry; she also had grown up with her biological parents and attended an affluent Episcopalian school in Hollywood. Seltzer later apologized, saying she sought to "give a voice to the voiceless." Some African American literature critics saw this as an embarrassment to the genre rather than an inspirational piece. Her book is still being published and is selling, despite the falsehood.

Some memoirs are partially true but still problematic. Herman Rosenblat, an actual Holocaust survivor, wrote *Angel at the Fence: The True Story of a Love That Survived* (2009). Rosenblat's memoir focused on his interaction, separation,

reunion, and marriage with a girl who passed him food through a fence while he was imprisoned at Schlieben, part of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Before being exposed as a fabrication, the film rights to the book were purchased for \$25 million. Winfrey described it as the single greatest love story she had heard in 22 years of the *Oprah Winfrey Show*. Literary critics, however, questioned the plausibility of the story's serendipitous plot. Rosenblat had, in fact, been imprisoned at Schlieben, but studies at Michigan State University revealed that neither prisoners nor civilians could have safely approached the perimeter fence at Schlieben. Evidence also arose that Mrs. Rosenblat and her family hid as Christians at a farm near Breslau, 210 miles away from Schlieben. Rosenblat ultimately admitted to fabricating the story, and Berkeley Books eventually dropped the book from publication.

Other authors claim that fabrications are a result of delusion or self-deception, in which they convinced themselves to believe what is false as true. In *Misha: A Mémoire of the Holocaust Years* (1997), Misha Defonseca, pseudonym of Monique De Wael, claimed to be a Jewish Holocaust survivor who parted with her parents when she was 8 years old. Her story chronicles a five-year, 1,900-mile walk across Europe, where she spent time in the Warsaw Ghetto, lived with wolves, and killed a rapist German soldier in self-defense. In actuality, she wasn't Jewish, didn't live with wolves, and never walked across Europe. However, Nazis had, in fact, taken her parents away when she was 4 years old. In 2008, 11 years after the book's publication, evidence was unearthed indicating that she was Catholic and attending school in Brussels when her story supposedly occurred. Defonseca confessed in a statement that said, "Ever since I can remember, I felt Jewish . . . I find it difficult to differentiate between reality and my inner world." Her delusion of what is real and what is not may not count as intentionally deceptive; however, her facts were incorrect and she admitted the fault in her actions.

### Creative Nonfiction

The questionable factual basis of memoirs has spawned debate about the legitimacy of "creative nonfiction" as a new genre. Edmund White, a novelist, essayist, and memoirist, argues that "a

writer's contract with the reader in a memoir is to tell the truth and nothing but the truth," whereas a novelist has made clear his intention to write fiction. White dislikes the phrase "creative nonfiction" because it sounds like a synonym for lying. Alternatively, author Melanie McGrath states:

Some of the facts have slipped through the holes . . . I have reimagined scenes or reconstructed events in a way I believe reflects the essence of the scene or the event in the minds and hearts of the people who lived through it . . . To my mind this literary tinkering does not alter the more profound truth of the story.

Despite conflicting beliefs on the genre's legitimacy, creative nonfiction has developed a loyal following of readers who believe in it as "artfully executed nonfiction." This new genre and attraction to memoirs as a whole have drawn more scrutiny to nonfiction, encouraging more thorough critiques and the pursuit for higher quality nonfiction as a whole.

Memoirs have been a literary anomaly since their inception in ancient history. They skirt on the edge of truth and deception. With countless examples of literary fraud and literary success, the memoir has exposed potential need for thorough analysis and critique and encouraged the growth of a new genre of literature altogether. Whether it will evolve into this new genre or continue as a subclass of autobiography is debatable, but it certainly is the basis for a cultural phenomenon in literature.

Therese Bailey  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Augustine, Saint; Columbus, Christopher; Deception, Characteristics of; Deception, Definitions of; Deception Motives; Exaggeration; False Memories; Fiction; Frey, James; Half-Truths; Historical Narratives, False; Pathological Lying; Plagiarism; Self-Deception; Tall Tales; White Lies.

### Further Readings

Fogarty, R. S. "Memoirs True and False." *Antioch Review*, v.69 (2011). <http://search.proquest.com/docview/900806233?accountid=10267> (Accessed January 2013).

- Heffernan, V. "Give us Your Snake Charmers, Your Fakirs, Your Frauds." <http://themedium.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/14/give-us-your-snakecharmers-your-fakirs-your-frauds> (Accessed January 2013).
- Kihlstrom, J. F. "Memoir." <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/memoir.htm> (Accessed January 2013).
- Rich, M. "Gang Memoir, Turning Page, is Pure Fiction." *New York Times* (March 4, 2008). <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/books/04fake.html?hp> (Accessed January 2013).

## Memory

Memory is essential to human survival. It contains the entirety of people's knowledge and understanding of themselves and their world. It helps individuals identify the objects around them, predict and understand events they may confront, and strategically interact with their physical and social worlds to survive and achieve their goals. It tells individuals where they have been, what they have experienced, and therefore who they are; what they can and cannot accomplish, what they should try and what they should not, and if they do try, how to go about it. Despite these essential functions of memory, and their overall success, memory can nevertheless be deceptive in ways great and small. It can simply fail, forgetting aspects of experience ranging from minor details to large segments of individuals' lives. And it can deceive, leading people to misremember events that did occur and even to falsely remember events that never occurred, sometimes very dramatic events such as being abducted by aliens or ritually abused in satanic cults.

Many people underestimate these multiple failures and deceptive functions of memory. Some even believe that memory works like a video camera, that it records exactly what is there to be perceived, that this recording remains unchanged in memory over time, and that it can be retrieved and recounted accurately. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Some aspects of what people experience are not stored at all. Memory misrepresents other aspects partially or completely; and it commits these deceptions during each of the three major stages of memory: encoding, storage, and retrieval.

### Processing and Encoding

When individuals first perceive and experience an event, their memories encode and store both more and less (and sometimes something different) than what they have experienced. Even though their eyes allow a relatively wide view of a scene, most of what is available to their eyes will not be noticed. Memory follows the focus of attention. Because attention is selective and cannot simultaneously focus on everything in people's sensory fields, memory is also selective, encoding only a fraction of what is available for processing.

Among the most interesting illustrations of this selectivity in processing is research on "change blindness." This work shows that very dramatic and large changes in people's visual field can take place as they watch something happen, though many fail to notice. Daniel Simons and Daniel Levin have provided many surprising illustrations of this phenomenon. In one striking demonstration, for example, research participants are talking with one person, are very briefly interrupted, and then many fail to notice when that person is replaced by a completely different person who continues the conversation as if nothing (and no one) had changed. Such failures occur, at least in part, because participants are not attending to specific features of the two persons necessary to tell them apart. Rather, people encode only broad categorical information, such as "a roughly 30-year-old white man." This phenomenon illustrates a broad category of failures of processing because of "inattention blindness," in which failures of attention translate to failures of encoding.

If something is attended to and encoded, it can nevertheless be encoded incorrectly. The act of encoding includes interpretation. Individuals encode a combination of sensory input and semantic (interpreted) meaning of an event, leaving memory traces that hold verbal meaning, sensory images, and affective traces of the emotions an experience evoked. These largely verbal stories people tell themselves about what happened and the feelings associated with them remain clearer over time than the sensory images and tend to become the primary basis of reported memories of the event. Because interpretation is a subjective process, and because it is central to

individuals' understanding of what happened and how they feel about it, what is encoded into memory can be strongly affected by individuals' existing knowledge, expectations, goals, and motivations, and by aspects of the context in which events unfold.

Most often, existing knowledge is helpful, telling people what they are seeing, what to expect from it, and what to do about it. To categorize a large, shaggy, onrushing figure as a "bear," for example, people must have learned the word *bear* and what it means; to decide to run away from the bear, people must have learned what bears might do to them. But sometimes people are led astray. Motivations can lead them to see what they want to see, such as when a male on a date with a beautiful woman "sees" her behavior as flirting when she only means it to be friendly. In addition, expectations can lead people to see what they expect.

A series of dramatic illustrations of disastrous expectation-based errors in encoding was provided by a line of research on the phenomenon of "weapons false alarm." This research was inspired by the case of a young black man, Amadou Diallo, who was shot to death by police officers who misperceived the wallet in his hand as a weapon. Researchers believed that Diallo's death, and those of other weaponless young black men shot by police, may not have been ill-intentioned. Rather, they suggested that cultural stereotypes associate blacks with violence, particularly young male blacks. Expectations based on these stereotypes can lead officers to mistakenly interpret neutral objects in the hands of young black males as weapons, particularly when officers feel endangered themselves, become focused on the detection and elimination of threats, and operate under pressure to react quickly, without time for reflection. A series of studies showed that neutral objects are more likely to be misinterpreted and reacted to as weapons in the hands of black men than white men, particularly when one must react quickly.

Memory researchers have documented a wide range of other effects comparable to the "weapons false alarm." People encode objective reality subjectively, colored through the lenses of pre-existing knowledge, expectations, emotions, and motivations triggered by their own personal

learning histories and personalities, and by the immediate context in which events occur.

### Characteristics and Components of Memory

Whether individuals encode correctly or incorrectly, memory is not constant. It fades over time, quickly at first, and then more and more slowly as time passes. As the original memories fade, they can morph and change. New events and sensory images blend, become confused with, or overwrite, the older experiences, and the old memories can become partially or fully reconstructed to fit more closely with people's current experiences, expectations, motivations, and beliefs.

To understand how this happens, it is important to consider what a memory is. As noted earlier, many think of a memory in terms of sensory images that can be replayed in their minds. Memory scientists, however, suggest that memory consists of three components: (1) beliefs about what did happen (the verbal stories referenced earlier), (2) sensory images, and (3) other relevant knowledge affecting the plausibility of what an individual believes happened versus that of alternative versions of what happened. Each of these can change over time, causing changes in what the person "remembers."

### False Memories

One line of research begun by Elizabeth Loftus illustrates the role that changes in these three aspects of memory can play in creating rich and detailed false memories for autobiographical events that never actually happened. Participants in these studies are first told by trusted family members that an event occurred earlier in their lives, even though the participant initially reported no memory of the event and did not believe it had happened. This led many participants to believe falsely that the event must have happened, even though they couldn't remember it. Participants were then told to spend time thinking about the event, trying to picture and remember it over the next week. The process of actively imagining and picturing the event creates images the person would not otherwise have. When participants returned to the laboratory the next week, some of them had developed false memories for the events, and they reported elaborate details of



what happened. The new beliefs and images created by the experimental procedures led them to develop new “memories.”

These rich, false memories developed for a variety of events, such as being lost in a mall as a young child, riding in hot air balloons, being attacked and bitten by vicious animals, nearly drowning and being rescued by a lifeguard, and others. False memories for some events were more difficult to implant, such as witnessing a demon possession. However, if participants were first given information enhancing the plausibility that demon possessions do occur, it became easier to implant false memories that they had witnessed such a possession themselves.

Though these studies illustrated how new, relevant information, images, or beliefs can facilitate the creation of completely false memories, related processes can more subtly alter memories for real events. Some internal motivations and goals seem to pervasively shape memories over time. These include the need for individuals to maintain self-esteem, to maintain coherent views of themselves, to justify their past actions, and generally to feel good. Other changes in memory are caused by external influences, such as conversations with others, or new information that causes individuals to think about the event from a different perspective. Among the most important external influences are those that occur when people are questioned about their memories. Suggestive questions can either directly state (“Did you see how drunk he was?”) or imply (“Did you see ‘the’ stop sign?”) that a particular version of events is true. These questions convey what others seem to believe happened and thereby affect individuals’ own beliefs (and through that pathway, their memories).

Despite the many ways in which our memories deceive people, individuals are largely unaware of these deceptions. Though they can knowingly lie, they are perhaps most often “honest liars,” reporting events as they remember them but failing to recognize how the normal processes of memory have misrepresented or fabricated the events they recount.

Ironically, the very conviction with which individuals hold their false memories may help them to deceive others. Evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers has recently argued that people’s many self-deceptions help them to deceive others and in

doing so also help them to survive, to get ahead, and to procreate.

Lawrence Patihis  
University of California, Irvine  
Deborah Davis  
University of Nevada, Reno  
Elizabeth F. Loftus  
University of California, Irvine

**See Also:** Brain; Cognitive Load; False Memories; Mental Effort in Lying; Repressed Memories; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

- Brainerd, Charles J. and Valerie F. Reyna. *The Science of False Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Davis, Deborah and Elizabeth F. Loftus. “Internal and External Sources of Distortion in Adult Witness Memory.” In *Handbook of Eyewitness Memory: Memory for Events*, Vol. 1, M. P. Toglia, J. D. Read, D. R. Ross, and R. C. L. Lindsay, eds. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2007.
- Levin, Daniel T. and Daniel J. Simons. “Failure to Detect Changes to Attended Objects in Motion Pictures.” *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*, v.4 (1997).
- Loftus, Elizabeth F. and Jacqueline E. Pickrell. “The Formation of False Memories.” *Psychiatric Annals*, v.25 (1995).
- Trivers, Robert. *The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life*. New York: Basic Books, 2011.

---

## Men

Edel Ennis and colleagues define lying as a message that one gives to another by which they are deliberately deceiving them. Current research on the prevalence of lying in the United States is inconclusive. One school of thought proposes that lying is natural to the human condition. In this sense, lying is thought of as a frequent and fundamental part of everyday life. Others view lying and deceptive behavior in general as a threat to the moral fabric of society. Societies potentially

rise and fall on the success or failure of many to adhere to a set of real or perceived moral codes. Researchers continue in their efforts to verify the reality of these and other defining characteristics of lying.

Research indicates that 91 percent of the human population tells lies on a regular basis, and that many individuals engage in at least 13 major lies within any given week. People in these situations don't want to lie, but sometimes they are caught up in situations in which lying is the better choice of two evils. The following examples are common situations in which many individuals have engaged in lying:

A wife asks her husband to comment on her new hairdo. While in truth he may think it hideous, to keep the peace and remain in her good graces, he tells her, "It looks great, honey."

A child has a starring singing role in the school play. Her parents see that the child is excited and that she puts much effort into her preparation for the big event. However, while listening to their daughter rehearse her song, her parents comes to the startling realization that the child can't carry a tune. The parents are faced with a difficult choice: hurt the child's feeling by telling her she can't sing, or continue to offer encouragement by telling a little white lie. "Oh baby, you sound great. You're going to be a hit," the parents reply.

A homeless individual approaches a man on the street, asking if he has some change to spare. The man is faced with a mild dilemma. He knows he has some change in his pocket; however, he hesitates. For whatever reason, he doesn't want to give the homeless person money. He is forced to choose from his three options: keep walking, tell the homeless person the truth, or lie, saying, "Sorry, I don't have any money on me today."

In this sense, lying and deception appear to be normal to the human condition, which raises the question: Do men lie more than women? To many, this question is irrelevant; everyone lies, so what is the distinction between men and women who knowingly or unknowingly practice the art of self-deception? Yet, a growing body of research suggests that men lie more than women.

### Lies Men Tell Women

According to a study by sociologist Dina Graham Scott, men tell lies that vary from the mundane to

the elaborate and range from the easily detected to the truly creative, with the more creative lies taking a little more time to interpret. The problem is that men don't seem to learn which lies are successful and which lies are unsuccessful.

For example, there are the lies that men tell women in an attempt to have sex with them. Many women have been told, "You are so hot," by a man in his attempt to pressure her into having sex with him. His motive for lying is that she will be flattered if he tells her that she is beautiful. If he presumes that all women like to be flattered, lying to her should accomplish the goal. Whether this lie is successful or not, many men will lie and brag that he "scored" with the woman. Alternatively, he may also denigrate her in an attempt to distance himself from the failure of his lie to be successful.

The fake marriage proposal is a grandiose lie designed to leverage what a man interprets as a woman's desperation to get married and have children. Many men are aware that women have been socialized from a young age to believe that they are expected to become wives and mothers. To many women, it is difficult to imagine their lives manifesting anywhere outside of this matrix, thus constituting the perfect setup for the lie: "I really want to marry you and have children with you." The lie becomes extended when the man is already married, as he attempts to hide the ring line on his left hand. If the woman is savvy enough to ask if he is married, his response will be, "No, of course I'm not married," thus distancing himself from his wife, and possibly his children, whom he has also drawn into his lie.

The most critical lie men tell women relates to the potential for physical consequences in the form of disease and/or pregnancy in woman and girls. Many women have heard this line: "I've been tested, and I'm clean." Or, "You can't get pregnant, I've had a vasectomy." The motive for this lie, one of the most insidious that men tell women when begging for sex, emerges in the man's belief that women, especially younger women, are so unintelligent that he can coerce them to have sex. By telling this lie, the man abdicates all moral or ethical responsibility for the woman's life or safety. His intent is to use her for his own sexual pleasure; therefore, any concern that he might

transmit a venereal disease or impregnate her is anathema to his cause, which is to “love them and leave them” without taking responsibility for the outcome of his actions.

### **Lies Men Tell Men**

Research also indicates that men lie to other men as well. Some men are so accustomed to lying to other men that it seems natural to also lie to women. When men congregate in social areas, such as bars and around the office water cooler, their socialization includes lying about a variety of subjects. The male experience in war is a striking example of the lies men tell one another. Although one's participation in a war warrants others' admiration, some men will exaggerate their own experiences, particularly in combat, in an attempt to appear more powerful and invincible than other men.

Furthermore, the level of income, the type of cars they drive, a swinging lifestyle, and any assortment of status-related events serve to bolster men's own status over other men. The caveat is that many men will go along with the lie, which directs attention to the unwritten rule that some men appear to share: “I won't call you on your lies if you don't call me on mine.” While the social and psychological motivation for such deception varies, lies of this type may mask the stress many men face in the workplace, at home, and in the world of men in general. Men traditionally work and play within the highest environs of power constituting the institutions of business, politics, and religion. This is a world in which the little white lie has little meaning or currency. On the contrary, this is a world where lying and deception are considered mechanisms and instruments of success.

### **Types of Male Liars**

Research points to a model representing five types of men practicing the art of self-deception at this level. First, there is the man of absolute integrity who demonstrates a high sense of ethics and rarely lies. In his life, integrity is cast as the opposite of hypocrisy, which implies that people who lie and deceive others should account for their actions. Second, the real straight shooter is an occasional, flexible liar, a man who is truthful most of the time. He seldom lies, but when

he does he is subject to feeling remorseful and guilty. He is also quick to seek forgiveness from the people he lied to.

The model of absolute integrity and the real straight shooter both appear to represent men who maintain some sense of ethics regarding their business practices and relationships with people in the world around them. For example, Warren Buffet, the primary shareholder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Berkshire Hathaway, is ranked one of the world's wealthiest people. Some believe the stereotype that a man of this stature would have lied and cheated his way to the top of the business world. Yet the record shows Buffet to be a man of integrity and a real straight shooter when it comes to business practices. He is noted for a philosophy of personal frugality and will more than likely go down in history as a notable philanthropist, having pledged to give away 99 percent of his vast fortune to charity and other philanthropic causes.

Third, the pragmatic liar lies when the situation calls for it. This man lies when he feels it is in his best interest. This is also a man who represents himself as ethical at every turn, always talking about morality. However, as people learn more about him, they find that his ethics go only so far. This is a man who talks of family values and then cheats with other woman. He may also be a man who commits acts of incest and domestic violence.

The model of the pragmatic liar stands in stark contrast to the standards established by the man of absolute integrity and the real straight shooter. The pragmatic liar is the hypocrite who has very little or no inclination to account for his actions unless forced to the task of confession. Jimmy Swaggart is one such embodiment of the pragmatic liar. Swaggart was a well-known Pentecostal pastor and televangelist hosting a weekly broadcast televised around the world to 3,000 stations and cable systems. He preached the Gospel, railed against homosexuals, and cast himself as the standard for moral purity and godliness. At least that's what he wanted everyone to believe. In 1988, however, he was implicated in a sex scandal involving a prostitute and was initially suspended, defrocked, and removed from the ministry. The hypocrisy and lies rose to a crescendo during the process, demonstrated by his infamous “I Have

Sinned” speech, in which he asked God to forgive him and forget about his sins. Three years later, he was arrested a second time for solicitation of a prostitute. Instead of perpetuating the lie of forgiveness for a second time, he simply told church authorities that “The Lord told me it’s flat none of your business.”

Fourth, the Pinocchio liar is someone who exaggerates often and has no qualms about lying, particularly if he wants something from another person. Pinocchio, a fictional character developed



*Lies that men tell women include those that are motivated by a desire to have sex. If a man presumes that all women like to be flattered, lying to her with “you are so hot,” should accomplish his goal; if not, he may lie to his friends that he “scored” anyway.*

by Italian writer Carlo Collodi in 1883, is a wooden boy who is prone to telling lies and fabricating stories, in which case his nose grows longer. Therefore, the Pinocchio liar in this sense serves as a metaphor for a man who lies so much that his nose is said to be visibly growing before others’ eyes.

Political history points to several individuals who may fit this description. One example is former president Bill Clinton, who lied under oath about his relationship with intern Monica Lewinsky. In 1998, he became the second president in U.S. history (the first was Andrew Johnson) to be impeached by the House of Representatives. President Richard Nixon barely escaped impeachment for lying about his involvement in illegal activities, including wiretapping and harassment of political opponents in the Watergate scandal in the 1970s. Nixon tried to cover up the misdeeds, but the truth eventually came to light and he was forced to resign. In addition, George W. Bush, the 44th U.S. president, was accused of lying about weapons of mass destruction, terrorist training camps, and a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, which sent the United States into a war with Iraq.

Finally, the compulsive liar simply cannot tell the truth about anything. This man lies even when it is not necessary for him to do so. This is a rather dangerous person to confront, particularly because he will exhibit a personality that reflects a specific type of pathology. For the compulsive liar, lying is a routine event. Like any addiction, it is difficult to recognize or stop. Compulsive lying is symptomatic of a larger problem such as extreme narcissism and borderline personality disorder.

Tour de France record holder Lance Armstrong epitomizes the compulsive liar. Heralded as probably the greatest cyclist in American history, Armstrong was seen as a philanthropist and founder of the Livestrong Foundation, which provided support for cancer patients. While his public image was that of the golden boy, his private life now appears full of dark secrets. For example, he announced his retirement from competitive cycling while facing a federal investigation into doping allegations. He was ultimately charged with having used illicit performance-enhancing drugs. Officials concluded that Armstrong



undertook what is said to be “the most sophisticated, professionalized, and successful doping program that the sport has ever seen.” Nevertheless, he lied continuously, denying the charges at every turn and going so far as to threaten and sue individuals, teammates included, who came forward to substantiate the charges. After years of public denial and public pressure to come clean, Armstrong appeared in a television interview conducted by Oprah Winfrey, where he admitted to doping.

### Conclusion

The question of the efficacy of men lying more than women has some merit in examination. As there is no conclusive argument, more research into the subject of lying and deception in gender roles is necessary.

Tracy F. Tolbert

*California State University, Long Beach*

**See Also:** Courtship, Deception in; Deception Motives; Dishonesty; Guilt; Infidelity; Lies, Types of; Manipulation; Narcissism; Pathological Lying; Pinocchio; Relationships: Sexual; Self-Deception; White Lies; Women.

### Further Readings

- Boon, S. D. and B. A. McLeod. “Deception in Romantic Relationships: Subjective Estimates of Success at Deceiving and Attitudes Toward Deception.” *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18 (2001).
- DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein. “Lying in Everyday Life.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1996).
- Ennis, Edel, A. Vrij, and C. Chance. “Individual Differences and Lying in Everyday Life.” *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.25/1 (2008).
- Mitchell, J. “Living a Lie: Self-Deception, Habit, and Social Roles.” *Human Studies*, v.23/2 (2000).
- Scott, G. G. *The Truth About Lying: Why We All Do It, How We Do It, and Can We Live Without It?* Petaluma, CA: Smart Publications, 1994.
- Serota, K. B., T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster. “The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies.” *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

## Mental Effort in Lying

There are many reasons why lying often requires more mental effort than truth-telling, particularly in an interview setting, and various sources provide empirical evidence that lying is indeed cognitively more demanding. If the reasons why lying requires mental effort are known, it is possible to predict under which circumstances lying is mentally taxing.

In an interview setting there are many factors that contribute to a liar’s cognitive load. First, formulating the lie itself is cognitively taxing. Liars need to make up their stories while monitoring their fabrications so that they are plausible and adhere to everything the observer knows or might find out. In addition, liars must remember their earlier statements, and know what they told to whom, so that they can be consistent when retelling their story. Liars should also avoid making slips of the tongue, and should refrain from providing new leads to investigators.

Second, liars are typically less likely than truth-tellers to take their credibility for granted. There are at least two reasons for this. The stakes (that is, negative consequences of getting caught and positive consequences of getting away with the lie) are often higher for liars than for truth-tellers. Smugglers are probably keener to make an honest impression on customs officers than nonsmugglers because the negative consequences for having to open their suitcases are much higher for smugglers than for nonsmugglers. In addition, truth-tellers typically assume that their innocence shines through, which could be explained by the illusion of transparency, the belief that “one’s inner feelings will manifest themselves on the outside,” and belief in a just world, the belief that people “will get what they deserve, and deserve what they get.” As such, liars will be more inclined than truth-tellers to monitor and control their demeanor so that they will appear honest to the lie detector.

Monitoring and controlling behavior is cognitively demanding. For example, the guilty suspect may experience powerful emotions (for example, fear, remorse, anger, or even excitement) that must be hidden or faked. Consider a woman publicly pleading for the safe return of her partner who, in reality, she murdered. She must monitor her body language and emotional expressions while

keeping the details of the story straight. A high level of cognitive load accompanies high-stakes deception.

Third, because liars do not take credibility for granted, they may monitor the interviewer's reactions more carefully to assess whether they appear to be getting away with their lie. Carefully monitoring the interviewer also requires cognitive resources. Fourth, liars may be preoccupied by the task of reminding themselves to act and role-play, which requires extra cognitive effort. Fifth, deception requires a justification (that is, a psychological or material reason to lie), whereas truth-telling does not. Considering a justification is mentally taxing. Sixth, liars have to suppress the truth while they are lying and this is also cognitively demanding. Finally, while the truth often comes to mind automatically, activation of the lie is more intentional and deliberate, and thus requires mental effort.

Lying is not always more cognitively demanding than truth-telling. For example, in daily life situations it is often easier to lie ("I like the present you gave me"), than to tell the truth ("I am really disappointed with this present"). The seven reasons given as to why lying is more cognitively demanding can provide insight into when it is more cognitively demanding—that is, lying is more cognitively demanding to the degree that these seven principles are in effect. For at least some of these principles to be fulfilled, two elements are required.

First, lying is likely to be more demanding than truth-telling only when interviewees are motivated to be believed. Only under those circumstances can it be assumed that liars take their credibility less for granted than truth-tellers and hence are more inclined than truth-tellers to monitor their own nonverbal and verbal behavior and/or the interviewer's reactions.

Second, for lying to be more cognitively demanding than truth-telling, liars must be able to retrieve their truthful activity easily and have a clear image of it. Only when liars' knowledge of the truth is easily and clearly accessed will it be difficult for them to suppress the truth. Similarly, truth-tellers also need to have easy access to the truth for their task of truthfully reporting an event to be relatively undemanding. If truth-tellers have to think hard to remember the event

in question (for example, because it was not distinctive or it occurred long ago), their cognitive demands may exceed the cognitive demands that liars require for fabricating a story.

### Experimental and Forensic Settings

In experimental studies, researchers ensure that interviewees are motivated (typically by giving them a reward for making a credible impression) and that the target event is easily retrieved (typically by interviewing the suspects shortly after informing them about the target event). In those experiments lying has been found to be more demanding than truth-telling in various settings. Participants who have directly assessed their own cognitive load report that lying is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling, both when elaborative and short responses were required. In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) deception research, lying and truth-telling is differentiated only by the act of pressing either a "lie" or "truth" button. Nevertheless, that research revealed that deception generally activates the higher centers of the brain associated with cognitive demand.

In forensic settings, it can reasonably be assumed that interviewees will be motivated to be believed, but it cannot be assumed that interviewees will always be able to easily retrieve from memory the target event, as this will vary from one case to another. Analyses of police interviews with real-life suspects, however, suggest that lying is often more cognitively demanding than truth-telling in the forensic setting. First, in those police interviews, lies were accompanied by increased pauses, decreased blinking, and decreased hand and finger movements, all of which are signs of cognitive load. Second, police officers who saw a selection of these police interviews (but did not know when the suspects were lying or truth-telling) reported that the suspects appeared to be thinking harder when they lied than when they told the truth. Finally, when police officers attempted to detect deceit explicitly ("Is the person lying?") or implicitly ("Is the person having to think hard?"), they were able to discriminate between liars and truth-tellers, albeit only in the implicit condition in which their attention was drawn toward the suspect's cognitive demands ("thinking hard"). In all, several findings converge on the claim that

lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth.

In sum, there is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that lying in interview settings is cognitively demanding, as long as liars are motivated and have a clear memory of the truth.

Aldert Vrij

*University of Portsmouth*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Memories; Meta-Analysis; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. L. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Gambos, V. A. "The Cognition of Deception: The Role of Executive Processes in Producing Lies." *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs*, v.132 (2006).
- McCornack, S. A. "The Generation of Deceptive Messages: Laying the Groundwork for a Viable Theory of Interpersonal Deception." In *Message Production: Advances in Communication Theory*, J. O. Greene, ed. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, (1997).
- Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, S. Mann, and S. Leal. "Outsmarting the Liars: Towards a Cognitive Lie Detection Approach." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, v.20 (2011).
- Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, and S. B. Porter. "Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.11 (2010).

time more studies of deception were needed, now researchers need a way to assimilate the vast body of deception research that has accumulated over the years.

To make sense of a deception study, researchers use statistics. On results from the study, investigators conduct a primary analysis. They analyze the results of the study with descriptive statistics (like means), as well as inferential statistics (like significance tests). Sometimes, deception researchers reanalyze results that were previously published. The purpose of this secondary analysis is to clarify the earlier finding.

By contrast to primary and secondary analysis, meta-analysis offers a statistical summary of multiple studies. It is an analysis of analyses—a synthesis of many primary research findings. Meta-analysis provides techniques for cumulating the hundreds of deception studies that have already been conducted. It has been used to synthesize research on cues to deception, the accuracy of deception judgment, explanations for judgmental inaccuracies, and individual differences in judging deception.

### Meta-Analysis and Behavioral Cues

Researchers have sought cues to deception—behaviors that distinguish liars from truth-tellers. They have examined many aspects of behavior—facial behaviors (such as eye contact), bodily movements (such as torso shifts), aspects of speech content (such as self-references), and vocal variables (such as pitch). Meta-analysts have assessed the strength and direction of the relationship of deception to these various behaviors, which have been examined in more than one study.

As the accumulated evidence shows, there is no infallible cue to deceit. Cues to deception are faint. The least faint cues indicate that liars sound distant and uncertain about what they are saying. They appear nervous and ambivalent. Their remarks lack detail. To each of these generalizations, there are exceptions. Certain truth-tellers, for instance, appear more nervous than certain liars, even though people (on average) appear more nervous when lying than when telling the truth. Meta-analysis yields a precise quantitative index of the difference between liars and truth-tellers in apparent nervousness, a so-called effect size. Effect sizes have been determined for over

---

## Meta-Analysis

A meta-analysis combines and compares statistical results from more than one research study. Long ago, a researcher conducted the first study of deception. That pioneering investigator offered a few tentative observations and called for more research on the topic. A second study of deception was done, and then a third. Now deception has been studied hundreds of times. If at one

100 potential deception cues. The more strongly a behavior is diagnostic of deception, the larger is its effect size.

People make judgments of deception every day, inferring, for instance, that a coworker is lying, and that a child is telling the truth. While some investigators have sought cues to deception, others have hoped to identify the bases for deception judgment—cues from which people infer that others are being deceptive. Meta-analysis shows that behavioral variables are more strongly related to deception judgment than to deception itself. Thus, one could better predict from a murder suspect's behavior whether the suspect would be perceived as lying than whether he was, in fact, lying. People are most likely to be perceived as lying if they appear incompetent, ambivalent, or indifferent; if their remarks do not place events in context; and if they fidget. Although there is no perfect sign of apparent deception (no behavior from which every observer in the world would invariably infer deceit), cues to deception judgment are (statistically speaking) stronger than deception cues. Precise effect-sizes for many judgment cues are available.

### Meta-Analysis and Lie Detection Ability

How successful are people when they make judgments of deception in everyday life? They are not very successful, meta-analytic evidence suggests. In hundreds of studies people have judged a series of messages (half-lies and half-truths), and upon encountering each message indicated whether it was a lie or the truth. By flipping a coin, the judges in these studies would have successfully guessed the truthfulness of 50 percent of the messages they encountered. In fact, they successfully judged the truthfulness of 54 percent of messages. This is the average finding in some 200 studies. Results are consistent across studies, with one exception. In a few very small studies, judges appear to be highly accurate; in a few other very small studies, they appear to be highly inaccurate. Meta-analysts regard these discrepant results as chance outliers.

Why are people so poor at detecting lies? One possibility is that there are no strong cues to deception. Another is that in trying to detect deceit, people ignore valid cues and base their deception judgments on other, misleading cues. A

meta-analysis was conducted to assess these possibilities. The pattern of evidence indicates that deficiencies in lie detection reflect an absence of good deception cues. Given the weak cues at their disposal, people detect almost as many lies as possible. They base their judgments of deception on the best cues available—imperfect though those cues may be.

Although most people are barely able to detect lies, there may be individual differences in lie detection ability. Perhaps some people are lie detection “wizards” (extraordinarily gifted at lie detection) while others are lie detection “dunces” (regularly confusing lies and truths). A meta-analysis of hundreds of studies belies this individual difference hypothesis. Yes, in every study research participants differ in the number of lies (and truths) they judge correctly. However, these differences are no greater than would be expected by chance. As probability theory would predict, individual differences in percentage correct are large when research participants judge only a few messages; they are small when participants judge many messages.

Long lie detection tests reduce the impact of guessing on apparent differences. Unfortunately, most lie detection tests are brief. Thus, there are apparent differences in lie detection performance but hardly any real differences from person to person in the ability to detect lies. This may explain why at a meta-analytic level differences in lie detection performances show no consistent relationship to the detector's sex, age, confidence, or experience.

While discriminating lies from truths at levels slightly better than chance, people are inclined to see others as more truthful than deceptive. In a typical study, in which people encounter half-lies and half-truths, they perceive roughly 56 percent of those messages as truths. There are individual differences in this tendency. Some people are more suspicious than others. They regard every message they encounter as a lie. The highly suspicious might seem to have a special gift at spotting deceit. They are also, however, highly inaccurate at judging truths. Blanket suspicion is not judgmental acumen.

There are also individual differences in detectability. As noted, observers achieve 54 percent accuracy in discriminating an average person's lies



from that same person's truths. However, some people tell lies and truths that can be discriminated at higher levels (say, 59 percent). Other people tell lies and truths that are completely indiscriminable (being correctly judged, for example, 50 percent of the time). Thus, meta-analysis confirms the colloquial saying—some people are easier to read than others.

The largest individual difference in this area is not, however, a difference in chronic suspicion or ease of detectability. It is a difference in apparent honesty. Some people appear more truthful than others. As noted above, the average person's lies and truths are seen as truths 56 percent of the time. However, some people are seen as truthful much more often (say, 68 percent of the time), while others are seen as truthful much less often (say, 44 percent of the time). People who appear honest when telling the truth also appear honest when lying. It is said that they have an honest demeanor and that deception judgments are subject to a demeanor bias.

### Meta-Analysts' View of Deception Research

Research on deception has been criticized. Most of the research has been conducted on college students who have been prompted to lie and who have no incentive to get away with the deceit. Even so, there are studies of deception by criminals, work on naturally occurring lies, and research on motivated liars. Some investigators dismiss studies of students' deceptions out of hand, as though those studies have no evidentiary value. Likewise, they dismiss studies of experimentally prompted lies and research on unmotivated lies. Such studies need not be considered, these investigators believe.

Meta-analysts take a different view. They include in their statistical reviews all evidence that might conceivably be relevant to an understanding of deception. Then they examine results within various subsets of the research literature to see whether factors that are hypothesized to affect research results do, in fact, affect those results.

Statisticians have developed meta-analytic techniques for assessing the impact of cross-study factors on research outcomes. Technically speaking, the relevant analyses determine whether the typical findings of deception research are moderated by differences among research participants (students versus nonstudents), differences in the

prompting of lies (prompted versus spontaneous), and differences in incentives (motivation versus no motivation to lie).

In the main, the findings of deception research generalize across different types of studies. On the average, people are barely able to detect lies from truths even if the liars are nonstudents, even if the lies are spontaneous, and even if the lies are highly motivated. In studies of nonstudents, studies of spontaneous lies, and studies of motivated lies, people vary widely in apparent honesty, and they barely differ from one another in the ability to detect lies. While a few cues to deception may be less faint in some types of studies than others, no cue ever studied has ever approached infallibility. Thus, people may speak at a nontrivially higher pitch when telling a motivated lie than when telling the truth. However, no credible lie detection technology could be built on a difference of this magnitude.

The behavioral signs of deception are weak. As a consequence, people have difficulty determining when others are lying. There are no strong individual differences in the ability to judge others' deceptions, but some people appear more truthful than others. Lie detection is not strongly affected by factors that one might expect to affect it (like motivation for the lie). Precise quantitative conclusions on these issues are afforded by meta-analysis—a set of statistical techniques for combining and comparing research results.

Charles Bond

*Texas Christian University*

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Linguistic Cues; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10 (2006).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Hartwig, M. P. and C. F. Bond, Jr. "Why Do Lie-Catchers Fail? A Lens Model Meta-Analysis of

Human Lie Judgments.” *Psychological Bulletin*, v.137 (2011).

Sporer, S. L. and B. Schwandt. “Paraverbal Correlates of Deception: A Meta-Analysis.” *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.20 (2006).

## Microfacial Expressions

Microfacial expressions, more commonly called microexpressions, are involuntary and fleeting facial expressions that reveal an individual’s experience of an emotion. Microexpressions can last anywhere from 1/5 to 1/25 of a second. The seven basic facial expressions—happiness, sadness, anger, contempt, surprise, fear, and disgust—can all be expressed as microexpressions. Research indicates that the stronger the emotion the more difficult it is to conceal, with fear being the most difficult to conceal and happiness the easiest.

Microexpressions were first described in the 1960s by researchers examining nonverbal communication during psychotherapy sessions. The researchers slowed the videotapes of patient and therapist interactions to discover “micromomentary” expressions produced by patients that lasted less than one-fifth of a second. Paul Ekman and his colleagues later connected microexpressions to the concept of deception detection by theorizing that microexpressions were involuntarily leaked emotions associated with the deception, such as guilt, shame, or anger, that a person was trying to mask, or the feigning of an emotion, such as smiling when upset. Ekman noted that the face has many muscles that are not typically under voluntary control, making microexpressions difficult to feign, while nonverbal behaviors in the rest of the body can be masked through conscious effort.

The use of microexpressions as a method for detecting deception quickly became popular among professionals in the deception detection field. Police manuals and training programs frequently discussed microexpressions as an important tool for detecting deception, often with claims that microexpression analysis could lead to high-accuracy deception detection. Microexpression’s usefulness for detecting deception was also popularized for the general public, with television



*An airport agent checks a passenger’s identification before allowing her to proceed through security, March 29, 2013. A large-scale, controversial program called Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques is based on detecting microexpressions.*

shows such as *Lie to Me* showing the main character catching liars through his ability to identify microexpressions.

Despite professional and popular conceptions of microexpressions, however, there have been few peer-reviewed scientific articles that have examined the relationship between microexpressions and deception. The first peer-reviewed study to examine the relationship between microexpressions and deception was not published until 2008, and found only partial support for Ekman’s idea that microexpressions can reveal a masked emotion. Consistent with that idea, microexpressions occurred more often when participants were trying to mask an emotion, especially under higher stakes, than during genuine expressions. Microexpressions, however, were also observed during genuine emotional displays, indicating that they are not solely related to masked emotions. Additionally, microexpressions were rarely full-face emotional expressions; rather, what often were leaked were partial expressions occurring only in smaller, specific areas of the face. Overall, microexpressions were extremely rare, suggesting that they may not be very useful in detecting deception in general. Further, microexpressions may not be as “micro” as previously believed, with some of the inconsistent expressions lasting more than one second.

### Tools to Measure Microexpressions

There is evidence suggesting that people can learn to identify microexpressions, especially with the help of training programs. Several tools have been created to measure when and which microexpressions are expressed. Since 1978, the facial action coding system (FACS) has manually and systematically coded facial expressions. FACS is used to trace every muscle movement in the face in order to help researchers learn to detect and categorize those movements. FACS can be used to determine whether a person is attempting to mask emotions by breaking each emotion into components.

The micro expression training tool (METT) has also been used to improve accuracy in detecting microexpressions through a pretest and posttest of facial analyses. This training involves learning about the various facial components of the seven major emotions, and the user is asked to determine a flashed microexpression. Similarly, the subtle expression training tool (SETT) was developed after new research was released about partial expressions. Users of SETT are asked to determine if the hidden emotion of the person on the screen is based on a microexpression on only part of the face. Proponents of METT and SETT argue that after training, reading microexpressions can increase social and communicative skills. Both methods are used for training professionals in fields in which deception detection is vital.

A large-scale program based on microexpressions is the controversial airport screening program Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT). This program trains airport security officers to search for clues in passenger behavior, such as microexpressions, that may reveal individuals intent on terrorism. One report claimed that SPOT allowed officers to catch liars with high levels of accuracy. According to a congressional report, however, while SPOT singled out 50,000 people in 2010, only 300 were arrested, suggesting a very high false-positive rate. All arrests were for drug possession, falsified documentation, or other offenses unrelated to terrorism. Earlier reports had at least 17 known terrorists passing through 23 SPOT program airports undetected. The recent research suggesting that microexpressions are rare and can also take place during genuine emotional displays has also raised concerns about the program.

While microexpressions are brief facial flashes of emotion that may reveal hints about a true emotional state, they are not a conclusive method of deception detection.

Julia Zhu  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Darwin, Charles; Drugs; Duchenne Smile; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Leakage; *Lie to Me*; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- ABC News. "Government Questions \$1 Billion TSA Airport Security Program. <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/spot-tsa-airport-security-program-catch-terrorist/story?id=14062893> (Accessed June 2013).
- Blair, J. P., T. R. Levine, T. Reimer, and J. D. McCluskey. "The Gap Between Reality and Research: Another Look at Detecting Deception in Field Settings." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, v.35 (2012).
- Matsumoto, D., H. S. Hwang, L. Skinner, and M. Frank. "Evaluating Truthfulness and Detecting Deception." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*. [http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/june\\_2011/school\\_violence](http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/june_2011/school_violence) (Accessed October 2012).
- Porter, S. and L. ten Brinke. "Reading Between the Lies: Identifying Concealed and Falsified Emotions in Universal Facial Expressions." *Psychological Science*, v.19 (2008).
- Porter, S., L. ten Brinke, and B. Wallace. "Secrets and Lies: Involuntary Leakage in Deceptive Facial Expressions as a Function of Emotional Intensity." *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, v.36 (2012). [https://people.ok.ubc.ca/stporter/Publications\\_files/Secrets%26Lies%20Final.pdf](https://people.ok.ubc.ca/stporter/Publications_files/Secrets%26Lies%20Final.pdf) (Accessed October 2012).

## Middle East

Efforts to understand human behaviors such as lying and deception must address a multiplicity of ecological contexts that influence individual development, which in turn influence the environments

in which individual development—including cognitive, social, and moral development—takes place. The ecological model, developed by Urie Bronfenbrenner and later refined by Jay Belsky, takes into account variables influencing behavior at four levels of analysis: the individual, the microsystem, the exosystem, and the macrosystem.

The individual/developmental level includes biological/genetic factors, gender, age, personality, cognition, and emotional characteristics. These variables are embedded within the microsystem, which includes the individual's proximal social environment such as family members. In turn, microsystem factors are located within the exosystem, which includes experiences within the community and with local groups. Finally, beyond these more immediate contexts, individuals are influenced by their macrosystems, which include broad national and cultural forces. To understand the causes and roles of lying and deception in the Middle East, it is necessary to understand how globalization and modernization have influenced the psychological functioning of individuals living in that region today.

### **Effect of Modernization**

Historically, truth-telling and honesty were necessary and respected values and traits in Middle Eastern cultures. Arabs have been nomadic and tribal since the dawn of history, living in harsh desert environments with limited resources. They had to rely on each other and social relations for survival. Within this context, honesty and truth-telling became essential because lies and deception could mislead and harm the group regarding the reality of their relationships, natural environment, and the capabilities of themselves and their enemies.

All three of the major Middle Eastern religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, prohibited lying and deception and encouraged truth-telling and devotion to keeping promises. Moreover, lying and deception were mostly ineffective as paths to advancement because social status was determined by tribal lineage and performance in trade or war. In a small tribal society, in which people know almost everything about each other since childhood, there is little room for lying and deception, and if it occurs, it can be detected and dealt with quickly.

With modernization, governmental centralization, and urbanization of the Middle East, there have been increases in individualism and mobilization, changes in political management and control, and the mixing of people from various backgrounds in urban areas. These kinds of macrosystem changes can produce social fragmentation, anomie, increases in self-interest, and the quest for personal wealth and power, all of which can increase levels of moral disengagement. As described by Albert Bandura and others, moral disengagement is an individual-level set of cognitive processes that allow individuals to morally disconnect from their own immoral behavior, so that they can behave inhumanely while continuing to view themselves as ethical people. Corrupt leaders can foster such moral disengagement in ordinary people in ways that lead these people to accept or participate in various forms of extremism.

Within many exosystems in the Middle East, such changes gave more freedom to some individuals to use lying and deception for personal or political gains without feelings of guilt and without the old fears of being caught easily or of loss of social status. A web of lies and deception creates an illusion of justice and development and a shared myth that “everything is okay.” In such circumstances, lying and deception are acceptable as long as they enforce the status quo and the dominant narrative, and truth-telling and honest opinion can be considered heroic or dangerous, if not illegal and naive. In addition, oppressive systems dictate what the “truth” is, enforce certain narratives, and silence any voice or opinion that might challenge that narrative. On the other hand, under oppressive and corrupt systems that deny some basic human rights and needs, and which are built on a fabric of deceptions and lies, lying and deception can become a way for individuals to assert their freedoms and get their legitimate survival needs met.

### **Corruption, War, and Radicalization**

Corruption in various sectors of government and businesses is a major problem in the Middle East today. Such corruption utilizes lying and deception as tools to exist. It contributes to economic and social underdevelopment and waste of resources. It also facilitates the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the few. Ironically, it creates



an environment in which lying and deception become necessary in order to “get things done,” and at the same time erodes national and international trust in economic processes. Such corruption resists the transparency and accountability required to attract international investments and for economic development.

The Middle East has been a constant theater for invasions and wars. Lies and deception are important components in creating acceptable contexts for war, in moral disengagement, in propaganda before and during wars, and in efforts to cover up the atrocities of war. Thus, individuals in the Middle East are faced with the challenge of identifying what is real and what is not from a large amount of lies and deception that affect their lives in various ways, on local, national, and international levels.

The constant presence of such lies in the lives of people in the Middle East, and sometimes in stereotypes about its realities and people, contributes to mistrust and cynicism among some. It also contributes to a sense of helplessness and repeated disappointments, especially among the youth, when idealism conflicts with the mysterious reality that seems to function according to unknown rules. Such encounters bring the youth to crossroads, where it might seem to them that they have to either abandon their idealism and higher values in order to function in society, or to keep adhering to their values and risk being marginalized, disrespected, and having most of their needs unmet. This situation is one of the factors contributing to radicalization in the Middle East. Radicalization can be seen as an effort to adhere to the “pure truth” in the face of lies, deception, and corruption.

Majed A. Ashy

Bay State College

Kathleen Malley-Morrison

Boston University

**See Also:** Ethnic Differences; Ideology; Iran-Contra Affair; Iraq War; Islam; Judaism; Lying as Exercise of Power; Military Deception; Terrorism.

#### Further Readings

Al-Qardawi, Y. *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*. Cairo: Al Falah Foundation for Translation, 2001.

Ashy, M. and K. Malley-Morrison. “Attitudes Towards War in the Middle East From Extremism Model Perspective.” *International Psychology Bulletin*, v.11/2 (2007).

Barakat, H. *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Imam, P. and D. Jacobs, “Effect of Corruption on Tax Revenues in the Middle East.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/270. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07270.pdf> (Accessed June 2013).

Jamieson, K. *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Kuran, T. “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, v.18 (2004).

Swain, S., G. Boys-Stones, J. Elsner, A. Ghersetti, R. Hoyland, and I. Repath. *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy From Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

## Military Deception

Military tactics often seek to obtain advantage through deception, actively pursuing this type of strategy in order to enhance the odds of a victorious outcome. Misleading the enemy in a secretive manner is accomplished through multiple approaches, each of which involves introducing uncertainty and maintaining the element of surprise. Stratagem encompasses the various forms of tactics utilized by the military to deceive enemies and serves to produce benefits without reducing a significant amount of resources in the process. Although the circumstances necessary for military troops to gain an advantage over the enemy may vary, deception plays an integral part in the success of any military campaign.

The significance of deceptive warfare strategies is well documented in historical military operations and is often cited in texts concerning military warfare strategies. Seminal works on warfare strategy, such as *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu, emphasize its importance in the planning stages

of any battle. The examination of numerous historical military operations reveals that several of the most notable victories throughout history benefited from this type of tactic.

Interestingly, military theory does not reference deception as a stable tactic to be utilized by all. This could be because prior to the 20th century deceptive tactics were normally created and implemented by small groups of individuals. Today's military environment instead relies on a centralized chain of military command, in which all tactics and strategies are promulgated via a top-down approach. Regardless, deception has always been, and remains, an important component of the vast majority of successful warfare strategies.

### **Deceptive Strategies**

Incorporating deception in a military campaign is generally accomplished via two interrelated approaches. Strategies are formulated to mislead opponents concerning information critical to maintaining a tactical advantage; the nature of a military unit's activities, the potential plan of attack, as well as the true motives for acting in a specific manner, are misrepresented to the enemy. Camouflaging this type of critical information enables military personnel to maintain security while still advancing their position.

Additionally, deceptive strategies serve to keep details regarding strengths and weaknesses hidden from a potential enemy, thus reducing the ability to properly prepare for an impending encounter. This type of tactic, when employed effectively, serves the purpose of providing military personnel with a strategic advantage over the enemy. Intellectual resources, such as knowledge regarding the enemy's abilities, or information the enemy would benefit from, are useful in the calculation of a sound deceptive strategy.

Deceptive military strategies, commonly referred to as stratagem, share a specific group of factors necessary for any ruse to be successful. One of the key tasks of stratagem is to maintain the element of surprise. A military unit gains a significant advantage anytime its strategy departs from what the enemy perceives as the expected plan of attack. In fact, the element of surprise has been emphasized as an important warfare principle by several military stratagem theorists,

including Barton Whaley. More specifically, military commanders plotting deceptive strategies that aim to sustain surprise purposefully introduce uncertainty into the minds of the enemy. By incorporating uncertainty into an enemy's perception concerning an impending attack, battlefield commanders are able to reduce the level of overall risk to their own personnel and resources, while at the same time exponentially increasing the odds of success.

Military deception is often enacted through the use of diversion, which may stem from several different methodologies, which all have the singular purpose of creating uncertainty in the mind of the enemy. One method, known as the *feint*, provides the enemy with a misrepresentation regarding the nature of a suspected attack. A *feint* gives the false impression that an upcoming attack will be implemented in a particular way in order to distract the enemy from the true intended target or goal.

Another form of diversion consists of deceiving one's enemy about the onset of the main attack through the use of a small force. This tactic attempts to draw the enemy into battle prematurely by convincing the enemy that it is engaging the main force, only to discover that another more forceful attack is yet to come. This type of ruse causes the enemy to expend valuable personnel and other resources, while also serving to expose their exact position and strength.

### **Disinformation**

One of the most subtle forms of military deception involves the inventive use of communication. Deceptive communication involves purposely providing information that is inaccurate to the enemy. Military stratagem of this method highlights the importance of knowing the enemy's communication preferences; it is essential to make the disinformation available to the enemy in a manner that conceals its origin. In order for this to occur successfully the inaccurate information must be delivered inconspicuously through a channel of communication that the enemy frequently utilizes. Implanting the disinformation in a location, or via a resource, that is trusted by the enemy is a key component of this tactic.

Disinformation is communicated through various avenues, such as word of mouth, newspapers,

and military radio. Disseminating a fraudulent claim, or plan, verbally to various sources with which the enemy interacts increases the likelihood that the information will reach the enemy in a timely manner, and from a trusted source. This form of communication provides an aspect of authenticity to the disinformation, thus increasing the odds the enemy will accept it as reliable. Other channels of communication involve the use of official sources, which may further mask the deceptive nature of the information provided. Military officials may utilize the newspaper or other popular media to purposely leak disinformation, which attracts the attention of journalists, who subsequently print the disinformation as if it were factual.

The use of military radio transmission in order to spread disinformation has historically proved an effective form of delivery, but it relies on the enemy's ability to gain access to otherwise secure lines of communication. In this case, the

disinformation is stated clearly, or in a manner that is simple for enemies to decipher, in order to ensure that they receive the information exactly as intended. An additional layer of deception is added when military officials deliver disinformation that appears to be accidental, so that enemy officials believe they have stumbled upon factual information that was meant to be kept secret.

### Operation Mincemeat

Operation Mincemeat, an elaborate ruse in which the British took advantage of Germany's connection to Spanish secret intelligence in order to divert their attention away from the predicted location of the English invasion during World War II, is a classic example of this type of military operation. Although planting disinformation in the enemy's line of sight was a common technique for British military personnel, Operation Mincemeat was particularly noteworthy because of its innovative use of resources to deceive Germany



*Performing an early morning operation to catch insurgents by surprise, British soldiers kneel on the ground while moving into position in the town of Pasab, Afghanistan, March 5, 2011. One of the key tasks of stratagem is to maintain the element of surprise. A military unit gains a significant advantage when its strategy departs from what the enemy perceives as the expected plan of attack.*

during a time in which the location for a future plan of attack was suspected. In early 1943, while growing increasingly suspicious of England, German military officials predicted that the likely target for a British invasion would be Sicily. Operation Mincemeat was coordinated by a committee of British military intelligence (MI5) specifically to deceive Germany's military intelligence into believing that the plan was to invade through Sardinia or Greece rather than Sicily.

In order to ensure that German intelligence would receive the required information while remaining unaware of its inaccuracy, the body of a man dressed as British officer was released into the waters off the coast near Spain on April 30, 1943. The body was planted with official-looking documents containing fraudulent plots for an impending British invasion. As planned, the decoy was retrieved by Spanish intelligence a week later and promptly turned over to German military hierarchy. As a result, the German commanders immediately altered their defense efforts with a new focus on Sardinia. Exploiting existing lines of communication between Spain and Germany as well as the trust established between the two nations played an invaluable role in ensuring that the Germans accepted the information as being both credible and reliable.

A critical element of the ruse was the use of a resource that by all appearances was incredibly reliable and seemingly trustworthy; a body resembling a deceased British military courier who could be reasonably expected to have this type of sensitive information gave credibility to the information recovered from the body. Operation Mincemeat is a prime example of the critical role that deception can play in successful military operations.

Well-planned and implemented deceptive strategies place an enemy in a predicament in which at the very least it is forced to expend precious time and resources both validating and reacting to the planted disinformation, often resulting in the enemy commanders making costly errors in the planning and execution of their operations. Military deception strategists purposefully create a situation in which the enemy is likely to choose the exact alternative plan of action that the deceiving military planners desire. The direct result of this type of operation is that the deceptive force gains

the invaluable element of surprise on the battlefield, while the enemy is manipulated into taking actions in direct opposition to their best interests.

Lindsay Perez  
Michael Zeigler  
Michael Minaudo  
*University of Nevada, Reno*

**See Also:** Battle of Fishguard; Battle of the Bulge; Bush, George W.; Camouflage; Churchill, Winston; Civil War, U.S.; Clausewitz, Carl von; Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment; Department of Defense, U.S.; Disinformation; Feigned Retreat; Iran-Contra Affair; Iraq War; Korean War; Napoleon Bonaparte; Nazi Propaganda; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; Siege of Mafeking; Smoke Screen; Sun Tzu; Terrorism; Torture; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II.

#### Further Readings

Mattox, John Mark. "The Moral Limits of Military Deception." *Journal of Military Ethics*, v.1/1 (2002).  
Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.  
Whaley, Barton. *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*. Boston: Artech House, 2007.

## Miller, Gerald

Gerald R. Miller (1931–93), known as Gerry or G. R., has often been referred to as the father of interpersonal communication research. Described by many of his colleagues as someone who was larger than life, he possessed a booming laugh, lightning-quick humor, and a penchant for witty limericks and chocolate. He eschewed the computer, preferring the typewriter to craft his contributions to the field of communication.

Miller completed his Ph.D. in 1961 at the University of Iowa. After one year at the University of Washington, he arrived, and stayed, at Michigan State University in what would become the Department of Communication. He was a departmental chair and a recipient of both the Distinguished



Faculty and University Distinguished Professor awards at Michigan State. The Gerald R. Miller Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award presented by the National Communication Association is named after him. He also was the founding editor of *Human Communication Research*.

In an article commemorating Miller, one of his former students and colleagues, Frank Boster, stated that the interpersonal communication book *Between People* (1975), coauthored by Miller and Mark Steinberg, generated the lines of deception research pursued by Miller and his students. These lines provided both creative methodological designs as well as significant contributions to the deception literature.

### Miller's Research

In 1979, Miller and colleagues published their study examining deception detection accuracy and verbal, vocal, and visual cues, in which participants judged videotapes of a speaker's head and body, a close up of the face or only the body. The study also varied because the videotape was filmed in both black and white and in color and included audio and visual cues or only visual cues. In 1980, Miller and colleagues published a study examining how familiarity with another person's communication behaviors and style affected deception detection accuracy. This type of work is known as a baseline study because it gave observers a baseline of communication behaviors to compare to the communication behaviors that were being judged for deception.

In 1985, Miller and Mark deTurck published a study that introduced an "aroused truthful" condition, in which arousal was induced in some research participants by subjecting them to intermittent bursts of white noise, prior to and during an interview. Thus, they were able to delineate cues that were elicited by general arousal from those elicited by deception. In 1986, Miller and James Stiff published their study examining how probing influences deception detection accuracy. Speakers were either positively probed by experimenters who agreed with the speakers' comments or negatively probed by experimenters who were skeptical of the speakers' comments. These conversations were videotaped and judged by participants for deception. In 1993, Miller & Stiff's book *Deceptive Communication* was published.

The last graduate seminar Miller taught at Michigan State University before succumbing to cancer was a doctoral seminar on deception. The legacy of G. R. Miller and his continuing contributions to the field of interpersonal communication and the literature on deception live on in the work of students who knew him as their professor, mentor, colleague, and friend.

Kelly Morrison  
Michigan State University

**See Also:** Honest Baseline Behaviors; Linguistic Cues; Nonverbal Cues; Probing Effect.

### Further Readings

- Bettinghaus, E. P. "Gerald R. Miller: A Colleague's View." *Communication Studies*, v.50/3 (1999).
- Boster, F. J. "Gerald R. Miller: One Student's View. A Commentary Invited by the Editor." *Communication Reports*, v.7 (1994).
- Brandt, D. R., G. R. Miller, and J. E. Hocking. "The Truth-Deception Attribution." *Human Communication Research*, v.6/2 (1980).
- deTurck, M. A. and G. R. Miller. "Deception and Arousal: Isolating the Behavioral Correlates of Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.12/2 (1985).
- Hocking, J. E., J. Bauchner, E. P. Kaminski, and G. R. Miller. "Detecting Deceptive Communication From Verbal, Visual, and Paralinguistic Cues." *Human Communication Research*, v.6/2 (1979).
- Kalbfleisch, P. J. "A Tribute to Gerald R. Miller." *Communication Studies*, v.50/3 (1999).
- Miller, G. R. and J. B. Stiff. *Deceptive Communication*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993.
- Stiff, J. B. and G. R. Miller. "'Come to Think of it...': Interrogative Probes, Deceptive Communication, and Deception Detection." *Human Communication Research*, v.12/3 (1986).

## Mimicry

Mimicry is one of nature's master devices of deception. In nature, mimicry can serve a protective purpose by signaling a warning, disappearing into the background, or warding off predators.

Predators have mastered mimicry for aggressive means as well, mostly to lure unsuspecting prey or to even masquerade as nonthreatening. Humans have also relied on mimicry for deception, most notably in military warfare, using mimicry to feign retreats and intimidate enemies. Humans engage in deceptive mimicry outside of warfare, such as in interpersonal contexts, but research on human mimicry has only begun, with most progress stemming from economic theory.

### Animal Mimicry

Under the damp, shady canopy of the Amazonian rainforest, Henry Walter Bates—the naturalist for whom the first type of mimicry (Batesian mimicry) is named—first discovered mimicry when he observed two different species of butterflies that looked profoundly similar. Studying the *Heliconius* butterfly and its mimic, the *Leptalis*, Bates reasoned that the prey (*Leptalis*) used mimicry to deceive the predator.

In Batesian mimicry, the purpose of the deception is protection. In the constant struggle between prey and predator, mimicry is a strategic ploy. Batesian mimicry assumes that only one species needs to be unpalatable to the predator. For instance, the *Heliconius* releases a pungent odor and skin irritant from its body when attacked, making it an undesirable target. The palatable mimic imitates the first species. The *Leptalis*'s wings are almost identical copies of the *Heliconius*'s, deceiving predators into perceiving it as unpalatable. By using mimicry, the succulent *Leptalis* is protected, or rather, untargeted by predators.

Another example of Batesian mimicry is the Sonoran mountain king snake's mimicry of the toxic coral snake. The Sonoran mountain snake effectively mimics the black-red-and-yellow stripe pattern of the coral snake, which serves as a warning sign of the coral snake's highly poisonous venom. The mimicry is almost flawless, and only the order of the colors can indicate whether the snake is toxic or harmless.

German naturalist Fritz Muller observed that harmless, attractive prey are not the only ones to use mimicry for protection. In Mullerian mimicry, multiple noxious-when-eaten species mimic each other, ultimately resembling others for protection against predators. If two, three, or

even four similarly noxious species mimic each other, their chances of survival will exponentially increase, because when a predator attacks one species the predator learns to avoid all of the mimicking species. The predator is duped into perceiving that each species mimicking the other is noxious. The previously mentioned unpalatable *Heliconius* butterfly engages in this type of mimicry. *H. numata*, *H. erato*, and *H. melpomene* (various species of the *Heliconius* butterfly) are part of the same Mullerian mimicry group in that they all mimic each other, and predators that feed on butterflies learn to avoid the entire group as a whole.

Animals do not always mimic other animals; they can also mimic the environment. The *Kalima* butterfly's wings are a nearly perfect imitation of a leaf, allowing it to blend into a forest background to camouflage it from predators. The Indo-Malaysian octopus is a master of deception with its ability to mimic both other animals, such as flounders and sea snakes, and the environment, taking on the appearance of surrounding rocks or the sea floor.

Nature employs mimicry not only for defensive but also for aggressive purposes. In aggressive mimicry, the predator is "a wolf in sheep's clothing." Mimicry is used to appear harmless or even attractive to lure its prey. A bird-dropping spider uses mimicry by imitating the appearance of bird-droppings, a delectable meal for flies. Attracted to the bait, flies are deceived by the mimicry approach, only to be captured by the spider. In another example, the Malaysian orchid mantis mimics the structure of an orchid to catch deceived flies attracted by the nectar of the seemingly harmless orchid.

In mimicry, appearance is not the only characteristic that is deceiving. Mimicry can be in the form of scent, sound, and even touch. The rebel large blue butterfly's caterpillar mimics the chemical scents of an ant, deceiving ants into carrying it into their nests, protecting, feeding, and raising it. The deception is twofold: the caterpillar not only mimics the scent but also the sound of an ant queen, giving it even more preferential treatment from the fooled ants. The *stenolemus bituberus* insect mimics an insect caught in a spider's web, cutting the web and sending vibrations to the spider signaling that a prey has been caught.

When the spider approaches to feed on its victim, *stenolemus bituberus* preys on the deceived spider.

### Human Mimicry

Animals are not the only species to use mimicry for survival. Humans employ mimicry in military warfare. Deceptive mimicry has been successfully used for protection, often attempting to fool the enemy by mimicking a larger army. A famous historical example of this occurred during the U.S. Civil War. Confederate General John Magruder's force of 8,000 men held off a Union Army force of more than 120,000 by creating scarecrows that mimicked soldiers. This gave the illusion that the army was 10 times bigger than it actually was. The Trojan Horse is another famous example, in which the Greek army deceptively mimicked a retreating army and accordingly supplied a large wooden horse to the Trojans as a gift of their victory. The retreat was a hoax and the wooden horse was a trap. The Greeks' mimicry of a retreating army successfully deceived the Trojans and gained the Greeks access to Troy.

Economic theory explains the possible incentives that lead to deceptive mimicry. In an economic scenario, an individual usually gains some type of advantage (economic, social, physical) by utilizing mimicry. When the rewards largely outweigh the costs, deceptive mimicry is desirable. For instance, the costs of impersonating a wealthy chief executive officer (copying mannerisms and dress) are negligible compared to the possible gains, such as preferential treatment, social status, and economic advantages. Consider the famous example of Frank William Abagnale Jr. from the film *Catch Me If You Can*, who successfully deceived others into believing he was a pilot, a doctor, an attorney, and a member of many other occupations. For Abagnale, the benefits of deceptive mimicry, such as wealth, social status, and respect, outweighed the costs of forging checks and diplomas, copying dress and mannerisms, or experiencing any feelings of guilt. Another example in a consumer culture can be seen from the coffee chain Starbucks, as it chooses to give free coffee to the first 10 doctors who enter a Starbucks's store on a particular day. A mimicker who dresses as a doctor obtains the free cup of coffee, while a real doctor whose place was taken loses.

### Conclusion

Nature and humans both use mimicry as a form of deception. In nature, deception through mimicry is a key form of protection for animals like the *Heliconius* and *Leptalis* butterflies. Likewise, mimicry can also be vital for attacking, such as for the caterpillar of the rebel large blue butterfly. Humans also rely on the potential advantages of mimicry, including strategies of mimicry in military warfare and, when the gains outweigh the costs, in interpersonal contexts.

James Kang  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Animals; Birds; Butterflies; Camouflage; Darwin, Charles; Duchenne Smile; Feigned Retreat; Fireflies; Insects; Plants; Trojan Horse.

### Further Readings

Forbes, Peter. *Dazzled and Deceived: Mimicry and Camouflage*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.

Gambetta, Diego. "Deceptive Mimicry in Humans." In *Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science*, Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

Macdonald, Scott. *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000.

---

## Morals and Ethics

The utilitarian moral philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) once said that there is nothing intrinsically, morally wrong with lying: "Falsehood, take it by itself, consider it as not being accompanied by any other material circumstances, nor therefore productive of any material effects, can never, upon the principle of utility, constitute any offense at all."

For strict consequentialists such as Bentham, the moral wrongness of lying and deceiving lies in the consequences of lying and deceiving. Even if all lies and deception were morally wrong, they would be so because of their bad consequences,

and nothing else. If this were true, then there would be nothing special about acts of lying and deceiving. In themselves, they would be morally neutral acts. Furthermore, if lying and deceiving happened to have no bad consequences, then they would not be morally wrong. If telling lies and deceiving people happened to have good consequences overall, then it would be morally obligatory to lie and deceive.

### Nonconsequentialist View of Lying

Nonconsequentialist moral philosophers have argued that lying and deception are morally wrong, and not merely because of their bad consequences. Lying and deception have what Sissela Bok has called an “initial negative weight,” and are not morally neutral acts. According to these philosophers, lying and deceiving are morally wrong even if they have no bad consequences. Lying and deception are morally wrong even if they have good consequences.

The question is whether any of these philosophers can successfully defend the position that lying and deception are morally wrong without appealing to some form of harm to others, which is an appeal to bad consequences. Also, there remains the question of whether, if lies and deception are morally wrong for reasons other than their consequences, they are nevertheless sometimes morally permissible, or are always morally wrong. Finally, there remains the question of whether lying is always worse than deceiving without lying, or whether deceiving without lying can be just as morally wrong, or worse, than lying.

One argument for the moral wrongfulness of lying can be found in the work of W. D. Ross, Roderick M. Chisholm, and Thomas D. Feehan and Charles Fried. According to Ross, every time a person makes an assertion, she or he makes an implicit promise not to lie: “the implicit undertaking not to tell lies which seems to be implied in the act of entering into a conversation (at any rate by civilized men).” According to Chisholm and Feehan, in telling a lie, the liar “gives an indication that he is expressing his own opinion.” And he does this in a special way—by getting his victim to place his faith in him.” Fried also holds that “An assertion may be seen as a very general promise: it is a promise or assurance that

the statement is true.” As a result, “Every lie is a broken promise, and the only reason this seems strained is that in lying the promise is made and broken at the same moment.” Every lie, therefore, is “a breach of trust,” and it is morally wrong for an individual to invite someone to trust them and to violate that trust.

One problem with this argument is that it may not be true that assertions necessarily involve a promise that the person is being truthful. However, even if every assertion were said to involve such a promise, this argument would seem to make lies a species of broken promises. That is problematic, since, as Marcus Singer has said, the claim that “it is always wrong to break a promise . . . is even less plausible than the proposition” that lying is always morally wrong. Lying would appear to be more morally egregious and a greater violation of trust than breaking a promise.

### Undermining Trust in Society

Numerous writers on lying and deceiving have argued that they are morally wrong because they undermine trust in society, which leads to the breakdown of society. This argument is a consequentialist argument because the moral wrongfulness of lying and deceiving stems from the bad consequences of undermining trust and not from the violation of trust itself. If it happened to be true that society could survive with little or no trust, then this argument would not morally prohibit lying. It remains a matter of controversy to what extent lying and deceiving undermines trust in society.

Studies by psychologists and sociologists appear to reveal that people lie and deceive on a daily basis. If this is true, then either a great amount of lying and deceiving fails to undermine trust in society (because the lying is sufficiently compartmentalized, and/or is tolerated), or society can survive with much less trust than previously thought. Furthermore, there are contexts, such as wars, in which, according to William Glenney, “there is no explicit expectation of trust.” This may also be true in business negotiations, according to Thomas L. Carson. There is evidence that investors know that there is widespread lying and deception about, for example, the value of stocks, and that this does not impede investment. As Brooke Harrington has said, “widely held



beliefs about the need for public trust in financial markets may be unfounded.” People are still capable of lying and deceiving in such contexts, in which there is little or no trust to undermine. It is not clear if this argument would be unable to find lying and deceiving in such contexts morally wrong at all.

### Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant on Lying

Nonconsequentialist moral philosophers have given more elaborate arguments as to why lying and deceiving are morally wrong. Saint Augustine (354–430) argued speech is a gift from God, given to use, as His gift, for the purpose of expressing what is thought. When people lie they appropriate speech, something that does not belong to them, to express what they do not think, a purpose contradictory to its intended purpose. This prideful appropriation of speech as something of their own, when it is actually God’s gift, ruptures their relationship with God and disrupts a graced world of ordered being, goodness, and love. This is why lying is morally wrong.

This is a purely religious argument for the moral wrongness of lying. It relies upon accepting that speech is a gift from a beneficent God that nevertheless remains God’s and may not be used except in the way that it was intended to be used. Should God’s existence be denied, or should it be argued that gifts may be used in any way that the recipient pleases, the argument would fail to morally prohibit lying.

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) argued that all lies are “inherently evil” because “Words by their nature being signs of thought, it is contrary to their nature and out of order for anyone to convey in words something other than what he thinks.” Language naturally signifies thought, hence it is contrary to the nature of language to signify what is not thought, which is to lie. Such an argument, importantly, makes no reference to the effect of this “disordered” use of language on others. This argument against lying relies upon a claim about the nature of language that requires support: is the sole natural function of language to communicate what is being thought by the speaker?

More important, however, even if communication of what is being thought is the only or most important natural function of language, it is not

clear why it is ever morally wrong to act contrary to nature. If masturbation or homosexual acts were said to be contrary to nature, because it was held that the natural function of sex is to reproduce, this would surely not be sufficient to make either of them morally wrong. If it is argued that the natural order has been created by God, and that acting contrary to nature is acting contrary to God’s natural order, then Aquinas’s argument against lying would become a purely religious argument for the moral wrongness of lying.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had several arguments against lying. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797–98) he argued that the moral wrongness of lying consists in what one does to oneself when one lies (either to oneself or to others). The human being, as a natural being, has a natural capacity to communicate her thoughts. The human being, as a moral being, can use the human being, as a natural being, to communicate her thoughts (either to herself or to others). However, the human being, as a moral being, can also use the human being, as a natural being, to communicate what are not her thoughts. To do this is to lie.

When one lies, one (as a moral being) uses oneself (as a natural being) as a mere means to an end. When one lies, one (as a moral being) treats oneself (as a natural being) as a “speaking machine,” that is, as a thing:

The human being as a moral being (*homo noumenon*) cannot use himself as a natural being (*homo phaenomenon*) as a mere means (a speaking machine), as if his natural being were not bound to the inner end (of communicating thoughts), but is bound to the condition of using himself as a natural being in agreement with the declaration (*declaratio*) of his moral being and is under an obligation to himself to truthfulness.

Since to lie is to use oneself, as a natural being, as a mere means to an end, it follows that to lie is to treat oneself as something less than a human being: “By a lie a human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being.” There are several problems with this argument. First, it is unclear what it means to divide a person into a moral being and a natural being. Second, it is unclear if there are any moral



Sandro Botticelli's fresco of Saint Augustine (1480). Augustine argued that lying is morally wrong because it is a prideful appropriation of speech, which is given as God's gift. He stated that lying ruptures a person's relationship with God and disrupts a graced world of ordered being, goodness, and love.

duties to oneself. Most importantly, however, it is unclear why it is morally wrong to use oneself as a natural being—to use oneself as a body—as a mere means to an end one has as a moral being. It is unclear why treating one's own body as a thing, for one's own ends, is morally wrong. Kant attempts to show that it is morally wrong to have sex purely for pleasure using a similar argument, and this is surely mistaken.

### Effect of Lying on Others

These arguments for the moral wrongfulness of lying from Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant make no mention of other people, although it is surely

plausible that the moral wrongfulness of lying and deceiving has something to do with how one treats or affects other people by lying to them or deceiving them. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant has a more famous argument against lying that does make reference to other people. Kant argues that when one lies or deceives, one treats other people as inferiors rather than as equals.

His argument is as follows: When one tells a lie, one acts on a rule of the following kind: in order to achieve some end, I will lie. For example, in order to get money, I will lie that I am only borrowing money. Lying to get money will only succeed so long as it is not the case that everyone else is lying to get money. If everyone attempted to get money by lying, then nobody would ever get any money, because nobody would be believed when they asked to borrow money. A liar, of necessity, applies a double standard: lying is permissible for me, but not for anyone else. A liar has one rule for herself (in order to achieve some end, lie) and another rule for everyone else (don't lie). As Kant says, "we do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law . . . but that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves."

The basis for applying a double standard, or having one rule for oneself and another for everyone else, is a presumption of inequality. It is permissible for one to lie, but not for others to lie, because other people are not equal to one; one is superior to them. That is why one applies the double standard. However, Kant holds that all persons are equal. Hence, lying is morally wrong.

In the *Groundwork*, Kant provides another version of this argument. To treat another person as an equal is to respect her autonomy, which is her freedom to make decisions for herself. To respect another person's autonomy is to not do anything to her without her consent. Certain actions, however, are such that it is not logically possible to have the other person's consent. It is an element of the action that the person's consent is not sought, or is denied. Kidnapping is an example of such an action. Logically, one cannot consent to being kidnapped. Insofar as one consents, one is not being kidnapped, and insofar as one is being kidnapped, it is without one's consent. Such actions

are such that, necessarily, one does not respect the other person's autonomy.

According to Kant, lying is an example of such an action:

[H]e who has it in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action.

Logically, one cannot agree to being lied to—or, more precisely, one cannot agree to being deceived by a lie. Insofar as one consents to be deceived, one is not being deceived; insofar as one is being deceived, one is not consenting to be deceived. When one lies to someone, one necessarily does not respect that person's autonomy. One treats her as less than an equal.

To return to the example of lying to get money, instead of begging someone for money, which would allow the person to make her own decision as to whether or not to lend one money, and hence treat her as an equal, one lies to the person from whom one wants to borrow money, and hence treats her as a mere means. To act toward a person in a way that precludes the possibility of her giving consent, to act toward a person without respecting her autonomy, is to treat her as a thing.

Persons, however, are not things. Persons are autonomous beings. What makes lying and deceiving morally wrong is that they are actions in which, by definition, one fails to treat a person as a person. This is true regardless of whether or not the person is harmed or benefitted from not being treated as a person. A person may benefit from being lied to because a person may benefit from not having her autonomy respected, but this does not alter the fact that, in lying to a person, one is treating the person as less than a person. Kant holds that it is always morally wrong to treat a person as less than a person.

### Objections to Kant's Arguments

There are objections that can be made to Kant's argument in the *Groundwork*. One can argue that it is possible to consent to being lied to (in

general) without knowing which lies one is to be told. For example, one can consent to being told any lie that is necessary for the throwing of a surprise party. If successful, this would establish that only lies that one has not consented to are morally wrong, and that lies that one has consented to are not morally wrong. This plausible conclusion, however, is Kantian in spirit because it is the conclusion that only lies that treat persons as equals are morally permissible.

A further objection is that lying to someone does not fail to respect that person's autonomy because the person remains free to make a decision based upon the person's lie. To return to the example of lying to get money, when one lies that one wants to borrow money, the other person remains free to decide whether or not to lend one money, even if one is going to keep the money and never return it. However, in such a case, one is treating the person in a way that one refuses to be treated oneself because one does not will to be lied to in return. Hence, in lying to someone without her consent, one does appear to be failing to respect her autonomy and treating her as less than an equal. A final objection that can be made is that, in certain situations, it is permissible to violate the autonomy of others, because they are failing to respect the autonomy of others. For example, in the case of a would-be murderer, the person may be said to have forfeited her right to have her autonomy respected, because she is intent upon murder.

In *On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy* (1797), Kant discussed the question of whether it would be a crime to lie to a would-be murderer at the door asking if one's friend was at home. Kant argued that even a lie to a would-be murderer undermines trust more generally, "although I indeed do no wrong to him who unjustly compels me to make the statement if I falsify it, I nevertheless do wrong in general by such falsification," because by lying "I bring it about, as far as I can, that statements (declarations) in general are not believed, and so too that all rights which are based on contracts come to nothing and lose their force; and this is a wrong inflicted upon humanity generally."

It is not at all clear that lying to would-be murderers undermines trust more generally, such that what everyone says is subject to suspicion.

However, if contrary to what Kant argues, such lies did not undermine trust, this still does not establish that it is morally permissible to lie to would-be murderers. This is because it has not been established that people forfeit their right to have their autonomy respected when they are failing to respect the autonomy of others. The fact that someone lies to one does not necessarily justify one's lying to her in return.

Arguments that lying and deceiving are morally wrong not merely because of their bad consequences but also because of some other reason are not necessarily arguments for why lying and deceiving are always morally wrong. It may be that lying and deceiving are morally wrong, but that they are only defeasibly morally wrong, so that, in certain contexts, they are morally permissible. First, according to Shelly Kagan, their moral wrongness may be merely *pro tanto* moral wrongness. That is, although lying and deceiving remain morally wrong, their moral wrongness may be overridden by some other moral factor, such as the moral goodness of the outcome (for example, the averting of a war).

Second, their moral wrongness may be merely *prima facie* moral wrongness. That is, although lying and deceiving remain morally wrong in normal circumstances, in extraordinary circumstances they are not morally wrong at all, because of other moral factors (for example, the people lied to are intent upon murder). Either way, lying and deceiving in certain situations may be morally permissible, all things considered. This means that even if lying and deceiving are morally wrong for reasons other than their bad consequences, they are not necessarily always morally wrong.

### Lying Versus Misleading

A final question that can be raised about the moral wrongness of lying and deceiving is whether lying is always more morally wrong than deceiving without lying, that is, misleading (or paltering), all other things being equal (that is, ignoring all other moral factors, as well as the consequences of the lie). Traditionally, lying has been judged to be more morally wrong than misleading because it necessarily involves a breach of trust, whereas deception does not. Contrary to what some writers, including Guido Mollerling, have argued, one can deceive people without

invoking trust (for example, laying a trap for a stranger in the woods). Furthermore, it has been held by Alasdair MacIntyre that in the case of lying, the responsibility for any deception lies entirely with the liar because the victim merely believed the liar, whereas in the case of being misled, the person may be in part responsible for her deceived state, because she made her own inferences to falsehoods.

Lying, according to Jonathan Adler, is supposed to be a violation of a norm of conversation that truthfulness is more important with respect to what individuals say than what they otherwise convey. However, some philosophers, including Jennifer Mather Saul, have recently argued that it is false that lying is necessarily more morally wrong than misleading, all other things being equal. Others, such as James Edwin Mahon and Cristina Ceballos, have also argued that in certain contexts people may be responsible for believing liars when they should not believe them, and that in certain contexts people may not be responsible, even in part, for being misled. Finally, it has been argued by Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser that the bad consequences of misleading may be worse than the bad consequences of lying, because misleading is more difficult to identify and is harder to penalize than lying.

James E. Mahon  
*Washington & Lee University*

**See Also:** Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine, Saint; Bok, Sissela; Deception and Trust; DePaulo, Bella; Financial Markets; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Kant, Immanuel; Lying, Prevalence of; Paltering.

### Further Readings

- Aquinas, T. "Question 110: Lying." In *Summa Theologiae (II.II)*. Vol. 41: *Virtues of Justice in the Human Community*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- Bentham, J. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Vols. 1 and 2. London: Pickering and Wilson, 1823.
- Bok, S. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Carson, T. L. *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.



- Chisholm, R. M. and T. D. Feehan. "The Intent to Deceive." *Journal of Philosophy*, v.74 (1977).
- DePaulo, B. M., et al. "Lying in Everyday Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1995).
- Fried, C. *Right and Wrong*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Glenney, W. "Military Deception in the Information Age: Scale Matters." In *Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Griffiths, P. J. *Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004.
- Harrington, B. "Responding to Deception: The Case of Fraud in Financial Markets." In *Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Kagan, S. *The Limits of Morality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
- Kagan, S. *Normative Ethics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
- Kant, I. "The Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, The Metaphysics of Morals, and On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy." In *Practical Philosophy*, M. J. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- MacIntyre, A. "Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Mill and Kant?" In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Vol. 16. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995.
- Mahon, J. E. "Kant and the Perfect Duty to Others Not to Lie." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, v.14 (2006).
- Mahon, J. E. and C. Ceballos. "The Bigger the Lie, The More People Will Believe It." In *Psych and Philosophy*, Robert Arp, ed. Chicago: Open Court, 2013.
- Mollering, G. "Leaps and Lapses of Faith: Exploring the Relationship Between Trust and Deception." In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Ross, W. D. *The Right and the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Saint Augustine. "Lying" and "Against Lying." In *Saint Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects*, R. J. Deferrari, ed. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952.
- Saul, J. *Lying, Misleading, and the Role of What Is Said*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Schauer, F. and R. Zeckhauser. "Paltering." In *Deception: From Ancient Times to Internet Dating*, B. Harrington, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Singer, M. G. *Generalization in Ethics*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961.

---

## Motivational Impairment Effect

Are people more likely to succeed at their attempts at deception when they are more highly motivated to do so? In 1983, B. DePaulo, K. Lanier, and T. Davis attempted to answer this question by conducting a study to test the relationship of motivation with the success of verbal and nonverbal deception. While it would seem logical that highly motivated liars would be more successful deceivers, these researchers predicted the opposite: people who are highly motivated to deceive others would be more likely to fail than less motivated liars.

Interestingly, the study's results supported their prediction, and these researchers coined the term *motivational impairment effect* (MIE) to represent this counterintuitive finding.

### Assumptions of MIE

The logic of the MIE hypothesis is based on two assumptions. First, the MIE assumes that during face-to-face attempts at deception, most people experience heightened psychological arousal, including feelings of stress, guilt, and fear of being detected. Second, the MIE assumes a fundamental difference in people's ability to control verbal and nonverbal behavior, with nonverbal behavior being more difficult to control than verbal behavior because it is more automatic, reactive, and unintentional. According to the MIE, when potential deceivers try to mask their fear of being detected, their stressful feelings unintentionally "spill over" in the form of nonverbal cues (for example, blushing, fidgeting, and excessive perspiring) that betray their deceptive intentions.

The MIE view asserts that the increased emotional and cognitive demands of a particularly

high-stakes lie make it harder for motivated liars to avoid detection. Because there are certain automatic links between emotions and nonverbal behaviors that make them more difficult to manage, they are more likely to surface than verbal cues, even if the deceiver has spent considerable time crafting a convincing performance. Another problem with controlling nonverbal behavior is awareness; people don't typically know what their facial expressions look like to others or how others hear their voice tones. According to the MIE, the more motivated deceivers are to succeed, the harder it is for them to control nonverbal evidence of deception and appear credible to their targets. Put another way, the harder potential deceivers try to be convincing, the more likely their nonverbal behavior will give them away and make them more likely to fail.

### **MIE and Computer-Mediated Communication**

While considerable research evidence appears to support the MIE hypothesis, this research has been limited primarily to deception in face-to-face encounters. On the other hand, the logic of the MIE suggests that if the receiver is presented with only verbal information, highly motivated deceivers will be less likely to be detected. When highly motivated liars present only verbal means to their target, they should be more likely to succeed than less motivated liars. Thus, it would be in the interest of potential deceivers, particularly highly motivated ones, to limit their target's access to nonverbal cues during their presentation. Providing their potential victims with only verbal means of deception should increase their odds of succeeding.

This logic would appear to have particular relevance today as computer mediated communication (CMC) has replaced face-to-face communication as the preferred method of social interaction for most people. CMC offers deceivers visual anonymity; nonverbal and vocal "leakage cues" that may signal deception are not available to the receiver. Thus, the MIE should be attenuated or even reversed for motivated liars who interact with their targets using CMC; motivated liars using CMC should be more successful.

Proponents of the MIE hypothesis suggest this may help account for the increasing number of victims of deceptive information and practices

received through CMC channels like the Internet (for example, highly motivated pedophiles using online forums to lure potential victims). However, this advantage also exists for highly motivated law enforcement officers who use CMC to pose as children in order to locate and apprehend these and other sex offenders.

A 2005 study by M. Woodworth, J. Hancock, and S. Goorha found that liars in CMC settings were more immune to the MIE and more successful in their deceptions than in face-to-face settings. These researchers further suggested that certain features of CMC may facilitate a deceiver's success. For example, because CMC interactions are less immediate than face-to-face interactions, deceivers have more time to develop and edit their messages before transmission. Also, text-based CMC lends itself to selective self-presentation, or the ability of deceivers to intentionally select, accentuate, and present more believable self-information to their targets. These researchers coined the term *motivational enhancement effect* to describe this advantage.

### **MIE and Interpersonal Deception Theory**

While considerable research appears to support the logic of the MIE, some researchers have proposed several flaws in the MIE hypothesis. For example, using the interpersonal deception theory (IDT), J. K. Burgoon and K. Floyd challenged the MIE hypothesis, proposing that motivation often improves both verbal and nonverbal performance, and does so for both deception and truth-telling performances. The IDT asserts that deceivers strategically manage their deception through the use of various techniques that allow them to control their nonverbal as well as verbal behavior (for example, increased laughing and smiling; encouraging receivers to talk more and to answer questions first). These techniques increase the time during which deceivers can come up with believable lies and allow them to respond to receivers answers with similar answers. Furthermore, as the receivers' nonverbal and verbal cues signal their own suspicion, deceivers are able to discern these cues, adjust their own behavior, and allay suspicion.

Several studies have offered support for the IDT-based view that motivated deceivers strategically manage both nonverbal and verbal behavior, which increases their success. Burgoon

and Floyd stated, “senders who are motivated to succeed . . . can strategically manage their deceptive presentations (verbal and nonverbal) to approximate a truthful demeanor that engenders trust and evades detection.”

### Conclusion

The MIE hypothesis proposes that people who are more highly motivated to get away with their lies, compared with less motivated liars, are less likely to succeed when their targets can see and hear their nonverbal behaviors. While the MIE view has been challenged by research grounded in IDT, its logic appears to have heightened relevance for deceivers who employ 21st-century computer-mediated modes of communication.

Thomas M. Kelley  
Wayne State University

**See Also:** Interpersonal Deception Theory; Nonverbal Cues; Sender Demeanor.

### Further Readings

- Burgoon, J. K., and K. Floyd. “Testing for the Motivational Impairment Effect During Deceptive and Truthful Interaction.” *Western Journal of Communication*, v.64 (2000).
- Depaulo, B. M., S. E. Kirkendol, J. Tang, and T. P. O’Brien. “The Motivational Impairment Effect in the Communication of Deception: Replications and Extensions.” *Journal of Non-Verbal Behavior*, v.12 (1988).
- DePaulo, B. M., K. Lanier, and T. Davis. “Detecting the Deceit of the Motivated Liar.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.70 (1983).
- Woodward, M., J. Hancock, and S. Goorha. “The Motivational Enhancement Effect: Implications for Our Chosen Modes of Communication in the 21st Century.” *Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference of System Sciences* (2005).

## Movies, Lying in

What shapes individual beliefs about deception? Certainly, a variety of cultural factors exist, including family, religious beliefs, friendship networks,

romantic partners, and the media. While multiple sources compose the media, movies may represent an important source shaping individual beliefs about deception. People often seek out the movie theater as a vehicle to transport them to a different place or time, or to provide some form of escape from reality. The question that must be examined is whether movies escape the reality of the scholarship on deception.

Many movies illustrate five central themes that shape beliefs about deception. These five themes are the (1) social necessity for deception, (2) the cognitive effort associated with producing deceptive messages, (3) the difficulties associated with concealing important information from others, (4) the verbal and nonverbal cues associated with deception, and (5) the emotional reactions to discovered deception.

### Social Necessity for Deception

In 1975, Ronny Turner and his colleagues explored the idea that deception may be necessary for people to function within society. They studied people’s conversations and found that people frequently reported controlling information within conversations, and they reported several reasons for why they did so. Two of the reasons reported were that people wanted to protect themselves from being embarrassed, and that they wanted to prevent other people from being embarrassed. Turner and his colleagues argued that social reality as people perceive it would collapse if people did not control information when they communicated.

This necessity for deception to preserve social harmony is displayed in two popular comedy films about lying. The 2009 film *The Invention of Lying* explores a place and time in which everyone tells the truth, often engaging in brutal honesty, until the central character played by Ricky Gervais tells a lie in order to protect himself. This lie is followed by several others that eventually allow Gervais’s character to become a rich and famous screenwriter-turned-prophet by his ability to craft fantastical lies in a land where no one can deceive, and thus, everything is believed.

This same theme is explored slightly differently in the 1997 film *Liar Liar*, which stars Jim Carrey as a lawyer who loses his ability to lie for 24

hours after his son makes that wish on his birthday. Again, comedy arises because, as Carrey's character demonstrates, people need to be able to control information in order to do their jobs and maintain relationships.

### Cognitive Load for Deception

Both of these films demonstrate a debated topic in the deception literature: the cognitive load hypothesis. The cognitive load hypothesis suggests that it is more difficult to lie than to tell the truth because it is more cognitively taxing to produce a deceptive message. However, much of the comedy that ensues in these films is consistent with the arguments of Turner and colleagues and stands in contrast to the cognitive load hypothesis. Specifically, most of the comedy in these films stems from the difficulties and impact of people communicating in a direct and unvarnished fashion, revealing all of the thoughts that are in their heads.

Although many researchers, including Miron Zuckerman, Aldert Vrij, and their colleagues, agree with the central premise of the cognitive load hypothesis, other scholars disagree. For example, Steven McCornack and Kelly Morrison each argue that there are situations in which it is, in fact, easier to lie and more difficult to be completely honest with others. This latter notion is captured by a scene from the 2003 film *Mona Lisa Smile*, in which a character reveals that he has been lying about his past and tells his lover that she makes it very difficult to be honest.

### Deception Concealment

*Mona Lisa Smile* and several other films demonstrate the difficulties associated with a particular form of deception, namely, that of concealing information about the self from others. Furthermore, these films accurately reflect the research of Ronny Turner and his colleagues, as they illustrate the personal and social reasons for controlling information.

A variety of films fall into the concealed-identity-deception genre. In several of these films, an identity is concealed in order to protect a superhero's ability to continue to save the world, such as in the *Superman*, *Batman*, and *Spider-Man* series of movies and the animated movie *The Incredibles* (2004).

In others, comedy and poignancy arise when a character takes the identity of the opposite sex and must conceal his or her own sex. This is seen in Disney's 1998 animated movie *Mulan*, in which a daughter takes the identity of a man in order to go to war to defend the honor of her family; in the 1993 film *Mrs. Doubtfire*, in which Robin Williams takes the identity of an older English female housekeeper in order to spend time with his children after his divorce; in the 1983 film *Yentl*, in which Barbra Streisand portrays a daughter who takes the identity of a man in order to be allowed to study the Talmud; and in the 1982 film *Tootsie*, in which Dustin Hoffman's character takes the role of an older woman so he can be hired as an actress in a daytime television soap opera because nobody will hire him when he is himself.

In other films, a character portrays another person and conceals his or her true identity: Robert Pattinson, as Edward, conceals the fact that he is a vampire from Kristin Stewart, as Bella, in the 2008 movie *Twilight*; Melanie Griffith, as Tess, conceals from her coworkers that she actually is a secretary posing as her boss in 1988's *Working Girl*; Michael J. Fox, as Brantley, conceals from his coworkers that he is a mail room employee pretending to be an executive in 1987's *The Secret of My Success*. In an update of the classic Cinderella tale, Jennifer Lopez, as Marisa, conceals from an elite political candidate, portrayed by Ralph Fiennes, that she is a hotel maid in the 2002 film *Maid in Manhattan*.

A variation of the concealment theme is shown in movies in which characters lie by creating a false world, or a false reality within the real world. In the 1997 film *Wag the Dog*, Robert De Niro portrays a political advisor to the president of the United States. The president is caught in a sex scandal shortly before his re-election. De Niro hires a Hollywood producer, played by Dustin Hoffman, to manufacture a false war for the president to win in order to detract attention from the scandal. In the 1998 movie *Pleasantville*, Tobey Maguire and Reese Witherspoon portray a brother and sister who are transported to an innocent 1950s television show and must conceal the fact that they are from the future from the other characters; and in the 1998 movie *The Truman Show*, Jim Carrey portrays Truman, the



naïve star of a reality show who discovers that his entire life has been a television production.

A final variation of the deception concealment theme is the trouble and emotional difficulties that emanate from concealing important information from others over a period of time. In the 2000 film *Return to Me*, Minnie Driver portrays Grace, a young woman who has had a heart transplant. The movie relates the love relationship Grace forms with Bob, portrayed by David Duchovny. Unbeknownst to either Grace or Bob, the heart that saved Grace was the heart of Bob's recently deceased wife. Grace discovers this information and struggles with if and how to tell Bob the truth about her heart.

These concealment struggles can also be seen in the movies *Say Anything* (1989), in which John Mahoney's character James conceals from his daughter Diane (played by Ione Skye) the fact that he has been embezzling money from the

senior citizens at his senior center; the 1992 film *School Ties*, in which Brendan Fraser's character David conceals his Jewish faith from his elite schoolmates at a prep school in the 1950s; the 1993 film *Schindler's List*, which tells the story of Oskar Schindler, portrayed by Liam Neeson, who secretly saves Jews from concentration camps; the 2001 animated film *Shrek*, in which the princess character voiced by Cameron Diaz conceals from the ogre, voiced by Mike Meyers, that she transforms from a princess into an ogre each night; and the 2011 film *The Help*, in which Emma Stone's character, Skeeter, and the maids portrayed by Viola Davis and Octavia Spencer all conceal that they are writing a tell-all book revealing the perspectives of African American maids in 1960s Mississippi. All of these films illustrate the difficulty associated with concealing information, even when it is for protective personal reasons or for the greater good.



Israeli President Ezer Weizman (center) and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (left) join director Steven Spielberg (right) at the Israeli premier of his movie *Schindler's List*, March 3, 1994. The film tells the story of Oskar Schindler (played by Liam Neeson), who secretly saves Jews from concentration camps. The storyline depicts a variation of the deception concealment theme: the trouble and emotional difficulties that emanate from concealing important information from others over a period of time.

### Behavioral Cues to Lying

Another deception theme portrayed in the movies is the idea that people can tell when others lie because of certain behaviors that accompany deception. These accompanying verbal and nonverbal behaviors are known as deception (leakage) cues. For example, in the 1995 film *The American President*, Annette Bening plays a character who falls in love with the current president of the United States, portrayed by Michael Douglas. In one of their early encounters in the film, Bening informs the president that she knew he had left something out of a speech she had attended because he did something with his face. Later in the film, she is skeptical about something he says because he is doing that thing with his face again. In the 2006 film *Casino Royale* from the James Bond series, Agent 007, portrayed by Daniel Craig, reveals the poker “tell” of the villain: whenever he bluffs he holds the corner of his eye.

The idea that people leak cues when they deceive is more scientifically portrayed in the 2003 film *Runaway Jury*. In this film Gene Hackman portrays a strategic legal consultant for gun manufacturers who are being sued. In the scenes revealing the jury-selection process, the audience sees how experts use computers and video imagery to identify when people are lying.

Eye contact is an example of a nonverbal behavior that is assumed to be related to deception. People tend to think that during the actual act of deception, a person cannot look another in the eye and simultaneously lie to his or her face. This is illustrated in the 2006 film *The Last Kiss*, with the dialogue “Look me in the eye and tell me that you don’t love me anymore,” followed by the statements “I don’t love you anymore,” and “I refuse to accept that.”

While many people may assume that lack of eye contact indicates deceptive behavior, research suggests that eye contact does not indicate whether or not someone is lying. Simply put, a person can look another in the eyes and lie right to his or her face, as illustrated by a scene from the 1988 movie *Dangerous Liaisons*. In this film, the Vicomte de Valmont (portrayed by John Malkovich) breaks off his affair with Madame Marie de Tourvel (portrayed by Michelle Pfeiffer), despite the fact that he is in love with her. He appears

bored and nonchalant, discussing reasons for dissolving the relationship that were beyond his control. She collapses in anguish while he continues to matter-of-factly lie to her face.

There is disagreement in the field regarding the concept that deception is associated with leakage cues because it is so arousing. On one side of the debate are scholars, such as Paul Ekman and Miron Zuckerman and his colleagues, who argue that because deception is arousing, multiple cues are associated with it. On the other side of the debate are scholars such as Bella DePaulo and Siegfried Sporer who with their colleagues each argue that relatively few cues are linked with deception. In a recent summary of the literature, Siegfried Sporer and Barbara Schwandt found that only two of the nine behavioral cues analyzed were associated with deception: when people deceive, there is a change in vocal pitch and a longer pause before they lie.

### Reaction to Discovered Deception

A final theme illustrated in some movies is the idea that when people, especially women, discover deception they take it in stride by forgiving the other person in a short amount of time, rather than becoming emotionally devastated. As shown in the 1987 movie *Overboard*, Dean Profit (portrayed by Kurt Russell) takes advantage of Joanna Stayton (portrayed by Goldie Hawn) after she falls overboard from her yacht and develops amnesia. Dean convinces her that they are married and that she is the mother of his four children. She becomes the wife, mother, and maid to his unruly family. At the end of the movie he reveals his deception. She attempts to go back to her life on the yacht but ultimately gives it up for the love of the man who deceived and took advantage of her.

As seen in the 1998 film *You’ve Got Mail*, Joe Fox (played by Tom Hanks) spends the better part of the film lying to Kathleen Kelly (played by Meg Ryan) by concealing the fact that he is the owner of the retail giant bookstore that put her little bookshop out of business. At the end of the film he reveals his true identity to her, and she readily accepts his deception in exchange for his love. This theme also is seen in the 2000 film *What Women Want*, starring Helen Hunt as an advertising executive who forgives Mel Gibson

from sandbagging her at work and getting her job after an accident leaves him with the ability to hear women's thoughts. Like the other movies, the film ends with the deception revealed and the happy couple in each other's arms.

Notably, the research on emotional reactions to discovered deception done by Steven McCornack and Timothy R. Levine indicates a different picture. People respond emotionally to the knowledge that others have lied to them, and women tend to respond more negatively than men.

Kelly Morrison

Michigan State University

**See Also:** Brer Rabbit; Cognitive Load; Computer-Generated Images; Government Propaganda; *Invention of Lying, The*; Leakage; *Lie to Me*; Memoirs; Nazi Propaganda; Public Relations; Tall Tales.

#### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Ekman, P. *Telling Lies*. New York: Norton, 1992.
- Ekman, P., W. V. Friesen, and R. C. Simons. "Is the Startle Reaction an Emotion?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.49 (1985).
- McCornack, S. A. "The Generation of Deceptive Messages." In *Message Production*, J. O. Greene, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997.
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lies are Uncovered: Emotional and Relational Outcomes of Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- Morrison, K., M. Ferrara, K., Klein, and M. Bisson. "'The Truth Shall Set You Free': Exploring the Difficulty in Generating Truthful and Deceptive Messages." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, New Orleans, 2004.
- Sporer, S. L. B. Schwandt. "Paraverbal Indicators of Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.20 (2006).
- Turner, R. E., C. Edgley, and G. Olmstead. "Information Control in Conversations: Honesty is Not Always the Best Policy." *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, v.11 (1975).
- Vrij, A., R. Fisher, S. Mann, and S. Leal. "Detecting Deception by Manipulating Cognitive Load." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, v.10 (2006).
- Zuckerman, M., B. M. DePaulo, and R. Rosenthal. "Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 14, L. Berkowitz, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1981.

## Myth

Myths are traditional or legendary stories, usually concerning a being, hero, or event, often involving deities or demigods, and explaining some practice, rite, or natural phenomenon. Joseph Campbell outlined four fundamental functions of myths: the mystical function (inspiring awe), the cosmological function (describing the nature of the universe), the sociological function (supporting or validating certain social orders), and the pedagogical function (providing models for living).

Deception is widespread in myth, especially for the sociological and pedagogical functions. Myths vary cross-culturally and temporally but possess similar human-oriented deception themes. Carl Jung claimed examining myth and its universal nature helps people infer existing "archetypes" originating from the collective unconscious and composing part of people's psychological lives, guiding emotions and experiences, and acting as prototypes of people, personalities, or behaviors. An example is the trickster, a crucial character in many deception myths. Other common themes include marital affairs, power struggles, displays of cleverness or wit, and teaching lessons. Myths teach people about human nature and how to navigate their social worlds.

Myths themselves could be considered deceptive, as they are often represented and transmitted as truths and sometimes sanctioned by people like rulers or priests possessing deceptive agendas related to power or impositions of moral or lawful order. Myths were once transmitted orally, allowing transmitters to tweak details to suit their own purposes. The conception of poets—oral and written transmitters of myth—as liars is timeless, and poets like Homer or Ovid could control



audiences and validate certain social orders with the framing of their stories. Upon the advent of writing, the ability to record myths allowed for greater concretization of details and wider transmission, which may have made deception more difficult in the retelling of myths.

Poets are not the only liars. Parents use myth to teach children lessons or morals or to unite families via cultural expression; however, parents may deceive children by not revealing myth's fictitious nature. Examples include Aesop's fables, over 600 stories mainly about anthropomorphized animals illustrating how to live, which are replete with deception, and cultural myths like Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny. Some argue such parental deceptions are harmful to child development, but others argue they are a necessary part of growing up.

### Self-Deception

Self-deception is a common theme in myth. Such stories illustrate folly resulting from thoughts, feelings, or rationalizations incongruent with reality that lead protagonists to exhibit morally negative attributes. One human example from Greek myth is Narcissus, an arrogant hunter famous for his beauty, who deceived himself that what he saw in a pool of water was someone he could love more beautiful than himself, when actually it was his own reflection. He could not relinquish this fantastical, "narcissistic" love and eventually died at the pool. Another example is King Midas, who greedily deceived himself into thinking riches, and the appearance they allowed, were all he needed to make him happy. Dionysus, god of decadence, gave Midas the power to turn anything to gold simply by touch. Midas was overjoyed initially, but when his feast and his daughter turned to gold he realized his folly and gave up his power.

A fiery fate befell Greek demigod Phaethon, son of Helios the sun god, who because of his desperation to prove his godly birth exhibited hubris, deceived himself that he could control the sun chariot, and almost burned up the world. The demigod Achilles, the Trojan War hero in Homer's *Iliad*, also believed himself invulnerable. His egoistic self-deception bested him when Paris, the prince of Troy, shot him in the heel, his one vulnerable area his mother failed to make immortal when dipping him in the river Styx.

Achilles died still believing he was indestructible. All these instances of self-deception mirror and address real-world social or personality blunders involving flaws related to overconfidence, greed, or desire to preserve one's self-presentation being manifest when characters lose contact with realistic expectations.

### Dyadic Deception

Deception in myths frequently occurs in dyads, or pairs. Instances of dyadic deception include marital affairs, power struggles, and demonstrations of cleverness.

Mythical marital spats are often exaggerated versions of reality, with serious costs associated with deception. Lessons portrayed sometimes appear designed to deter real-life domestic upsets, but others are more cynical. When demigoddess Helen is unhappy with her husband, King Menelaus of Sparta, her affair with Paris initiates the Trojan War. Agamemnon, king of Mycenae, deceives his wife Clytemnestra into bringing their daughter Iphigenia to Aulis to wed Achilles. He instead sacrifices his daughter to the goddess Artemis because a seer told him that if he failed to do so, Greek ships could not sail to Troy. When Agamemnon returns victorious, Clytemnestra welcomes him lovingly, only to trick him into taking a relaxing bath and then murdering him in the tub. Such stories discourage marital deception.

Gods in myth are also famous for deceiving each other via extramarital affairs, both with other gods and with humans. In her affair with Ares, Aphrodite continuously deceived Hephaestus until he discovered and trapped the lovers in an unbreakable net during a tryst, dragging them to Mount Olympus—the gods' abode—to display and shame the pair. Zeus and Odin—kings of the Greek and Norse gods, respectively—also frequently cheated on their wives Hera and Frigg with mortal women, other goddesses, and even other Titans or giantesses. To avoid detection, Zeus appeared to mortal females in disguise and deceived them about his identity, masquerading as such entities as a swan, the virginal goddess Artemis, and a shower of golden rain.

Dyadic power struggles also often involve deception in myth, mirroring real-world interpersonal disputes and challenges to authority. Prometheus the Titan tried to cheat Zeus out of



his rightful traditional sacrifice. Hades, always jealous of his brother Zeus, deceived his sister Demeter, and with Zeus abducted her daughter Persephone so that she could be his bride in the underworld. Demeter recovered Persephone, but only after Persephone was tricked into spending one-third of every year in the underworld as Hades's wife. The Egyptian god Seth also envied his brother Osiris, king of the gods, and hated his sister (Osiris's wife) Isis. Seth wished to kill Osiris and be ruler. So he devised a plan, learning of Osiris's exact measurements and constructing a beautiful chest that would fit only him. He threw a feast for Osiris and deceived him by proclaiming that whoever fit into the chest could keep it. Osiris succeeded, but Seth sealed him inside and killed his brother's human form.

Mythical characters also deceive one another to demonstrate cleverness. The clever trickster is a prime example of a deception-relevant Jungian archetype and in myth is represented as a god, human, animal, or other creature that deceptively plays tricks or tends to break the rules or norms of behavior. Tricksters can be sly, foolhardy, or both, often thwarting traditional morality or rules of the gods and/or nature. They are usually funny, may evoke feelings of discomfort regarding transgressions, and throughout history have been predominantly male. Their stories often provide moral lessons for audiences of the nature that "bad things happen when you deceive."

One prominent example of a trickster from West African folklore is Anansi, the spider god. Many Anansi myths concern his efforts to deceive people into letting him steal resources that can benefit him, or tricking females into having sex with him. However, his tricks usually go awry and harm him and benefit others, as when he tried hoarding all the world's wisdom for himself and accidentally let it wash away into the ocean, where it spread among everyone. Coyote is a similar trickster found in western Native American cultures. With the ability to transform his shape, Coyote often tricks people, but ultimately gets caught and appears foolish in the end. Like Anansi, Coyote can be mean but also noble, sometimes even playing the Robin Hood figure, a when he stole water from the water-wealthy Frog people because they were greedy.

A famous example of a human trickster demonstrating his cleverness is Odysseus from Homer's the *Odyssey*. Traveling from Troy to Ithaca, Odysseus deceives nearly everyone he meets in order to return home safely but also to prove himself a resourceful, clever individual. The trickster Odysseus deceived the Cyclops Polyphemus during his travels by first cleverly concealing his identity (calling himself "Nobody") and then blinding the Cyclops and escaping from the cave in which he was imprisoned with his men under the bellies of Polyphemus's flock. Athena also cleverly deceived Odysseus multiple times throughout the *Odyssey* and tested Odysseus's own cleverness to keep him confident, as when she masked the landscape of Ithaca and disguised herself as a shepherd upon Odysseus's homecoming.

Often people view such trickster figures as culture heroes who change the world through innovation and creative solutions, paralleling the human predicament that while deception may normally be disapproved of, its results are often venerated. Other examples of important trickster figures include Loki (Norse); Prometheus (Greek); the god Hermes (Greek) or Mercury (Roman); Pan (Greek); Br'er Rabbit (African American); Iktomi, the spider spirit (Lakota Native American); Raven (Native American Pacific Northwest); Baba Yaga (Russian); the spirit Ellegua (Yoruba); and the monkey king, fox, and frog (Chinese).

In Norse myth, knowledge is power, and Odin frequently uses deception to acquire knowledge from wise men. In *Vafþrúðnismál*, Odin sought wisdom from the giant Vafþrúðnir by challenging him to a contest while in disguise, the prize purportedly being his life. However, Vafþrúðnir unwisely wagered his own head. Odin revealed himself to the giant by asking him a question only Odin would know the answer to and thus won the bout. In *Þrymskviða*, the giant Þrymr steals the god of strength Thor's hammer, Mjólnir, and demands Freyja, Norse goddess of love, as ransom. Mighty Thor cross-dresses as Freyja to trick Þrymr, get the hammer back, and smite him.

All these instances of mythic deception illustrate deceptive themes from everyday social life in a hyperbolic manner—much like soap operas today—and guide people (impartially or not) in navigating their social environments.

### Group Deception

There also exist many instances of mythic deception at the group level involving love, war, and mischief-making power struggles. For example, before Paris wooed and “kidnapped” Helen from Sparta, he convinced the Greeks he was on a diplomatic mission. In another example, Odysseus concealed his identity from his wife Penelope and her host of suitors upon returning to Ithaca. With the help of Athena, he returned appearing much weaker than he actually was, which allowed him to infiltrate his home, kill his wife’s suitors, and reclaim his court and family.

One of the greatest instances of mythic group deception involves the Trojan horse. After 10 years of failed siege, the Greeks built a giant wooden horse and hid men inside it. They then pretended to sail away, and the Trojans saw the “peace-offering gift” of the horse as a victory trophy and brought it into Troy. At night, the Greek soldiers emerged and opened the gates for the rest of the Greek army that had sailed back under darkness. The Greeks destroyed Troy, and this act of deception won the war.

Often myths of this variety teach lessons. When pirates attempted to kidnap young Dionysus, they tried to deceive him, saying they would sail him to his destination. However, clever Dionysus pretended to play along when they were going in the wrong direction, and he even feigned helplessness. When the pirates began mocking him, Dionysus revealed his true form and transformed them all into dolphins. This myth teaches audiences about the punishments that can come from bullying mistreatment. In another example, Prometheus deceived the gods and stole their fire for humans. Zeus harshly punished this disrespectful deception by chaining Prometheus to a rock, where his liver was eaten daily by an eagle and regrown every night.

Group-level deceptions involving power struggles frequently occur in Norse mythology. Icelandic sagas are replete with family feuds and property disputes. One story describes a trip by Thor, his servant, and Loki to Jotunheim, land of the giants. While there, they were deceived by ruling giant Utgard-Loki into thinking they failed at simple feats, including an eating contest, a race, drinking from a horn, lifting a cat, and wrestling a crone. This disheartened them, especially Thor.

They were informed upon departing that they were actually contending with the entities Fire, Thought, the Sea, the Serpent surrounding the world, and Old Age, respectively, and that they were formidable challengers.

Finally, the Norse gods—the *Æsir*—hired a builder to secure Valhalla, home of the gods, in exchange for the goddess Freyja, the sun, and the moon. The *Æsir* agreed but specified that the builder must finish within three seasons unassisted. The gods deceived the builder, giving him an “impossible” task. The builder requested only the use of his horse Svaðilfari, and the trickster god Loki convinced the others this would be fine. However, the builder also deceived the *Æsir*, as Svaðilfari was enormously powerful. The builder made rapid progress, and the *Æsir* blamed Loki and demanded he save their scheme or be killed. Loki delivered more deception by transforming himself into a mare and seducing Svaðilfari, distracting the stallion enough to delay building. When the gods discovered the builder was a disguised giant, Thor smote him.

### Universality of Mythical Themes

Deceptive themes are found worldwide and across cultures, as seen with the trickster archetype. What accounts for such convergence? One possible explanation is cultural transmission. The Romans borrowed much of their pantheon from the Greeks. However, many similar stories have arisen in drastically different places that did not interact in a less globalized world.

An alternative explanation involves something similar to Jung’s idea of the collective unconscious. Michelle Sugiyama asked how, without writing, ancestral humans stored and shared information. Her research suggests that narrative may have evolved as a psychological adaptation for that purpose. Oral traditions of hunter-gatherers contain much information regarding recurring problems of forager life, like deceiving or being deceived by others, resource acquisition, predator avoidance, cheating, and way-finding. Narrative may have served to help make people aware of these survival issues, perhaps thus explaining the ubiquitous presence of certain themes. For instance, deceptive cheaters would have posed a significant threat to a group’s well-being by reaping benefits of cooperation, such as food gathering, while failing to

contribute. This may have led to stories showing deceivers being caught or punished. Alternatively, sometimes deception would have been useful for navigating one's social environment: hence, deception stories involving demonstrations of cleverness.

Whatever the origin, it seems deception has played a major role in myth for thousands of years, and some common themes of deception teach people about themselves and their social worlds.

Brian L. Mayer  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Bible; Courtship, Deception in; Coyote; Fairy Tales; Fantasy and

Imagination; Fiction; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; Jackalope; Middle East; Relationships: Romantic; Santa Claus; Self-Deception; Tall Tales; Trojan Horse; UFOs; Urban Legends.

#### **Further Readings**

Apollodorus and Robin Hard, trans. *The Library of Greek Mythology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Bulfinch, T. *Bulfinch's Mythology*. New York: Modern Library, 2004.

Campbell, J. *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1949.

Snorri Sturluson and A. Faulkes, trans. *Edda*. London: Dent, 1987.

# N

## Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) was born in his ancestral home of Casa Buonaparte, at Ajaccio, Corsica, on August 15, 1769. He was the second son of Carlo Maria di Buonaparte and Maria Letizia Ramolino. His family, undistinguished minor Italian nobility, had moved to Corsica in the 1500s. His birth came a year after the Republic of Genoa had transferred Corsica to France. Christened with the Italian name, Napoleone di Buonaparte, he eventually Gallicized it to Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napoleon's father, Carlo Buonaparte, was a lawyer and Corsican political activist. After France took control of Corsica in 1768, he opposed the French accession and joined other Corsican patriots in the mountains. However, seeing better opportunities in cooperating, he accepted French rule and was eventually a representative to the Court of Louis XIV from Corsica. He may have passed on some diplomatic skills to his son Napoleon, as well as Corsican duplicitous folklore and proverbs about lying (e.g., "lies have twisted limbs").

Carlo Buonaparte, an aristocrat, secured admission at royal expense (*boursiers*) for Napoleon in the school at Brienne. Entering at the age of 10, Napoleon concentrated on mathematics, geography, and history. He completed his studies ahead

of schedule, at the age of 15. He next entered the École Militaire in Paris, again on a royal scholarship. At the age of 16, he was commissioned first lieutenant in an artillery regiment. Shortly afterward, his father died. He gained leave to go to Corsica to deal with family's affairs. To extend his military leave, he deceitfully sent his commanding officer a medical certificate stating that he was ill and unfit for duty. He then went to Paris to secure payment of 9,000 francs owed his father. There, he unsuccessfully struggled with the government and learned much about bureaucracy's red tape. He then returned to his regiment.

### French Revolution

When the French Revolution began, Napoleon was uninvolved until the National Assembly was organized. He then adopted the ideas that the revolutionaries advocated and sailed to Corsica to spread the Revolution; however, he was ordered to return to duty. To stay in Corsica, he engaged in blatant fraud to win election to the rank of lieutenant colonel of Corsican volunteers. His dishonesty was matched by other coup d'états in the future. However, he was not able to win support for his agenda, and he endangered his family, who were forced to escape to France.

Napoleon found an opportunity to demonstrate his military skills during the siege of Toulon. His fame spread with the city's capture. For





*Napoleon Crossing the Alps (1801), a painting by Jacques-Louis David, captures the leader's valiant skills during his military career, which he entered at age 16. He advocated deception as a military strategy, exaggerating troop numbers and utilizing spies, secret codes, and media propaganda.*

the rest of his life, his fame rose and fell with his success and failure in the events of the day. The event that next propelled him into the forefront was the ending of the National Assembly in favor of the Directory. To protect itself from the mobs in Paris, the Directory called upon Napoleon for help. He calmed the situation with a “whiff of grapeshot.” The Directory promoted Napoleon to second in command of the Army of the Interior.

In 1796, Napoleon married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais). He was dispatched a few days later to northern Italy to fight the Austrians. His Italian campaign ended with a treaty in 1797. In 1799, he was ordered by the Directory to campaign in the Near East. He conquered Egypt, and would have been successful against the Ottoman Empire, if the British had not destroyed the French fleet at Aboukit. About this time, Napoleon learned that the situation at home was unstable. He quickly

returned to Paris, where he successfully maneuvered to become the first counsel, and soon thereafter took sole power.

To please the Paris mob, he allowed the return of the émigrés (including aristocrats), and reestablished Roman Catholicism as the religion of France while providing protections for other faiths. He also reformed the French administration and its national finances. By 1805, a new French code, the Civil Code, often called the Napoleonic Code, was issued. Numerous other reforms were instituted that strengthened France.

### Exile

Between 1805 and 1807, Napoleon used the newly formed Grande Armée to establish dominance in Europe. Unable to bring the British to terms because of their naval superiority, he closed continental Europe to the British “nation of shopkeepers.” However, smuggling spread so that British goods flowed into Europe, especially through Russia. In 1812, he launched a Russian campaign that reached Moscow but was defeated by the Russian winter and the Russian defense through a scorched earth strategy that deprived the French of supplies acquired by foraging.

Returning to Paris defeated and with the British advancing in the Iberian Peninsula Campaign, Bonaparte struggled to stay in power from 1813 to 1814. He finally abdicated and went into exile on the Island of Elba in the Mediterranean. In 1815, he escaped from Elba and returned to France where he sought to regain the throne. However, the Congress of Vienna outlawed him and forced him to fight for survival. He organized a new army and advanced into Belgium, where he was defeated by the Duke of Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo. He was forced to abdicate and was exiled to St. Helena. There, he was able to walk about the grounds of the house where he lived while dictating his memoirs. He died in 1821 of stomach cancer.

Napoleon advocated secrecy to protect military movements. He also advocated deception, once telling General Clarke to tell his brother Joseph, King of Spain, to exaggerate the number of troops he had or that the enemy had. He used examples from different campaigns against the Austrians and others as illustrations. He encouraged orders of the day to be exaggerated in order to encourage

the troops and to discourage the enemy. He also advocated using disinformation to fool spies and the enemy.

Napoleon used spies and secret codes to gain information. He used the press and created propaganda to gain favorable public opinion. He was a master of propaganda, even lying or exaggerating to promote morale. He issued carefully crafted bulletins, dispatches and proclamations full of distortions to win public opinion. The French expression to “lie like a bulletin” (military information sheet) dates from this period. Information favorable to Napoleon and designed to awe the French public was at times inserted *ex post facto*. He also used military medals, art, and theater as propaganda tools.

Napoleon was a serious student of history, especially of great commanders, claiming that “History is a set of lies agreed upon.”

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Government Propaganda; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Military Deception.

### Further Readings

- Chandler, David G. *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995.
- Luvaas, Jay, ed. and trans. *Napoleon on the Art of War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
- Milner, John. *Art, War, and Revolution in France, 1870–1871: Myth, Reportage, and Reality*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
- O'Brien, David. *After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting, and Propaganda Under Napoleon*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006.

---

## Narcissism

Narcissism is a personality trait that is associated with several kinds of dishonesty. Most of these dishonest behaviors can be described as self-directed or other-directed, although some seem to involve dishonesty toward both the self

and others. When narcissists, or people who are unusually egotistical, tell lies directed toward other people, these lies are often in the service of narcissists' personal, even selfish, goals. When narcissists' lies are directed toward themselves, the lies also serve a selfish end. Narcissists lie to themselves about their abilities, characteristics, and behaviors in order to build and maintain their grandiose self-images.

Several decades of research have described the nature of narcissism and its associated characteristics. Narcissism lies on a continuum, which means that some people are relatively low in narcissism, some people are relatively high, and most people are somewhere between the two extremes. Narcissists, or people who are relatively high on the continuum, hold exaggerated self-views and see themselves as superior to others. They tend to feel entitled to special treatment. Narcissists are generally extraverted, highly sensitive to rewards, and prone to thrill-seeking, but also disagreeable, domineering, arrogant, and impulsive. Narcissists tend to become hostile when they are challenged, and when they learn about others' successes, they tend to feel envious. In their own quests for success, narcissists are prone to taking unfair advantage of others.

In some ways, narcissists seem highly motivated. Narcissists generally seek dominance, fame, uniqueness, power, wealth, and others' admiration. Sometimes they achieve these ends (for example, some accomplished athletes and celebrities seem to be highly narcissistic), but most narcissists are no more successful than the average person. In domains concerned with getting along with others, narcissists tend to be less motivated than average. Narcissists are less interested than most people in understanding others' feelings, cooperating with others, or working toward others' well-being.

On the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, a widely used questionnaire that measures narcissism, men generally score a little higher than women. However, biological sex does not correlate as strongly with narcissism as masculinity does. Toughness, independence, dominance, and risk-taking are considered key characteristics of masculinity (and are also characteristics valued by narcissists), so it is understandable that narcissism is more strongly associated with masculinity than

biological sex. Narcissism is also weakly associated (in a negative direction) with femininity.

Age is negatively related to narcissism, such that adolescents score higher than younger adults, who in turn score higher than older adults. The negative relationship between age and narcissism may be due to either developmental changes, cultural changes, or both. In recent decades, Western cultures have tended to strongly emphasize a focus on the self, and among American college students, scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory have steadily risen since the early 1980s. This latter finding suggests that an increase in cultural messages that emphasize the self at least partly explains why younger people tend to be more narcissistic than older people.

When a person is so high on the narcissism continuum that his or her behavior causes significant distress (to the self or others), or increases the risk of suffering, that person may qualify for a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder. Some authors have suggested that narcissists may become distressed and qualify for a diagnosis when their needs (for glorious success, fame, and so on) are repeatedly frustrated. If their own distress does not motivate them to seek treatment, narcissists may enter treatment because of pressure from distressed friends or family members. Narcissistic personality disorder is considered difficult to treat, but recent research has documented some successful psychotherapeutic approaches.

There is currently controversy about how narcissistic personality disorder differs from other personality disorders. As the American Psychiatric Association developed the fifth edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders*, researchers debated the usefulness of narcissistic personality disorder as a concept. The status of this disorder may be debated well into the future, but one point of relatively clear agreement is that some people behave so egotistically that they cause problems not only for themselves but also for people around them. Narcissistic people can be annoying, hurtful, and sometimes even violent.

### **Narcissism and Other-Directed Deception**

Evidence suggesting that narcissism is related to behaviors aimed at deceiving others is mostly indirect. Investigations of the association between

narcissism and lying are lacking, but many studies show that narcissism is related to characteristics and habits that are associated with lying. Because research on personality traits is correlational, it is not always clear whether narcissism (or some other trait associated with narcissism) causes dishonest behavior. Nevertheless, many studies suggest that lying is more common among narcissists than it is among people who are low in narcissism.

Research has established that a variety of problem behaviors that typically involve lying are related to narcissism. Some of these problem behaviors include pathological gambling and compulsive buying, two habits that often involve lying about frequency of engaging in the behavior and financial losses. Other problem behaviors associated with narcissism include heavy alcohol use (which often involves lying about frequency of use) and infidelity (which often involves lying to at least one partner). This pattern of associations does not directly link narcissism to lying, but it suggests that such a link is likely.

Stronger evidence of a link between narcissism and lying comes from studies showing that narcissists seem to have little hesitation about describing themselves as relatively dishonest (and generally unethical) on questionnaires. Several versions of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory include the statement, "I can make anybody believe anything I want them to." This statement is probably frequently endorsed by people who think they are good liars, and when it is endorsed, it contributes to a higher narcissism score.

Narcissists also score relatively high on questionnaire measures of Machiavellianism, a trait that involves manipulating and deceiving others. They also score highly on self-monitoring, a trait that involves a chameleon-like tendency to present oneself differently in different social situations, and psychopathy, a trait that involves anti-social behavior coupled with diminished feelings of empathy and guilt. Moreover, on a questionnaire that personality psychologists use to assess honesty and humility, narcissists tend to receive relatively low scores.

### **Narcissism and Self-Directed Deception**

Narcissists are not only dishonest with others but also are often dishonest with themselves. Several studies suggest that narcissists tend to cheat on

tests. Normally cheating on tests is considered to be other-deception (because it is an attempt to deceive an authority figure about one's skill), but for narcissists in some circumstances, cheating on tests may also involve self-deception. One recent study showed that narcissism is related to rationalized, but not deliberative, cheating. Deliberative cheating is intentional and recognized as wrong, whereas rationalized cheating involves explaining misconduct to oneself in a way that makes it seem morally acceptable. The link between narcissism and rationalized cheating suggests that, at least some of the time, narcissists' dishonesty toward others is facilitated by narcissists' dishonest, internal rationalizations of their own behavior.

Narcissists' exaggerated self-views also seem to be self-deceptive. Life usually provides people with a balance of positive and negative feedback, but in many of their self-descriptions, narcissists seem to emphasize their strengths much more than their weaknesses. Several studies suggest that narcissists rate themselves high in intelligence, attractiveness, and performance in group tasks, even when objective evidence does not support these self-perceptions. Narcissists also claim to have greater general knowledge than they actually do. On some personality traits, narcissists see themselves as better than the average person, and better than their romantic partners. The latter finding is especially interesting because many people in relationships view their romantic partners at least as positively as, if not more positively than, they view themselves.

One interesting theme in narcissists' exaggerated self-views is that they are more likely to consider themselves superior on social dominance characteristics (associated with getting ahead) than social connection characteristics (associated with getting along). In some studies, narcissists have rated themselves as better than the average person in mind-reading ability (during a business negotiation) and also better than average in intelligence and extraversion. They do not rate themselves as better than average in morality or kindness. Findings like these suggest that narcissists are at least somewhat selective with their exaggerated self-perceptions.

Narcissists tend to explain their successes and failures in ways that probably sustain their exaggerated self-perceptions. Research suggests that

when narcissists are told they have performed well, they explain their success primarily in terms of personal ability. Attributing success to personal skill, of course, helps sustain a grandiose self-image. When narcissists are told they have performed poorly, they explain their failure in terms of external circumstances (such as attributing a low test score to extreme test difficulty). By blaming poor performance on external circumstances, narcissists can protect their grandiose self-images from countervailing evidence. The flexibility narcissists allow themselves when explaining successes and failures suggests that narcissists are often dishonest with themselves when thinking about performance feedback. After all, whether the outcome is success or failure, a full and honest explanation for one's performance should typically include consideration of both personal abilities and external circumstances.

Paul Rose

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Infidelity; Lying as Exercise of Power; Machiavellianism; Manipulation; Overconfidence; Pathological Lying; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Brown, R. P., K. Budzek, and M. Tamborski. "On the Meaning and Measure of Narcissism." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.35 (2009).
- Campbell, W. K. and J. D. Foster. "The Narcissistic Self: Background, an Extended Agency Model and Ongoing Controversies." In *Frontiers in Social Psychology: The Self*, C. Sedikides and S. Spencer, eds. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2007.
- Campbell, W. K., E. Rudich, and C. Sedikides. "Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and the Positivity of Self-Views: Two Portraits of Self-Love." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.28 (2002).
- Foster, J. D. and W. K. Campbell. "Are There Such Things as 'Narcissists' in Social Psychology? A Taxometric Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.43 (2007).
- Foster, J. D., W. K. Campbell, and J. M. Twenge. "Individual Differences in Narcissism: Inflated Self-Views Across the Lifespan and Around the World." *Journal of Research in Personality*, v.37 (2003).



Lee, K. and M. C. Ashton. "Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and Narcissism in the Five-Factor Model and the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure." *Personality and Individual Differences*, v.38 (2005).

Stucke, T. S. "Who's to Blame? Narcissism and Self-Serving Attributions Following Feedback." *European Journal of Personality*, v.17 (2003).

## Native Americans

The traditional history of American Indians suggests that the massive loss of life by native peoples after 1492 was both tragic and unavoidable and was not intended by the incoming settlers from Europe. However, since the Vietnam War era, a strong counter-narrative has developed specifying that the native population was intentionally and drastically reduced by means of an American Indian holocaust. In forthright language, the new narrative charges that deception and lies were at the heart of the traditional history.

The traditionalist argument is that Indians' resistance to European diseases was low, and many fell mortally ill because of that cause. The deaths, though unfortunate, were part of the price paid for progress as Eurocentric ideas and ways of life spread westward. In this traditional view, the Indians were depicted as living in small, scattered bands of hunting and gathering tribes in North America, leading a miserable existence until the advanced culture of the settlers came along to show them a better way of life.

Waves of historians and anthropologists gave legitimacy to this line of thought by claiming that the original aboriginal population was not nearly as large as some had suggested, and that the main cause of death was disease and not warfare. Further, these historians maintain, it was inevitable there would be some reduction in population on both sides of the conflicts over land. The vacant geographic area now known as the United States was open to whoever might wish to claim it; claims to land could invite challengers. Jews and Jewish scholars also lent their collective voices to legitimize the narrative by arguing that upstart claims of an American Indian holocaust were

overdrawn and inaccurate. They cited the exclusivity of the Jewish holocaust, noting that all of the other claims of genocide pale in comparison with the tragic loss of life in the Nazi concentration camps in Germany during World War II.

In the counter-narrative, holocaust writers state that the idea of "no American Indian holocaust" is one of the biggest lies ever foisted upon the worldwide public about American Indians. Several holocaust scholars have pointed out the scope of this deception. Ward Churchill, for example, contends that during the 400 years from 1492 to 1892, the Indian population was reduced from approximately 125 million to less than one quarter of a million, a reduction of about 90 percent. The causes of death were disgusting, barbaric, and unfathomable to the modern reader. The same scholars that bring evidence of these horrific deaths also unashamedly indicate that failure to recognize the carnage as genocide amounts to a denial of the American Indian holocaust, a lie that flies in the face of the statistics they provide.

These writers contend that the "outrageous" massacres during the Indian Wars, such as those at Sand Creek and Wounded Knee, were simply continuations along a steady path of genocide, and were not anomalies as the standard narrative suggests. At Sand Creek in 1864, a 700-troop force of Colorado militiamen attacked and destroyed a village of friendly Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho encamped in southeastern Colorado, killing and mutilating an estimated 148 Indians, more than half of whom were women and children. By the end of the following year, the Cheyenne and Arapaho had been driven out of Colorado. This violence warranted national attention as Congress convened hearings to investigate the use of excessive force.

The Wounded Knee conflict in 1890 reportedly began with a fight between an Indian and a soldier, which escalated into the indiscriminate shooting of 150 Lakota Sioux, including scores of women and children, by the U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment. Comparable massacres of American Indians at Washita River (Oklahoma), Blue Water Creek (Nebraska), Sappa Creek (Kansas), Bear River (Idaho), and Camp Robinson (Nebraska) are cited as evidence of the regularity of such killings.

Ward Churchill, David Stannard, and others have written that the slaughter of Indians at places like Sand Creek and Wounded Knee were only the beginning of the genocide, because it embraced only one type of genocide, namely, physical extermination. Working closely with the definition of genocide developed by Raphael Lemkin (and later, the United Nations), Churchill's view was that biological and cultural genocide occurred along with the physical type. Biological genocide included acts such as involuntary sterilization, compulsory abortion, segregation of the sexes, and obstacles to marriage, as well as any other policies whose purpose was to prevent births within a target group.

Cultural genocide encompassed the idea of denationalization and imposition of an alien national pattern, which was introduced into the genocide dialogue by Lemkin in 1944. Cultural genocide includes all policies aimed at destroying the specific characteristics by which a target group is defined, or defines itself, thereby forcing it to become something else. Among the acts specified are the forced transfer and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of the group; the prohibition of the use of the national language; the systematic destruction of books printed in the national language; and the destruction or dispersion of objects of religious, artistic, or historical value. Thus, the forced removal of tribes east of the Mississippi River during the Trail of Tears in 1838, and the removal of Indian children from tribes for relocation to Indian industrial schools are two examples that fit Churchill's definition of cultural genocide.

Similarly, the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i in 1893 paved the way for a provisional government friendly to the United States and led to the gradual erosion of native Hawai'ian culture. A less violent but still potent land grab in the Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act of 1971 transferred native land rights to a series of Alaskan Native regional corporations, in the process nearly extinguishing the native heritage, culture, and way of life of the Eyak tribe.

This preliminary definition of genocide developed by Lemkin was later revised and distilled into the second article of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It defines the crime as being any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy a religious,

ethnic, or national group: (1) killing group members, (2) causing serious mental or physical harm to group members, (3) purposefully changing the group's conditions of life with the intent of destroying the group, (4) imposing measures to prevent births within the group, and (5) under threat of force, transferring children of the target group. Churchill noted that killing is one of five criteria, or 20 percent of the total. The other four, or 80 percent of the total of the definition of genocide posited in international law, consist or devolve upon explicitly nonlethal lines of action.

### COINTELPRO

In the 1960s, when the American Indian Movement (AIM) began to advocate more openly for the holocaust position and for Indian self-determination, its members were cast as political extremists bent on overthrowing the U.S. government, and as a result, were subjected to a Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence program called COINTELPRO. The purpose of this program was to interfere with the political activities of groups deemed harmful to the United States, and to seek the destruction of the groups "from within" by disrupting them and/or causing the groups to violate the law. COINTELPRO actions against AIM led to the arrest of the organization's key leaders from 1968 to 1975. Further, there was a serious allegation that the program's actions against AIM in 1975 advanced into a counterinsurgency, in which scores of Indians died in and near the site of the 1973 Wounded Knee siege.

The traditional narrative lives on and continues to be a viable explanation for reductions in the native population. Experts with access to all the statistics disagree about the size of the original population of natives at the time Christopher Columbus arrived in the New World. Additionally, Jewish scholars have pushed back against the use of the concept of genocide as a heuristic tool to analyze the Indian experience. They are probably right in arguing that, no matter what atrocities American Indians faced, their experience was not comparable to that of the European Jews in Nazi concentration camps and ghettos during World War II. Thus, use of the term *genocide* may be an overstatement. Critics also claim there was a distinct lack of genocidal intent in many of the instances of massacres cited by

Churchill, Stannard, and others. Finally, in 2006, Ward Churchill was accused of academic misconduct, including fabrication and plagiarism, thus besmirching the totality of his work.

Despite this, the counter-narrative appears to be gaining ground and emerging stronger each year as an explanation of the historical experience of the American Indians. As multiculturalism spread on college campuses during the 1990s, students were familiarized with the holocaust argument, and many read it in the native voice. The counter-narrative was further legitimized by the current understanding that the Indians were better stewards of communities and lands than were the Europeans who settled in North America. Native ways of justice, such as circle sentencing and restorative justice, are making a comeback and are being hailed as credible alternatives to the mostly failed American criminal justice system.

Also, the native populations had a better relationship with the earth than did the conquering settlers. The Western way of exploiting the environment for profit has led to environmental changes that could be responsible for the climate change that has begun to affect millions of Americans. Native Americans, on the other hand, long ago realized that human progress must be coterminous with the natural order, rather than something that is separate or superior to nature. This vision of progress allowed the indigenous people of this hemisphere to live comfortably and in harmony with the earth, which they believed must remain healthy if their people were to survive and thrive.

Stan C. Weeber  
McNeese State University

**See Also:** Columbus, Christopher; Colonialism; Contagious Disease Outbreaks; Historical Narratives, False; History of Deception: Renaissance; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; Jackson, Andrew; Justice; Spanish-American Conquests; World War II.

### Further Readings

Churchill, Ward. *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997.

Churchill, Ward. "Kill the Indian, Save the Man": *The Genocidal Impact of American Indian Residential Schools*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2004.

Churchill, Ward and Jim Vander Wall. *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*. Boston: South End Press, 1990.

Gunther, Lewy, "Were American Indians the Victims of Genocide?" *Commentary*, v.118 (2004).

Jaimes, M. Annette, ed. *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press, 1992.

Jones, Adam, ed. *Genocide, War Crimes, and the West: History and Complicity*. London: Zed Books, 2004.

Moore, Marijo, ed. *Eating Fire, Tasting Blood: An Anthology of the American Indian Holocaust*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2006.

Nichols, Roger. *American Indians in U.S. History*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004.

Stannard, David. *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

---

## Nazi Propaganda

In Chapter Six of *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*), Adolf Hitler acknowledges that he views the function of German propaganda as unflinchingly serving the ends of the Nazi Party. Outside Germany's borders, the propaganda campaign in which the Nazis engaged consisted of distributing false information and sowing seeds of distrust among the Allies and between various classes and groups. Within Germany, the Nazis used propaganda in addition to physical force and intimidation to keep the German people in line. The ultimate goal of the internal propaganda campaign was to make Germany appear invincible and present the Nazis as the saviors of the German people.

The ongoing pattern of propaganda often included spreading rumors of secret German weapons that were capable of wiping out entire populations. The propaganda machine even launched a concentrated and successful campaign

to convince British intelligence that the Germans had an entire fleet of He113 Super Fighter planes. The campaign was carried out using false information and photographs of staged settings designed to frighten the British.

Before the German invasion of Austria, Hitler dispatched undercover Nazis to Austria, where they pretended to be Austrian schoolboys. In order to undermine government authority, they staged pranks designed to make the police appear inefficient and foolish. The propaganda continued over the course of the World War II. In France, the Nazis hired professional mourners and palm readers to make it seem as if a German victory against France were inevitable. In order to weaken the bonds among the Allies, the Nazi propaganda machine went so far as to send postcards to French soldiers at the front, informing

them that their wives and sweethearts had run away with British soldiers. The Nazis combed the French gossip columns and traced down any hint of scandal that could potentially give them grounds for blackmailing prominent individuals into supporting Germany. In Belgium, the Nazis engaged in rumor-mongering that allowed them to pit group against group by telling them that King Leopold III was making secret deals with either the Allies or Germany.

Nazi propaganda efforts involved taking control of the German media. One method for maintaining that control was the establishment of the Reich Chamber of Commerce in 1933, and only members of this group were allowed to publish in any medium. Films became a major tool in the plan to spread dissension and distrust. Anti-Semitism was a constant theme in such films. Director Leni Riefenstahl became the voice of Nazi propaganda films, producing such films as the *Triumph of the Will*. The government took over newsreel production within Germany and used newsreels to convince the population that Germany was destined to win the war. Nazi soldiers were sometimes posted at the doors to prevent Germans from leaving theaters without viewing the newsreels.

Many German propaganda films have been lost to history, but one of these films was auctioned on the Internet in 2007. Produced in 1940, *Kampf um Norwegen* depicted the battle between German and Norwegian troops. It is assumed that the Nazis refused to approve its release because of its relatively neutral stance. Political cartoons were also used in propaganda campaigns, and the Jews and the British were popular subjects.

Within Germany, books were seen as a means of exerting control, and strict censorship was enforced. In May 1933, Joseph Goebbels, the minister of public enlightenment and propaganda, instituted a public book-burning at which all material perceived as detrimental to Hitler and the Nazi Party was destroyed.

The radio was also considered an essential tool in spreading Nazi propaganda. To ensure that Hitler was able to spread the word to the people, cheap radios were produced in Germany, which sold for only 35 to 76 marks. Not all of the individuals who broadcasted propaganda were German. One of the most notorious broadcasters was



This 1944 Nazi SS propaganda poster by Nazi propagandist Harald Damsleth promoted Storm SS, a Nazi propaganda tabloid targeted for the occupied Netherlands. The monster symbolizes numerous aspects of American culture that the Nazis found threatening, including race violence, blacks, Jews, Freemasons, commercialism, decadence, jitterbugging, and military violence.



actually born in Brooklyn, New York, but claimed to be a British citizen. That claim ultimately cost him his life. William Joyce, known throughout Europe as Lord Haw Haw because his anti-British propaganda was generally considered ridiculous rather than dangerous, became a fascist in 1933. He used a British passport to move to Germany in September 1940 and subsequently became a German citizen and a staunch Nazi supporter. His claim to British citizenship provided grounds for his conviction of treason, and he was executed on January 3, 1946.

Despite being the chief target of Nazi brutality, European Jews were forced to participate in the propaganda campaign. Prisoners incarcerated at various camps were ordered to send postcards to family members, informing them that were in good health and were being treated well. The most lavish deception involving concentration camps took place in 1944 at Theresienstadt, a Czech camp where Danish Jews were being held. The group included the elderly, disabled war veterans, artists, and musicians. After being forced to accede to requests to allow the International Red Cross to visit the camp, the Nazis put the prisoners to work beautifying the camp. Gardens were planted and buildings were painted. A film, which was never released, was produced that portrayed the inhabitants of Theresienstadt attending concerts and playing sports. After the visit was over, most of the camp's inhabitants were sent to concentration camps such as Auschwitz and Birkenau, where they were killed.

In order to respond to Hitler's campaign of Nazi propaganda, the American government issued the pamphlet *Divide and Conquer* in 1942, explaining the concept of propaganda and what it meant for the American people. The pamphlet cautioned Americans against giving in to Hitler's attempt to eliminate the truth through his tactics of promoting mental confusion, indecisiveness, and panic. In May, the *Saturday Evening Post* broke its own rule against reprinting articles that originated from other sources and reprinted *Divide and Conquer* in its entirety.

The Hoover Institute of Stanford University contains an extensive collection of Nazi propaganda material, including the writings of Hitler, Goebbels, and Alfred Rosenberg, an influential member of the Nazi Party. The Goebbels material

provides a firsthand view of letters he received while serving as head of Hitler's Propaganda Ministry. The collection also includes records on Nazi concentration camps and the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, at which war criminals were tried. Another valuable resource for material on Nazi propaganda is the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.

Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Big Lie Technique; Consensual Reality; Cooperation; Disinformation; Eisenhower, Dwight; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Hitler, Adolf; Memoirs; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Smoke Screen; Stalin, Josef; World War II.

#### Further Readings

- Bauer, Brad. "Defiance of the Lambs." *World War II*, v.27/5 (2013).
- Bytwerk, Randall L. *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004.
- Fitzpatrick, Daniel Robert. *Divide and Conquer*. Washington, DC: United States Office of Facts and Figures, 1942.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Hitler, Adolf and John Chamberlin, et al., eds. *Mein Kampf: Complete and Unabridged*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939.
- "How Big Were the Lies?" *Time*, v.38/7 (August 18, 1941).
- Jowett, Garth and Victoria O'Donnell, eds. *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006.
- Kallis, Aristotle A. *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Scott, Niall. *Monsters and the Monstrous: Myths and Metaphors of Enduring Evil*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007.
- Smith, Robert Barr. "The Short Unhappy Life of Nazi Propagandist Lord Haw Haw Ended With a Drop From the Gallows." *World War II*, v.15/4 (2000).

Taylor, Edmond. *The Strategy of Terror: Europe's Inner Front*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940.

U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Propaganda." <http://www.ushmm.org/propaganda> (Accessed February 2013).

"What Hitler Wants You to Think." *Saturday Evening Post*, v.214/45 (May 19, 1942).

---

## Neurophysiology

Technological developments allow unprecedented observation of brain activity in a continued quest to distinguish truth from lies. Neural monitoring, also called brain mapping, neural mapping, or brain fingerprinting, represents the latest potentially objective attempt in improving the accuracy of determining the truthfulness or veracity of a person's statements. Although the traditional polygraph and neural graphing approaches share common elements, neurophysiological approaches present distinct legal and ethical concerns about how this information might be used in legal courts, law enforcement, and national security.

Historically, observation of individuals' behaviors was the most immediate method of determining their statement veracity. Research on deception detection established connections between several different channels of nonverbal behavior (e.g., touch, hand/foot gestures, facial expressions, eye behavior, scent, posture, use of space, and vocal variation) and different types of deceptive behavior (e.g., highly practiced lies, planned lies, and spontaneous lies). With so many channels to simultaneously attend to, deceivers would often "leak" behaviors associated with the truth, mixed in with controlled behaviors associated with their lie, creating a disparity across the behavioral channels. A weak point within this research was the accuracy levels of humans trying to solely use this information to detect deception.

Deceptive behaviors are frequently associated with physiological changes when anxiety about detection is present. Polygraph administration is designed to heighten this anxiety in participants in order to provide clear responses to questions. A traditional polygraph simultaneously

measured participants' blood pressure, galvanic skin response, pulse, and respiration as indicators of anxiety-induced autonomic arousal. Inherent within this line of deception detection is the erroneous assumption of a universal arousal baseline across all humans. Not all individuals are aroused by telling lies, and even those who would normally be stimulated by this activity may experience lower arousal levels via practice or planning of the lie (i.e., the stimulating effect of any behavior reduces through habituation across practice/performance of the behavior).

Additionally, counter-polygraph training hampers the polygraph's abilities to detect changes in a person's anxiety or arousal by changing their autonomic reactivity, and although steps have been taken to inoculate many of these hampering methods from affecting a polygraph administration, the reliance on external behaviors and internal aspects of an individual's arousal continue to offer weaker evidence. Consequently, courts continue to view polygraph results with suspicion. The most valuable use of polygraph technologies lies in their ability to elicit subject's verbal statements that could subsequently be used in court, even though the actual polygraph test results could not.

### Telling Lies

Where the polygraph focuses on peripheral autonomic activity, brain electrophysiology and neuroimaging focus on direct changes in the brain's activity. Thus, at the core of any neurophysiological approach to deception and lying lies a concern with finding neurophysiological differences between deception and truth. Telling a lie requires an individual to expend additional neural energy beyond what they might expend telling the truth. Additionally, attempting to deceive another requires the deceiver to monitor and produce specific nonverbal behaviors consistent with the false alternate reality of the deception. As such, higher loads of neural energy should be able to be detected. Yet, the more one practices a specific lie, the less energy is required to produce that lie/deceptive attempt.

The blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and galvanic skin response, and pupil dilation used in traditional polygraph administration all stem from changes in brain activity, so measuring

the brain directly should, theoretically, provide a more direct, reliable measure of deceptive behaviors. Some of the technologies used in neural monitoring include: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, a derivative of MRI), using oxygen-consumption and blood flow to map the most active areas of a brain at a specific moment; positron emission tomography (PET scan), which uses radioactive tracers injected into the body to analyze brain tissue by following the flow of the radioactive material; electroencephalography (EEG), which records electrical activity produced by the brain along the scalp; event-related potentials (ERPs), which measure cognitive and sensory experiences using EEG technologies; and “brain fingerprinting,” which is based on unique brain-wave patterns in matching situations (e.g., a familiar scene). Within these technologies, fMRIs only provide images taken each second, whereas EEG and ERP techniques can register activity changes to a thousandth of a second.

Several of these approaches study deception by focusing on matching methodologies, where an individual is shown a familiar/unfamiliar scene, and then is asked whether they recognize the scene or not. Similarly, participants are sometimes asked to say “true” or “false” in response to reading statements, creating either true or false statements in the process. These methods were well established in the 1980s, using event-related potentials (ERPs), and have continued to be utilized with more sophisticated technology (e.g., fMRIs, PET scans, and even more sensitive EEG technologies). All of these approaches suffer from external and ecological validity challenges, attempting to generalize findings of their samples to other deceptive encounters, as well as poorly resembling actual deceptive events and activity. What is emerging within this research line is a focus on deceptive constructions and decisions to deceive, both of which offer promise to better inform those seeking to understand neural aspects of actual human deception. A practiced lie is likely to take less neurological energy than a planned one, and a planned lie is likely to take less energy than a spontaneous one. Although this finding is well established within the cognitive research platform, it is only now beginning to emerge as a viable research question to pursue within the neural monitoring area.

Although historically some critics have suggested that specific brain areas need to be consistently associated with deceptive behaviors before neural monitoring can be accepted as a viable deception detection technique, more recent neurophysiological research shows progress toward this very goal. In regard to neuroscience as a form of lie detection, specific regions of the brain have been analyzed in order to uncover patterns of truth-telling, deception, and false memory. Lies can show increased activity in the entire prefrontal cortex. Within this, the anterior cingulate cortex seems to play a role because of the conflicting information between truth and the deceptive reality that is constructed, though rehearsed and/or practiced lies do not seem to involve the area as much as spontaneous ones.

The general capacity to deceive rests within the neocortex, the most recent part of the human brain to evolve. This is the outer layer of brain tissue comprising a majority of the overall brain volume. Correlations exist between the larger size of a primate’s neocortex and efficacy at deceiving their primate associates. Lies show increased activation of the inferolateral cortex, along with higher activation levels within the left middle temporal areas, right anterior cingulate, right inferior front, right middle frontal, and right orbitofrontal areas. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activates when individuals pretend to know information that they do not know, as opposed to telling the truth. Conversely, the right anterior hippocampus activates when individuals present false recognition, as opposed to lying or telling the truth.

Beyond the matching and constructive areas of deception lies an area investigating the inhibition of honest responses in favor of deceptive ones. Similar to lie constructions, these activities require greater amounts of human energy to produce. In this case, it is because the individual must withhold the true state of things while simultaneously creating a plausible, but alternate reality and communicate that reality convincingly. Inhibitions of honest responses, while producing deceptive ones, produce fairly reliable ERP responses within the medial frontal areas, though these areas are focal points for multiple sensory modalities and play a role in a host of executive decision-making tasks of the brain.

A caveat in terms of this research area's external validity is that the vast majority of published neural monitoring research into deceptive behaviors used cooperative individuals, bearing little resemblance to actual deceptive interactions.

### **Market Aspects of Neural Technology and Deception Detection**

The events of 9/11, and the resulting dramatic increase in all things pertaining to national security, have pushed forward the importance of developing more reliable and objective methods of interpreting statement veracity. Research funding and markets for neural monitoring technologies have also dramatically increased. Companies such as Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, No Lie MRI, and Cephos Corp. offer neural-based lie-detection services, advertising to lawyers, prosecutors, and other firms such as the CIA and FBI, in attempts to provide 21st-century versions of the traditional polygraph.

The U.S. military has become increasingly interested in the neurophysiological possibilities of deception detection. In antiterrorism situations, brain imaging may help distinguish enemy combatants from those who pose no risk. Though the Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 prohibits employees from having to undergo lie-detector examinations, the federal government is one of the highest polygraph users for security clearances and other purposes.

### **Legal Concerns**

Many legal systems rely on witness testimony, and have developed checks to determine the veracity of these witnesses' statements. Historically, taking an oath on a bible would create enough fear to confidently make most individuals tell the truth. Added to this was the ability of cross-examinations to ferret out misstatements or lies. Finally, the court could find a liar guilty of perjury, and subject the deceptive individual to incarceration. Yet, in this process, juries and judges introduce subjective elements in judging false or true statements, creating inconsistencies/inaccuracies from case to case by taking into consideration ethnic and other social information, whereas neural monitoring machines would be more objective by using pre-established algorithms and activity thresholds to establish statement veracity.

Two major legal concerns currently associated with neural monitoring in the United States pertain to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Neural issues regarding the Fifth Amendment apply, where individuals' brains should not make self-incriminating information available to others. Beyond this concern lies issues pertaining to the Fourth Amendment, dealing with privacy and unlawful search and seizure of an individual's personal property; in this case, his or her thoughts. Unlawful invasion of a person's brain thus becomes an issue and is frequently debated within neurolaw discussions.

The *Miranda* case ruling prevents data collection from unsuspecting individuals, where that data could ultimately be used against them as evidence. At present, obtrusive data collection methods (e.g., lying inside an MRI scanner or wearing an EEG hood or cap) prevent such an unconscious collection situation. Yet, future development of unobtrusive remote data collection technology seems realistic because this would allow greater equipment portability to field situations where combatants are interrogated and the veracity of their statements could have large-scale safety implications.

### **Concerns Regarding the Neurophysiology of Lying and Deception**

Unlike polygraph machines, current neural monitors tend to focus exclusively on the brain area of the nervous system. Some have voiced concerns regarding these machines' abilities to read a person's thoughts in an Orwellian style of "big brother" government agencies able to tell whether a person's statements are truthful or not.

These concerns attribute greater capabilities to neural monitoring technology than currently exists, though this line of technological development elicits concern regarding how pervasively this technology will be used, by whom, against whom, and for what purpose. There is concern regarding mental surveillance versus neural monitoring. Yet, the line of development is heading in the direction of the ability to accurately and precisely determine the veracity of a person's statements.

Daniel Cochece Davis  
*Illinois State University*



**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Department of Defense, U.S.; Electroencephalography; Espionage and Counterespionage; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Law and Law Enforcement; Malingering; Polygraph; Theory of Mind; Vocal Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Appelbaum, P. S. "The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the Courts." *Psychiatric Services*, v.58 (2007).
- Brown, T. and E. Murphy. "Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States." *Stanford Law Review*, v.62 (2010).
- Chen, I. "Neurolaw." *Stanford Lawyer*, v.44/81 (2009).
- Nobuhito, A. "Neural Correlates of True Memory, False Memory, and Deception." *Cerebral Cortex*, v.18 (2008).
- Raichle, Marcus, E. "A Brief History of Human Brain Mapping." *Trends in Neuroscience*, v.32 (2008).

## New York Sun's Moon Series

The *New York Sun's* Moon Series refers to a series of six articles published in the *New York Sun* newspaper in 1835 that claimed to describe life on the moon. The articles are believed to have been written by Richard Adams Locke (1800–71), the editor of the *Sun*, and helped insure the success of the newspaper and the "penny press." The Moon Series is still regarded as one of the great media hoaxes of all time.

The *New York Sun* began publication on September 3, 1833, and was the first penny press newspaper in the United States. The paper's founder was Benjamin H. Day (1810–89). Penny press newspapers were intended to appeal to a larger audience and relied on street sales and advertising for their revenues. The penny press challenged the so-called 6¢ newspapers, which had small circulations and relied on funding from political parties or subscriptions.

Day, the *Sun's* publisher, was responsible for publishing the stories about the moon, the first of

which was printed on August 26, 1835. The story appeared under the headline, "Great Astronomical Discoveries Lately Made By Sir John Herschel, L. L. D. F. R. S. & c. At the Cape of Good Hope [From Supplement to the *Edinburgh Journal of Science*]." The hoax had actually begun a few days earlier. In the Friday, August 21, 1835, edition, a notice appeared on page two, announcing that "We have just learnt from an eminent publisher in this city [Edinburgh] that Sir John Herschel, at the Cape of Good Hope, has made some astronomical discoveries of the most wonderful description, by means of an immense telescope of an entirely new principle." The articles would begin appearing the next week. The journal that the *Sun* said the articles would be reprinted from had actually ceased publication in 1833.

The stories were supposedly written by a Dr. Andrew Grant, who claimed to be the traveling companion of Sir John Herschel (1792–1871) and a pupil of his father, Sir William Herschel (1738–1822), the discoverer of Uranus. John Herschel, the leading astronomer of the day, was identified by Grant to be the source of the discoveries in the articles. Grant, the author, was fictitious. The series of six articles, published in the next six issues of the paper, claimed that there was life on the moon—including unicorns, bison, goats, beavers that walked upright on their hind legs, and four-foot-tall flying man-bats (which Grant called *Vespertilio-homo*) that built temples. There were also trees, oceans, and beaches.

### The Six Articles

The August 25 edition carried the first story, which described the new telescope. This telescope was so powerful that it could be used to view distant objects with such magnification that it was possible to study "even the entomology of the moon, in case she contained insects upon her surface." It was a large telescope, measuring 24 feet in diameter, and it had two lenses. The second lens, which the article called a "hydro-oxygen microscope," projected an image onto a screen. This made the image large enough to see even the smallest objects.

On August 26, 1835, an article on plant and animal life on the moon was published. According to the article, Herschel first examined the moon through the telescope on January 10, 1835,

seeing “a beautifully distinct, and even vivid representation of basaltic rock.” Grant wrote that these rocks were covered by red flowers. In addition to the plants, Grant wrote that Herschel had discovered animal life on the moon. There were herds of animals that appeared to be similar to bison, goats, and “a strange amphibious creature, of a spherical form, which rolled with great velocity across the pebbly beach.”

The article that appeared on August 27, 1835, started by describing some geological features on the moon, including the existence of oval-shaped mountains and extinct volcanoes. Grant presents a list of the plants and animal life that Herschel had discovered on the moon: 38 species of trees, twice this number of plants, nine species of mammals, and five of ovipara. This piece focused on the biped beaver. These animals walked on their hind legs and built and lived in huts that were, according to Grant, “constructed better and higher than those of many tribes of human savages.” Grant thought that signs of the intelligence of these animals were the puffs of smoke that were seen coming from the tents. This had led Herschel to believe that these beavers had learned how to use fire.

On Friday, August 28, 1835, an article reported the existence of four-foot-tall flying man-bats (which Herschel supposedly called *Vespertilio-homo*). The man-bats were “covered, except on the face, with short and glossy copper-colored hair, and had wings composed of a thin membrane, without hair, lying snugly upon their backs.” Their faces, “a yellowish flesh color, was a slight improvement upon that of the large orang outang.” Grant wrote that confirmation of the existence of the man-bats would be forthcoming from ministers who had been allowed to visit the observatory and view the man-bats.

The Saturday edition, published August 29, 1835, described the discovery of what appeared to be a temple, built of polished sapphire, with a roof made of yellow metal that looked like flames moving toward the sky. The astronomers speculated as to the meaning of this design, but decided in the end that they would avoid “indulging in speculative theories, however seductive to the imagination.”

The paper did not publish on Sundays, so the sixth and final article in the series appeared on

Monday, August 31. In this article, the author reports that astronomers discovered a superior order of *Vespertilio-homo* living near the temple. These man-bats were “of a larger stature than the former specimens, less dark in color, and in every respect an improved variety of the race.” Grant then reported that the observations had ended because they had accidentally left the telescope in a position where the sun’s rays had caused the lens of the telescope to act as a “burning glass,” setting fire to the observatory. By the time they had completed the repairs to the observatory, the moon was out of their sight.

Grant ended his story by writing that they did resume their observations of the moon the next month, when he found yet another group of *Vespertilio-homo* who “were of infinitely greater beauty, and appeared in our eyes scarcely less lovely than the general representations of angels by the more imaginative schools of painters.” Grant wrote that more would be reported in “Dr. Herschel’s authenticated natural history of this planet” which would soon be published.

### Reaction to Series

The articles created a sensation. The stories were reprinted in newspapers in the West and in Europe. The *Sun* published a special-edition pamphlet that included all six articles, which it sold for one shilling. The newspaper also sold prints showing Herschel’s discoveries, including the lunar animals and the Ruby Coliseum, which appeared to be an amphitheater where the man-bats were seen.

On September 1, the *Sun* printed a story responding to some of the comments about the articles. The story said that those newspapers that were critical of the stories proved that, “Consummate ignorance is always incredulous to the higher order of scientific discoveries, because it cannot possibly comprehend them.”

For the most part, the skeptical newspapers and readers did not really condemn the *Sun*. In his 2009 doctoral dissertation, Mario Castagnaro explained the following:

The early 19th-century was a culture of curiosity, one in which readers did not have clear-cut expectations about truth and fiction and the two usually blended together on

newspaper pages; credibility was not the chief reason people picked up newspapers.

One newspaper that was critical of the *Sun*'s stories was James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald*. In a column that appeared in the *Herald*'s August 31, 1835 edition, Bennett wrote that "the town has been agape two or three days at the very ingenious astronomical hoax." Bennett wrote that the *Sun* had claimed that the articles had been originally published in the *Edinburgh Journal of Science*. However, Bennett observed there was "no work of that kind being now published. A few years ago there was such a work, but it merged into another journal published in London."

On September 3, 1835, Bennett's *Herald* again attacked the *Sun* for its hoax:

We mean now to show up the *Sun*—the impudent *Sun*—the unprincipled *Sun*—the mercenary *Sun*—the low bred *Sun*—the *Sun* that hoaxes the public—that tells untruths for money—that makes fools of the wine [sic]—that cheats the whole city and country. The revulsion of public sentiment, is fast accumulating. Its astronomical hoax will touch the *Sun* yet to the quick.

Bennett continued the attack the following day, writing that the *Sun*'s stories were "highly improper, wicked, and in fact a species of impudent swindling."

The *Sun* would defend itself against the *Herald* and other skeptics, asserting that if the articles were a hoax, then the paper itself was a victim because it was reprinting what had first appeared in Europe. In its September 16, 1835 edition, the paper replied to its critics that, "Certain correspondents have been urging us to come out and confess the whole to be a hoax; but this we can by no means do, until we have the testimony of the English or Scotch papers to corroborate such a declaration." Of course, the articles were a hoax. Herschel, who was working in South Africa during this time, did not observe the moon. Herschel wasn't even aware of the *Sun* articles until much later when he was given copies of the newspapers. His initial response was bemusement: "It is too bad my real discoveries here won't be that exciting." However, in an 1837 letter he would



A portrait of a man-bat, which the fictitious New York *Sun* writer Dr. Andrew Grant called "Vespertilio-homo," appears in the August 31, 1835, edition of the newspaper. The paper claimed that because the story was originally published in a scientific journal, it was the victim of the hoax, not its readers.

complain about the questions he received from people who believed the stories were real: "I have been pestered from all quarters with that ridiculous hoax about the Moon—in English, French, Italian, and German!"

Another person who was annoyed by the *Sun* hoax was Edgar Allen Poe (1809–49), who was convinced that the *Sun* had gotten the idea for the stories from an article he had published in the *Southern Literary Messenger* a few months earlier. In his hoax, "Hans Phaall—A Tale," a man had sailed a balloon to the moon. However, few had read Poe's story, and the *Sun* stories attracted international attention.

There have been questions about Day's motivation in publishing the moon hoax articles. Obviously, increasing circulation of the newspaper was a goal. Day's paper relied on newsboys to sell the paper on New York's streets, and the moon stories certainly attracted curiosity and readers, selling

more papers. In a letter written by Locke in the May 16, 1840, edition of the *New World* newspaper, the now former editor of the *Sun* explained his intent had been to satirize what he called the “theological and devotional encroachments upon the legitimate province of science.”

The *Sun*’s Moon Hoax was the first time that the mass media demonstrated its power to shape popular attitudes and spread information. This would become a greater concern to many in the years to come.

Jeffrey Kraus  
Wagner College

**See Also:** Beatles Hoax; Cottingley Fairies; Disinformation; Hearst, William Randolph; Photographs, Altered; Piltdown Man; News Media: Print; *War of the Worlds*.

### Further Readings

- Castagnaro, Mario. “Embellishment, Fabrication, and Scandal: Hoaxing and the American Press.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2009.
- Goodman, Matthew. *The Sun and the Moon*. New York: Basic Books, 2008.
- Simanek, Donald E. “The Moon Hoax.” <http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/hoaxes/moonhoax.htm> (Accessed January 2013).
- Thornton, Brian. “The Moon Hoax: Debates About Ethics in 1835 New York Newspapers.” *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, v.15/2 (2000).

## News Media: Internet

Historically, information on current events was transmitted by word-of-mouth. News was transmitted by couriers and official government bulletins. As communication and trade grew prior to the Industrial Revolution, information was transmitted in official and private handwritten sheets. Official sheets in Venice in the 1500s cost one *gazetta*. With the rise of newspapers in the 17th century, some kept the name “gazette.”

The rise of print media as broadsheets, and then as morning and evening papers, was in part an

outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. Lloyd’s of London and other insurers needed news in order to keep up with shipping departures and arrivals, as well as losses. Commercial interests needed market information to determine market prices that were affected by wars, famines, droughts, plagues, and other adversities.

News gathering reporters eventually traveled in order to report on the progress of military campaigns or other events. Dispatches from battlefronts became stories printed (eventually with pictures) in city and town newspapers.

After World War II, news issued in printed media was brought or sent to the newsroom by reporters or by reporters in the field through wire services. There, it was edited, set in type, and printed on cheap newsprint. Print media moguls like William Randolph Hurst exercised great power through their organizations’ printed words. Newspapers, however, began to face competition from broadcast media. As radios and then televisions increased from just automobiles and large sets in homes to portable transistor sets, broadcast media began to exercise more power. Newspaper readership sales and advertising revenues began to decline.

By the 1980s, cable systems began to bring large numbers of television programs into homes via cables. This was eventually followed by commercial cable news systems. The most important cable news channel was established by Ted Turner in Atlanta, Georgia, the Cable News Network (CNN). The rise of television programming lasting 24 hours a day, seven days a week, made “breaking news” standard operating procedure.

### Objectivity

Readers and television viewers expect objectivity in news reporting. Many readers expect stories to be written and edited as factual information, not biased treatments. This is a change from the early history of newspapers, when they were often the communication organs of political parties. Some newspapers, such as the *Arkansas Democrat Gazette*, have retained their earlier partisan names. In reality, most newspapers are not objective but have an editorial position that is liberal to moderate or moderate to conservative. Stories are printed that are newsworthy. Editors decide what is and what is not “news.” A story is newsworthy if it is relevant to the public or to a



special audience. Biased editorial selectivity leads to biased news reporting and interpretations.

These biased print media sources, including news magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek*, began to face competition as politically and ideologically disgruntled readers and viewers turned to talk radio for news and opinions. Cable news programming also faced this politically driven competition from talk radio and then from Internet news media.

Advances in computers and Internet connections that created the World Wide Web allowed for the growth of global connections. News media, both print and cable, had new competition.

Internet news media rapidly grew after 2000. The Internet provided instant access to news on a global basis. It also allowed for real-time exposure to ongoing stories. Opportunities for instant feedback or for forms of participation rapidly grew. Via the Internet, consumers could access news stories anywhere in the world, anytime.

The Internet created a much more democratic and egalitarian opportunity for people to create news sources and interpretations that could appeal to people of shared beliefs. Many people began to practice online journalism. Private individuals began to report, produce, and distribute news via the Internet. Advertising soon followed, and so did misinformation and lies.

Internet news opportunities have attracted bloggers and others who report news. One successful site is the Drudge Report, a news aggregation Web site run by Matt Drudge and others. With more and more people moving from print media to electronic media via their personal computers, telephones connected to the Internet, and Internet devices such as the Apple iPad, commercial print media have also moved online.

### Misinformation

Bloggers and others are able to detect mistakes and frauds committed by the mainstream media, even when online. A major case arose when aging reporter and CBS mainstay Daniel Rather reported on *60 Minutes Wednesday* (September 8, 2004) that President George W. Bush's service records from the Texas Air National Guard had been found. The claim was made that the records had been found in the personal files of Lieutenant Colonel Jerry B. Killian. The records alleged that

while in the Texas Air National Guard, then Lieutenant Bush had served with less than distinction. However, when posted online, bloggers quickly denounced the records as forgeries. The first report was posted on the Free Republic, which is an Internet forum for activists, many of whom describe themselves as conservatives. They post anonymously but are known as Freepers using screen names. They quickly demonstrated that the type fonts used to write the documents did not exist in military typewriters at the time that President Bush was serving. CBS and Daniel Rather were later involved in legal actions because of the "Rathergate" incident.

Another Internet news media source is the Onion. Some of the stories are funny spoofs that will only fool the very uninformed. However, to some people, this and similar sources can spread disinformation. BigGovernment.com, BigHollywood.com, the late Andrew Breitbart's conservative news site Breitbart.com, and Arianna Huffington's liberal Huffington Post are more responsible Internet news providers. Some political sites on the left have attacked adherents of other viewpoints with baseless, vicious stories.

There have been many famous people who have been victimized by misinformation, or by lies posted on the Internet. In some cases, the lies were hoaxes or pictures that were manipulated to create a false image. Morgan Freeman and other Hollywood celebrities have been falsely reported to have died in online celebrity hoaxes.

One very dramatic hoax involved Notre Dame's football player, Manti Te'o. He was informed that his online girlfriend, Lennay Marie Kekua, had died of leukemia about the time he also lost his grandmother. He then inspired his teammates to win a game for them. It was eventually revealed that Lennay Kekua was a fabrication, a hoax masterminded by Te'o's friend Ronaiah Tuiasosopo.

The 2013 Boston Marathon terrorist attack evoked an outpouring of citizen journalism. It was accompanied by charity scams and by reporting of rumors and false information about who the killers were. The Reddit newsfeed carried photos of possible suspects, who it was later discovered were falsely identified. Some critics of citizen journalism believe that the lack of editorial guiding hands contributes to false rumors plaguing Internet media.

Some well-known journalists and commentators have been accused of using weak or conflicted sources in order to push an agenda via the Internet. While not exactly falsehoods, the weak evidence supporting stories such as dramatic climate change or the reverse position misleads people.

In 2013, Edward Snowden released information about secret Internet spying conducted by the U.S. government. His whistleblowing attracted global attention. He soon became the target of numerous false stories on many Internet news sites.

### Censorship

The Internet has provided forums for radicals on both the left and right where they can share their views. Some of these groups are anarchists, communists, neo-Nazis, or environmental extremists. On these sites are stories that may exaggerate subjects such as climate change and/or make unsubstantiated claims. Their Internet information media sites allow for publications that would be censored or barred in more mainstream media.

In some countries, such as Singapore, there are restrictions on sites that simply report on conditions in the country. What is “objectionable” to the government is a classic censorship issue. In the case of Singapore, mere criticism of the government or of other aspects of Singapore, even if true, is “objectionable.” Singapore’s government policy is that nation building is more important than accurate news reporting, even online journalism.

Some Internet news media are private or secretive. If pressure is applied to Internet providers such as Yahoo! to block these unwelcome sites, they are likely to go underground. The response from some of the more radical groups would likely be to engage in cyberattacks or to become more covert and hostile.

By 2013, most American voters had abandoned print news media for television and the Internet. Only half of voters polled believed that traditional news media, even online, was trustworthy.

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Disinformation; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Ideology; Internet: Facebook and Social Media

Sites; News Media: Print; News Media: Television and Radio; Photographs, Altered; Sock Puppetry.

### Further Readings

- Fowler, Andrew. *The Most Dangerous Man in the World: The Explosive True Story of Julian Assange and the Lies, Cover-Ups and Conspiracies He Exposed*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011.
- Franken, Al. *Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right*. New York: Penguin, 2004.
- Holiday, Ryan. *Trust Me, I'm Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator*. New York: Penguin Group, 2012.
- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell. *The Interplay of Influence: News, Advertising, Politics, and the Internet*. Independence, KY: Cengage Learning, 2005.
- Pinker, Steven. *The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
- Schechter, Danny. *When News Lies: Media Complicity and the Iraq War*. New York: Select Books, 2010.

## News Media: Print

In journalism, honest reporting is a fundamental value. Despite this ethic, deception has a long history in journalism that dates as far back as the 19th century. The definition of deception in journalism has been debated by those inside and outside the industry. According to Deni Elliott, a prominent researcher on deception, journalists are deceptive if they “have, in the course of an investigation, through intentional act or assertion, attempted to initiate or sustain a false belief, or if they have allowed another person, with whom they have a special relationship, to initiate or sustain a false belief.”

However, some journalists have argued that the second half of this definition, allowing someone to form the wrong impression, is not deception, but rather pretense. A term coined by journalist James Reston, “pretense” is a passive act, whereas deception is an intentional act. Regardless, intentional deception in journalism can be achieved in

two ways: investigative deception and informative deception.

### Investigative Deception and Informative Deception

Investigative deception is to deceive by false identification with the purpose of gathering information. This means that the reporter falsely identifies him or herself and his or her intentions while exploring a story. A popular term for this kind of falsification is “sting story,” deriving from the traditional law enforcement term “sting” that is used to describe deceptive operations used to catch illegal activity, of which there exist many examples.

In 1887, American female journalist Nellie Bly successfully feigned insanity to gain entrance into the Women’s Lunatic Asylum on Blackwell’s Island and examine the living conditions of patients. Because she falsely identified herself as mentally ill in order to obtain information on how the asylum was operated, she engaged in investigative deception. Her subsequent published report launched an investigation by a grand jury into the asylum’s operations.

Another famous instance of investigative deception occurred in 1979, when *Chicago Sun-Times* reporters Pamela Zekman and Zay Smith pretended to be the owners of a new bar they named The Mirage. In their undercover operation, they found that city inspectors of the recently opened bar offered to accept bribes so that Zekman and Smith wouldn’t have to carry out costly repairs mandated by the state. Several inspectors were indicted after the newspaper’s four-week exposé of the corruption.

In 2005, after the *Spokesman-Review* in Spokane, Washington, learned that the city’s mayor, James West, was participating in conversations in a gay Internet chat room under an assumed name, the newspaper hired a forensic computer expert, who created a false, gay persona he used to chat with West. As a result of this sting operation, the newspaper reported that West had used the chat room to help someone he thought was an 18-year-old high school student receive gifts, favors, and a City Hall internship. The story revealed that West, a Republican with an antigay political agenda, was gay himself, and resulted in his recall from office.

Informative deception occurs when journalists either present fabricated or altered information,

or selectively exclude certain pieces of information in their writing. There are many examples of this type of deception. *Washington Post* reporter Janet Cooke authored a story called “Jimmy’s World” in 1980 that detailed the life of an 8-year-old heroin addict, which moved many of the *Post*’s readers and caused the mayor of Washington, D.C., to authorize a thorough police search for the boy. Cooke later confessed that “Jimmy” never existed and that she had completely fabricated the story.

In 2003, up-and-coming *New York Times* reporter Jayson Blair falsified and plagiarized information in at least 36 of his articles, many of which covered high-profile incidents. He published



Nellie Bly (the pen name of Elizabeth Cochrane) in 1890, in her famous checkered traveling suit. As a crusading young reporter, Bly once faked insanity to gain admittance to a lunatic asylum, from which she gathered information for a scathing exposé.

five articles on the homecoming of prisoner-of-war Jessica Lynch in 2003 that contained blatant falsehoods, including interviews with family members, when in fact he never spoke to anyone in her family. In 2004, FOX News retracted an entirely false report by political reporter Carl Cameron that claimed that presidential candidate John Kerry, who had gotten a manicure before a debate, had said: “Women should like me! I do manicures.”

### Consequences and Reasons for Deception

The consequences of engaging in either investigative or informative deception can be severe given the ethic of honesty and truthfulness in journalism. When the *Chicago Sun-Times* published its report on The Mirage, investigative reporters praised Zekman and Smith for their work. However, the two journalists did not receive a Pulitzer Prize because of their use of dishonest methods to procure their information. Benjamin Bradlee, the executive editor of the *Washington Post* from 1965 to 1991 who also sat on the review board of the Pulitzer Prize committee, at the time said, “How can newspapers fight for honesty and integrity when they themselves are less than honest in getting a story?”

Exposure of informative deception often results in resignation. For example, Cooke resigned from the *Washington Post* after “Jimmy’s World” was revealed to be fabricated, and she returned the Pulitzer Prize she had won just two days before she confessed. Stephen Glass, a rising star in journalism, partially fabricated 27 of the 41 stories he wrote for *The New Republic*, and he was fired when his trail of deceit was discovered in May 1998. Blair resigned from the *New York Times* when his history of plagiarism and fabrication was discovered. The *Times* called the incident “a low point in the 152-year history of the newspaper.”

Why do journalists deceive? In both kinds of deceptive journalism, there are typically professional motives: to report compelling stories that will capture attention, improve the author’s reputation, and ultimately drive the newspaper’s revenue. By engaging in informative deception, many journalists succumb to the pressures of promoting their careers. For example, in explaining why he fabricated as much as he did, Blair said he was living up to the expectations of those around him.

Some journalists who have engaged in investigative deception, however, have further justified their

actions with selfless reasons. An example of this occurred in 1977, when five *Milwaukee Journal* reporters posed as patients and visited local doctors. They discovered that a number of the doctors they saw gave them whatever drugs they asked for. These doctors were consequently investigated by the State Medical Examining Board after the *Milwaukee Journal* reported this information. Thus, this act of deception functioned to benefit the larger community, because the undercover operation exposed doctors who were not serving their patients appropriately, and it eventually ensured that these doctors would be held accountable.

The question of whether investigative journalism deception can be justified is frequently examined. One view is that journalists should not be exempt from the social norm of honesty to which all citizens adhere and upon which journalism prides itself. Another view is that deception is justified if it uncovers serious threats to society. After former *Los Angeles Times* writer Kevin Silverstein drew fire for his own undercover reporting in 2007, in which he posed as a representative of a London-based energy company to lobbyists, he described how there was too much emphasis on the fact that he lied and not enough emphasis on the fact he had exposed serious corruption in the Washington, D.C., area.

There are two types of journalism deception: investigative and informative. Examples of both are plentiful; however, investigative journalism deception has been on the decline in recent years. This is because investigative journalism as a practice has waned significantly since the emergence of the Internet, which has stunted the growth of traditional journalism. Roberta Baskin, director of the investigative reporting team at WJLA, a television station in Washington, D.C., states that “traditional news rooms [have] cut their budgets and the first thing that they want to cut out is investigative reporting because it can be litigious, it takes a long time to gather your information [and it] takes more resources.” While some people believe that deception for the sake of uncovering serious dangers is justified, informative journalism deception is generally frowned upon.

Danica Gredoña  
Jeff Hancock  
Cornell University



**See Also:** Blair, Jayson; Computer-Generated Images; Disinformation; Glass, Stephen; Hearst, William Randolph; Nazi Propaganda; *New York Sun's* Moon Series; News Media: Internet; News Media: Television and Radio; Photographs, Altered.

### Further Readings

- Braun, Paul. "Deception in Journalism." *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, v.3 (1988).
- Elliot, Deni and Charles Culver. "Defining Acts of Journalistic Deception." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Portland, Oregon, 1988.
- Miller, Megan. "The Maverick." *American Journalism Review*. <http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4671> (Accessed October 2012).
- Reider, Rem. "The Jayson Blair Affair." *American Journalism Review*. <http://ajr.org/article.asp?id=3019> (Accessed October 2012).
- Robinson, Steve. "Pulitzers: Was the Mirage a Deception?" *Columbia Journalism Review*, 18/2 (1979).
- Steele, Bob. "Lying in the Name of Truth: When Is It Justified for Journalists?" <http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/everyday-ethics/83268/lying-in-the-name-of-truthwhen-is-it-justified-for-journalists> (Accessed October 2012).
- Ting Lee, Seow. "Lying to Tell the Truth: Journalists and the Social Context of Deception." *Mass Communication and Society*, v.7 (2004).

---

## News Media: Television and Radio

Individuals' understanding of the role of the news media, specifically television and radio news, in deceiving the public comes from what they know about how a journalist may present or omit certain information. Individuals must consider if the news reports on television or the radio are in fact accurate. Mass communication scholars and criminologists have been examining this for some time, as the media impacts how various news reports, and specifically crime news, are received and processed. If these reports are inaccurate, the

public receives an inaccurate account of news in their area, the country, or the world. The credibility of sources and of a specific medium must also be considered in examining broadcast news accuracy. The over-representation of crime stories and the use of video news releases are deemed to be major forms of exaggerated or fake news, which can mislead the public.

Much of what is understood in terms of journalistic deception comes not just from news-gathering practices, but also from the types of relationships journalists have with their target audiences. Additionally, the stories that are omitted must be considered as well as the stories that are covered. Deception has been documented to occur in at least one-quarter of all conversations, and media outlets such as radio and television stations would not be immune to deception when presenting the news. In fact, journalistic deception, can be defined as the act of communicating messages verbally (that is, telling a lie) or nonverbally (that is, withholding of information). Both of these forms of deception have been shown to be routine in broadcast news, with the goal of initiating or maintaining a false belief with the radio listeners and television viewers.

### Role of Broadcast Media in Deception

The role of the media in lying and deception is understood through the types of stories they are pressured to present. This is something that television, radio, newsprint, and the Internet all fall victim to. Specifically, television and radio news must have attention-grabbing stories to draw viewers and listeners.

However, a key question must be asked: Are such news reports accurate? The creation of television and radio news, the presentation of these stories, and the accuracy of these news accounts have been considered by mass communication scholars for several decades. Criminologists also have considered the reporting of crime news for decades, as crime is often deemed newsworthy and open to manipulation by news agencies such as television and radio stations. For example, crime stories will vary based on the medium on which they are broadcast (that is, radio or television), and where in the country they are broadcast: larger urban areas may be more selective about which murders or violent acts are reported

because of the frequency of these crimes and the space limitations of their broadcast news programs, while smaller, suburban areas are more likely to report on all violent acts, as they are less frequent.

### Standards of News Credibility

When considering deception in radio and television news, it is important to examine the perceptions the public has concerning the credibility of these broadcast media. Research in the field of mass communications examines the perceived credibility that citizens attribute to media sources, such as radio and television news. Credibility can be defined as the level of trustworthiness and expertise attributed to the news media. News reports are supposed to be truthful and unbiased, not deceptive. If individuals perceive radio or television news to be credible, they will grow to rely on these outlets for news, thus increasing their daily exposure to news.

The field of communications has identified two forms of credibility that are important to consider. The first is source credibility, which focuses on the perceived truthfulness of individuals communicating in the medium (that is, radio or television). Key components to source credibility include, but are not limited to, safety, qualifications, dynamism, competency, and objectivity. A second form of credibility is medium credibility. With medium credibility, people judge the specific medium (that is, radio or television) itself, and not the source presenting it.

### Crime News and Deception

Various constituencies use the media (as much as their power will allow) as an outlet to have their concerns publicly aired. In fact, it has been proposed that the more exposed an audience is to a particular issue through television and radio, the more concerned they will be about it. To use crime stories as an example, it has been argued that news consumers are indeed saturated with crime-focused stories. Research indicates that most television stations begin the evening news with a crime story, close to one-third of news stories concern crime, and crime news is included in news broadcasts almost twice as much as political news. In recent years, researchers have argued that crime has ceased to be reported solely for

informative purposes, and its presentation is more for entertainment. However, this presentation is clearly deceptive to the audience.

### Video News Releases

A video news release (VNR) is the ultimate form of lying and deception in television news. A VNR is a news segment that appears to be produced by television journalists, using a tone and format similar to that of television news. However, VNRs are created by public relations agencies, advertising firms, government agencies, and other organizations and individuals as a means of obtaining television coverage that will advance their particular cause, product, or interest. These prepackaged “news segments” are then broadcast during a television station’s news programming.

Many stations air prepackaged VNRs in their entirety, without adding footage or other journalistic commentary. Some large media conglomerates, such as Clear Channel, News Corp./FOX Television, Viacom/CBS, Tribune Co., and Sinclair Broadcast Group, produce their own VNRs. Although other news media have come to the forefront in recent years (for example, Internet news), many citizens still receive their news by watching television. That is why it is imperative to understand how and why VNRs are used.

The use of VNRs is widespread; over half of the U.S. population has been exposed to them. VNRs can be syndicated, which broadens the reach of these messages. Additionally, VNRs are aired in markets of all sizes, as stations will use VNRs to reduce the costs of filming, producing, and editing their own news reports, while masking VNRs as their own unique reporting. In some cases, a station anchorperson may revoice the narration before the VNR is aired.

Courtney A. Waid-Lindberg  
*Northern State University*

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Credibility; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; Photographs, Altered; Public Relations, Source Credibility.

### Further Readings

Beale, Sara S. “The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News

- Promotes Punitiveness.” *William and Mary Law Review*, v.48 (2006).
- Cavender, Gray. “Media and Crime Policy: A Reconsideration of David Garland’s *The Culture of Control*.” *Punishment and Society*, v.6 (2004).
- Dowler, Kenneth. “Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice: The Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness.” *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, v.10 (2003).
- Dowler, Kenneth, Thomas Fleming, and Stephen L. Muzzatti. “Constructing Crime: Media, Crime, and Popular Culture.” *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice*, v.48 (2006).
- Farsetta, Diane and Daniel Price. “Fake TV News: Widespread and Undisclosed.” <http://www.prwatch.org> (Accessed February 2013).
- Pfeiffer, Christian, Michael Windzio, and Matthias Kleimann. “Media Use and Its Impacts on Crime Perception, Sentencing Attitudes, and Crime Policy.” *European Journal of Criminology*, v.2 (2005).

## Nietzsche, Friedrich

A concern with lies and deception is central to the oeuvre of German philosopher, philologist, and cultural critic Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). In his 1873 essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche argues that language operates on the basis of a social contract that obligates everyone to lie according to fixed linguistic convention. He claims that language has no interest in the objective truth of what he calls, following Immanuel Kant, the “things in themselves.” Instead, language only designates the subjective relations between humans and the world around them through metaphors that correspond in no way to the essence of external objects. For the purpose of security and consistency, society obligates individuals to use a fixed set of metaphors, and by the force of habit, individuals forget that the words and concepts that they consider truthful are nothing but metaphorical functions of their conventional morality.

Significantly, Nietzsche’s argument itself relies heavily on metaphors, many of which revolve

around the opposition between life and death. For instance, he compares language to a Roman columbarium and calls it a graveyard of perceptions, suggesting that the lies that society obligates individuals to use to designate things kill their colorful and vivid first impressions and intuitions. Nietzsche’s own heavy use of metaphors seems necessary because he believes that a criterion for “correct perception” is not available: between the human subject and the perceptual object there can only be an aesthetic relation at best.

Therefore, Nietzsche concludes the essay by distinguishing between “rational” and “intuitive” people, who use metaphors in different ways. Whereas rational people cling to an immense “framework and planking of concepts” and live regular and prudent lives in scientific disenchantment, intuitive people, such as the ancient Greeks, dare to choose beauty over need and embrace the “immediacy of deception,” which can lead to the establishment of art and culture. Like various other 18th- and 19th-century German critics of modernity, Nietzsche, who was a professor of classical philology in Basel, Switzerland, from 1869 to 1879, often presented an idolized view of ancient Greek culture in order to critique what he saw as the lifeless and artless utilitarianism of modernity.

Critics have argued that what Nietzsche discovers in “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” is not that language as such is a lie but the inadequacy of so-called correspondence theories of truth, which hold that a linguistic utterance is true only if it corresponds to a fact in the world. According to this objection, Nietzsche’s discovery of language’s failure to correspond to “things in themselves” should simply lead him to adopt either a coherence theory of truth, which holds that the truth of linguistic utterances is determined by their coherence with other utterances; or a pragmatic theory of truth, which views those linguistic utterances as true that successfully organize individuals’ experience of the world for practical purposes. However, this objection fails to engage with Nietzsche’s philosophical project as it develops in his mature work, which might be summarized as a radical critique of lies and deception in the present, composing a “prelude to a philosophy of the future” (this is also the subtitle of his 1886 book *Beyond Good and Evil*).

Nietzsche's fundamental orientation toward the future first manifests itself in *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits* (1878), in which he calls for "historical philosophizing." In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche argues that all previous philosophers have mistakenly taken their contemporaries as the measure of all things, attributing an eternal essence to a notion of humanity that has in fact been constituted historically by particular religions and particular political events. Just as Charles Darwin argued in *On the Origin of Species* (1859) that species do not have a transhistorical essence but evolve over time, Nietzsche maintains that there are no eternal facts or absolute truths and that everything, including humanity itself, is in a constant process of becoming. This fundamental insight harbors the possibility of progress as originality, because if people disentangle themselves from their false, essentialist, humanist metaphysics, they might create a better culture and a better morality. They might do this by comparing existing world views, customs, and cultures and by making conscious decisions, relying on their now liberated aesthetic sense, about which values are best.

### Scientist or Allegorist?

Given Nietzsche's consistent project of exposing lies and deception, it might seem surprising that although he often presents himself as a scientist (compare his book *The Gay Science*, 1882), most of his books are not systematic treatises but collections of aphorisms, and he relies heavily on fiction to develop his arguments. In what is perhaps the most famous instance of Nietzsche's historical philosophizing, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), he argues that individuals have forgotten that their current values do not reflect eternal moral truths but result from historical struggles for hegemony of certain value systems over others. More specifically, he seeks to demonstrate that Christian morality is a cynical lie.

Nietzsche develops his argument through the following allegory. Once upon a time, the word *good* reflected an aristocratic value judgment based in a feeling of superiority. The noble and mighty defined themselves and their actions as "good" and called those they considered low, base, and plebeian "bad." However, a slaves' revolt in morality took place in which the dominated

classes managed to radically reverse the values of their aristocratic masters, calling their former masters not "bad" but "evil," out of *ressentiment* (resentment), and designating themselves as "good" by comparison.

This radical reversal of values led to the establishment of a reactionary morality that was not grounded in affirmation but in negation. Contrary to the "naturally" felt, active happiness of the former masters, the former slaves lied themselves into an artificial, passive happiness by telling themselves, through "sublime self-deception," that they were not evil and therefore good. This myth allegorizes the triumph of Jewish and Christian morality over the "life-affirming" values of the Romans and other "noble races." Nietzsche, whose father and grandfather were Protestant pastors, denounced Christianity as a nihilistic ideology premised on a hatred of reality (compare also *The Anti-Christ*, which he wrote in 1888, only months before his nervous breakdown, from which he would never recover).

Just as Nietzsche can only expose the false, metaphorical nature of language by resorting to metaphors, he can only expose Christian morality as a reality-denying fiction through the use of fiction. This is because an objective outside perspective on the web of lies and deception in which individuals are entangled is never immediately available. Therefore, instead of making a vain attempt to construct such a "truthful" perspective in his texts, Nietzsche appeals to what he alternatively calls his readers' aesthetic sense, their intellectual conscience, or their will to truth, provoking his readers, often through the use of irony, to see all their present values for what they are a constellation of lies and deception, daring individuals to overcome these lies in the present so that they may consciously create new values in the future.

Michiel Bot  
New York University

**See Also:** Darwin, Charles; Fiction; Freud, Sigmund; Kant, Immanuel.

### Further Readings

Nietzsche, Friedrich and Carol Diethe, trans. *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.



- Nietzsche, Friedrich and Marion Faber, trans. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich and Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, eds. *The Birth of Tragedy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich and R. J. Hollingdale, trans. *The Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*. New York: Penguin, 1990.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich and Walter Kaufmann, trans. *The Gay Science*. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich and Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann, trans. *Human, All Too Human*. Lincoln, NE: Bison, 1996.

## Nixon, Richard

As Richard Nixon sought, and subsequently won, a second term as president of the United States, he became embroiled in a massive scandal involving illegal practices during his reelection campaign. On June 17, 1972, five men with connections to President Nixon's re-election committee were caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. This intrusion funneled responsibility directly to the president and was not the only improper or illegal campaign activity sanctioned by the Nixon administration. Formally known as the Watergate scandal, such wrongdoings from Nixon and his staff led to the president's resignation from office on August 9, 1974.

In an effort to gather intelligence from the Democratic Party's presidential campaign, the Nixon administration attempted numerous break-ins at their opposition's headquarters. The first, authorized by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President's general counsel G. Gordon Liddy, instructed a team to invade the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters on May 26, 1972. By prearranging a dinner at the DNC complex, a group of hired burglars had access to the building and tried to obtain information from the Democrats. This was unsuccessful and required another effort.

The second break-in was made one evening later on May 27. Eight men were disguised as

Federal Reserve workers reporting to the Watergate complex. They dodged security and tried to breach the DNC facility's security system. However, the mission failed, as one trespasser did not have the correct tools to complete the break-in. The two attempts on the DNC center were documented solely by testimonies of the coconspirators. Evidence does not exist to verify that either of the failed entries actually occurred.

Members of the Nixon administration were dissatisfied with their futile breach of the Democratic Party and remained committed in their efforts to seize competitive information. Nixon's team was eventually successful on May 28, when a well-equipped unit of five men took photographs of various DNC documents. Specifically, snapshots were taken of a DNC contributors' list to enable Republicans to strategize toward obtaining more voter support prior to the November 1972 election. Intruders also wiretapped the phones of Democratic strategists during the break-in.

One of the phone taps was improperly executed at the DNC facility. This required another visit to the Watergate, which took place on June 17. While surveying the grounds, a member of the Watergate security force, Frank Willis, noticed that tape was covering the bolts of various doors in the building. He removed the tape and did not believe this to be a concern. However, Willis later made another search of the premises and noticed that the tape had been reapplied at approximately 1:00 A.M. Police were subsequently notified, and the authorities caught five men who were burglarizing the DNC headquarters. Virgilio González, Bernard Barker, James W. McCord Jr., Eugenio Martínez, and Frank Sturgis, along with head conspirators Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, were all connected to the series of intrusions on the Democratic Party. They were eventually indicted for conspiracy, burglary, and violation of federal wiretapping.

President Nixon denied any personal involvement in the scandal and maintained that no one in his administration had taken part in the illegal activities. Specifically, he stated, "I can say categorically that . . . no one in the White House staff, no one in this Administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident." Several months passed while Nixon



*President Richard Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon calmly sip coffee on the White House Truman Balcony on July 25, 1972, while allegations over the previous month's Watergate break-in continue to pile up. Denying any involvement in the phone tapping and break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters, Nixon was later found to have recording systems installed in the White House. The Smoking Gun Tape ultimately proved the president had lied to the nation, his closest aides, and his own lawyers for over two years.*

remained in office and legal action piled against the burglars who were caught at the Watergate complex. On February 7, 1973, the U.S. Senate established a committee to investigate the scandal as evidence of perjury arose from the court statements of the individuals who were charged with participating in the break-in.

The committee's investigators revealed that the president had recording systems installed in the White House. Special investigator Archibald Cox requested and eventually subpoenaed tapes from the Oval Office because he suspected that Nixon was hiding information about his involvement in the Watergate scandal. Nixon refused to release the tapes, declaring that his refusal was his "executive privilege" as commander in chief. He ordered Cox to terminate the summons, but after

Cox refused, the committee began investigating how to impeach the president.

On numerous occasions, Nixon was caught trying to remove members of his administrative staff who undermined his authority during the Watergate investigation. When this information became public, he lost political support and experienced heightened suspicion about his involvement throughout the scandal. In March 1974, the investigation reached a climax when legal action was taken against those who had broken into the DNC headquarters. A grand jury in Washington, D.C., named seven of Nixon's aides as co-conspirators to the scandal, and the president himself was called an unindicted co-conspirator by adjudicators.

This legal action forced the president to appease critics and appear as though he was working with

authorities. Nixon released several private recordings of his conversations with his counsel, John Dean. The tapes revealed the Watergate strategy, a plot to cover-up the break-in, and information about how Nixon's break-in crew was paid with "hush" money to keep quiet about the plan. The most damaging footage for Nixon, called the Smoking Gun Tape, was recorded shortly after the DNC facility break-in. It exposed Nixon's plan to cover-up the DNC intrusions and block an investigation of the raid. The president's lawyers confirmed Nixon's untruthfulness by finding that the Smoking Gun tape "proved that the president had lied to the nation, to his closest aides, and to his own lawyers—for more than two years."

Intense pressure and scrutiny forced President Nixon to resign from office on August 9, 1974, after learning there were enough votes in the House of Representatives to impeach him. Nixon strategically never admitted to lying. However, in hindsight it can be seen that his repudiation of personal involvement was false. The president deceived Americans trust and confidence that a political leader would not put his own personal and political gain ahead of his public duties. In sum, the combination of recorded evidence outlining the Republican plots against the DNC, and testimonies from the indicted burglars, provided enough evidence to conclude that Nixon's denials were fabricated.

David Markowitz  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Conspiracies; Cooperation; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Lying, Intentionality of; Lying as Exercise of Power; News Media: Print; Paltering; Spin, Political; Watergate; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

- Alterman, E. *When Presidents Lie*. New York: Penguin Group, 2004.
- Dickinson, W. B., M. Cross, M., and B. Polsky. *Watergate: Chronology of a Crisis*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1973.
- Greenberg, D. "The Unsolved Mysteries of Watergate." *New York Times* (June 5, 2005).

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/weekinreview/05green.html> (Accessed October 2012).

Watergate.info. "The Smoking Gun Tape." <http://www.watergate.info/1972/06/23/the-smoking-gun-tape.html> (Accessed October 2012).

## Nonverbal Cues

Nonverbal cues to deception refer to unique motor behaviors that occur when lying but are absent or present to a lesser degree when truth-telling. Nonverbal cues also include vocal behaviors separate from the content of the speech, such as vocal pitch. It is thought these cues are connected to the underlying cognitive and emotional demands of deception and so unintentionally reveal a liar's true beliefs. These cues may also, or instead, reflect the strategies that liars employ in an attempt to appear convincing. Whether unwitting or strategic, these behaviors vary depending on characteristics of the situation and of the individual. Consideration will be given to each of these topics, exploring how the emotional and cognitive elements of deception elicit nonverbal cues to their deceit, the situational and individual differences that modulate the cues to deceit, and the benefits of using nonverbal cues.

### Mental State of the Liar

Initial research into the nonverbal cues of deception was concerned with the notion that liars experience different emotional states than truth-tellers. Despite liars' best efforts, unintentional manifestations of emotions were thought to be observable in bodily behavior, often referred to as leakage cues. These cues are thought to reflect guilt associated with misleading another and anxiety about being caught. The leakage hierarchy hypothesis suggests that cues associated with these emotions are more likely to be expressed through bodily channels that are not as perceptually salient to a communication partner and thus not as closely monitored by the liar. As a result, leakage should be most evident in the movements of the legs and feet, followed by the hands, and less so in the more visible and practiced movements of the face. A critical



exception, according to Paul Ekman, a pioneer of the emotional approach to lie detection, are the fleeting and nearly indistinguishable emotional expressions that occur on the face while one attempts to suppress true responses. Commonly referred to as microexpressions, the evidence for their existence has been mixed, and even when isolated, they are often reported as being too scant for reliable use in practice. Other emotional displays have been found to be more reliable indicators. For example, liars tend to produce fewer genuine smiles than truth-tellers but attempt to compensate with feigned smiles.

Extending the emotional approach, the four-factor model proposes that liars must also contend with unique cognitive demands (along with greater overall arousal and the overcontrol of behavior). In many cases, deception has been shown to be more cognitively challenging than truth-telling: a false reality must be maintained while the ever-present truth competes for expression. Thus, when cognitive demands are present during deception, characteristic signs of cognitive load are revealed across a range of nonverbal behaviors, including decreased eye blink rates, greater speech hesitations, and a longer initial pause before beginning to respond. Recently, researchers have focused more sharply on establishing nonverbal cues to deceit that tap into the heavy processing demands, with less attention given to the nonverbal behaviors indicative of felt emotions. However, it is noteworthy that there is some controversy around the cognitive load approach, with some researchers arguing that the cues to deception should be expected to decrease when a person is mentally taxed.

### Deception in Context

There is no simple correspondence between the cognitive and emotional antecedents of deception and its behavioral consequences. In a review of 100 nonverbal cues to deceit, 75 percent of the behaviors investigated were not related to deception in any way. There is little evidence that any single nonverbal cue, akin to Pinocchio's growing nose, will accurately distinguish deception from truth across a range of individuals and situations. Lies vary dramatically, from outright inventions to subtle concealments, from mundane white lies to highly consequential deceptions, and from lying

for self-gain to lying for selfless reasons. The memory demands of inventing a lie, the emotional impact of highly consequential deceptions, and the social implications of lying for self-gain place various demands on the individual. By accounting for the differences in the type of lie told, reliable lie-dependent nonverbal cues can be discovered.

The cognitive demands associated with deception can be greatly minimized by rehearsal. For instance, there is a longer initial response time when lying. This is thought to reflect the processing time needed to either generate the lie or inhibit the truth. However, after rehearsal liars take a shorter time to respond than truth-tellers, reflecting the reduction in cognitive demand. Thus, police officers conducting street interviews moments after the crime will observe different indicators of deceit than would a police interviewer who interviews the suspect after they had been given time to prepare their account.

The emotional demands also vary by situation. When lying, people may experience diverse emotions, including fear of being caught, guilt associated with misleading another, or even enjoyment from having successfully misled someone. However, there are occasions when lying may be as emotional as telling the truth. According to studies in which people are asked to keep a record of their lies in their daily life, the majority of deception is relatively inconsequential, as most lies are told to protect another's feelings or to exaggerate one's own accomplishments. These deceptions are not fraught with fear of being spotted or with feelings of guilt for deceiving. Nonverbal cues to felt emotions may offer little advantage in this situation. In some situations lying can even be emotionally easier than telling the truth. For example, a teenager who deceptively says that he or she was studying at a friend's house might be telling a lie that is trivially easy when this is what the teenager's parents already assumed. Thus, liars need not experience the anxiety that is predicted to accompany deception.

Equally, truth-tellers may feel more apprehensive than may be expected because of the possibility of not being believed. Studies examining vocal cues of deception have shown that human lie detectors are able to recognize the apprehension



of honest speakers but often misinterpret this information as being deceptive, a phenomenon known as the Othello error. Thus, context not only influences the emotions experienced when lying but also when telling the truth. Any interpretation of nonverbal behavior must be done with an understanding of the context in which the behavior was produced.

### Interactions With Individual Differences

The context in which lies are told will influence the availability of nonverbal cues presented. There are also particularities of the person that influence the nonverbal display, such as working memory capacity and emotional control. Differences in motivation and confidence can also alter the naturalness of behavior. People who are too eager to appear believable will often exhibit actions that are overly deliberate, thereby producing behaviors that violate expectations of what is considered appropriate in a given situation. Conversely, those who are more confident and well practiced in their ability to lie do so with greater success.

There is mounting evidence that the latter is more common in everyday types of deception, where deception mostly goes undetected and reliable nonverbal cues for identifying deception are few. The self-presentational perspective supports this notion, arguing that liars are quite adept at regulating their behaviors by avoiding apparently suspicious behaviors and creating an impression of honesty. For example, deceivers who mimic the movements of their conversational partner are more readily believed, suggesting a simple behavioral adaptation that is tailored to project an honest demeanor.

There is of course an alternative explanation to low detection rates that has less to do with the individual skills possessed by liars but more with the inability of lie detectors in detecting deception. In a comprehensive study that spanned 75 different countries, people reported that the most revealing nonverbal cue in detecting deception is gaze aversion, a cue that has received little or no empirical support. However, followup research has shown that lie detectors rarely rely on these wrong beliefs when attempting to detect deception in real-time. Instead they are more sensitive to open-ended categories of others' perceived

incompetence and ambivalence. Thus, the self-presentational skills of individual liars, in more or less demanding situations, seem to best explain low detection rates.

The culture in which the individual was raised also influences their nonverbal behavior. Surinamese people make less eye contact than people in other cultures. Although it is not a reliable indicator of deception, conversational partners commonly link gaze avoidance to dishonesty. Cues that are more diagnostic of deception, such as decreased bodily movement, also differ by culture. Some research shows that African Americans move more overall than white people. Nonetheless, the differences in nonverbal behavior when people lie and tell the truth appear promisingly stable across cultures. Although African Americans may exhibit more movement, they show a reduction in that movement when they lie, as would people in other cultures.

### Benefits of Seeking Nonverbal Cues

Although nonverbal cues to deception are not highly reliable from one lie to another, with the proper controls and a clear specification of the conditions in which deception can occur there are advantages to using nonverbal cues as indicators of deceptive intent.

Nonverbal cues to deceit appear to be similar in the cultures that have so far been explored. Nonverbal cues span not only cultures but also time. One study found that over a two-year period nonverbal behavior remained consistent, while verbal behavior showed no such consistency. There also are cues that appear to be reliable relatively independent of context. For instance, whether rehearsed or unprepared, liars display an overall reduction in their bodily movement. Reduced bodily movement shows up in many studies using a range of lies. That is, there are cues to deceit that are diagnostic and potentially generalize across the various lies people tell.

Because truth-tellers tend to believe "the truth will come out," they typically do not regulate their outward appearance. When people lie it is thought they strategically control their movements in an attempt to minimize any cues. Ironically, this strategy gives liars away precisely because truth-tellers do not usually engage in such nonverbal self-control.

Although liars may strategically attempt to suppress cues to deceit, the interviewer can actively elicit them. One method requests interviewees to tell their stories backward. Deceivers find this difficult because the act of generating a false story depletes cognitive resources, leaving little cognitive capacity available to deal with reordering their tale. This has been shown to increase the nonverbal cues to deceit that are associated with cognitive effort.

Nonverbal cues also offer a direct benefit to the lie detector. The use of nonverbal cues is less cognitively demanding than processing verbal content. As such, this can free cognitive resources and aid a police interviewer, for example, in developing more effective questions for further probing as well as keeping in mind the facts about the case at hand. There may also be situations in which verbal communication is not possible, such as at an international airport, where nonverbal behavior may be the sole source of information; security officials need to decide who to search at customs and can only make this judgment from visual behavior. Bearing in mind the strategies liars use and the contextual and individual influences on behavior would serve security officials well.

Nicholas D. Duran  
University of California, Merced  
Chris Street  
University College London

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Crying; Deception Detection Accuracy; Duchenne Smile; Emotions; Leakage; Lies, Types of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Mental Effort in Lying; Meta-Analysis; Microfacial Expressions; Motivation Impairment Effect; Othello Effect.

#### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Ekman, P. and W. V. Friesen. "The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding." *Semiotica*, v.1 (1969).
- Masip, J., E. Garrido, and C. Herrero. "The Nonverbal Approach to the Detection of Deception." *Psychology in Spain*, v.8 (2004).

Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, and S. Porter. "Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.11 (2010).

Zuckerman, M., B. M. DePaulo, and R. Rosenthal. "Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, v.14 (1981).

## Normandy, Allied Invasion of

Allied forces invaded the beaches at Normandy, France, on June 6, 1944, surprising German commanders who anticipated landings at the Pas-de-Calais, France, the narrowest point of the English Channel. The success of the invasion followed years of British and American planning for Operation Overlord and two lesser-known cover efforts code-named Operation Bodyguard and Operation Fortitude.

In 1943, planners at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) realized that the German command would anticipate and plan for an invasion of Europe, so the Allies needed to influence German planning. The London Controlling Section commanded by Colonel John Bevan and the chief of staff of SHAEF, General Frederick Morgan, devised a deceptive invasion plan: Operation Fortitude, which shadowed the real Allied invasion plan. Allied planners sought to make the German command believe that the attack at Normandy was a diversion and the attack would come elsewhere. This would tie up large numbers of German forces and allow the Allied landings to get a firm hold on the beachhead before the Germans realized their mistake.

Operation Bodyguard was designed to tie up German forces in four separate areas so they couldn't group in one place. Allied diversions led Germans to believe that invasions would come in Scandinavia, the Pas-de-Calais, the eastern Mediterranean, and the south of France in the late summer and that the Allied priority was on air offensives.

Operation Fortitude South at Pas-de-Calais was created to appear as the real location of the

attack and to lead the Germans to believe that the Normandy landings were just a diversion. Allied planners used Ultra messages to confirm the successful acceptance of information by the Germans; Ultra was an intelligence program that enabled the Allies to decode and read German war communications. The diversion at Calais included false orders of battle and published division and corps dispatches of nonexistent airborne troops. A false First U.S. Army Group was activated under General George Patton, who was seen in public as often as possible.

German reconnaissance found dummy encampments along the east coast of England that included false radio traffic to attract German signal units, and fake equipment that looked like convoys and other heavy trucks. Additional bombing of the Pas-de-Calais area contributed to the diversion. These operations were collectively called Operation Quicksilver and effectively masked the real invasion forces building up in western England. The success of this operation was due to the inability of the Germans to verify by air reconnaissance the information they received because of Allied air superiority in Germany.

Phase two of the plan, Operation Fortitude North, involved making the Germans believe the invasion would take place in the Scandinavian countries. The Germans anticipated a landing in the autumn of 1944, and the purpose of this operation was to convince the Germans that a cross-channel invasion would not be attempted. Instead, Allied forces would move from the northern areas of Scotland and Ireland and invade German-occupied Norway. Agents also made sure that the Germans believed that Allied bombing runs had precedence over a land invasion. This operation was successful in that it kept over 300,000 Germans stationed in Norway until the end of the war.

Allied planners used double agents and translated messages to perpetuate the deception of Operation Fortitude on the Germans. The primary double agent used by the Allies, Joan Pujol Garcia, code-named Garbo, was a Spaniard who created his own network of agents. Two other agents who worked with the Double-Cross Committee included Tricycle, the code name for Yugoslav businessman Dusko Popov, and a Polish officer, Captain Roman Garby-Czerniawski, code-named Brutus. These three men kept the British informed

about German plans and the location of troops, while leaking information to the Germans about the Allied invasion plans. The role of the double agents continued after the invasion's success.

German commanders Gerd von Rundstedt and Wilhelm Keitel took the reports from the agents and tried to convince the high command of the dangers. They disagreed with the decision to spread the forces in four different areas that could not be reinforced. Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the invasion would come at Calais because of the narrowness of the channel and the convincing radio traffic picked up by German observers. Attempts were made prior to June 1944 to move some of the German panzer units closer to the coast, where they could more easily be called into service. However, Hitler ordered von Rundstedt to keep the bulk of the panzer forces near Calais, and only Hitler could order the panzers to another location.

### Successful Ruse

On the day of the invasion, the German command continued to believe the ruse that an invasion at Normandy was a diversion. They encountered miniature paratroopers designed to make noise and draw attention away from the real drop zones. Areas near Calais were bombed just as in Normandy to disable the railroads and to cause confusion.

However, the chief of staff of the German Seventh Army, General Max-Josef Pemsel, was in Normandy and notified General Hans Speidel and other superiors of the invasion. Pemsel assured them that they could reverse the Allied advances in Normandy because it was a small force. However, the Germans soon realized the actual size of the landing force and called for reinforcements. Von Rundstedt requested the reserve panzer units but was denied the request by General Alfred Jodl, who refused to wake Hitler from his nap. The panzer units were released late on June 6, but did not arrive until June 7 because Allied bombings impeded their travel. Once the units arrived it became apparent that a solid Allied beachhead was already established. German commanders also did not foresee the follow-up plan that included Allied landings in the south of France and forces commanded by General Patton. This, too, was part of the ruse of Operation Fortitude.

The success of the Allied invasion at Normandy relied on deceptive information put out by the Allies to mislead the German high command and war planners. Within Germany and France, false press coverage, information passed from double agents to members of the German high command who trusted their sources, and wireless communications between agents to their connections meant to be intercepted by the Germans all helped build the belief among German planners that the invasion would be in another location. The deception continued in England, with press coverage of General Patton, decoy military vehicles, false radio traffic, and messages sent from fictional units to command.

The ability of the Allies to verify German acceptance of the supplied information through the Ultra decoder confirmed the continued success of a carefully constructed operation. The deception carried out by the British preceding the invasion of Normandy helped bring about the invasion's success, while protecting troops being amassed in Great Britain. It is a deception the size of which could never be attempted again because of advances in technology and warfare that would lead to the endangerment of civilians and the military.

Theresa S. Hefner-Babb  
*Lamar University*

**See Also:** Churchill, Winston; Disinformation; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Military Deception; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Barbier, Mary Kathryn. *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Breuer, William B. *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.
- Deutsch, Harold, ed. *Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion*. New York: Garland, 1989.
- Heskith, Roger. *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000.
- Koch, James R. "Operation Fortitude: The Backbone of Deception." *Military Review*, v.72/3 (1992).

## Nostradamus

Michel de Nostredame (1503–66), more commonly known by the Latin form of his name, Nostradamus, was an apothecary, astrologer, and visionary (or seer), whose apparently prophetic writings have acquired a huge following of believers. His followers claim he was uniquely capable of seeing into the distant future and predicting events of global importance, such as, most famously, the Great Fire of London, the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, the fall of Adolf Hitler, the Hiroshima bombing, the death of Princess Diana, and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center.

### Life of Nostradamus

Nostradamus was born and educated in the south of France. By all accounts his grandfather had been Jewish, later converting to Roman Catholicism, and the influence of more than one sacred narrative on the young Nostradamus is often regarded—largely because of the vague pronouncements of Nostradamus himself concerning his childhood—as formative. He appears, for instance, to have shown an interest in the Kabbalah as well as in such Christian scriptures as the Book of Revelation. A precocious scholar, he familiarized himself with Latin, Classical Greek (a much less normal academic achievement at that time than later), and Hebrew. He is also said to have demonstrated an aptitude for mathematics, an interest in the natural world, and a fascination with astrology.

His undergraduate studies in the liberal arts at Avignon, France, ended when the university was closed by an outbreak of plague, at which point Nostradamus set himself up as a traveling apothecary. He subsequently migrated to Montpellier, France but was expelled from its university owing (as he claimed) to the authorities' displeasure at discovering his history as a practitioner, rather than academic theoretician, of medicine. During the extensive travels which led up to this period Nostradamus specialized in treating plague victims, and in time he established a reputation as an effective herbalist, using natural cures such as the vitamin-rich "rose pill" (compacted from crushed rose hips) and an emphasis on basic hygiene, an approach that was opposed to many



of the kill-or-cure techniques used in medicine at the time.


In consequence, he became something of a regional celebrity and began associating with politically and culturally influential figures, such as the Renaissance scholar Julius Caesar Scaliger. Despite his training and experience in medicine, Nostradamus's interest in almanacs and books of prognostication continued to grow. Although he published medical treatises and commentaries, his transition toward occultism, and the published predictions which followed, would seal the destiny by which he has been known ever since.

### The Prophecies

His most famous work is *Les Prophéties* (*The Prophecies*). The first version of this almanac of predictions appeared in 1555, an expanded second edition was released in 1557, with a third and final edition published posthumously in 1568. The predictions are arranged in four-line verse stanzas (or quatrains), mostly in French, and mostly in rhyme. These are in turn organized in groups of 100, which Nostradamus calls “centuries.” The final edition of the *The Prophecies* contains 942 quatrains. Problematically, they are phrased in such a way that interpretation is left up to the reader and many widely differing readings have been offered; difficulty in interpretation is compounded because details are omitted and the text is intentionally vague, containing no dates and sowing confusion over verb tenses—past, present, and future.

Additionally, Nostradamus frequently departs from French, interspersing his verse lines with Latin, Greek, Italian, and the southern French dialect, Provençal. It is sometimes claimed that this vagueness is pre-emptive protection against charges of magic, diabolism, or witchcraft, although this issue is contentious. It is more possible that he assumed the guise of seer and prophet to provoke the respect and awe he coveted at key stages in the ambitious trajectory of his career.

Thematically, he tends to the apocalyptic and writes about disasters like droughts, fires, plagues, earthquakes, and wars, one reason, in all likelihood, for the hold his writings have established on the Western imagination for five centuries. From the outset his works generated a remarkable degree of attention, and his fame grew proportionately.



Michel de Nostredame (top) more commonly known as Nostradamus, was an apothecary, astrologer, and visionary who claimed a unique capability of seeing into the distant future. The *Prophecies* (bottom), a set of predictions written in four-line stanzas in French, first appeared in 1555.

After the publication of the first edition of the *The Prophecies* in 1555, for example, he attracted the notice of King Henri II's queen, Catherine de Medici, who appointed him to the royal court as physician-in-residence to her son.

The psychic methodology used by Nostradamus is unknown, although some theorize that he

used techniques of meditation involving ritual use of fire and a bowl filled with herbs and water. He may also have used his herbalistic expertise to create hallucinogens. In his writings he primarily employs astrological divination but also draws on the printed record in terms of classical, scriptural, and Apocryphal sources, as well as medieval chronicles, which are not always acknowledged.

### Current Interest in Nostradamus

The open-endedness, obscurity, and vagueness of his prophecies have led to the suggestion that anyone can read almost anything into them at will. Nostradamus does demonstrate an interest in repetitions and cyclical patterns in history, and it is therefore conceivable that the writings are a projection of these into future time. For their own reasons, many readers still opt to believe that Nostradamus's abilities were genuine and that he was writing in a predictive code, although within this constituency there is doubt over whether or not the meaning of the quatrains has yet been satisfactorily explained.

The desire to believe is, in turn, stoked by printed and online media devoted to the man and his works. There is a considerable industry concerned with popularizing and glossing Nostradamus's prophecies, yoking them unerringly to modern-day turmoil, catastrophes, and political events, and searching for retrospective validation of his claims. The authors of such books are addressing a lucrative market in fortune-telling, occultism, and new-age psychic phenomena, which is growing ever more sizeable in the Western world. These writers often claim that they alone have—for the first time—"unlocked" the seer's mysteries. The large number of popular works about Nostradamus may be held to obscure the research of more traditionally scholarly biographers and investigators, who find the task of separating fact

from fantasy increasingly challenging. In works which do not set out to popularize, skepticism if not incredulity is the prevailing response.

In any case, the penumbra of mystery and uncertainty surrounding Nostradamus's life and career has not been completely dispelled, despite a new quantity of verifiable biographical information which has emerged since about 1990. Almost every claim made for him has been met with a counterclaim. Sifting through these statements, however, the consensus is that Nostradamus himself believed his predictions point to a truth lying beyond them, which time would subsequently ratify. Academic researchers as well as the public at large remain fascinated by this claim, although definitive proof has never been supplied.

Nicholas J. Crowe

*Centre for Medieval & Renaissance Studies, Oxford*

Rachel M. Reznik

*Elmhurst College*

**See Also:** Deniability; Fantasy and Imagination; Gullibility, Hitler, Adolf; Napoleon Bonaparte.

### Further Readings

Dumézil, G. *The Riddle of Nostradamus: A Critical Dialogue*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.


Gerson, S. *Nostradamus: How an Obscure Renaissance Astrologer Became the Modern Prophet of Doom*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2012.

Leoni, Edgar. *Nostradamus and His Prophecies*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2000.

Randi, James. *The Mask of Nostradamus: The Prophecies of the World's Most Famous Seer*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1993.

Wilson, Ian. *Nostradamus: The Man Behind the Prophecies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002.





## Oaths

The oath is the antithesis of lies and deception. It is constructed as the “gold standard” of truth. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, an oath is “a solemn or formal declaration invoking God (or a god, or other object of reverence) as witness to the truth of a statement, or to the binding nature of a promise or undertaking; an act of making such a declaration.” An oath makes a promise inviolable by linking it to the actor’s most sacred loyalties. The basic structure is that a speaker swears, taking an oath confirming the truth of some assertion of fact by connecting it to a core value through language such as “as my witness” or “so help me.” The earliest reference to an oath is found in *Beowulf*; the device is found in many other literary works, including Charles Dickens’s *Dombey and Son* (1848): “But I could take my oath he said . . .”

As a matter of philosophy, the oath is a representation of speech act theory. The core premise of this theory is that, under the proper conditions, to say is to do. The classic examples are saying “I do” at the front of a church, which means that you are married, or saying “I bet” under the right conditions when someone else responds. “You’re on” means that a wager has been made, and at the end of a contest money is going to change hands. The core notion here is that talking is

commitment. An oath is a very powerful example of that commitment.

The notion of a promise underlies much of social organization. Individuals need to be able to depend on one another’s word to function as a society. In law, the promise takes the form of a contract, which binds two parties to mutually defined actions and specifies penalties for failure to comply. The oath is the premier form of a contract; individuals give their word, backed by their devotion to a sacred object or relationship, that they are speaking the truth.

Anything humankind can construct, however, it can also pervert. So oaths can be broken, or oaths themselves can be used for antisocial purposes. The former case, when it happens in court, can result in charges of perjury or obstruction of justice, in which serious criminal penalties result from conviction. The North Carolina General Statutes define perjury this way: “If any person shall willfully and corruptly commit perjury, on his oath or affirmation, in any suit, controversy, matter or cause, depending in any of the courts of the State . . . every person so offending shall be punished as a Class F felon.” The presumptive sentence for someone with no prior convictions is 13 to 16 months. The legal system takes seriously the need for honest testimony under oath.

The Mafia and other fraternal forms of organized crime are said to promote a particular sort of



oath: Omerta, or the code of silence. Under these rules, Mafiosi are never to cooperate with law enforcement or any other form of authority, even in naming the individuals who attempted to kill them in a daylight attack. Under this approach, honor requires organizational members to take revenge for themselves through the mechanism of the vendetta but never to involve agents of the state. This mechanism, too, is a sacred vow, though it is oriented in antisocial ways. As with other oaths, it is a valued mechanism for preserving the disciplinary tenets of an institution.

Experts trace the notion of an oath to the Book of Genesis (8:21), in which God promises to “never again” curse the ground because of humans nor destroy all living creatures as he had done in the flood. “Never again” is defined as an oath through the Talmudic tradition. That phrase is recognized in a modern context as a statement in response to the Holocaust, intended to promise that those horrors will not be repeated. Some religious traditions decline to take oaths based on their readings of scripture. The U.S. Constitution makes provision for citizens to “affirm” their statements in lieu of taking an oath that would offend their religious tenets.

U.S. history includes a prominent encounter with loyalty oaths. President Harry S. Truman established a loyalty program that included an oath. This movement was a reaction to the actions of U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy and the actions of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The oaths were enacted by various states for public employees and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Garner v. Board of Public Works* (1951). The court has generally upheld state loyalty oaths as reasonable conditions on employees, despite civil liberties advocates’ assertions that these sworn statements interfere with the freedoms of association and expression.

The irony of loyalty oath requirements is that the only people who would run afoul of these rules would be people who objected to them on principle and refused to comply in order to make their point. Anyone bent on espionage or other efforts to subvert the government would blithely sign the oath and go on with his or her nefarious actions. Therefore, the imposition of loyalty oaths is a symbolic battle between forces of conformity and individuality, not an exercise

likely to distinguish between loyal citizens and saboteurs.

John T. Llewellyn  
Wake Forest University

**See Also:** Bible; Islam; Judaism; Lies, Types of; Morals and Ethics; Perjury.

#### Further Readings

Agamben, Giorgio and Adam Kotsko, trans. *The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Blauner, Bob. *Resisting McCarthyism: To Sign or Not to Sign California’s Loyalty Oath*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.


Ide, Arthur Frederick. *Vows, Virgins, Oaths, and Orgies*. Arlington, TX: Liberal Arts Press, 1988.

---

## Operation Bodyguard

Operation Bodyguard was the code name given to the Allies’ plan to convince Adolf Hitler that the invasion of western Europe would take place at the Pas-de-Calais, France, while planning the actual invasion (Operation Overlord) for Normandy. In order for the plan to succeed, the Allies tricked the Nazis through the use of fake armies, dummy landing craft, and false intelligence. The D-Day invasion of Normandy, beginning on June 6, 1944, was one of the most successful military operations of World War II. One million men and thousands of ships and aircraft from around the world combined to form the largest joint military operation in history. On the first day, more than 5,000 ships would carry more than 200,000 Allied troops to Normandy, the largest amphibious operation in military history. This would lead to the opening of the second front in the war against the Nazis and would result in the collapse of the Third Reich less than a year later.

However, the D-Day operation would not have been successful without the incredible deception efforts undertaken by the Allies. The effort was based on the Allies’ belief that the Axis powers, notwithstanding their near total domination



A graphic from a scrapbook prepared for Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, commander of the 9th Air Force from August 1944 to the end of the war, shows a detail from Operation Bodyguard. The enemy was led to expect an invasion in one area (Pas-de-Calais, France) while the invasion was actually scheduled for Normandy. In addition to attacking key sites in the Normandy region, 9th Air Force aircrews flew many missions against the Pas-de-Calais to support the deception that the Allies intended to land there.

of Europe, would be unable to defend all of the 3,000 miles of coastline, stretching from Norway to France, under their control.

Operation Bodyguard had two goals: first, to weaken Hitler's "Atlantic Wall" by causing its defenses to be stretched even thinner than they were, and second, to convince the Nazis to concentrate their forces at a false invasion spot. Also, after the D-Day operation began, the continuation of Operation Bodyguard's activities were intended to convince the German military that Normandy was only a diversion, as the real invasion would be launched elsewhere. The name for the operation comes from a speech given in 1943 by Winston Churchill, prime minister of Great Britain, in which he stated: "In wartime, truth is

so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."

### The Double-Cross System

Critical to the success of the operation was the Double-Cross System developed by the British in 1941. Captured German spies (or those who turned themselves in) were interrogated by M15, the British intelligence agency. Those who were deemed suitable were given the opportunity to become double agents for the British. Initially, the double agents would be given accurate information to send back to German intelligence agencies. This information was often insignificant or, in some cases, communications were delayed so that German intelligence would receive

important intelligence too late. Notwithstanding the untimely receipt, the double agents' credibility with their German handlers was often enhanced by the accuracy of their reports. A notable example of this was the accurate (albeit late) intelligence given to the Germans about Operation Torch, the joint British-American invasion of north Africa that took place in November 1942. The British knew that their efforts were succeeding because they had deciphered the German codes.

The Double-Cross System was used to protect the D-Day invasion. Agents were given a combination of real and false information to report to the German intelligence services. Based on these reports, German intelligence concluded that the main invasion would be at Calais. Even after the Normandy invasion began, German intelligence remained convinced that the real invasion was still going to be launched at Calais.

### **Dummy Military Operations**

One of the goals of Operation Bodyguard was to convince the Germans that Allied military strength was actually greater than it was and that the Allies were capable of mounting two large-scale operations against Hitler's Atlantic Wall defenses. Operation Bodyguard was actually divided into two operations: Operation Fortitude and Operation Zeppelin. There were two elements to Operation Fortitude. First, there was a phony joint American-Anglo-Russian invasion of Norway in order to keep in place the 464,000 German troops occupying Norway. This assault would be launched by the fictional Fourth Army Group that was headquartered in Edinburgh, Scotland. British General Andrew Thorne, who had been the British military attaché in Germany during the 1930s and knew Hitler, was appointed "commander" of this group. The troops that made up this rump army were led by another British officer, Colonel R. M. MacLeod. The dummy Fourth Army, according to William B. Breuer, was supposedly composed of "some 250,000 men with their own tactical air force and 250 tanks and armored vehicles" but was in fact nothing more than Colonel MacLeod, several other officers, and roughly 20 radio operators.

Another part of the deception was diplomatic communications between the Allies and Sweden. Sweden was neutral during World War II,

but the diplomatic communications between the Allies and Sweden made it appear that an Allied invasion of Norway was imminent. When this information made its way to German intelligence and German diplomats, it only reinforced the belief that the Allies were planning an invasion of Norway.

A second element of Operation Fortitude's deception was the invasion route across the Pas-de-Calais, or as the English referred to it, the Straits of Dover. Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of German forces on the Western Front, was convinced that this would be the invasion route as it was the shortest distance (22 miles) between Great Britain and France. The invasion was to be mounted by a dummy First U.S. Army Group, which the Germans were led to believe would be made up of more than 1 million men led by General George S. Patton. The Germans held Patton in such high regard that they believed he was the only general capable of leading the invasion; they referred to his "army" as Army Group Patton. Patton contributed to the deception by making speeches throughout England as the commander of the First U.S. Army Group.

The German High Command was so convinced that the main Allied attack would be mounted by what turned out to be a phantom army that German forces were not redeployed from Calais until seven weeks following the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion, as Hitler refused to believe that Normandy was anything more than a diversion intended to lure the German 15th Army away from the real invasion. To further this deception, radio communications led the Germans to believe that the First U.S. Army group would be attacking in mid-July. Contributing to the ruse were the British and American motion picture industries. Special effects workers created dummy barracks, oil dumps, tanks, airplanes, Jeeps, landing craft, and any other equipment that a real army would possess. These wooden and rubber dummies were then set just as the real equipment would have been arranged. Therefore, German reconnaissance planes would believe that the fake equipment and armies were real. Even bombing operations contributed to the deception, as the Calais area was the target of more bombing missions than Normandy in the weeks prior to the invasion.

Operation Zeppelin was a plan to convince Hitler that an attack would be mounted by a phantom British 12th Army against the Axis' Balkan allies: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. The purpose of this fabrication was to freeze German troops in place to defend Hitler's Southern Front. To heighten the threat, the Allies leaked the story that Patton was assembling an army that would attack Trieste, Italy. The allies were so successful at this scheme that the Germans sent infantry and tanks from coastal defenses in France to Hungary and, in July 1943, briefly sent the "Desert Fox," Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, to Greece to command German Army Group E. Rommel would eventually be sent to Normandy (in November 1943) to take command of the German defenses there. Patton would ultimately be sent to England to command the dummy First U.S. Army Group, the force the Germans believed would invade Calais.

### Conclusion

Operation Bodyguard was a critical element in the success of Operation Overlord—the Allies' opening of the Western Front. The deception forced the Germans to divert forces away from Normandy in the weeks before D-Day and convinced them to keep those forces in place to await an attack that would never come.

Jeffrey Kraus  
Wagner College

**See Also:** Battle of the Bulge; Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Military Deception; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Barbier, Mary. *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Breuer, William B. *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993.
- Brown, Anthony C. *Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day*. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
- Haswell, Jock. *The Intelligence and Deception of the D-Day Landings*. London: Batsford, 1979.

Hesketh, Roger. *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000.

Macintyre, Ben. *Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012.

Wendell, Jon S. "Strategic Deception Behind the Normandy Invasion." *Global Security.org*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Wendell.htm> (Accessed June 2013).

---

## Operation Mincemeat

Winston Churchill said of wartime deception and espionage: "In the higher range of Secret Service work the actual facts of many cases were in every respect equal to the most fantastic inventions of romance and melodrama." In April 1943, Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, gave approval for an elaborate deception program, Operation Mincemeat, on the condition that General Dwight Eisenhower would approve the plan, which the American commander quickly did.

Operation Mincemeat was a plan by British intelligence to arrange for the body of a British Marine officer to wash up on a Spanish beach, the apparent victim of an airplane crash in the Mediterranean. The officer would have a briefcase chained to him, and in it would be letters between generals that obliquely suggested the Allies' next invasion targets. British intelligence hoped that the briefcase would come to the attention of German intelligence operatives, who were rife in that part of nominally neutral Spain.

According to the plan, the German spies would investigate the military briefcase, find the letters, and take the bait; access would come from the spies' close cooperation with Spanish officials, assured by a mixture of political affinity and bribery. After the covert copying, Spanish officials would return the dead man's effects to British authorities. Then German agents would pass the information on to Berlin. If top German analysts believed their "find," they would alter their strategy and staffing, moving resources to Greece and Sardinia, the letters' nominal targets. These actions would leave fewer defenses in



Sicily, described in the “discovered” letters as the Allies’ cover target but, in fact, the genuine invasion target.

Mincemeat’s deception succeeded in spite of universal agreement on the logic of Sicily as the Allies’ next step after the North Africa campaign. Churchill observed: “Everybody but a bloody fool would know it was Sicily.” And yet with an imaginative plan and the expenditure of only 200 pounds, members of British intelligence, diplomats, double agents, ordinary civilians, and the Royal Navy fooled the German intelligence hierarchy. The plan was designed to exploit the two major flaws that Admiral John Henry Godfrey, Britain’s director of naval intelligence, identified in spies: wishfulness and yes-manship. Mincemeat’s deception enabled Allied forces to take Sicily with a force of 160,000 men in 38 days with only 7000 casualties. Original estimates anticipated a 90-day campaign and much higher losses.

From Sicily, the Allies rolled up Italy: Benito Mussolini resigned, and Italy got out of the war. Because of the invasion, Adolf Hitler suspended Operation Citadel with 900,000 troops and 3,000 tanks poised to retake Russian territory, and sent its panzer units to Italy. This action was the blitzkrieg’s first failure and marked the beginning of the end on the Eastern Front.

### The Men Behind the Operation

Godfrey noted that deception requires a “sort of corkscrew mind.” Those minds must be top-notch, Godfrey added: “It is quite useless, and in fact dangerous to employ people of medium intelligence. Only men of first class brains should be allowed to touch this stuff. If the right people can’t be found, better keep out altogether.” Among the other top-notch minds working for Godfrey was Ian Fleming, who would gain fame as the creator of superspy James Bond; among his colleagues were men who became the models for Bond staples: the administrator M and the gadget-master Q.

Operation Mincemeat originated in two top-notch minds. Charles Cholmondeley (pronounced “Chumly”) was a 25-year-old flight lieutenant from the Royal Air Force assigned to MI5, the British Security Service. At 6 feet 3 inches tall and with poor eyesight he was not destined to be a

pilot; his work in military intelligence was outstanding. He was a fount of ideas, many exotic or unworkable, “but every now and again quite brilliant in their simplicity.” His complement was Ewen Montagu, a brilliant 38-year-old barrister gifted in analysis of opponents’ strategies. He led Section 17M, distributing naval decryptions of German coded messages from Bletchley Park and running double agents. Godfrey judged Montagu’s group “a brilliant band of dedicated war winners.”

These two imaginative intelligence officers found a body, crafted a backstory for the fictional Major William Martin, arranged to preserve the body for three months, and transported it via special canister aboard a submarine. They navigated the intelligence bureaucracy for plan approval; assisted in crafting credible letters; and created ticket stubs, receipts, and other “pocket litter” to be found with the body. Every item had to ring true when scrutinized by world-class intelligence agents wary of “plants.” Any error could destroy the plan; Germans would reinforce Sicily, meaning higher Allied casualties and possible mission failure.

### Later Accounts of the Operation

Operation Mincemeat became famous in a 1953 book by Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was*. It was first serialized in the *Sunday Express* under pressure from authors mounting their own versions. A thinly veiled fictionalized account, *Operation Heartbreak*, was published in 1950 by former cabinet minister Duff Cooper. Eventually the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) gave Montagu permission when the release appeared inevitable. Under JIC guidelines, he was not to explain how the dead body was acquired, give its identity, show how Britain had deceived Spain, or call attention to Spain’s collaboration with Germany. Montagu’s book has never been out of print since it was first issued. In 1956, a film with the same title debuted; it won the year’s award for best British screenplay. Popular acceptance of the story was demonstrated in 1956, when it was the basis for an entire episode of the British madcap radio comedy *The Goon Show*. Most of public understanding of Operation Mincemeat comes from the idealized and sanitized version Montagu rendered under the scrutiny of the JIC.

In 2010, a new and comprehensive examination was published by Ben Macintyre titled *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory*. While researching a book on a World War II spy, Macintyre had come across a second book by Montagu, *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*, published in 1977. In it, Montagu mentions that he was “allowed to keep” some intelligence materials because of “special circumstances.” Macintyre assumed that was an allusion to Operation Mincemeat. After Montagu died in 1985, Macintyre set out to find the materials. Montagu’s son was the keeper of these records and allowed Macintyre access, providing the basis of his detailed re-examination of the Mincemeat saga. This volume includes more extensive photographs and copies of original reports than Montagu’s 1953 book.

Macintyre explains how a body was acquired to become Major William Martin; Montagu had used a cover story to obscure original issues. In fact, the body was that of Glyndwr Michael, a down-and-out Welshman who committed suicide in London. Macintyre illuminates the complex world of British and Spanish relations, which was manipulated as British intelligence worked to get German agents to take the bait after Martin’s body washed up. He also suggests that German intelligence operations, specifically chief analyst Lieutenant Colonel Alexis von Roenne, may not have been fooled by the materials but went along with lower-level analysts to placate and eventually weaken Hitler. This analyst, once Hitler’s favorite, was tried and executed after the attempt on Hitler’s life, not for involvement but because of his friendship with some conspirators.

Operation Mincemeat is a famous textbook example of deception in warfare. The account from Montagu and the updated and expanded treatment from Macintyre document the intricacies of this operation.

John T. Llewellyn  
*Wake Forest University*

**See Also:** Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Military Deception; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; World War II.

### Further Readings

Macintyre, Ben. *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory*. New York: Harmony Books, 2012.

Montagu, Ewen. *The Man who Never Was*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1953.

Smyth, Denis. *Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

---

## Operation Neptune

Operation Neptune is the covert name given by the U.S. military to its landing operations at Normandy during World War II. After the war began, Germany occupied northwestern France in early 1940 after invading the area. Adolf Hitler knew that Allied forces were bound to appear on the scene after his actions, but he believed the ends justified the means. Not knowing when or where the Allied forces would attack, Hitler quickly appointed Erwin Rommel to lead German efforts in the region. As the initial defense, Rommel opted to finish the Nazi’s Atlantic Wall, an over two-mile-long wall on the coast with bunkers and other fortifications.

As Hitler had predicted, Allied forces wasted little time in beginning to strategize on how to most efficiently and effectively make inroads toward recapturing France from Germany. The landings began on D-Day (June 6, 1944) at approximately 6:30 A.M. Operation Neptune remains one of the most successful military operations undertaken by the U.S. military in its history. Just over two million men and thousands of planes and ships came together for a joint military action aimed at deterring further advancement by Hitler and Nazi Germany throughout the European continent.

While there have been immeasurable writings based on the activities at Normandy, few have actually discussed the amount of deception that went into making the operation successful. To some degree, this is because the information was not publicly available until the 1970s, when the British press began seeking access to information. After 1977, when the British government

chose to release a large volume of classified information, the world began to see the deception employed by the Allies in their efforts to bring down the Third Reich.

### Two Phases of the Invasion

There were two phases to the landings on Normandy. The initial wave consisted of just less than 25,000 troops, composed of British, American, Canadian, and French pilots, who invaded by air, which was followed by an amphibious landing of infantry and armor about six hours later. Without the element of surprise provided by horrible weather and planned deception for months leading up to D-Day, the mission would have likely failed, or at least been significantly less effective. Operation Bodyguard was a key piece of the surprise. Its mission was to distract German authorities as much as possible from believing Normandy was a likely invasion point. The goal was to get Germans (especially Hitler) to believe that any landing would occur at the Pas-de-Calais, France.

The Allied forces were led by General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States; ground forces were directed by General Bernard Montgomery of Great Britain. Before the Allied forces went into action, Eisenhower declared to them the following:

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force! You are about to embark upon a great crusade, toward which we have striven these many months . . . The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers in arms on other fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Through these words, Eisenhower hoped to explain why the invasion was so important. Further, looking back, his words clearly explain why it was so important for Allied forces to use as much deception as possible. The mission was extremely dangerous and important to the future of the West.

### Use of Deception

Under Operation Bodyguard, Allied forces had created a comprehensive series of deceptions, which helped guarantee that the landings came as a surprise to Germany. Underneath Operation Bodyguard was Operation Fortitude, which had three main divisions. Operation Fortitude North involved the threat of a Norway invasion with a follow-up attack of Germany coming through Denmark. Operation Fortitude South brought forth rumors of a fictitious invasion directed against Belgium and northern France through the Strait of Dover. Operation Fortitude South II was radio deception conducted after D-Day, aimed at getting Germans to believe that Operation Neptune was only a distraction for the real invasion, which was yet to occur.

Operation Fortitude South II was especially significant for Allied efforts after landing at the five beaches throughout Normandy. Hitler fully believed that Operation Neptune was a diversionary tactic, and as a result he refused to send additional troops to Normandy. This decision gave Allied forces a head start on their mission and put the Germans in an insurmountable deficit later in the war.

Operations Glimmer and Taxable also proved to help sell Operation Neptune. In these two missions, bombers flew patterns over the Strait of Dover and dropped aluminum strips. As the strips fell, they looked like a large fleet of planes moving on German radar. This finding only further cemented in Hitler's mind that Operation Neptune was neither the major Allied landing site nor operation.

Other tactics were utilized to assure the deception. These included numerous pieces and types of fake equipment, a phantom army led by General George Patton that was to be based in England, double agents, and fake radio transmissions. Dummy tanks and troop camp facades were constructed. German planes were permitted to photograph the design and implementation of these fake elements being built in southern Britain. Allied forces were cunning enough to use double agents to convince the Germans to attempt to decode white noise. While there was no real reason for doing this, it kept German intelligence officials focused on something besides the Allied-planned Operation Neptune. This was the key to all Allied

deceptions. They did not need to completely fool the Germans; instead, they needed to distract them and force them to split their energies and efforts.

While there is no guaranteeing which elements ultimately led to Hitler being deceived, it can be safely said that collectively the acts of deceit helped assure Allied victory over Hitler and the Nazis. For Operation Neptune to go as well as it did, the Allied forces first needed the weather to cooperate. It did. With Nazi forces believing that no attack could be launched where they believed one was coming because of the weather, their guard was down and their troops poorly positioned to combat a Normandy landing. Further, the Allied forces needed the Nazis to attempt to defend multiple potential attack sites, which they did. If the German forces were spread across multiple areas, there would be less initial resistance to the D-Day invasion. This was important considering the vulnerability the Allied forces would face while undertaking the initial invasion and subsequent trudge toward the enemy.

By June 30, 1944, Operation Neptune was complete. A secure foothold had been established in Normandy, which positioned Allied forces well for further advancement and eventual victory in World War II. If not for the well-strategized deception techniques instituted by American and British intelligence officers and soldiers, the war could have turned out quite differently.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Military Deception, Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Quicksilver; World War II.

#### Further Readings

- Ambrose, Stephen. *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
- Beevor, Antony. *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*. New York: Viking, 2009.
- Holderfield, Randal J., and Michael J. Varhola. *D-Day: The Invasion of Normandy, June 6, 1944*. Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing, 2001.
- Tute, Warren, John Costello, and Terry Hughes. *D-Day*. London: Pan Books, 1975.

## Operation Quicksilver

World War II was an international war conducted between 1939 and 1945 that involved most of the countries of the world, including all of the major powers at the time. Ultimately, the two sides of the war were classified as the Allies (anchored by the Americans and the British) and the Axis (powered mostly by Nazi Germany and the Japanese). As would be expected in an event called a world war, all of the countries involved placed their entire societies into the war efforts domestically, as manufacturing and technology became geared entirely toward achieving victory. Ultimately, the Allied forces were able to be victorious, defeating enemies in both the European and Asian theaters. The war came at a cost, however: the Holocaust, nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and tens of millions of fatalities all occurred over the time span of the war.

Operation Quicksilver was a major element of the Allied victory in World War II, which focused on deceiving Axis forces (particularly Adolf Hitler) in the European theater. Quicksilver was a subprogram attached to Operation Fortitude South, which was launched in 1944 to help detract German attention from the planned invasion on the beaches of Normandy. Ultimately, the goal of Operation Quicksilver was to convince Axis leaders that any American invasion would occur at the Pas-de-Calais near the Strait of Dover. By creating such deception, Allied forces hoped to ensure their victory by limiting the presence of Axis forces in the area of Normandy. The plan was thought up by David Strangeways, a colonel in the British Army who was a specialist in military deception.

#### Strategy and Tactics

The primary tactic of Operation Quicksilver was the creation of a fake element of the U.S. Army. German leaders—including Hitler himself—were, over time, convinced that there was an American Army group preparing to land in the Pas-de-Calais for the major invasion that had long been expected. The group, fictitiously called the First U.S. Army Group, was allegedly training under General George Patton in the United Kingdom while finalizing details of the invasion. The key player in the scheme was



Joan Pujol Garcia. He was a double agent loyal to the Allies who supplied the Germans with all of the detailed information created by the Allied forces to help steer the Axis leaders away from the Allies' actual plans.

Operation Quicksilver focused on utilizing fake radio signals to show Allied forces in southeast England preparing for a massive invasion. Likewise, double agents such as Garcia were depended upon to add credence to the fake plans with Axis officials. Aware that German officials would be suspicious of getting too much direct information, the Allies were strategic in permitting agents to only report on minor, secondary details. But they provided so many secondary details that, when considered together, Axis leaders had no choice but to believe the Allied forces were in fact going to come aground close to Dover instead of Normandy.

Reports provided to Axis leaders suggested that there were many troops located in south

central England, very few in the southwest, and the fake groups in the southeast. By creating such reports, it painted a picture for the Axis that the Allied forces were likely to attack from the southeast because that was where the largest number of forces and subsequent activity were reported. Through the German battle order that was prepared in response to Operation Quicksilver, attention turned toward Pas-de-Calais, just as the Allied forces had hoped it would.

### Six Subprograms

There were six major subprograms involved in Operation Quicksilver. Quicksilver I focused on the main, underlying idea behind the operation. The First U.S. Army Group, which was allegedly based in southeast England, planned to land in Pas-de-Calais because Axis troops (mainly German reserves) were being directed toward Normandy. Quicksilver II focused on radio communications as a means to divert attention toward



*German forces listen in on radio transmissions during World War II. In 1944, Operation Quicksilver utilized fake radio signals to create the deception that Allied forces were in southeast England, preparing for a massive invasion of the French coast close to Dover, England, when in fact they were secretly planning to invade Normandy. Double agents were used to add credence to the fake plans. The Allies "leaked" enough secondary information to create a puzzle that the Germans would put together and conclude was genuine.*

Pas-de-Calais. The goal was to use radio reports of unit movements from true locations to their place in England to prepare for the invasion. Quicksilver III involved the creation of dummy materials to provide aerial photographs in order to convince the Axis countries of the impending invasion from the north. The key facets of this subprogram were dummy landing crafts and simulated wireless traffic.

Quicksilver IV was the fictitious invasion plan that centered on bombing the beach area of Pas-de-Calais and railways in the area in the days preceding the Normandy invasion. The hope was that these activities would lead Axis leaders to move troops and supplies toward Pas-de-Calais and away from Normandy. Quicksilver V involved increasing as much activity as possible around Dover to make it seem that a build-up of troops and supplies was occurring in order to launch a successful invasion. And lastly, Quicksilver VI used increased lights at night to make it appear that there was activity occurring around the dummy landing craft created in Quicksilver III. When taken together, the six subprograms helped assure that Normandy was not the center of Axis attention, making D-Day an easier invasion than it otherwise would have been.

### Conclusion

How convincing was Operation Quicksilver? Even after D-Day had happened, Hitler and Axis leaders opted to keep over a dozen divisions (equating to hundreds of troops) behind at Pas-de-Calais in order to protect the region if Normandy was in fact a distraction for the real invasion. Operation Quicksilver had been developed to also convince Axis forces that the anticipated invasion would happen later than expected. The hope was that through this strategy, even if Normandy had been discovered as the actual invasion spot, the timing would have still come as a great surprise.

Many historians have incorrectly claimed that the true deception was the creation of dummy artillery aimed at providing visual cues to Axis aerial photographers. But at the time these events were occurring, German planes were unable to undertake reconnaissance missions over the United Kingdom, meaning they would have never seen the dummy equipment. The deception ran

far deeper and was far more sophisticated than anything that could simply be viewed from above.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Military Deception, Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Ambrose, Stephen. *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
- Beevor, Antony. *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*. New York: Viking, 2009.
- Holderfield, Randal J. and Michael J. Varhola. *D-Day: The Invasion of Normandy, June 6, 1944*. Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing, 2001.
- Tute, Warren, John Costello, and Terry Hughes. *D-Day*. London: Pan Books, 1975.

---

## Othello Effect

A common mistake in lie detection is to interpret signs of nervousness too readily as diagnostic of deception. This misattribution phenomenon is known as the Othello error and is particularly prevalent in lie detection tools that consider stress as indicative of lying. The stress-based approach is problematic and prone to the Othello error, as truth-tellers may also experience stress. Lie detection that departs from the different cognitive states of liars and truth-tellers may be less prone to the Othello effect.

The term *Othello error* was coined by emotion theorist Paul Ekman, who took the name from William Shakespeare's play *Othello, the Moor of Venice* (written c. 1603–04). The play provides an excellent and famous example of misinterpreting nervousness as a signal of deception. Othello falsely accuses his wife Desdemona of having an affair with his lieutenant Cassio. Desdemona denies this charge and asks to summon Cassio, so he can testify to her truthfulness. When Othello tells her that he has already murdered Cassio,

Desdemonia realizes that she cannot prove her innocence and cries out. Othello misinterprets this emotional outburst as evidence for her treachery and kills her too.

The Othello error is a common occurrence in traditional lie detection, which departs from the stress-based approach to lying. This approach assumes that liars will be more concerned and nervous than truth-tellers. This nervousness is expected to shine through in behavioral cues such as gaze aversion, moving around, and increased fidgeting.

The control question polygraph test also departs from the idea that liars' fear of being caught will elicit marked physiological arousal. The problem, however, is that truth-tellers may also be aroused when accused of wrongdoing. Lie detectors can accurately pick up signs of stress but cannot determine the origin of the stress, making them prone to the Othello error.

With a false positive rate in the 16 to 35 percent range, the Control Question polygraph test is vulnerable to the Othello error. With regard to nonverbal lie detection, meta-analyses have shown that signs of nervousness, such as increased fidgeting, moving around, and avoiding eye contact, are not reliable cues to discriminate liars from truth-tellers. However, the belief that these nervous behaviors do correlate with deception is tenacious, not only among lay persons, but also among professional lie catchers. Police manuals, judges, and trainers sometimes advise observers to pay attention to cues that signal nervousness when attempting to detect deceit. The use of such invalid cues helps in understanding why people are bad lie detectors and are prone to the Othello error.

The chance of making the Othello error is especially problematic in high-stake situations, such as the courtroom. Facilitated by high levels of motivation, jurors and judges often get into a mode of tunnel vision, thereby overvaluing information in favor of their first impression of a suspect's trustworthiness and putting too small a price on disconfirming or ambiguous information. As an example, imagine an innocent suspect whose face is instantaneously assessed as being untrustworthy by the judge based on certain physical characteristics. When the suspect later bursts into tears while denying his guilt, it is not unlikely that

his tears will be interpreted by the judge as crocodile tears, in line with his bias.

Several solutions have been proposed to reduce the chance of committing the Othello error. A first solution takes the form of a guideline for observers. Lie detectors should be stimulated to avoid tunnel-vision thinking and to be cautious when interpreting cues that signal nervousness. They should keep in mind alternative explanations that may have evoked the very signs they use to infer deception.

Second, some tests provide safeguards against the Othello error. The concealed information test, for instance, assesses recognition of critical crime details by providing the examinee with the crime detail among a number of equally plausible alternatives (for example, "Was the victim killed with a gun? A knife? A rope? A bat? A screw driver?"). Research confirms that the concealed information test is unlikely to lead to an Othello error.

Third, in the field of verbal and nonverbal lie detection, the cognitive approach on lying has recently been promoted as a way to reduce the impact of the Othello effect. The approach is based on the notion that lying is cognitively more demanding than truth-telling. Observers should therefore pay attention to cues that signal mental effort, such as fewer movements, slower response times, and inconsistencies.

Observers have been shown to better discriminate liars and truth-tellers when they have to indicate how hard the suspects are thinking compared with when they are explicitly asked who is lying. While cognitive cues seem to be more reliable than cues of nervousness, cues are often shallow and small in number. Researchers have therefore suggested increasing the cognitive load, for instance, by asking the interviewees to tell their stories in reverse chronological order. Imposing mental load has shown to improve the observers' classification of liars and truth-tellers. However, one can imagine that such manipulation is also mentally demanding for truth-tellers, and it needs to be established whether imposing cognitive load not only increases the detection of liars but also comes with the cost of increased chance of an Othello error.

In short, falsely accusing innocents can be considered one of the major concerns about lie detection. Yet many lie detection techniques suffer from

high false-positive rates because they assume that signs of stress are solely exhibited by liars. Possible ways to reduce this Othello effect are to be open-minded and consider alternative hypotheses for the nervousness displayed by interviewees, to detect memory instead of lying by assessing the Concealed Information Test, or to depart from a cognitive approach to lying when detecting deceit.

Evelyne Debey  
Ghent University  
Bruno Verschuere  
University of Amsterdam

**See Also:** Cognitive Heuristics; Cognitive Load; Concealed Information Test; Credibility; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Eye Contact; False Signals; Iago (Shakespeare's *Othello*); Linguistic Cues; Memory; Mental Effort in Lying; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph.

### Further Readings

Ekman. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1985.

Harnsberger, James D., Harry Hollien, Camilo A. Martin, and Kevin A. Hollien. "Stress and Deception in Speech: Evaluating Layered Voice Analysis." *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, v.54/3 (2009).

Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, and S. Porter. "Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.11 (2011).

---

## Overconfidence

Overconfidence is an inflated self-assessment of one's knowledge, answer, or estimate on a task. It is a bias in which a person's subjective confidence of performance is greater than his or her actual performance. This is in contrast to calibration, in which subjective confidence matches accuracy or performance.

Overconfidence has been studied in two distinct ways, either as overestimation of knowledge or performance (overestimation), or as excessive certainty that one's estimate or answer is correct

and accurate (overprecision). For example, if a student estimates he or she scored 90 percent on a test but actually scored 75 percent, the student is overconfident through overestimation. With overprecision, a student would create intervals that they are 90 percent confident contain the correct answer, and research with overprecision has found that people create intervals that are too narrow.

Overconfidence is often undesirable because it causes decision makers to underestimate obstacles, to fail to engage in proper preparation and information gathering, or to fail to seek out information contrary to their knowledge. However, overconfidence can be beneficial for increasing persistence in a course of action in the face of failure or in persuading other people about the accuracy of one's ideas. Generally, overconfidence is seen as a form of self-deception or illusion that people sincerely believe, but in certain cases confidence can be strategically and deceptively inflated.

One traditional way of studying overconfidence in the laboratory is by having people answer general knowledge questions (for example, what was Martin Luther King, Jr.'s age at death?) and providing a range that they are 90 percent confident contains the correct answer (overprecision), or providing a confidence assessment that their answer is correct (overestimation). People's confidence is usually only weakly related to accuracy. Other research has assessed overconfidence in students' rating their academic performance; workers' assessment of workplace performance; managers' view of their managerial skills; or nurses', physicians', and medical residents' assessment of their skills and knowledge. This research has also found that actual skill and knowledge falls significantly below self-assessment of skills and knowledge. Research on deception detection has assessed judges' confidence in their detection skill compared to their actual accuracy in detecting deception and found that people are generally overconfident.

Overconfidence has several hypothesized causes. One cause is that people lack the knowledge necessary for accurate self-assessment of performance. If someone lacks the knowledge to perform well on a test or if someone is using cues that lack predictive utility on a deception detection task, he or she would also lack the



knowledge to accurately assess their poor performance, something researchers have termed the “double curse of incompetence.” For example, novice card players are less able to distinguish good from bad moves. Another cause is that people have little insight into errors of omission and cannot adjust their confidence accordingly. People over-rely on available evidence and fail to consider evidence or cues that they have missed in their judgment. For example, people may over-rely on only a few cues to deception and ignore valid cues. Further, for some topics or traits, competence is ill-defined, relative, and ambiguous, so that different people could judge competence and knowledge based on different criteria and choose those criteria by which they are more successful. People are often motivated to maintain flattering assessments of themselves and cherry-pick criteria and feedback that portrays them as the most capable and affable.

Some research has found that on easy tasks in which success is expected or on tasks in which individuals are highly skilled, people are actually underconfident. A theory of confidence of regressive estimates helps explain conflicting findings. According to this theory, when people have imperfect self-knowledge about their performance on a task, their estimate of performance is regressive toward the middle of a distribution of scores. Therefore, for difficult tasks people will overestimate their performance upward and display overconfidence, but on easy tasks people will underestimate their performance downward and display underconfidence.

Detecting deception is especially prone to overconfidence because it is a very difficult task in which people generally perform only slightly better than chance. Further, because there are many cues that people can use to detect truth and deception, people tend to over-rely on a small subset of cues that may or may not have any predictive utility, and they then fail to consider cues they have omitted from consideration.

Overconfidence can result in many negative outcomes. Research in the field of health has found that people who are unrealistically optimistic and confident about their health and future outcomes are less likely to take measures to minimize health risks (such as using seat belts or condoms). Overconfident students overestimate their level of

comprehension after reading a text, and as the “double curse of incompetence” would suggest, the poorest students are often the least calibrated about their comprehension of material. Research into the effects of overconfidence on chief executive officers (CEOs) found that predictors of CEO overconfidence (media praise, past success, high power in comparison to other executives) were related to poor stock performance.

Overconfidence has been implicated in many famous decision failures. For example, during the 1996 ill-fated Mount Everest expedition detailed in Jon Krakauer’s *Into Thin Air* (1999), the expedition leaders minimized the risks of climbing Mount Everest, recklessly violated their own safety rules, and failed to prepare for potential obstacles and setbacks caused by a storm. The 2009 British Petroleum (BP) oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico was preceded by minimization of potential hazards and negligence of safety standards by overconfident BP executives.

Overconfidence can be beneficial. Overconfident entrepreneurs work harder during the initial start of their business. Overconfident advisors are more likely to have their advice accepted. Overconfidence can also contribute to positive self-esteem.

There are many solutions to combatting overconfidence. One solution for student overconfidence is to expose students to especially difficult scenarios or obstacles that can reveal gaps in their knowledge and skills. Research in the workplace has stressed the importance of rating systems and providing feedback, especially from outsiders not involved in the project. For repeated decisions, procedures and routines can be put in place that help combat the destructive effects of individual overconfidence.

The study of overconfidence is part of a larger body of research on positivity illusions that has found that people generally perceive themselves and their future prospects more optimistically and positively than may be reasonable by statistical chance or reality.

Lyn M. Van Swol  
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Exaggeration; Self-Deception; Source Credibility.

**Further Readings**

- Blanton, Hart, Brett W. Pelham, Tracy DeHart, and Mauricio Carvallo. "Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, v.37/5 (2001).
- DePaulo, D. M., K. Charlton, H. Cooper, J. J. Lindsay, and L. Muhlenbruck. "The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.1 (1997).
- Dunning, D., C. Heath, and J. Suls. "Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace." *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, v.5 (2004).
- Klayman, J., J. B. Soll, C. Gonzalez-Vallejo, and S. Barlas. "Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.79 (1999).
- Moore, D. A. and P. J. Healy. "The Trouble With Overconfidence." *Psychological Review*, v.115 (2008).
- Russo, J. E. and P. J. H. Schoemaker. "Managing Overconfidence." *Sloan Management Review*, v.33 (1992).
- Snizek, J.A. and L. Van Swol. "Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a Judge Advisor System." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.84 (2001).



# P

## Paltering

A lie involves three components: intent, literal meaning, and effect. A liar (1) presents factually incorrect information with the intent to deceive, (2) communicates information that is literally untrue, and (3) produces the effect of having the listener believe that the false information is true. Conversely, if these three components are missing in a communication, the statement would be considered truthful.

Many communications, however, fall somewhere between outright lying and truth-telling. In these communications, an element of full-blown lying is missing, as is an element of truth-telling. For example, if the intent component of a lie is missing, the speaker would be communicating a false statement he or she believes to be true. While such communications may be viewed as reckless or negligent (for example, former president George W. Bush's claim of Saddam Hussein's nuclear arsenal), because they lack the element of intent they would likely not be viewed as lying or fraudulent. Within a legal context, when intent to deceive is absent, lying or fraud is missing as well.

In another set of communications, the first and third components of lying (that is, intent and achieved deception) are present, while the second component (that is, the literal untruth of the communication) is relaxed. These communications

bend, stretch, shade, slant, and distort the truth. However, they manage to fall short of outright lying. These insincere, misleading, and deceptive communications have been referred to as "palters," and their use has been called "paltering."

The goal of the palterer and the liar is exactly the same: to mislead or deceive the listener. However, the palterer's communication, unlike that of the liar, falls short of a literal falsehood or untruth. The palterer's message typically contains a "grain of truth," which keeps it short of a full-blown lie. For example, an aspiring actress was hired as an extra in a crowd scene of a major motion picture. Subsequently, she posted on her resume that she had acted in this movie with Robert DeNiro, the film's star. While her statement was not a total lie, it was clearly deceptive and designed to exaggerate her acting prominence and perhaps entice other filmmakers to offer her roles.

A former musician tells his friends that he played drums with the famous Tommy Dorsey orchestra and turned down an opportunity to tour with the renowned rock group, Rare Earth. In reality, he sat in with the orchestra for one number while the group's drummer relieved himself, and he was asked to tour with the Sunliners, who years later changed their name to Rare Earth.

There are several varieties of paltering based on what the palterer says or does, or neglects to say or do. Perhaps the most common and least



consequential form is the social or “white palter,” often employed as etiquette or tact. Examples include telling an overweight person their outfits make them look slim, making up a prior commitment to avoid an undesirable social event, and the memorable *Seinfeld* episode in which Jerry and George, after observing a homely infant, exclaim, “Now, that’s a baby!”



*President Bill Clinton kisses First Lady Hillary Clinton in the White House, December 18, 1997. When the story of his earlier affair with Monica Lewinsky broke just one month later, Clinton paltered to the press, stating—with a critical pause—“I did not have sexual relations with that woman . . . Miss Lewinsky.”*

Another form of paltering occurs when people take advantage of the misimpressions of others. For example, an author, a Ph.D., hoping to receive more prompt and professional medical care, failed to correct the misperception of hospital staff that he was an M.D. Other palterers use vague or ambiguous terms to misguide others. For example, the marquis of an Italian restaurant proclaimed, “Voted best on the beach 15 years!” Of course, who voted, best what, and which 15-year period were not specified.

Another variety of paltering involves deliberate actions intended to mislead or deceive others. For example, college professors have been known to make hotel and restaurant reservations as “Dr. So-and-So,” hoping to be seen as more important and affluent than underpaid academics. Some businesses and home owners place surveillance warning stickers around their property, yet have no security cameras or alarm systems on their premises. Around tax time, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sends out press releases, which suggest a highly exaggerated probability of being audited. Other examples include litigation attorneys who mislead juries by discrediting truthful witnesses and the mudslinging campaigns of politicians against their rivals.

While paltering can be as destructive and as costly as outright lying, liars often prefer paltering for several reasons. First, compared to lying, paltering appears less deceptive, and palterers are typically seen as less responsible for their actions. Even if the palterer’s deception is discerned, the recipient is usually reluctant to call the palterer “a dirty liar.” Second, harsh legal and nonlegal social sanctions are rarely applied to paltering. Third, while there may be only one or a few ways to lie, there are often several creative ways to palter. Fourth, there appears to be less guilt and shame associated with paltering than lying. Finally, when palterers are discovered, they can claim to be misunderstood. Compared to liars, palterers have more “wiggle room” in which to defend or justify their statements and actions and escape full blame and responsibility.

Recall, for example, former president Bill Clinton’s infamous proclamation in 1998, “I did not have sexual relations with that woman.” Most agree this statement was designed to mislead the public and the Congress, not to mention his wife

and family. When Clinton's palter was uncovered, however, he attempted to neutralize his guilt by claiming "oral sex" and "sexual relations" were separate and distinct categories. The response to Clinton's palter, while inconvenient and damaging to his reputation, paled in comparison to the sanction for Richard Nixon's outright lie in 1973, "I am not a crook."

Which is worse, lying or paltering? Both the liar and the palterer intend to misguide or deceive others, and both frequently achieve this outcome. The sole difference between these deceivers is that the palterer's falsehood is disguised, obscured, and less literal than that of the liar. Thus, compared with lying, the deception and harm caused by paltering are harder to distinguish and prove. Also, victims of paltering typically blame themselves for being deceived or "taken in" by the palterer and often feel embarrassed for falling for a palterer's clever deception (for example, Orson Welles's *War of the Worlds* radio spoof in 1938). Victims of outright lies, on the other hand, are more likely to be enraged, to fully blame the liar, and to want revenge or compensation (for example, Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme in 2008).

Some have argued that palters (taken in aggregate) are more common than outright lies, cause as much harm as lies, and therefore should be subjected to the same legal and nonlegal social sanctions as lying. Some evidence suggests this is slowly beginning to happen. For example, certain tax, securities, and real estate statutes now sanction various omissions, misrepresentations, and evasions. Overall, however, laws as well as harsh social sanctions remain little used deterrents against paltering.

Thomas M. Kelley  
Wayne State University

**See Also:** Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception Motives; Dishonesty; Half-Truths; Madoff, Bernie; Nixon, Richard; *War of the Worlds*; White Lies.

### Further Readings

Alexander, L. and E. Sherwin. "Deception in Morality and Law." *Law and Philosophy*, v.22 (2003).  
Frankfurt, H. G. *On Bullshit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Schauer F. and R. J. Zeckhauser. "Paltering." John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Faculty Research Working Paper. <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/paltering.pdf> (Accessed June 2013).

Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." *Science*, v.211 (1974).

## Park, Hee Sun

Hee Sun Park is on the faculty of the Media School at Korea University in Seoul, South Korea. She has propounded a number of highly influential ideas related to deception and deception detection, including the veracity effect, the Park-Levine probability model, and ideas regarding how people really detect lies. Her research on deception, in collaboration with Timothy R. Levine, has been funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the National Science Foundation. Besides deception, her research focuses on cross-cultural communication, especially the use of apologies and "thank yous."

Park was born in 1971 in Seoul, South Korea. At age 21 she came to the United States to study English, where she discovered the academic field of human communication. She earned her B.A. from Michigan State University, her master's degree from University of Hawai'i, and her Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 2003. From 2002 to 2013 she was on the faculty at Michigan State University in the Department of Communication. In 2008, she received the prestigious Young Scholar Award from the International Communication Association, and in 2009 she received the Early Career Award from the International Academy of Intercultural Research. In 2013, she was an associate editor of the *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. She is a prolific researcher, having published more than 80 articles in academic journals.

### Veracity Effect

Hee Sun Park's most influential contribution to deception research was her 1999 paper describing the "veracity effect," which is the idea that

because people are typically truth biased, they tend to get truths right more often than lies in deception detection experiments. She developed the idea while taking a class on deception as a graduate student.

Prior to the publication of the paper on the veracity effect, most research looking at deception detection accuracy averaged across truths and lies when calculating accuracy. This research found that people are typically slightly better than chance at distinguishing between truths and lies. The average accuracy in such research is just under 54 percent. That research also found that people are usually truth biased; that is, people guess truths more often than they guess lies.

Park reasoned that because people are more likely to believe than disbelieve (that is, they are truth biased), they would be right about truths more often than about lies. People would be much better than 50/50 recognizing honest messages and below 50/50 recognizing lies. Consequently, the conclusion that people were 54 percent accurate at deception detection was potentially misleading. A more careful conclusion required looking at accuracy for truths and lies separately.

In 1999, teaming up with Timothy R. Levine and Steven McCornack, Park published the findings in a series of four experiments documenting the veracity effect in *Communication Monographs*. Accuracy for truths ranged from 75 percent to 82 percent, while accuracy for lies fell between 31 percent and 39 percent. How often people made correct truth-lie judgments was impacted by the veracity of the message they judged. People most often correctly believed truthful messages, while incorrectly believing lies. Following the publication of the veracity effect study, it has become more common for research to report accuracy for truths and lies separately.

An implication of the veracity effect is that the truth-lie base rate should influence deception detection accuracy. The findings that people are 54 percent accurate at distinguishing truths from lies not only involves averaging across truths and lies but also people judging an equal number of truths and lies. The truth-lie base rate refers to the proportion of messages that are truthful compared to how many are lies in a deception detection task. The logic of the veracity effect predicts that as the proportion of messages

judged becomes increasingly honest, accuracy will increase. In contrast, the more the base rate becomes tilted toward more lies than truths, the lower the accuracy.

Park devised the Park-Levine Probability Model to predict precisely how the truth-lie base rate should influence deception detection accuracy. She came up with the idea while taking a math class during her Ph.D. education and published it in *Communication Monographs* with Timothy R. Levine in 2001. Predicted accuracy is specified by the model to be the product of truth accuracy and the proportion of messages that are true, plus the product of accuracy for lies and the proportion of messages that are lies. This formula predicts a linear relationship between the proportion of messages that are honest and the accuracy with which truths and lies are distinguished. Subsequent research showed that the Park-Levine model predicts the outcomes of deception detection experiments very well.

### **“How People Really Detect Lies”**

Park’s other highly influential idea relates to “How People Really Detect Lies,” a paper she and her colleagues published in 2002. Most social scientific theories of deception are based on the ideas that liars behave differently from honest people, that people detect lies by observing others’ nonverbal behaviors, and that careful attention to the right nonverbal behaviors provides a useful way to detect deception. In almost all deception detection experiments, research subjects are asked to make truth-lie judgments shortly after hearing each potential deceptive message and to do so based on a potential liar’s verbal and nonverbal behaviors.

Park doubted that this is how people detect lies outside the research lab. To make her point, she and her colleagues conducted a very simple research study. Two hundred research subjects were surveyed and asked about a recent situation in which they had discovered a lie. Participants who could recall discovering a lie were asked to describe how it was that they found out that they had been lied to.

The results were striking. As Park had expected, most lies were not detected through the observation of sender nonverbal behavior, and most lies were discovered well after the time the lie was told. Instead, most lies were detected either because the

liar later confessed to lying or because the lie was contradicted by some evidence. Common types of evidence included information from other people, prior knowledge, and physical evidence.

The implications of these findings are that the lie detection tasks performed in deception detection experiments are different in many important ways from how people detect deception outside the lab. In the lab, liars do not confess and verbal content is of less use because statements cannot be fact-checked. In nonresearch deception detection, in contrast, people try to persuade people to tell them the truth, and they use a variety of types of evidence that are not available in the typical experiment.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Deception, Research on; Deception Detection Accuracy; Lying, Prevalence of; Park-Levine Probability Model; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

Levine, T. R., R. K. Kim, H. S. Park, and M. Hughes.

“Deception Detection Accuracy Is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine’s Probability Model.” *Communication Monographs*, v.73/3 (2006).

Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack.

“Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting ‘Veracity Effect.’” *Communication Monographs*, v.66/2 (1999).

Park, H. S. and T. R. Levine. “A Probability Model of Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments.” *Communication Monographs*, v.68/2 (2001).

Park, H. S., T. R. Levine, S. A. McCornack, K. Morrison, and M. Ferrera. “How People Really Detect Lies.” *Communication Monographs*, v.69/2 (2002).

## Park-Levine Probability Model

The Park-Levine Probability Model is a formula showing how deception detection accuracy varies

as a linear function of the truth-lie base rate. The truth-lie base rate has to do with the percentages of truths and lies being judged in a deception detection task, and accuracy is the percent of correct truth-lie discriminations in a deception detection task. Truth bias is also an important consideration. Truth bias refers to the tendency to judge messages as honest regardless of their actual honesty. So long as people are truth-biased, the model predicts that as the messages under scrutiny become proportionally more honest, the accuracy of the judgments increases. Conversely, the model shows that the greater the proportion of lies, the lower the resulting accuracy. If the extent of truth bias and the accuracy for truths and lies are known for one specific base rate, for example 50 percent truths and 50 percent lies, the model can be used to determine what the accuracy would be at a different base rate, for example with 75 percent lies and 25 percent truths.

Specifically, the model predicts that the percentage of accuracy with which truths and lies are correctly discriminated will equal the accuracy for only truths, times the proportion of messages that are truthful, plus the accuracy for lies, times the proportion of messages that are lies. That is,  $\text{accuracy} = (\text{truth accuracy})(\text{truth proportion}) + (\text{lie accuracy})(\text{lie proportion})$ .

As an example, imagine that the overall observed accuracy in a deception detection experiment, in which judges were shown 10 truths and 10 lies, was 55 percent correct. Imagine further that the judges were truth biased and more accurate for truths than lies, getting 75 percent of the truths correct but only 35 percent of the lies right. Because there are an equal number of truths and lies, the truth-lie base rate and the proportion of truths and lies are all 0.50. So, there is an accuracy of  $0.55 = (0.75)(0.50) + (0.35)(0.50)$ .

If the base rate was 90 percent truths and 10 percent lies, the model predicts that accuracy would increase to  $(0.75)(0.90) + (0.35)(0.10) = 0.71$ , or 71 percent. In contrast, if the base rate were 90 percent lies and 10 percent truths, the model holds that accuracy would fall to  $(0.75)(0.10) + (0.35)(0.90) = 0.39$ , or 39 percent accuracy. If 0.71, 0.55, and 0.39 were plotted, each accuracy figure would fall on a straight line.

The model predicts a linear relationship between the proportion of messages that are



honest and deception detection accuracy. The slope of the linear relationship is a function of truth bias. The slope becomes steeper as truth-bias increases. Consequently, the truth-lie base rate makes a bigger difference when truth biases are strong. If judges were lie-biased, the slope would be negative.

Research has strongly supported the utility and predictive power of the Park-Levine model. In a paper published in 1999, Levine and his colleagues showed that people are generally truth-biased, and that accuracy increased linearly as the base rate increased from 75 percent lies to 75 percent truths.

In another study published in 2006, Levine and his colleagues offered a more precise test of the model. Truth and lie accuracies were measured in a control group with 50 percent truths and 50 percent lies. Then an experiment exposed judges to deception detection tasks with a variety of several different base rates ranging from all lies to all truths. Accuracies were observed in the experimental groups and compared to accuracies predicted by the model, using the base rate and the accuracies from the control group. The experiment showed that the Park-Levine-model predictions closely approximated the experimental results. The predicted linear relationship was observed, and all accuracies were predicted to within 2 percentage points. The model has also been supported by several experiments that are as yet unpublished.

The most controversial feature of the model rests on its probabilistic nature. Like most basic probability calculations, it presumes that probabilities are constant over observations and that people are insensitive to base rates. This makes the Park-Levine Probability Model at odds with theories of deception detection that predict that people are sensitive to others' actual honesty and that accuracy is dynamic over time.

The model has important real-world applications. The likelihood of encountering deception changes from situation to situation and person to person. Talking to a close and trusted friend is different from talking to an aggressive salesperson. Listening to the promises of a politician seeking reelection is different from listening to the advice of the family physician. Base rates are not constant, and an equal number of truths and lies occur only inside the research lab. The

Park-Levine Probability Model is useful in showing how deception detection changes from situation to situation.

Lie detection is especially challenging in situations in which lies occur at a low base rate. An example might be catching terrorists boarding airplanes. Because most passengers are not terrorists, most people who are suspected are likely to be innocent. Most people claiming a lack of terroristic intent will be honest. Picking out the few who are not is probabilistically a challenge. So, even though accuracy as a percentage will be high in a low base-rate situation (that is, most people are correctly not suspected of being terrorists), the chances of correctly identifying the isolated liar may be poor.

For researchers, the model is useful because most deception detection experiments employ only one base rate, usually 50/50 truths-lies. If subjects are truth biased, as is typical, the results only apply to the specific base rate. The Park-Levine Probability Model allows researchers to estimate how different base rates might affect the results.

Because people are most often truth biased, because more people tend to be more honest than not, and because most experiments use a 50/50 base rate, the Park-Levine model shows that most deception detection experiments may provide an overly pessimistic view of deception detection accuracy. The 54 percent accuracy finding in the research involves studies using a 50/50 base rate. But, most people do not lie half of the time. So, truth bias may be functional, and experimentally imposed base/rates may be unrealistic. On the other hand, in environments in which lies are highly likely, accuracy may dip below 50 percent

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Deception, Research on; Deception Detection Accuracy; Lying, Prevalence of; Park, Hee Sun; Truth Bias; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

Levine, T. R., R. K. Kim, H. S. Park, and M. Hughes. "Deception Detection Accuracy is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine's Probability Model." *Communication Monographs*, v.73/3 (2006).

- Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66/2 (1999).
- Park, H. S. T. R. Levine. "A Probability Model of Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments." *Communication Monographs*, v.68/2 (2001).

---

## Pathological Lying

Pathological lying, also known as *mythomania* or *pseudologia fantastica*, is an illness or behavior characterized by compulsive or habitual lying. One of the most widely accepted definitions of pathological lying was written in 1915, by W. Healy and M. T. Healy, two psychologists who first attempted to define the disorder and who brought pathological lying to the public eye. They describe pathological lying as having four criteria. First, pathological liars often have no discernible motive or reason to lie. Second, the lying is typically complicated, interwoven into a web of lies with multiple layers. Third, the lying can take place over a long period and usually encompasses several years of extensive lying. And fourth, pathological lying cannot be merely a symptom of another disorder.

Healy and Healy based their conceptualization of pathological liars on patients they encountered, and it is useful to consider one of these patients in the context of this conceptualization of pathological liars. Patient Janet B. was a 19-year-old female and presented all four components. Janet's lying was described as consisting of lies that had no clear reason, including lying about the existence of a man who had saved her life as a child, her purchase of an exorbitantly expensive sewing machine, and her constant reference to various medical illnesses and nervous disorders from which she claimed to suffered.

Janet's lies were incredibly complicated and multifaceted, presented as stories rather than single untruths. She claimed to have a relationship with a man who did not exist, whom she met in a western town where she has never visited, and who died in an accident that never occurred. Janet's parents were able to verify the major falsehoods.

This ground truth is critical in the study of pathological liars because without ground truth it is difficult to diagnose the magnitude of the deception.

To be considered pathological, the lying behaviors must be both long-term and regular, and not simply a reaction to a single event. In Janet's case, her excessive lying began at the age of 12 or 13 and lasted over six years. This duration of deceptive behavior is an important and distinguishing characteristic of pathological lying, although the scientific community has not agreed upon a specific time frame.

### Pathological Lying and Related Disorders

The last requirement, the absence of other disorders, is the most controversial of this conceptualization of pathological liars. If pathological lying is observed in a person with no other known mental disorders, then pathological lying can be classified as a disorder on its own. If individuals with other diseases, such as insanity or malingering, display pathological lying then pathological lying should be perceived as only a symptom of another disorder. Janet B. exemplifies the conception of a pathological liar because she displayed no other signs of mental or physical illnesses.

There are at least two disorders in which pathological lying may reasonably be thought of as a symptom. These two disorders are factitious disorder and borderline personality disorder. Factitious disorder is the intentional production of contrived symptoms for maintaining the role and appearance of a sick person. Borderline personality disorder is often characterized by pathological lying because the individual lies to form new versions of his or her own self-identity. The reason that these two disorders do not independently qualify as pathological lying is that, in the first example, there is a goal of being seen as an invalid. In the example of borderline personality disorder, the individual does not have a clear perception of who he is, so his intention to mislead is not sufficient to qualify as deceptive. Therefore, though factitious disorder and borderline personality disorder may have similar characteristics to pathological lying, they do not overlap, because of the difference in the intentions of the individual.

Besides the case of Janet, other individuals provide evidence that pathological lying is an independent disorder. Pathological lying can be

identified among successful and accomplished individuals who do not have another apparent mental disorder or a history of criminal behavior. For instance, the State of California Commission on Judicial Performance dismissed Judge Patrick Couwenberg because Couwenberg had told numerous lies about his accomplishments, many of which were responsible for earning him his prestigious position. The judge, who was ruled fit in all other capacities except his inability to stop his misrepresentations, had lied about having a master's degree in psychology, serving in Vietnam, as well as many other deceptions, all of which proved to be untrue. The Couwenberg case indicates that even materially successful people may be overcome by a need to lie for no apparent reason.

### Neurological Traits of Pathological Lying

Though people like Janet B. and Judge Couwenberg exist in society, most people are intrinsically truthful. People have a tendency to judge messages as truthful rather than deceptive, independent of whether the statement is true or not, a phenomenon known as the truth bias. Communication would fail if everyone believed that they were always being lied to. It is possible, therefore, that pathological liars may be neurologically different from other people. An examination of the structure of the brain using magnetic resonance imagery (MRI) revealed an important difference between the brains of people deemed to be pathological liars and the brains of "normal" controls.

The individuals who were identified as pathological liars showed an increase in prefrontal white matter compared with controls. White matter is the portion of the brain that consists of axons that provide the mechanism for neural activity. The link between prefrontal white matter and increased capability for deception is the increased cognitive capacity associated with white matter. Though this increased capability to lie does not imply causation, it does signal a relationship between the increased neural activity and increased likelihood of lying.

The link between increased white matter and deception is also supported by the study of the cognitive development of children. Young children from the ages of 3 to 8 are particularly inept at lying or telling any type of falsehood, yet by the time they reach the age of 10 they have become

adept at deception. This increase in the ability to deceive coincides with the human brain reaching adult weight and a marked increase in the absolute volume of white matter.

### Do Pathological Liars Know They Lie?

Perhaps the obvious question one must ask when examining pathological lying is whether or not the patient knows that he is lying. The general consensus is yes, but there are complications. For a pathological liar to have no idea that her statements are false, and to lie to the extent that she does, the patient would have to be completely delusional. Generally, when pathological liars are trapped in a corner and confronted about a lie, they will admit to having exaggerated or been mistaken. However, by this concession they only admitted to lying about one small detail in their web of lies. Psychologists have come to believe that although pathological liars are not delusional and do not truly believe individual lies, they come to accept and believe the overall narratives and personas they have fabricated about themselves.

For people who display symptoms of pathological lying, no panacea exists. Instead, the most recommended line of treatment is psychotherapy. Psychotherapy sessions for pathological liars are usually long term and complex. Often, the goal of the psychotherapy sessions is to weed out the root of the problem by asking the patient to illustrate certain portions of his past. In the case of Janet B., the psychologists were able to ascertain that early sexual experiences coincided with the beginning of her pathological lying. The troubling issue of psychotherapy as a treatment for pathological lying is that there is no verification that what the patient tells the therapist is not just another lie. However, to date, there is no pharmacological treatment for pathological lying, and psychotherapy is believed to be the best approach.

Although the definition of pathological lying may be contested, the rarity of pathological liars is relatively undisputed. In a study examining 1,000 repeat juvenile offenders, less than 1 percent were identified as possible pathological liars. Yet perhaps what fascinates the public about pathological lying, and is responsible for the numerous movies and books on the subject, is what fascinates people with lying in general: pathological liars break the rules that tell individuals to tell

the truth, but they break this rule over and over again, for no apparent reason.

Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Shane Dunau  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Duping Delight; Fantasy and Imagination; Freud, Sigmund; Glass, Stephen; Lies, Types of; Lying, Intentionality of; Lying as Exercise of Power; Manipulation; Narcissism; Psychoanalysis; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Dike, C. C., N. Baranoski, and E. E. Griffith. (January 01, 2005). "Pathological Lying Revisited." *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, v.33/3 (2005).
- Grubin, D. "Commentary: Getting at the Truth About Pathological Lying." *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, v.33/3 (2005).
- Healy, W. and M. T. Healy. *Pathological Lying, Accusation, and Swindling: A Study in Forensic Psychology*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915.
- Wiersma, D. D. "On Pathological Lying." *Character & Personality*, v.2/1 (1933).
- Yang, Y., A. Raine, T. Lencz, S. Bihrlé, L. Lacasse, and P. Colletti. "Prefrontal White Matter in Pathological Liars." *The British Journal of Psychiatry : The Journal of Mental Science*, v.187 (2005).

## Perjury

When someone commits an act of deception while under oath in a legal proceeding, that person can be charged with the crime of perjury. The classification of crime and resulting punishment varies by jurisdiction, but it is usually a felony that carries a fine, a prison sentence, or both. A person may commit perjury in an attempt to protect either himself or someone else or, in the case of a law enforcement official, may be motivated by the desire to secure a conviction. Despite a widespread belief that perjury is common, the crime is difficult to prove because of the strict requirements of evidence, and it is relatively easy to

defend based on such claims as forgetfulness. As a result, only very strong cases tend to be prosecuted, so although there are few cases overall, there is a high rate of conviction.

In early societies, such as the Roman Empire, lying under oath had both moral and religious implications and was treated as a sin rather than a crime. The modern origin of the crime can be traced back to 16th-century England, when the Perjury Statute of 1563 was enacted, making perjury a prosecutable offense. It became part of British common law, a set of legal precedents that are used to decide court cases. The U.S. legal system, including its perjury laws, is based on British common law.

There are two main sections of U.S. law, Chapter 79, Title 18, Sections 1621 and 1623, which contain definitions of perjury. According to these laws, a deceptive statement must contain a number of elements to qualify as perjury. First, as with most definitions of deception, the false statement must be made knowingly with the intent to mislead. This eliminates cases in which the witness made a false statement because of a bad memory or because he was confused by the question. Second, the statement must be unambiguously false. A statement that is misleading, but technically true, is not perjury. Third, the statement must be material. This means that it must be of some importance and have a direct influence on the potential outcome of the related proceeding. A lie that is minor or unrelated to the case would not qualify as perjury.

Fourth, the statement must be made after the witness has sworn under oath to tell the truth. A witness who lies to a police officer has not committed perjury because she is not under oath. Finally, the witness must make the statement either as part of a judicial proceeding or after acknowledging that she is operating under penalty of perjury. This includes written and oral statements in both civil and criminal courtroom proceedings, sworn depositions taken outside of the courtroom, testimonies before legislative bodies, and statements such as income tax returns, which are signed under penalty of perjury. A federal perjury conviction carries a maximum of five years in prison, with a maximum fine of between \$2,000 and \$10,000, depending on the exact charge.



Individual U.S. states and other countries have laws that apply to their own judicial systems; these may be somewhat different from the U.S. laws. For example, New York State Penal Code Article 210 defines three degrees of perjury, ranging in severity from a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail, to a class D felony, punishable by up to seven years in state prison. In Michigan, someone who commits perjury in a capital felony case can receive a life sentence. Canada has a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison. On the opposite end of the spectrum is France, where criminal suspects cannot technically commit perjury because they are not allowed to testify under oath.

There are a number of reasons someone might lie while under oath. The self-interested criminal defendant may perjure himself in an attempt to escape a conviction. A witness may lie under oath in order to protect a friend or family member. For example, the sister of an accused criminal might testify that the defendant was home in bed at the time the crime occurred, when in fact she did not see her brother that night and does not know where he was. Law enforcement officials may testify falsely or even manufacture evidence against a defendant to help obtain a conviction. In a study done on New York City police officers in 2000, more than 75 percent admitted they would be likely to commit perjury in a variety of hypothetical situations. Most of the officers felt they would be morally justified in lying under oath if it meant helping secure a conviction against someone they strongly believed to be guilty.

### **Prosecuting Perjury**

Despite the belief that perjury is common, statistics indicate that prosecutions are rare. Many of the cases that do reach trial, however, result in a conviction. According to U.S. Department of Justice statistics, only 237 cases in the category “perjury, contempt, and intimidation” were tried in federal courts during a 12-month period in 2003–04. This was 0.27 percent of all federal cases tried during that time period. However, almost 80 percent of those cases resulted in conviction.

One reason perjury is not often prosecuted is that proving perjury in a court of law is very difficult because of the standards of evidence that must be met. The prosecution must prove beyond

doubt that the deceptive statement meets all the legal requirements for perjury. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors must also produce at least two independent witnesses to contradict the statement in question or one witness plus additional evidence that the statement was false. If they cannot find two witnesses or additional evidence, perjury can be proved on the basis of the witness himself making two contradictory statements. The prosecution does not have to prove which of the statements was false, just that they were mutually exclusive and met the other qualifying criteria.

Other reasons a perjury charge might not be pursued are related to the type of legal case involved. In civil cases, the government may avoid filing a perjury charge because of the expense relative to the small number of people affected by the outcome of the case. In criminal cases, many of the alleged perjurers have already been convicted of the more serious crime of which they were accused, and the time and expense involved in prosecuting them for the additional perjury offense would not be worthwhile.

There are also many tactics for defending against a perjury charge, so prosecutors are unlikely to pursue a case unless they are confident of success. One common defense strategy is recantation, meaning that the witness testifies to knowingly making a false statement and withdraws that statement. The new testimony must contain a clear admission that the statement was false, and cannot be presented as a request to clarify or provide additional information. If the recantation is done before the case reaches a conclusion (for example, before the jury begins deliberations), and the witness had no reason to believe that his lie was about to be exposed, the prosecution is unlikely to file perjury charges.

Less complicated defense strategies include claims of forgetfulness, of not fully understanding the question, or the “literal truth” defense: acknowledging that the testimony may have been misleading, but it was technically true. It can be very difficult for the prosecution to counteract these defenses and prove that the accused perjurer knew that she was making a false statement.

### **Well-Known Perjury Cases**

A closer examination of famous perjury cases helps illustrate how rigorous the proof of the



*Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius (left) and Alger Hiss of the U.S. State Department (second from left) at the Yalta Conference in Yalta, Soviet Crimea, January 1945. Hiss, a member of the U.S. delegation headed by Stettinius, ostensibly met to coordinate strategy to defeat the Nazis. However, by 1950, Hiss was convicted of perjury by lying to the House Un-American Activities Committee about his affiliation with the Communist Party, allegations backed up by espionage documents provided by communist Whittaker Chambers.*

crime must be. Two well-known cases that resulted in conviction were the case against Detective Mark Fuhrman, a police officer who testified in the 1995 O. J. Simpson murder trial, and the case against Alger Hiss, who was convicted based on testimony he gave when he was on trial for espionage.

During the Simpson trial, Fuhrman testified that he had not used a particular racial slur at any point in the previous 10 years. The prosecution had several witnesses who refuted this statement, plus audio tape of the defendant using the term repeatedly. The trial did not reach the stage of jury deliberations. Faced with the strong evidence against him, Fuhrman made a plea agreement in which he received three years felony probation in lieu of jail time.

The case against Hiss, a former State Department official, resulted in one of the most widely publicized perjury trials in U.S. history. In 1950,

Hiss was convicted of lying to the House Un-American Activities Committee about his affiliation with the Communist Party; specifically, he denied knowing a man named Whittaker Chambers, who had already testified that he was well acquainted with Hiss through the Communist Party. As part of the investigation, Chambers turned over documents that appeared to have originated from Hiss. These documents implicated Hiss as part of an espionage plot with the Soviets. However, because the statute of limitations for the espionage charge had passed, the government chose to prosecute Hiss for perjury. Hiss had two separate perjury trials; the first ended in a mistrial, and the second in a conviction. He was sentenced to the maximum term of five years in federal prison, but he claimed innocence until his death.

It is also instructive to look at famous perjury cases in which the accused party was not

convicted to see how cases can be defended. Two recent well-known cases involved President Bill Clinton and professional baseball player Roger Clemens. In Clinton's case, the perjury allegations were part of independent counsel Kenneth Starr's 1998 report to Congress regarding Clinton's potential impeachment. The report said that Clinton lied under oath when testifying to a grand jury about his relationship with then-White House intern Monica Lewinsky, denying that they had a sexual relationship. Clinton used the literal truth defense, claiming that the way the questions were worded, he had indeed answered truthfully. The perjury charge was eventually rejected by the Senate.

Former Major League baseball pitcher Clemens was charged with perjury for allegedly lying to Congress in 2008 when he testified that he had never used steroids or human growth hormones during his professional career. The case centered on trainer Brian McNamee's claim that he had personally injected Clemens with the drugs. Because prosecutors had only a single contradictory witness, they needed independent evidence that Clemens had knowingly testified falsely, and they were unable to produce this. Clemens's 2011 trial ended in a mistrial, and in 2012, the jury in a second trial acquitted him of the charges.

### Conclusion

An individual can be charged with perjury if he knowingly makes a material false statement while under oath in a legal context. Perjury is a felony under U.S. law, although there can be other classifications at the state level based on the circumstances of the case. Punishment typically involves a prison sentence, a fine, or both. Motives for committing perjury include self-interest, protecting another person and, in the case of law enforcement officials, helping obtain a conviction. Based on available statistics, it appears that perjury is rarely prosecuted, but a large percentage of prosecuted cases result in conviction. Because of the difficulty in proving that a defendant intended to lie under oath, the prosecution must be confident of its case before pursuing it. Looking more closely at examples of famous perjury cases, such as Mark Fuhrman's conviction or former president Clinton's acquittal, helps

illustrate the burden the prosecution faces when trying to prove perjury.

Chantelle Farmer  
Jeffrey Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Alibi; Attorneys; Bankruptcy; Charles II Plot; Clinton, Bill; Espionage and Counterespionage; False Confessions; Justice; Law and Law Enforcement; Neurophysiology; Nixon, Richard; Oaths; Stewart, Martha; Watergate; Witness, False Testimony of.

### Further Readings

- Doyle, Charles. "Perjury Under Federal Law: A Brief Overview." Congressional Research Service Publication No. 98-808 (2010). <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-808.pdf> (Accessed June 2013).
- Foley, Michael Oliver. "Police Perjury: A Factorial Survey." National Institute of Justice Research Report (2000). <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/181241.pdf> (Accessed October 2012).
- Northwestern University. "Perjury: The Forgotten Offense." *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, v.65/3 (1974).
- U.S. Department of Justice. "Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics." (2004). <http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf> (Accessed November 2012).
- U.S. Department of Justice. "Grand Jury Manual, Chapter VIII: Perjury and Obstruction of Justice." (1991). <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/207102.htm> (Accessed October 2012).
- U.S. Department of Justice. "United States Attorneys' Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual, 'Perjury and False Declarations Before Grand Jury or Court—Prosecution Policy.' (Section 9-69.200)." (1997). [http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia\\_reading\\_room/usam/title9/69mcrm.htm](http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/69mcrm.htm) (Accessed October 2012).

---

## Photographs, Altered

Altered photographs have been manipulated, either digitally or manually, in order to change the content of the photographic image. The alteration of photographs has occurred since shortly after



the invention of the permanent photograph in the early 19th century, although its prevalence has increased with the advent of photo manipulation software. An altered, or “doctored,” photograph can be a particularly insidious means of deception because people tend to perceive photographs as highly credible, accurate representations of people and events. The very existence of a photograph of an event, then, can be taken as evidence that the event truly occurred. Photographs are often used as proof that an event occurred, both in the media and in legal settings. Photographs are doctored for many reasons, ranging from achieving political gain to altering one’s physical appearance to editing out minor background details in order to improve the photographic composition. Research on altered photographs has suggested that viewing doctored images can influence peoples’ preferences, attitudes, and even memories of past events.

Photographs have been manipulated since at least 1840. Before the use of computers made photo alteration widespread and easily accessible, alteration techniques involved manipulating the film or prints. Among the more crude methods were painting the print or retouching the negative. Other techniques were more subtle: double exposure involved exposing the film twice to incorporate components of two scenes into the same image, while combination printing involved using two or more negatives to create a single print. Early photographic alteration was done not to mislead viewers but to improve the accuracy of the image, as photographers were frustrated by the technology’s limitations in its depiction of color and lighting.

Altered photographs have been used to deceive viewers for political reasons as early as 1871, when Ernest Eugene Appert doctored photographs of the Paris Commune massacres as propaganda for the Versailles government. Later, many examples originated in the years just prior to World War II. Stalin, Hitler, and Mao Zedong all had photographs of themselves altered by removing high-ranking political rivals (e.g., Trotsky, Goebbels, and Po Ku, respectively) in order to appear as more monolithic leaders. While the practice of altering photographs to influence public attitudes was often found in totalitarian prewar states, it is still used in contemporary politics. For example,

during the 2004 American presidential campaign, in an attempt to portray candidate John Kerry as unpatriotic, a photograph was circulated of Kerry on stage with actress Jane Fonda (who was known for her leftist political leanings) at a rally to protest the Vietnam War. However, Kerry had never attended a rally with Fonda, and it was later discovered that the photograph was a composite of two separate images. In each of these cases, the altered photographs were intended to change perceptions of—and attitudes toward—political leaders and events.

### **Influence of Altered Images**

A growing body of research has begun to investigate just how much influence over people doctored images might hold. Research investigating the effects of altered photographs often involves exposing research subjects to counterfactual images and subsequently asking about their memories for related events. Experiments with doctored photographs have demonstrated that manipulating photos can change subjects’ autobiographical memories, memories for news events, and their attitudes and preferences.

Some research suggests that peoples’ preconceived attitudes can affect how they view an altered photograph. In one study, when subjects saw doctored photographs of political events that never happened, half the time they reported that they remembered the event. Furthermore, they were more likely to say that they remembered the event when it was congruent with their prior attitudes. For example, if an altered photograph reflected poorly on a Republican politician, Democrats were more likely to say that they remembered the event, and vice versa. This finding is supported by research that suggests that events are more likely to be remembered if they are easy to imagine or in line with a person’s expectations.

Research has also investigated how doctored photographs might influence viewers. If political leaders can alter photos of events in order to deceive the public about details of those events, it is important to understand the effects that these altered photographs might have. Research using famous photographs of protests has demonstrated that when people are shown a novel doctored version, they often report recognizing it,



even though they haven't seen that version before. These doctored photographs can cause people to remember events differently (e.g., more positively or negatively), and consequently affect their attitudes about the events. Moreover, doctored photographs can change how people plan to behave in the future. When subjects were shown a photograph of a peaceful protest altered to make the event appear violent, they reported that they would be less likely to participate in protests in the future. This finding suggests that doctored photographs may be able to influence behavior, in addition to memories and attitudes.

### Participating in a Lie

In addition, experiments have shown that people can be influenced by doctored photographs of themselves. Research on product preferences has suggested that when photographs are altered to show subjects using a particular brand of product, they later prefer that brand to alternatives and even express a greater likelihood of purchasing that brand. Experimenters studying false memories—memories for events that never occurred or details that are incorrect—have shown that altered photographs can even alter a person's autobiographical memories. In one study, when researchers doctored childhood photographs of subjects to depict them in scenarios that they never experienced, 50 percent of the subjects developed false memories of those scenarios. Subjects can also develop false memories from doctored video footage of themselves, even when the footage depicts events that happened only a few days earlier.

People can be deceived by altered photographs in different contexts, such as politics, advertising, and their autobiographical memories. With the advent of image editing software, altering photographs has become even more accessible and commonplace. While altered photographs carry a serious potential to influence people, the ability to create them also provides less sinister opportunities for deception. Photographers can remove extraneous details crowding their photographs; people can view younger, more slender versions of themselves; and graphic designers can craft creative advertisements. In the modern era, because of the ubiquity of altered photographs, people are becoming accustomed

to them. However, the creation of such images represents a lie.

Kevin J. Cochran

Lawrence Patihis

Steven J. Frenda

Tayopa Mogilner

*University of California, Irvine*

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Authoritarian States; Caveat Emptor; Computer-Generated Images; Conspiracies; Cottingley Fairies; Deception and Technology; False Memories; Government Propaganda; Historical Narratives, False; Hitler, Adolf; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Memory; *New York Sun's* Moon Series; News Media: Internet; Spin, Political; Stalin, Josef; UFOs; Urban Legends; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Ahn, Sun Joo and Jeremy Bailenson. "Self-Endorsing Versus Other-Endorsing in Virtual Environments." *Journal of Advertising*, v.40/2 (2011).
- Frenda, Steven, Eric Knowles, William Saletan, and Elizabeth Loftus. "False Memories of Fabricated Political Events." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, v.49/2 (2013).
- Nash, Robert, Kimberley Wade, and Stephen Lindsay. "Digitally Manipulating Memory: Effects of Doctored Videos and Imagination in Distorting Beliefs and Memories." *Memory & Cognition*, v.37/4 (2009).
- Sacchi, Dario, Franca Agnoli, and Elizabeth Loftus. "Changing History: Doctored Photographs Affect Memory for Past Public Events." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.21/8 (2007).
- Wade, Kimberley, Maryanne Garry, J. Don Read, and Stephen Lindsay. "A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Lies: Using False Photographs to Create False Childhood Memories." *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, v.9/3 (2002).

## Piltdown Man

The Piltdown Man, one of the biggest scientific frauds of the 20th century, demonstrates that everyone, even so-called experts, can be gullible.

On December 18, 1912, Charles Dawson presented hominid bone fragments he had discovered in a gravel yard near Piltdown, East Sussex, England, to the Geological Society of London. Dawson and his partner, Arthur Smith Woodward, keeper of the geological department at the British Museum, maintained the reconstructed fragments (skull, jawbone, and teeth) indicated the Piltdown Man was most likely the missing link between apes and humans. Thus began a notorious hoax that lasted for over 40 years. Why did most scientists of the day blindly accept the fraudulent findings when more scientifically credible missing links were ignored? Who perpetrated this blatant fraud? How was the scientific community deceived for so long?

Although some (mostly American and European) scientists soon questioned Dawson's findings, they were ignored or vigorously attacked. Why? British national pride definitely played a role. How could anyone question evidence that proved what every British citizen knew in his heart: of course Britain was the origin of modern man and civilization. Moreover, scientists had a working assumption that the missing link would have evolved mentally first, thus having a human-like brain with other features remaining ape-like.

When Dawson presented bone fragments suggesting a human-like skull and an ape-like jaw, many scientists were overjoyed that their hypothesis was correct (a clear example of confirmation bias—the tendency to favor information confirming existing beliefs.) Scientists who questioned the authenticity of the Piltdown Man discoveries were silenced two years later, when Dawson conveniently found new Piltdown Man fragments just two miles away from the original site. It would be too much of a coincidence to find this combination of fragments together twice; they must belong together.

Why did it take over 40 years (and over 500 scientific essays on Piltdown Man) for someone to look for evidence of fraud? Dawson was well known in the field. Though he was an amateur archaeologist, he made many significant finds, including a previously unknown species of mammal, three new dinosaur species, and a new form of fossil plant, and several of his discoveries were named after him (*Plagiaulax dawsoni*, *Iguanodon dawsoni*, and *Salaginella dawsoni*). For these

finds, the British Museum named him an honorary collector, and he was elected a fellow of both the Geological Society of London and the Society of Antiquaries of London. Because Dawson was perceived as distinguished and reputable, he seemed a credible expert source whose findings must be correct.

It's interesting to note that in 1891, a Dutch paleoanthropologist and geologist found authentic remains in Java of an ape-man with a small brain that stood erect (*Homo erectus*.) Even though his facts were meticulously logged and documented, and he carefully verified his results, the scientific community ignored and ridiculed him. He had the misfortune to be an unknown, unconnected foreigner (of suspect credibility) who discovered something contradicting prevailing theories. (Yet another sad example of confirmation bias.)

Even in 1949, when a new flourine dating test revealed the age of the Piltdown artifacts as relatively recent rather than ancient fossils, it still didn't occur to anyone that something associated with Dawson could be a fabrication. Not until 1953, when Piltdown Man did not match with accumulating missing-link fossils discovered over the years, did someone examine the artifacts for deliberate fraud. J. S. Wiener was amazed at the strikingly clear indicators of fraud: There was obvious evidence that the teeth had been filed down. Later tests indicated that skull fragments were from medieval humans, the jawbone was from an orangutan, and the canine tooth was from a chimpanzee fossil. Bones were treated with an iron and acid solution, making them appear ancient, and the canine tooth was painted and patched with chewing gum.

Who perpetuated this flagrant fraud? Dawson must have been involved. Between 1912 and 1916, scientific challenges were remarkably answered with his new "finds," and no new discoveries occurred after his death. However, in 2003, Miles Russell identified at least 38 specimens of Dawson's antiquarian collection as clear fakes, noting that Dawson's career had been "one built upon deceit, sleight of hand, fraud and deception, the ultimate gain being international recognition."

Many believe Arthur Woodward must have been involved in the hoax, as well as a few others who tended to gloss over facts as they vigorously supported their fellow Englishmen. A trunk

found in the Natural History Museum in 1970 containing animal bones and teeth carved and stained in a manner similar to the Piltdown finds throws suspicion on yet another British scientist, Martin Hinton.

But perhaps the most amusing theory has Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (of Sherlock Holmes fame) as a possible instigator. Evidently Conan Doyle lived very close to the Piltdown site and participated in some of the digs. Some speculate that Conan Doyle had a grudge against the scientific community for persecuting and discrediting a favorite psychic, so he filled the gravel yards with fake artifacts to make scientists look ridiculous. If so, he waited 40 years for satisfaction.

Whoever the perpetrators, the surprisingly long life of the hoax is the true lesson, for it reveals how people's biases and motivations can lead anyone to deceive themselves. Individuals often uncritically accept something supporting what they already believe rather than carefully evaluate all of the evidence.

S. Renee Botton

Deborah Davis

University of Nevada, Reno

**See Also:** Cardiff Giant; Con Man; Credibility; Disbelief, Suspension of; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

Brafman, O. and R. Brafman. *Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior*. New York: Doubleday, 2009.

Russell, M. *The Piltdown Man Hoax: Case Closed*. Stroud, UK: History, 2012.

Weiner, J. S. *The Piltdown Forgery*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

## Pinocchio

Pinocchio is a character in a children's story, originally written in Italian, but later translated into English and further popularized by many movie, television, and stage adaptations, most famously the 1940 Walt Disney movie *Pinocchio*. Although more recent adaptations toned down darker

aspects of the original story, these versions have generally enhanced the message about the dangers of lying and deception and the importance of obedience.

The main character, Pinocchio, is a wooden puppet constructed by woodcarver Geppetto. Throughout the story, Pinocchio gets into a great deal of mischief both as the perpetrator and as the victim of deceit. Pinocchio's nose grows when he tells a lie, an element of the story that has made an enduring impact on popular culture. The story concludes with Pinocchio's selfless behavior, convincing a fairy to grant his wish of becoming a real boy.

*The Adventures of Pinocchio* was written in Italian by Florentine writer Carlo Lorenzini (1826–90), under the pen name of Carlo Collodi. The story was originally serialized in *Il Giornale dei Bambini*, a weekly children's newspaper. It was later published as a novel in 1883. Children's literature was a relatively new genre at the time of Collodi's writing, and the original story contains many elements that might be considered rather dark for a modern children's story. For example, Collodi initially seemed to kill Pinocchio off at the end of the story, with Pinocchio being hanged by assassins as a result of his misdeeds.

When the author was asked to continue the story, Pinocchio was rescued by the fairy with the blue hair (in Walt Disney's adaptation, the Blue Fairy), who became an important character in this portion of the story. It is in this second group of installments that a redemption theme emerges, the very theme that continues to be associated with Pinocchio today. However, in the original installments (Chapters 1 to 15 of the novel), Pinocchio is clever, disobedient, and lazy, and shows little interest in becoming "good." Only in the second installment (Chapters 16 to 36) is there some attempt to have Pinocchio's moral character develop.

In Collodi's story, the backdrop is one of chronic poverty, and death and violence seem to be constant threats. Pinocchio accidentally kills a cricket (who becomes the Jiminy Cricket character in the Disney version of the tale), and it is the ghost of the cricket who later visits Pinocchio. Pinocchio is caught in a weasel trap, and then tied to a doghouse by a farmer. He bites a cat's paw off, is turned into a donkey, and then

is sold to a man who wants to skin him. At one point, the fairy character is presented as a dying young woman.

*The Adventures of Pinocchio* was first translated into English in 1892, and there have since been additional translations. There have also been numerous movie adaptations, television broadcasts, and operas based on Collodi's novel. Some have argued that over the years, Collodi's strong-willed protagonist, who disobeys inconsistent and unjust authority figures, has, through these adaptations, changed. Instead of being actively involved and agentic in his transition from boyhood to adulthood, he has become an innocent, wide-eyed child, who eventually learns to obey his elders.

The 1940 Walt Disney musical animated movie, *Pinocchio*, was instrumental in changing Pinocchio's nature. The movie has been recognized for its breakthroughs in animation and cinematography, its musical score ("When You Wish Upon a Star" won an Oscar for Best Original Song), and its strikingly human cartoon characters. The movie, like Collodi's novel, depicts a dangerous world populated by unsavory characters. Family, however, can be trusted. Disney's Geppetto is loving and kind and had earnestly wished upon a star for a real son, whereas Collodi's Geppetto was loving but initially disliked children and was prone to anger and impatience.

In the Disney version, Pinocchio is not an active agent in creating his own destiny. He is naïve and mischievous but basically good-hearted, and he learns important lessons about truth and bravery from his experiences. Much is made of Pinocchio's nose growing when he lies, a phenomenon that was not a major plot point in Collodi's novel. The cricket character plays a larger role in the Disney version, with Jiminy Cricket agreeing to the Blue Fairy's request that he serve as Pinocchio's conscience. The Blue Fairy, rather than being the complex character of Collodi's story, who is sometimes cruel and sometimes affectionate, becomes a glamorous, sparkling, figure who can magically rescue Pinocchio.

In the Disney version, the Blue Fairy tells Pinocchio that in order to be a real boy, he must demonstrate truthfulness, bravery, and unselfishness. By the end of the story, Pinocchio proves his selflessness by giving up his own life to save Geppetto



*Pinocchio's nose grows when he lies in "Le Avventure di Pinocchio" (1902) by Carlo Collodi, illustrated by Carlo Chiostrì and A. Bongini. Originally a series in a weekly children's paper, a second group installments features a redemption theme, with the puppet being rescued by a fairy and desiring to be good.*

from a whale. The Blue Fairy recognizes Pinocchio's sacrifice and brings him back to life as a real, flesh-and-blood boy. Unlike the end of Collodi's story, in which Pinocchio is taking on adult responsibilities, the Disney version ends with Pinocchio as childlike as ever, restored to Geppetto's gentle, loving protection.

### Conclusion

The "classic" story of Pinocchio, the mischievous little puppet with which people are familiar today, is rather different from the original Italian novel. Collodi's novel drew some criticism that it encouraged disobedience, whereas the modern version has a strong lesson around the importance of obedience, truthfulness, and selflessness. Even those who know very little about Pinocchio today are likely aware that his nose grew whenever he told a



lie, a very minor component of the original story. Whereas the Pinocchio of today is a story with a strong lesson about lying, the original story was far more ambiguous in its morality.

Beth A. Visser  
Trent University Oshawa

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; DePaulo, Bella; Fairy Tales; Fiction; Movies, Lying in.

### Further Readings

Collodi, C. and Geoffrey Brock, trans. *The Adventures of Pinocchio*. New York: New York Review of Books, 2009.

Perella, N. J. "An Essay on Pinocchio. *Italica*, v.63/1 (1986).

Wunderlich, R. "The Tribulations of Pinocchio: How Social Change Can Wreck a Good Story." *Poetics Today*, v.13/1 (1992).

## Plagiarism

Plagiarism refers to taking someone's ideas or words without crediting that person as the original source. Plagiarism scandals have resulted in lawsuits and the revocation of academic titles. Although estimates of the incidence of plagiarism vary widely, there are indications that plagiarism in academic settings has increased, with many blaming the Internet, large class sizes, and the commoditization of degrees for the increase. Institutions and instructors have taken steps to prevent plagiarism, for example, by modifying the structure of assignments and by promoting academic integrity in general.

In the music world, well-known artists, such as the Beach Boys, George Harrison, Michael Bolton, and the Black Eyed Peas, have been sued for copyright infringement in relation to plagiarizing the works of other songwriters. Successful book authors, such as Alex Haley (*Roots*) and Janet Dailey (author of over 100 novels), have been accused of plagiarism, with Dailey settling out of court with fellow romance novelist Nora Roberts. In journalism, Fareed Zakaria, *Newsweek* columnist, *Time* editor-at-large, and political

commentator, was accused of having used material from a fellow journalist's *New Yorker* article, and Boston Globe columnist Mike Barnicle resigned after accusations that he had plagiarized the work of author and comedian George Carlin. These plagiarism scandals highlight the importance of intellectual property rights in contemporary Western culture.

In academia, where plagiarism generally falls under the broad umbrella of academic dishonesty, the ownership of words and ideas is fiercely defended. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, the German minister of defense, resigned from office after it was discovered that he had plagiarized significant portions of his doctoral dissertation. One of the most famous cases, though, was undoubtedly that of Martin Luther King, Jr., a Boston University investigation determined that the civil rights leader had plagiarized portions of his doctoral dissertation but concluded that there was not sufficient reason to posthumously revoke his doctorate.

### Plagiarism by College Undergraduates

However, aside from relatively few high-profile cases of academic misconduct by professors, concern about plagiarism has generally been focused on undergraduate students. In colleges and universities, there is a perception that student plagiarism is on the rise, and research using anonymous self-report measures of academic misconduct have generally confirmed that this is the case. In relation to plagiarism, in particular, one explanation for this perceived increase is the ease of accessing and reproducing information from Internet sources. Some authors have suggested that a generation of students who grew up downloading content from the Internet has difficulty understanding that ideas and words from the Internet have authors and are not fair game to be incorporated into one's own work.

There are several kinds of plagiarism that occur on college campuses. Some students submit essays obtained from "essay mills" or from other students, perhaps doing some minor rewording. Internet sources for essays are abundant, with students able to purchase standard or custom-written essays from these services. Students may submit the work of a friend or relative who has completed a similar assignment in the past. Another version of this form of plagiarism is self-plagiarism—submitting

the same (or a somewhat revised version of the same) essay for multiple courses, without the knowledge or permission of the instructors.

A pervasive form of plagiarism involves copying from Web sites or source texts without quotation marks and/or without citations. This plagiarism often involves copying and pasting from one or more sources, sometimes as part of the note-taking process. Sometimes these sources are cited, but the student fails to make it clear that the work remains in the original source's words or is only marginally paraphrased.

Another form of plagiarism involves collusion between two or more students on individual assignments. Students may work together and, indeed, peer collaboration is often encouraged in college classrooms. However, this same collaboration becomes highly problematic when the work of two or more students bears striking similarity, and it is sometimes unclear, even to the students, where the original ideas and words came from.

Plagiarism can be intentional or unintentional, and instructors and institutions may differ in the extent to which they consider ignorance as a mitigating factor when punishing students who plagiarize. Many cases of plagiarism are not as blatant as the purchase of an essay from a paper mill. Students might be unaware of appropriate citation standards and may genuinely believe that so long as they have moved a few words around from the source text, they have not committed plagiarism. Others have engaged in sloppy copy-and-paste note-taking and lost track of which words were their own and which came directly from source texts.

Furthermore, students and seasoned academics and professionals alike have defended their obvious plagiarism by arguing that it was entirely "accidental," professing astonishment that another's words somehow found their way into what they believed to be their own work. While there is likely some disingenuousness in many of these claims, psychologists describe "cryptomnesia" as a kind of memory bias, in which people genuinely but falsely recall that they themselves were the source of an idea or word string.

### Reasons for Plagiarism

Reasons for engaging in deliberate plagiarism are diverse, but there are some common themes.

Some have pointed to the increasing commoditization of higher education as being associated with students seeing their degrees as products and plagiarizing as the most efficient avenue to goal attainment. Also, students who feel overburdened may plagiarize because they feel they cannot get assignments completed otherwise. Some students claim they do not care for their classes or their instructors and plagiarize out of disrespect for or defiance toward a program of education that seems meaningless and impersonal. A related concern is that with many higher education institutions increasing class sizes in order to adapt to tight budgets, instructors are unable to establish the trusting relationships with students that serve as a deterrent to plagiarism and other forms of academic misconduct. When these factors are combined with a perception that plagiarizing is a relatively low-risk activity that is infrequently detected and/or penalized, plagiarizing can be seen as a reasonable academic strategy.

Some individual and group differences have been observed in plagiarism. For example, international students studying in English-speaking countries have been identified as being at greater risk of plagiarizing than their domestically studying peers. Various explanations have been offered for this risk, including the greater difficulty of writing essays in an unfamiliar language, pressure to succeed in an unfamiliar academic and social context, lack of experience and skills in essay writing, and sometimes a different cultural attitude toward ownership of words and ideas. Students who come from cultures with a greater emphasis on memorization and a lesser priority on critical thinking about source texts might experience discomfort with expressing personal ideas that are critical of the experts.

Some, but not all, research has suggested that academic dishonesty, including plagiarism, is more prevalent among male than female students, and in some disciplines (such as business) more than in others (such as humanities).

Recent personality research has indicated that both self-report academic dishonesty and naturalistic plagiarism (as detected by computer software) are associated with psychopathic personality traits, that is, the tendency to be manipulative, callous, irresponsible, and to have antisocial tendencies. This research has also indicated that

students with higher levels of psychopathic traits are less deterred than other students by the fear of getting caught.

### Detecting and Preventing Plagiarism

Although the Internet has made the commission of plagiarism easier, it has also made the detection of plagiarism easier. Instructors can now easily search for distinctive word strings from student papers. In addition, some institutions use commercial plagiarism detection software (for example, TurnItIn), in which student papers are compared to all other student papers in the database, as well as to Internet content that is publicly accessible (that is, not password protected) using search engines. Thus, many paper-mill essays will not be included in the database unless previously submitted to the data bank by another student.

In order for an institution to be seen as credible in its plagiarism policies, students should be able to feel confident that when plagiarism has been committed it will be addressed in a fair and systematic fashion. Students accused of plagiarism should be part of the investigation and provided with the opportunity to challenge evidence presented. For first-time and relatively minor infractions, some institutions take a purely educational approach, with escalating consequences for repeat offenders and larger-scale plagiarism.

Although the detection of plagiarism as well as a fair, consistent, and transparent approach to disciplining students who plagiarize are important, there are also educational practices that can be useful in the prevention of plagiarism. One such practice is to change assignments every time a course is taught, so that students are not tempted by having access to the work of previous students who were presented with the same selection of case studies or essay topics. Assignments can also be created in such a way that they call upon students' integrative abilities (for example, compare and contrast how two models of child development would explain the behavior of a character in a novel) and are unlikely to be readily available on the Internet or from other students. Another option is to have progressive "check-in" points in order to ensure that students are working in advance toward a final product, thus avoiding plagiarism that results from last-minute panic.

In order to foster a culture of academic honesty, many colleges and universities have introduced honor codes. Honor codes can take different forms, but in general, students commit to uphold their institution's values around academic integrity. Some institutions and/or instructors require students to submit a signed commitment to academic integrity with every written assignment, whereas others have students make a global commitment, generally in their first year of studies. In general, the honor code approach seems to be effective in reducing plagiarism and other kinds of academic misconduct, particularly when the institution's definition of academic integrity is very clear, as is the importance of this shared value.

### Conclusion

Although there is some evidence that plagiarism is on the rise, there is much that can be done to prevent plagiarism, including clearly communicating definitions of plagiarism, using a thoughtful approach to creating assignments, establishing an institutional culture of academic honesty, and providing a transparent process for disciplining those who plagiarize.

Beth A. Visser

*Trent University Oshawa*

**See Also:** Academia; Adolescence, Lying in; Blair, Jayson; Book of Mormon; Cheating; Computer-Generated Images; Forgery, Art; Gossip; Historical Narratives, False; Honesty; Memoirs; News Media: Internet; News Media: Print; Photographs, Altered; Stylometry.

### Further Readings

- Ashworth, P., P. Bannister, and P. Thorne. "Guilty in Whose Eyes? University Students' Perceptions of Cheating and Plagiarism in Academic Work and Assessment." *Studies in Higher Education*, v.22 (1997).
- Blum, S. D. *My Word! Plagiarism and College Culture*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
- Carroll, J. and J. Appleton. "Plagiarism: A Good Practice Guide." Learning and Teaching Briefing Papers Series, Oxford Brookes University, 2001. <http://www.plagiarismadvice.org/resources/institutional-approaches/item/carroll-goodpractice-2> (Accessed June 2013).

Park, C. “In Other (People’s) Words: Plagiarism by University Students—Literature and Lessons.” *Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education*, v.28 (2003).

Williams, K. M., C. Nathanson, and D. L. Paulhus. “Identifying and Profiling Scholastic Cheaters: Their Personality, Cognitive Ability, and Motivation.” *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, v.16 (2010).

## Plants

In 1793, researchers discovered that some plants offer no reward to their pollinators, relying instead on deception for pollination. Deceptive plants possess traits that signal rewards they do not offer, such as food, mating opportunities, refuge, and oviposition sites. An exception is plants that do not falsely offer rewards but elicit a territorial response in certain insects. Pollinators can learn to discriminate between rewarding and deceptive plants, but plants resist this learned avoidance by exhibiting significant variation in traits.

### Plant Deception

Angiosperms, commonly referred to as flowering plants, are the most diverse group of land plants, with over 350,000 species occupying nearly every habitat on Earth. Roughly 7,500 are pollinated through deceit and, of these, approximately 6,500 are in the orchid family (*Orchidaceae*). Although deceptive flowers suffer reduced pollination success compared with rewarding species, deception remains common, and recent phylogenetic evidence has suggested that deception may even be ancestral in orchids or have evolved early in their history. One hypothesis to explain the evolution and maintenance of deception in plants is that they are able to utilize the resources that would be allocated for nectar production in other aspects of their survival, such as overall growth. Another more empirically well-supported hypothesis is that their deception encourages cross-pollination.

Increasing the likelihood of cross-pollination is beneficial because self-pollination has a negative impact on fitness and can cause reduced genetic variation or even inbreeding depression. Orchids

are especially susceptible to losing reproductive opportunities because their pollen is typically packed into masses called pollinia, which can be removed by a pollinator in a single visit, thus rendering self-pollination problematic. This might explain why deception is so prominent in orchids; nearly one-third of orchids offer no rewards.

Although it has not been well established, it is assumed that pollinators’ visits to deceptive flowers will be brief and few. Whereas pollinators typically visit many flowers on the same rewarding plant, they are less likely to investigate multiple flowers on a deceptive plant, reducing the likelihood of pollinator-mediated self-pollination.

These nonrewarding plants most commonly use food deception by resembling rewarding species either generally or specifically. Another relatively common method is sexual deception, a system in which plants mimic the females of pollinator species in order to attract males. Other forms of deception present in some species are less common and have received less empirical support. They include the use of brood-site or shelter imitation, in which plants attract pollinators seeking oviposition sites or refuge; “pseudoantagonism,” in which plants exploit the territorial behavior of some pollinator species; and “rendezvous attraction,” in which plants resemble and grow near rewarding plants, and are pollinated by males searching the flowers for foraging females.

### Food Deception

The vast majority of deceptive plants engage in food deception to attract pollinators. Some species in the arum (*Araceae*) and birthwort (*Aristolochiaceae*) families, among others, exploit carrion flies and beetles looking for food by resembling carrion. Some plants that have male and female flowers deceive pollinators because the male flowers offer rewards and the female flowers do not. Examples of this can be found in the palm (*Areaceae*), aster (*Asteraceae*), and gourd (*Cucurbitaceae*) families. However, most plants utilize what is known as “generalized food deception,” resembling the general features of a rewarding flower without a specific model.

Generalized food-deceptive plants may use showy inflorescences, floral colors, scents, nectar guides, and spurs (appendages that typically contain nectar in rewarding plants) to attract





The *Amorphophallus konjac*, or devil's tongue, engages in food deception by smelling like rotting carrion. This odor is irresistible to carrion-feeding insects, which are tricked by into visiting the flowers (and therefore transporting pollen) under the illusion that it is a promising place to obtain food or lay eggs.

pollinators. Food-deceptive plants also tend to flower early in the spring, exploiting pollinators that are just emerging from hibernation and are naively investigating all flowers in search of food. A potential explanation for the development of generalized food deception is that pollinators have pre-existing sensory biases for certain traits, and plants that possess these traits are favored during selection.

Visual signals appear to be the most important floral cues for food-deceptive species. For example, various insects are known to be attracted to contrasting colors, the color yellow, and ultraviolet wavelengths, all of which are common in food frauds. Also, bumblebees show a preference

for flowers of similar color to one that they have just successfully foraged on and seem to generally prefer violet.

Another potential reason for the success of generalized food frauds, known as the magnet species hypothesis, is that deceptive plants may benefit from growing near rewarding species, even if they do not resemble them, because of the increased number of pollinators that will be attracted to the area. However, they must rely on generalized pollinators: ones that will visit any flower. On the other hand, some insects form reliable associations with certain plants, and for deceptive species to be pollinated, they need to accurately mimic those rewarding plants.

### Plant Mimicry

In order for even a close resemblance to be considered mimicry there are a number of requirements which must be satisfied: (1) the mimic and model must overlap in distribution and interact with the same receivers, (2) the mimic should be less abundant than the model within the same area, (3) the mimic should have higher reproductive success in the presence of the model than in its absence, and (4) the mimic must resemble the model closely enough that the receiver is unable to discriminate between them. Plants that meet these requirements are known as Batesian mimics.

Commonly, the term *Batesian mimic* refers to a palatable species that closely resembles an unpalatable model, so that a mimic benefits when a predator mistakes it for the model. Botanists have argued that this term is equally applicable to mimicry in plants because the driving processes are the same: plant mimics benefit (that is, are more likely to be pollinated) if receivers mistake them for the rewarding model. Batesian mimics, overall less common than generalized food-deceptive plants, are especially rare outside *Orchidaceae*, but some are present in the dogbone (*Apocynaceae*), begonia (*Begoniaceae*), and buttercup (*Ranunculaceae*) families. The most prominent mimics, however, are *Disa ferruginea* and *D. pulchra* in the orchid family.

Visual signals in food-deceptive plants appear to be essential for Batesian mimicry. However, olfactory signals appear less important. Research has revealed that many mimics produce only a weak odor or none at all. They may rely on the

scent produced by surrounding flowers to attract pollinators. If imperfect mimicry, such as that seen in plants that do not produce an odor, is adequate for successful fertilization, the benefits of perfecting the resemblance do not outweigh the costs. Additionally, studies have shown that some bees prefer the odor of imperfect mimics, perhaps attracted to uncommon signals. Despite any imperfections, there is evidence that plant mimics resemble their models so closely that pollinators cannot distinguish between them.

### Sexual and Other Forms of Deception

While Batesian mimicry is rare within food-deceptive plants, it is well documented in sexually deceptive orchids. In sexually deceptive systems, the female of the pollinator species is the model, the males are the target receivers, and pollination of the plants occurs during precopulatory routines or pseudocopulation performed by the pollinator. Pollination by sexual deception was first discovered in the early 1900s by two independent researchers and has, to date, been conclusively reported only in *Orchidaceae*.

Orchids utilize olfactory, visual, and tactile cues to attract male pollinators: Olfactory cues are likely the most important and are useful in long-distance attraction, but visual and tactile cues are essential for promoting pseudocopulation once the male has gotten close. Mating signals, specifically sex pheromones, are thought to be among the most species-specific signals in the insect world, pressuring orchids to specialize in the precise mimicry of one or few species. Electrophysiological tools used in conjunction with analytical chemistry allowed researchers to separate the odor compounds produced by the orchids to determine which compounds elicited behavioral reactions in the pollinators—and revealed that orchids rose to the challenge, producing chemicals identical to the sex pheromones produced by the females. Similarly, although the colors of orchids compared to the female insects look different to people, they look identical within the insect visual system.

Typically, sexually deceptive plants are pollinated by solitary male wasps, although other pollinators have been reported. Solitary male wasps are generally attracted by airborne signals, search intensely for females, respond quickly

to sex signals, mate vigorously, and are polygynous—all factors which increase the likelihood that a male will pollinate an orchid through pseudocopulation. Some plants, like the orchid *Chiloglottis trapeziformis*, capitalize on the preferences of their primary pollinator. In this instance, the males of the targeted thymine wasp species prefer females of larger body size, which produce greater amounts of scent. *Chiloglottis trapeziformis* has flowers that are larger than the body size of the female wasps and produces up to 100 times more chemical signals than the females.

In addition to food and sexual deception, other types of deception are also seen among plants, but are less common and have received less experimental support. Some species within *Orchidaceae*, *Aristolochiaceae*, and *Araceae* employ brood-site imitation to attract pollinators through a general resemblance to desirable oviposition sites, such as carrion or manure. Some flowers utilize shelter imitation with floral tubes, which attract pollinators seeking refuge from rain or cold; however, because these tubes are likely to actually provide shelter, this may not be a deceptive strategy. Some orchids resemble intruders, eliciting territorial behavior, and are pollinated when males attack. This is known as pseudoantagonism and is thought to be extremely rare. A final type of deception, called “rendezvous attraction,” is another strategy exploiting the mate-searching behavior of pollinator males, which typically search flowers for foraging females. Deceptive species that resemble and grow near rewarding plants may be pollinated by these males searching for mates.

### Costs of Plant Deception

Although much research has been done on the types of deception exhibited by plants, there is limited knowledge of the costs incurred by pollinators when they mistake flowers, but it is hypothesized that the only costs for many species are time and energy. Carnivorous plants, which trap and consume deceived insects, are an exception. Another exception is the cost incurred by pollinator males that regularly ejaculate during pseudocopulation, potentially reducing opportunities to copulate with actual females later on.

Some species, such as the thymine wasp targeted by the orchid *Chiloglottis trapeziformis*,

may face even larger costs. The females of this wasp species are wingless, relying on pheromones to attract males for copulation and to carry them to a food source. If the males have learned to avoid an orchid patch after unsuccessful copulatory attempts, the females in the area may never successfully attract a male or, at least, will have to exert more time and energy into signaling. Females can increase their attractiveness by walking away from the patch, but this will cost time and energy as well. But even in species which suffer greater costs, it is unlikely that deception by plants will have a major impact on a population because only a portion of individuals will encounter deceptive flowers and even fewer will fall for the deception.

Despite the costs to the pollinators being minimal, pollinators still learn to avoid deceptive plants. The pollinators of generalized food frauds, for instance, are typically bees and bumblebees, which are known to be accurate and reliable in choosing flowers and quickly learn to discriminate against nonrewarding species. However, nonrewarding plants have a number of ways to prevent avoidance learning in pollinators and to increase the likelihood of fertilization. They can exhibit different degrees of deception, show different degrees of resemblance, and elicit different responses. Many deceptive plants also exhibit color polymorphism, in which two or more different color morphs are present within the same population of a species, making it even more difficult for pollinators to learn to avoid deceptive plants, even of the same species.

### Conclusion

Approximately 7,500 plant species are pollinated through deceit. Deception is most common within *Orchidaceae*, in which roughly one-third of species are deceptive. Generalized food deception, in which nonrewarding plants possess general traits that suggest they offer food rewards, is seen in a wide variety of plants. Specialized mimicry is less common in food-deceptive plants, but has been well documented in sexually deceptive orchids. Other types of deception (brood-site imitation, shelter imitation, pseudoantagonism, and rendezvous attraction) rarely occur and have received less support. The costs to pollinators are believed to be minimal, yet they still demonstrate learned

avoidance. Deceptive plants resist this behavior by showing a remarkable amount of variety in deceptive tactics and physical characteristics. Further research is required into the lesser-known types of deception, the costs to the pollinators, and learned avoidance by insects.

Caitlin Homan  
*University of Portsmouth*

**See Also:** Animals; Butterflies; Darwin, Charles; Evolution and Natural Selection; Insects; Manipulation; Mimicry.

### Further Readings

- Augsburg College. "Amorphophallus Konjac." <http://www.augsburg.edu/aquariums/amorphophallus-konjac> (Accessed August 2013).
- Gaskett, A. C. "Orchid Pollination by Sexual Deception: Pollinator Perspectives." *Biological Reviews*, v.86 (2011).
- Jersáková, J., S. D. Johnson, and A. Jürgens. "Deceptive Behavior in Plants. II. Food Deception by Plants: From Generalized Systems to Specialized Floral Mimicry." In *Plant-Environment Interactions: From Sensory Plant Biology to Active Behavior*, F. Baluska, ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009.
- Jersáková, J., S. D. Johnson, and P. Kindlmann. "Mechanisms and Evolution of Deceptive Pollination in Orchids." *Biological Reviews*, v.81 (2006).
- Schiestl, F. P. "On the Success of a Swindle: Pollination by Deception in Orchids." *Naturwissenschaften*, v.92 (2005).

---

## Plato

Unlike his teacher Socrates, who condemns all lying and deceiving (unless his use of irony is considered deceptive, a conclusion resisted by scholars), and his student Aristotle, who says that all lying is base and blameworthy (although falsely modest self-deprecating lies may be exempt), Plato (429–347 B.C.E.) explicitly endorses lying. In his major ethical and political work, *The Republic* (c. 388–375 B.C.E.), Plato provides an ethical justification for lying to

others: it is justified when it benefits them and/or when it stops them from harming others. Thus Plato defends paternalistic lies and protective lies. Importantly, however, these lies are never lies about (true) reality. Lies about (true) reality can never be justified.

Plato makes a number of distinctions that are critical for an understanding of his position on lies and deception. First, Plato distinguishes between falsehood in the soul and falsehood in words.

A falsehood in the soul is a false belief about (true) reality, which includes ethical reality, held in that part of the soul that rules over the rest of the person, namely, his or her reason. Having a false belief about (true) reality is harmful to that person; hence falsehood in the soul is always “hated.” This is what Plato calls a “true falsehood.” There is never a justification for a true falsehood, not even a true falsehood told to one’s enemies. The lies and deception that Plato endorses in *The Republic* are not true falsehoods.

A falsehood in words is merely a “copy” of a true falsehood. It is not a falsehood about (true) reality. It is possible for a falsehood in words to be “useful,” that is, beneficial, as opposed to harmful. When it is “useful” it is not “hated,” that is, it there is a justification for it. The lies that Plato defends in *The Republic* are falsehoods in words (only).

## Two Kinds of Falsehood

Plato distinguishes between two kinds of falsehood in words: a *myth* and a *lie*. This is the second distinction. People who do not know the truth about the past tell a myth. They create a myth, making “the false as much as possible like the true.” A myth is “useful,” that is, beneficial, and hence is justified. Myths are not intended to be believed and do not aim at a particular truth. They are falsehoods in words that are not lies, and they do not stand in need of the same defense as lies. By contrast, a lie is a falsehood in words in which the tellers know the truth and do intend the falsehood to be believed. Lies therefore stand in need of a defense.

Plato distinguishes between two kinds of lies: a lie that aims at truth and a lie that aims at falsehood. This is the third distinction. A lie that aims at truth is a lie in which people are led to believe something that is true by believing a falsehood,

albeit not a falsehood about (true) reality. The most famous example of a lie that aims at truth is the “noble lie” in Book III of *The Republic*. This is the “needful falsehood” told by the rulers to the citizens that the citizens were born from the womb of the motherland and that the god mixed gold with the souls of some to create the class of rulers (philosophers), mixed silver with the souls of others to create the class of army and police force (auxiliaries), and mixed bronze with the souls of others to create the class of craftspeople and farmers (producers).

Although this is a falsehood about their origins, it is not a falsehood about (true) reality, and it aims at a truth, namely, that people have radically different innate capacities that make them suited for very different occupations in a state. This is a truth that citizens would not believe without being told a lie. Acceptance of this truth will make for a happier state. Hence, the “noble lie” about their origins is told to the citizens for their benefit. It is a paternalistic lie.

Lies that aim at falsehood are “useful as a medicine for averting evil.” Here it is necessary to understand the difference between gods and people. While both gods and people avoid all true falsehood, it is only gods who avoid all falsehood in words and hence avoid all myths and lies. A god knows the past, does not fear any enemy, and does not have friends who are foolish or mad. Hence, it is never “useful” for a god to use falsehood in words. A god never has a reason to create a myth or to tell a lie of any kind.

People do not know the past. Hence, it is “useful” for them to create a myth. People also have enemies who would do them harm, whom they fear. People also have friends who “through madness or some folly . . . undertake to do something evil,” whom they both fear and fear for because they are concerned about their welfare. Lies to enemies or to threatening friends aim at creating a false belief in the enemy or the threatening friend, and not to true belief. However, they do this only in order to avert an evil to the teller, the person lied to, or to others. These lies are not “hated,” that is, they are justified. These lies are protective lies and/or paternalistic lies.

The most famous example of a lie that aims at falsehood is the lie told to the mad friend in Book I. Here Plato argues that if one receives weapons



from a friend in his right mind, who subsequently becomes mad and demands them back, then one would be justified in keeping the weapons from the mad friend and not telling “the whole truth” to the mad friend (such as where the weapons are), in order to prevent him from harming himself, oneself, or others. Although such a lie aims at creating a false belief in the mind of the mad friend, it is not a false belief about (true) reality, and it averts an evil. It is a protective and paternalistic lie.

The most infamous case of a lie that aims at falsehood is the lie about the state’s eugenic practices in Book V, which Plato introduces by saying, “The rulers will need to use a quite considerable amount of falsehood and deception for the benefit of those ruled.” The rulers will arrange marriages amongst the auxiliaries so as to maximize breeding by the best and minimize breeding by the worst. The defective offspring of the former, and all the offspring of the latter, will be kept out of the auxiliary class. This will insure that “the race” of the auxiliaries is “kept pure.”

Some auxiliaries will therefore not have children among the younger generation of auxiliaries. However, the rulers want all of the auxiliaries to look upon all of the younger auxiliaries as their children and want all of the younger auxiliaries to look upon all of the older auxiliaries as their parents. They also want each generation of auxiliaries to look upon each other as siblings. This will create unity in the city because each guardian will “consider everyone he meets as a brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter, or their descendent or forebear.”

This unity and purity of breeding cannot be achieved without lying. The rulers will therefore lie to the auxiliaries that all marriages are decided by lottery and will secretly not bring “the offspring of inferior parents, or any others who may perhaps be born defective,” to the nursery in the city that holds the other auxiliaries’ children. Instead they will conceal them “in a secret and out-of-the-way place.” Because these lies create a unity that benefits the citizens, these lies are also paternalistic lies, told to those who are not, or not yet, rulers.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Aristotle; Authoritarian States; Deception Motives; Government Propaganda; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; Ideology; Lying as Exercise of Power; Morals and Ethics; Myth; Relationships: Sexual; Truth.

### Further Readings

- Brickhouse, T. and N. D. Smith. “Justice and Dishonesty in Plato’s Republic.” *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, v.21 (1983).
- Gill, C. “Plato on Falsehood, Not Fiction.” In *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman, eds. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993.
- Page, C. “The Truth about Lies in Plato’s Republic.” *Ancient Philosophy*, v.11 (1993).
- Plato and R. E. Allen, ed. and trans. *The Republic*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Popper, K. R. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Vol. 1: *The Spell of Plato*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Zembaty, J. S. “Aristotle on Lying.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, v.31 (1993).
- Zembaty, J. S. “Plato’s Republic and Greek Morality on Lying.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, v.26 (1988).

## Plausibility

Plausibility, typically defined as having the quality of appearing believable, persuasive, and valuable, is one of the factors that can help people discriminate truth-tellers from liars. Research has been conducted in 60 interviews to analyze the plausibility of truth-tellers and liars’ stories, and truth-tellers’ statements and answers were found to be more plausible than those of liars. Based on the factor of plausibility, 72 percent of the truth-tellers and 74 percent of the liars were correctly classified. Although there was no difference in the amount of details between truth-tellers’ and liars’ statements, liars’ statements were less plausible than that of truth-tellers.

Contradictions and spontaneous corrections could account for the plausibility of lying to some extent. These two factors could help determine whether or not a statement is plausible. For

example, truth-tellers' statements have fewer contradictions and more spontaneous corrections, which can make their statements sound more plausible. Therefore, plausibility is negatively related with contradictions and positively related with spontaneous corrections.

### A Subjective Cue

People usually depend on plausibility to distinguish lying from truth. However, plausibility is a subjective cue. Different lie detectors might interpret the same lie differently based on the plausibility of that lie. It is hard to draw the line between plausible and implausible. Perhaps the judging of plausibility could be more accurate when other objective factors are considered.

In addition, people not only use plausibility as a factor to determine whether others are lying, but they also use latency, a statement's vagueness and consistency, another party's smiling, as well as postural shifting and grooming to help them discriminate liars from truth-tellers. For example, when people give plausible answers, the hesitations before their answers are longer, and the answer itself is often overly long.

Plausibility of account is a verbal content behavior. Verbal content behaviors are easier to control than nonverbal behaviors. However, plausibility of content is associated with truthful contents most of the time, whereas other verbal content behaviors, such as contradictions and slips of the tongue, are indicators of lying and deception. Therefore, the verbal cues associated with truthfulness are more controllable, and liars can use many verbal content behaviors to create more credible and plausible accounts. Furthermore, liars also believe they are able to present greater plausibility, logical consistency, and response length than others when they try to provide a convincing account.

Especially when there is an opportunity for liars to develop a deceptive response, the planned lie is more plausible than spontaneous lies, and less likely to be detected. Time and opportunity are important for liars. They not only help liars develop a response with more plausible verbal content but also allow liars to inhibit nonverbal behavior cues, because nonverbal cues could be the main factor that distinguish planned lies from spontaneous lies. Planning increases the

effectiveness and plausibility of lies, and makes planned deceptive responses more like spontaneous truthful responses.

A lie must have narrow plausibility to qualify as an assertion. Bald-faced lies do not need to have wide plausibility, which is the credibility relative to one's total evidence. But narrow plausibility is required by all assertions to at least make other people understand. When there is doubt about the plausibility of that assertion, liars might adopt sober tones and serious faces to evince sincerity.

Plausibility is also known as "plausible deniability." The term *plausible deniability* was coined by the Central Intelligence Agency during the John F. Kennedy administration, and was used to explain how information was withheld from high-level supervisors so that they would be shielded from unlawful or dishonest events. Often, plausible deniability is used to describe how instructions are passed down from a superior to an underling. If these instructions become public, then supervisors can deny any involvement. In turn, this lack of proof or connection to the supervisors would make their denials plausible or credible. Often, deniability is associated with politics or spying and can refer to how the actions of one person cannot be connected with the person executing orders. "Plausible deniability" can relate to any behavior that does not leave any evidence of misconduct or cruelty.

Plausible deniability is a legal concept and is defined as a lack of proof to establish an accusation. Evidence varies in criminal and civil cases. Most proof must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Sometimes political officials may deny certain statements or actions, especially when there is circumstantial evidence. Yet, the term *plausible deniability* is typically related to espionage and is intended to hide the truth from the general public.

Narissra Maria Punyanunt-Carter  
Iris Shuang Xia  
Texas Tech University

**See Also:** Credibility; Disbelief, Suspension of; Deception Motives; Espionage and Counterespionage; Kennedy, John F.; Neurophysiology; Nonverbal Cues; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Kraut, R. E. "Verbal and Nonverbal Cues in the Perception of Lying." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.36/4 (1978).
- Lakhani, M. and R. Taylor. "Beliefs About the Cues to Deception in High- and Low-Stake Situations." *Psychology, Crime & Law*, v.9/4 (2010).
- Littlepage, G. E. and M. A. Pineault. "Detection of Deception of Planned and Spontaneous Communications." *Journal of Social Psychology*, v.125/2 (2001).
- Sorensen, R. "Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, v.88 (2007).
- Vrij, A., P. A. Granhag, S. Mann, and S. Leal. "Lying About Flying: The First Experiment to Detect False Intent." *Psychology, Crime & Law*, v.17/7 (2011).

## Poker

Poker is a popular noncooperative, multiplayer card game that involves betting on who has the better set of cards, typically for some economic advantage (for example, money). Optimal strategies for betting are obscured by imperfect information as well as uncertain and random outcomes. Lying and deceiving one's opponents is a fundamental principle practiced by all experienced poker players.

One common strategy poker players use is bluffing or trying to convince other players that one has either a better or worse set of cards than one actually has. Research on the moral permissibility of lying has shown that in certain contexts, like games of poker, people form an implicit social contract that permits lying to one another. Thus in this context, lying is not seen as threatening to one's sense of a moral self or to one's social relationships because it has been sanctioned by others.

### Research on Poker

A large body of research has focused on the probabilities of winning and the timely use of bluffing behavior. Players typically are not rational thinkers, despite previous experiences that should inform their current decisions. More specifically, contrary to learning theory, people tend to bet

more money when they should stay and quit the hand more often when they should continue. Furthermore, based on mathematical models of risk, informed poker players do not raise as frequently as they should, and uninformed players call too frequently. To be successful, players instead should strike a balance between aggressive tactics and restraint, and the optimal strategy is to call a potential bluff half of the time.

Which half, however, is up for debate. Knowing when to bluff, mathematically, is only part of the equation—knowing how to communicate competently with the other players may be equally important. Taking these factors into consideration, computer models have attempted to produce a program that can win against the best human players. To date, however, no advanced model of human intelligence has defeated human players, perhaps because such programs cannot account for idiosyncrasies in verbal and nonverbal communication.

Another body of research is dedicated toward detecting "tells" or leakage behaviors indicating that a player is a lying. Several factors may account for why it is so challenging to determine when someone is bluffing. Poker players may lack certain visible signs of deception because they feel no guilt when lying, due to the social contract permitting them to do so. Alternatively, it may depend on the stakes. Players betting their remaining money have higher stakes and may leak signs of deception; whereas players who are betting lower or inconsequential amounts may not fear losing. Other factors may include the level of expertise of the player, the amount of practice the player has at bluffing, or the initial reaction to the cards dealt.

Some research has examined physiological changes when bluffing in a poker context and has found that measures of stress predicted bluffing behavior 71 percent of the time. Specifically, using variation in skin conductance and voice pitch, the researchers were capable of identifying high-stress situations, which, in turn, predicted bluffing. Methodological idiosyncrasies, such as comparing skin reactivity to a data point after the poker hand is completed and the short duration of speaking (for example, "call" or "hit"), however, preclude this research from more real-time analysis of lie detection in poker.

Individual differences also may be related to lie detection abilities in this context. For example, in one study although people with dysphoria or sub-clinical depression were unable to explicitly identify when professional poker players were bluffing, they disliked the pros more when they were bluffing than when they were not. In other words, they implicitly detected that the other person was not trustworthy. Future research needs to investigate this relationship and other personality factors that could affect lie detection in poker situations.

Despite the sizable literature on deception in poker, little research has examined the psychological factors that are utilized in poker, such as various bluffing contexts or strategies. For instance, is bluffing more advantageous in high- versus low-stakes (for example, all-in versus minimal) betting scenarios? Are people more successful when they try to make their opponents believe they have better cards than they actually have or when they try to convince others that they have worse cards than they actually do?

The majority of research on poker has focused on the probabilities of betting versus bluffing in an attempt to maximize the win-loss ratio, but no model has been designed that can win against a professional player. Some research suggests that detecting bluffing in poker may be function of leakage, physiological reactions, or individual differences.

Kevin Rounding  
Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen's University*

**See Also:** Bluffing; Cheating; Collusion; Consensual Reality; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception, Research on; Eisenhower, Dwight; Games, Children's; Theory of Mind; Transparent Liars.

### Further Readings

- Rapoport, A., I. Erev, E. V. Abraham, and D. E. Olson. "Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, v.69 (1997).
- Siler, K. "Social and Psychological Challenges of Poker." *Journal of Gambling Studies*, v.26 (2010).
- von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953.

## Polygraph

A polygraph, commonly called a lie detector, is literally a device for graphically displaying multiple physiological measures of human arousal simultaneously (for example, blood pressure, heart rate/pulse, the skin's electrical conductance via varying levels of water being present). As such, it provides a window into a participant's physiology during interrogations. Lies can cause physiological reactions (that is, stress) that can be monitored with or without instrumentation. Though much research on polygraphs focuses on whether they are completely accurate in determining whether individuals are lying or not, the most successful applications are as aids in eliciting verbal admissions from suspects, rather than providing indisputable evidence on their own. Rarely admissible as prosecutorial evidence, polygraphs typically are not required by courts because to do so would force individuals to provide evidence against themselves. Polygraphs are, none the less, often used for security checks and as part of the employment process for high-security clearance positions in government, intelligence, and military organizations.

Lies are a specific form of deception and have the potential to cause physiological reactions



A polygraph test is conducted using Limestone Technologies' Paragon Acquisition System. Modern polygraphs use objective computer algorithms to ascertain whether there is a higher possibility that participants are lying, rather than the more subjective judgment of the administrator alone.



(that is, stress) in the liar. The more important to the liar it is to deceive the other person, the more heightened reaction the liar may have to telling the lie. With this said, highly performed, practiced, and planned lies may cause less arousal as the individual becomes used to telling them (the individual may even believe a lie after performing it many times), and spontaneous lies would cause the most stress and arousal.

As such, there are many potential reactions to telling a lie and no universal deceptive reaction, so no single unified method of detecting a lie can exist. However, there are three dimensions of a lie that provide potential deception detection: physiological reaction, observable behaviors that indicate a lack of consistency across nonverbal channels, and the verbal statements an individual makes. Single-cue approaches to detecting deception (for example, pupil dilation) have been shown to be less effective, whereas multimodal-cue approaches are not only more effective but also mirror the natural way humans process social information, providing a more synergistic total picture of an individual's behavior exhibition.

### How the Polygraph Works

First developed at the end of the 19th century, modern polygraphs use objective computer algorithms to ascertain whether there is a high possibility that participants are lying, rather than rely on the more subjective administrator's or polygraphist's judgment alone. As such, the polygraph administrator's position has rightly focused more on eliciting verbal admissions from participants, and the administrator uses the polygraph to better know when to pursue a line of questioning. Thus, the polygraph serves as a technical aid to the administrator.

The typical polygraph interview takes place in rooms specifically designed for polygraph interview purposes; participants are placed into comfortable seats, remove their shoes, and are outfitted with the equipment that attaches them to the polygraph machine or, more recently, the computer (for example, an Axciton computerized polygraph, developed for the National Security Agency in 1991 and constantly updated). The instrument consists of a sensor box and attachments monitoring the volume and rate of

breathing, galvanic skin response, heart rate and strength, and changes in lateral blood pressure. The reactions are displayed on a video monitor and may also be printed out on chart paper. The examination is scored by an algorithm (mathematical formula) developed at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.

Each participant signs a release form indicating that the test is being taken voluntarily. The interview chairs are placed in direct opposition to one another with no barriers so behaviors of the entire body can be noted. The examiner's chair is positioned slightly higher than the examinee's chair so that psychological dominance can be maintained. This increases the stress reactions of the interviewee. The administrator monitors both participants' verbal and nonverbal behaviors (for example, answer delay to and/or repetition of question, arms crossed over chest, closed body position, reduced or lack of eye contact, and speech errors) and the polygraph program's data analysis to ascertain whether following a line of questioning is likely to prove fruitful at detecting deception through aroused suspicion. The more a participant believes in the validity and reliability of the polygraph device to detect deception, the more heightened the participant's stress/arousal reaction to deceptive attempts, thereby assisting the polygraph in detecting deception.

The stress responses manifested on relevant questions are averaged and compared to the "control," or comparison, questions typically asked during an earlier calibration prepolygraph phase of the interview. If there is a consistently greater reactivity to the relevant questions, the person is labeled "deceptive." If there is a consistently greater reactivity to the comparison questions, the person is labeled "truthful."

The polygraph is often viewed as a potential deterrent to dishonest activities, such as stealing, espionage and counterespionage, or lying, especially in positions requiring security clearances in which individuals know they will be subject to a polygraph. The U.S. government, intelligence agencies (for example, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Defense Intelligence Agency), and military positions carrying high-security clearances frequently require successful polygraph interviews.

## Are Polygraphs Legal?

A goal of a polygraph interview is to have participants make verbal statements that reveal guilt, if appropriate. Courts would admit such verbal statements as confessional evidence. However, several legal systems have safeguards preventing individuals from being coerced into testifying against themselves or committing compelled self-incrimination, such as the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, largely in response to historical situations of torture and elicited confessions. Thus, for some countries, any court-ordered polygraph constitutes compelled self-incrimination, in which suspects' own bodies are testifying against them, though this position still allows for voluntary polygraphs to play a role in courts.

As such, few court systems require polygraphs of suspects, and many courts expressly forbid polygraphs as evidence. Further, although polygraph-aided deception detection is substantially higher than unaided human deception detection or chance alone, both false positives (that is, an innocent person being found guilty) and false negatives (that is, a guilty person being found innocent) occur with regularity in polygraph use.

Other lie detectors include functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), vocal stress analysis machines (for example, the MACH series), and more field-friendly tests such as muscle testing, in which the individual's own body is used to determine lies and truth.

Daniel Cochece Davis  
Illinois State University

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Confession; Deception Detection Accuracy; Department of Defense, U.S.; Espionage and Counterespionage; Eye Contact; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Honest Baseline Behaviors; Law and Law Enforcement; Leakage; Lies, Types of; Lying, Difficulty of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Nonverbal Cues; Pathological Lying; *To Tell the Truth*; Torture; Transparent Liars; Vocal Stress Analysis.

## Further Readings

American Psychological Association. "Monitor on Psychology: The Polygraph in Doubt." <http://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug04/polygraph.aspx> Accessed February 2013).

- Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education and Committee on National Statistics. *The Polygraph and Lie Detection*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003.
- Bunn, Geoffrey C. *The Truth Machine: A Social History of the Lie Detector*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
- Carney, Ralph. "SSBI Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI." Defense Security Research Center, 1986. [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA308505](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA308505) (Accessed February 2013).
- Greene, John O., H. Dan O'Hair, Michael J. Cody, and Catherine Yen. "Planning and Control of Behavior During Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.11 (1985).
- Hess, Pamela. "Pentagon's Intelligence Arm Steps Up Lie-Detector Efforts." *Arizona Daily Star* (August 24, 2008).
- Horvath, Frank S. "Verbal and Nonverbal Clues to Truth and Deception During Polygraph Examinations." *Journal of Police Science & Administration*, v.1/2 (1973).
- Lewis, Jerry A. and Michelle Cuppari. "The Polygraph: The Truth Lies Within." *Journal of Psychiatry and Law*, v.37/2 (2009).
- O'Hair, Dan, Michael J. Cody, and Ralph R. Behnke. "Communication Apprehension and Vocal Stress as Indices of Deception." *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, v.49 (1985).
- Reid, John E. and Richard O. Arther. "Behavior Symptoms of Lie Detector Subjects." *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, v.44 (1953).
- "Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation." Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1983. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota/index.html> (Accessed February 2013).

## Primates

Deception is not a uniquely human capacity. Accounts of deception have been documented among many nonhuman primate species, including macaques (monkeys), baboons, gorillas, chimpanzees, and orangutans. Nonhuman primates

tend to exhibit patterns of deception that appear to serve two key evolutionary functions: survival and reproduction. To these ends, primates have also been observed hiding food, bluffing to avoid threat and punishment, and hiding courtship behavior from fellow primates. In other instances, primates have exhibited deception in playful ways that do not directly impact day-to-day survival or reproduction.

Deception in nonhuman primates has also been linked to the size of the brain's neocortex as well as the complexity of their social system. Given the complexity of both the form and function of these acts of apparent deception, deceitful primate behavior has spurred debate about the potential for nonhuman primates to experience consciousness, engage in higher order thought processes, and understand the mental experiences of fellow primates—responses that otherwise appear uniquely human.

Recent research has found that frequency and complexity of deception is strongly related to brain size in nonhuman primates. Particularly, it seems to be the size of the brain's neocortex—relative to the size of the animal—that is linked to deception. The larger the relative neocortex in the primate species, the more that primate species seems to deceive. In primates with very small neocortices relative to their size, such as lemurs and bush babies, there are not many recorded instances of deception. Yet, in primates with larger neocortices, such as gorillas, chimpanzees, baboons, and orangutans, many instances of complex tactical deception have been observed. The neocortex is largest, relative to body size, in humans—the only primate species unarguably known to exhibit intentional deception. These findings, however, do not answer the question regarding whether or not nonhuman primates are consciously using deception.

Nonhuman primate deception has been commonly referred to as tactical deception because it serves the function of actively deceiving others for personal gain, but is not necessarily intentional. It is also not passive, which distinguishes it from other forms of deception such as camouflage. Although tactical deception has been observed in several nonhuman primate species, the existence of intentional deception—which is commonly observed in humans—is still heavily debated. The

following examples of primate deception represent tactical deception, though arguments have been made regarding the intentionality of these actions.

### Food Deception

There are many instances in which a nonhuman primate withholds the truth and/or actively deceives other nonhuman primates as a means of increasing his or her odds of survival. Many different species of monkeys—including some brown capuchins, macaques, and spider monkeys—have been found to keep secret food sources. They also stay away from their secret food sources when more dominant monkeys (that is, the monkeys that always get first access to food) are around so that the dominant monkeys cannot find it. Some capuchins have been known to purposefully point to a location that does not contain food so as to deceive any competitors that would take it. Some will even fake disinterest in a desirable food while others are around to keep them from stealing it.

Similar behaviors have been observed in baboons, gorillas, and chimpanzees as well. When female savannah baboons notice a male baboon eating a food that is not easily obtainable, she will walk up to the male and begin grooming him. Once he becomes more relaxed, she will steal his food and run. When sitting near a dominant male gorilla, female gorillas have been known to eat leaves while secretly gathering fruit (the more desirable food) with their feet.

Jane Goodall had also witnessed similar behaviors during her observations of the chimpanzees in Gombe Stream National Park. If chimpanzees approach a banana while a dominant chimpanzee is around, the dominant chimpanzee will take it from them and eat it. The other chimpanzees can find ways around this though. Goodall observed one chimpanzee that noticed a banana but stayed away from it until the dominant chimpanzee was gone. He then approached, acquired, and ate the banana. Several instances of this type of deceptive hiding behavior have been observed in chimpanzees both in laboratory experiments and the wilderness.

Some chimpanzees will withhold information regarding the location of a food source to all others in their group. Sometimes, when a chimpanzee comes across a single piece of fruit, she

will act as though there is no food around, then calmly grab the food, keeping it hidden in her hand, and continue to walk on all four limbs. When carrying food, chimpanzees will walk on three limbs while holding the food with their fourth, so walking on all four limbs signifies to the others that she does not have any food. Other researchers have observed accounts in which a chimpanzee learns of a food source and then leads the other chimpanzees away from it only to come back later and feast.

These observations may be evidence for consciousness and intentional deception in nonhuman primates; however, skeptics argue that these behaviors could have been learned through trial and error. For instance, if a chimpanzee finds some tasty food and begins eating it in front of the others in her group, she may have the food stolen from her—forcing her to go hungry. When she finds food again in the future, she may realize that revealing possession of this food to the others means she will not get the opportunity to eat it.

### **Other Forms of Tactical Deception**

Tactical deception for survival is not just about hiding food. Orangutans have been found to hold leaves to their mouths to help emit a lower tone of warning calls, along with shaking and throwing sticks and leaves, when they are startled by predators. These actions are performed as a means of making themselves seem much larger than they really are in order to scare away predators and other potential threats.

Male chimpanzees display similar bluffing behaviors when competing for dominance with a bigger, stronger male. In these instances, the bluffing chimpanzee tends to turn his back to his rival and reflexively bare his teeth, which is a sign of fear. He will then use his hand to cover his teeth—sometimes by pressing his lips together—as a way of hiding his fear before he turns back around to confront his enemy. In one instance, primatologist Frans de Waal observed two chimpanzees fighting at the Arnhem Zoo (in Arnhem, the Netherlands). One chimpanzee hid a brick behind his back so that the other chimpanzee would be unaware of it. He then threw the brick as a surprise attack toward the other chimp.

There are also instances in which a nonhuman primate may deceive other nonhuman primates

as a means of increasing his or her probability of reproducing with a desirable mate. Competition for mates can be fiercely violent among male primates. As such, subordinate primates may mate with females in private to avoid danger. In one famous example of deception, a male chimpanzee was observed hiding his erection in the presence of a more dominant male after attempting to mate with a female. By hiding his erection, it is possible that he avoided a violent confrontation.

Young female hamadryas baboons who are supposed to mate with their male troop leader will sometimes sneak away to groom and mate with younger males. Grooming and mating with other males will enrage the troop leader, so these females have found deceptive ways to mate with younger males without their troop leader knowing. They will repeatedly mate with the younger male in a hiding place, while going and checking on the troop leader between matings—sometimes even presenting herself sexually to the leader in, what researchers believe, an attempt to minimize any suspicion from the leader. One researcher observed an instance in which a female positioned herself perfectly behind a large rock so that the leader could see the top of her head and back, but her front and arms were completely hidden. She then proceeded to groom another male while the leader was none the wiser.

There are also instances of nonhuman primate deception that occur to simply avoid punishment. In one instance, researchers observed a young baboon, in an attempt to prevent a physical punishment from his mother, looking intently to the horizon as if an enemy or predator was on its way—fooling his entire troop, including his mother, into frenzy and successfully escaping his punishment. Savannah baboons have been known to emit a predator alarm call when they are being chased by their parents or other dominant adults. Bonnet macaques (monkeys) will also emit alarm calls to prevent punishment or attack from an adult. In these cases, the use of tactical deception tricks the aggressor into thinking there is a predator nearby, which causes the aggressor to stop punishing or attacking the young primate in preparation for a predator attack.

A 2010 report from Nebraska's Omaha Zoo described an orangutan named Fu Manchu that



would use a piece of curved metal to repeatedly pry open the service door of his habitat in order to climb and lounge in the trees outside. Fu Manchu kept this bent piece of metal hidden in his mouth, curving it between his lower teeth and lip like a mouth guard. There is also the famous story of Koko, the gorilla who learned sign language, ripping a sink off the wall. When the researchers asked her who ripped the sink off the wall, Koko blamed her pet kitten.

### Is Deception Intentional?

These anecdotes and experiments on primate deception raise important philosophical questions about language, thinking, and consciousness in nonhuman primates. Intentional deception is commonly understood as normal behaviors that are performed with the intention that they will be misunderstood by an observer and result in positive outcomes for the deceiver (for example, bluffing to avoid threat, sneaking food). These definitions assume that the deceiver is not only aware of his or her actions and the consequences of those actions but also aware of the way those actions might be perceived by an observer. In humans, this perspective taking represents a higher order level of thought that gradually develops over childhood.

Because some primate behaviors appear to mimic human deception, some theorists have suggested that primates who exhibit deceptive behavior may be consciously anticipating the ways other primates will perceive their behavior. That is, primates may be able to deceive others because they possess thinking, an understanding of their own minds, and some understanding of the minds of fellow primates. However, experimental analyses regarding this have found conflicting results.

Although humans intentionally deceive others, behaviorists might argue that thought and intention is not needed to understand or exhibit deceptive behavior. It is possible that some behaviors, though they may seem intentional, were actually learned through trial and error and are thus merely instances of tactical deception. In the case of the male chimpanzee that covered his genitals in the presence of a dominant male, it is possible that on previous occasions he was struck when he was erect around females and learned to cover himself

out of habit. As such, his covering himself was not so much a conscious act but an automatic habit.

### Conclusion

A large body of research has found several instances of tactical deception across many different primate species. Deception among nonhuman primates occurs for different reasons and in different environments, such as increasing one's chances of survival and/or reproduction and preventing punishment. This evidence, however, is not sufficient to support the theory that nonhuman primates have consciousness, engage in higher order thought processes, or understand the mental experiences of fellow primates. Because of this, it can only be said that nonhuman primates are utilizing tactical deception, not intentional deception.

Carey J. Fitzgerald  
Oakland University

James I. Gerhart  
Rush University Medical Center

**See Also:** Animals; Anthropology, Cultural; Birds; Clever Hans; Consciousness; Darwin, Charles; Duchenne Smile; Evolution and Natural Selection; Theory of Mind.

### Further Readings

- Amici, F., J. Call, and F. Aureli. "Variation in Withholding of Information in Three Monkey Species." *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, v.276 (2009).
- Byrne, R. W. and N. Corp. "Neocortex Size Predicts Deception Rate in Primates." *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, v.271 (2004).
- Byrne, R. W. and A. Whiten. "Cognitive Evolution in Primates: Evidence From Tactical Deception." *Man*, v.27 (1992).
- Radiolab. "Animal Minds." <http://www.radiolab.org/2010/jan/11> (Accessed September 2012).
- Smith, D. L. *Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004.
- Smith, E. O. "Deception and Evolutionary Biology." *Cultural Anthropology*, v.2 (1987).
- Towner, S. "Concept of Mind in Non-Human Primates." *Bioscience Horizons*, v.3 (2010).
- Wich, S. A., S. S. U. Atmoko, T. M. Setia, and C. P. van Schaik, eds. *Orangutans: Geographic*

*Variation in Behavioral Ecology and Conservation.*  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Wildlife Direct. "Deliberate Deception in Gorillas?"  
<http://gorillasound.wildlifedirect.org/2010/04/22/deliberate-deception-in-gorillas> (Accessed September 2012).

---

## Probing Effect

The probing effect is the finding within deception research that if a source is further questioned, or probed, deception detection accuracy will not improve. However, the source will be more likely to be perceived to be honest, when compared to a source that is not probed. This robust finding has been found to hold true regardless if the information presented is truthful or deceptive, if the interactants have a previous relationship, if the receiver is suspicious, or whether the individual making the truthful or dishonest judgments is an observer or a participant in the interaction.

The most common explanation for this finding is focused on the source adapting his or her behavior in an effort to appear more honest, although this explanation has encountered a great deal of criticism. Regardless of the explanation, however, the implications for deception and deception research are apparent and numerous. The method of continued questioning is a common strategy for suspicious and nonsuspicious, amateur and professional interrogators alike. Furthermore, it is presumed that continued questioning should improve the accuracy of a veracity judgment. However, the mere act of follow-up questioning, which may result from even the slightest suspicion or even curiosity, enhances the likelihood of a source being perceived as honest, even when he or she is being deceitful.

### Behavioral Adaptation Explanation Debate

The explanation most commonly accepted for the probing effect is the behavioral adaptation explanation (BAE). The BAE speculates that as the source is probed, the individual will pick up on any potential suspicion from the receiver and, as a result, strategically adapt his or her behavior in an effort to appear more honest. It is reasoned

that through the extended interaction, the source may think that the receiver is suspicious of the veracity of the responses because of the extra or probing questions. Thus, the source will behaviorally adapt in an effort to assuage the suspicion. There is, however, a contentious academic debate around the empirical support of this explanation.

The BAE postulates a three-link causal chain: (1) probing with additional questions alerts the message source that the receiver is suspicious, (2) the recognition of potential suspicion causes the source to purposefully and strategically adapt his or her behavior in an effort to appear more truthful, and (3) the change or adaptation of the source's behavior results in a more honest perception of the receiver, relative to a nonprobed source.

Criticisms of the BAE are focused on two main areas. The first is the lack of clarity around which behavioral cues are altered by probed sources in an effort to appear more honest. There is a debate over what constitutes stereotypical cues to deceit, whether these are in fact the behaviors that are adapted, and if laypersons would possess the level of information required to alter such behaviors in an effective manner. Second, there is considerable concern around the empirical support of the predicted links that compose the BAE. There is trepidation about a potential overemphasis on what support has been found and perhaps misinterpretation of a variety of statistical tests utilized to assess the data collected.

Responses to the criticisms have focused on concerns that the critiques are based on an inaccurate context of probing and based on earlier, less developed assessments of the probing effect and the BAE. Specifically, the critiques do not account for the necessary perceived suspicion of the receiver by the source and only assesses the earliest of studies testing it. The responses also cite evidence from various other areas of communication research, including deception research, that demonstrate behavioral adaptation does in fact occur over time between interactants. Moreover, this adaptation is not necessarily limited to stereotypically deceptive behaviors. Additionally, responses to criticism also express concern that the statistical techniques utilized to assess and criticize the BAE are inadequate.

One explanation for the continued endurance of the BAE despite strong criticism is its fit within

the typically accepted focus of communication theory. Specifically, the BAE embodies the strategic nature of communication that most communication scholars abide by.

### Probing Heuristic Explanation

A cognitive heuristic referred to as the “probing heuristic explanation” has been offered as an alternative explanation of the probing effect. That is, there is evidence that behavioral adaptation is not necessary for the probing effect to occur; rather, it may be because of factors that elicit heuristic processing in the receiver who ultimately provides the veracity assessment. For example, studies inducing various levels of active processing found that individuals who engaged in greater heuristic processing were more likely to judge probed sources as honest than individuals induced into more active processing. This finding suggests that the probing effect is more likely due to the cognitive state of the receiver, rather than a behavioral reaction of the sender.

### Implications for Deception

Despite an enduring academic debate over the explanation for the probing effect, it remains a robust piece of deception and deception detection research. Specifically, it is consistently found to be the case that a probed source is more likely to be seen as honest and truthful than a nonprobed source. This appears quite counterintuitive when one considers the response to piqued suspicion or curiosity, which typically would be further questioning. This has major practical implications given that interrogations are common practice for amateur and professional deception detectors alike, and it is presumed that further questioning will result in improved detection accuracy. However, merely being aware of a tendency to judge a probed source as more honest compared to a nonprobed source, especially under increased heuristic processing, may allow for incorrect judgments to be noticed and corrected.

Lauren M. Hamel  
Dublin City University

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Cognitive Heuristics; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Leakage; Miller, Gerald; Nonverbal Cues.

### Further Readings

- Buller, D. B., J. B. Stiff, and J. K. Burgoon.  
“Behavioral Adaptation in Deceptive Transactions: Fact or Fiction: Reply to Levine and McCornack.” *Human Communication Research*, v.22 (1996).
- Buller, D. B., K. D. Strzyzewski, and J. Comstock.  
“Interpersonal Deception: Deceivers’ Reaction to Receivers’ Suspicions and Probing.” *Communication Monographs*, v.58 (1991).
- Levine, T. R. and S. A. McCornack. “Behavior Adaptation, Confidence, and Heuristic-Based Explanations of the Probing Effect.” *Human Communication Research*, v.27 (2001).
- Levine, T. R. and S. A. McCornack. “Can Behavioral Adaptation Explain the Probing Effect? Rejoinder to Buller, et al.” *Human Communication Research*, v.22 (1996).
- Levine, T. R. and S. A. McCornack. “A Critical Analysis of the Behavioral Adaptation Explanation of the Probing Effect.” *Human Communication Research*, v.22 (1996).

---

## Projection

The social and personality psychology literature is rife with demonstrations of the ways in which people self-deceive in the interest of maintaining favorable self-views. The desire to enhance and protect one’s self-image is among the strongest of individuals’ self-motives. While accomplishing this goal is certainly a multimechanistic process, one early explanation of how individuals protect and enhance the self advanced the concept of projection.

Originally proposed by Sigmund Freud as an ego-defense mechanism, projection involves perceiving one’s undesirable qualities in others as a means of avoiding seeing these same faults in the self. The Freudian view assumes that such projection occurs subconsciously, as doing so effectively deceives the ego from realizing that the person possesses the negative disposition. Thus, in its original psychoanalytic conceptualization it was argued that people were unaware of possessing the unfavorable characteristics they projected onto others. Supporting this perspective, early research showed that people who were evaluated by others

as possessing an undesirable characteristic—and importantly, lacked awareness that they possessed this trait—were more likely to see others as possessing this characteristic than were those who were keenly aware of their shortcoming.

However, succeeding social-cognitive interpretations of the phenomenon, which label the process defensive projection, challenge the notion that individuals must not be aware of possessing the undesirable trait in order for projection to occur. To the contrary, one investigation showed projection to be strongest among individuals who were mindful of possessing the projected quality. Thus, the role of conscious awareness in eliciting classic projection has been debated. Nevertheless, traditional and contemporary conceptualizations alike agree that defensive projection occurs when people seek to defend their self-image by denying the possession of certain undesirable qualities, which in turn increases the likelihood that these same characteristics will be perceived prominently in others.

### Research on Projection

Early investigations effectively established evidence for basic projection effects. Yet, much of this work was criticized for lacking the methodological rigor necessary to conclude that defensive projection was indeed responsible for the effects observed in these studies. Despite its psychodynamic roots dating back to the early 1900s, methodologically sound evidence for projection, and its underlying mechanisms, did not emerge until much later. One intuitive model has been advanced by Leonard Newman and colleagues, which asserts (as did Freud) that projection begins with the motivation to avoid recognizing threatening qualities in the self. This motivation, they showed, leads people to actively suppress any thoughts suggesting that they possess the unfavorable trait.

As a growing body of social-cognitive evidence has shown, however, people are rarely successful in these suppression attempts. Rather, the ironic effect of thought suppression is that people often become extra-sensitive to thoughts related to the unwanted content. Thus, Newman and colleagues argue (and provide evidence) that projection occurs when the enhanced accessibility of the undesired trait increases the likelihood that it will be incorporated into impressions formed of other

people (even when one successfully suppresses seeing the fault in the self).

Experimental evidence for the ego-defensive property of projection has also been obtained. These studies show that individuals afforded the chance to project their undesirable traits onto others subsequently experience decreased accessibility of thought content related to this attribute and are less likely to report possessing this trait than are those who are not provided the opportunity to project.

Other investigations have explored onto whom people focus their projection. One common target is members of stereotyped groups. Projection most effectively occurs when it seems warranted to describe another person as possessing an objectionable characteristic. As such, members of negatively stereotyped groups are often perceived as reasonable targets, particularly when the stereotype includes the undesirable trait being projected. Accordingly, studies have shown that experiencing self-threat in an important personality domain (for example, intelligence) enhances the accessibility of stereotype-relevant knowledge related to the unfavorable quality (that is, student athletes as unintelligent). This augmented accessibility, in turn, increases the likelihood that projection will be focused on members of this group rather than on nonstereotyped individuals. The projection that occurs following such ego threat is domain specific. In other words, stereotyped individuals are not evaluated less favorably overall but only with regard to possessing the undesirable quality that people wish to deny in themselves.

### Other Forms of Projection

In addition to classic defensive projection, other forms of projection have also been documented. For example, attributive projection describes the general tendency for people to project their attributes onto specific others irrespective of wishing to deny these characteristics in themselves. In a typical experiment, participants are informed that they possess particularly desirable or undesirable traits. Thereafter, these qualities are more likely to be attributed to others than when such feedback is not provided.

As with classic projection, attributive projection manifests selectively in ways that enhance



individuals' self-esteem. For example, although attributive projection occurs for both positive and negative characteristics, the effect is particularly apparent for undesirable traits. Such strategic projection minimizes the threat posed by objectionable qualities by instilling in people the perception that their flaws are common. Likewise, onto whom individuals project their traits is also selective. People are more likely to project their attributes onto liked rather than onto disliked others, especially in the case of undesirable characteristics. Projecting one's positive qualities onto well-liked others reaffirms that these attributes must be favorable, while doing so for negative traits diminishes their threat potential by reassuring that, if other highly regarded people also share these qualities, they must not be that detrimental.



A Washington Wizards Girl performs during the Washington Wizards versus Minnesota Timberwolves basketball game in Washington, D.C., March 5, 2011. One common target of projection is members of stereotyped groups, which are seen as reasonable targets. For example, cheerleaders, like athletes, are often accused of possessing traits of low intelligence or snobbery.

Work on another variant of projection—coined the false consensus effect (FCE)—has shown people to overestimate the commonality of their attitudes, behaviors, and traits among the general population. While a number of nonmotivational explanations for the FCE have been advanced and supported, the FCE is also the product of ego-protection concerns. For instance, people typically show more false consensus for attributes and attitudes they deem undesirable than for those they perceive as favorable. This strategic pattern allows individuals to maintain the perception that, whereas their strengths are somewhat rare and unique, their shortcomings are shared and normative.

### Conclusion

Historical and contemporary research alike illustrates that projective techniques—including classic defensive projection and its subsequent derivatives—facilitate people's self-protection agenda. By operating beyond explicit awareness, these processes effectively deceive individuals into perceiving fewer shortcomings in themselves than truly exist and greater inadequacies in others when their own flaws are readily apparent.

Corey L. Guenther  
Rachel Meisinger  
Karen Vanderzanden  
*Creighton University*

**See Also:** Cognitive Dissonance; Denial; Freud, Sigmund; Ideology; Psychoanalysis; Self-Deception; Self-Esteem.

### Further Readings

- Dunning, D. "The Relation of Self to Social Perception." In *Handbook of Self and Identity*, 2nd ed., M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney, eds. New York: Guilford, 2012.
- Freud, S. "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 14, J. Strachey, ed. and trans. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.
- Govorun, O., K. Fuegen, and K. B. Payne. "Stereotypes Focus Defensive Projection." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.32 (2006).
- Holmes, D. S. "Projection as a Defense Mechanism." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.85 (1978).

Marks, G. and N. Miller. "Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.102 (1987).

Newman, L. S., K. J. Duff, and R. F. Baumeister. "A New Look at Defensive Projection: Thought Suppression, Accessibility, and Biased Person Perception." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.72 (1997).

Schimmel, J., J. Greenberg, and A. Martens. "Evidence That Projection of a Feared Trait can Serve a Defensive Function." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.29 (2003).

---

## Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis was developed by Sigmund Freud around 1895, but it has since evolved into a diverse and internally complex combination of theoretical approaches, institutions, and clinical practices conducted in various parts of the world. Nonetheless, this diversity is unified by the common postulate of the unconscious. This hypothesis has profound implications for notions of lying and deception. Arguably the most sophisticated theorist on the topic of lying and deception is the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose ideas show how psychoanalysis institutes what is almost a reversal of traditional understandings of lying and deception.

Psychoanalysis in general offers a very different perspective from much of the mainstream psychology of lying. While the latter focuses on the conscious, intersubjective motivations behind deceptive but fundamentally social behavior, such as "white lies" and "face-saving" lies, psychoanalysis does not focus directly on the socialized intentions of the speaker at all. Instead, it locates truth—understood as cause in something like the medical, etiological sense—in a region actively excluded from consciousness by the forces of repression, namely the unconscious.

Thus, deception from a psychoanalytic perspective becomes primarily self-deception. Its bracketing out of the social aspects central to the psychology of lying allows psychoanalysis to isolate the ego, the seat of conscious selfhood, as

a defense (a lie of sorts) against the truth of the unconscious, which in the Freudian tradition is fundamentally sexual.

When treated as an abstract social and perhaps even universal psychology, rather than as a clinical practice taking place only under certain conditions, this approach can reduce psychoanalysis to a violent, hermeneutic device that finds the "truth" of an Oedipal unconscious everywhere. Though cultural theorists in academia have found this a useful way to produce "psychoanalytic" readings of novels, paintings, and films, it has understandably invited criticisms from philosophers engaging with psychoanalysis on a primarily epistemological level.

However, the rich complexity that psychoanalysis has brought to debates about lying and deception can only be appreciated if it is rooted in clinical practice. It is from there that analysts from Sigmund Freud to Carl Jung, from Melanie Klein to Donald Winnicott, have considered the impact of lies and deception on transference (traditionally understood as positive and negative feelings directed toward the person of the analyst) and on therapeutic outcomes (again, traditionally understood on a medical model based on a reduction in pathological symptoms).

### Lacan on Lying and Deception

The most sophisticated theorist of the psychoanalytic perspective on lying and deception, however, was arguably the French analyst Jacques Lacan. Drawing on the natural world, Lacan recognized that deception is a fundamental mechanism in evolutionary adaptation at the phylogenetic or species level, as well as in reproductive behavior at the ontogenetic or individual level. This can be seen in everything from the camouflage of chameleons to the mating rituals of numerous bird species (with males, for example, fluffing up their feathers to appear larger), from eye-like patterns on the wings of butterflies to predators mimicking the calls of their prey to lure them nearer.

In their own "mating rituals" and intersubjective relations generally, humans are no exception to this. For Lacan, the "imaginary" ego is a tissue of deceptions that gives the subject an "imago" or image of selfhood broadly legible at a social level. However, humans are also very different from animals in their unique capacity for speech.

It is only this ability to construct symbolic systems that makes lying per se, as opposed to deception, possible. Though capable of exquisite camouflage, the animal is not capable of the double or even triple bluff.

Lacan often illustrated this with an example taken from Freud's *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905):

Two Jews met in a railway station in Galicia. "Where are you going?" asked one. "To Crakow" was the answer. "What a liar you are!" broke out the other. "If you say you are going to Crakow, you want me to believe you are going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you're going to Crakow. So why are you lying to me?"

This example seems to suggest a vertiginous oscillation between truth and deception, made possible by a symbolic system with exchangeable elements ("Crakow" for "Lemberg" and vice versa). Unlike the primarily visual *trompe l'oeil* of deception, then, lying requires a combinatory system operating by means of formal relations, not resemblance or correspondence to a referent. It is no coincidence that Lacan also made early use of game theory, in which the logic of move and countermove discernible in this joke is mathematically modeled.

From a clinical perspective, however, this joke might be interpreted differently. The inability to finally settle the oscillation between lying and deception could indicate traits of paranoia, in which the only certainty obtaining for this man is that he is everywhere deceived. In other words, for an analyst there is a truth to be read between the lines.

For this reason, Lacan has little time for the so-called liar paradox beloved of philosophers of language, in which the logical form of a statement such as "I am a liar" seems to scramble traditional logic. At least in the clinical setting, it would immediately be significant that the patient felt the need to lie to their analyst, quite apart from the content of this lie. This is why Lacan claims, with characteristic allusiveness, that "truth has the structure of fiction." This means that psychoanalytic truth is often presented as a lie, a story, a distortion, but that this is precisely the only form that unconscious truth can take. For example, approaching

the delusional constructions of a paranoid psychotic by simply denying his or her objective reality is known to be almost completely ineffective. Freud's term *psychic reality* already indicated the subjective durability of this other reality.

Psychoanalysis, then, does not judge "lies" for their deliberate dissimulation of the truth (as if there were only one), but reads a different truth precisely in that dissimulation. Conversely, psychoanalysis does not accept stated truths at face value, because they can be acts of self-deception that conceal their opposites. However, it is disingenuous to take phenomena largely confined to the analytic setting and extrapolate them into a global theory of truth in general.

Colin Wright  
University of Nottingham

**See Also:** Brain; Denial; Fantasy and Imagination; Freud, Sigmund; Pathological Lying.

### Further Readings

- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Freud, Sigmund and James Strachey, trans. *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*. London: Vintage Press, 2001.
- Lacan, Jacques and Alan Sheridan, trans. *Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. London: W. W. Norton, 1998.
- Lacan, Jacques and Sylvana Tomaselli, trans. *Seminar II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*. London: W. W. Norton, 1991.
- Laplanche, Jean, Jean-Bernard Pontalis, and Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans. *The Language of Psychoanalysis*. London: Hogarth Press, 1973.

## Public Relations

Public relations involves the promotion of an organization's identity, culture, values, and agenda through strategic outreach to relevant designated

publics. This outreach is particularly important during times of crisis within an organization. Public relations strategies often utilize traditional and social media tools to communicate an organization's messages. Unlike journalists whose idealistic moral intent is to serve the greater good, the intent of public relations is to serve the organization. Therefore, public relations professionals are not neutral media practitioners. As a result, a skeptical public often associates public relations with deception, and the industry is stigmatized as one in which lying is common practice. Most public relations representatives choose to walk the fine line of spin and not admit to lying as a professional attribute. However, some argue that lying is the currency used in the public relations industry.

At their best, public relations companies diplomatically and strategically use various communication channels, including the media, to navigate threats to brand reputation. For example, in 1982 and unbeknownst to the company, Tylenol capsules were infected with cyanide and sold. This resulted in seven deaths. Although not directly the fault of the company, the brand's reputation suffered considerably. Working with those within and outside of the company, public relations representatives helped Tylenol respond to the crisis, launch a new tamper-free design for the product, and rebuild the brand's reputation. Through productive and ethical public relations practices, Tylenol was able to rebound.

### Spin Versus Lying

While public relations practitioners are loath to consider themselves liars, they comfortably view their profession as involving spin. *Spin* is the term used to capture the ethical side of a fine line in public relations. Outright deception would involve providing a public with inaccurate information. In contrast, spin involves providing information in such a way as to guide the targeted public in the interpretation of that information. Spin involves finding a way to view and discuss an issue that helps an organization accomplish its goals strategically. Various techniques are used to spin a story in the interest of an organization while walking a fine line regarding deception.

Spin can involve withholding information at a current moment. One example of this is stonewalling. Stonewalling occurs when a spokesperson

postpones providing information that may reflect poorly on the organization.

Spin also involves tailoring a message to minimize the more injurious aspects of that message. This can occur, for example, when an organization facilitates and reports about relevant research studies. Organizations can sponsor research studies, give input into which population is studied, report only those results that reflect positively on the organization, and reinterpret research study results to downplay the negative implications of findings.

Another type of spin involves dispersal. Dispersal occurs when agents of an organization are sent directly to an affected public to provide positive information about a company. An example of dispersal is the work of lobbyists, who advocate for the goals of an organization.

The difference between spin and deception is consequential. This is because lying can have the reverse effect than desired in public relations. Public relations goals are harder to achieve once trust with a public is broken through a deceptive act on the part of an organization. Moreover, public relations representatives have been prosecuted and fined for engaging in deceptive practices. Public relations practitioners walk a fine line when it comes to deception. As a result, the ways in which organizations manage their reputation has implications for legal, political, and health issues, among other important issues. Media representations of the public relations industry often depict the struggle faced by ethical public relations practitioners.

### Media Representations of Public Relations Deception

Albeit fiction, movie representations of the public relations industry thrive on the deception connection. Movies such as *Jerry Maguire* (1996), *Wag the Dog* (1997), and *Thank You for Smoking* (2005) demonstrate the way public relations representatives spin on behalf of their employers.

Nonfictional representations of the public relations industry are arguably closer to the truth. For example, former insider Ryan Holiday published his controversial book, *Trust Me. I'm Lying: The Tactics and Confessions of a Media Manipulator* in 2012. Holiday claims to provide secrets about the public relations industry and its manipulation tactics. Prior to his book's publication, Holiday



used an e-mail list called HARO (Help a Reporter Out), which reporters use to find experts, to prove his point. He responded to each inquiry from a reporter, regardless of topic, as if he was an expert. Without detection, Holiday was able to make media appearances and contribute to news stories. The HARO “experiment,” as Holiday called it, was widely criticized and dismissed within the industry as a public relations ploy used to generate book sales.

When public relations events garner considerable media attention they become case studies that represent the industry. These events provide insight about how public relations can tread ethical lines. In some of the most well-known cases, public relations attempts to shield an organization from backlash when there are considerable health and economic concerns for the general public. However, these attempts are not always successful. Famous historic cases include the nuclear threat at Three Mile Island in 1979 and the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in 1989.

In the Three Mile Island Case in 1979, the threat of nuclear leakage raised fervor in the public, which was further fueled by the unrelated and purely coincidental release of *The China Syndrome*, a film about a nuclear accident. Government officials such as Governor Dick Thornburgh of Pennsylvania and President Jimmy Carter helped alleviate public concern, and positive policy changes resulted from the incident. Public relations efforts were less successful in quelling concerns about radiation, which had not been leaked at dangerous levels. Three Mile Island is still synonymous with nuclear accidents in part because of the assumption that lying played a role in the messages about the incident.

During the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in 1989, Exxon ignored mounting fear and criticism related to the health, environmental, and economic costs of the spill. Rather than seek external public relations assistance, the company relied on questionable legal advice to withhold information from the public in order to deal with the crisis. The organization’s choices in using deceptive message design in its public relations strategy heightened suspicion about the company, which contributed to the need for Exxon to pay billions of dollars in clean-up costs and criminal, civil, and punitive settlements.

Recent cases suggest that some organizations have not learned the value of public relations that stays on the ethical side of spin. This is especially unfortunate when history repeats itself and organizations continue to make similar public relations mistakes. Most recently, the BP oil spill in 2010 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 demonstrate that public relations is arguably least convincing when deception plays a role in its practice.

During the BP oil spill in 2010, deflection and downplaying the severity and the effects of the spill were commonplace. BP (British Petroleum) underestimated the size of the spill and tried to divert attention from the company by referring to the spill as the “Gulf of Mexico oil spill.” These artificial and ethically questionable attempts to sidestep the economic and health issues associated with the spill resulted in considerable financial cost and fostered public skepticism of the company’s public relations messages.

After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, which occurred on March 11, 2011, the Japanese government was criticized for its poor public relations. For example, the discovery of tainted rice in Onami, Japan, in the fall of 2011 fueled concerns that the government processes for determining food safety with relation to radiation were not sufficient. The political effects of the disaster are still being experienced and distrust of the government manifested in a variety of ways. For example, people living near nuclear plants have protested perceived government deception by refusing government subsidies that they have historically been given because they are willing to live in these locations.

Case studies like these popularized in the media represent the problems that can arise when public relations strategies are deceptive. These cases demonstrate why ethical public relations strategies are necessary to accomplish the message design goals of an organization. The ability for public relations to spin, but not necessarily to deceive, is valuable to organizations in crisis, particularly when there are political, economic, or health issues at stake.

### **Lying and the Use of Social Media**

Digital public relations is a thriving industry. Organizations can use social media in particular in innumerable ways as an alternate and more

interactive outlet than traditional media. Moreover, social media tend to have less systematic and official oversight than traditional media. Social media provide new opportunities for deceptive practices by public relations practitioners. For example, fake reviews on company Web sites and exaggerations about experiences with products or services on blogs can be strategic messages designed to promote company hype.

In July 2012, Chick-Fil-A was accused of backdating a recall of a children's toy it was distributing with its meals after the licensor expressed disagreement with the company founder's religious views. Matters were made worse by rumors that the company had created a fake Facebook post by a teenage girl in support of its claim, which the company denies any involvement in and evidence does not support. Social media outlets such as Reddit publicized the controversy.

Watchdogs and gatekeepers notwithstanding, legal boundaries for deceptive practices in social media exist. Faking online product reviews and inflating numbers that indicate the popularity of a product have been grounds for legal action. One of the most well-known cases involves Universal, Sony, and RCA, who were fined for artificially inflating their video views through YouTube in violation of Google's user agreement policies.

### **Lying as an Attraction to the Public Relations Industry**

Regardless of the ethical and legal issues that are foremost in the mind of any public relations representative, droves of college students are intrigued by the public relations industry. Public relations is among the top 10 most popular majors across colleges in the United States. The potential to work for Fortune 500 companies and meet high-profile professionals and celebrities is an irresistible magnet for many college students looking for a career. Moreover, because students may share the stigmatized representation of public relations as an industry inseparable from deception, they may find the opportunity to flex their deceptive skill appealing. Low pay and slow progress up the hierarchical ladder in a public relations company do not dissuade students from viewing public relations as an attractive profession.

### **Legal Issues in Public Relations**

Various legal issues are relevant to the public relations industry and temper any organization's inclination to engage in deceptive public relations practices. Public relations practitioners benefit from understanding the legal boundaries of their profession. Regardless of the preferences of their clients, the law places limits on what takes place in the industry.

Relevant laws require accuracy and expediency in information that is revealed to the public. Some of these laws require public relations practitioners to testify against their clients. Other laws dictate restrictions related to defamation and libel when public relations strategies include a discussion, for example, of competitor organizations. Other legal issues of which a public relations practitioner must be aware involve privacy, statutes of limitations, consent, as well as restrictions related to copyrights and trademarks. These laws are intended to hamper an organization's ability to engage in deceptive public relations practices.

Even something as seemingly simple as an organization's offering of an apology to its publics can be a point of legal contention for a public relations practitioner. An apology can be viewed within a legal system as an admission of guilt and, thus, organizations may wish to strategically avoid offering one. However, some states have adopted so-called apology laws that provide organizations a measure of legal protection against self-incrimination for offering an apology. These laws address the importance of compassion for victims in times of crisis.

### **Ethics in Public Relations**

Despite the bad reputation that the public relations industry has garnered because of its association with deception, public relations is a valuable and thriving industry aided by its strong ethical stance. Consider the importance of public relations to rally support for or against various political agendas, such as foreign aid, universal health care, wars, and other domestic and international initiatives. These initiatives could not be undertaken successfully without adhering to strong ethical principles.

The Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) works with its members to help ensure that practices in the industry are ethical and to provide guidance to members when situations

become ethically questionable. Toward this end, the association provides an extensive Member Code of Ethics for public relations practitioners. This document articulates the value the association places on advocacy, honesty, expertise, independence, loyalty, and fairness. The code also includes specific provisions about the free flow of information, competition, disclosure of information, safeguarding confidences, conflicts of interest, and enhancing the profession. These provisions include guidelines as well as examples of improper conduct under each provision.

Perhaps in anticipation of and response to the stigma of deception that is often used against public relation practitioners, the PRSA Member Code of Ethics ends with a pledge for its members:

To conduct myself professionally, with truth, accuracy, fairness, and responsibility to the public; To improve my individual competence and advance the knowledge and proficiency of the profession through continuing research and education; And to adhere to the articles of the Member Code of Ethics 2000 for the practice of public relations as adopted by the governing Assembly of the Public Relations Society of America.

I understand and accept that there is a consequence for misconduct, up to and including membership revocation.

And, I understand that those who have been or are sanctioned by a government agency or convicted in a court of law of an action that fails to comply with the Code may be barred from membership or expelled from the Society.

Anastacia Kurylo

*Fortified Communication Consulting*

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Deception and Trust; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Manipulation; Marketing, Deceptive; Spin, Corporate; Spin, Political.

#### Further Readings

Foley, Michael. "Lies, Lies, and Damned PR." *Index on Censorship*, v.33/2 (2004).  
 Holiday, Ryan. *Trust Me, I'm Lying: The Tactics and Confessions of a Media Manipulator*. New York: Portfolio, 2012.

Morris, Trevor and Simon Goldsworthy. *PR: A Persuasive Industry? Spin, Public Relations, and the Shaping of Modern Media*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Parsons, Patricia. *Ethics in Public Relations: A Guide to Best Practices*. London: Kogan Page, 2004.

Public Relations Society of America, "PRSA Member Code of Ethics" <http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/Ethics/documents/Code%20of%20Ethics.pdf> (Accessed January 2013).

## Puffery

While overly representing the characteristic value of an item to be greater than in actuality has its roots deep in human history, the word *puffery* is a relatively new legal term of art. Puffery is most commonly the use of exaggerations reasonably expected from a seller regarding the degree of quality of a product, the truth of which cannot be precisely determined. The exaggerated commendation for promotional purposes must not be material to the true character of the product for fear of leading to fraud or intentional misrepresentation. Puffery, although a specifically protected form of speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, remains highly regulated to prevent commercial abuse of unsuspecting consumers. Product puffery is not the sole form promotional praise may take, but rather puffery of individual prowess is commonplace among professional service providers and is often the form most readily abused.

Puffery, although likely used for as long as commercial enterprise has existed, first appeared in legal form in 1893 in the English case of *Louisa Carlill versus the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company*. Following the 1890 influenza pandemic, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company advertised a product guaranteed by monetary payment to prevent contraction of the virus by a regular user. Louisa Carlill used the product as directed; however, she contracted influenza despite the commercial claims and subsequently filed suit for payment under the advertised guarantee.

The respondent company argued in its defense that its claims that no product user ever contracted

Puffery in advertising is primarily utilized to subtly, and harmlessly, encourage consumers to buy a specific product or engage services from a specific individual. Promotional statements that express subjective rather than objective views to

*A Campbell's Soup ad in the January, 1934, issue of American Magazine promises an "old-fashioned" taste that "everybody likes." Puffery, an over-representation of the characteristic value of an item, became more regulated in commercial use in 1946.*

Although limited formal definitions exist, the “reasonably prudent person” standard is used universally in legal practice as a legal fiction to qualify the expectations and duties of a similarly situated individual. The reasonable person standard attempts to objectify standards that may otherwise appear to be subjective to each individual. Regarding a consumer who relies upon the puffery of a salesman, the standard of what comments become material to the inducement of a sale, rather than merely imprecise promotional exaggerations, may be found in what a consumer



of similar knowledge and expertise would rely upon when comparing a product for purchase. When the reasonable person of similar knowledge and expertise would find that a statement claiming, for instance, a car gets the best gas mileage of any car on the lot forms the basis for purchasing that specific car, the consumer of said car may hold the seller liable for such claims that go beyond mere puffery.

The legality of all claims of exaggeration, or the associated defense that such exaggeration was merely puffery, hinges on that which constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. Commercial speech by a company or individual is done with intent of making a profit and by its nature proposes a commercial transaction that may be controlled under a variety of trade regulations. Commercial speech is afforded a limited measure of freedom and is not necessarily “free” to be spoken without restraint. The regulation of commercial speech, and consequently puffery, may be imposed where the limitation of what can be stated is founded in an important governmental interest. As commercial enterprise is considered an important interest to the government, statements about a product intending to induce a sale may be appropriately regulated.

Puffery is allowable as speech free from regulation, and thus free from liability upon the part of the speaker, because its immaterial nature cannot be considered by the reasonable person to induce entry into a purchase of product or utilization of service. The lines of distinction for allowable puffery and regulated speech are even more ambiguous when such statements are intended to induce a consumer in the utilization of an individual for professional services, such as the employment of an attorney.

Attorneys must be very careful about the terms and phrases utilized when describing their legal prowess, as lawyers are often held to a higher standard regarding permissible puffery. Statements that a reasonable person may find predictive of an outcome regarding their legal claim go beyond allowable puffery and subject the attorney to sanctions under every state bar association. Exaggeration crosses the line of permissible puffery when claims of superiority or expertise in legal prowess over other attorneys cannot be qualified by sanctioned certification by the governing bar. Likewise,

certain exaggerations go beyond puffery when they constitute commercial speech, such as having never lost a case or a guarantee of success sought to induce the utilization of the specific legal services, and thus are forbidden in legal advertising.

### Nonverbal Advertising

Puffery is readily observable in the nonverbal “advertising” engaged, for example, by an attorney as self-promotion of his or her propensity for success. The luxurious office, the expensive automobile, the lavish personal residence, and even the physical attractiveness of the legal staff all allude to the attorney who is successful. Potential clients associate such indicators with an attorney having a greater probability of prevailing in their interest and so more readily seek out the legal services of that counsel. Puffery in like form is acceptable and forms no basis for fraudulent inducement, as no reasonably prudent person would stake the validity of a legal claim on such indicators of attorney self-promotion.

Puffery has been a major advertising tool since the Industrial Revolution and when used appropriately has been determined to be harmless to the consumer. The U.S. Supreme Court and government agencies allow the use of puffery as free speech under the First Amendment as statements that are immaterial to the product or service and would be relied upon by a reasonable person as the basis of a business transaction. Exaggeration goes beyond mere puffery as deceptive to the consumer and misrepresentative of the product or service sought. Puffery continues to be expected in commercial enterprise and where implemented appropriately exhibits little probability of harm to the average consumer.

Webster B. Baker  
Saint Leo University

**See Also:** Advertising; Consumer Products; Attorneys; *Caveat Emptor*; Consumer Protection Laws; Drug Advertising; Exaggeration; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Marketing, Deceptive; Ward, Lester F.

### Further Readings

Boudreaux, Donald J. “Puffery in Advertising.” *Free Market*, v.13/9 (1995).

- Federal Trade Commission (FTC). "Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174." Washington, DC: FTC, 1984.
- Kauffman, Matthew. "In Advertising, it's Tough to Know How Much Truth to Tell." *The Hartford Courant* (June 4, 2003).
- Lemley, Mark A. "The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense." *Yale Law Journal* v.108/7 (1999).
- Louisa Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company*, 1 QB 256 (1893).
- Pardun, Carol J. *Advertising and Society: Controversies and Consequences*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
- Preston, Ivan L. *The Great American Blow-Up: Puffery in Advertising and Selling*. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996.
- Reichert, Tom. *Issues in American Advertising: Media, Society, and a Changing World*. Chicago: Copy Workshop, 2008.
- U.S. Congress. "The Lanham Act." 15 U.S.C. §1501 (2011).



# R

## Racism

Racism and other forms of prejudice have increasingly become a topic of interest to social scientists who study deception. This interest largely stems from the observation that blatant and explicit displays of prejudice, which were once commonplace, tend to occur rather infrequently in the modern world. Some have argued that this is evidence of a true decrease in racism over time. In contrast, others have argued that as societies have begun to espouse more egalitarian values, people have simply become less willing to divulge their true racial attitudes in such an obvious way.

Evidence from a variety of sources provides support for the latter view, indicating that modern racism is often intentionally masked in survey research through lies and deceit. Moreover, some people may actually be deceiving themselves about their true feelings when it comes to race. To combat these issues, psychologists have developed techniques for bypassing such deception and detecting implicit racial attitudes. The results of this research have revealed that while racism has become more covert in the present day, it is still very much alive and well despite frequent claims to the contrary.

### Denial of Racism

Although white Americans have historically held negative attitudes toward blacks, survey research

suggested that this bias had effectively disappeared by the end of the 20th century. Study after study found that white participants were rating blacks just as favorably as they did their own racial group. And it is not just white-black prejudice that has seemingly disappeared—most forms of race-based prejudice appear to have been waning in recent years. At the same time this was noted, however, studies looking at the association between race and behavior appeared to indicate that things had not changed one bit: whites were still providing preferential treatment to members of their own race and penalizing racial outgroups. Thus, despite claiming that they are not prejudiced, studies continue to find that whites are treating members of other races differently on everything from whom they would hire for a certain job to the severity of the punishment they would assign to a criminal offender.

As one particularly compelling laboratory example of this seeming duplicity, a classic study by Shirley Weitz found that the white participants who expressed the most favorable attitudes toward blacks on a survey actually demonstrated the least friendliness toward a black confederate in a subsequent interaction. For a real-world example demonstrating similar hypocrisy, consider the case of gubernatorial candidate Tom Bradley, the first African American mayor of Los Angeles, who ran for governor of California in





*The first black mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley (left), meets with Orange County Supervisor Ralph B. Clark in 1980. The Bradley effect is named after his race for governor of California in 1982, when he was ahead in the polls but lost on Election Day. Pollsters theorized that this was a type of social desirability bias, in which voters lied at the polls to avoid appearing racist.*

1982. Although a variety of public opinion polls showed that he held a significant lead going into the election, he wound up losing the race to a white candidate. Although the polls could have been wrong in that instance (just as they were in the infamous Dewey-Truman presidential contest of 1948), pollsters and social scientists have documented a number of other cases since then in which political polls have overestimated support for racial minority candidates. This phenomenon has since been dubbed the “Bradley effect.”

According to psychological research, this apparent disconnect between people’s self-reported racial attitudes and behaviors is mostly a matter of deception. Individuals may intentionally lie about their true racial attitudes when participating in survey research or political polls for any number of reasons. For example, some people may feel compelled to conform to egalitarian social norms, or they may seek to present themselves in the most positive light possible by

expressing a high degree of political correctness. And people do not report just a slight attitude adjustment. For instance, in the case of the aforementioned Weitz study, racist participants actually overcompensated by presenting themselves as the least biased individuals in the entire sample.

Psychologists have found that the pressure to suppress and disguise information about the self that other people might perceive as undesirable (known as the “social-desirability bias”) is incredibly strong. As some evidence of this phenomenon in the arena of race, consider what research on the Bogus Pipeline technique has concluded. In Edward Jones and Harold Sigall’s original study that pioneered this method, they recruited a sample of white individuals who were asked to indicate whether a set of positive and negative attributes was characteristic of African Americans. However, half of the participants were first hooked up to a supposed lie-detector machine via electrodes and were essentially told that the machine could read their minds by measuring their “implicit muscle movements.” In reality, the machine was completely bogus and was not even recording any physiological information; the goal of this elaborate setup was simply to convince participants that they should tell the truth because it will come out one way or another. The other half of the sample never saw or heard about this machine.

The end result was that in the Bogus Pipeline condition, participants rated negative attributes (for example, lazy, ignorant) as more characteristic of African Americans and positive attributes (for example, intelligent, sensitive) as less characteristic of this same race than did participants in the control condition. These results provide strong support for the idea that, under normal circumstances, people tend to lie about their true racial attitudes in order to appear nonprejudiced. It is only when they have an incentive to tell the truth that such bias tends to emerge.

However, active deception is not the only factor at work here. Self-deception may also play a major role. In other words, some people may be hiding their true feelings about race from themselves. This can occur at either a conscious or unconscious level, which means that people may not necessarily realize this is even happening. The reason people engage in such self-deception

regarding their racial attitudes is that deceiving themselves about their own positive attributes and about others' negative attributes may help them to maintain high levels of self-esteem and self-confidence. For instance, if individuals can convince themselves that they are not prejudiced, they are then able to benefit from perceiving the self as moral and just.

As counterintuitive as this may seem, this does not necessarily prevent people from displaying prejudice in the future. When individuals experience situational threats to their self-esteem, they may actively discriminate against minorities as a way of restoring their threatened self-image. Research by Steven Fein and Steven Spencer has found that derogating racial out-groups actually helps people to recover from losses to their self-image. This can occur without necessarily contradicting the overall view of the self as nonprejudiced, because such instances may be selectively ignored or simply not categorized as discrimination because possessing nonprejudiced credentials may effectively license one to engage in discriminatory behavior with impunity.

In short, it would appear that multiple forms of deception are responsible for the paradoxical finding that racism has largely disappeared on attitudinal measures but is still present on behavioral measures.

### **Bypassing Deception in the Study of Racial Attitudes**

The scientific study of racism has become more complicated over the years because lying and deception have substantially increased on explicit measures of prejudice as societies have become more egalitarian. To get around the problems of people being both unwilling (active lying) and unable (self-deception) to report their true racial attitudes, researchers have had to find new ways of assessing racism.

One of the earliest attempts at this involved crafting more subtle survey items, such as those used on the Modern Racism Scale (for example, "discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem" and "blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve"). Such items do indeed help address social desirability concerns to a small extent because people feel less of a need to misrepresent their true feelings when the

survey questions are less blatant. However, such measures do not begin to broach the issue of self-deception, which is subject to less conscious self-control. In order to bypass the biases inherent in self-report studies, researchers have increasingly turned to implicit measures of racism. Implicit measures seek to assess attitudes of which a person may have no conscious awareness but that can still impact individual behavior.

One such measure is the Bona Fide Pipeline technique, which involves the use of priming to assess implicit racial attitudes. The procedure consists of first priming the participant with a photograph of someone from a particular racial group (for example, white, black, Asian, Hispanic). Specifically, the image is shown for a very short amount of time (that is, milliseconds) on a computer screen. The exposure time is actually so short that participants cannot necessarily consciously report what they have seen.

Afterward, participants are given a set of adjectives and are asked to categorize them as having either a positive or negative meaning. The idea is that the individual's true racial attitudes are uncovered by variations in the speed with which he or she categorizes the words after exposure to an image of someone who is either part of the same or of a different racial group. Specifically, prejudice is revealed to the extent that participants are quicker to categorize negative words and slower to categorize positive words after exposure to someone of a different race. In such cases, negative words will be consistent with their implicit attitudes, while positive words will be inconsistent.

Related to this is the Implicit Association Test, which examines how readily people associate specific social groups with positive and negative descriptive terms. Although it sounds similar to the Bona Fide Pipeline in many ways, the difference is that priming is not used in this case. Instead, participants are shown a series of faces and asked to categorize whether they represent the category of black or white. Next, they are presented with a series of words that vary in emotional valence (for example, joy, agony, peace, failure) and are asked to categorize whether they are good or bad. Then participants are asked to complete a combined task in which they categorize both words and faces. However, in this case, each of the racial categories

is paired with one of the attribute categories (that is, black faces and bad words versus white faces and good words, or black faces and good words versus white faces and bad words). The basic idea is that when a subject has a faster and easier time with the categorization task when the racial minority group is paired with negative words rather than with positive words, the subject harbors more implicit prejudice toward that group.

Perhaps not surprisingly, research comparing the results of these implicit measures to data obtained from explicit (that is, survey) measures has revealed that they often do not converge when it comes to racial attitudes, suggesting that they are indeed measuring different things. That said, both the Bona Fide Pipeline and Implicit Association Test have been criticized on the grounds that perhaps they simply capture participants' knowledge of broader cultural and societal stereotypes of racial minority groups, meaning they may not necessarily reflect participants' true attitudes. However, studies have shown that scores on each of these tests do indeed predict subsequent expressions of prejudiced behavior toward targets of different racial categories.

For instance, greater levels of implicit racial bias predict displaying less friendliness and taking a seat further away from a racial minority member during an interracial interaction. Moreover, implicit attitudes tend to be an even stronger predictor of discriminatory behavior than explicit, self-reported racial attitudes. This finding lends further support to the idea that the predictive validity of explicit racism measures is compromised by deceptive reporting on the part of participants. Studies have also found that implicit procedures, such as the Bona Fide Pipeline and Implicit Assumption Test, are relatively resistant to social desirability biases, and that intentional deception, while technically possible, is relatively rare and especially difficult for people who are new and unpracticed at these tasks. Thus, the overall body of research in this area indicates that there may actually be a number of ways to break through both intentional lying and self-deception in the study of racism.

### Conclusion

In short, although some studies suggest that racism has decreased over the past few decades, it

appears that this "decrease" is most likely just an artifact of widespread deception in how people respond to explicit measures of racial bias. Such deception can be the result of intentional lying, as well as subtle forms of self-deception. However, measures of implicit racial attitudes, such as the Bona Fide Pipeline and the Implicit Association Test, appear to bypass both conscious and unconscious deception and may perhaps provide a more accurate gauge of individuals' true racial attitudes.

Justin J. Lehmiller  
Harvard University

**See Also:** African Americans; Anthropology, Cultural; Asian Americans; Cognitive Heuristics; Colonialism; Deception and Trust; Deception Detection Accuracy; Deniability; Dreyfus Affair; Ethnic Differences; Hispanic Americans; Ideology; Jefferson, Thomas; Machiavellianism; Manipulation; Native Americans; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Egloff, B. and S. C. Schmukle. "Predictive Validity of an Implicit Association Test for Assessing Anxiety." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.83 (2002).
- Fazio, R. H, J. R. Jackson, B. C. Dunton, and C. J. Williams. "Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.69 (1995).
- Fein, S. and S. J. Spencer. "Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self Through Derogating Others." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.73 (1997).
- Greenwald, A. G. and M. R. Banaji. "Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes." *Psychological Review*, v.102 (1995).
- Greenwald, A. G., D. E. McGhee, and J. K. L. Schwartz. "Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- Jones, E. and H. Sigall. "The Bogus Pipeline: A New Paradigm for Measuring Affect and Attitude." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.76 (1971).
- McConahay, J. B. "Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale." In *Prejudice*,

- Discrimination and Racism*, J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner, eds. New York: Academic, 1986.
- von Hippel, W. and R. Trivers. "The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, v.34 (2011).
- Weitz, S. "Attitude, Voice and Behavior: A Repressed Affect Model of Interracial Interactions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.24 (1972).

## Rationality

Rationality is a characteristic of belief, action, and decision. It is generally described as having the following aspects:

- *Reasoned justification.* When one's beliefs, actions, or decisions are rational, one should be justified in his or her reasons or goals.
- *Conformity.* When one has a goal or a problem to be solved, one's rational beliefs, actions, or decisions should conform to the goal or the solution.
- *Consistency.* When one derives rational beliefs, actions, or decisions from a goal or a problem to be solved, those beliefs, actions, and decisions should be consistent across cases, situations, or contexts.
- *Optimality.* When one has a rational belief, takes a rational action, or makes a rational decision, the belief, action, or decision is optimal for the goal or solution among other possible alternatives.

The term *rationality* is used differently or in more specific ways in different fields of social science. The fields of psychology and behavioral economics have studied the relationship between deception and rationality.

*Homo economicus.* Psychological studies that focus on judgment and decision making have treated the concept of rationality from two points of view: the normative microeconomics model and the descriptive model of human behavior.

In the normative microeconomics model, rationality refers to the characteristics of behavior in

*Homo economicus*, or economic man. This concept maintains that human beings are rational and narrowly self-interested actors who egocentrically pursue material desires. These characteristics are based on the following principles of *Homo economicus*'s behavior: He pursues only self-interest; he always seeks optimal behavior that maximizes self-centered, material gains; and his decisions, which are based on the maximization of selfish material gain, are consistent across contexts.

These principles imply that *Homo economicus* has a means to evaluate utility for behavioral options. Utility for *Homo economicus* is based only on the context-free, ordinal, and measurable materialistic aspects of material gains and losses. The principles also imply that *Homo economicus* is capable of immediate and precise calculations of the utility in any situation. However, the principles of *Homo economicus* (that is, the normative microeconomics model) are not always compatible with actual human behavior. Psychologists' studies of human behavior in judgment and decision making have found many cases in which people violate the following principles:

*Reversal of preference.* When *Homo economicus* chooses an option, the option is optimal at any time. But people often reverse their preference, such as preferring to get \$100 immediately rather than \$200 one year later. However, people always prefer to receive \$200 over \$100 if they can get either amount immediately.

*Mental accounting.* When *Homo economicus* calculates outcomes of choice, the total gain or cost is constant. In practice, however, people mentally frame assets such as current income, current wealth, or future income. This implies that in human behavior, the accounts are not fungible, and the marginal propensity to consume out of each account is different.

*Refusal in ultimatum game.* In an ultimatum game, two players divide an amount of money between them. One player has the right to decide how to divide the sum, but another player can turn down the proposal if he or she doesn't like the offer. In case of refusal, the pay-off to both players is zero. If the second player is *Homo economicus*, he should accept the first player's offer



as long as it is not zero, because the offer is better than zero payment in case of refusal. In experiments, however, people tend to turn down the first player's offer when they feel it is unfair, that is, they are willing to accept zero payment.

*Altruistic punishment in public goods game with punishment rule.* In a public goods game with a punishment rule, multiple players decide for themselves how much to invest in a share of the sum in a pot. Money put into the pot is multiplied by a certain factor (commonly 1.4 to 1.6) and paid out in equal shares to all players. After one round of the game, players can make another kind of investment to punish a player who made zero investment in the first round. A *Homo economicus* would not commit such a punishment at his personal cost, because he never benefits from punishment. In experiments, however, people tend to invest to punish players who are free riding.

If seen from the classical microeconomics' point of view, actual human behaviors are far from rational. Herbert Simon explained this discrepancy, pointing out that it is impossible for real people to achieve normative rationality because their cognitive ability is too bounded to make optimal choices that maximize ordinal and measurable utility. Instead, he offered the alternative idea that people are still rational in the sense that they try to achieve a satisfying choice with their limited cognitive ability. This idea, called "bounded rationality," is now advocated by a new group of economists, as well as psychologists. By means of empirical methods, these economists have created the new field of behavioral economics in order to pursue a descriptive model of realistic human behavior. Thus, psychologists and behavioral economists have developed their theoretical positions in a similar way.

### Rationality in Studies of Deception

Deception is sometimes studied in relation to rationality. Similar to studies on judgment and decision making, behavioral economists have researched deceptive behavior by using a normative economic model of crime, which refers to the traditional sense of economic rationality.

An example of the normative economic model related to deception is Gary Becker's Simple Model of Rational Crime (SMORC). It suggests

that people commit crimes on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation: People compare the cost and benefit from both positive and negative outcomes of a crime. If the total benefit exceeds the total cost, they will commit a crime; in the context of deception, they will tell the truth if being honest is more beneficial.

In recent years, however, psychologists and behavioral economists have reported findings suggesting that human deception does not follow the normative economic model. For example, Uri Gneezy investigated how people responded to monetary incentives when there were no economic costs to deception, no risk of detection, and no punishment for detection. He created a Sender-Receiver game in which only the sender was aware of the payoffs for the two options available: one option paid him more money than the receiver, while the other option paid the receiver more. The sender was free to deceive the receiver in order to receive a higher pay-off, and he could do so without risk because the experiment prevented the receiver from knowing the truth, even after the payment had been made.

Gneezy's finding was that not all the senders lied. More significantly, he also found that, when faced with a large difference between the payout options for the receiver (that is, the receiver's loss was large), less than 20 percent of the senders lied. This result suggests that the target's loss can be considered a type of cost that discourages potential liars. This finding goes against the normative economics principle of egocentricity and contradicts the SMORC model, which predicts that, as rational actors, senders would always tell their receivers a lie.

In the same study, Gneezy also compared the sender-receiver game to the dictator game, in which one player (the dictator) not only knows the payment for each option but also decides the action. The dictator was allowed to keep the payment for the other option he or she did not choose. Note that in the dictator game, no lying could be involved. Applying the same pay-off conditions, Gneezy found that most dictator-players picked the option that benefited the dictator themselves, while fewer senders lied in the same pay-off condition of the sender-receiver game. This difference suggests that people do not calculate economic cost and benefit in a consistent way: in terms of

the economic cost and benefit, these two games were the same, which suggests that the games cause the same percentage of lying, but this was not the case. Again, the result contradicts the normative economics theory.

Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg reported another violation of normative economics principles using a trust game between two players. In the game, player A has two options: Let player B make the decision (the option “In”), or choose a less attractive payment for both A and B (the option “Out”). Player B can choose only if A takes “In; he can choose the option “Don’t roll,” which guarantees him the greater pay out, or the “Roll” option, which benefits him less, but might benefit A more than A’s “Out” option.

In this game, researchers found that when player B verbally promised to choose the option that benefits player A (that is, “Roll”), and A allowed B to make the choice (that is, “In”), fewer people in the player B role chose the selfish option of “don’t roll.” Charness and Dufwenberg explained this effect with a theory of guilt aversion: people felt guilty to the extent that they believed they were hurting the other party. In other words, people were motivated by their beliefs about others’ beliefs. Charness and Dufwenberg also suggested that guilt aversion prevents people from deceiving others even when deception benefits them.

In his book *The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty*, Dan Ariely introduced many other examples of human dishonest behavior that contradict the normative economic principles of rationality (this is SMORC). He found that the effect of economic cost-benefit calculations was weaker than psychological factors. Dishonesty decreased with moral reminders but increased with factors irrelevant to economics, such as cognitive fatigue, creativity, others benefitting from someone’s dishonesty, and watching others behave dishonestly.

Ariely arrived at an alternative rational theory of human dishonest behavior. When faced with situations in which dishonesty is an option, people are affected by two conflicting motivations: the rational economic motivation and the psychological motivation to view themselves as morally sound human beings. People sought to satisfy both motivations at the same time by cheating in a subtle way that does not hurt their positive self-image. Ariely implied that this kind

of self-justification reflected another kind of rationality for flexible human beings: People seek to satisfy multiple and conflicting goals.

## Conclusion

The concept of rationality has provided normative hypotheses on human behavior and has helped psychologists and behavioral economists discover significant findings on the nature of human behavior, including deception. Researchers also have elaborated on the concept of rationality so that it fits the reality of human behavior.

Kayo Sakamoto

Swati Gupta

*Institute of High Performance Computing*

**See Also:** Cognitive Dissonance; Cognitive Heuristics; Lying as Norm in Social Interaction; Lying, Costs of; Morals and Ethics; Self-Justification.

## Further Readings

Ariely, D. *The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty*. New York: HarperCollins, 2012.

Becker, G. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” *The Journal of Political Economy*, v.76 (1968).

Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg. “Promises and Partnership.” *Econometrica*, v.74/6 (2006).

Gneezy, U. “Deception, the Role of Consequences.” *The American Economic Review*, v.95/1 (2005).

Simon, H. A. “Rationality in Psychology and Economics.” *The Journal of Business*, v.59/4 (1986).

---

# Reaction Time

Attempts to diagnose deception using reaction time (RT) date back at least a century. In 1920, William M. Marston—better known as a pioneer of the polygraph—investigated with a stopwatch whether the honest or dishonest reporting of data from printed cards produced faster or slower RTs. In recent decades, advances in chronometry and computing have made the accurate and affordable measurement of RT ever easier. Accordingly, many contemporary researchers have explored

afresh the diagnostic potential of RT. The result has been the development of several promising and efficient lie detection techniques.

### **Rationale**

Why should RT diagnose deception? Everything else being equal, the more complex a mental process is, the longer it takes to unfold. In general, lying is a more complex process than truth-telling. Hence, lying takes longer to unfold. It follows that RT can empirically distinguish lying from truth-telling.

Why is lying a more complex process? There are several reasons. For one thing, lying involves extra cognitive operations. In an honest respondent, an inquiry automatically activates knowledge, which is then directly communicated. In a dishonest respondent, however, knowledge activation is followed by deliberation over whether to tell a lie, and once the decision is made, by an attempt to construct one, entailing the suppression of activated knowledge and its replacement by an appropriate fiction. Moreover, the ongoing challenges of keeping a false narrative straight, of monitoring and managing one's demeanor, and of dealing with the fear of exposure all compound the complexity of lying.

The greater complexity of lying makes it more difficult. Hence, for lying to succeed, relatively more mental effort must be exerted and relatively more mental resources must be available. Tellingly, slower RTs are often accompanied by increased errors. Note that, given the speed-accuracy trade-off, attempts to reduce errors will retard RTs, while attempts to hasten RTs will increase errors.

### **Measurement, Magnification, Manufacture, and Modification Detection Techniques**

RT-based lie detection techniques can be grouped into four classes. Those in the first class involve measurement. They simply capitalize on lying being naturally more complex than truth-telling. Those in the second involve magnification. They amplify the foregoing natural difference. Those in the third involve manufacture. They engineer an entirely artificial situation in which slower RTs diagnose deception. Those in the fourth involve modification. They take an existing paradigm and add RT measurements to it.

On occasion, techniques in all classes detect deception comparatively well. The jury is still out, however, on whether they will ultimately prove robust to countermeasures or practical to implement. The techniques are described as follows:

*Measurement.* When respondents lie, their verbal replies to spontaneous inquiries take longer. Yet this effect seems confined to inquiries that arouse emotion; plain facts can be lied about just as quickly. However, if verbal inquiries are repeated and verbal responses to them dichotomized (for example, as yes/no), or if statements are presented on a computer for digital classification, then the effect emerges solidly for plain facts too. True, prior practice at lying, by decreasing RTs generally, attenuates diagnostic accuracy. However, taking errors into account alongside RT augments accuracy.

*Magnification.* If lying is cognitively more complex, but truth-telling is cognitively simpler, then the imposition of a concurrent mental load should interfere more with lying than with truth-telling. This should, despite inducing an overall slowing, amplify differential effects on RT. Sure enough, if liars relate a series of fictitious events backward—something that heavily depletes processing resources—they then speak more slowly and hesitate more often, an effect not observed if they relate that series of events forward. Moreover, observers are better at distinguishing liars from truth-tellers if liars are kept mentally busy by being forced to maintain eye contact, possibly because observers notice, among other things, some revealing increases in RT.

*Manufacture.* In the Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA), respondents rapidly classify statements as true or false by pressing one computer key or another. Crucially, they alternately co-classify two different types of statements: target statements, which are empirically true or false and which may be classified either honestly or dishonestly; and control statements, which are analytically true or false, and which must be classified accurately. Truth-tellers now have an advantage: They can use the same strategy to classify both target and control statements (for example, “p” for all true statements, “q” for all false statements). Liars, in contrast, must use

one strategy to classify target statements (for example, “q” for true and “p” for false), and another to classify control statements (for example, “q” for true and “p” for false), and keep switching between them. Lying is thus made more difficult than truth-telling. Accordingly, liars exhibit longer average RTs than truth-tellers.

A cousin of the TARA is the Autobiographical Implicit Association Test (AIAT). Here, target statements take the form of accusatory or defensive statements, which respondents respectively classify as “guilty” or “innocent.” In one block, control and target statements get co-classified as true/innocent or false/guilty. In another block, they get co-classified as true/guilty or false/innocent. Slower RTs in the former block—driven by incriminating semantic associations—diagnose deception.

*Modification.* The Concealed Information Test (CIT)—a more general version of the Guilty

Knowledge Test (GKT)—works by detecting an orienting response toward selected items that only a guilty liar would recognize. In contrast, an innocent truth-teller, not recognizing any of the items, should not consistently orient toward any item. Traditionally, the orienting response has been operationalized physiologically—most commonly as a peak in skin conductance. However, RT can be readily substituted, or added as an ancillary index.

Respondents completing RT-based CITs classify three types of items: those familiar to everyone, those familiar to liars, and those unfamiliar to everyone. Both truth-tellers and liars accurately affirm recognition of the first type of item and accurately deny recognition of the third type of item. However, whereas truth-tellers honestly deny recognition of the second type of item, liars dishonestly deny it. These dishonest denials take longer than honest denials, permitting liars and



*Observers are better at distinguishing liars from truth-tellers if liars are kept mentally busy with forced, maintained eye contact, possibly because observers notice increases in reaction time. If liars are made to relate a series of fictitious events backward—something that heavily depletes processing resources—they then speak more slowly and hesitate more often than if they were telling the truth.*



truth-tellers to be distinguished. Combining RT with physiological indices also augments diagnostic accuracy.

Aiden P. Gregg  
Sonja Edwards  
*University of Southampton*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Concealed Information Test; History of Deception: 1900 to 1950; History of Deception: 1950 to the Present; Lying, Difficulty of.

### Further Readings

- Gregg, A. P. "When Vying Reveals Lying: The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.21 (2007).
- Marston, W. M. "Reaction Time Symptoms of Deception." *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, v.3 (1920).
- Sartori, G., S. Agosta, C. Zogmaister, S. D. Ferrara, and U. Castiello. "How to Accurately Detect Autobiographical Events." *Psychological Science*, v.19 (2008).
- Verschuere, B., G. Crombez, T. Degrootte, and Y. Rossee. "Detecting Concealed Information With Reaction Times: Validity and Comparison With the Polygraph." *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, v.24 (2010).
- Vrij, A., S. Mann, R. Fisher, S. Leal, B. Milne, and R. Bull. "Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie Detection: The Benefit of Recalling an Event in Reverse Order." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.32 (2008).
- Walczyk, J. J., K. T. Mahoney, D. Doverspike, and D. A. Griffith-Ross. "Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception." *Journal of Business and Psychology*, v.24 (2009).

## Reality Monitoring

Sometimes a question arises as to whether someone actually experienced an event or whether the memory they have of it in their mind is based on imagination. The processes by which a person attributes a memory to an actual experience (external

source) or imagination (internal source) is called reality monitoring. Although the reality monitoring (RM) concept is not related to deception, scholars believe that the concept has this application and can be used as a lie detection tool. Much of the RM deception research is concerned with testing the assumption that RM assessments can be used to discriminate between truth-tellers and liars.

The core of RM is that memories based on real experiences differ in quality from memories based on fiction. In their seminal work on memory characteristics, Marcia Johnson and Carol Raye argued that memories of real experiences are obtained through perceptual processes. These memories are therefore likely to contain (1) sensory information: details of smell, taste or touch, visual details, and details of sound; (2) contextual information: spatial details (details about where the event took place, and details about how objects and people were situated in relation to each other), and temporal details (details about the time order and duration of events) and (3) affective information: details about people's feelings throughout the event. These memories are usually clear, sharp, and vivid.

By contrast, memories about imagined events are derived from an internal source and are therefore likely to contain cognitive operations, such as thoughts and reasoning ("I must have had my coat on, as it was very cold that night"). These are usually vaguer and less concrete.

### Reality Monitoring and Lie Detection

Scholars since 1990 have examined whether RM analyses can be used to discriminate between truths and lies. The assumption these scholars make is that truths are recollections of experienced events, whereas lies are recollections of imagined events. Obviously not all lies are descriptions of events that a person did not experience. Many lies are not about events but are about people's feelings, opinions, or attitudes. And even when people lie about events (about their actions and whereabouts), they can sometimes describe events that they have actually experienced but at a different time. For example, a burglar who denies having committed a burglary last night can claim that he went to the gym instead. He can then truthfully describe a visit he made to the gym but which he made on another occasion.

Researchers have examined whether deceptive statements that are based on events that the liar imagined differ in terms of RM criteria from truthful statements about experienced events. The typical procedure in these studies is that liars and truth-tellers are interviewed, and these interviews are taped and transcribed. RM experts check for the presence of RM criteria in these transcripts. A standardized set of RM deception criteria has not been developed to date. Different researchers use different criteria and sometimes use different definitions for the same criterion.

Most researchers include the following criteria in their RM veracity assessment tool:

*Clarity and vividness of the statement.* This criterion is present if the report is clear, sharp and vivid instead of dim and vague.

*Perceptual information.* This criterion refers to the presence of sensory information in a statement, such as sounds (“He really shouted at me”), smells (“It had a smell of rotten fish”), tastes (“The chips were very salty”), physical sensations (“It really hurt”), and visual details (“I saw the nurse entering the ward”).

*Spatial information.* This criterion refers to information about locations (“It was in a park”) or the spatial arrangement of people and/or objects (“The man was sitting to the left of his wife”).

*Temporal information.* This criterion refers to information about when the event happened (“It was early in the morning”) or explicitly describes a sequence of events (“When he heard all that noise, the visitor became nervous and left”).

*Cognitive operations.* This criterion refers to descriptions of inferences made by the participant at the time of the event (“It appeared to me that she didn’t know the layout of the building”) or inferences/opinions made when describing the event (“She looked smart”).

All criteria are thought to be more present in truthful than in deceptive accounts, except the cognitive operations criterion, which is thought to be present more in deceptive than in truthful accounts. Research has shown general support for

these assumptions, although the support for some criteria, such as temporal and spatial details, is stronger than the support for other criteria, such as cognitive operations. Moreover, truths and lies can be detected above the level of chance with the RM tool, with average truth and lie accuracy scores being just below 70 percent.

There are restrictions in using an RM veracity assessment tool. For example, the tool cannot be used with young children. In some circumstances children do not differentiate between fact and fantasy as clearly as adults do, for several reasons, including that children have a richer imagination than adults. Children may therefore be better than adults at imagining themselves performing acts.

It is probably also difficult to use the RM tool when people talk about events that happened a long time ago. Over time, cognitive operations may develop in memories of experienced events because they facilitate the remembering of events. Someone who drove fast in a foreign country may try to remember this by remembering the actual speed his speedometer indicated; alternatively, he could remember by logical reasoning and by deducing that he must have driven fast because he drove on the motorway. Imagined memories, on the other hand, can become more vivid and concrete over time if people try to visualize what might have happened.

## Conclusion

Reality monitoring refers to the process by which a person attributes a memory to an actual experience (external source) or imagination (internal source). Although the RM concept is not related to deception, it could be applied to deceptive contexts when liars discuss an event that they have imagined rather than experienced. In such situations RM can discriminate between truths and lies at just below 70 percent accuracy. RM cannot be used with very young children or when people talk about events that happened a long time ago.

Aldert Vrij  
University of Portsmouth

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Scientific Content Analysis; Statement Validity Assessment.

### Further Readings

- DePaulo, B. M., J. L. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper, H. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129 (2003).
- Johnson, M. K. and C. L. Raye. "Reality Monitoring." *Psychological Review*, v.88 (1981).
- Lindsay, D. S. "Children's Source Monitoring." In *Children's Testimony: A Handbook of Psychological Research and Forensic Practice*, H. L. Westcott, G. M. Davies, and R. H. C. Bull, eds. Chichester, UK: Wiley and Sons, 2002.
- Masip, J., S. Sporer, E. Garrido, and C. Herrero. "The Detection of Deception With the Reality Monitoring Approach: A Review of the Empirical Evidence." *Psychology, Crime, & Law*, v.11 (2005).
- Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and its Implications for Professional Practice*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2000.

## Relationships: Family

Lying among family members is a complex topic to explore, primarily because of the complex nature of the definition of family structures in general. Additionally, lying within families can be a complex concept to consider because it is often considered a "natural" process, especially when considering the development of children and adolescents in families. The conclusions from this research are numerous. First, studying or defining lying in family units is a complex analysis to draw. Second, lying for different groups of family members has different sets of repercussions. For example, lies told by children are thought to be (to a degree) a natural component of maturation. However, the way lying is viewed changes greatly from childhood to adolescence to adulthood. Each developmental stage is accompanied by its own set of expectations related to lying and deception. Finally, lie-telling in children is thought to be a critical component of their social-cognitive development.

Much more research is needed in the specific areas of lying and deception in nontraditional

and non-nuclear families, such as extended families, parents with adopted children, homosexual couples and their children, and blended families (including stepchildren and half siblings,). Furthermore, more study is needed to address lying norms among siblings, as well as among parents and their children.

The definition of the makeup of a family unit was originally much more concrete than it is today. The traditional definition of a family was a heterosexual, married couple and any biological children that they had together. That definition has since broadened to include heterosexual couples with no children, homosexual couples, foster parents and their foster children, stepchildren, and blended families, among others. Also included are parents who have adopted children, and in some cases even close friend networks are considered family units. With this premise in mind, detecting deception among family relationships can be a complex process.

Three types of lies are prevalent in research on deception and lying: (1) lies to harm others, (2) lies to protect the self, and (3) lies to spare others. Research has been done on lying in television families, and reports show that lies to spare others are the most common types of lies depicted in these families, with the husband/father characters lying the most, the children depicted as the most honest characters, and the majority of lies undetected. More important, researchers argue that these conclusions about television families run parallel to real families. Thus, in actual family units perhaps lies with the purpose of sparing others are in fact the most commonly told. More research needs to be conducted in this area, particularly to determine if this conclusion is valid and, if so, how the patterns among family members relate to patterns in nonfamily groups.

### Parents Teaching Children About Lying

Parents are typically considered the people who are responsible for teaching their children right from wrong, which is deemed part of the normal socialization process. However, it is assumed that there will be some bumps in this instruction, and that correcting those missteps is the way to teach fundamental, moral principles. It is expected that children and/or adolescents will lie to their parents at some point. It is also assumed that parents will

correct this behavior and thus, lying is deemed an immoral behavior. Lying is an action that will often result in punishment in a household.

However, studies on moral development and lying behavior show that children are also taught that lying, in some cases can be seen as acceptable. For example, if a child is asked by a friend if he or she likes the friend's coat, parents teach their children that it is considered to be polite to be a little dishonest. Thus, this process of learning to differentiate right and wrong when it comes to lying can be a complex one.

Also, adolescents face decisions regarding deception, and parents face a new set of challenges when dealing with disciplining or instructing them about the issue. Adolescence is often the time when children will choose to initiate independence from their parents. This can take many forms, but often the question of honesty arises in some vein. The issue of deception among adolescents (and the involvement of their parents) is a complex one because many believe that the openness of the communication environment that parents create in the home has direct impact on whether or not an adolescent will choose to lie or be deceitful. Others believe that the more open a communication environment in the home is, the more freedom adolescents feel to communicate how they choose. Some feel that open communication and firm, strict discipline cannot work together and if parents are too open in their communication with their adolescents, the teens will begin to perceive the openness as a window to make their own poor choices, independent of their parents' wishes or discipline.

Families that have experienced divorce are a rising population, and parents who choose to divorce face a unique set of challenges when it comes to honesty about the situation. Studies have shown, however, that there are strong correlations between whether or not a child feels that he or she was being deceived in the communication about the divorce and the child's overall level of communication satisfaction with their parent. There can be many negative impacts of divorce for children. Some children may have lower self-esteem or a difficulty in developing socially. Studies do show, though, that the way that parents communicate with their children about the divorce can impact the intensity of these repercussions. A

study conducted by Candice E. Thomas, Melanie Booth-Butterfield, and Steve Booth-Butterfield found that children who report feeling deceived in the communication they receive from their parents about an impending divorce feel less satisfied with their communication with their mothers.

### Family Secrecy

Family secrecy is another interesting topic to consider when discussing deception among family members. At times, families have certain rules or norms that are often unspoken but understood. These rules might relate to verbal communication (for example, "children should never speak unless they are spoken to by an adult or initiate conversation as such"), behavior (for example, "our family is always on time"), or emotions (for example, "our family does not openly display negative emotions in public").

Rules about secrecy often apply in family units. Kathleen Galvin and Bernard Brommel state that, "Secrets create or reinforce boundaries—whether between the family and the outside world or around individuals or subsystems." Thus, some secrets may be known to the entire family but not to the outside world, or some secrets may be known only to certain members of the family (intrafamily secrets), or known only to an individual family member (individual secrets). Although lying, being deceitful, and withholding information from others (secret-keeping) are typically thought of as negative constructs, secrecy, in this sense, can have some positive outcomes for the family unit. Sometimes keeping secrets within a family unit can reinforce family identity or a sense of cohesion among the group. For example, if one member is embarrassed by something in particular and the family agrees not to share that information with anyone outside the family, it can make that individual feel cared for and protected. Additionally, simply knowing that there is information that no one else but one's family members know, whether embarrassing information or not, can make a person feel close to his or her family and solidify feelings of solidarity with their family members.

There are, of course, different types of family secrets. Some types, such as those that are in fun, for a surprise, or promote boundaries that are necessary and enhance feelings of solidarity



or comfort, can have positive impacts on the family unit and its relationships. Other types of secrets may have mild to severe consequences for individual family members or the overall family unit. For example, lying (or withholding information) about an affair or dangerous addiction may severely impair the communication climate within the family. Even more dangerous are types of secrets that could put a family member in immediate danger, such as keeping secrets about sexual, physical, or emotional abuse. Thus, the type of secrecy involved in familial interactions can greatly affect the overall communication climate among family members. Secrets can be positive in that they achieve positive boundaries and redefine relationships and closeness, but secrecy among family members can also be detrimental to individual members and/or the family as a whole. The hinge point in this question primarily depends on the function and purpose of the secrecy.

Additionally, secrecy among families may not solely exist for the present family unit. Secrets are frequently passed down through multiple generations and, again, this can have positive or negative ramifications for families depending on the type of secrecy and the purpose in keeping the secret. Perhaps more important than the actual secrets themselves, patterns involved in secret-keeping among families can be passed down through generations as well. Thus, secret-keeping and the motivations behind it can be a learned behavior that spans generations and affects the communication climate of each family unit along the generational line.

Ashley Joiner George  
Carol Bishop Mills  
*University of Alabama*

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Betrayal; Childhood, Lying in; Emotions; Honesty; Secrecy.

### Further Readings

- Bristol, T. and T. F. Mangleburg. "Not Telling the Whole Story: Teen Deception In Purchasing." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, v.33/1 (2005).
- Dandekar, N. "Fostering Honesty in Communication Between Parent and Child in the Setting of Family

Mediation." *The Florida Communication Journal*, v18/2 (1990).

- Galvin, K. M. and B. J. Brommel. *Family Communication: Cohesion and Change*. 5th ed. New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 2000.
- Heyman, G. D. and M. A. Sweet. "Children's Reasoning About Lie-Telling and Truth-Telling in Politeness Contexts." *Social Development*, v.18/3 (2009).
- Mazur, M. and P. J. Kalbfleisch. "Lying and Deception Detection in Television Families." *Communication Research Reports*, v.20/3 (2003).
- Talwar, V. and K. Lee. "Social and Cognitive Correlates of Children's Lying Behavior." *Child Development*, v.79/4 (2008).
- Thomas, C. E., M. Booth-Butterfield, and S. Booth-Butterfield. "Perceptions of Deception, Divorce Disclosures, and Communication Satisfaction With Parents." *Western Journal of Communication*, v.59 (1995).
- White, J. M. and D. M. Klein. *Family Theories*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008.

## Relationships: Friends

Friendships play a crucial role in the lives of most people. However, when young adults were asked to describe an experience in which someone hurt their feelings, the most commonly described experience was being hurt by a close friend. Hurt feelings in friendships often result from situations in which one friend communicates a hurtful but honest message. Lies—particularly lies told to spare a friend's feelings—may play an important role in the maintenance of friendships.

According to studies in which people recorded information about every social interaction they had over a period of a week, people lie at least once per day on average. However, people lie less frequently to those people who are closest to them. Researchers have found that people lie in 21 to 27 percent of their interactions with friends, whereas they lie in 35 to 48 percent of their interactions with acquaintances and strangers. In another study, people reported telling approximately two lies per week to their best friend.

### Lies Told To Friends

The types of lies people tell to their friends tend to differ from the types of lies people tell to acquaintances or strangers. In friendships, people are more likely to tell altruistic lies (that is, lies told to spare a friend's feelings or to enhance a friend's well-being) than self-centered lies (that is, lies told to spare one's own feelings or to make oneself look better). In acquaintanceships and in interactions between strangers, the reverse is true. Friends who tell more altruistic lies have higher ratings of closeness and relationship satisfaction than do friends who tell more self-centered lies.

People often lie to friends when telling the truth would involve violating their friends' expectations or impressions. Lies involving intrasexual rivalry fall into this category. In a study in which participants described lies told to friends, the second most common type of lies (following altruistic lies) were lies about intrasexual rivalry (for example, interest in the same potential mate, or even mate poaching). Because people are frequently similar to their friends, there is the potential for mate competition with friends. Fifty percent of people report some degree of intrasexual rivalry with their friends.

The third most common types of lies in friendships were lies about sexual experience and promiscuity. Women were particularly likely to lie to their friends about their own sexual experience, perhaps in part because some women report that they dislike being friends with promiscuous women, whom they may see as potential rivals.

Of course, some lies are told to friends simply to avoid conflict and unpleasantness. People commonly lie to friends when they don't want to comply with a friend's request. For example, one might pretend to have carried out a friend's request when in fact one did not do so, or one might make a false excuse regarding why one does not want to comply with the request.

While it is true that people lie less frequently—and usually with more altruistic motives—to their friends than to strangers, the lies individuals tell to friends tend to be more serious. Most lies to acquaintances and strangers are relatively inconsequential; people usually do not ruminate over or feel guilty about these lies. However, when people are asked to recount the most serious lie

they have ever told—as well as the most serious lie ever told to them—they generally recount lies with close relationship partners (that is, friends, romantic partners, and family members).

### Social Acceptability of Lying to Friends

How socially acceptable (or unacceptable) is it to lie to a friend? Although people generally think it is less acceptable to lie to friends than to strangers, and they feel more discomfort when they lie to close friends, there are certain types of lies that are considered acceptable and useful within friendships. Cross-cultural research in the United States and China has shown that people feel it is acceptable to lie to their friends when those lies serve to protect their friend's feelings, promote affiliation, benefit their friend, preserve privacy, or avoid conflict within the relationship.

Furthermore, people who lie in the service of helping their friends make a positive impression on a potential suitor are considered particularly likeable. Although women are especially likely to lie to protect their friends' feelings, they are more likely than men to think lying is unacceptable in close relationships. Compared to men, women report that past lies told to them were more significant, women are more likely to be upset by the lies, and women are more likely to feel guilty about telling lies in close relationships.

### Detecting a Friend's Lie

Several factors influence how upset people will be when they discover that their friend has lied to them. The closer the friendship, the more important the lie, and the greater the importance one attaches to lying generally, the more upset one will be about the lie. The perceived importance of the deceptive information is the strongest predictor of termination of a close relationship. In one cross-cultural study conducted in the United States and Russia, participants believed that serious lies of omission (such as neglecting to tell a friend that his or her romantic partner has been unfaithful) would be such a serious friendship violation that they would end the friendship.

Of course, people are upset by friends' lies if they realize they have been lied to. People are notoriously unskilled at detecting lies; whether they are any better at lie detection in friendships is a topic of some debate. When people are given



*Circle of truth or web of deception? Research has shown that people lie less frequently to others closest to them. The rate of lying is 21 to 27 percent of interactions with friends, whereas people lie in 35 to 48 percent of their interactions with acquaintances and strangers. However, when people are asked about the most serious lie in their memory, they generally recount lies with close relationships.*

feedback regarding the deceptive cues for a particular sender, they improve at detecting lies told by that particular sender. This would seem to imply that relationship experiences improve one's ability to detect lies within that relationship; however, such improvement may be contingent on receiving accurate feedback. If one fails to detect a friend's lie, one essentially receives false feedback because any deceptive cues displayed by the friend are perceived as truthful.

Counterintuitive though it may be, the ability to detect lies may not be an inevitable concomitant of relationship familiarity. Across a variety of experimental paradigms, there is no unqualified support for the notion that friends are uniformly better (or worse) than strangers at detecting each other's lies. Likewise, there is no firm evidence that people are any better or worse across the board at detecting a friend's lies than a spouse's lies. However, there is some evidence that close friends are more accurate at detecting lies than less close friends, and close friends

are especially likely to improve in their lie detection accuracy during the first few months of friendship.

An important impediment to friends' ability to detect each other's deception may be the truth bias; people generally have a greater bias to interpret communications as truthful for friends than for strangers. Researchers have diminished the truth bias by encouraging judges to be highly suspicious. However, one model of relationship closeness posits that when individuals are close to each other, they will be subconsciously motivated toward "empathic inaccuracy" when they encounter information that is potentially threatening to the relationship. In these instances, it may be better for the friendship for lies to go unnoticed. One study found that close friends were worse than less close friends at correctly judging concealed anger and sadness, emotions which could threaten a relationship.

Most studies of deception detection involve videotaped senders telling lies and truths, along

with judges who watch these videotapes. But some researchers have questioned how externally valid this paradigm is. In real life, people often rely on sources such as conflicting evidence and gossip from third parties to detect lies. In this sense, friends should have a clear advantage over acquaintances and strangers because their relationships would more frequently allow them access to evidence and gossip. Furthermore, to the extent that friends do have an advantage, it may be due to the fact that people judge behavior that looks “different from the norm” as deceptive—and friends have a better idea of the sender’s “norm.”

Could people be aware that something is “off” when they hear a lie, without realizing that their fishy feeling is indicative of a lie? There is evidence to indicate that such “implicit deception detection” occurs in friendships. In one study, both friends and strangers felt less comfortable, less confident, less informed, and more suspicious when they heard a lie rather than a truth—even when they could not identify the communication explicitly as a lie.

Most studies comparing friends’ deception detection ability to that of strangers, acquaintances, and romantic partners have focused on the skill (or lack of skill) of the judges. Equally important, however, is the question of whether senders lie differently to friends than to other people. One study found that people exhibit more arousal and negative affect when lying to strangers than when lying to friends. People may also lie differently to closer friends versus less close friends. Women report planning their lies told to close friends more carefully than their lies told to casual friends; men plan their lies to casual friends more carefully than their lies to close friends.

## Conclusion

Individuals lie less frequently, more altruistically, and about more serious topics to friends than to acquaintances and strangers. People are most upset by lies told by closer friends and by lies perceived as important. Women are more likely than men to be upset by lies in friendships. However, lies told to friends may serve to avoid conflict and maintain the friendship. Although closeness may improve lie detection accuracy among friends,

close friends may also be motivated not to recognize lies that might threaten their friendship if discovered.

R. Weylin Sternglanz  
Nova Southeastern University  
Wendy L. Morris  
McDaniel College

**See Also:** Adolescence; Anthropology, Cultural; Aroused Suspicion; Deception Detection Accuracy; DePaulo, Bella; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Lies, Types of; Men; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; Truth Bias; Women.

## Further Readings

- Anderson, D. E., M. E. Ansfield, and B. M. DePaulo. “Love’s Best Habit: Deception in the Context of Relationships.” In *The Social Context of Nonverbal Behavior*, P. Philippot, R. S. Feldman, E. J. Coats, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Bleske, A. L. and T. K. Shackelford. “Poaching, Promiscuity, and Deceit: Combatting Mating Rivalry in Same-Sex Friendships.” *Personal Relationships*, v.8 (2001).
- DePaulo, B. M. D. A. Kashy. “Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- DePaulo, B. M., W. L. Morris, and R. W. Sternglanz. “When the Truth Hurts: Deception in the Name of Kindness.” In *Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships*, A. L. Vangelisti, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Levine, T. R., S. A. McCornack, and P. B. Avery. “Sex Differences in Emotional Reactions to Discovered Deception.” *Communication Quarterly*, v.40 (1992).
- McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. “When Lies are Uncovered: Emotional and Relational Outcomes of Discovered Deception.” *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).
- Metts, S. “An Exploratory Investigation of Deception in Close Relationships.” *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.6 (1989).
- Sternglanz, R. W. and B. M. DePaulo. “Reading Nonverbal Cues to Emotions: The Advantages and Liabilities of Relationship Closeness.” *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, v.28 (2004).



## Relationships: Romantic

Deception is widely defined as the intentional manipulation of information so as to instill a false belief within a recipient. Deception within romantic relationships involves deceiving a person one counts as a romantic love interest or partner.

The late scholar Gerald (G. R.) Miller argued that three aspects of romantic involvements should combine to make deception in such relationships both unique and potentially volatile. First, romantic partners share an intimate personal history. This affords them a broad and deep information base about each other—creating both the potential for enhanced detection (through noting inconsistencies between what partners say in the current context versus past knowledge of partners' true beliefs and experiences) as well as exploitation of this information as the basis for deceiving (that is, knowledge of what makes a partner suspicious, and what one can and cannot say in order to be believed).

Romantic partners also share a great deal of time together. Frequent interaction allows for both the possibility of deception as well as opportunity for questioning that leads to detection. Finally, romantic partners often share an intense emotional bond. This amplifies the personal and relationship outcomes associated with honesty and deception, in paradoxical ways. On one hand, partners involved in such relationships are compelled to lie in order to protect partners' feelings and maintain relationship harmony—both of which are exceedingly important in romantic involvements. On the other hand, if/when such lies are discovered the reaction should be intense and traumatic.

### Studies of Deception in Romantic Relationships

Scientific examinations of deception in relationships bear out the reasoning of Miller, especially with regard to the frequency and importance of lying. For example, Ronnie Turner and his colleagues had relationship partners record self-judged "important" conversations and then self-analyze the percentage of statements that were "less than honest." Turner found that fully 61.5 percent of statements in important relationship conversations were judged by the people who defined them as "less than honest." But rather

than viewing this ubiquitous dishonesty as problematic, participants in Turner's study defended it, arguing that fidelity to the maintenance of a close relationship trumps unbridled truth in terms of aiding and enhancing intimacy.

In a similar fashion, Sandra Metts and Helen Chronis examined the types and motives of deception for friends, dating partners, engaged couples, and spouses. They found that the most common reasons people involved in romantic relationships cited for lying were to protect partners' feelings and maintain their relationship.

Perhaps the most detailed examination to date of motives for romantic deception is the work of Susan Boon and Beverly McLeod. When participants in their study were asked whether "complete honesty" was important for maintaining a romantic relationship, only 27 percent of their sample said yes; the vast majority said that "it depends on the situation." In addition, fully two-thirds of their respondents agreed that deception is defensible, especially within situations in which partners' feelings, esteem, or the survival of the relationship are at stake.

### Lie Detection in Romantic Relationships

Given the widespread occurrence and support for deception in romantic relationships, can partners involved in such unions detect each other's lies? Intuition would say yes: a common belief is that people can detect the lies of their loved ones with greater accuracy than those of strangers.

Science, on the other hand, would say no. Researchers Steven McCornack and Malcolm Parks examined the deception detection abilities of romantic couples. They found that increases in romantic intimacy led partners to believe that they could, in fact, detect their partners' lies (that is, confidence in detection ability). At the same time, this increase in confidence was associated directly with an increased belief that the "partner is always telling me the truth," which McCornack and Parks labeled "truth bias." Truth bias, in turn, was directly negatively related to accuracy in detecting deception. That is, individuals involved in romantic relationships believe that they can detect their partners' lies, believe that their partners never lie to them, and are decidedly poor in actual deception detection accuracy. This causal string is known as the McCornack-Parks Model.

But Gerald Miller's reasoning also suggests that when lies are discovered in romantic relationships, the effects should be devastating. The first study to focus exclusively on reactions to discovered deception was the work of Steven McCornack and Timothy Levine. Drawing upon Ellen Berscheid's theory of emotion, as well as prior work in cognition and relational deception, McCornack and Levine argued that relational intimacy, the importance of the information that is lied about, suspicion, and the degree to which lying itself is viewed as a transgression should all impact emotional reactions to discovered deception.

Analyzing the self-reports of several hundred respondents, McCornack and Levine found confirmation for their predictions. They also examined the impact of these variables upon relationship termination. They found that negativity and intensity of emotional reaction, and importance of the information, all significantly predicted relationship termination, the most influential factor being information importance. In 67.4 percent of the cases in which the relationship had ended, the discovery of deception was cited as the cause for the breakup.

Bolstering the findings of McCornack and Levine, Tim Cole analyzed the effects that deception had upon romantic relationship dynamics. He found that perception of a partner being dishonest had a substantial negative effect upon both commitment and satisfaction.

Of course, the preceding discussions raise the question, if people involved in romantic relationships can't detect deception, how is it discovered? In contrast to popular views that communicators detect lies on the spot by noting anomalous source behaviors, the bulk of actual deception detection occurs through incidental discovery. For example, Hee Sun Park, Timothy Levine, and colleagues examined self-reports from more than 200 individuals who recently had discovered lies. Their data suggest that, overwhelmingly, lies are discovered not through direct behavioral detection but instead through third-party information or the discovery of incriminating evidence. In only four instances in the entire data set did participants report having detected a lie through verbal and nonverbal behaviors at the moment it was delivered.

Steven McCornack  
Michigan State University

**See Also:** Courtship, Deception in; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Infidelity; Internet: Online Dating; McCornack-Parks Model; Relationships: Sexual; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Boon, S. D. and B. A. McLeod. "Deception in Romantic Relationships: Subjective Estimates of Success at Deceiving and Attitudes Toward Deception." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18 (2001).
- Cole, T. "Lying to the One You Love: The Use of Deception in Romantic Relationships." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.18 (2001).
- McCornack, S. A. and M. R. Parks. "Deception Detection Accuracy in Dating Relationships: The Other Side of Trust." In *Communication Yearbook* 9, M. L. McLaughlin, ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1986.
- Metts, S. and H. Chronis. "Relational Deception: An Exploratory Analysis." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Chicago, May 1986.
- Miller, G. R., P. A. Mongeau, and C. Sleight. "Fudging With Friends and Lying to Lovers: Deceptive Communication in Personal Relationships." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.3 (1986).
- Park, H. S., T. R. Levine, S. A. McCornack. K. Morrison, and M. Ferrara. "How People Really Detect Lies." *Communication Monographs*, v.69 (2002).
- Turner, R. E., C. Edgley, and G. Olmstead. "Information Control in Conversations: Honesty Is Not Always the Best Policy." *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, v.11 (1975).

---

## Relationships: Sexual

Sex is a fundamental human need that serves many important purposes, both physical and psychological. When this need is strongly felt, some people will do just about anything in order to fulfill it, which may include telling lies or deceiving others in an attempt to get them into bed. People do not just lie in order to get sex, though—some people also deceive their partners during the sex

act. For instance, people may pretend to have an orgasm when they are ready for sex to end. In addition, people often lie about their sexual experiences after the fact. In some situations, under-reporting one's sexual history can yield benefits (e.g., protecting one's reputation), whereas in other cases, exaggerating or boasting about one's sexual experiences gives way to personal gain (popularity or fame). From beginning to end, lying and deception thus permeate many sexual relationships, and this has a number of important health and social consequences.

Decades of psychological research have demonstrated that people are often less than forthright when pursuing sexual partners. In order for someone to be sexually attractive, he or she needs to create a desirable impression. However, total and complete honesty will not always enhance sex appeal; sometimes, honesty can actually have the opposite effect. Deception is an easy way to enhance one's perceived desirability, and it is often successful. Consequently, deception is incredibly tempting in the seduction process, and is frequently employed, with studies indicating that one in four to one in five people admit having intentionally lied to another person at least once in order to have sex.

Some forms of sexual deception appear to be socially accepted, such as making minor alterations to one's physical appearance. This includes the use of makeup and hair dye, certain cosmetic procedures (such as breast implants), as well as specialty bras and underwear that enhance the appearance of one's bodily assets. However, there is a risk in modifying one's appearance too far (to the point where the deception becomes obvious), in which case there may be social penalties. Enhancing one's desirability by deceiving others about one's personal characteristics (such as lying about one's income, occupation, or achievements) or relationship history (hiding one's marital status and children), or by making false proclamations of love also happens with some frequency; however, these are less socially acceptable forms of deception.

Another way that people may attempt to enhance their perceived sexual desirability is by selectively revealing their sexual histories. For instance, when exchanging histories with a prospective romantic partner, people often report

that they are less experienced than they really are. Most commonly, this involves under-reporting one's previous number of sexual partners. Under-reporting sexual experience can reduce a partner's anxiety by creating fewer concerns about sexually transmitted infections (STIs); however, it can also enhance attractiveness in cultures where virginity is prized. Some women have taken this one step further by having their hymens surgically restored, with the goal of convincing their partner of their virginity. Many people view the presence of a hymen (a thin piece of tissue covering the vaginal opening) as proof of virginity; however, the presence or absence of a hymen is not necessarily a reliable predictor of virginity because activities other than sex (such as exercise) can cause the hymen to break.

In addition to under-reporting sexual experience, people frequently lie about having unusual sexual interests (fetishes), their previous condom use habits, and their STI history because they know that the truth might be a turnoff to certain partners. For example, persons with incurable STIs (such as HIV or genital herpes) often do not disclose their infection status to partners because they fear a negative reaction. In a review of studies concerning HIV disclosure among men who have sex with men, Kathleen Sullivan found that 12 to 33 percent of HIV positive participants reported failing to reveal their infection status to their primary sex partners. Such deception has important public health consequences because it makes it difficult for people to accurately assess their risks and take appropriate precautions.

### **Deception During Sex**

Perhaps the most common form of deception that takes place during sex is the false orgasm. Research by Charlene Muehlenhard and Sheena Shippee on college students found that 25 percent of men and 50 percent of women had previously faked an orgasm with at least one sexual partner. It is possible that males fake orgasm less because the male orgasm typically produces more physical evidence, which is more difficult to fake. Fake orgasms most commonly occur during sexual intercourse (as opposed to other sexual activities), and they typically involve some mix of bodily acting (clenching muscles and breathing faster) and vocal acting (moaning and screaming). Contrary

to popular belief, most people who have faked orgasms report having done so with an established romantic partner, as opposed to a casual partner they had just met.

People report a variety of reasons for faking orgasms, including the recognition that an actual orgasm was not going to happen, a desire for sex to be over, the avoidance of negative consequences (to prevent a partner from having hurt feelings), as well as to obtain positive consequences (pleasing one's partner). Research has found that men are more likely to have faked it because they wanted to be done with sex, whereas women are more likely to have faked it because they wanted to make their partner happy.

### **Sexual Deception in Other Contexts**

People do not just lie about their sex lives to their sexual partners—they also lie to the rest of the world. However, the nature of the lies told depends upon the nature of the audience, as well as prevailing cultural and societal views of sex. Politicians and celebrities frequently cover up their sexual histories (e.g., concealing a gay or bisexual identity, or denying an affair) in order to protect their moral credentials or reputation. In contrast, other persons may find that providing a more accurate account of or perhaps even exaggerating one's sexual history can yield personal gain. For instance, in some Western cultures, men are accorded popularity and social status for having an extensive sexual history, which may lead some men to embellish upon or boast about their past. Likewise, individuals who have affairs with prominent politicians or celebrities may choose to reveal that information (or even fabricate it in some cases) in the hope that it will become a springboard to fame and fortune.

Sexual dishonesty also occurs in scientific contexts, which hampers the ability to obtain an accurate understanding of human sexual behavior. Tendencies toward socially desirable responding have been well documented in the arena of sex research. In any scientific study, research subjects do not necessarily know who will see their responses or how their responses will be used. However, when given a survey about an especially personal and private matter such as sex, feelings of threat and worries about potential embarrassment can be very strong and promote an even

higher degree of dishonesty than usual. This is particularly true for women, who are under greater social pressure to maintain an appearance of sexual propriety. In a classic study by Michele Alexander and Terri Fisher, male and female college students were asked about their sexual attitudes and behaviors under one of three conditions. In the “bogus pipeline” condition, participants were hooked up to a polygraph and were falsely led to believe that the machine could detect whether they were telling the truth.

In the “exposure threat” condition, participants were not hooked up to a polygraph and instead were led to believe that one of their peers might be able to see their responses. In the “anonymous” condition, participants were assured that all of their responses would remain completely anonymous and were given complete privacy to complete the questionnaire. In general, women's responses tended to fluctuate more across conditions than men's. For example, whereas men reported having relatively similar numbers of sexual partners across conditions (3.7 to 4.2), the range for women was much larger (2.6 to 4.4). Moreover, women reported being the most sexually experienced in the bogus pipeline condition and the least experienced in the exposure threat condition (the anonymous condition fell in between). These findings indicate that women are more likely than men to consider the potential social consequences when reporting on their sexual behaviors and, therefore, may be more inclined to respond in socially acceptable ways.

In order to reduce tendencies toward socially desirable responding in sex research, scientists typically provide strict assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, which helps to some degree. Additionally, sexual scientists are increasingly turning to biological measures whenever possible (e.g., brain imaging and devices that assess genital arousal) instead of subjective self-reports because it is harder to fake physiological responses. The downside to biological measures is that they cannot answer all questions of interest (such as sexual history).

Lying and deception are common elements of human sexual relationships and are employed to achieve a number of distinct goals. For example, deceptive self-presentation may be used to obtain sex, fake orgasms may be used to end unsatisfying



sexual events, and selective self-reporting of one's sexual history may be used to maintain a certain social image. This tendency toward sexual dishonesty not only poses certain public health threats, but it also creates a number of challenges for scientists who study sexual relationships.

Justin J. Lehmiller  
Harvard University

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Clinton, Bill; Courtship, Deception in; Deception Detection Accuracy; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Edwards, John; Infidelity; Internet: Online Dating; Men; Relationships: Romantic; Women.

### Further Readings

- Alexander, M. G. and T. D. Fisher. "Truth and Consequences: Using the Bogus Pipeline to Examine Sex Differences in Self-Reported Sexuality." *Journal of Sex Research*, v.40 (2003).
- Marelich, W. D., J. Lundquist, K. Painter, and M. B. Mechanic. "Sexual Deception as a Social-Exchange Process: Development of a Behavior-Based Sexual Deception Scale." *Journal of Sex Research*, v.45 (2008).
- Muehlenhard, C. L. and S. K. Shippee. "Men's and Women's Reports of Pretending Orgasm." *Journal of Sex Research*, v.47 (2010).
- Sullivan, K. M. "Male Self-Disclosure of HIV-Positive Serostatus to Sex Partners: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care*, v.16 (2005).
- Toma, C. L., J. T. Hancock, and N. B. Ellison. "Separating Fact From Fiction: An Examination of Deceptive Self-Presentation in Online Dating Profiles." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.34 (2008).

proponents believe that repression is a mental mechanism that helps individuals deny the reality of true traumatic experiences. On the other hand, critics of the concept of repression argue that efforts to "recover" repressed memories can lead to very rich, seemingly real, false memories for events that never happened. What these opposing views have in common is that both implicate repression in the self-deceptive functions of memory.

The concept of repression gained widespread attention from the writings of Sigmund Freud at the end of the 19th century. Freud argued that memories of traumatic, threatening, or otherwise unacceptable experiences can be repressed into the unconscious, where they are effectively walled off and inaccessible to the conscious mind, in effect, deceiving the repressor to falsely assume that things that did happen actually did not. Nevertheless, Freud argued, the repressed content remains accurately represented in the unconscious mind, and may leak from the unconscious into dreams and into waking life in the form of problematic clinical symptoms. Among the goals of therapy, as envisioned by Freud, was the reintroduction of the repressed content into conscious awareness, where it could be addressed and facilitate improvement of the symptoms.

Freud's theories have been highly influential in the therapeutic community, in which they formed the basis of three widespread assumptions: (1) that memories of traumatic experiences are particularly likely to be repressed; (2) that, while repressed, the memories do not fade but remain unchanged and undistorted for as long as decades; and (3) that they may be recovered unchanged through a variety of common therapeutic techniques. Each of these assumptions has been vigorously contested in a controversy that has come to be known among psychologists as the "memory wars."

## Repressed Memories

Among the most interesting ways individuals can deceive themselves is through memory. Though there are countless undisputed ways in which memory fails or becomes distorted, the concept of "repression" has been among the most controversial in modern psychology. On one hand,

### Repressed Memories of Sexual Abuse

This sharp division, largely between practicing therapists versus memory and clinical scientists, emerged in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to increasingly frequent reports of memories of sexual abuse that had allegedly been repressed, sometimes for as long as decades, and later recovered by patients in therapy. In part,

these reports were fueled by the publication of several popular books arguing for the widespread prevalence of sexual abuse and of repression of memories of abuse, such as *The Courage to Heal: A Guide for Women Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse* (1988) and *Secret Survivors: Uncovering Incest and its Aftereffects in Women* (1990). These and similar books listed a large number of clinical symptoms alleged to reflect buried memories of sexual abuse and recommended various personal procedures to “recover” these memories and begin to heal the trauma of the abuse.

Along with increasing cultural awareness of the real prevalence of child sexual abuse, these publications encouraged many distressed people to attribute their symptoms to sexual abuse they

couldn't remember and to take action to recover their repressed memories of the abuse they assumed must have occurred. Similarly, many therapists were encouraged to attribute their patients' symptoms to unremembered abuse and, as a result, actively encouraged their patients to believe they had been abused and to undergo a number of therapeutic procedures with the goal of recovering the (presumed) repressed memories.


Concurrently, during the late 1980s and early 1990s some states relaxed their statutes of limitation, allowing criminal or civil actions to be filed based on testimony of those who claimed they had only recently recovered their memories of abuse or other crimes, sometimes many decades after the crime had allegedly occurred. The amended statutes began at the time the memories were allegedly recovered, rather than at the time of the alleged original events. This allowed alleged victims to file legal actions against parents, neighbors, priests, and others for abuse or other crimes based on alleged actions decades in the past, memories for which had been recovered in therapy.

In response to these events and to pleas for help from those claiming to have been falsely accused, some clinical and memory scientists began to contest such claims in earnest and to investigate the potential for many therapeutic techniques to plant false memories in those who undergo them. During the memory wars that followed, each side offered evidence favoring their positions that was largely discounted by the other.

### The Memory Wars

Proponents of repression have primarily focused on attempts to document real-life instances of repression of traumatic memories that were later recovered either spontaneously or during therapy or other memory recovery procedures. Two types of such studies have been reported. Retrospective memory studies have asked adults who report that they had been abused whether there had ever been a time when they forgot their abuse (referred to as the “do you remember whether you ever forgot” method). If they do report times when they did not or could not remember, their forgetting is considered to reflect repression.

Prospective memory studies identify apparently verified victims of abuse and follow up with them



*Sigmund Freud in 1926. At the end of the 19th century, Freud argued that memories of traumatic or threatening experiences can be repressed into the unconscious where they are effectively walled off from the conscious mind, deceiving the repressor into falsely assuming that certain events did not occur.*

later, inquiring about whether they had ever been abused. Those who do not report a memory of being abused are considered to have repressed the abuse. Though such studies purport to provide evidence of repression, they have been widely criticized for failing to establish one of the following necessary elements to establish repression and memory recovery: (1) that the original event did occur, (2) that the event was traumatic (otherwise repression should not occur), (3) that the person was unable to remember the event for a period of time, (4) that the person actually did not remember the abuse during the alleged interval of repression, (5) that the cause of the failure to remember was repression rather than normal failures of memory, and (6) that the “recovered” memories correspond to the verified instance(s) of abuse.

In contrast to the proponents of repression, memory and clinical scientists have widely argued that traumatic experiences are actually more likely to be remembered, that there is virtually no credible scientific support for the concept of repression, and that many suggestive influences within and outside therapy can cause the development of rich, false memories of events that never happened. Moreover, they have pointed out that highly implausible memories have been recovered in some therapies, memories such as past lives, in utero experiences, birth, memories before the age of 2, alien abduction, and satanic ritualistic abuse. Though many patients believe their memories are real and experience them as highly vivid and emotional, as is true for real traumatic memories, even such false memories as these can be generated through suggestive procedures.

Many laboratory studies have demonstrated that false autobiographical memories can indeed be created by common suggestive and therapeutic procedures, including suggestive questioning, hypnosis, guided imagery, dream interpretation, and others. Proponents of repression, on the other hand, have criticized such studies, suggesting while these influences may lead to false memories of relatively unimportant events, they are unlikely to do so for events as serious as sexual abuse and other traumatic events.

### **Repression and Deception**

Though the controversy over the reality of repression is unlikely to be fully resolved in the near

future, it is clear that there are many levels at which repression is implicated in deception of oneself and of others. Repression itself, if real, is a form of self-deception facilitating the denial of real, but unacceptable, experiences. Even if repression were to exist, efforts to recover the purported repressed memories can at least distort memories of real events, or worse, create rich, false memories for events that never happened. Either, in effect, can make the person an “honest liar” who believes in the reality of the memories, yet who is deceiving both him or herself and those who are told about the memories, with potentially devastating consequences for those implicated in criminal activities and for the families, relationships, careers, and lives destroyed by the allegations based on the memories.

Moreover, claims for the reality of repression and recovery of memories for crimes such as sexual abuse present opportunities for those who would deliberately deceive. Where there is potential for lucrative monetary awards, for revenge or punishment of a disliked foe, or for other practical gains, there can be temptation for accusers to knowingly lie, citing repression as a mechanism to explain why they had not previously reported the events in question. Some have argued that false claims of repression have been deliberately brought forth to help accusers negate the effects of a statute of limitations that would otherwise prevent a criminal or civil action after a specific period of time has passed.

Moreover, the self-deception and self-justification processes can affect the memories of those who begin with a knowing lie regarding repression. The knowing perpetration of a lie with devastating impact for the target can pose a significant threat to self-esteem. This can be averted if the person comes to believe the lie is actually the truth. Moreover, if the person needs to give the appearance of truth by entering therapy and otherwise behaving as if trying to recover a real memory, such activities can themselves create a false memory that seems real to the accuser. Thus, the liar might come to sincerely believe he or she was telling the truth all along.

Even the position one takes with respect to the reality of repression and recovery of traumatic memories is subject to processes of self-deception and self-justification. The monetary interests of

“recovered memory therapists,” for example, could motivate belief in the concept of repression and motivate denial that they could be promoting a false concept to distressed clients.

Altogether, given the entanglement of the issue of repression with the legal system, claims of repression have offered a fertile field for deception, whether deliberate deception for gain, or unintended self-deception and “honest lying.”

Lawrence Patihis  
*University of California, Irvine*  
 Deborah Davis  
*University of Nevada, Reno*  
 Elizabeth F. Loftus  
*University of California, Irvine*

**See Also:** Denial; False Confession; False Memories; Memory; Reality Monitoring; Self-Deception; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

Bass, E. and L. Davis *The Courage to Heal: A Guide for Women Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse*. New York: Perennial Library, 1988.

Belli, R. F. *True and False Recovered Memories: Toward a Reconciliation of the Debate*. Vol. 58. New York: Springer Science, 2012.

Blume, E. S. *Secret Survivors: Uncovering Incest and Its Aftereffects in Women*. New York: Wiley, 1990.

Davis, D. and E. F. Loftus. “The Scientific Status of ‘Repressed’ and ‘Recovered’ Memories of Sexual Abuse.” In *Psychological Science in the Courtroom: Consensus and Controversy*, J. L. Skeem and S. O. Lilienfeld, eds. New York: Guilford Press, 2009.

Loftus, E. F. and K. Ketcham. *The Myth of Repressed Memory*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

or dividing societies. Because of the importance of reputation in starting or continuing a personal relationship or business deal, or in gaining employment, individuals and groups engage in various efforts to control, shape, and protect their reputations. These efforts might include lying and deception or resorting to violence as means to protect or promote a reputation.

Psychologists such as Sigmund Freud, Carl Rogers, and Alfred Adler discussed various forms of lying and deception as psychological defense mechanisms that individuals might utilize in order to manufacture and protect their image in front of themselves and others. Such defense mechanisms, if overutilized, can contribute to various psychological symptoms. Some psychologists argue that keeping and creating one’s reputation in the form of a life narrative is a major human motive. Research on reputation has focused on the biological and evolutionary bases of reputation, types of reputation, the role of reputation in personal relationships and friendships, and the role of reputation in business. Recently, research has considered the consequences of the new Internet, technological, and communication advancements on reputation, especially among youth, and the mental and physical health consequences of reputation construction or damage.

Deception can be seen as part of nature. Camouflaging is a known natural mechanism in which an animal evolves to have physical characteristics that make it not salient in its background. In addition, some animals engage in deception in order to survive or project strength. For example, a tiger might hide before it jumps on its prey. Studies of both vertebrates and invertebrates have shown that social animals use reputation as a source of information about members of the group and their fighting abilities. Reputations can form by direct encounters or witnessing encounters with others. Once formed, a reputation can serve in survival and determine social hierarchy and strategies utilized in future conflicts. Moreover, the formation of a particular reputation can contribute to social order and a reduction in the frequency of conflicts. Misperceiving the abilities of another animal can result in dangerous consequences. From an evolutionary point of view, lying and deception in regard to reputation are not favored, because they interfere with the process of natural selection.

## Reputation

A person’s reputation—that is, the kind of person he or she is reputed to be—has been used through the centuries as a mechanism integrating individuals into larger social units, serving as a tool to punish those who do not adhere to a particular group’s social norms and values, and even uniting



### Types of Reputation

In regard to reputation among humans, researchers have classified reputation into three types: reputation as a property, as an honor, and as dignity. Reputation as a property is the major conceptualization found in the marketplace. According to this view, one labors continuously to build one's reputation, which is seen as a property essential in the marketplace, and one can re-establish the reputation if it becomes damaged.

When viewed as an honor, reputation is seen not as something earned through labor but as a form of recognition given to particular individuals because of the social role and status they occupy. From this perspective, individuals are expected to live up to the expectations associated with the role they occupy and the reputation associated with it. Damage to this type of reputation through lying and deception can damage the reputation of the social role itself.

Reputation as dignity is viewed as a consequence of being a member of a social group respected by both the self and others. Reputation here is not a property or an honor associated with a role but an integral part of identity. Damage to this type of reputation can have deep psychological consequences. Other research has focused on the role of reputation in the construction of self-identity, self-concept, and self-esteem; incongruity between one's self-image and one's reputation; and the possible psychological consequences of threats to this type of reputation.

### Reputation and the Internet

With the presence of the Internet and social media, self-identity among young people extends beyond real life and includes self-image and reputation on the Internet. In this case, the construction of reputation can be motivated by psychological and social objectives, and damage to one's reputation can have serious consequences for individuals faced with threats or actual damage to their reputation.

With the advancements in communication, the Internet, and social media, the consequences of lying and deception in regard to reputation have acquired new dimensions. Gossip, which once was limited to a few individuals or to small, identifiable groups of people, has become accessible to many, easy to find, permanent, and can be instigated by anonymous individuals. The loss

of control over one's reputation and privacy on the Internet is contributing to new psychological challenges. For example, cyberbullying has been found to be associated with anxiety, depression, and suicide among teens. Furthermore, some studies have found evidence for links between psychopathy and lying and deception in self-representation and reputation management.

### Reputation and Health Consequences

In addition, the desire to build a certain type of reputation has been found to be associated with health consequences. For example, an individual might engage in lying and deception in order to build or protect a reputation of health or strength. Such efforts can be seen among teens, among adults seeking to find a mate or to avoid social rejection, and among employees who are concerned about the consequences of a reputation for illness on their employment. Thus, the utilization of lying and deception to damage or promote a reputation can have serious consequences on individuals, physically, mentally, and socially, and on society in general.

Majed A. Ashy

Federika Muchacho

Bay State College

Kathleen Malley-Morrison

Boston University

**See Also:** Animals; "Boy Who Cried Wolf"; Cheating; Credibility; Daily Life, Lying in; Deception and Technology; Dishonesty; Gossip; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites; Libel and Slander; Lying, Accusations of; Rumor.

### Further Readings

Edens, J., J. Buffington, T. Tomicic, and B. Riley.

"Effects of Positive Impression Management on the Psychopathic Personality Inventory." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.25/3 (2001).

Leary, M. and R. Kowalski. "Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-Component Model." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.107/1 (1990).

Leary, M., L. Tchividjian, and B. Kraxberger. "Self-Presentation Can be Hazardous to Your Health: Impression Management and Health Risk." *Health Psychology*, v.13/6 (1994).

- Marwick, A., D. Diaz, and J. Palfrey. "Youth, Privacy and Reputation: Literature Review." The Berkman Center for Internet and Society Research Publication Series. [http://147.237.72.56/NR/rdonlyres/4CA36194-FEFE-4DE8-965A-3A1464118554/26314/Perceptions\\_SSRNid15881632.pdf](http://147.237.72.56/NR/rdonlyres/4CA36194-FEFE-4DE8-965A-3A1464118554/26314/Perceptions_SSRNid15881632.pdf) (Accessed November 2012).
- Mitchell, R. *Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- Public Interest Advocacy Center. "All in the Data Family: Children's Privacy Online." 2008. [http://www.piac.ca/files/children\\_final\\_small\\_fixed.pdf](http://www.piac.ca/files/children_final_small_fixed.pdf) (Accessed November 2012).
- Solove, D. J. *The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Solove, D. J. and P. M. Schwartz. *Information Privacy Law*. 3rd ed. Austin, TX: Walters Kluwer Law & Business, 2009.
- Yehudai, C. "Informational Blackmail: Survived by Technicality." *Marquette Law Review*, v.92 (2008).

## Résumés

Job seekers often have only one chance to make a first impression, and this impression usually comes in the form of a résumé. A résumé is used to showcase an individual's experience, knowledge, skills, and other pertinent background information. Most often, a résumé is used to obtain employment but it can be used for a variety of other reasons, such as gaining entrance to a graduate program, winning a scholarship or award, or securing a grant. Given the high stakes, much time is devoted to résumé construction. The process of creating a résumé can be considered a form of impression management, as it represents an attempt to control the image that others form of the candidate; however, when job seekers choose to use deceitful information, the degree of impression management used becomes an ethical concern.

Examples of once well-respected and high-ranking individuals who have been caught lying on their résumé are not difficult to find. Former Yahoo chief executive officer Scott Thompson

resigned his position in May 2012 after it was discovered that he lied about holding a bachelor's degree in both accounting and computer science from Stonehill College. His degree is actually only in accounting. Laura Callahan, former senior director at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, resigned in 2004 after an investigation revealed that she had obtained her academic degrees by purchasing them from a diploma mill. Marilee Jones, who was the dean at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, lied about her college degrees, and former Veritas Software chief financial officer Kenneth E. Lonchar was let go in 2002 after it was discovered that he lied about his M.B.A. degree from Stanford University and his accounting degree from Arizona State University. These stories are not just found among corporate-suite executives and other high-ranking officials. Many recruiters have example after example of fraudulent claims they have discovered on résumés.

### Consequences of Lying on Résumés

Getting caught may be the most obvious consequence of lying on a résumé. Once caught, an individual faces myriad legal and professional consequences. If discovered during the application process, the consequences are less extreme. Most likely, the offender will be rejected from the application pool. The consequences even at this stage, however, may be far-reaching as the applicant may never be considered for a position at that company in the future. If the hiring manager has a wide network of colleagues and business acquaintances and is ever asked about the applicant, a negative reputation begins to build and may prevent other job opportunities.

If the fraudulent claims are not noticed until the applicant has been hired, there are more potential consequences. The most obvious is immediate termination. Depending on how extensive the lie was and how pertinent it was to the current position, employers face a serious dilemma after realizing a position is currently filled by an employee lacking the necessary credentials. Perhaps more important, the employee is revealed as someone who is willing to deceive, and trust is now broken. Few employers would have reason to keep the employee.

In addition to individual consequences, there are organizational consequences. The costs associated with hiring an individual who has fabricated

parts of his or her résumé are high, especially at the executive level. What's more, if the exposed individual is high-ranking, the scandal can bring dishonor and embarrassment to the business or organization. Overall, résumé fabrication can detract from the accomplishment of an organization's goals.

### Reasons for Lying

Not surprisingly, there is a relationship between morale and willingness to lie. In an environment in which jobs are more difficult to come by, people are often afraid of staying unemployed. This fear can lead to desperation that is experienced over weeks or months of being without a job. Under these conditions, applicants are willing to engage in deceitful actions that are highly risky. For some applicants, the allure of a potential job is worth the risk. They rationalize their actions as something they need to do to get the job. Once rationalized, the behavior is no longer viewed as necessarily unethical.

Individuals are motivated to rationalize attitudes they hold and behavior in which they engage. Through this process of cognitive dissonance, people distance themselves from their wrongdoing, while justifying their actions. The brain is wired to continuously reduce the discomfort felt from transgression. Additionally, given that some sources estimate that half of all job seekers are lying on their résumés, many people may engage in falsification in reaction to a perceived threat that the competition will appear better in comparison. This threat may be quite real in actuality. Given the number of résumés found with fabrications, the honest individuals may be put at a disadvantage.

The most common areas of falsification on a résumé include employment history and education credentials. Job seekers have been found to lie about the length of employment, the reason for their departure, job titles, responsibilities and duties, accomplishments and rewards, and even the employers themselves. A quick Google search of this practice also reveals individuals who advocate making up employers, using non-United States-based employers that cannot be easily contacted for references, or using companies that have gone out of business in order to fill employment gaps on a résumé.

Job seekers will also include the universities and colleges that they attended and falsify the degrees they earned from those institutions. A surprising number of individuals have also been caught faking degrees and attendance days when they were not accepted or never attended the listed university. The advent of "diploma mills," which are online companies offering degrees and licenses with substandard or no academic study, and without recognition by any accredited educational institution, have made this practice even easier.

### Tips for Detecting Résumé Fraud

With even the simple technology that is available today, spotting fraudulent résumés is easier than ever before. A fairly simple way to verify credentials is to contact the references given by the applicant and perform checks on each of these references to ensure they are legitimate. When employers have narrowed the applicant pool, they should consider more thorough checks, especially for high-level positions. To verify education credentials, employers should ask the applicants to sign a release directing that an official copy of their transcripts be forwarded to the business or organizations to which the applicants are applying. Employers should also verify licenses with the appropriate issuing agencies.

U.S.-based employers can verify employment dates by requesting the applicant's Internal Revenue Service W-2 forms and by asking applicants to list the month and year of prior employment. It is also advisable to consider asking the applicant in great detail about past employment, including specific responsibilities. While this does take more time during the recruitment and selection phase, the employer could be saving a lot of time and money; investing in hiring and then training someone new is certainly more time-consuming and expensive.

### Conclusion

While résumé enhancement may allow applicants a foot in the door, the consequences are truly great. If it is discovered that an individual lied on a résumé, the integrity and character of that individual and, perhaps the entire organization, may be called into question. With the increased frequency that hiring managers are checking résumé

information, anyone considering lying on their résumé should truly consider whether the risk is worth the reward.

Meghan R. Lowery  
*Psychological Associates*  
Amanda Blinebry  
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**See Also:** Academia; Bragging and Grandiosity; Business; Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Exaggeration; Letters of Recommendation.

### Further Readings

- Kaplan, D. and J. Fisher. "A Rose by Any Other Name: Identity and Impression Management in Résumés." *Employee Responsibilities & Rights Journal*, v.21/4 (2009).
- Kidwell, R. E., Jr. "'Small' Lies, Big Trouble: The Unfortunate Consequences of Résumé Padding, From Janet Cooke to George O'Leary." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.51/2 (2004).
- Marcoux, A. "A Counterintuitive Argument for Résumé Embellishment." *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.63/2 (2006).

---

## Rose, Pete

Born Peter Edward Rose in Cincinnati, Ohio, Rose is one of four children of parents Harry and LaVerne Rose, who raised their family in the Western Hills working-class area of the city. At a young age Harry encouraged Pete's love for sports, and until his death Harry remained an important influence in his son's sports career.

Pete Rose's ambition for the sport of baseball is evident by his nickname, Charlie Hustle, given to him for his unique grit and energetic playing style. Rose enjoyed an illustrious 26-year career as both a player and manager. However, his career abruptly ended in 1989, after rumors of gambling led him to voluntarily accept a permanent place on Major League Baseball's (MLB) ineligible list. Rose was accused of breaking MLB's Rule 21, which states that any player, umpire, club official, or employee may not bet on any baseball game.


Rose made his debut as a player for the Cincinnati Reds on April 8, 1963, competing against the Pittsburgh Pirates, and that same year he won the National League Rookie of the Year Award. Rose played with the Reds until 1978, the Philadelphia Phillies from 1979 to 1983, and the Montreal Expos in 1984. That year, he rejoined the Reds as both a player and manager. Despite his numerous accolades, Rose became a controversial figure in the sport of baseball.

Three years after his final game as a player on August 17, 1986, Rose was questioned by outgoing MLB Commissioner Peter Ueberroth and his replacement, Bart Giamatti, in February 1989. Rose denied the reports that he bet on baseball, closing the investigation. Once Giamatti was named the MLB commissioner, he retained lawyer John Dowd to investigate charges against Rose. In 1987, Dowd documented Rose's gambling activities for the previous two years, compiling a day-to-day report of his bets. The investigation revealed that Rose bet on 52 Reds games, gambling \$10,000 per game. Dowd was not able to provide evidence that Rose bet against his own team.

Rose denied his involvement with gambling, refusing to appear at a hearing with Commissioner Giamatti. The case eventually moved to federal court, where Rose and MLB officials eventually negotiated a settlement. On August 24, 1989, Rose voluntarily agreed to a lifetime ban from baseball, signing a five-page document. In exchange for the ban, he asked MLB officials to refrain from making any formal findings of his gambling on the Reds. Rose adamantly denied gambling on baseball; however, Giamatti said he believed that Rose did gamble. Rose was replaced as Reds manager by Tony Helms. Giamatti died of a sudden heart attack at age 51 on September 1, 1990.

On April 20, 1990, Rose pled guilty to two charges of filing false income-tax returns, withholding information on the income he received from sports memorabilia. He was sentenced to a medium-security prison in Marion, Illinois, for five months and fined \$50,000. Rose was later released on January 7, 1991, after paying \$366,041 in back taxes and interest. Less than a month later, the Baseball Hall of Fame voted to exclude individuals who are placed on baseball's





Former Major League Baseball (MLB) player Pete Rose in Las Vegas, January 2008. In 1987, an MLB attorney compiled a day-to-day report on Rose's gambling activities from the previous two years, revealing that Rose gambled \$10,000 per game on 52 Reds games. Rose denied his involvement with gambling.

permanently ineligible list from being inducted into the Hall of Fame. Rose applied for reinstatement in 1997, but Commissioner Bud Selig never acted upon his application. After several years of denying his involvement with gambling, Rose publicly admitted to betting on baseball and other sports while playing and managing the Reds in his autobiography *My Prison Without Bars*, published on January 8, 2004.

Since then, there has been a show of strong support for Rose, who constantly reaffirms that he did not bet against his team. On September 12, 2010, Rose walked onto Cinergy Field, home of the Reds, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of his record-setting 4,192nd hit. Former Cincinnati Reds player Barry Larkin was inducted into the Hall of Fame on July 22, 2012. Among thousands of fans in attendance, Larkin thanked Rose, his former manager, during his induction speech.

At 4,256 hits, Rose is baseball's all-time leading hitter and the only living member on the MLB's ineligible list. With a career batting average of 0.303, numerous awards, and 18 MLB records under his belt—including most career outs, hits,

and games played—whether Rose deserves to be inducted into the Hall of Fame is still a controversial topic among baseball fans.

Jennifer Summary  
Southeast Missouri State University

**See Also:** Baseball; Morals and Ethics; Public Relations; Rumor; Truth.

### Further Readings

Baseball Reference. "Pete Rose Statistics and History." <http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/r/rosepe01.shtml> (Accessed October 2012).

New World Encyclopedia. "Pete Rose." [http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Pete\\_Rose](http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Pete_Rose) (Accessed October 2012).

Pete Rose Web Site. <http://peterose.com> (Accessed October 2012).

Reston, James. *Collision at Home Plate: The Lives of Pete Rose and Bart Giamatti*. New York: Burlingame Books, 1991.

Rose, Pete and Rick Hill. *My Prison Without Bars: Pete Rose*. Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2004.

Sokolove, Michael. *Hustle: The Myth, Life, and Lies of Pete Rose*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

Standen, Jeffrey. "Pete Rose and Baseball's Rule 21." *Nine*, v.18 (2010).

Towle, Mike. *Pete Rose: Baseball's Charlie Hustle*. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House, 2003.

## Rumor

The spread of rumors is a pervasive aspect of American culture. The study of rumors spans many disciplines including anthropology, history, literature, communication, sociology, and social psychology. A rumor is an unverified explanation of an event, object, or issue of public concern that circulates from person to person, or an unverified relevant statement that arises during a situation of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat. In this context, rumors function to help people make sense of uncertainty, threat, or imminent danger.

Both of these definitions allude to the fact that (1) rumors are not verified, (2) a rumor has to be perceived as important enough to be passed

on, (3) individuals have to have confidence in the rumor, and (4) rumors are transmitted from person to person. As a rumor is transmitted, valuable information is lost. Person A receives the full rumor intact. Person B receives Person A's reproduction of the rumor, which is somewhat smaller than the original version. Each person receives a smaller quantity of the rumor. With each smaller quantity, the rumor is reduced in accuracy.

### Historical Perspective

The study of rumor is multidisciplinary, inclusive of rhetoric, sociology, and social psychology. In the field of rhetoric, Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman conducted a study in 1947 differentiating a rumor from a legend. A legend is a "tall tale" that emphasizes the skill, wit, and exploits of an individual. It allows one to take pride in his or her culture. The motives behind transmission of a legend and a rumor are the same. They both emphasize the cognitive processes of forgetting, imagining, and rationalizing.

Folklorist Patricia Turner conducted research to determine how a traditional rumor is perpetuated among African Americans, publishing a book on this subject in 1993. Turner unearthed rumors such as drugs were deliberately planted in the black community by the Mafia and others trying to suppress the freedom of blacks, the Klu Klux Klan owned Church's Fried Chicken and several restaurants in the black community, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) plotted to kill Martin Luther King, Jr. Turner found that rumor helped the African American community cope with white oppression.

Although rumor is multidisciplinary, empirical research and guiding theoretical perspectives largely come from sociology and social psychology. Sociologists study the collective nature of rumor and how rumor functions in society, while social psychologists study how rumor is transmitted. In fact, a preponderance of the empirical studies on rumor was conducted by behavioral psychologists. Rumors were studied in controlled conditions (for example, rumor clinics), and uncontrolled conditions (for example, rumors in the natural environment already in circulation). Altman and Postman wrote the seminal text on rumor—*The Psychology of Rumor*—and provided the impetus for future research.

### Rumor Transmission

Allport and Postman were among the first researchers to conduct a systematic study of rumor transmission and the psychological processes that affect it. They gathered their data in the 1940s from rumor clinics, including the Boston Rumor Clinic.

The two researchers reached eight conclusions based on their data: First, the flow of a rumor depends on its importance and level of ambiguity. Second, during the transmission of a rumor details are omitted, causing the rumor to be leveled. Third, in the same vein, materials that are not leveled tend to be made more important or sharpened. Fourth, distortions occur in serial messages; in addition, in some cases, the rumors become a substitute for the news.

Fifth, the transmission of a rumor can be represented quantitatively with the formula  $R = i \times a$ . In other words, rumor or "R," equals "i" (the importance of the rumor) times "a" (the ambiguity present in the rumor). This formula contains two key variables: ambiguity and importance. In analyzing the formula, a third factor is implied: a phenomenon that is defined as important or ambiguous varies from person to person. The variable "c" was added to this equation by Anthony Chorus to represent an individual's insight into social situations, taking into consideration such variables as social intellect, psychological insight, and individual differences.

The sixth conclusion in Allport and Postman's study held that when a rumor is cognitively unclear, there is an increase in transmission. Seventh, attitudes, needs, and motives affect whether a rumor is distorted during transmission or not. And eighth, when one considers attitudes, needs, and motives, rumor is a perceptual process similar to cognition, memory, and recall.

### Classifications of Rumor Research

Several researchers have attempted to categorize rumors. Mark Knapp, conducting research in 1944, classified rumor research into the following three categories:

- *Pipe dream rumors*. These rumors, later called "wish rumors" by other scholars in the field, are rumors that are positive in nature. For example, if a university

administrator was to make the decision that classes were cancelled because of the visit of the Dalai Lama, this would be a rumor of something most students would want to occur and would instill hope.

- *Fear rumors.* Later termed “dread rumors,” are rumors that are negative and may be induced because of ambiguity, threat, or danger. For example, if one were to say that underarm deodorant causes breast cancer, this would be a rumor deliberately planted to instill fear.
- *Wedge-driving rumors.* This is malicious gossip intended to cause harm to a phenomenon perceived as a threat.

Knapp’s classification scheme added to the body of knowledge in this area by categorizing the content of a rumor. It gave future researchers explanatory power and a means of organizing their data.

Years later, scholars reduced Knapp’s tripartite categories to two: wish rumors and dread rumors. In 1985, Fredrick Koenig identified three crucial aspects of a rumor: the target, the allegation, and the source. The target is the person, place, or thing being attacked with the rumor; the allegation is the rumor itself; while the source is the person originating the rumor.

Similarly, the research of R. L. Rosnow, conducted in 1974, classified three stages of rumor: parturition, diffusion, and control. Parturition is the birth of a rumor. Rumors originate for a variety of reasons. They could be coping mechanisms arising during times of fear, anxiety or uncertainty; they also could arise as a result of deliberate, malicious, intended gossip.

Diffusion refers to how a rumor is spread. Findings from a study conducted by S. C. Dodd in 1950 revealed that a rumor spreads faster in a small town than a bigger city. Further, results showed that a rumor spreads faster among friends than among strangers. The last category, control, refers to the cessation of a rumor. A rumor stops either when the facts are revealed or by natural death.

### Believability of a Rumor

Six major findings relate to the believability of a rumor: First, respondents believe a rumor more when the source is perceived to be credible.

Second, respondents tend to believe a rumor when it is consistent with beliefs they already hold. Third, when rumors coincide with pre-existing beliefs, a snowball effect occurs: new ideas are added to an already existing set of beliefs. If a rumor is false, it will continue to spread falsehood; if a rumor is true and checked for accuracy, the snowball effect stops.

Fourth, respondents will eliminate parts of the rumor to fit their existing set of beliefs. Fifth, respondents will conveniently forget information (selective retention) that does not coincide with their existing beliefs. Sixth, respondents will shape the rumor to coincide with their prejudices, stereotypes, and biases, thereby distorting the rumor and passing it on to others. These perceptual distortions occur with a lack of critical thinking.

Shirley M. Crawley

*Western Connecticut State University*

**See Also:** Beatles Hoax; Conspiracies; Disinformation; Dreyfus Affair; Espionage and Counterespionage; Gossip; Nazi Propaganda; News Media, Internet; Tall Tales; Urban Legends; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

- Allport, G. W. and L. Postman. *The Psychology of Rumor*. New York: H. Holt, 1947.
- Anthony, S. “Anxiety and Rumor.” *Journal of Social Psychology*, v.89 (1973).
- Buckner, H. “A Theory of Rumor Transmission.” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v.29/1 (1965). <http://www.tbuckner.com/Rumor.htm> (Accessed October 2012).
- Chorus, A. “The Basic Law of Rumor.” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, v.48 (1952).
- DiFonzo, Nicholas and Prashant Bordia. *Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2007.
- Dodd, S. C. “Formulas for Spreading Opinions.” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v.22 (1958).
- Festinger, L., D. Cartwright, K. Barber, J. Fleischl, J. Gottsdanker, A. Keysen, and G. Leavit. “A Study of Rumour: Its Origin and Its Spread.” *Human Relations*, v.1 (1948).
- Higam, T. M. “The Experimental Study of the Transmission of Rumour.” *British Journal of Psychology*, v.42 (1951).

- Jaeger, M. E., S. Anthony, and R. L. Rosnow. "Who Hears What From Whom and With What Effect: A Study of Rumor." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, v.6 (1980).
- Kapferer, J. N. "A Mass Poisoning Rumor in Europe." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v.53 (1989).
- Kimmel, A. J. and R. Keefer. "Psychological Correlates of the Transmission and Acceptance of Rumors About AIDS." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.21 (1991).
- Knapp, R. H. "A Psychology of Rumor." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v.8 (1994).
- Morsin, E. *Rumour in Orleans*. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Nkpa, N. K. U. "Rumor-Mongering in War-Time." *Journal of Social Psychology*, v.96 (1975).
- Peterson, W. A. and N. P. Gist. "Rumor and Public Opinion." *American Journal of Sociology*, v.51 (1951).
- Rosnow, R. L., J. H. Yost, and J. L. Esposito. "Belief in Rumor and Likelihood of Rumor Transmission." *Language and Communication*, v.6 (1986).
- Rubin, B. D. "Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Mass Communication Processes in Individual and Multi-Person Systems." In *Inter/media: Interpersonal Communication in a Media World*, 3rd ed., G. Gumpert and R. S. Cathcart, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Schall, H. M. B. Levy and M. E. Tresselt. "A Sociometric Approach to Rumor." *The Journal of Social Psychology*, v.31 (1950).
- Shachter, S. and H. Burdick. "A Field Experiment on Rumor Transmission and Distortion." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, v.50 (1955).
- Smith, G. H. "Beliefs in Statements Labeled Fact and Rumor." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, v.42 (1947).
- Solove, Daniel J. *The Future of Reputation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Turner, P. *I Heard it Through the Grapevine: Rumor in African American Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Walker, C. J. and S. Beckerle. "The Effect of State Anxiety on Rumor Transmission." *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, v.2/3 (1987).
- Walker, C. J. and B. Blaine. "The Virulence of Dread Rumors: A Field Experiment." *Language and Communication*, v.11 (1991).





# S

## Saint Augustine

Aurelius Augustinus (354–430 C.E.), or Saint Augustine, a saint and doctor of the Catholic Church, is the most important writer on lies in late antiquity, and one of the most important writers on lies of all time. He was the first thinker to systematically address the descriptive question of what is a lie, and the normative question of whether or not a lie is always impermissible. He was also the first thinker to address both of these questions in the light of Christian theology. He is one of the few thinkers (along with Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant) to hold that a lie is always impermissible.

Augustine discussed lying in many of his works, but he wrote two treatises devoted solely to the topic of lying: *Lying (Mendacio)*; 395), and *Against Lying (Contra Mendacium)*; 420).

It remains a matter of controversy as to what Augustine's final answer was to the first descriptive question of how a lie (*mendacium*) is to be defined, although much of his answer is clear. Augustine held that a lie requires "speech," that is, "words or . . . some other kind of signifying act," or more generally, the making of a statement. A statement is made in words or symbols—that is, conventional signs—that are spoken or written or otherwise expressed. For Augustine, it is not possible to lie by remaining silent. There can be no lie

of omission in that sense. It is also not possible to lie by using nonlinguistic or natural signs. It is not possible to lie by smiling, or groaning, for example. Although one can deceive by these means, one cannot lie by these means, as there is no statement.

Augustine held that a lie requires that the statement that is made be contrary to what one believes to be true: "He lies who has one thing in his mind and says something else." Augustine means by this that the liar (*mendax*) does not merely not believe his statement to be true but believes his statement to be false:

. . . the heart of the liar is said to be double, that is, twofold in its thinking: One part consisting in that knowledge he knows or thinks to be true yet does not so express; the other part consisting of that knowledge which he knows or thinks false yet expresses as true.

Someone who makes a statement that he neither believes to be true nor believes to be false is not lying. A lie therefore requires that the statement made be untruthful. If the person making the statement does not believe the statement to be false, then the person is not a liar, even if the statement that he makes happens to be false: "who utters falsehood does not lie if he believes or at least assumes that what he says is true." To make a statement that one believes is false is an

intentional act: “intention to tell a falsehood, i.e., what is, at least, believed to be false.” One cannot lie by mistake.

Augustine held that falsehood is not necessary for a lie and hence that a lie can be true or false: “that man is in conscience a liar who utters the truth thinking it to be false.” A person is judged to be lying or not lying on the basis of being untruthful: “he says what which he does not believe . . . even if what he does say be found to be true.”

Augustine appears to have considered all statement-making as a kind of testimony: “whoever pronounces any statement gives testimony to his own mind.” It follows that jokes, ironic statements, or lines delivered on a stage are not lies, as the person is not giving testimony to his own mind. Lies, it may be said, are assertions that are untruthful. What remains unclear, finally, is whether Augustine held that in addition to an untruthful assertion a lie requires an intention to deceive, either about the contents of the assertion, or about the beliefs or the intentions of the liar. Augustine provides an example of a person who makes an untruthful assertion to a mistrustful friend without the intention that the friend believe the following assertion:

Such would be the case of a man who, knowing that a certain road is besieged by bandits and fearing that a friend, for whose safety he is concerned, will take the road, tells that friend that there are no bandits here. He makes this assertion, realizing that his friend does not trust him, and will therefore believe that the bandits are there and will not go by that road.

About this case Augustine simply asks the question, “Is this a lie?” and does not answer it. It is certain, however, that he held that untruthful assertions that were intended to deceive were lies.

There is no uncertainty about Augustine’s answer to the second, normative question of whether or not a lie is always impermissible. Augustine condemns all lies: “Whoever thinks, moreover, that there is any kind of lie which is not a sin deceives himself.” Nevertheless, he believed that there were differences between lies: “It is my opinion, however, that every lie is a sin, though it makes a great difference with what intention and in what matter the lie is uttered.”

Some lies are worse than others. He divided lies into the following categories: (1) lies about religious doctrine; (2) lies that unjustly cause injury; (3) lies that benefit some and harm others; (4) lies told simply for the pleasure of telling lies; (5) lies told in order to please others “in smooth discourse”; (6) lies that harm no one and benefit some person; and subtypes of this sixth kind of lie, namely (7) lies that harm no one and that protect people from capital punishment; and (8) lies that harm no one and that protect people from physical defilement (principally, rape).

Although some of these lies are classified according to results (the second, third, sixth, seventh, and eighth types of lies), some according to reasons (fifth), and some according to content (first), all of them are lies, regardless of the content, the reason, or the result. The lie told for the pleasure of telling a lie he calls the “real lie.”

Although Augustine condemns all lies as impermissible, there are both theological and ethical arguments against lying in his writings. There are at least eight ethical arguments against lying. Lying is said to be impermissible because it is a perversion of the natural faculty of speech, because it is deceptive, because it involves breaking faith with an audience, and because it harms the liar. The four more indirect arguments are that lying undermines trust in society, that permitting one lie entails permitting all lies, that permitting lying entails permitting other evil acts, and that a permissible lie is a self-contradiction.

However, it is Augustine’s theological arguments against lying that are most important. The principal theological argument against lying is that speech is a gift from God, given to people to use as His gift for the purpose of expressing their thoughts. Lying is an appropriation of something that is not theirs, for a purpose contradictory to its intended purpose, namely, expressing what is not thought. This prideful appropriation of speech as something of their own, when it is actually God’s gift, ruptures the liars’ relationship with God, and disrupts a graced world of ordered being, goodness, and love. The exceptionless ban on lying is simply an instance of the exceptionless ban on sin.

James Edwin Mahon  
*Washington & Lee University*

**See Also:** Aquinas, Thomas; Bible; Catholic Church; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; History of Deception: Medieval Period; Lying, Intentionality of; Morals and Ethics.

### Further Readings

- Feehan, T. "Augustine on Lying and Deception." *Augustinian Studies*, v.19 (1988).
- Feehan, T. "Augustine's Own Examples of Lying." *Augustinian Studies*, v.22 (1991).
- Feehan, T. "The Morality of Lying in St. Augustine." *Augustinian Studies*, v.21 (1990).
- Griffiths, P. J. *Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004.
- Saint Augustine. "Lying" and "Against Lying." In *Saint Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects*, R. J. Deferrari, ed. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952.

## Santa Claus

Santa Claus is a fictional character recognized in the holidays of many European and North American cultures. While celebrating the secular aspects of Christmas, many parents willingly deceive their children into believing that Santa Claus will visit their home to bring gifts. Much controversy exists concerning this widespread, cultural deception. Upon hearing the truth, however, children typically do not feel betrayed; they instead take the truth as a rite of passage into adulthood.

The myth of Santa Claus coalesced from a number of cultural stories and traditions dating back to the 17th century, most from European/Christian regions. Saint Nicholas, a Greek religious figure in the early and mid-4th century C.E., was known for his acts of generosity and kindness to those in need, including clandestinely placing gifts and coins in individual's shoes. Removing even the Christian associations, the influence of this figure can also be traced back to pre-Christianized Germanic tribes' reverence of the pagan god Odin, a bearded old man who was thought to ride through the sky on his mystical horse.

The modern-day interpretation of Santa Claus owes much of its inspiration from Clement

Clarke Moore's 1822 poem "An Account of a Visit from St. Nicholas," more commonly known as "'Twas the Night Before Christmas." This poem described Santa Claus much as he is today: an old, overweight man who enters people's houses through chimneys on Christmas Eve in order to bring children gifts, flying from house to house on a sleigh pulled by reindeer. Since the introduction of this character and characters like him, parents all over the world have been happily deceiving their children.

The current practice of giving gifts around the Christmas holiday varies among Western countries, but the same pattern applies: children believe a mythical figure visits and leaves them with presents and candy. Whether these gifts are found in shoes, stockings, or under a tree, it is the parents' responsibility to deceive their children by secretly placing the items in these designated locations. "Evidence" of the visit by Santa Claus does not stop with the appearance of gifts: In places such as North America, many parents construct the visual remains of cookies and milk as "proof" that Santa Claus did indeed visit and enjoy a snack while inside the home.

Most parents who engage in the creation of a Santa Claus myth and the corresponding deceptive practices foster the idea with their children from a very young age. From the time a child is able to understand the concept of Santa Claus, parents reinforce the truth of his existence, even reassuring against doubts that occasionally arise, especially as the child increases in age.

There is some controversy about this practice of lying to children. One concern is that the role of parents as authority figures, sources of information, and conveyors of trust to children can be undermined. Other concerns focus on the potential to bias children's perceptions of the world when unrealistic and fantastical ideas are willingly promoted by adults.

There are several justifications of maintaining the Santa Claus myth and deceiving children. One argument is that belief in Santa Claus and the corresponding rituals tend to bring families closer together, while exploring creativity and cultural expression. In addition, this deception, while elaborate, is considered by many to be too small of a lie to cause any significant harm or distrust between children and their parents.



The discovery of the fabrication of Santa Claus is virtually inevitable and can take place in many ways at different stages of development. In many cases, the child finds out through a classmate, friend, or peer, either through direct or indirect contact. Television and film, while typically portraying Santa Claus as a real individual, may also contain instances of characters admitting to the fiction. In other situations, a child may stumble upon his or her parents while they are in the process of creating the fabrication (placing the presents in the designated location, eating the cookies). Rarely do parents simply tell the child they have been deceiving him or her.

After discovering the secret of their parents' deception, children generally do not exhibit a negative response. This is attributed to the child now embracing the feeling of being older and sharing a "grown-up" point of view and field of knowledge. Many children of this age desire to be treated as older than they actually are, and studies show that the discovery of the truth coincides more with feelings of happiness than with sadness. In fact, children's perceptions of the Santa Claus fantasy have been positively associated with cognitive growth and development. The thought processes required to foster this belief may encourage problem-solving in some children. Parents, in contrast, report feeling negative emotions upon their children's discovery of this deception. This response is due more to the discovery indicating the increasing maturity of the child rather than the detection of their deception.

The character of Santa Claus has a widespread origin, based on a number of stories and cultural archetypes. In spite of this, a common pattern of deception is carried out in each culture that celebrates his existence. Although some people disagree with deceiving children in this way, no significantly negative effects have been reported, and the practice remains a mainstay of the Christmas celebration.

Phillip J. Dalton  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Childhood, Lying in; Deception, Attitudes Toward; Deception and Trust; Fairy Tales; Fiction; Myth; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Anderson C. J. and N. M. Prentice. "Encounter With Reality: Children's Reactions on Discovering the Santa Claus Myth." *Child Psychiatry and Human Development*, v.25 (1994).
- Boerger E. A., S. A. Tullos, and J. D. Woolley. "Return of the Candy Witch: Individual Differences in Acceptance and Stability of Beliefs in a Novel Fantastical Being." *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, v.27 (2009).
- Bowler, G. *Santa Claus: A Biography*. Random House Digital, 2011.
- Breen, L. "What if Santa Died? Childhood Myths and Development." *Psychiatric Bulletin*, v.28 (2004).

## Sawyer, Tom

Lies and acts of deception play a significant role in the narrative of *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1876), written by Mark Twain (the pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens). This classic tale of American youth proved popular enough to prompt Twain to pen several sequels: *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884), *Tom Sawyer Abroad* (1894), and *Tom Sawyer, Detective* (1896). The work has remained an enduring part of the American literary canon, and it continues to occupy a prominent place in America popular culture, having inspired film and comic book adaptations and theatrical plays.

The prominence of lying in *Tom Sawyer* is not surprising, given Twain's literary preoccupation with truth and falsehood, which can found in works ranging from "The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County" (1865), a comic short story depicting a gambler's use of cheating and deception to win a bet, to *Puddin'head Wilson* (1894), in which a black child's mother switches her light-skinned son with a white child in the hope of improving his lot in life by having him pass for white.

*Tom Sawyer's* title character routinely tells lies small and large, with outcomes ranging from comical to serious. The novel's very first chapter has Tom lying to his guardian, Aunt Polly, denying that he stole jam and played hooky. Like these, many of Tom's lies are exculpatory

attempts to avoid guilt and evade punishment. In one case, however, he does the reverse, chivalrously lying to protect his love interest, Becky Thatcher, from retribution for having damaged their teacher's prized anatomy book, claiming that he was the culprit and taking upon himself Becky's punishment.

The novel's second chapter features one of American literature's most iconic scenes, in which Tom displays sharp psychological insight in inducing his friends to pay him for the privilege of whitewashing a fence he was assigned to paint as a punishment. He deceives his friends into thinking the work is a rare privilege and not dull drudgery. Later, Tom leverages the loot gained from the whitewashing scam to trade for Sunday school tickets given to students for reciting Bible verses from memory; students who collect enough tickets are awarded their own Bible.

This leads to one of the novel's most comical scenes. Through shrewd trading Tom accumulates the number of tickets—representing 2,000 memorized verses—required to earn him his own Bible. During a special church event, which includes speeches and recitations by Sunday school students, Tom produces the tickets and claims his prize. When asked by a visiting dignitary to demonstrate his biblical knowledge by identifying the first two apostles appointed by Jesus, Tom delays and then, when pressed, reluctantly responds by naming David and Goliath.

Most of the lies Tom tells concern minor matters. There is one lie, however, that has life-and-death consequences. While visiting a cemetery at midnight as part of a superstitious cure for warts, Tom and his friend Huck Finn witness two local ruffians, Muff Potter and Injun Joe, robbing the grave of a recently deceased town resident under the direction of Dr. Robinson, who had paid the men in advance for the deed. Before carting the body away, Potter demands an extra \$5. This request leads to heated words and a fistfight that ends with Injun Joe using his partner's knife, which he had retrieved after it had fallen to the ground during the struggle, to kill Dr. Robinson. Injun Joe places the knife in the hand of Potter, who had been knocked unconscious. When Potter comes to, he concludes based upon the planted evidence that he has killed the doctor, and his devious partner affirms that Potter is the murderer.

Tom's witnessing this crime prompts the novel's major moral crisis. Fearing fatal retribution from Injun Joe, Tom and Huck swear to each other that they will not reveal what they had witnessed. However, Tom realizes that if they remain silent—essentially a lie of omission—a dangerous killer will go free, while an innocent man who had been kind to them stands to be condemned and executed for a crime he did not commit. This presents a moral dilemma that causes Tom nightmares. Eventually, he determines that the only right course is to reveal what he knows, regardless of any potential danger to himself. His court testimony exonerates Potter and clears Tom's conscience.

In *Tom Sawyer*, Twain clearly rejects the absolutist view of lying as always wrong. He does not depict all lies as bad, and in some cases suggests that lying might well be the right thing to do. Twain thus assumes a decidedly consequentialist perspective: there are good lies and bad, the moral worth of which is determined by whether they result in a positive or negative outcome.

There is, however, one curious case in which Tom's deception causes much suffering and exacts great cost, and yet even when the truth is revealed he enjoys a positive outcome. Seeking adventure, Tom and friends Huck Finn and Joe Harper run away from town to play at being pirates. When they stay away for several days, the town's men drag the river, presuming the boys have drowned, while the women and children stay home and grieve. Tom has it within his power to alleviate the sorrow of his family and friends, and put an end to the efforts to find him and his companions, by revealing the truth, but he elects not to do so. Instead, Tom delights in the cruel climax he has planned, when he and his friends dramatically enter their own funeral, to the amazement and relief of those present. Tom does not suffer any negative consequences for his sadistic deception; he is welcomed home rather than whipped by Aunt Polly and is treated as a kind of folk hero by his peers.

When it comes to lying, the warning with which Twain opens *Huckleberry Finn* seems equally applicable for that book's antecedent: when it comes to lying, readers should not seek any moral lesson from the narrative of *Tom Sawyer*.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
College of Charleston

**See Also:** Bible; Fiction; Guilt; Humor; Manipulation; Morals and Ethics; Tall Tales.

### Further Readings

- Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec. "Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, v.60/1 (2006).
- Twain, M. *The Gilded Age and Later Novels*. New York: Library of America, 2002.
- Twain, M. *Mississippi Writings*. New York: Library of America, 2002.
- 

## Scientific Content Analysis

Scientific content analysis (SCAN) is a verbal lie detection tool developed by the former Israeli police lieutenant and polygraph examiner Avi-noam Sapir. The tool is very popular and used worldwide. It is used by federal law enforcement (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), military agencies (including the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps), secret services (including the Central Intelligence Agency), and other types of investigators, including social workers, lawyers, fire investigators, and the American Society for Industrial Security. Despite its widespread use, SCAN has not been the subject of much research. The scarce research findings available to date have not yet demonstrated that SCAN actually works.

### How SCAN Works

SCAN analyses are based on written statements. It is important that the statement reflects the examinee's own words. Investigators can transcribe oral statements, but preferably, examinees write their statements themselves because this reduces the risk of their statement being contaminated by the views of the investigator.

Examinees are requested to write down their activities during a certain period of time (for example, "What did you do from the time you woke up until you went to bed?"). They should write their statements in enough detail so that a reader without background information about

the examinee's activities could fully grasp the statement. Examinees are asked to write this statement when they arrive for their interview. The investigator is not present when the examinee writes the statement because there is a risk that the investigator's presence may influence the statement. Alternatively, examinees can write their statement at their preferred time and location and return it by mail or fax. The statement needs to be handwritten because one SCAN criterion examines the number of corrections made by the examinee. SCAN can be applied to statements from suspects and witnesses and can be used with adults and children.

The handwritten statement is analyzed by a SCAN expert on the basis of a list of predetermined but undefined criteria. The underlying assumption of SCAN is that true statements, derived from memory of an actual experienced event, differ in content and quality from statements that are based on invention or fantasy. The SCAN method provides no theoretical rationale for this assumption. A SCAN analysis is supposed to give insight into whether the examinee is truthful or deceptive, is trying to conceal something, or was involved in the crime. The SCAN expert uses the SCAN analysis to prepare him or herself for the interview. During the interview he or she will focus on aspects of the statement that raised concern or suspicion.

### SCAN Criteria

It is thought that some SCAN criteria are more likely to occur in truthful than in deceptive statements, whereas other criteria are more likely to occur in deceptive than in truthful statements. Examples of criteria include the following:

*Social introductions.* This refers to how the persons described in the statement are introduced. Truthful social introductions are thought to be unambiguous, for example, "My wife, Lisa."

*Spontaneous corrections.* This criterion refers to the presence of corrections in the statement, such as crossing out what has been written. Although explanations and additions are allowed, examinees are explicitly instructed not to cross anything out. A failure to follow this instruction could indicate deceit.

*Lack of conviction or memory.* Lack of conviction is present when the writer is vague about certain elements in the statement (“I believe,” “I think,” “kind of”) whereas lack of memory is present when the writer reports that he or she cannot remember something. SCAN investigators interpret lack of conviction or memory as suspicious.

*Structure of the statement.* This refers to the balance of the statement. It is thought that in a truthful statement the first 20 percent is used to describe activities leading up to the event, the next 50 percent to describe the actual event, and the final 30 percent to discuss what happened after the event.;

*Emotions.* This criterion refers to mentioning emotions in the statement, including at which point during the statement they are reported. It is thought that deceivers will mention emotions just before the climax of the story, whereas truth-tellers are more likely to mention emotions throughout the story but particularly after the climax of the story.

Other criteria SCAN experts use are “objective time” and “subjective time,” which refers to how different time periods are covered in a statement. Objective time refers to the actual duration of events described in the statement, whereas subjective time refers to the amount of words spent to describe these events. It is thought that in a truthful statement the objective and subjective time will correspond with each other in length, unlike in a deceptive statement.

Another criterion, “out of sequence,” examines whether the statement recounts the events in chronological order. A deviation of the chronological order of events is considered to indicate deception. “Extraneous information” examines whether there is information reported that does not seem relevant. If irrelevant information is provided, the SCAN expert should investigate why the examinee felt the need to include it. It is thought that examinees could include extraneous information to hide more important information.

The criterion “missing information” refers to phrases in the statement that indicate that some information has been left out. Examples are the use of words such as “sometime after,” “finally,”

“later on,” and “shortly thereafter.” Missing information is thought to be suspicious. In addition, statements are examined to determine if they are written in the first-person singular, past tense. It is thought that truthful statements are written in this manner because the writer describes an event that has taken place (“I saw the smoke coming out of the window”). Deviations from this norm should raise suspicion. Similarly, the use of pronouns, such as I, my, he, his, they, and their, signal commitment, responsibility, and possession. Omitting pronouns (“left the house” rather than “I left the house”) suggests the writer’s reluctance to commit him or herself to the described action. Leaving out pronouns that indicate possession (such as “my”) suggests that the writer denies ownership.

Finally, the criterion “change in language” refers to the change of terminology or vocabulary in the statement. A change in language indicates that something has altered in the mind of the writer. For example, if a suspect refers in his statement to all conversations he had as “conversations,” except one conversation that he describes as a “discussion,” it is likely that he perceived this conversation differently from the others.

### Research on SCAN

Research on SCAN is scarce. In a field study published in 1994, 30 written statements voluntarily given by suspects immediately prior to their polygraph tests were analyzed. The SCAN expert allocated 73 percent of the truthful and 95 percent of the deceptive statements correctly. These accuracy scores are high and often mentioned by SCAN users.

However, the study had an important limitation, as acknowledged by the author of the paper himself: it was unknown whether each suspect was actually telling the truth or lying. In technical terms, the “ground truth” was uncertain. It is a common problem in deception field studies that researchers do not know what truly happened in the cases that are included in their study. Ground truth can only be determined via facts (such as DNA evidence, fingerprints, credit card receipts, independent witnesses,) that indisputably link, or do not link, the alleged perpetrator to the crime. Such facts are often not present, which makes interpreting the results of field studies problematic.



A second SCAN field study was carried out in 2001 for the British Home Office. Three groups of SCAN users with different levels of experience, a fourth group of experienced detectives not trained in SCAN, and a fifth group of newly recruited officers also not trained in SCAN analyzed 27 real-life statements. As was the case in the first field study, ground truth was not established. The three groups of SCAN users performed well and correctly classified at least 80 percent of the truths and 75 percent of the lies. However, so did the experienced detectives untrained in SCAN, and so the study therefore showed no benefit of using the technique. This field study also revealed that different SCAN experts used different SCAN criteria to justify their decision of whether or not a statement was deceptive. In other words, there was a lack of consistency in the application of SCAN among SCAN users.

In one further published SCAN study, a laboratory experiment, truth-tellers truthfully wrote down their activities during the previous half hour, whereas liars were asked to fabricate a story. The statements were analyzed with SCAN and, by way of comparison, with reality monitoring (RM), another verbal veracity tool. SCAN did not distinguish truth-tellers from liars above the level of chance, but RM did. With RM analyses, 71 percent of truth-tellers and liars were correctly classified.

There is some overlap between SCAN criteria and the criteria in yet another verbal veracity tool, Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA). For example, the criteria lack of memory, out of sequence information, and extraneous information, appear on both lists. Intriguingly though, the predictions about how these criteria discriminate between truth-tellers and liars differ. In CBCA, the occurrence of these cues is perceived as indicators of truth, whereas in SCAN the same criteria are seen as indicators of deceit. Research regarding these individual criteria (all laboratory studies) gives support only to the CBCA assumptions.

### Conclusion

Two field studies revealed high accuracy rates in using the tool, but the same high performance was achieved by non-SCAN users. The SCAN laboratory experiment and the CBCA laboratory experiments showed no support for SCAN. In

sum, SCAN is popular among practitioners and widely used. There is not much research into it, but research carried out has yet to demonstrate that SCAN actually works.

Aldert Vrij  
*University of Portsmouth*

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Reality Monitoring; Statement Validity Assessment.

### Further Readings

- Driscoll, L. N. "A Validity Assessment of Written Statements From Suspects in Criminal Investigations Using the SCAN Technique." *Police Studies*, v.17 (1994).
- LSI Laboratory for Scientific Interrogation. "SCAN Unlocks the Mystery." <http://www.lsiscan.com> (Accessed June 2013).
- Nahari, G., A. Vrij, and R. P. Fisher. "Does the Truth Come Out in the Writing? SCAN as a Lie Detection Tool." *Law & Human Behavior*, v.36 (2012).
- Smith, N. *Reading Between the Lines: An Evaluation of the Scientific Content Analysis Technique (SCAN)*. Police Research Series Paper 135. London: UK Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2001.
- Vrij, A. "Criteria-Based Content Analysis: A Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies." *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, v.11 (2005).
- Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2nd ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2008.

---

## Secrecy

Secrecy can be conceptualized as the intentional act of keeping information contained, such that it may be known to select individuals or groups but not to other individuals or groups. Some suggest that secrecy is passive deception while lying is active deception, though it can be argued that mentally juggling information in order to maintain secrecy is just as active a process. Secrecy may also be a reason for lying or deception. For example, a battered spouse who wishes to protect

the perpetrator may fabricate excuses for injuries or use cosmetics to cover bruises. Secrecy is common in that most individuals are able to identify at least one piece of information that they do not reveal freely. Complete secrecy (that is, a secret that is concealed from everyone), however, is rare.

Generally, the type of secrets people keep fall into categories varying from taboo (that is, strongly stigmatized by society) to conventional (that is, information that people normally keep private). Topics range from shameful to traumatic, past experiences to current health concerns, and often relate to sex or past relationships. Research on family secrets has identified several reasons for secrecy that have been applied to work on general secret keeping. In particular, a strong reason for secrecy is to avoid the negative evaluation of others. People may also withhold information because they feel it is private (that is, not relevant to others), to protect themselves from people who may use the secret against them, or because they find it difficult to communicate about the problem. They may also keep secrets as a relationship-protective measure; for example, they may wish to bond with others who share the secret or to maintain good relations, rather than create trouble.

### Consequences of Keeping Secrets

The consequences of secrecy appear ambiguous in the existing literature. In studies of both clinical and normal samples, the act of keeping secrets has been linked to negative well-being. These effects may manifest themselves psychologically (for example, stress, anxiety, depression) or physically (e.g., bodily symptoms, illness). Researchers have proposed several models as possible explanations for this connection. For instance, inhibiting thoughts or being preoccupied by thoughts about the secret involve continuous mental effort and prevent a secretkeeper from escaping the secret. Not sharing a secret may also rob a person of the opportunity to receive the support needed to cope with the problem.

Some studies found that people who are keeping serious secrets are also more likely to overestimate physical burdens, such as expecting physical tasks to require more effort or offering others less assistance with physical work.

Additional research has found improvements in the health of secret-keepers after a secret is disclosed. However, other research suggests that poor outcomes result only when a secret is serious and that secrecy may not always be detrimental. It may protect others from information they do not need to know, and it may be a way for individuals to maintain independence and their own sense of identity.

Secrecy may also damage relationships. When secret-keepers are not forthcoming with information, the people around them may feel alienated or rejected. They may also trust the secret-keeper less if they suspect or know that the secret-keeping is hiding something. Based on longitudinal research studies, secrecy may lead to less closeness, satisfaction, and commitment in personal relationships. However, avoiding topics that are points of contention or sources of negative emotion can also be a way of maintaining peace in a relationship.

### Conditions of Revealing Secrets

Research suggests several conditions under which people decide to reveal a secret; in particular, they are more likely to share their secret when they feel emotionally close to a person or when they are concerned that the secret will eventually be revealed. Having a confidant who is nonjudgmental and supportive also increases the likelihood of secret revelation. Positive secrets are also likely to be shared, as well as secrets involving the escalation of a romantic relationship (for example, wishing to turn a dating relationship into something more serious).

However, people are least likely to reveal a secret voluntarily when they expect disapproval or other negative reactions, or when they wish to preserve their relationship with the potential confidant and other individuals relevant to the secret. Privacy (that is, the secret is not relevant to the confidant) and communication problems (that is, the secret-keeper is unsure of how to broach the topic) are also cited as conditions that promote an individual's continued secrecy. Secret-keepers also tend to predict that confidants will react more negatively than they actually do when a secret is revealed. Curiously, once the secret is revealed, secret-keepers may believe they accurately predicted the confidant's reaction.

### Benefits and Pitfalls of Disclosing Secrets

There are some benefits to disclosing a secret. In close relationships, such an act is a show of trust and may help foster bonds between family, friends, and lovers. If the secret involves a problem the secret-keeper has been enduring, bringing the information out into the open can be a step toward receiving help or achieving closure. Based on the confidants' reactions, secret-keepers may realize that the secret is not as terrible or shameful as they might have assumed.

Nevertheless, the pitfalls of revealing secrets are also numerous. The confidants themselves may find it impossible to keep the secret, repeating it to others more than half the time. Additionally, although secret-keepers may find it cathartic to share a troubling secret, the confidants now face the prospect of shouldering a burden they may not have wanted. The confidants may also wish to provide support but not know the best way to do so, and as a result, secret-keepers seeking support or acceptance may not find confession to be the remedy they desired. For these reasons, unburdening one's secrets to others is not always recommended.

### Conclusion

To conclude, secrecy is a fundamental feature of the way humans relate. Researchers have identified relatively consistent reasons for protecting information; the most prominent reason involves a desire to protect oneself or someone else from negative evaluation. Often, the secret involves a taboo. Research on the consequences of keeping a secret is mixed, with some suggesting poor physical and mental health outcomes and others proposing that secrecy can be beneficial. Certain conditions are likely to yield secret confessions, namely, having an accepting confidant with whom one is emotionally close. Revealing a secret may have both positive and negative consequences.

Helen Lee Lin  
University of Houston

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Confession; Deception, Characteristics of; Deception and Trust; Deception Motives; Dishonesty; Distrust; Honesty; Lies, Types of.

### Further Readings

- Caughlin, J. P., W. A. Afifi, K. E. Carpenter-Theune, and L. E. Miller. "Reasons for, and Consequences of, Revealing Personal Secrets in Close Relationships: A Longitudinal Study." *Personal Relationships*, v.12 (2005).
- Kelly, A. E. *The Psychology of Secrets*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002.
- Vangelisti, A. L. "Family Secrets: Forms, Functions and Correlates." *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, v.11 (1994).
- Vrij, A., K. Nunkoosing, B. Paterson, A. Oosterwegel, and S. Soukara. "Characteristics of Secrets and the Frequency, Reasons and Effects of Secrets Keeping and Disclosure." *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, v.12 (2002).

## Self-Deception

Lying typically involves (at least) two people: a subject S who lies and a target T who is lied to. S intends, by asserting that some belief ( $\beta$ ) is true, to make T believe that  $\beta$  is true, even though S knows  $\beta$  to be false. Thus, one person, who knows something, sets out to deceive another person, who does not.

Reasoning by analogy, self-deception would seem to involve the same person setting out to deceive themselves (and succeeding). But this seems impossible on the face of it. How can a single person play the roles of S and T, both sending and receiving a misleading message, both knowing that  $\beta$  is false and believing it is true? Much philosophical analysis has attempted to square this conceptual circle. Whether or not it succeeds is moot.

Despite the paradoxical nature of self-deception, everyday examples are easily envisaged. A persistent hard-drug user boasts he can kick his habit whenever he wants. A student who keeps skipping class insists she wishes to pursue an academic career. A husband who habitually cheats on his wife swears that he loves only her. Here, actors stubbornly deny what observers can readily perceive: their problematic deeds imply character flaws.

Such everyday examples highlight how self-deception is not merely accidental—a type of

cognitive error. It is also motivated—a type of wishful thinking. In particular, the desire to maintain a positive self-view, to self-enhance, lies at the heart of much self-deception. To admit to a character flaw—to being, say, an addict, idler, or cad—entails a psychic cost in the form of lower self-esteem or social shame. To avoid incurring that cost, the admission is avoided. Thus, every act of self-deception involves denial, a classic defense mechanism.

Self-deceptive denials range from moderate to extreme. Suppose one pays a sizeable sum to see a movie, but the movie disappoints. The conclusion that one wasted money, or was foolish enough to do so, is unwelcome. It can, however, be avoided by concluding that the movie was better than it was. Such rationalizations are convenient ways of resolving otherwise dispiriting cognitive dissonances. More unqualified forms of denial surface in clinical cases of narcissism. Here, the motive to self-enhance predominates so strongly that arrogant self-justification becomes routine and invincible.

### What Mechanism Underlies Self-Deception?

Can the paradox of self-deception be resolved? If people do not literally lie to themselves by dividing themselves into two distinct and antagonistic centers of consciousness, how does the process work psychologically?

One promising model draws an analogy with junk mail. Sifting through one's mailbox, one attempts to separate mail one wants to keep from mail one wants to discard. To do so effectively, it is not always necessary to open every envelope. Superficial inspection of the envelope itself—is it familiar and formal, or glossy and generic?—often suffices to reliably identify each item.

A similar dynamic may characterize self-deception. That is, self-deceivers may indeed suspect that their problematic deeds carry unflattering implications. However, they do not need to unpack that suspicion fully to be disturbed by it. Even “unopened,” it contains enough cognitive cues to signal that it is unwelcome. Accordingly, self-deceivers may opt not to dwell on its “contents.” The suspicion accordingly passes out of their minds, to be replaced by more reassuring reflections.

Formally put, the mechanism underlying self-deception may be this: more elaborate processing

of information is short-circuited if less elaborate processing hints that it poses a potential threat, especially to one's positive view of self. Hence, there is no need to postulate two selves inhabiting one mind: one the deceiver, and the other the deceived. There may be no need even to postulate the coexistence of two conflicting beliefs. An uncongenial belief may be nipped in the bud before it gets the chance to properly compete with a congenial one.

This junk-mail model is consistent with several findings from experimental research. For example, people selectively forget critical (but not flattering) feedback that pertains to personality characteristics that they regard as of primary (but not of secondary) importance to their identity. This suggests that, on receiving the feedback that they tend to forget, people do not dwell on it as much, or do not process it as elaborately, as the less disturbing feedback that they tend to recall.

### Can Self-Deception Be Experimentally Demonstrated?

Examples of self-deception are easily enumerated. However, they still involve some degree of subjective interpretation. Accordingly, they may be mistaken, like the far-fetched diagnoses of some Freudian psychoanalysis. Three studies offer



*Despite the paradoxical nature of self-deception, everyday examples abound; for example, a persistent hard-drug user boasts she can kick her habit whenever she wants.*



classic examples of the direct experimental demonstration of self-deception.

In one study, participants initially had their self-esteem lowered or raised by informing them that they had performed either poorly or well on a bogus examination. Next, they listened to audio recordings of varying durations. Some featured their own voice, some other people's voices. Participants had to distinguish the one from the other. In addition, participants had their levels of physiological arousal concurrently assessed.

Hearing one's own voice normally increases arousal because one implicitly recognizes it. This was also the case here: increased arousal reliably indicated the playing of one's own voice. However, in some cases participants mistakenly denied hearing their own voice when it was played, and in others mistakenly affirmed hearing their own voice when it was not. Crucially, false denials were more common among participants who had had their self-esteem lowered, whereas false affirmations were more common among those who had had their self-esteem raised. This suggests that feelings of shame or pride made participants either reluctant or keen to identify themselves at a conscious level. Nonetheless, they still always identified themselves at an unconscious level. Here, participants seem to deny that they were experiencing particular perceptions.

In another study, participants were led to believe that two types of heart existed: the Type I sort, predicting longevity, and the Type II sort, predicting the opposite. They were also led to believe that the length of time they could keep their forearm submerged in a bath of ice water—either for a longer period or a shorter one—reliably indicated which type of heart they had. Upon taking the relevant test, participants acted so as to modify the amount of time they kept their forearm submerged in the direction that implied a greater likelihood of possessing the desirable Type I heart.

However, before taking the test, participants would either have possessed a Type I or a Type II heart. This fact would not have changed in the course of the experiment. Hence, it would have been pointless for participants to strive to submerge their arm for a longer or shorter period. That is, their performance on the test could only have been diagnostic of the type of heart they had,

but it could not have had any causal impact on it. Yet if participants “accidentally” found themselves keeping the hand submerged for a longer or shorter time, then they would have been free to regard the reassuring test result as real. This is exactly what happened in this experiment, in which participants seemed to deny that they were acting on particular intentions.

A final study featured male participants who all claimed to be entirely heterosexual. They were divided into two groups: those who also reported being homophobic, and those who did not. Both groups watched three types of erotic movie clips: heterosexual, lesbian, and gay. As they watched, their penile circumference was continuously monitored with a plethysmograph.

Both homophobic and nonhomophobic participants showed substantial and equivalent arousal to heterosexual and lesbian clips. However, the homophobic participants also showed mild arousal to the gay clips, whereas the nonphobic participants showed next to none. This pattern of findings is consistent with homophobia at least partly deriving from a latent bisexuality deemed morally unacceptable. Here, participants seemed to deny that they entertained particular desires.

### Why Does Self-Deception Occur?

Self-deception entails irrationality. People cling to positive illusions about themselves in the face of contradictory evidence and despite the practical risks of misjudging themselves. Why would they do so? Several hypotheses have been advanced. Some contend that self-deception is a structural by-product of how the mind generally works. Others contend that self-deception is a functional adaptation facilitating survival and reproduction. Both classes of hypothesis are complementary rather than contradictory.

Structurally, self-deception may arise naturally out of the modularity of the human mind. If somewhat autonomous mental units each perform their own specialized tasks, then one would not expect them always to operate in concert. This view can be readily harmonized with the junk-mail model above.

Functionally, self-deception may assist the deception of others. Suppose—because of sex differences in reproductive biology—men generally seek to mate widely, whereas women generally

seek to mate wisely. If so, then men may evolve to deceive women about their fidelity, and women evolve to deceive men about their availability. As a counterstrategy, both sexes may then evolve to see through one another's deception.

What next? One counter-counterstrategy would be for both sexes to deceive themselves into believing—at least at first—they are offering what the other sex really wants. By doing so, there would be no more deception to detect. Analogously, it may also be advantageous for people to deceive themselves about their intentions in other relationships, whether cooperative or competitive.

Aiden P. Gregg  
Nikhila Mahadevan  
*University of Southampton*

**See Also:** Bragging and Grandiosity; Cognitive Dissonance; Courtship, Deception in; Darwin, Charles; Deception, Definitions of; Denial; Disbelief, Suspension of; Evolution and Natural Selection; False Signals; Freud, Sigmund; Narcissism; Overconfidence; Psychoanalysis; Rationality; Self-Esteem; Self-Justification.

### Further Readings

- Adams, H. E., L. W. Wright, and B. A. Lohr. "Is Homophobia Associated With Homosexual Arousal?" *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, v.105 (1996).
- Greenwald, A. G. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception: Further Consideration." In *The Mythomanias: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Deception and Self-Deception*, M. S. Myslobodsky, ed. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997.
- Gregg, A. P., C. Sedikides, and J. E. Gebauer. "Dynamics of Identity: Between Self-Enhancement and Self-Assessment." In *Handbook of Identity: Theory and Research*, S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, and V. L. Vignoles, eds. New York: Springer, 2011.
- Gur, R. C. and H. A. Sackeim. "Self-Deception: A Concept in Search of a Phenomenon." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.37 (1979).
- Kurzban, R. *Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Mele, A. R. *Self-Deception Unmasked*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Quattrone, G. A. and A. Tversky. "Causal Versus Diagnostic Contingencies: On Self-Deception and on the Voter's Illusion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.46 (1984).

Trivers, R. *The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life*. New York: Basic Books, 2011.

## Self-Esteem

Self-esteem refers to how one would evaluate his or her self-worth, which is derived from one's own experiences, beliefs, and self-perception. Sigmund Freud breaks self-esteem into three components: one's aspirations for oneself, one's aspirations that are corroborated by actual experience, and one's loving and being loved by others. Being loved by others can be falsified when people alter their true identities in order to be more desired and approved by society. One's own self-esteem can be falsified because those with high self-esteem tend to overestimate their own abilities and traits, and those with low self-esteem tend to more accurately predict their own abilities. Self-esteem in this case functions as a form of self-lying in order to increase feelings of accomplishment and satisfaction.

Until recently, it was believed that self-esteem was a consequence of life outcomes, including job satisfaction, salary information, relationship outcomes, personal health, and depression. More recent research indicates that life outcomes do not have direct effects on self-esteem. Conversely, self-esteem does seem to predict life outcomes. Even though the effects are often small, self-esteem affects relationships, job satisfaction, and health. However, self-esteem has not been found to be related to occupational status.

Taken across outcomes, self-esteem plays a large role in overall life consequences. Those with higher self-esteem tend to be more healthy and satisfied with multiple aspects of their lives. Similarly, those with lower self-esteem tend to be less healthy and less satisfied overall.

### Defensive Self-Esteem

When individuals have high self-esteem combined with a high need for approval, it has been

suggested that they are high in defensive self-esteem. Defensive self-esteem occurs when an individual falsifies his or her behaviors to avoid criticism, hostility, and unfavorable opinions about themselves. In effect, they report high levels of self-esteem targeted on a version of their self that is manufactured to obtain the approval of others. Two underlying factors of socially desirable responding have been found to affect defensive self-esteem: impression management and self-deception.

Impression management occurs when individuals are fully aware that he or she is changing their own behaviors in order to be approved. Most people utilize impression management, such as in the job interview process and on social networking sites, in order to appear more socially acceptable. Having control over what others see and hear are only two aspects of making an impression. Social media makes it easier to mask one's personality, focusing on one aspect instead of personality in its entirety. For example, one could focus solely on philanthropy, making the individual appear to be more generous, but no other aspect of his or her personality would be noted. Impression management also includes having more control over self-presentational behavior.

Self-deception is said to occur when an individual simultaneously and unknowingly holds two opposing beliefs regarding his or her behaviors and feelings of self-worth. Self-deception has been suggested as a response to self-confrontation, and individuals may or may not elicit contradictory beliefs about themselves during self-report measures. As such, self-deception can be defined as an unconscious bias that protects an individual's self-esteem against psychological threats of being inadequate, incapable, or undesirable. When confronted with information regarding themselves that would threaten their self-esteem, they convince themselves this information is not a true reflection of themselves.

A recent study demonstrated that when self-esteem is low, there are stronger feelings of pleasure arising out of the misfortunes of others. The misfortune of others provides a downward comparison that can boost a person's own feelings of adequacy. Those with higher self-esteem do not feel as strongly about self-protection because they are desired and accepted by society.

Similar to projecting deceptive self-esteem and misrepresenting oneself in order to be more socially acceptable, self-esteem is related to individuals' perceptions of their own capabilities. When asked to rate one's self-efficacy, those that rate higher on self-esteem scales tend to have higher self-efficacy ratings as well. This belief is somewhat skewed, however, as individuals tend to believe they are more capable than they actually are when tested. Conversely, those with lower self-esteem ratings tend to rate themselves more accurately on self-efficacy scales.

This is also seen on social media sites because such sites allow people to filter what they want to be publicly viewed, stated, or projected. Social media allows more control over self-presentational behavior compared to face-to-face contact. Those with higher self-esteem tend to have more friends or followers on social media sites, and they share disproportionately more positive activities and pictures depicting themselves in positive activities compared to people with lower self-esteem. Over-sharing or inappropriate sharing, such as pictures of alcoholic excesses, are more likely to be posted by those with lower self-esteem.

### Measuring Self-Esteem

Self-esteem can be measured in various ways. Self-esteem was initially measured through the analysis of verbal interviews. These interviews were more likely to capture an individual's self-esteem as projected through impression management and self-deception. Interviews may also fail to capture self-views that individuals may not be consciously aware of. Even if they are aware of their self-esteem, individuals may give inaccurate responses as a method of defensive self-esteem.

More recent research on self-esteem uses various self-report rating scales. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is one of the first scales created to measure self-esteem and is still widely used today. This 10-item scale provides a range of self-esteem: the higher the rating, the higher the self-esteem an individual possesses. Though explicit rating scales such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale have high internal consistency, they can easily be falsified, as with interviews, because they are self-report measures. Self-report measures can be unreliable because some individuals may not be aware of their own self-esteem and may give

responses that they believe are accurate but actually are an inaccurate measure of the individuals' true feeling toward themselves.

Because of the inaccuracies of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and other self-report measures, researchers have begun to utilize the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit or unconscious self-esteem. The IAT requires participants to associate certain words to either themselves or to others. Through the IAT those individuals with genuinely high self-esteem will relate more positively associated words to themselves. Those with lower self-esteem relate less positive words to themselves and more positive words toward others.

The Name-Letter Test, or NLT, has also been developed to measure self-esteem. Individuals are asked to rate their liking for all the letters of the alphabet. When comparing letters, the initials of the names of those who report high self-esteem are rated higher than the ratings of other letters. Items that represent the self are rated higher than the items that are not representative of the self. The NLT or the IAT provide additional tools to measure self-esteem. Such methods are needed, as self-esteem by its very nature is often deceptive.

Self-esteem in relation to lying and deception is in individuals' ability to lie to themselves or to others regarding their sense of self. Such lies of the self can include pretending to be something they are not, thus deceiving others about their true personalities, or deceiving themselves through exaggerated appraisals of their own traits and abilities through high self-esteem. Those with high self-esteem rate facets of themselves as unrealistically high compared to those with low self-esteem. Similarly, those with high self-esteem rate their self-efficacy less accurately than those with lower self-esteem. Such scales also display that when someone has low self-esteem and encounters something that may be detrimental to his or her self-esteem, he or she is more likely to engage in self-deception to protect the good feelings that go along with high self-esteem.

Joel T. Nadler  
Rosey Morr

*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**See Also:** Adolescence; Lying in; Bragging and Grandiosity; Denial; Freud, Sigmund; Guilt;

Narcissism; Overconfidence; Projection; Reputation; Self-Deception.

### Further Readings

- Gur, Ruben C. and Harold A. Sackeim. "Self-Deception: A Concept in Search of a Phenomenon." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.37 (1979).
- Kramer, Nicole C. and Stephan Winter. "Impression on Management 2.0: The Relationship of Self-Esteem, Extraversion, Self-Efficacy, and Self-Presentation Within Social Networking Sites." *Journal of Media Psychology*, v.20 (2008).
- Orth, Ulrich, Richard W. Robins, and Keith F. Widaman. "Life-Span Development of Self-Esteem and Its Effects on Important Life Outcomes." *Personality Processes and Individual Differences*, v.102 (2012).
- Ouwerkerk, Jaap W. and Yoka M. Wesseling. "Self-Esteem, Self-Affirmation, and Schadenfreude." *Emotion*, v.11 (2011).
- Save, Florin A., et al. "Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem and Irrational Beliefs." *Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies*, v.11 (2011).

---

## Self-Justification

The most insidious form of deception is self-deception. When an individual deceives others (as in a political speech), that deception may temporarily affect the attitudes and behavior of the audience. But if the deceiver then needs to justify what he has done and succeeds in deceiving himself, the effects on his attitudes and behavior are often profound and long-lasting.

Scientific research on self-justification and self-deception began in earnest in 1950, when Leon Festinger invented the theory of cognitive dissonance. Basically, cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual holds two cognitions (ideas, beliefs, attitudes) contradicting each other. Dissonance produces mental discomfort, from minor pangs to deep anguish. People do not rest easily until they reduce this discomfort, usually by modifying one cognition to make it more consistent with the other.



As a student working in Festinger's lab, Elliot Aronson made an important discovery: cognitive dissonance causes most pain, and therefore the most permanent changes, when one of the cognitions is about the way individuals see themselves and the other is about an action they perform or a statement they make that runs counter to that self-concept. Elaborating on that insight, Aronson suggested that because most people consider themselves to be relatively smart, moral, and competent, when they do something that makes them feel stupid, immoral, or incompetent, they experience the greatest pain of dissonance. Because it is virtually unthinkable for people to change their beliefs in the kind of persons they are ("I guess I am a stupid, immoral slob after all!"), they strive, instead, to invent a story that justifies the action that threatened their self-concept.

There are a great many ways for individuals to justify their actions, but they usually involve constructing a story that enhances the value of the action they have taken, that diminishes the importance of the unethical behavior in which they have engaged, or that dehumanizes the person they have harmed. Fifty years of research has supported these ideas.

### Research in Self-Justification

In a classic experiment by Festinger and Merrill Carlsmith, participants were asked to lie by falsely telling an incoming participant that the excruciatingly boring task they had just performed was actually fun and interesting. In subsequent experiments, participants were asked to lie to others about what they really thought: to publicly argue in favor of a position they were actually strongly against. Some participants were paid well for their misrepresentations, and others poorly. Participants who were paid well, or were offered other strong incentives or justifications for their behavior, seemed to feel no dissonance and no need to tell themselves any further story about why it was okay to lie. But those who were not offered adequate justifications came up with their own, typically by deciding that they weren't really lying. They really believed what they said, and they were doing good by convincing others.

While early studies focused on lying or other harmful behaviors toward others, research soon

showed that individuals feel compelled to justify foolish behaviors as well: lying to themselves is an effort to feel good about their choices. But people often suffer from these self-justifications, finding it difficult to abandon foolish choices, to admit their mistakes and move on. With blinders shielding them from awareness of their mistakes, they persist in walking the same flawed paths. The worse the mistakes, the harder they work to justify them to themselves and others.

A laboratory experiment by Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills further illustrates how these processes work. College students volunteered to participate in a series of group discussions on the psychology of sex. Some students were randomly assigned to a control condition, which allowed them into the group with little or no effort. Others had to go through a great deal of effort to be admitted to the group. Each volunteer then listened to what they believed to be a live discussion by the group they had just joined (actually a standardized recording of a terribly boring and tedious discussion).

The students in the control group saw it for what it was, a boring and worthless group, and they had no wish to come back for another meeting. But those in the high-effort condition rated the group as worthwhile and enjoyable; they could hardly wait for the next meeting. Why? The cognition, "I went through hell and high water to get into a boring group" was dissonant with their self-concept of being smart. They needed to tell themselves a story that would allow them to see the group in the best possible light.

The process of self-justification works below conscious awareness. For example, after his experiment, Aronson explained the theory and hypotheses to the students. The typical response of those in the high-effort condition was, "Yes, I understand the theory; it sounds reasonable. But it's not true for me. I really liked that discussion. I really do consider it an interesting group and I am unhappy that I can't join it."

In much the same way, other researchers have found a host of additional results showing the power of self-justification. Summarizing this search, Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson concluded that self-justification is most destructive when it allows individuals to engage in immoral behaviors that cheat or harm others. This is

when individuals can get truly creative, often by blaming their own dishonest or hurtful behavior on the victims themselves, deciding they were unworthy and deserved the abuse that was heaped on them.

Although all people spin masterful tales of self-justification, some people are more clever than others. Dan Ariely has described many instances of real-life cheating among professionals as well as among participants in laboratory studies. He found that cheating was quite pervasive, but one group stood out as the most likely cheaters. Just as self-justification theory would predict, it was the most creative people—those who could tell the best stories to justify their cheating—who cheated the most. A lifetime of creative self-justification seems to allow people to find a way to feel good about whatever they want to do whether it is deceiving others without remorse, or engaging in unhealthy behavior (such as smoking, overeating, or underexercising).

Fortunately, creative self-justification can also push individuals toward useful behaviors. For example, considerable effort, sacrifice, or commitment can be a necessary requirement making the right choice. As dissonance researchers have shown, the need to justify these “costs” of doing the right thing can drive people toward more responsible actions, for example, to behave more ethically, practice safer sex, conserve water, or exercise more regularly.

## Conclusion

Self-justification processes are powerful and ubiquitous. They lead sensible people to deceive themselves in countless ways in everyday life. Most important, these changes are far from ephemeral. For good or for evil, they can exert lasting and powerful effects on a person's beliefs and behavior.

Deborah Davis

*University of Nevada, Reno*

Eliot Aronson

*University of California, Santa Cruz*

**See Also:** Attorneys; Cognitive Dissonance; Deception, Characteristics of; Deception Motives; Ideology; Law and Law Enforcement; Lies, Types of; Memory; Rationality; Repressed Memories; Self-Deception.

## Further Readings

Ariely, D. *The Honest Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone, Especially Ourselves*. New York: HarperCollins, 2012.

Hauser, Marc, Fieri Cushman, Liane Young, R.

Kang-Xing Jin, and John Mikhail. “A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.”

*Mind & Language*, v.22/1 (2007):

Tavris, C. and E. Aronson. *Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me)*. New York: Harcourt, 2007.

---

# Sender Demeanor

Sender demeanor refers to a person's tendency to convey a certain impression. Some people convey an impression of honesty; others, an impression of dishonesty. Senders convey these impressions to most people in most settings, whether they are lying or telling the truth.

The first evidence of sender demeanor was uncovered in a laboratory study in which participants were videotaped while telling lies and truths. Later, other participants viewed the resulting tapes. They judged which of the earlier participants had been lying and which had been telling the truth. Results showed large differences in sender credibility. Some senders appeared truthful to virtually all the judges, and other senders were almost always judged to be untruthful. Significantly, the senders who appeared most honest when they were lying were the very senders who appeared most honest when telling the truth. The investigators termed this pattern of results a demeanor bias.

A later analysis of results from hundreds of studies attempted to quantify the impact of individual differences on deception judgments. Of several individual differences considered, differences in judgment ability were smallest, and differences in sender demeanor were largest. People differ in the honesty of their demeanor at least 14 times as much as they differ in the ability to detect lies. As these results imply, judges agree on who appears honest and who appears dishonest; they agree even when their judgments are wrong.

Individual differences in apparent honesty are large in every situation in which the differences have been studied. People differ widely in

apparent honesty when they tell motivated lies as well as white lies. They differ widely in apparent honesty when they engage in deceptive interactions and when their honesty is judged from a videotape. They differ widely in apparent honesty when (on average) their lies are detectable and when their lies are not. When Person A judges Person B's truthfulness, the largest single determinant of the judgment is Person B's demeanor, research suggests.

A recent series of experiments underscores the importance of individual differences in apparent honesty. Researchers began by videotaping people who were telling lies and truths, and solicited deception judgments of these videotapes from undergraduates. Using the undergraduates' judgments, they identified the people on the videotape who were perceived as most and least honest. The researchers then created two videotapes: a veracity-matched tape and a veracity-mismatched tape. On the veracity-matched tape were people who appeared honest and were telling the truth as well as people who appeared dishonest and were lying. On the veracity-mismatched tape were people who were telling the truth but appeared dishonest, as well as people who were lying but appeared honest.

The investigators solicited deception judgments to these two specially constructed tapes from a variety of judges: American undergraduates, Koreans, and U.S. government security agents. Without exception, judges were highly accurate in discriminating lies from truths on the veracity-matched tape. Without exception, they were highly inaccurate when judging the veracity-mismatched tape. Deception judgments can be more strongly affected by a sender's apparent truthfulness than the sender's actual truthfulness, as this research dramatically shows.

Researchers have sought to explain why some people appear honest and others appear dishonest. Perhaps people have an honest (or dishonest) demeanor by virtue of the way they talk or certain impressions they convey. Research shows that people who appear honest are those who seem competent and involved in social interactions. People who appear dishonest are those who sound indifferent, uncertain, and ambivalent. Their remarks seem planned and implausible. As conversationalists, they do not place events in context. A person's

apparent honesty does not strongly depend on the person's tendency to make eye contact. This is surprising because a widely held stereotype holds that liars can't look people in the eye.

Judges make inferences about a sender's honesty in different settings. Often, they see and hear the sender in a face-to-face interaction. Sometimes, they hear the sender but are not in a position to see him (or her), as in a telephone call. Still other times, they might need to determine the honesty of a person they have seen but not heard from a soundless videotape. There are still other occasions when deception must be judged from text, as from a written transcript of a sender's remarks.

Do people who appear honest in one communication medium appear honest in another medium? The answer is yes. A recent analysis of multiple studies shows that people who sound honest (in an audio-only medium) look honest (in a video-only medium). Moreover, their remarks appear truthful when read in a transcript. These cross-modal consistencies have not yet been explained. Additional findings suggest that audiovisual impressions of honesty depend more on how a person sounds than how he (or she) looks. The strongest cues to apparent honesty seem to be audible, not visible, these findings suggest. An opposing viewpoint is the video primacy hypothesis that social judgments depend most heavily on what the judge sees.

Laboratory research suggests that it is hard to tell when people are lying. No doubt, there are many obstacles to lie detection. One, however, may be sender demeanor. Many people appear honest, even when they are lying. Others appear dishonest, even when they are telling the truth. Differences in sender demeanor may bias deception judgments. They may bias judgments in the courtroom, where guilty-looking defendants may be sentenced to jail, while those who appear innocent are set free.

Individual differences in apparent honesty might, in principle, be related to differences in the tendency to lie. It is possible, for instance, that the people most likely to avoid lying are those who appear honest. This would be true if others' prophecies of a person's honesty became self-fulfilling. In a relevant investigation, people were encouraged to agree to tell lies for a later study. They were, however, given the option not

to lie. Meanwhile, a facial photograph was taken of each participant. In a later session, people who did not know the participants rated the resulting facial photographs on several dimensions, including the honesty of the person depicted. Results showed that the participants least willing to tell laboratory lies were participants whose facial photographs were perceived as most honest.

If it is true that people who appear honest are unlikely to lie in everyday life, real-world lie detection may be more accurate than laboratory research would suggest. In laboratory research, all participants are required to lie, even those who are truthful in other settings. Outside the laboratory, it is possible that people have a better sense of who is likely (and unlikely) to lie. Further work on this possibility would be welcome.

Charles Bond  
*Texas Christian University*

**See Also:** Credibility; Deception Detection Accuracy; Duchenne Smile; False Signals; Interpersonal Deception Theory; Lying as Ability or Skill; Microfacial Expressions; Motivational Impairment Effect; Nonverbal Cues; Transparent Liars; Vocal Stress Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F. Jr., D. S. Berry, and A. Omar. "The Kernel of Truth in Judgments of Deceptiveness." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, v.15 (1994).
- Bond, C.F. Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).
- Levine, T. R., K. B. Serota, J. Shulman, D. D. Clare, H. S. Park, A. S. Shaw, J. C. Shim, and J. H. Lee. "Sender Demeanor: Individual Differences in Sender Believability Have a Powerful Impact on Deception Detection Judgments." *Human Communication Research*, v.37 (2011).

---

## Siege of Mafeking

The Siege of Mafeking was a decisive victory for Great Britain during the Boer Wars. The battle endured for 217 days, spanning from October

16, 1899, to May 17, 1900. It took place in and around the city of Mafeking, South Africa, as British forces sought to defend the premises from a Boer invasion. The British army employed a number of deceptive strategies during the siege, which served as a turning point for Great Britain in the war.

The Boer Wars consisted of two wars: the lesser-known First Anglo-Boer War and the Second Boer War. Both wars were fought between the British Empire and Dutch settlers of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. The First Anglo-Boer War was triggered, in part, by Britain's 1877 annexation of the South African Republic (not to be confused with the present-day Republic of South Africa). After three months of combat, the British government resolved that victory would be too costly and take too long to actualize. A peace treaty was signed on March 6, 1881.

In 1886, however, the Witwatersrand Gold Rush reignited tensions between the British and the Boers, as each side sought control of the lucrative Witwatersrand gold mines. Located 30 miles south of the Boer capital, Witwatersrand contained the largest deposit of gold-bearing ore in the world. Such wealth made it financially viable for Britain to renew its imperial interests in the South African Republic, initiating the Second Boer War.

The Second Boer War began with a pre-emptive attack by the Boers on British-controlled territories in Natal and Cape Colony. Among their pre-emptive strikes was an assault on the city of Mafeking, a clash which would later become known as the Siege of Mafeking. British forces had gathered in Mafeking because of the resources and mobility supplied by its railway junction. They amassed between 1,200 and 2,000 soldiers in preparation to march south. But before they could launch an assault, approximately 6,000 Boers descended upon the town.

Boer forces began their siege of Mafeking on October 13, 1899. Realizing they largely outnumbered the British, the Boers demanded that British forces surrender. When they refused, the Boers began shelling Mafeking with payload-carrying siege mortars. Over the next seven months, the Boers continued their assault on Mafeking, culminating with a final offensive attack on May 12, 1900. The Boers lost more than 100 soldiers





*Lord Frederick Roberts steps onto the gangway upon his arrival at Cape Town, South Africa, to the relief of British troops, who are badly shaken by a succession of defeats. Roberts was instrumental in the victory of the Siege of Mafeking in May 1900, in which the British made skillful use of military deception.*

in the attack (60 dead and 108 imprisoned). In light of their losses, the Boers finally decided that Mafeking was too heavily fortified to seize; they eventually redeployed their forces elsewhere. The 217-day Siege of Mafeking was finally lifted on May 17, 1900, resulting in a British victory.

### **British Deception During the Siege**

Britain's ability to withstand such a prolonged assault from the larger Boer army has been largely attributed to its skillful use of military deception. Deceptive strategies included faux land mines, nonexistent barbed wire, an embellished number of gunners, feigned military confidence, and even cross-dressing soldiers. Early in the battle, British forces supplemented their dwindling artillery by distributing phony land mines along the perimeter of Mafeking, within clear view of Boer forces

and their spies. When moving between trenches located on the edge of town, British soldiers also simulated the presence of nonexistent barbed wire by pretending to duck beneath, climb over, and move between imaginary wire obstacles. An embellished number of gunners were conveyed to the Boers by systematically repositioning artillery and searchlights in order to give the impression that more gunners existed than the British actually possessed.

The Boer army was also deceived and intimidated by Britain's aggressive attack using an armored train. Laden with British sharpshooters, the armored train was sent deep into the Boers' camp. Such an assertive strike, augmented by the train's safe return, led many Boers to overestimate Britain's military strength. Finally, British soldiers were even ordered to dress as women in an effort to deceive the Boers. The cross-dressed soldiers were then directed to carry out everyday tasks within the Boers' range of view, such as washing dirty laundry or stitching with needle and thread. The soldiers' casual performance of such common chores deceived their enemy into thinking conditions were much more desirable within Mafeking than they actually were, thus disheartening the Boer army, whose strategy had been to wait out the British forces.

### **Victory Celebrations**

Prior to Britain's successful defense of Mafeking, the Second Boer War had largely been a disaster for the British army. As news of the victory reached Britain, however, the citizenry was enthused by the Mafeking resistance. Immense, extravagant celebrations erupted in London as citizens learned of the British victory. These celebrations served as the inspiration for the back-formation of the English verb "to maffick," which means to celebrate in a public, extravagant manner.

Sergeant Horace Martineau, Trooper Horace Ramsden, and Captain Charles FitzClarence were awarded Victoria Crosses for their heroic actions during the Siege of Mafeking—the highest military decoration awarded to members of the armed forces of various British Commonwealth/Empire countries. In 1904, under the direction of Lord Frederick Roberts, an obelisk was also erected at Mafeking bearing the names of all those who were killed defending the town.

The greatest honors, however, were reserved for Colonel Robert Baden-Powell. Baden-Powell was promoted to major general, becoming the youngest person in the British army to hold this position. He also was celebrated as a national hero when he returned to Britain in 1903 to serve as inspector general of cavalry. Upon his return to Britain, Baden-Powell learned that his book *Aids of Scouting* had become immensely popular and was being adapted by teachers for children. Building upon his newfound celebrity, Baden-Powell went on to be an instrumental figure in the modern Scout movement by holding scouting camps for young boys and writing *Scouting for Boys*, which modified his previous work for a younger audience.

### Conclusion

The 217-day Siege of Mafeking served as a major turning point for Great Britain during the Second Boer War. In order to guard the city of Mafeking from incursion by a much larger Boer army, the British employed a number of deceptive strategies. Such strategies ranged from faux land mines to nonexistent barbed wire, feigned military confidence to cross-dressing soldiers. Ultimately, their deception proved successful, resulting in spontaneous celebrations (also known as “mafficking”) throughout Britain and a legacy that includes the modern Scout Movement.

J. Jacob Jenkins.

*California State University Channel Islands*

Patrick J. Dillon

*University of Memphis*

**See Also:** Colonialism; History of Deception: 1800 to 1900; Military Deception.

### Further Readings

Doyle, Arthur Conan. *The Great Boer War*. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1900.

National Army Museum. “Online Exhibitions.” <http://www.nam.ac.uk/exhibitions/online-exhibitions> (Accessed February 2013).

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War*. New York: Random House, 1979.

Scott, David C. “The Siege of Mafeking.” *International Scouting Collector’s Association Journal*, v.8 (2008).

Young, Filson. *The Relief of Mafeking*. Seattle: Amazon, 2012.

## Situational Familiarity

Situational familiarity is defined as a “personal perception of knowledge of a place, task, activity, or topic relevant to a judgmental situation.” For example, police officers could be more or less familiar with the process of an interrogation in general. A judge could also be more or less familiar with a topic or an activity described in a suspects’ alibi. Moreover, judges are sometimes more or less familiar with a place described in a message to be judged. Two types of situational familiarity can be distinguished. First, people can be objectively highly familiar with a place, task, topic, or activity, especially when they have actual, detailed knowledge about the place, task, topic, or activity. Second, people sometimes only feel subjectively highly familiar with a place, task, topic, or activity, but do not have actual knowledge about it.

To test the influence of situational familiarity on the ability to detect deception, judges’ situational familiarity was first measured or manipulated. Next, judges had to classify a number of true and deceptive videotaped messages. For example, in one experiment people had to judge videotaped job interviews of applicants talking truthfully or deceptively about their most recent job. Before people saw and classified the applicants’ messages, situational familiarity was manipulated experimentally. In the high-familiarity condition, judges received additional detailed information about the jobs mentioned in the interviews, whereas in the low-familiarity condition, no such information was given. In another study, the subjective familiarity with interrogations was manipulated with experienced police officers and police trainees. In the high-familiarity condition, police officers and police trainees received feedback that enhanced their perceived situational familiarity. In the control condition, no such positive feedback was given.

In sum, recent research has assumed and found that judges’ situational familiarity could influence the ability to accurately classify true and deceptive messages. Both correlational and experimental studies have found that higher actual or perceived situational familiarity leads to higher classification accuracy when judging true and deceptive messages. For example, police officers’ and lawyers’ self-reported familiarity with police interrogations, in general, or with the specific topic

of the messages to be judged, was found to be positively correlated with the ability to correctly classify true and deceptive accounts. Moreover, experimental research found direct evidence that situational familiarity influences the accuracy to correctly classify truth and deception.

The result that higher situational familiarity leads to better detection of deception was found for different populations (students, experienced police officers, police trainees, lawyers, and law students), with different topics mentioned in the true and deceptive messages to be judged (an alibi in a mock crime, job interviews, driving exams), and with different manipulations of actual or perceived situational familiarity. Overall, higher situational familiarity was found to improve accuracy rates in the range of about 8 percent to 23 percent. Considering the lesser ability of laypersons and experts to detect deception, these are not trivial improvements.

Judges' situational familiarity did not influence the judgmental bias (that is, truth bias). Judges under high or low situational familiarity did not differ in the overall percentage of messages classified as truth.

Interestingly, judges under high situational familiarity reported higher confidence in their decision than judges under low situational familiarity. Most important, the confidence ratings of judges under high situational familiarity were positively correlated with actual classification accuracy. For judges under low situational familiarity, no such positive correlation was found. This better accuracy-confidence calibration of judges under high situational familiarity shows that judges under high situational familiarity are not only better in detecting deception but also have better insight into whether the judgment is correct or not.

### **Influence of Situational Familiarity on Verbal and Nonverbal Cues**

Why does higher situational familiarity improve deception detection accuracy? Situational familiarity influences the type of information people use when making deception judgments. When judges are highly familiar with a situation, they use predominantly verbal content cues (that is, plausibility or detailedness) for their lie/truth judgments. They do not rely strongly on false

stereotypical nonverbal cues (that is, liars avoid eye contact or liars show more arm or leg movements). In contrast, low familiarity leads to the use of more false nonverbal cues when judging the veracity of a statement.

The hypothesis that situational familiarity influences the use of verbal content and stereotypical nonverbal cues was tested and confirmed with different experimental methods. First, some researchers use simulated interviews to manipulate verbal content and stereotypical nonverbal cues in a message. For example, in one study researchers created four versions of a videotaped conversation in which they orthogonally manipulated both stereotypical verbal content and nonverbal cues shown by an actor. The advantage of this procedure is that it provides the opportunity to directly demonstrate judges' use of verbal content and/or nonverbal cues in credibility attribution, but actual accuracy of judgments cannot be tested with this procedure. Researchers also use self-report measures to assess if judges use either verbal or stereotypical nonverbal cues. Finally, the correlations of peoples' judgments with the objective presence of verbal and nonverbal cues were used to investigate the judgmental process.

Research on actual cues to deception has found that verbal content cues are better indicators of actual deception than most of the stereotypical nonverbal cues. Therefore, the strategy of judges under higher familiarity to use more valid verbal content cues and less false stereotypical nonverbal cues leads to better deception detection.

### **Conclusion**

Research on the influence of situational familiarity on veracity judgments has come to the following conclusions: situational familiarity moderates the use of stereotypical nonverbal and verbal content cues, with higher situational familiarity leading to a more pronounced use of verbal cues and less use of stereotypical nonverbal cues. Higher actual and perceived situational familiarity improves the ability to correctly classify true and deceptive messages. Judgments under higher situational familiarity are associated with higher confidence, and these judgments are better calibrated.

Marc-Andre Reinhard  
*University of Mannheim*

**See Also:** Content in Context; Deception, Research on; Deception Detection Accuracy; Evidence, Strategic Use of; Language; Linguistic Cues; Nonverbal Cues; Scientific Content Analyses; Statement Validity Assessment; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Blair, J. P., T. R. Levine, and A. S. Shaw. "Content in Context Improves Deception Detection Accuracy." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).
- Mann, S., A. Vrij, and R. Bull. "Detecting True Lies: Police Officers' Ability to Detect Suspects' Lies." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, v.89 (2004).
- Reinhard, M.-A., J. Dahm, and M. Scharmach. "Perceived Experience and Police Officers' Ability to Detect Deception." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, v.35 (2012).
- Reinhard, M.-A., M. Scharmach, and S. L. Sporer. "Situational Familiarity, Efficacy Expectations, and the Process of Credibility Attribution." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, v.34 (2012).
- Reinhard, M.-A., S. L. Sporer, and M. Scharmach. "Perceived Familiarity With a Judgmental Situation Improves Lie Detection Ability." *Swiss Journal of Psychology*, v.72 (2013).
- Reinhard, M.-A., S. L. Sporer, M. Scharmach, and T. Marksteiner. "Listening, Not Watching: Situational Familiarity and the Ability to Detect Deception." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.101 (2011).
- Stiff, J. B., G. R. Miller, C. Sleight, P. Mongeau, R. Garlick, and R. Rogan. "Explanations for Visual Cue Primacy in Judgment of Honesty and Deceit." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.56 (1989).

---

## Smoke Screen

A smoke screen is something intended to confuse, obscure, or mislead others. In the original sense, a smoke screen is a dense mass of smoke used to conceal operations or movement from an opponent, traditionally from a military enemy force. The term has also come to be used more generally for the use of other strategies to conceal information or misdirect attention.

Smoke screens can help conceal troop movements, slow attacking forces, disrupt command and control functions, and reduce the vulnerability of significant assets for both friendly and enemy forces. Smoke, as used in this discussion, is an artificially created product produced by burning or vaporizing some substance, which results in particles becoming suspended in air, such that it weakens or blocks a particular part or parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, particularly visible light, infrared light, ultraviolet light, or microwaves. The U.S. military classifies smoke as visual, which obscures visible light; bispectral, which obscures visible through infrared light; multispectral, which obscures visible through millimeter wavelengths; and special purpose smoke, which obscures specifically targeted portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.

### Historical Use of Smoke Screens

Smoke screens have been used as a military tactic since ancient times to confound an enemy by shielding from view an opposing force. In antiquity a simple campfire or smoldering torch could have been used to produce excess smoke. It has been speculated that the fleeing Hebrew people during the Exodus from Egypt were screened by smoke from Pharaoh's forces. There is evidence that military application of smoke by burning damp straw to smoke enemy positions dates back at least as far as 2000 B.C.E.

The U.S. Army experimented with smoke screens during World War I but used them more extensively during the World War II and subsequently. Accordingly, the Chemical Warfare Service was established as part of the American Expeditionary Force in 1918; it became the Chemical Corps in 1946 as a branch of the U.S. Army. Smoke screens were a significant part of the battle arsenal of the Chemical Corps.

During World War I, battleships would deploy smoke screens to conceal their location. One of the best-known instances of the use of this tactic was during the Battle of Jutland on May 31 and June 1, 1916. During World War II, the U.S. Army deployed HC M1 smoke pots in battle situations, such as during the Battle of Monte Cassino in Italy, in which smoke had numerous uses, such as screening ammunition dumps, constructing bridges, in group operations, at river



assault crossings, at supply routes, and in troop concentrations. The U.S. Air Force used smoke to control flights and to mask targets in midair.

Smoke screens have also been used defensively to conceal cities and towns during bombing raids. During World War II, for example, the United Kingdom routinely used smoke screens to protect cities, harbors, and factories from Luftwaffe bombers. The U.S. Navy used smoke screens as protection from air attacks and to otherwise conceal vessels at sea. For example, American naval personnel used M1 mechanical smoke generators to screen Allied ships of the invasion fleet and supply facilities in the port of Bizerte in North Africa on July 7, 1943, such that Nazi pilots could not locate their targets; therefore, the over 3000 bombs dropped all missed their targets and not a single ship was sunk.

Of course, not only the Allies used smoke screens during the World War II. The Japanese forces, for instance, used a Type 100 50-kilogram smoke bomb.

During the Korean War, chemical smoke generation companies were established within the U.S. Army. One Korean battle site became known as Smoke Valley because one of these companies generated smoke 24 hours a day to obscure the North Korean and Chinese forces' visibility of the U.S. Army Tenth Corps. During the Vietnam War, smoke ships were used as part of the Airmobile Concept to protect men on the ground from small-arms fire.

### Modern Use of Smoke Screens

Smoke screens continue to be employed in modern warfare, and an array of technologies is now employed to create varied types of cover. Smoke screens can be generated from canisters, such as by grenade or mortar shell, or deployed by smoke generators, which can be either stationary or placed in vehicles, such as from a tank, ship, or a U.S. Army Humvee. Smoke screens can help conceal troop movements, slow attacking forces, disrupt command and control efforts, and reduce the vulnerability of significant assets for both the friendly and enemy forces.

More sophisticated detection devices have resulted in the evolution of more developed smoke screen technologies as countermeasures. The strategic use of smoke screens is still recognized to

have utility to attack and defeat specific enemy targets and to target acquisition systems, sensors, weapon guidance systems, and other electro-optical devices. Synchronized smoke planning is currently integrated into tactical battle planning. For example, the use of infrared viewers and sensors has led to techniques to screen beyond the visible light spectrum. Similarly, target designators or range finders utilizing laser beams can be thwarted by extra dense forms of smoke with additional types of particulate matter dispersed.

Modern smoke grenades, whether hand-thrown, fired from a rifle (such as the U.S. M19 A1 WP spigot launched grenade), or otherwise projected, are primarily meant to obscure vision, as were their predecessors. However, many smoke grenades now also contain white phosphorus, which also has incendiary and anti-personnel effects. Contemporary hand-thrown examples of white phosphorus smoke grenades include the British No. 80 WP, which is time-fused, and the German DM 19, which has a pull cord arming device and phosphorus filler that detonates as the canister body breaks upon impact with the ground.

The use of smoke screen technologies is not restricted to only military situations. For example, rum runner boats were known to deploy smoke screens during Prohibition in order to evade capture. Currently, police and other law enforcement agencies can deploy smoke screens to assist with riot control and similar activities. It has been known for some time that smoke screens can produce harmful effects to those exposed to the smoke screen material. The inhalation effects of breathing this material can be seriously adverse, including acute inflammatory changes, respiratory distress, pulmonary injuries, and even death.

### The Figurative Smoke Screen

*Smoke screen* is a term that has acquired several different meanings with respect to lying and deception. The original use of the term, of course, was to refer to the use of a dense mass of smoke to impede the visibility of opponents, typically an enemy military force. However, the concept has come to be used to describe other forms of deception. In political campaigns and other public activities, a smoke screen can be an attempt to conceal some embarrassing or scandalous

information; this could serve as a pretense to keep some material secret. In debates or in business marketing programs and other similar dealings, a smoke screen can be used as a red herring thrown up as a distractor; this might be used to grab attention and to serve as bait to attract customers, but the real intent could be to maneuver customers toward another product or service. Similarly, a student taking an examination might submit a vague essay rather than clearly indicate that he or she does not know the correct answer.

Victor B. Stolberg  
*Essex County College*

**See Also:** Camouflage; Department of Defense, U.S.; Korean War; Military Deception; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

Dellas, Harris and Vally Koubi. "Smoke Screen: A Theoretical Framework." *Public Choice*, v.78/3-4 (1994).

Han, Jie, Jian-qi Zhang, and Guo-jing He. "Estimation Technology of the Infrared Smoke Interference Effect." *Infrared and Laser Engineering*, v.33/1 (2004).

Karlsson, Nils, Gudrun Cassel, Ingrid Fargmark, and Frank Bergman. "A Comparative Study of the Acute Inhalation Toxicity of Smoke From  $\text{TiO}_2$ -Hexachloroethane and Zn-Hexachloroethane Pyrotechnic Mixtures." *Archives of Toxicology*, v.59/3 (1986).

---

## Soccer (Football)

Soccer is one of the oldest and most popular sports in the world. It is played by tens of millions of youth and children in North and South America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. It is gaining popularity in the United States. Today, there are approximately 250 million players officially playing in teams around the world. The World Cup competition, which is held once every four years and includes teams representing between 190 and 200 countries, is watched by billions of people across the world. It is played between two teams,

each with 11 players, and a ball. The aim of the game is to put the ball in the goal at each end. Except for the goalkeeper, players are not allowed to use their hands to hit the ball. The International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) governs the game internationally and organizes the World Cup.

In agreement with several theories in psychology, such as Bandura's social cognitive theory of moral thought and action and Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory, many communities, schools, organizations, and governments use soccer as a way to instill values of honesty, cooperation, respect for the rules, and trust in youth. As in many team sports, trust among players is important, and lying and deception can erode such trust. Even in the countries suffering severe oppression or



Argentina's soccer team captain, Diego Maradona, celebrates their World Cup victory, June 29, 1986. In the quarterfinal between Argentina and England on June 22, Maradona scored one of the most controversial points in World Cup history when he used his hand while pretending to hit the ball with his head. Four years later, he apologized for his comment at the time: "From the hand of God to the head of Maradona."

corruption, soccer provides an opportunity for youth to play by common rules, expecting fairness and that the better team wins. As an opportunity for some form of Freudian catharsis, soccer also provides a nonviolent outlet for hostilities that might exist between communities or countries. Soccer has also been used as a form of therapy to help children suffering consequences of wars or trauma to rebuild their trust in themselves and others. Lying and deception, especially if the victim's story is not believed, can in such circumstances stimulate buried history of psychological hurt. In addition, sometimes perceptions of unfairness or lying and deception might be symptoms of other hidden psychological issues. Many referees are accused of bias by fans, despite a lack of evidence to support such perceptions. Such accusations might reflect a history of trauma or general sense of persecution and oppression.

### Winning by Deception

Even though lying and deception are outlawed in soccer, they are frequently used by players or others in the game. Some players try to deceive referees by breaking the rules when the referees are not looking in their direction. Deception by players can take many different forms, such as touching the ball by hand while playing, physically injuring another players, pretending to be injured to win a foul or to waste time or to cool the other team down. One the most famous examples is when Diego Maradona of Argentina, one of the world's most famous soccer players, scored a goal in the England versus Argentina World Cup quarterfinal game in 1986 by using his hand while pretending to hit the ball with his head. The FIFA rules do not allow the referees to rely on recorded TV images to review the incident, so the goal stood.

Another form of deception by players is the use of banned substances. FIFA has been strictly trying to enforce the banned substances rules for a long time. The FIFA rules punish such behaviors severely if discovered. Players, teams, or anyone affiliated with such behaviors can be given a warning or a fine or can be kicked out of the game or suspended for extended periods.

Sometimes lying and deceptions are undertaken by the referees. Game fixing is a big problem in soccer, in which some players or referees might play in ways or make decisions that will produce

a game with secretly agreed upon results. A player might let the opponent team score a goal, or a referee might make several biased calls in favor of a team. Sometimes, both teams agree to end the game with a certain result that will favor them both at the expense of a third team. Sometimes, powerful forces in society supporting a team, or criminal elements involved in underground betting on game results, try to bribe or threaten players or referees in order to control the outcomes of games. Such perceptions of game fixing can ignite violent reactions by supporters of various teams, also known as football hooliganism. Recently, accusations of lying, deception, bribery, and corruption reached deep into FIFA in regard to how it chooses the host countries for World Cup competitions.

Furthermore, sometimes lying and deception in soccer are done by fans of teams. Some fans, in communities that believe in superstitions, are involved in magic or sorcery in an attempt to influence the outcome of the games. Some might use laser light to blur the vision of players, throw objects at them, or scream racial or other insults in order to influence the game. Some fans might even physically attack, injure, or drug players before, during, or after a game.

### Soccer During Incarceration

Many prisons and jails in the United States and other countries provide some kind of recreational activities, including soccer. These activities are meant to provide inmates with physical, mental, and emotional outlets to enhance their well-being. Soccer and other sports provide constructive ways for inmates to use their spare time while also giving them the skills that may help prevent them from reoffending. When inmates are completely idle, they become bored. They may also feel frustrated or aggressive and become violent toward themselves or others. Soccer can provide a positive way to reduce the stresses of incarceration by providing physical stimulation while teaching team-building skills.

One potential downfall to soccer played in prisons and jails is that lying and deception can occur among the inmate population, by those participating or those observing or refereeing. Because cash and currency are strictly prohibited within the correctional environment, soccer and

other sports can be used as a means of betting and organized gambling. Game fixing by players or inmate referees is one way to sway the outcome of the competition so that the winning team benefits from gaining additional canteen products or winning inmate labor services such as laundry or other cleaning duties. Depending on the race or nationality of the assembled inmates, their allegiance to a particular country or team can also contribute to a climate issue among those participating. Setting aside the downfalls of lying and deception, the benefit of soccer to those incarcerated far out weighs the downside of the sport. Proper supervision of the competition by correctional officials will minimize the risk of gambling and place an emphasis on the physical outlet and team-building skills that soccer can bring.

Several studies examined the psychological correlates of antisocial behavior, such as lying and deception, in soccer. For example, ego orientation was positively correlated to antisocial behavior toward opponents. Further, ego orientation and perceived value of toughness had an indirect positive correlation to antisocial behavior toward opponents. Moral disengagement, as defined by Bandura, was found to mediate between such psychological characteristics and antisocial behavior. In addition, studies found that antisocial behavior ratio to prosocial behavior in soccer increased with age. There were also gender differences in antisocial behavior in soccer, with males engaging in more antisocial behavior than females. Lack of empathy was positively correlated to antisocial behaviors such as lying and deception in soccer.

Majed A. Ashy  
Randy Azzato  
Bay State College

**See Also:** Baseball; Basketball; Children's Sports Teams; College Sports; Football; High School Sports.

### Further Readings

Boardley, D. and M. Kavussanu. "Effects of Goal Orientation and Perceived Value of Toughness on Antisocial Behavior in Soccer: The Mediating Role of Moral Disengagement." *Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology*, v.32/2 (2010).

Gibbons, T., K. Dixon, and S. Braye. "The Way It Was: An Account of Soccer Violence in the 1980s." *Soccer & Society*, v.9/1 (2008).

Hersh, Phil. "Diego Maradona: He's the Michael Jordan of Soccer." *Chicago Tribune* (May 29, 1990). [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-05-29/features/9002130651\\_1\\_world-cup-argentina-san-diego](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-05-29/features/9002130651_1_world-cup-argentina-san-diego) (Accessed August 2013).

Kavussanu, M. "Moral Behaviour in Sport: A Critical Review of the Literature." *International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology*, v.1/2 (2008).

Kavussanu, M., R. Stamp, G. Slade, and C. Ring. "Observed Prosocial and Antisocial Behaviors in Male and Female Soccer Players." *Journal of Applied Sports Psychology*, v.21/1 (2009).

Pielke, R. "How Can FIFA Be Held Accountable?" *Sports Management Review*, v.16/3 (2013).

## Sock Puppetry

Pseudonyms and other false identities have been used for centuries. However, the rise of the Internet has created public forums in which people speak their minds and at the same time wish to remain anonymous. On the Internet, the new form of false identifies is termed *sock puppetry*.

A sock puppet is a false identity used online in order to hide true identity. It is a form of deception. The term *sock puppetry* comes from the use of puppets made from socks. The puppets were characters in some form of "show." On the Internet, the term came to be applied to people who would assume a false identity and then join an Internet group. The term has been extended to include people who use false identities on the Internet in order to deceive others. The deception may be acts which praise, blame, defend, oppose, support, attack, defame, ridicule, or otherwise criticize an individual or an organization.

A pseudonym is a name used to protect an identity. Authors have long used pen names for various reasons. Benjamin Franklin, George Sands, Walt Whitman, Anthony Burgess, and other writers have used pseudonyms. However, a sock puppeteer pretends to be someone who is not a member of a group to which they are really connected. Or, he or she falsely pretends to be sympathetic to



a group in order to be disruptive. Some Internet social communities will expel or block sock puppets when exposed.

The first use of the term *sock puppet* was on July 9, 1993. The term came into general use by 1996. At first, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defined a “sock puppet” as a person who is controlled by someone else. The idea of a sock puppeteer as a minion was an extension of the term that was published in 2000 by *U.S. News and World Report*.

The Internet has created many opportunities for online voting. Unscrupulous people will create sock puppets in order to stuff online ballot boxes. In other cases, a sock puppeteer may create multiple identities to support arguments, voice opinions, or otherwise create the online illusion that many people support the sock puppeteer. This practice is called a “Sybil attack” after Sybil Dorsett, which was a pseudonym for Shirley Ardell Manson, used by Cornelia B. Wilber in her 1973 book, *Sybil*. Wilber, a psychoanalyst, treated “Sybil” for multiple personality disorders. Those who use “Sybil attacks” are using multiple personalities in order to anonymously attack others online.

### Straw Men

Another use of sock puppets is to engage in stealth marketing. Also known as “undercover marketing” or “buzz marketing,” the stealth marketer will create sock puppets in order to create the illusion of genuine allegiance to a product, cause, ideology, or other item that is being sold. The sock puppeteer engaging in stealth marketing is an actor who engages in a confidence game to win people to their product by deceptive means. Critics of stealth marketing call it “roach marketing.” It is a form of guerrilla marketing in which people do not even realize they are being hustled to buy something.

In logic, a straw man argument is an informal fallacy that creates a caricature of an opponent’s argument. The “straw man” is then presented as a faithful representation of an opponent’s position, but because it is a flimsy representation, it is easily defeated or discredited. A straw man sock puppet pretends to be a faithful representation of the teachings, beliefs, ideology, or position of an individual or organization, but the straw man sock puppeteer is really just pretending. It is a form of a false flag (*ruse de guerre*), flown to pretend to be

neutral while hiding one’s true identity as pirates, privateers, or covert military operatives.

The straw man puppeteer pretending to be from the opponent’s side will engage in a manner to discredit that side with behaviors that are bigoted, ignorant, or irrational. They operate in a manner similar to Internet “trolls.” Trolls seek to sow discord on the Internet, confuse with distractions, or to otherwise disrupt the rationality of the group’s communications.

Sock puppet behavior is sometimes described as “meat puppeteering.” A number of online behaviors are described with this term. The behaviors include using blogs or other venues to push a product or interest. The meat puppeteer tries to generate the illusion of interest or a buzz about something using sock puppet identities. The buzz may be enhanced by recruited fellow travelers who promote the goals of the meat puppet with “astroturfing.” This is the practice of hiding the sources behind the sponsors of a message. It is using a front organization that hides the identities of those behind the promotion while concealing the identity of the true sponsors. It makes artificial support look like natural grassroots support for something or some cause.

### Modern Sock Puppets

The use of sock puppetry in the virtual spaces of social media has allowed the unscrupulous to forge their identity, usually multiple times, in order to practice praising or defaming. Sometimes, sock puppeteers engage in Internet vandalism by changing facts or information online. Wikipedia has been open to these attacks.

Ways to identify sock puppeteers are growing. Techniques involve using algorithms that combine analysis of the links used and the style of authorship.

People caught practicing sock puppetry have included Jeremy Trevathan of Pan Macmillan. He and others have been accused of posting book reviews that either exaggerated the worth of books or belittled competitive books.

John Mackey of Whole Foods Market was uncovered as a sock puppeteer after he practiced deceptions online for eight years. He posted messages on Yahoo’s financial message boards praising the stock of Whole Foods Market. He also belittled the worth of competitors, particularly

Wild Oats Market, while engaged in actions to acquire Wild Oats Market at a cheaper price. The discovery of Mackey's over 1,200 sock puppet posts prompted an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Raphael H. Golb, a Chicago real estate lawyer, maliciously created sock puppet accounts in order to attack and discredit biblical scholars who disagreed with his father's theories about the Dead Sea Scrolls. On November 18, 2010, in *New York v. Raphael Golb*, Golb was convicted for his defamatory attacks and for identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, aggravated harassment, and unauthorized computer use.

Andrew J. Waskey  
Dalton State College

**See Also:** Advertising, Consumer Products; Computer-Generated Images; Conspiracies; Deception and Technology; Identity Theft; Internet: Chat Rooms; Internet: Facebook and Social Media Sites.

### Further Readings

- Peters, Chelsea. "Constitutional and Regulatory: Whole Foods, Unwholesome Practices: Will Sock Puppeteers Be Held Accountable for Pseudonymous Web Postings?" *Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology*, v.5/4 (2008).
- Rhey, Erik. "Corporate Sock Puppets." *PC Magazine*, v.26/19 (2007).
- Stone, Brad and Matthew Richtel. "The Hand That Controls the Sock Puppet Could Get Slapped." *New York Times* (July 16, 2007).
- Tabar, Taheri, Imran Ghani Mahdi, and Mohd Shafie Abd Latiff. "User's Verification to Prevent Malicious Access in Web-Based Forums." *International Journal of Computer Applications*, v.63/11 (2013).
- Zhan, Bu, Xia Zhengyou, and Wang Jiandong. "A Sock Puppet Detection Algorithm on Virtual Spaces." *Knowledge-Based Systems*, v.37 (2013).

actual argument or presentation. Like many topics of interest in social psychology, inquiry into source credibility has roots in World War II. Led by Carl Hovland and his contemporaries, explorations of source credibility came about because of interest in the construction and effects of propaganda. From the beginning there was an intuition that highly credible sources could be useful in delivering messages focused on persuasion rather than truth. A concern, therefore, is that persons of high credibility may be used to deliver lies or deceptive messages, and that these lies will go undetected.

### The Sleeper Effect

One of the early important findings on source credibility was Hovland's "sleeper effect," which showed that a message from a low-credibility source may become more believable across time as the link between the message and the source fades. This somewhat counterintuitive finding has many practical applications in modern political campaigns, in which unknown (noncredible) political action committees run deceptive ads. According to the sleeper effect, such ads will be persuasive in the long term because their message will remain after its original source is forgotten. Later research suggests that this effect only occurs when the message is persuasive and has an impact over time, the discounting cue is large, and enough time has passed. One way to reduce this deception would be to remind the audience of the low credibility of the original source.

Typically, the impact of source credibility is measured by presenting research subjects with a message given by message communicators of variable credibility. The impact of credibility is measured by changes in subjects' beliefs, behavioral intention, or decision making. A meta-analysis indicated that while source credibility only has a relatively small effect on persuasion (4.5 percent of the variance), the combination of source, message, involvement, and the listener has a larger collective effect.

Source credibility's power is centralized in the communicator-listener interaction. While individual characteristics of the communicator, such as perceived expertise and trustworthiness, have been found to increase source credibility, such characteristics do not exist in a vacuum.

## Source Credibility

Source credibility is the extent to which the communicator of a message is believable; it is distinct from message credibility, which focuses on the

Perceived expertise depends on the message being communicated: the more consonant the message is with characteristics of the communicator, the more expertise will be perceived. For example, a message about the reliability of memory, from a person with published research in the area of memory, would likely be seen as credible.

In turn, the importance of the message is often a function of the listener's involvement in the message: the more identifiable a message is with a trait or concern of the listener, the more the message will be perceived as important. For example, a person with a specific health issue is more likely to listen to messages about that issue than a healthy person would.

### Credibility and Persuasion

Modern inquiry of source credibility also owes a large debt to Richard Petty and John Cacioppo's experiments in the late 20th century on credibility and persuasion. Their work demonstrated that source credibility is most important when listeners either are relatively uninvolved in the message content or unable to process the complexity of it. Conversely, source credibility is least important when listeners are heavily involved in a message, especially one that they perceive they understand well. Additionally, listeners who are presented with a message they disagree with might reject it more vigorously when it comes from a credible source than from a less credible source.

Recent research also indicates that a communicator's source credibility may impact not only the attitudes of a listener but also listener certainty about their attitudes. In fact, Zakary Tormala and Richard Petty found that if a high-credibility communicator fails to persuade a listener, the failure might have a "boomerang" effect—unsuccessful persuasion from a high-credibility source might force the listener to dig in harder against persuasion.

If the listener can detect deception in the communicator, it will undermine source credibility. Deception detection is often studied by exposing research participants to a series of truths and falsehoods. Participants are then asked to make judgments about the truth content of each statement. These answers are then assessed, often using signal detection theory. As such, results can give a complex picture of peoples' abilities: First,

it seems that people are truth-biased, defaulting to expect that others tell the truth. Second, a meta-analysis demonstrated that people, both in the aggregate and individually, are only slightly better than chance (approximately 55 percent) at detecting falsehood. These results stand in stark contrast to people's perception of their own capabilities. The general public believes themselves very capable of detecting deception, and some subgroups, such as police officers, rated themselves as being able to detect falsehood 77 percent of the time.

As noted above, people are poor deception detectors. A recent meta-analysis indicated that there is not a great variability from person to person in terms of ability to detect falsehood. Potential individual-level moderators such as sex, education, intelligence, profession, age, and so on all have negligible-to-zero effects. Message transmission medium (for example, e-mail, person to person, telephonically, and over the Internet) has similarly little impact. In other words, the inability to detect deception may be generalizable to all types of people in all types of settings.

While it is true that some people are regarded as more honest or less honest than others, it has been demonstrated that the more credible a communicator seems, the less likely it is that their message will be heavily scrutinized. It is this lack of scrutiny that allows lies and deception to go unnoticed.

Source credibility and deception interplay in a number of public arenas. For example, Bernie Madoff, architect of one of the biggest financial frauds in U.S. history, used his considerable perceived credibility to lie about complex financial vehicles to a number of clients, investors, and investigators, and he was able to dodge serious inquiry of his misdeeds for over 10 years. Madoff's lie was highly related to his perceived area of expertise, and he has not been able to gain his credibility back.

However, not all losses of credibility that follow lying are irreversible. For example, former president Bill Clinton lied under oath about a sexual affair, and although he did lose credibility, the fact that his area of expertise (politics) is different from the actual domain of the lie likely made it possible for him to regain credibility over time. In addition, Clinton's lie was seen as less damaging

than Madoff's, and thus it was easier to regain credibility.

### Conclusion

High source credibility is an important factor that can lead to deception and lies going undetected. A source is considered credible if he or she is seen as trustworthy and an expert in the domain of the message. People are relatively poor detectors of deception, and is especially true when they pay very little scrutiny to the message, as is the case with messages delivered by highly credible sources.

Ian W. Tingen

Adam J. Dunbar

Lawrence Patihis

*University of California, Irvine*

**See Also:** Clinton, Bill; Communication; Credibility; Deception Detection Accuracy; Discovered Deception, Reactions to; Madoff, Bernie; News Media: Print; Reputation.

### Further Readings

- Bond, Charles and Bella DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134/4 (2008).
- Franklin, Bob, and Matt Carlson. *Journalists, Sources, and Credibility: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Hovland, Carl and Walter Weiss. "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v.15/4 (1951).
- Kassin, Saul, Christian Meissner, and Rebecca Norwick. "I'd Know a False Confession If I Saw One": A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.29/2 (2005).
- Petty, Richard and John Cacioppo. *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986.
- Tormala, Zakary and Richard Petty. "Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion." *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, v.14/4 (2002).
- Wilson, Elizabeth. J. and Daniel L. Sherrell. "Source Effects in Communication and Persuasion Research: A Meta-Analysis of Effect Size." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, v.21/2 (1993).

## Spanish-American Conquests

The Spanish-American Conquests refers to an era initiated by Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian explorers and discoverers of the Americas. As history well demonstrates, there is a very fine and jagged line that separates explorers from conquerors, and it is quite difficult if not impossible to determine at what point the explorer became a conqueror and vice versa. Some of these historical figures/legends include Christopher Columbus, Hernán Cortés, Ferdinand Magellan, Francisco Pizarro, Vasco Núñez de Balboa, Amerigo Vespucci, and Juan Ponce de León.

Seen in this light, 1492 could very well mark the beginning of the conquests. Although Columbus would initially be placed under the rubric of The Age of Discovery and Exploration, it was not long before the admiral became a conqueror/conquistador. The act of enslaving the natives, together with that of taking possession of the Caribbean Islands for the Spanish Crown and renaming them, rendered Columbus a conqueror.

Although many conquerors immediately followed in Columbus's footsteps, one conquistador is emblematic of the conquests and owes much if not all of his success to his cunning: Hernán Cortés, who subjugated the Aztecs and took the territory today known as Mexico for the Spanish Crown. Although Cortés was the winner, and a champion of lying and deception, he was deceived and lied to as well. The cunning and deceit of this conqueror will serve as a paradigm of the lying and deception always evident throughout the Spanish-American Conquests.

### A "True" History of the Conquest of Mexico

Even the telling of the conquests themselves is problematic. In the early 1560s—upon reading the accounts of the conquests written by Francisco López de Gómara—Bernal Díaz del Castillo, a conquistador who participated in the conquest of Mexico, was so appalled by the utter misrepresentation of the Mexican conquest that he decided to write his own account in 1568, which he promised would be truthful and "bring into full light the conquest of New Spain, and of the heroic services of us the true conquerors, who



with our small numbers, under the adventurous and brave Captain Hernando Cortes, and with great danger and hardships, gained to his majesty this rich country.”

In the preface to the *True History of the Conquest of Mexico* (which suggests that there was a false history), Díaz lists several of Gómara's untruths. Many had to do with the exaggerations “of the numbers of the natives, and of those who were killed in the different battles,” thus rendering his account “utterly unworthy of belief.”

Díaz avers that the number of people who were killed never exceeded 400 men, and if it had, the Spanish could not have put them to death: “Alaric a most brave king, and Attila a proud warrior, never killed so many of their foes as were are said by that historian to have done in New Spain.” Díaz also denies having burned many cities and temples and that Cortés gave orders secretly for the destruction of the Cuban governor's ships; Díaz insisted it was done by the common consent of all. Other critical assessments of Gómara's account have to do with his omission of the discovery of Yucatán by Francisco Hernández de Córdoba; the defeat of conquistador Pánfilo de Narváez; the wars of Tlascalala, where he is “as erroneous as ever”; and the war in Mexico, where Gómara treats as a matter of little importance the fact that the Spanish lost over 800 men, makes no mention of further losses in the siege, and “speaks of it as if it had been a festival or a marriage!”

It would appear that even in the telling, untruths that want to pass as truths are continually replacing firmer untruths. The truth of the matter is that everyone who participated in the conquest, or wrote about it, had stakes in the conquest, and therefore had to bend reality in order to secure these stakes. Consequently, the first lie or myth about the Spanish-American Conquests, one that is pertinent to all the different expeditions and the conquerors themselves, is the myth of truth: every single lie claimed to be the truth.

### The Myth of the Conquerors

Another lie or myth tied to the Spanish-American Conquests is that of the conqueror himself. Even during their lifetimes, these conquerors were converted into larger-than-life figures capable of incredible military prowess and superhuman bravery. Hernán Cortés, who was appointed captain

general of the Armada in 1518 by the governor of Cuba, Diego Velasquez, will serve as a paradigm. Although it was most likely that Cortés set out on his expedition with the intent of conquering land west of Cuba, of finding gold, and of subjugating peoples, he assured the governor of Cuba that his journey would prove useful and exploratory.

Although there were some Spanish explorers who had disappeared after a scouting expedition, Cortés's expedition was the opportunity to discover more land and claim it for the governor of Cuba and the Spanish Crown. In fact, Cortés had grown weary of the tedious life in Cuba and tired of being second to the governor; he therefore set out with the intention of defying Velasquez by assuming independent command of the fleet and declaring himself sole conqueror of the land that would soon be known as New Spain. This expedition, therefore, started out as a lie.

The first land spotted was the coast of Yucatán. In a theatrical gesture, Cortés seized upon Captain Pedro Alvarado's pillaging of a native village to reprehend Alvarado, send for the aggrieved natives, return their stolen goods, and send them to tell others of the Spaniards' kindness and generosity.

As Cortés and his men proceeded along the coast, they formed alliances with Mayans who had recently been conquered by the Aztecs, and they collected as much information as possible, making the Mexican ambassadors believe that Cortés was an ambassador himself, full of innocent curiosity and honesty and eager to meet Moctezuma, the Aztecs' leader.

Historians agree that Cortés knew how to stage a theatrical presentation for the maximum effect. For example, in his effort to impress the Mexican ambassadors, he used a snorting stallion as he scented a mare and fired a cannon to blast a tree to suggest supernatural powers. But his deceit was not only aimed at the peoples he was attempting to subjugate; in an effort to evade Velasquez's orders to return to Cuba, Cortés pretended to have burned his ships, when he had in fact grounded them.

### The Myths of La Malinche and Moctezuma

Soon after their arrival, Cortés and his men came across one of the men who had disappeared during the former expedition and enlisted him because he spoke the Mayan language. A few months later,



*In this Mexican mural, Hernán Cortés's arrival in Mexico is depicted as coinciding with the return of the Aztec god Quetzacoatl, which appears as a serpent. La Malinche is shown by his side, managing a network of interpretations between Moctezuma and the Spaniards. Cortés's lying and deception was emblematic of the Spanish-American conquests; however, he was deceived and lied to as well.*

Cortés would receive a woman captive as a gift, one who would become yet another myth, the myth of La Malinche. The chronicles have it that La Malinche was a captive Mayan princess who had learned the language of the Mexicans. The result was a chain of interpreters: Cortés would address the Spaniard who had been a captive of the Mayas in Spanish, this Spaniard would in turn address La Malinche in Mayan, and La Malinche would speak for Cortés to the Mexican ambassadors and ultimately to Moctezuma himself in the language of the Mexicans. Moctezuma, in turn, would address La Malinche, who would address the Spaniards, who would address Cortés. Legend has it that La Malinche was so in love with Cortés that she soon betrayed her own people and learned Spanish in order to help Cortés conquer the city of Mexico.

With the myth of truth, the myth of Cortés, and the myth of La Malinche comes the myth of Moctezuma himself, of his weakness and credulity. There is also the myth that Cortés's arrival coincided with the prediction of the arrival of

the plumed serpent, and that Cortés was immediately considered a god by the native people. It could very well be that the natives believed that the Spaniards' horses and the men riding them were one entity, and Cortés and his men used this to their advantage for as long as they could. The chronicles have it that in his dealings with Moctezuma Cortés continued to pretend to be a friendly ambassador, and that he induced Moctezuma to go to a house where the Spaniards were staying, offering him hospitality, and that Moctezuma was made a prisoner when he entered that house.

### **Cortés, the Pícaro**

Cortés is the archetype, the model representative of what Alexander Blackburn considered to be living in the "age of real heroes such as the conquistadores" when "society was teeming with those for whom heroic grandeur would inevitably and often tragically be denied . . ." But could a heroic Cortés be at the same time considered a marginal being, a trickster, an antihero? Is there a contradiction here? Not in the sense that the

*pícaro* is a persona, and a mask, and not merely, as Blackburn states, a parodistic antihero.

Although science considers species and not individuals to be in competition for a niche, a *pícaro* is an individual caught in a competitive race for a niche. In this race there are models, mimics, and dupes or receivers, and these roles are not written in stone; on the contrary, today's model can be tomorrow's mimic, who is always on the verge of being duped by a new mimic.

As a persona, Cortés was a *pícaro* before reaching the shores of Mexico. As an eternal *buscón*, or searcher-wanderer, it was precisely his picaresque nature that led him away from Spain to Hispaniola, then to Cuba, and then to Mexico away from Velasquez. It was also his picaresque nature that made Cortés write letters to the king of Spain while on his way back to Spain, letters in which he continually justified his disobedience toward Velasquez, who represented the king's power.

An outsider and a survivor who never stops to contemplate or to question, a literary character in his own letters, Cortés was therefore a *pícaro*, similar to the characters in picaresque novels. In fact, Cortés announces both the character and the genre. Otherwise, according to Luis Sáinz de Medrano, "How could we explain the fact that a novelist did not emerge from the conquistadors themselves?"

In the second letter, Cortés writes that he is "crazy enough to go where [he] could not return." Here, the Spanish conquistador is a manipulator who mimics the societal wilderness around him in his effort to adapt, to survive, and to get his way in the end. "With that purpose I set out from the town of Cempoal, which I renamed Sevilla, on the sixteenth of August with fifteen horsemen and three hundred foot soldiers, as well equipped for war as the conditions permitted me to make them," Cortés writes to King Charles V. The year is 1519, and nothing will stop Cortés's onward march toward the unknown. At the frontier of the kingdom of Cempoal, Cortés and his army go through a pass and continue for three days through dry, cold, unfertile desert country.

It was not long before Cortés made enemies and took sides, or at least pretended to take sides. A survivor, the conquistador was loyal to no one but himself. Quick to join the war in this fortress-strewn landscape, Cortés writes, "The next day

I left before dawn by a different route, without being observed . . . I burnt more than ten villages, in one of which there were more than three thousand houses."

Barely any time was wasted adapting to this new place, or being an observer, or a transplant. Cortés immediately seizes upon the animosity and the discord between different villages and sees this as an opportunity for subduing them more quickly. He even interpreted the Gospel message, that every kingdom divided is brought to desolation, to justify his actions: "So I maneuvered one against the other . . . and told each that I held his friendship to be of more worth than the other's." Always convinced that God is more powerful than nature, Cortés does not hesitate to join the natives and to commit to war, in other words, to catapult himself into the heart of the action.

Although Cortés was a *pícaro* before he reached the city of Mexico, it is in the city of Mexico—and at the precise moment that he encountered Moctezuma—that his picaresque nature fully developed, as if the stage had already been set. Thus, some environments are good hosts to *pícaros* and to deceivers, as they are to parasites. According to Michael Serres:

One parasite chases another out. One parasite (static), in the sense that information theory uses the word, chases another, in the anthropological sense. Communication theory is in charge of the system; it can break it down or let it function, depending on the signal. A parasite, physical, acoustic, informational, belonging to order and disorder, a new voice, an important one, in the contrapuntal matrix.

By definition, parasites eat and thrive within the body of their host. In this case Cortés represents two different trophic levels of *pícaros*/parasites on an ecological pyramid, and the city of Mexico became his niche, his host. In his book *Parasite*, Serres dedicates an entire chapter to the picaresque, because the *pícaro* is in fact a parasite: "The parasite invents something new . . . He crosses the exchange, makes it into a diagonal . . . He wants to give his voice for matter, (hot) air for solid, superstructure for infrastructure."

It is interesting to note that in all picaresque novels there is barter. One parasite, for example,



lends his eyes to another parasite, in some cases a blind man in exchange for bread, trading eyes for bread in an eternal game of exchange. In Cortés's case, there was voice, translation, and language in exchange for power.

Beatriz Rivera-Barnes  
*Pennsylvania State, Worthington-Scranton*

**See Also:** Bible; Colonialism; Columbus, Christopher; Historical Narratives, False; History of Deception: 1600 to 1700; Inca Empire; Myth; Native Americans.

### Further Readings

- Blackburn, Alexander. *The Myth of the Picaro*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
- Cortés, Hernán. *Letters From Mexico*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Díaz del Castillo, Bernal. *The True History of the Conquest of Mexico*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1966.
- Jones, R.O. *Historia de la Literatura Española*, Vol. 2. *Siglo de Oro: Prosa y Poesía*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1998.
- Leon-Portilla, Miguel, ed. *The Broken Spears. The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.
- López de Gómara, Francisco. *Cortés, The Life of the Conqueror by His Secretary*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Manes, Christopher. "Nature and Silence." In *The Ecocriticism Reader*, Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm, eds. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996.
- Mann, Charles C. *1491 New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus*. New York: Vintage, 2005.
- Meeker, Joseph W. *The Comedy of Survival*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997.
- Ordaz, Ramón. *El Pícaro en la Literatura Iberoamericana*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2000.
- Padgen, Anthony, ed. *Hernán Cortés. Letters From Mexico*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Serres, Michel. *Parasite*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. *La Conquête de l'Amérique: La Question de l'Autre*. Paris: Seuil, 1982.

## Spin, Corporate

Based on the perspectives of many, corporations have been deceiving the public for years through corporate spin. Corporate spin is the process used to subvert the interests of the public in order to further a corporation's interests and to accomplish an organization's desired objectives. The term has long been associated with the work of public relations practitioners, perhaps as the result of historical public relations figures and events including Ivy Ledbetter Lee, the Ludlow Massacre involving the Rockefeller family, and the work of Edward Bernays.

The use of the term *corporate spin* often conjures up negative and seedy images of public relations professionals, who are perceived as fixers, manipulators, or members of a "cleanup" crew. However, public relations advocates argue that their work is by necessity joined with a set of deliberate and intentionally persuasive activities. These activities, they argue, should be visible, should be ethical, and should be coupled with a strict adherence to a code of ethics.

### Lee and Bernays

Ivy Ledbetter Lee, one of America's first corporate public relations professionals, played a key role in what would later become known as corporate spin. A former newspaper man, Lee represented many clients in the early 1900s, disseminating facts and information to the public through cultivating an open relationship with the press. During this time, public relations experts were typically called in to "fix" negative public sentiment about an organization or to garner publicity aligned with an organization's views.

Perhaps the most famous of Lee's corporate spin activities is his representation of the Rockefeller family in a 1914 incident known as the Ludlow Massacre. During a coal miners' strike at the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in Ludlow, Colorado, 14 individuals were killed by company guards. Among the dead were striking miners, miners' wives, and their children. As the Rockefeller family abdicated any connection to wrongdoing, Lee began defending his client and sharing the "facts" of the massacre with the public. Before the U.S. Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, he asserted that the truth



was open to public interpretation, and he propagated facts through the eyes of the Rockefeller family rather than offering an accurate, objective chronicling or an honest depiction of the family's activities. Lee's ability to disseminate facts to the public with minimal concern for ethics, little regard for the public interest, and a maximum concern for representing his client laid the foundations for what would later become known as corporate spin.

If Lee is thought to have initiated corporate spin, many would argue that Edwards Bernays perfected it. Through representing numerous corporate clients in more than six decades of counseling on public relations activities, Bernays is often credited as being both the father of public relations and the father of spin. In service to his clients and their interests, Bernays implemented unprecedented public relations campaigns. He sold Ivory Soap by offering soap sculpture contests. He increased bacon sales by having physicians recommend a daily "American" breakfast that included bacon on behalf of the Beechnut Packing Company, a bacon producer, and he created a worldwide celebration of the electric light bulb called Light's Golden Jubilee on behalf of General Electric Corporation.

Bernays is perhaps best known for his campaign on behalf of the American Tobacco Company, where he was successful at persuading women's rights advocates to hold up Lucky Strike cigarettes as symbols of their freedom in a *Torches of Freedom* campaign. This was accomplished at a time when cigarette smoking was taboo for sophisticated women. Along with charting a direct path to the desired objectives of major corporations, Bernays served as public relations counsel to U.S. presidents, countries, associations, and governmental agencies.

Though regarded as corporate spin and underhanded activity by many, the work of Bernays, the nephew of Sigmund Freud, may best be characterized as using social science research to directly influence the forces that shape public interest, rather than to directly promote products, positions, issues, or movements. In this way, public consent was secured through indirect influence. Individuals were led toward a particular cause, were persuaded to agree with it, and then accepted the idea as if it were of their own origination. For

example, rather than focus on selling pianos, the idea of music rooms in homes became a symbol associated with the elite of society, who would need to purchase a piano to avoid having an empty music room. Rather than a promotional focus on selling cigarettes to women, having the choice to light up became a symbol of female liberty.

Influencing the forces that culminate in the desire for a product or in the consent to a focal activity became the hallmark of Bernays's work as public relations counsel. These activities, referred to as a process of engineering consent, were viewed by many as corporate spin or elitist activities. However, an alternative explanation is that proven research on persuasive strategies was used to influence human behavior and to sway the public's opinion in such a way that the idea originated with the public.

### Modern Use of Corporate Spin

Generally, corporate spin activities continue to be employed in organizations, especially when the systematic intent is to deceive the public. Concealing the harmful ingredients present in food products that permit a corporation to save money, diminishing the negative health implications of poor factory working conditions, and downplaying the detrimental effects of environmental emissions as part of community relations efforts all represent the unethical efforts of corporations to subvert the public good and accomplish their own desired outcomes through corporate spin.

In addition, front-group stealth campaigns are conducted on behalf of corporate partners. These front groups have deceptive names like National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) or Citizens for Better Medicare (CBM) in an effort to disguise their genuine interests. On the surface, front groups are not linked to their corporate partners. However, upon further investigation, the groups founded to preserve U.S. wetlands and reduce drug prices under Medicare actually oppose government intervention to accomplish these outcomes, and they are supported by prominent corporate sponsors like Exxon-Mobil (linked to NWC) and Merck Pharmaceutical (linked to CBM), which are both companies who benefit from the front-group stealth campaign efforts. By acting invisibly with the use of behind-the-scenes coalitions, corporations can wield their influence on public thought and

on lawmakers' thinking with the ultimate aim of impacting legislation to protect their own private interests.

Along with front-group stealth activity, corporations have greater access to media at a time in which fewer sanctions on lobbying efforts and campaign contributions exist. This, too, further positions the public relations profession to potentially have a greater impact on undermining rather than on advancing democratic values.

### In Defense of Public Relations

The negative connotation of corporate spin, along with the serious ethical issues concerning public relations, prompted practitioners in the field of public relations to actively engage in overcoming the negative perception of their work. The largest professional association of public relations practitioners, the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), established a Member Code of Ethics to demonstrate its commitment to ethical practices, and to emphasize member adherence to professional values such as honesty, fairness, and loyalty in serving the public interest. Though the tactics of public relations, like third-party endorsements or advocacy advertising, continue to be used by practitioners, deception and outright coercion are deemed unacceptable activities for those who adhere to the PRSA code of ethics. Additionally, the use of front groups is a violation of the PRSA code, which specifically identifies front-group activity as an example of improper conduct.

In response to critics who relegate public relations activities to the practice of merely creating and implementing corporate spin, public relations practitioners have offered multiple arguments in their defense. First, public relations involves a broader set of strategic communication functions aimed at both internal and external publics, including issues management, employee relations, investor relations, integrated marketing communications, community relations, and a host of other important organizational functions along with publicity. Second, public relations activities depend on the mutual adjustment of corporate and public interests rather than a rigid insistence on public manipulation. By researching public opinion, corporations are better able to design specific message strategies that are most likely to resonate with a particular public. Through

strategic efforts, the corporation adjusts to fit the public rather than attempt to align the public's view with the corporation.

A final consideration in defense of public relations activities is that persuasion is an integral part of a corporation's strategic communication efforts. Corporations are consistently engaged in assessing the attitudes, issues, and values of the public in an effort aimed at creating, shaping, influencing, or maintaining public consent. Though inherently persuasive, public relations activities are deemed to be a routine and natural component of an organization's relationship with the public and of a thriving democracy. As long as public relations activities remain visible, and the agents fully disclose their involvement and desired outcomes, public relations activities fall within the scope of accepted symbolic activity. In fact, public relations professionals argue that organizations with strong reputations and favorable organizational images are those who link corporate desires with societal interests rather than risk being exposed for violating public confidence.

### Conclusion

The term *corporate spin* continues to describe the deceptive and unethical activities associated with subverting the public good in order to benefit the private interests of corporations. Influenced by the work of early public relations practitioners, corporate spin can range in outcomes from altering, creating, or maintaining an organization's or individual's image to casting a different light on a series of events, a product, a cause, or a movement. To combat the negative associations of corporate spin and similar unethical practices, the PRSA promotes strict adherence to a Member Code of Ethics, in which deceptive activities, such as front groups, have been identified as improper conduct.

Jeanetta D. Sims  
University of Central Oklahoma  
Rod Carveth  
Morgan State University

**See Also:** Barnum, P. T.; Business; Corporations; Enron; Government Propaganda; Marketing; Deceptive; Public Relations; Spin, Political; Tobacco Advertising.

### Further Readings

- Beder, S. *Suited Themselves: How Corporations Drive the Global Agenda*. Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2006.
- Bernays, E. *Crystallizing Public Opinion*. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923.
- Bernays, E. *Propaganda*. New York: H. Liveright, 1928.
- Crossen, C. *Tainted Truth: The Manipulation of Fact in America*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- Ewen, S. *PR! A Social History of Spin*. New York: Basic Books, 1996.
- Greider, W. *Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
- Pfau, M., M. H. Haigh, J. Sims, and S. Wigley. "The Influence of Corporate Front-Group Stealth Campaigns." *Communication Research*, v.34 (2007).
- Stauber, J. and S. Rampton. *Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995.
- Tye, L. *The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998.

## Spin, Political

Political spin is the practice of deceptively publicizing favorable interpretations to explain politicians' words or actions and to create a desirable impression of them, or to explain the statements and actions of political entities, such as party organizations, interest groups, and political action committees. Research by E. M. Stark has shown that spin can make a losing candidate into an electoral victor; researchers Michael Norton and George Goethals found weaker but significant effects. Yet, spin, from its formal recognition in the late 1980s, has received almost no peer-reviewed, scientific study. Most noteworthy about spin is that, even though the target audience (TA) knows spin is deceptive, biased information, delivered by a biased source, regarding an event or utterance that the TA has eyewitnessed, it can, nonetheless, affect the audience's opinions of both candidate and debate, and it can persuade.

### Context

The provider of spin is often a surrogate for a political candidate and is known in the vernacular as a spin doctor; however, a candidate may provide self-spin.

Although spin is often delivered to appear as ad-libbed and conversational, spin is systematically conceived to maximize effectiveness. Spin statements range from having biased, misleading, and selective use of facts, to employing well-established and highly effective propaganda techniques that intentionally exploit a TA's psychological vulnerabilities. Spin's key characteristic is deceptiveness.

There are several types of spin as formally defined, and the nature of spin has evolved from a postdebate phenomenon during the Bush-Dukakis 1988 presidential election, to the current, culturally embedded idea of spin to mean a deceptive, self-serving explanation, usually in reaction to a politician's gaffe.

Following each Bush-Dukakis debate, each campaign's spin doctors gathered in large rooms or halls known as spin alley so that the press could report on each campaign's spin on the debate. Initially, spin sessions like these were televised, but by the 2004 election, most of the major networks stopped covering them because they felt they had little news value. However, spin sessions are now accessible through social media.

Of particular interest when considering political spin are two of its aforementioned aspects: (1) the spin doctor is most always known to the TA as a biased source lacking in the authority and credibility typically characteristic of the persuasive source and (2) spin can be persuasive even though the target audience has eyewitnessed the activity or event that the spin doctor is spinning about, that is, the TA can evaluate the veridicality of the spin doctor's statements (and thus pay no attention to it) because they can make their own judgment about the event in question.)

### The Nature of Spin Content

Most fundamentally, spin content (or spin) can be conceived as the dissemination of one-sided, biased, deceptive conclusions, or a form of white propaganda in which the identity of the propagandist (spin doctor) is known, as are his or her intentions. Most concretely, in the televised debate context, spin is the answers to television interview



*Republican presidential candidates face off during the Iowa GOP/Fox News Debates at Stephens Auditorium in Ames, Iowa, August 11, 2011: from left, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, Minnesota Representative Michele Bachmann, and former Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty. In the televised debate context, spin consists of answers to interview questions posed by journalists. They are seldom direct answers and focus on interpretations and praise of the candidate as well as criticism of the opposition candidate.*

questions posed by journalists. They are seldom direct answers and often bear no relationship to the questions that elicited them. Generally, spin is interpretations, conclusions, and repetitive praise of the candidate, and criticism, warranted or not, of the opposition candidate.

As mentioned, and from a psychological perspective, spin is often laden with schemata to lessen the cognitive miser's workload. Schemata allow the subject to make rapid inferences with little effort and reach conclusions without assiduously and diligently examining the information at hand. Many types of schemata exist, among them political schemata. One example might include, "She is card-carrying member of the NRA." Such a statement affects the TA by providing a single piece of content that allows them to infer a wealth of information about the candidate with little cognitive expenditure.

Richard Lau offered a model of political cognition in which voters evaluate candidates using

four schemata: issues, group affiliations, party identification, and personality. For many people, a candidate's party affiliation alone will determine the resonance of their conclusions about the spin doctor's statements. For other, uninvolved debate viewers, attending to superficial characteristics related to the candidate's personality will serve the same function. Each of these cases refers to viewers who are cognitive misers.

Spin statements are also well stocked with common propaganda techniques found in publicly available copies of the Army Psychological Operations Field Manual. Such techniques include the bandwagon effect. This is essentially communicating to the TA that the vast majority of people will vote for the candidate or think favorably about him or her, which exerts social pressure on the TA to join the crowd.

Another common technique is glittering generalities. This is the practice of heaping lavish praise on the candidate for his or her debate performance.



Such praise or statements might be, for example, “He did fantastic tonight,” or “He was presidential,” or “Tonight you saw a wonderfully competent performance by candidate Jones.”

### Characteristics of the Spin Doctor

The first component of effective spin under normal circumstances of social influence ought to be that the spin doctor—he or she who delivers the spin—would have high source credibility in order to be persuasive. However, as another departure from normal social-psychological thinking about influence, this is not true in the case of spin.

Source credibility typically accrues from the spin doctor having expertise related to the subject at hand, perhaps a good, well-established reputation, and a modicum of attractiveness. A good example of credible sources are commentators who are Nobel laureates and have no pecuniary or other interest in the subject matter upon which they are commenting. They are thus expert and unbiased and trustworthy. A good example of a nonexpert but credible source would be the then highly popular and late baseball player Joe DiMaggio, who was a pitchman for the Mr. Coffee brand of coffee makers. DiMaggio was not a coffee expert, beyond, perhaps, his knowledge of his own taste preferences. However, he had a long-established reputation among the greater public of being trustworthy, so in his case, expertise was not a variable that figured into his credibility.

What makes spin doctors as sources a special case within an influence paradigm is that in almost all circumstances, they are known as biased sources of information. In fact, in the context of televised candidates’ debates, spin doctors are identified as workers or surrogates for the particular candidate they represent. As such, one might expect that the TA would pay no attention to their utterances. The TA’s expectation would be that the spin doctors’ statements would be uninformative, because by nature they would reflect only positively on the candidates whom they represent. Moreover, because the TA has viewed the debate for themselves, they have good reason to completely disregard the spin doctors’ statements. But this is not the case.

As one example, the uninvolved TA is by nature tasked with reaching a conclusion about the debate they have just witnessed. They must do

so with an information deficit. Moreover, the TA hears not only favorable interpretations and conclusions regarding a candidate but also negative interpretations and conclusions about the opposing candidate. As a cognitive miser, the availability of such conclusions lightens their cognitive workload.

### The Psychology of Spin


One formulation, verified by research conducted by the author, is that the TA comprises of a gamut of people, most of whom are cognitive misers. This is to say that people, tasked daily with making a large quantity of judgments, conclusions, and decisions, and perhaps lacking the ability, resources, interest, and time to engage in effortful thinking, seek to reduce their cognitive workload by using shortcuts or heuristics, a hypothesis first put forth in detail by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. The spin doctor, aware of this, provides carefully considered conclusions about the event the TA has witnessed for themselves, and this relieves them of the task of thinking for themselves.

Moreover, to make the cognitive workload even lighter, the spin is laden with schemata, which have the powerful property of allowing the TA to go beyond the information given and easily make inferences. For example, if a spin doctor characterizes an opposition pro-choice comment as that of a baby killer, the TA can draw many vivid conclusions about the character of the candidate.

Richard Petty and John Cacioppo have made a distinction between heuristic and effortful thinking, which they term peripheral versus central cognition, and several other researchers have developed similar formations with different formulations, such as Shelly Chaiken’s systematic versus heuristic formulation. These models have several implications for spin and when and under what conditions it will be effective.

Making the assumption that people are cognitive misers, the following would obtain: When the TA is uninvolved or uninterested, the stimulus (debate) is complex and difficult to process, the TA has little time in which to do the processing, and the postdebate spin is laden with schemata that allow the TA to make inferences well beyond what is stated, the spin will evoke unsystematic, uneffortful processing of the spin

(little thinking about it), and it will be effective. When the TA is involved, the debate issues matter a great deal to them, the debate itself is not complex and taxing of thought, they have plenty of time to think things over, and the spin is not laden with schemata, then the spin will be ineffective. (See Figure 1.)



**Figure 1** Conditions under which peripheral and systematic processing occur.

Source: Dr. Evan Mitchell Stark

### Contemporary Spin

Spin has evolved far from its narrow meaning related to televised debates. Contemporarily, it is well embedded in the lexicon of the culture and is meant to mean any deceptive explanation given for a transgression, usually political, and usually in the form of a statement. An example would be when a U.S. Senate candidate made a comment about women and rape: "What I understand from doctors is that it's really rare—if it's a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down."

This comment generated a firestorm of negative reaction, which required a corrective spin, also known as "walking back" the statement. To do so, the candidate subsequently said the following:

In reviewing my off-the-cuff remarks, it's clear that I misspoke in this interview and it does not reflect the deep empathy I hold for the thousands of women who are raped and abused every year. Those who perpetrate these crimes are the lowest of the low in our society and their victims will have no stronger advocate in the Senate to help ensure they have the justice they deserve.

Notice how the spin attributes the misstatement not to ignorance of female reproduction but instead speaks of "off-the-cuff remarks."

Evan Mitchell Stark

*Sophia/Ignatius University at the United Nations*

**See Also:** Cognitive Heuristics; Disinformation; Equivocation; Evidence, Strategic Use of; False Confessions; Government Propaganda; Public Relations, Source Credibility; Spin, Corporate.

### Further Readings

Chaiken, S. "Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion." *Journal of Social and Personality Psychology*, v.39 (1980).

Petty, R. E. and J. T. Cacioppo. *Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches*. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown, 1981.

Stark, E. M. "Availability of Candidate Schemata: The Spin Doctor's Prescription for Social Influence." Unpublished Dissertation. New York:

City University of New York Graduate School, 2000.

Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." *Science, New Series*, v.185 (1974).

## Stalin, Josef

Josef Vissarionovich Stalin was born on December 18, 1878, in Georgia, then part of the Russian empire. As a Bolshevik revolutionary, he played an active role in the Russian Revolution of 1917 that toppled the czarist regime. In 1922, he was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee. In 1924, Stalin successfully navigated the power vacuum created by Vladimir Lenin's death, effectively becoming the leader of the Soviet Union. He continued to serve as such until his death on March 5, 1953. In an effort to soften his harsh image, Stalin deliberately cultivated an avuncular public persona. He was informally referred to as Uncle Joe, affectionately by his friends and admirers and ironically by adversaries as well those uncomfortably allied with him.

Stalin was a master of Machiavellian machination. He seized leadership of the Soviet Union, and kept it, by ruthlessly purging the Communist Party—and the nation as a whole—of any potential opponents. Those who posed actual or perceived threats to Stalin were eliminated in a variety of ways. Some were falsely charged as "enemies of the state" and then executed, exiled, or imprisoned in the labor camps of the infamous Gulag. Others were covertly assassinated, with their deaths faked to look accidental.

Such was the case with Solomon Mikhoels, artistic director of the Moscow State Jewish Theater. Despite Mikhoels's additional service as chair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II, an increasingly anti-Semitic Stalin ordered him killed. The murder was made to look like the result of a car accident by having a truck run over Mikhoels's already dead body, which was then deposited in a snowbank beside a street in Minsk. To keep up appearances, Mikhoels was given a state funeral.

Stalin's opponents disappeared in others ways as well. Official photographs were doctored to eliminate images of those who had fallen out of favor with him. Not even high-ranking Soviet officials or close friends of Stalin were immune from such treatment, as the cases of Nikolai Yezhov and Leon Trotsky illustrate.

As People's Commissar for State Security, Yezhov was head of the NKVD (the Soviet Union's secret police). From 1936 to 1938 he was the point man for Stalin's Great Purge, which targeted a wide swath of Soviet citizens, ranging from humble peasants to the powerful and privileged, millions of whom were killed. As an unintended consequence, the Great Purge diminished the nation's agricultural, industrial, and military capacity, leaving the Soviet Union ill-prepared to face the threat posed by Nazi Germany. Yezhov's efforts earned him the same treatment, with Stalin's approval, that he had inflicted upon others. In 1940, he was arrested, tortured, and forced to confess to crimes against the state, for which he was executed.

Trotsky suffered a similar fall from favor. Despite his credentials as a leading Communist theorist and his service as the Red Army's founder and first leader, he was assassinated in Mexico on orders from Stalin. After their deaths, Yezhov and Trotsky were conspicuously absent from official photographs in which they had previously appeared, often in close proximity to Stalin. Such positioning was an unambiguous sign of the status they once enjoyed as members of his inner circle.

### Duplicity in International Relationships

Duplicity played a significant role in Stalin's relationships with other countries. In August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a nonaggression treaty, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As part of a secret protocol, the two powers connived to divide eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence, sealing the fate of Poland, the Baltic states, and other peoples and regions. Neither Stalin nor Adolf Hitler abided by their agreements, and by June 1941 their two countries were at war with one another, with Stalin allying the Soviet Union with Germany's enemies.

Toward the end of the war, in 1945, Stalin met at Yalta with Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain and the United States' ailing leader,

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to discuss details concerning the conclusion of the war in Europe and the geopolitical reorganization of the continent once Nazi Germany had been defeated. Immediately after World War II, Stalin broke with the Western allies and failed to live up to what he had agreed upon, such as free elections in Poland. Consequently, Europe was effectively divided into two opposing camps by a boundary Churchill called the Iron Curtain, and it remained divided until the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Many of Stalin's lies have lived on long after his death, and some have continued to shape internal policy and international relations. A particularly instructive example is the cover-up of the March 1940 Katyn forest massacre of approximately 22,000 captured Polish officers.

When Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski, head of the Polish government in exile, asked about the missing officers, Stalin assured him that they had been freed. The massacre came to light when, in 1943, German soldiers discovered the mass graves. The Germans, however, were conveniently blamed for the atrocity by the Soviet government. This scapegoating continued until 1990, when the Soviets finally admitted culpability.

The crime continues to be a divisive issue in Polish-Russian relations, with disagreements about declassifying documents and whether to define the massacre as merely a political crime or an act of genocide. Today, there are still Stalinist apologists who maintain his innocence regarding Katyn, as well as other atrocities committed during his tenure as the leader of the Soviet Union.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
*College of Charleston*

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Betrayal; Churchill, Winston; Disinformation; Hitler, Adolf; Photographs, Altered; World War II.

### Further Readings

Davies, S. and J. Harris. *Stalin: A New History*.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Rappaport, H. *Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Companion*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999.

Service, R. *Stalin: A Biography*. Oxford: Pan Macmillan, 2004.

## Statement Validity Assessment

Statement validity assessment (SVA) is a verbal veracity tool designed to determine the credibility of child witnesses' testimonies in trials for sexual offenses. SVAs are accepted as evidence in some North American courts and in criminal courts in several western European countries. The tool originates from Sweden and Germany and comprises four stages. Much of the research concentrates on the third stage, criteria-based content analysis.

### Stage 1: A Case-File Analysis

The case-file analysis should include information about the child witness (age, cognitive abilities, relationship to the accused person); the nature of the event in question; and previous statements of the child and other parties involved. This gives the SVA expert insight into what may have happened and the issues under dispute. The three subsequent stages focus on these disputed elements.

### Stage 2: The Interview

In the interview the child provides his or her own account of the allegation. Interviewing young children is difficult because their descriptions of past events are notably incomplete. Special interview techniques based upon psychological principles have been designed to obtain as much information as possible from interviewees in a free narrative style.

### Stage 3: Criteria-Based Content Analysis

Criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) is a systematic analysis of the child's statement (which is transcribed for this purpose). CBCA consists of 19 criteria that are thought to be more frequently present in truthful than in fabricated statements. Examples of these criteria are: unstructured production (whether the information is not provided in a chronological time sequence); contextual embeddings (references to time and space: "He approached me for the first time in the garden during the summer holidays"); descriptions of interactions (statements that interlink at least two actors with each other: "The moment my mother came into the room, he stopped smiling"); and reproduction of speech (speech in its original



form: “And then he asked: ‘Is that your coat?’”). These criteria are more likely to occur in truthful statements because it is thought to be cognitively too difficult for liars to fabricate them.

Other criteria are more likely to occur in truthful statements for motivational reasons. Liars cannot take their credibility for granted and are concerned with making a credible impression on the interviewer. Liars are therefore keen to leave out information they believe will sound suspicious. As a result, a truthful statement is more likely to contain information that people may think sounds suspicious, such as spontaneous corrections (corrections made without prompting from the interviewer: “He wore a black jacket, no sorry, it was blue”) and raising doubts about one’s own testimony (anticipated objections against the veracity of one’s own testimony: “I know this all sounds really odd”).

#### Stage 4: The Validity Checklist

CBCA scores may be affected by factors other than the veracity of the statement. Stage 4 of the SVA method is to examine whether there are any alternative explanations that may have affected the CBCA scores. The Validity Checklist comprises 11 issues that are thought to possibly affect CBCA scores. One issue is inappropriateness of affect. This refers to whether the affect displayed by the child when being interviewed (usually via nonverbal behavior) is inappropriate for the child’s alleged experiences.

A second issue is appropriateness of language and knowledge. It refers to whether the child’s use of language and display of knowledge is beyond the normal capacity of a person of his or her age. When this occurs, it may indicate the influence of other people in preparing the statement. A third issue is whether the child demonstrates any susceptibility to suggestion during the interview. Suggestible children may be inclined to provide information that confirms the interviewer’s expectations but is, in fact, inaccurate.

#### Research and Evaluation

Despite being used as evidence in courts, it is unclear how accurate SVAs are because no reliable data in real-life cases are available. To examine the accuracy of SVA in real-life cases it is necessary to know what truly happened in the disputed

event. This can only be determined via case facts (for example, medical evidence) that indisputably link, or do not link, the alleged perpetrator to the crime. Such case facts are often not present in sexual abuse cases.

CBCA has been evaluated almost exclusively by laboratory experiments. In these studies, occasionally children, but usually adults, took part, but the studies showed similar results for children and adults. In alignment with the CBCA assumption, many CBCA criteria were more often present in truthful statements than in fabricated reports, and 73 percent of the truths and 72 percent of the lies were correctly classified using CBCA assessments.

There are reasons to believe that applying the Validity Checklist is sometimes problematic. The justification of some issues listed on the Validity Checklist could be questioned, such as displaying inappropriate affect during the interview. It implies that “appropriate affect” exists, whereas it does not. Some sexually abused victims express distress that is clearly visible to outsiders, while others appear numbed and cues of distress are not clearly visible. The communication styles represent a personality factor.

Other issues, such as susceptibility to suggestion, are difficult to measure. To measure susceptibility it is recommended to ask the witness a few leading questions. Interviewers should, however, only ask questions about irrelevant peripheral information, because asking questions about central information could damage the quality of the statement. Being restricted to asking questions about peripheral information is problematic, as this information may say little about the witness’ suggestibility regarding central parts of the event. Children show more resistance to suggestibility for central parts than peripheral parts of an event.

Determining the exact impact of issues is also difficult. For example, in one study SVA raters were instructed to “take into account” (in an unspecified way) the age of the child when calculating CBCA scores. Nevertheless, several criteria positively correlated with age.

Given these difficulties with the Validity Checklist, it is not surprising that if two experts disagree about the truthfulness of a statement in a German criminal case, they typically disagree about the likely impact of Validity Checklist issues on that statement. A Swedish field study revealed

that experts sometimes use the Validity Checklist incorrectly as a result of difficulties in applying it. For example, the study highlights the influence of Validity Checklist issues on children's statements in general, but fails to discuss how these issues have influenced the statement under investigation.

### Conclusion

Although SVA assessments are used as evidence in criminal courts to evaluate the veracity of child witnesses' testimonies in trials for sexual offenses, the accuracy of these assessments is unknown. Research has shown that CBCA-trained evaluators make mistakes in classifying truth-tellers and liars and that the use of the Validity Checklist is problematic.

Aldert Vrij  
University of Portsmouth

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Reality Monitoring; Scientific Content Analysis.

### Further Readings

- Bull, R. "The Investigative Interviewing of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: Psychological Research and Working/Professional Practice." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.15 (2010).
- Gödert, Heinz Werner, Matthias Gamer, Hans-Georg Rill, and Gerhard Vossel. "Statement Validity Assessment: Inter-Rater Reliability of Criteria-Based Content Analysis in the Mock-Crime Paradigm." *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, v.10/2 (2005).
- Gumpert, C. H. and F. Lindblad. "Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse: A Qualitative Study of the Swedish Approach to Statement Analysis." *Expert Evidence*, v.7 (1999).
- Köhnken, G. "Statement Validity Analysis and the 'Detection of the Truth.'" In *Deception Detection in Forensic Contexts*, P. A. Granhag and L. A. Strömwall, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Steller, M. and T. Boychuk. "Children as Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases: Investigative Interview and Assessment Techniques." In *Children as Witnesses*, H. Dent and R. Flin, eds. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992.
- Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2d ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2008.

## Stewart, Martha

Martha Stewart, a self-made billionaire, a former stockbroker, and one of the most well-known women in the United States, was imprisoned in 2004 for insider trading in the stock of biopharmaceutical company ImClone Systems. A federal grand jury in New York City and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had filed nine charges against Stewart, and a jury found her guilty on four counts of obstructing justice and lying to investigators. She was sentenced to five months in prison.

### Before the Scandal

Stewart was born in Jersey City, New Jersey, to middle-class Polish Americans Edward and Martha (Ruszkowski) Kostyra. She was the second of six children. Growing up, her mother taught Stewart how to cook and sew, while her father had a passion for gardening, teaching Stewart his expertise. After high school, Stewart attended Barnard College, where she met future husband Andrew Stewart, a recent graduate of Yale Law School. They married in 1961, and eventually had a daughter, Alexis. Stewart returned to college, graduating with a double major in history and architectural history.

The couple moved to Westport, Connecticut, where Martha began a catering business. In 1977, Andrew became the president of Harry N. Abrams, a prominent publisher of high-quality art and illustrated books. Martha's company was hired to cater the book release party of the blockbuster success *The Secret Book of Gnomes*, resulting in her encounter with Alan Mirken of the Crown Publishing Group. This chance meeting led to Mirken personally contacting Stewart to write a cookbook that would feature recipes and photos from parties and would showcase Stewart's talents for catering events. On December 13, 1982, *Entertaining* hit the bookstores, becoming a huge success and leading to Stewart's many other books. Andrew and Martha's marriage was less successful, ending in a divorce in 1987.

In 1990, Stewart began her magazine *Martha Stewart Living*, serving as editor in chief; the publication's circulation peaked in 2002 at more than two million copies per issue. Stewart also began a weekly 30-minute television spot for her

magazine, showcasing her talents for homemakers. This program expanded into an hour week-day format and half-hour episodes on the weekends and led to her position as a contributor on CBS's *The Early Show*.

In 1997, Stewart created a business empire after securing funds with the assistance of business partner Sharon Patrick. Stewart was able to purchase ventures related to the Martha Stewart brand, consolidating them into one company named Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (MSLO). That same year, Stewart announced the launch of the companion Web site to *Martha Stewart Living*, a catalog business, and a floral business. The control of this empire was in the hands of Patrick, who was named the chief of operations of MSLO, with Stewart as chairperson, president, and chief executive office. Stewart became the first female, self-made billionaire in the United States on October 19, 1999, when her company went public on the New York Stock Exchange.



*Martha Stewart at the Time 100, an event publicizing Time magazine's published list of the 100 most influential people in the world, May 4, 2010. Stewart gradually rose back up the ranks of popularity after her 2004 conviction for insider trading.*

### Insider Trading Scandal

According to court documents, Stewart was flying to Mexico with two friends on December 27, 2001, when she checked her messages, including one from her stockbroker Peter Bacanovic. He informed her that ImClone stock had dropped below \$60 a share. Stewart received this message a day before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) refused to review ImClone's cancer drug. Stewart, to this day, insists that a stop-loss order was issued to sell her ImClone stock if it fell below \$60 per share.

In response to her broker's message, Stewart called Bacanovic to sell her 3,928 shares and also called her friend Samuel Waksal. Additionally, Bacanovic transferred \$4.9 million in stock to the account of Waksal's daughter Aliza, who requested that Bacanovic sell \$2.5 million of her own ImClone stock. However, Merrill Lynch blocked the shares Waksal attempted to sell and the stocks he had transferred to his daughter. ImClone's stock price tumbled after the announcement of the FDA's refusal to review the cancer drug Erbitux.

On June 12, 2002, Waksal was arrested and charged with insider trading, obstruction of justice, bank fraud, and previously filed securities and perjury charges. For nine months he claimed his innocence before pleading guilty to insider trading and to six of the 13 charges. Waksal was sentenced to seven years in prison and was released after five years. On October 2, 2002, Douglas Faneuil, the broker's assistant who handled the sale of Stewart's ImClone stock, pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge. He was fined \$2,000 and was fired by Merrill Lynch. The following day, Stewart resigned from her board membership on the New York Stock Exchange.

During the investigation of her alleged wrongdoing, Stewart denied that she engaged in improper trading. Stewart and her broker, Bacanovic, could not provide evidence that a stop-loss order existed. Furthermore, investigators for the House of Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee could not find any credible record. The SEC was ready to file a civil securities fraud suit, but prosecutors could not prove that Stewart had made a deceptive statement in attempts to repair her credibility. Thus, the five counts against Stewart that were related to the SEC were thrown out.

On March 5, 2004, a jury found Stewart guilty on four counts of obstructing justice and lying to the investigators. Stewart's fate was sealed after the jury heard the damaging testimony of her friend Mariana Pasternak. She revealed on the witness stand that Stewart said, "Isn't it nice to have brokers who will tell you these things." Stewart was sentenced to five months in prison, two years of supervised release, along with a fine of \$30,000. Stewart continues to maintain her innocence and, ironically, if she had sold her stock on December 31 instead of December 27, she would have collected a profit of \$180,000 (\$48,000 less than she gained earlier) without raising concerns. Bacanovic was convicted on all but one charge, making a false statement. He was fired from Merrill Lynch for declining to cooperate with investigators looking into ImClone's stock trading activity.

### After the Scandal

Stewart is one of the few major businesspeople who have successfully rebuilt their companies and regained trust and popularity after a highly publicized scandal. To date, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia is making a comeback, partnering with other companies, such as E. & J. Gallo Vintage Wines, KB Home, and Macy's, and publishing another best-selling book titled *Dinner at Home*. Stewart continues to control 50 percent of MSLO's stock and 90 percent of voting stock. Although MSLO has taken a huge hit since her incarceration, this decline does not compare to more recent scandals by companies such as Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and Countrywide Financial Corporation. Stewart's conviction shows that no one is immune from the penalties of misconduct.

Jennifer Summary  
Southeast Missouri State University

**See Also:** Corporate Fraud; Corporations; Insider Trading; Investment Fraud; Medical and Pharmaceutical Industry.

### Further Readings

Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative. "Martha Stewart's Insider Trading Scandal." <http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu/pdf/Martha%20Stewart%20Case.pdf> (Accessed December 2012).

Murphy, Priscilla. "The Intractability of Reputation: Media Coverage as a Complex System in the Case of Martha Stewart." *Journal of Public Relations Research*, v.22/2 (2010).

Slater, Robert. *Martha: On Trial, in Jail, and on a Comeback*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2006.

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. "Martha Stewart and the ImClone Scandal." <http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pdf/2004-1-0083.pdf> (Accessed December 2012).

## Stylometry

Stylometry is the study of text from a linguistic perspective in order to determine its authenticity and authorship. Stylometry is typically applied to written language; however, its techniques have also been used for music and fine art.

One of the earliest known examples of analyzing a text for its authenticity came during the mid-15th century. In 1439, an Italian Catholic priest named Lorenzo Valla analyzed the Donation of Constantine, an alleged decree by Constantine I through which authority over Rome and the Western Roman Empire was conferred to Pope Sylvester I.

Within his work *De Falso Credita et Ementita Constantini Donatione Declamatio*, Valla showed that the donation was a forgery by studying its use of the Latin language. Not only were there discrepancies within the text, but also such terms as *fief* were inconsistent with the form of Latin used at the time of its supposed authorship. Reginald Pecocke, a Catholic bishop of Chichester, later reached the same independent conclusion as Valla. The donation's falsification was finally confirmed when Caesar Baronius, an Italian cardinal, admitted that it was a forgery within *Annales Ecclesiastici*, published during the late 16th century.

Stylometry gained further popularity among linguistic scholars during the 1800s in an effort to determine authorship of certain English Renaissance dramas. These efforts were met with mixed results, however, prompting Wincenty Lutoslawski to outline the foundations of modern



stylometry in *Principes de Stylométrie*, published in 1890. Lutoslawski's text delineated several stylometric techniques that have since become characteristic of the practice.

### Techniques of Stylometry

One such technique is referred to as "author invariant." Author invariant refers to the properties of a text that are consistent with the known texts of one author and inconsistent with known texts of other authors. Common properties that are analyzed using this technique are distribution of word length, average word length, average sentence length, vocabulary richness, functional word frequency, and the use of specific function words. Linguistic scholars, for example, will often work to determine the 50 most common words within a text. They will then divide the text into 2,000- to 10,000-word segments in order to reveal the regularity of those 50 words within each segment. The results can be used to compare two literary works in order to show whether they were written by the same author.

Three additional techniques of stylometry are "rare pairs," "neural networks," and "genetic algorithms." The rare pairs technique analyzes instances of author collocation (that is, sequences of word pairs that co-occur more often than normal within a certain author's writing). There are six common forms of collocation: adjective-noun, noun-noun, verb-noun, adverb-adjective, verb-prepositional phrase, and verb-adverb. Not unlike author invariant, a text's authenticity and/or authorship can be determined by identifying rare pairs that are consistent with the known texts of one author and inconsistent with the known texts of other authors.

Both neural networks and genetic algorithms rely heavily upon computer-mediated software. Neural networks traditionally refer to a circuit of biological neurons: nerve cells that transmit information via chemical and electrical signals. Within the context of stylometry, however, neural networks refer to a training set of desired output(s) that are learned from a multitude of inputs. Referred to as the "backward propagation of errors"—or "backpropagation" this learned training set allows a neural network to approximate new information, thus determining a text's authorship and/or authenticity.

Finally, genetic algorithms use a set of superimposed rules or limitations to determine a text's authorship. One such rule could be "If the word *that* appears more than 2.4 times per 1,000 words, then the text is not by Author X." This set of rules evolves over time, trending toward satisfactory results. It is tested against a known text, revised and modified until it is able to correctly determine authorship.

### Applications of Stylometry

Since its conception, stylometry has been applied to a variety of prominent texts, ranging from the collected works of William Shakespeare to books of the Bible to the *Federalist* papers. Doubts about the authorship of manuscripts attributed to Shakespeare began during the mid-19th century. The most popular speculation of Shakespeare's authorship is the Oxfordian theory, which proposes that works traditionally attributed to Shakespeare were actually written by Edward de Vere, the 17th Earl of Oxford. The Oxfordian theory of Shakespearean authorship is based in part upon author invariants and rare pairs found within Oxford's biography and the plays of Shakespeare. Although this theory persists in some circles, it is largely dismissed by academics and historians.

Stylometric techniques have also been applied to the Bible for centuries. Scholars most commonly focus on the first five books of the Bible, collectively referred to as the Torah or the Five Books of Moses. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza first argued in the 17th century that Moses could not have authored the Torah. Despite an overwhelming consensus among contemporary scholars, many Christians continue to oppose Hobbes and Spinoza, arguing in favor of Moses's authorship.

Stylometry has played a role in judicial history as well. The *Federalist* papers consist of 85 essays that were anonymously published in 1787, in an effort to support the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Following the death of Alexander Hamilton in 1804, a list was revealed that claimed he had authored 63 of the *Federalist* papers, with James Madison and John Jay authoring the remaining 22. In 1944, however, Douglass Adair analyzed the texts in order to determine their true authorship. He concluded that Hamilton had only written 51 of the essays; Madison had written 26

of the essays; Jay had written five of the essays; the three remaining essays were the result of collaboration. Adair's findings were confirmed in 1964 via computer analysis.

### Conclusion

Although the roots of stylometry can be traced to the mid-15th century and the work of Lorenzo Valla, it gained a foothold in academia during the 1800s. Since that time, a number of stylometric techniques have become standard: author invariant, rare pairs, neural networks, and genetic algorithms. Stylometry has also been applied to a range of prominent texts, evidencing its continued relevance and validity.

J. Jacob Jenkins

*California State University, Channel Islands*

**See Also:** Bible; Corporate Fraud; Linguistic Cues; Plagiarism; Source Credibility; Statement Validity Assessment; Scientific Content Analyses.

### Further Readings

Can, Fazli and Jon M. Patton. "Change of Writing Style With Time." *Computers and the Humanities*, v.38/1 (2004).

Hope, Jonathan. *The Authorship of Shakespeare's Plays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Kenny, Anthony. *The Computation of Style: An Introduction to Statistics for Students of Literature and Humanities*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982.

Romaine, Suzanne. *Socio-Historical Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Samuels, M. L. *Linguistic Evolution: With Special Reference to English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

## Sun Tzu

*The Art of War* is a Chinese treatise assembled two millennium ago addressing war strategy for battle and invasion. The work has generally been in its complete form since the Han dynasty (approximately 200 B.C.E.), and was probably written between 500 and 300 B.C.E. during the Warring

States period of ancient China. It is attributed to Sun Tzu (Master Sun), a military official, and consists of 13 sections associated with war and battle. Along with Sun Tzu's statements on battle and strategy, 11 commentators provide additional information on the various topics covered. These individual commentaries were added to Sun Tzu's statements sometime between 155 and 1300 C.E.

Section 1, "Strategic Assessments," contains strategies for deception. Though Sun Tzu made only three broad comments regarding deception, much of the strategies on deception in *The Art of War* come from the commentators addressing Sun Tzu's statements (this is also true across all the sections). Sun Tzu states that: "A military operation involves deception. Even though you are competent, appear to be incompetent. Though effective, appear to be ineffective." Mei Yaochen, commenting on Sun Tzu's statement, observes, "Without deception you cannot carry out strategy, without strategy you cannot control the opponent." Another commentator, Wang Xi, addresses Sun Tzu's statement by noting, "Deception is for the purpose of seeking victory over an enemy; to command a group requires truthfulness."

The comments regarding deception in *The Art of War* maintain that deception is not only acceptable but also a required element of military strategy. In particular, an army should appear "opposite" of what it really is. If strong, it should appear weak; if orderly, it should appear disorderly. In essence, one's military goals should include altering the perception of one's enemies.

Other portions of the treatise also mention forms of deception and altering perceptions. Though these comments are not as well known, they do underscore the importance of creating misperceptions to the enemy and even to one's own troops. Section 5, "Force," notes that unorthodox attacks are preferred and that, "victory is gained by surprise." In Section 6, "Emptiness and Fullness," Master Sun states, "Appear where they cannot go, head for where they least expect you."

In Section 7, "Armed Struggle," he states, "So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination." A commentator, Du Mu, then adds, "A military force is established by deception in the sense that you deceive enemies so that they do not know your real condition, and then can establish

supremacy.” Section 11, “Nine Grounds” focuses on leaders being deceptive to their troops, because revealed plans are often discussed, and troops will notice changes in a leaders’ day-to-day routine and anticipate plans. Master Sun states, “The business of the general is quiet and secret, fair and orderly . . . he can keep the soldiers unaware, make them ignorant.”

In terms of knowing when one is being deceived, the last section of *The Art of War* addresses spies (Section 13, “The Use of Spies”). Spies act to provide correct information, therefore foiling deceptive practices by an enemy. Master Sun notes, “Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation. It must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy.” In other words, foreknowledge is obtained from spies. Because deception is part of warfare, developing ways to see through deception, such as the use of spies is paramount.

### Wide-Ranging Impact

*The Art of War* has been referenced thousands of times across the world in terms of military strategy and politics. But its impact is more wide-ranging, with its messages spread beyond military applications into the areas of psychology, business, economics, history, education, and a host of other fields. Research on perceptions and misperceptions (whether intended or not) is a well-traveled area in psychology research. Sun Tzu’s point is that to directly deceive allows one to gain an advantage over an enemy. Though for Westerners

such prevarications may seem foreign and even immoral beyond wartime, east Asian cultures sometimes see such practices as advantageous and even protective. This may be interpreted as collectivism fully realized, with in-group member needs and rewards taking hierarchy over the out-group. Further, in military application, controlling perception is paramount for success.

William D. Marelich

Jamie Graham

*California State University, Fullerton*

**See Also:** Clausewitz, Carl von; Feigned Retreat; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; Military Deception; Terrorism.

### Further Readings

Blum, S. D. “Five Approaches to Explaining ‘Truth’ and ‘Deception’ in Human Communication.”

*Journal of Anthropological Research*, v.61 (2005).

Seiter, J. S., J. Bruschke, and C. Bai. “The Acceptability of Deception as a Function of Perceivers’ Culture, Deceiver’s Intention, and Deceiver-Deceived Relationship.” *Western Journal of Communication*, v.66 (2002).

Triandis, H. *Individualism and Collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Tzu, S. *The Art of War*. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Boston: Shambala, 1988.

Wang, C. S., A. K. Y. Leung, Y. H. M. See, and X. U. Gao. “The Effects of Culture and Friendship on Rewarding Honesty and Punishing Deception.” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, v.47 (2011).

# T

## Tall Tales

Tall tales are stories that feature larger-than-life characters and grossly exaggerated situations. Tall tales are deliberate “whoppers,” filled with hyperbole, that purposefully call attention to their outrageously implausible elements, which are conventionally related in a matter-of-fact fashion that suggest they are true. The more preposterous these tales, the better. In this respect, they are unlike the narratives of other fictional genres—such as fables and fairy tales, fantasy and science fiction, horror and urban legends—which include characters and events that challenge credibility, but which still invite their audiences to suspend disbelief.

Tall tales are included in the oral traditions of cultures throughout history and around the world, and their protagonists are consequently diverse: African shamans, Arabic merchants, Hasidic rabbis, Hindu adepts, Native American warriors, Taoist immortals, and Zen Buddhist monks, among others. In the United States, the protagonists are typically members of the working class, rather than affluent members of society, reflecting perhaps traditional American cultural ambivalence toward the wealthy. Like urban legends, tall tales are now disseminated not only from person to person but also via the mass and social media. In this way their narratives spread

further and faster than was possible when they were exclusively shared via oral transmission.

The characters populating tall tales are most often fictive inventions, but some are based on real people—such as Johnny Appleseed, Daniel Boone, Davey Crockett, or Calamity Jane—who have story cycles that include, and often mix, established history and dubious legend with the hyperbolic elements associated with tall tales. At times it is difficult to separate fact from fiction in tall tales that feature historical figures. Some tale tales might better be regarded as legends, which may or may not be true but the veracity of which it is impossible to definitively confirm or deny. Such is the case with a tale told about Cornelius Darnell, a companion of Daniel Boone, who is reported to have jumped across a gorge and over the Little Miami River in order to elude capture by Shawnees, from whom he had escaped. The gorge, located near Yellow Springs, Ohio, is narrow where Darnell is said to have made his legendary leap, with a span of approximately 20 feet. While it is not probable that he leaped that distance, it is possible, especially given his incentive to do so.

Many of the heroes of American tall tales represent occupational types and/or regional identities. They reflect in a highly exaggerated way the aspirations and life experience of cowboys, lumberjacks, sailors, soldiers, and other manual



laborers, as well as eccentrics like Johnny Appleseed who fit no standard occupational category. In doing so, they reflect and reaffirm shared communal values, such as hard work, physical strength, cleverness, and courage. These heroes do things bigger and better than is possible in “real life,” and their possessions are equally supersized.

A classic example is Alfred Bulltop (Old) Stormalong, a ship’s captain who stood six fathoms (36 feet) tall, and whose vast vessel, the *Courser*, had masts so high they were hinged so that they could be lowered in order to avoid hitting the sun or moon. He once saved ships and their sailors by lifting them out of the ocean by himself and placing them onto his own giant ship during a hurricane. Another tall tale hero, Pecos Bill, is a cowboy from Texas who once lassoed a large tornado, which he rode like a big bucking bronco. The force of the water that poured out of the tornado as it tried to throw him is said to have carved out the Grand Canyon. Tall tales of this

kind provide a humorous explanation for the origin of important geographic landmarks.

Old Stormalong’s story illustrates the willingness of one sailor to help others during times of danger, while Pecos Bill’s demonstrates the dogged determination a good cowboy needs to succeed. While many heroes of tall tales conform to and support the values of the established order, some rebel against social norms, as Calamity Jane does in challenging the received view regarding gender roles.

Of all the American tall tales, perhaps none is more popular or better known than those featuring Paul Bunyan, a literally larger-than-life lumberjack, and his companion Babe the Blue Ox, also of gigantic dimensions. There is some dispute as to whether Bunyan’s origins can be traced to anonymous oral folk traditions, or whether his narrative is an example of what folklorist Richard M. Dorson calls “fakelore” (pseudofolklore created by authors who strive to make their stories



Statues of the legendary lumberjack Paul Bunyan and his faithful blue ox Babe tower over visitors to the Trees of Mystery roadside attraction in Klamath, California. The legend of Paul Bunyan is perhaps one of the best-known American tall tales. The origins of the story are somewhat unclear, having come from either anonymous oral tradition or what folklorist Richard M. Dorson calls “fakelore.”

appear to be authentic products of a living folk tradition rather than their own creation).

There is no disputing, however, that Paul Bunyan as he is known today is based upon a series of newspaper stories that appeared in 1906, written by James MacGillivray, a reporter for the *Oscoda Press* in Oscoda, Michigan. In 1922, William B. Laughead, an advertising manager for the Red River Lumber Company, adapted these and other Paul Bunyan stories and included them in illustrated pamphlets that promoted his company and popularized the giant lumberjack. Thanks to his giant size and great strength, Paul Bunyan could outperform any other lumberman. Like Pecos Bill, he is said to have left his mark upon the American landscape, leveling whole forests and creating the Great Lakes, the Grand Canyon, Mount Hood, and other American landmarks.

As cultural products, newly minted tall tales reflect current concerns, and older stories continue to voice those of previous generations. The story of John Henry illustrates the tension between manual work and the machines that displaced such labor during the Industrial Revolution. An African American, John Henry was a freed slave who worked for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway as a steel driver. This was hard physical labor, requiring great strength and much skill. The introduction of a steam driver to the site where John Henry worked threatened to replace him and his fellow workers. To prove human superiority to machines and save the steel drivers' jobs, John Henry challenged the steam-powered machine to a contest in which he outperformed it. After doing so he collapsed from the strain and died. The Big Bend railroad tunnel near Talcott, West Virginia, is purported to be the place where this heroic contest occurred, although historians, such as Scott Reynolds Nelson, dispute this claim. Still, a marker near the tunnel references the legend, and the town holds an annual festival commemorating it.

Tall tales do more than merely entertain. They reflect and perpetuate cultural values, offer social critique, and voice concerns and complaints. Tall tales are not relics from the past but continue to play a prominent role in contemporary popular culture, where they are recycled through comic books, cartoons, feature films, fine and folk art, songs, television series, and Web sites. They are

also associated with such cultural fixtures and geographic features as local festivals, historical plaques, kitschy roadside art, monumental memorial sculptures, and theme campgrounds. In this way, tall tales enable communities to define themselves by shaping their present and celebrating their past, both the real past and the imaginary.

Robert Westerfelhaus  
College of Charleston

**See Also:** Barnum, P. T.; Disbelief, Suspension of; Exaggeration; Fairy Tales; Fiction; Humor; Jackalope; Myth; Tom Sawyer; Urban Legends.

### Further Readings

- Brown, C. S. *Tall Tale American Folklore Literature*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987.
- Dorson, R. M. *Folklore and Fakelore: Essays Toward a Discipline of Folk Studies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Laughead, W. B. *The Marvelous Exploits of Paul Bunyan*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2010.
- Nelson, S. R. *Steel Drivin' Man: John Henry, the Untold Story of an American Legend*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

---

## Terrorism

Terrorism describes a consistent use of terror in order to create a state of fear that often implies the use of violence and coercion. The United Nations in 1994 defined terrorism as the following:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

However, the term has not reached a definitional consent among the international community because its attribution heavily depends on

whose point of view is being addressed. In fact, almost all aspects of the word are subject to disputations: terrorism may be considered as a crime or a moral duty, an offensive or a defensive strategy, asymmetric warfare for small organizations or the enterprise of state actors.

One of the reasons that possibly explain the difficulty in providing an analytic definition of terrorism is that its meaning is also discussed differently in overlapping and competing arenas of public discourse. In the academic field, scholars attempt to find a useful operational definition of terrorism for their research; in the context of the state, statements about terrorism are expressed in the forms of laws, judicial rulings, and regulations; in the public discourse, mediated by means of communication, terrorism tends to be dramatized; finally, in the marginal discourse of groups supporting political violence, terrorism is framed as a necessity, a last recourse, or a desirable form of social action.

There are still common traits in the numerous existing definitions: Terrorism is about politics, violence, and fear. However, the three elements seem to always overlap each other because one of the main analytical difficulties consists of not only clearly distinguishing between the political and the criminal dimension of terrorism but also between politics and violence. Politics, understood as an open competition for the acquisition, maintenance, and expansion of state power, may comprise elements such as violence and coercion, allegedly characterizing terrorism. In fact, it could be argued that in contemporary societies both consent and coercion represent a *conditio sine qua non* for the emergence, establishment, and reproduction of political power. The concept “hegemony,” for example, comprises both aspects.

### Political Aspects of Terrorism

Regardless of its unclear semantic boundaries, terrorism is certainly political in both form and content. Content-wise, terrorism, like war, frequently wants to accomplish political objectives. Not accidentally, many terrorist groups organize themselves as political parties in order to represent their political interests in institutional politics. Form-wise, terrorism is in itself eminently political because of the particular use of violence.

First, terrorists very often adopt political violence in order to politically challenge the monopoly of violence constituted by the state. Furthermore, many terrorist organizations consider political violence as propaganda by the deed or armed propaganda, according to which violence becomes the most rhetorically eloquent political communication.

Political violence, as an inherent characteristic of terrorism, leads to another characteristic: terrorism is designed to produce terror, physical, and psychological fears. Fear is indeed another quality which can be defined as political. Terrorism becomes a fundamental element of the “politics of fear” of both terrorist and counterterrorist strategies. In fact, if violence is political in its challenge of the Weberian definition of the state, fear, as apprehension and a sense of the unsafe, is political in its challenge of the modern contractualist understanding of the state (that is, the state as a social pacification project emerging from a common agreement among its citizens) and the disruption of an economic system funded on the systematic calculations of risks. Thus, terrorism becomes a political tool to dispute the validity of modernity projects of pacification in societies: the state and the civil society.

Finally, terrorism frequently tends to be configured as an asymmetrical conflict between state and nonstate actors. Confirming such an account, Mahatma Gandhi once said that “Terrorism and deception are weapons not of the strong, but of the weak.” In addition, such an asymmetry, understood in political, institutional, and material terms, leads to a political economy of terrorism: because terrorists habitually have less available resources compared to their opponents, terrorist acts are rarely redundant as they tend to economize/maximize the impact of a given action. For this reason, terrorism tends to codify its message into highly symbolic terms, in which the symbolism does not only directly present its message but also represents its mediacy by allegoric language.

### Terrorism as Communication

Given such an excursus about the complexity and multifaceted nature of the definition of terrorism, lying and deception may become important assets of predominately nonstate actors in order to guarantee their safety as combatants operating in the



enemy territory. Furthermore, deception is frequently used in order maintain the element of surprise. Deception and lying used by nonstate actors are mostly utilized to gain tactical and strategic advantage over the enemy. In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu clarifies the importance of deception by saying that “All warfare is based on deception” and goes on to explain that “. . . when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”

Framed as an act of high symbolic and communicative value, terrorism can be seen more explicitly connected to lying and deception. Certainly, the relationship between the three terms is a complex and extremely problematic one because of both the ideological and moral charge of terrorism but also because of the ideological and moral charge of deceptive behavior. Terrorism, lying, and deception are frequently associated in the mediated collective perception but their link is not self-evident. When terrorism is used in its pejorative sense (as criminal, immoral, illegal), lying and deception are easily included in its semantic field as criminal and clandestine gestures that misinform through their propaganda.

When terrorism is understood as a communicative practice, lying and deception assume a preponderant role in pursuing terrorist activities. Terrorism can almost systematically be interpreted as a rhetorical situation with a message producer—the terrorist—with a specific means of communications—the source/act of terror—and an audience—both the possible victims and the larger public formed by civil society and the state. Lying and deceptive communication can be operative at all levels of communication, the message production, message dissemination, and message reception.

The link between terrorism and communication seems to be a foundational one and could be traced back to the origin of the modern form of terrorism in the 19th century, when terrorism was known as “propaganda by the deed.” The idea was that spectacular social events could be performed in the public, and therefore could capture the general attention and penetrate the collective mind. Several radical groups of the 1970s, such as the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red

Army Faction, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and the North American Weather Underground, colloquially known as Weathermen, were involved in what they defined as “armed propaganda.”

Such propaganda had the objective to disseminate their ideas and beliefs but also to fight against the allegedly deceptive lies and information manipulation of mainstream media and news agencies controlled by their opponents. For instance, the 1970s Italian radical group Red Brigades understood part of their agencies as a sort of investigative journalism that would bring to the public eye the lies of the state and its alleged servers.

### Mainstream Media and Terrorists

Mainstream media and terrorist media outlets frequently enter into a rhetorical competition in framing events and unveiling the opponent’s alleged lies. In such competitions, lying and deception become one of the most important fields of contention, as media outlets of opposing parties (that is, terrorist versus state) could reciprocally accuse each other of manipulating the reporting of a given event, such as a terrorist attempt, according to their political agenda. So, for example, on the one hand, mainstream media could be accused by terrorist media outlets of lying in order to manipulate the original message of the terrorist group and to be servile to an equally secretive and deceptive political power. On the other hand, terrorist media outlets could be accused by mainstream media of distorting events because of the overwhelming ideological mediation of the terrorist groups.

The confrontation between mainstream media and terrorist groups in terms of accusation of deceptive behavior may be explained at several levels. First of all, mainstream media would tend to attack the terrorist message based on a dominant sense of morality, legality, and/or ideological principles distinct from the ones of the terrorist group. Second, the media, as economic subjects seeking profit, could establish an ambiguous relationship with terrorism: on one hand, opportunistically, terrorism can become an extremely powerful source of a new event; on the other hand, terrorists tend to behave as powerful ideological state apparatuses, framing nonstate actors and the state in simplistic narratives of villains and heroes. Therefore, the tendency of treating terrorism as



a source of newsworthiness may push the media toward an objective (as supposed to subjective) deceptive process that manipulates terrorism events and transforms them into news stories, therefore highly spectacular and highly simplified.

### Private and Public Spheres

Understanding terrorism as communication also allows one to conceptualize the link to deception through the concept of private and public spheres. As already mentioned, in the public sphere, when a terrorist act is performed in public and under the public eye, deception can occur at the level of production of the terrorist message, at the level of mediation of the terrorist message, and at the level of reception of the terrorist message. The message itself could be considered as deceiving because of the political economy of terrorism, which tends to maximize the (communicative) impact of a given terrorist act. In other words, a group involved in asymmetric warfare, with considerably less resources than its opponent (for example, non-state actors versus state) is not directly connected to the ultimate objective of the given terrorist group, but instead stands as a symbol or a particularly eloquent exemplification.

For instance, when a given terrorist group hits a soldier, a police officer, or a politician, frequently the indirect and more important target of the act was what such a figure represents in the management of a given social order. Thus, the strategic maximization of the impact of a given terrorist act may produce dialectical outcomes: On the one hand, it tends to codify the message in effective and powerful symbols, which, like an image, could speak a thousand words; on the other hand, the symbolic codification of the terrorist act may result in a deceiving and misleading kind of communication process in which the “audience” could misunderstand what the real targets and objectives of the given terrorist group are.

Still, terrorism seen from a public eye may provide occasions for the audience’s self-deception. Because of the remarkable semantic weight of the label terrorism, which flattens and simplifies the understanding of a given phenomenon, the moralized and paradigmatic approaches that understand terrorism as the prototype of a Manichean confrontation between “good” and “evil,” “us” and “them,” are frequently self-deceiving. The

self-deception takes place because, given a will to comprehend a social phenomenon, a moral judgment superimposes a rational/analytic one. In fact, recalling the problem of definitions previously mentioned, and the importance of whose perspective is addressed, from the point of view of an organization militant, the very term “terrorism” may represent a lie, a deceptive representation of a belligerent confrontation whose political value is deprived.

In the private sphere, in the intimate understating of his or her role as a terrorist, or inside the organization, terrorism may be interpreted as a self-deceptive practice. There is an important body of literature that points out how frequently the radicalization and the exceptional internalization of a given ideology may de facto produce a deceptive understanding of reality. For instance, the deceptive force of a deeply internalized ideology may provoke a schizophrenic detachment between the actual reality and the reality understood by that specific worldview. The (self-) deceptive capabilities of ideological mediations also may constitute a fundamental element that guarantees the internal cohesion of the terrorist group, its organizations, and its shared objectives.

### Conclusion

The meaning of the word *terrorism* is highly affected by the rhetoric and politics that surround it. Depending on the point of view represented, the terrorist can be framed as the most dangerous criminal or a national hero, and can be identified as an organization or even a state. Because of its polysemic and contested nature, the word *terrorism* also makes the relationship with deception and lying rather complex. One productive approach that allows some clarification of such a relationship is to treat terrorism as a communicative situation.

Terrorism as communication illuminates the rhetorical confrontation between opposing actors and between opposing, potentially deceptive propagandas. In such a context lying and deception become instruments of rhetorical confrontation competing to frame the meaning of events (such as terroristic attempts). According to such a perspective even the term *terrorism* itself may be considered as the successful achievement of rhetoric that deceives the public by constructing simplistic

binary oppositions, such as political/criminal, legal/illegal, and good /bad. The role of ideology mediating both the perpetration of terrorist acts and the evaluation of such acts may also produce occasions for self-deception.

Marco Briziarelli  
University of New Mexico

**See Also:** Audience; Bush, George W.; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Clausewitz, Carl von; Communication; Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment; Department of Defense, U.S.; Disasters; Disinformation; Espionage and Counterespionage; Government Propaganda; Iraq War; Language; Middle East; News Media: Print; Self-Deception; Sun Tzu; Torture.

### Further Readings

- Altheide, D. "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear." *Critical Methodologies*, v.6 (2006).
- Crenlisten, R. "Analyzing Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Communication Model." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, v.14 (2002).
- Crenshaw, M. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics*, v.13 (1981).
- Debray, R. *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and the Political Struggle in Latin America*. New York: Grove, 1967.
- Dowling, R.E. "Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre." *Journal of Communication*, v.36 (1986).
- Gutmann, D. "Killers and Consumers: The Terrorist and His Audience." *Social Research*, v.46 (1979).
- Hoffmann, B. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Law, R. *Terrorism: A History*. London: Polity, 2009.
- Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60. "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism." (1994). <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm> (Accessed June 2013).
- Walter L. *Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.
- Weimann, B. and C. Winn. *Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*. New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1994.

## Theory of Mind

Researchers have argued that a central cognitive process of deception is the ability to consider and make inferences about the mental states of others, including the beliefs, intentions, and knowledge that another may possess. Such an ability is commonly referred to as a "theory of mind." In having a theory of mind, others' mental states have causal consequences on one's own thinking and behavior; in turn, others' mental states can be directly influenced. This distinction between what one and another know allows deceivers to elicit false realities in the minds of others. However, such explicit mental state reasoning may also enact considerable cognitive costs. Given the ease in which people lie, and the real-time demands of communication, an explicit monitoring of what another knows, or is likely to believe, may be unnecessarily demanding for a liar. Very young children and nonhuman animals are capable of misleading behavior despite the lack of sophisticated mental state reasoning capabilities. Thus, deception may only require a more implicit form of belief reasoning that involves simple belief attributions and perspective taking. Consideration will be given to this relationship between deception and theory of mind by touching on issues in evolutionary theory, cognitive development, and adult social interactions.

### Evolutionary Emergence

Strategic deception is uniquely human, insofar that other species are thought to lack the capacity to model the mental states of conspecifics. Nevertheless, some nonhuman primates and birds (for example, corvids) have been documented as engaging in tactical forms of deception. The nature of such deception mostly involves information concealment rather than actively attempting to instill false beliefs in another. For example, corvids routinely cache (hide) food in one location in the presence of a competitor and will then recache in a new location when the competitor has moved. Such forms of deception suggest a sophisticated ability to navigate complex social environments and seem to require an understanding that, at the very least, others have unique visual perspectives and goals. It has been suggested that such actions correspond to precursors for theory

of mind reasoning, but others caution that such findings only demonstrate learned behavioral contingencies or rudimentary social reasoning and, as such, do not warrant claims of explicit mental state awareness.

### Developmental Considerations

The area in which deception and theory of mind has been most widely explored is that of child development. A great deal of focus has been on whether children's emerging propensities for deception, as well as the complexity of their lies, are related to their development of theory of mind. Existing evidence suggests that children's ability to engage in deception is directly related to the degree to which they understand that others are able to see something they cannot see (first level), to understanding the thoughts of others and possible inferences that can be drawn from this understanding (second level).

To evaluate various levels of belief reasoning, researchers typically employ tasks that examine children's abilities to attribute false beliefs to another. A common example is with an "unexpected change" scenario. Children are given a story in which a character witnesses an object being placed in a box. This person leaves the room, at which time the object is switched to a new location. When the main character reenters the room, children are asked where they think the person will go to retrieve the object. If a child understands that the person has a false belief about the object's location (because the person was absent when the object was switched), the child should indicate the original location. Many versions of this and similar tasks have been developed, varying in terms of the memory and language demands needed to complete the task, as well as the complexity of the mental states that need to be considered.

Studies suggest that over the course of development, as children tell lies of increasing difficulty, their ability to reason about others' mental states also becomes more sophisticated. Thus, children as young as 2 years of age may be able to engage in simple forms of deception (for example, denial), but their lies are also expected to be limited and lacking in variation. It is not until a sophisticated theory of mind is developed, around 3 or 4 years of age, that children are able to tell more complex

lies. As converging evidence for the central role of theory of mind, children who have autism, a condition associated with the inability to access and reason about the mental states of others, are suspected to have considerable difficulty with deception at all ages.

Although a theory of mind appears necessary for deception, there are also significant challenges to this view. One source of conflicting evidence is that children as young as 15 months old, who are unable to pass rudimentary false belief tests, are still able to lie. This has raised the question whether very young children are actually engaging in intentional deception. Rather, they may be responding in such a way that expresses a desire for how things ought to be. For example, when a young child breaks a toy and is asked who did it, an answer of "nobody" may reflect wishful thinking. For responses that are less ambiguous, such as "I don't know" or "the cat," these lies also may not count as genuine cases of intentional deception. Theory of mind advocates have argued that such responses arise from learned behavior-response contingencies that are tied to limited contexts. As a result, lies told by very young children should be highly predictable.

However, recent evidence suggests otherwise. With evidence drawn from naturalistic contexts, the range and types of lies told by young children are seemingly complex. One reason for this complexity is that the observed lies occur in communicative interactions, in which simple attributes about another's knowledge are easily realized. Merely being questioned ("why is the toy broken?") suggests a lack of knowledge by the speaker and an opportunity for the child to provide information that serves their own needs (avoid punishment). Explicit reasoning about another's mental states may not be necessary. Ongoing evidence from the interaction, in how a caregiver responds or behaves, provides further opportunities that allow the child to maintain or expand on their deception. Thus, deception may be a communicative act that is similar to any other type of information the child wants to express.

Other studies that challenge the role of explicit theory of mind are those that dissociate mental state reasoning from the ability to lie. For example, researchers have compared the deception aptitude of children who show delays in mental state

reasoning with those who show no delays. Important for analysis, the groups are otherwise equivalent, including on measures of general intelligence and demographics. The reason that one group of children shows specific delays is that they were born deaf and therefore have not yet mastered certain language skills that are hypothesized to be critical for a theory of mind. These skills include the use of mental state verbs and certain syntactical structures for expressing propositional attitudes (for example, “The girl believed that he was going to the store”). As expected, compared to the hearing group, the deaf children performed poorly on the false belief tests yet showed no differences with the hearing children in understanding and employing deception.

### Adult Social Interactions

According to impression management theories, deceivers typically monitor the linguistic and nonverbal behavior of others for signs of suspicion. This requires an awareness of the social impressions that they are having on others. Presumably, this also requires an understanding that others’ also possess and are drawing from a theory of mind that is unique from that of the deceiver. To prevent suspicion, as any good poker player can attest, deceivers need to act or speak in such a way that conforms to what others are likely to perceive as being honest.

In studies examining the neural processes involved in impression management during deception, distinct brain regions, such as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), tend to show greater activation. This region is also involved in nondeceptive tasks in which people must predict and explain the behaviors of others based on what they might believe. However, RTPJ activation is not solely dedicated to theory of mind processing, as it is also implicated in what is known as attentional reorienting. Such domain-general processes may thus support theory of mind reasoning in distinguishing one’s own mental state from another and, in the case of deception, in switching between deception and truth during communicative exchanges.

The above neuroimaging example suggests that deceivers may actively reason about others’ mental states. Although plausible, more evidence is still needed given the relative lack of research

in this area. An alternative explanation is that deceivers may be drawing from an implicit theory of mind that is more cognitively efficient, requiring only simple belief attributions about another. Such an account is better suited to the demands of actual communication in which people rapidly and seamlessly exchange information in a coordinated fashion. Extensive reasoning about what another understands during communication is seen by many as being incompatible with the real-time dynamics of social interaction. Furthermore, the cognitive demands of explicit mental state reasoning, coupled with the demands of having to overcome a truth bias, might also disrupt deceivers’ linguistic and nonverbal behaviors to a point where deception is easily detectable. Existing



*David Oppenheim is deep in concentration at the 2010 World Series of Poker in Las Vegas, Nevada, June 1, 2010. The ability to consider and make inferences about the mental states of others, invaluable to lie detection experts, deceivers, and poker players alike is commonly referred to as “theory of mind.”*



research suggests otherwise, with detection rates in interpersonal interaction often being no better than chance. Thus, given the frequency and ease in which people lie, the possibility of a more implicit theory of mind is likely warranted.

Nicholas D. Duran

Rick Dale

*University of California, Merced*

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Children, Development of Deception in; Evolution and Natural Selection; Impression; Lying, Intentionality of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Mental Effort in Lying; Neurophysiology.

### Further Readings

- Adenzato, M. and R. B. Ardito. "The Role of Theory of Mind and Deontic Reasoning in the Evolution of Deception." In *Proceedings of the 21st Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, M. Hahn and S. C. Stoness, eds. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999.
- Bhatt, M. A., T. Lohrenz, C. F. Camerer, and P. R. Montague. "Neural Signatures of Strategic Types in a Two-Person Bargaining Game." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, v.107 (2010).
- de Villiers, P. A. J. G. de Villiers. "Deception Dissociates From False Belief Reasoning in Deaf Children: Implications for the Implicit Versus Explicit Theory of Mind Distinction." *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, v.30 (2012).
- Duran, N. D. and R. Dale. "Increased Vigilance in Monitoring Others' Mental States During Deception." In *Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, N. Miyake, D. Peebles, and R. P. Cooper, eds. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 2012.
- Newton, P., V. Reddy, and R. Bull. "Children's Everyday Deception and Performance on False-Belief Tasks." *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, v.18 (2000).

been suggested to function as a lie detection tool. A liar's fear of getting caught is assumed to bring about a surge of blood flow, thereby increasing facial temperatures. Studies found that 69 to 92 percent of liars and 60 to 92 percent of truth-tellers could be correctly classified through thermal imaging technology, indicating thermal imaging has potential as a lie detection device. Many issues remain to be resolved, however, in particular the concern that thermal imaging will erroneously regard the truth-tellers arousal (for example, fear of flying, stress of being interviewed) as a sign of deceit.

Originally, thermal imaging was developed during the Korean War to enhance vision during nighttime and to detect enemy objects. Later on, it gained a wide application in a variety of fields, such as security, firefighting, industry, medicine, and science. Thermal imaging cameras measure the invisible infrared radiation emitted by objects and convert it into colored-pixel images, called thermograms. As the infrared radiation emitted by an object is a function of its surface heat (that is, the higher an object's temperature, the greater the intensity of radiation it emits), the color gradients of the image reflect variations in temperature. Thermal imaging makes it possible to see one's environment better, with or without daylight. Warmer objects, such as humans or animals, thereby easily stand out from typically cooler backgrounds.

### Accuracy as a Lie Detection Tool

In 2002, Ioannis Pavlidis and colleagues proposed thermal imaging as a lie detection tool in a brief communication in *Nature*. Departing from the assumption that liars experience anxiety about being caught, liars are expected to show a fight-or-flight reaction. This reaction is the response of the sympathetic nervous system to a stressful event, preparing the body to fight or flee, and is characterized by an increased blood flow to the brain and muscles. The increase in blood flow leads to a heightened body temperature, which can be picked up by a thermal imaging camera. Prior research indeed showed that a startle response elicited by an auditory noise is accompanied by heating of body temperature, particularly around the eyes. By focusing on thermal patterns around the eyes, Pavlidis and colleagues could correctly classify 75

## Thermal Imaging

Thermal imaging is the technique that depicts the temperature variations of the environment using thermal imaging cameras. Thermal imaging has

percent of the liars and 90 percent of the truth-tellers in a mock crime study, when participants replied to the question “Have you stolen \$20?”

The authors claimed that the thermal imaging technique has an accuracy comparable to that of the polygraph. Moreover, because thermal imaging can occur rapidly, without the need for skilled staff or physical contact, they argued that it could be used for instantaneous lie detection without the subject being aware. One apparent application they suggest would be mass airport screening, in which the thermal pattern of every passenger’s face could be measured nonintrusively, thereby instantly identifying the wrongdoers among them. In an erratum, the authors later toned down their claims, stating it was premature to propose thermal imaging for large-scale truth screening.

The study did not go unnoticed and caused considerable controversy; the fact that no control questions were used threw a shadow on the boldness of the authors’ claims. Participants only responded to one question that explicitly referred to the mock crime. Such a question may also be anxiety-provoking for innocents, thereby increasing the risk of falsely accusing innocents (also known as the Othello error). A comparison with questions that control for the effect of the generally threatening nature of relevant questions is therefore an absolute must.

Screening subjects without their awareness circumvents the problem that innocents may become nervous in the interrogation situation, but it does not control for individual differences. People have different baseline levels of anxiety, differ in their susceptibility to stress, and may experience anxiety for many reasons other than deception. In airports, for example, innocent subjects may display nervousness because they have a fear of flying or worry about missing their plane. Later research indeed showed that thermal imaging could not discriminate truth-tellers and liars prior to being interviewed. An interview protocol is thus essential to reliably apply thermal imaging in a deception context.

Until now, a handful of studies have implemented thermal imaging during three interview protocols. Some studies used the control question technique, in which a crucial question (for example, “Did you remove the check from the envelope?”) was compared to other anxiety-provoking

questions related to the crime (for example, “Is everything you have told me about the check the truth?”). One study designed neutral questions that should only evoke concern in liars. Passengers at the airport were asked unexpected questions about their forthcoming trip (for example, “Have you been there before?”). When asked unanticipated questions, liars have to fabricate their answers on the spot, which is mentally taxing. As a result, they may struggle with their answers and become afraid of not being believed.

Finally, some studies applied the concealed information test, in which deceptive subjects were asked to hide recognition of known relevant items (that is, items related to a mock crime) embedded in a series of irrelevant items. The studies showed that 69 to 92 percent of liars and 60 to 92 percent of truth-tellers could be correctly classified based on thermal imaging data.

In a nutshell, laboratory studies have shown that thermal imaging can discriminate between liars and truth-tellers above chance level, which makes it a potential lie detection device. The technique cannot be reliably applied in a one-question format or outside an interview context, as suggested by pioneers. When used in interview protocols, thermal imaging can classify liars and truth-tellers with 60 to 92 percent accuracy. One should bear in mind, however, that the studies used different methods and analyses that capitalized on chance. Cross-validating each specific method and analysis in an independent sample is therefore necessary to establish firm conclusions.

Moreover, researchers should acknowledge that interview protocols differ in their sensitivity to the Othello error. Accumulating evidence from polygraph research has shown that the control question technique leads to a troublesome number of misclassified innocents because of its flawed rationale: Guilty suspects will not necessarily show stronger responses to crucial questions, whereas innocent suspects may respond strongly, for example, because they fear not being believed. Even neutral questions that should only evoke concern in liars may in real life also elicit arousal in innocents when they realize the consequences of failing to convince the interviewer.

The only protocol that contains safeguards against the Othello error is the concealed information test. Only guilty suspects should recognize

the relevant items and become concerned of not being able to hide this. Thermal imaging may therefore serve as an interesting covert measure in polygraph examinations that use the Concealed Information Test.

Evelyne Debey  
Ghent University  
Bruno Verschuere  
University of Amsterdam

**See Also:** Computer-Generated Images; Concealed Information Test; Credibility; Deception and Technology; Electroencephalography; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Korean War; Mental Effort in Lying; Othello Effect; Polygraph; Vocal Stress Analysis; Wizards of Lie Detection.

#### Further Readings

Pavlidis, I., N. L. Eberhardt, and J. A. Levine. "Seeing Through the Face of Deception." *Nature*, v.35 (2002).

Pollina, D. A., A. B. Dollins, S. M. Senter, T. E. Brown, I. Pavlidis, J. A. Levine, and A. H. Ryan. "Facial Skin Surface Temperature Changes During a 'Concealed Information' Test." *Annals of Biomedical Engineering*, v.34 (2006).

Warmelink, L., A. Vrij, S. Mann, S. Leal, D. Forrester, and R. P. Fisher. "Thermal Imaging as a Lie Detection Tool at Airports." *Law & Human Behavior*, v.35 (2011).

(challengers) who all claim to be the same person. The host reads a signed affidavit from the real person, and the panelists then ask the challengers questions. One challenger is sworn to tell the truth, and the other two are imposters who lie and attempt to deceive the celebrities into thinking they are the real person. The imposters are not only encouraged to lie, they receive cash prizes for effectively deceiving the panel. Each panelist then guesses who is telling the truth. In two versions of the show, the studio audience also votes. The truth-teller then reveals himself after the host asks, "Will the real [person's name] please stand up?" The challengers receive prize money based upon the number of wrong guesses, incentivizing their ability to bluff effectively.

The truth-tellers came from fields including the arts (Hunter S. Thompson, Berry Gordy Jr., Stan Lee), business (Orville Redenbacher, Mary Kay Ash), and sports (Tony La Russa). Some of the imposters also became famous later in life, such as Anderson Cooper, who appeared as an imposter when he was a child.

#### Broadcast History

*To Tell the Truth* debuted on December 18, 1956, on CBS during prime time as *Nothing But The Truth*. The show was quickly renamed and remained on CBS until 1968. Mike Wallace (who later appeared on the television program *60 Minutes*) hosted only the pilot episode; Bud Collyer (the voice of Superman on the serialized radio drama *The Adventures of Superman*) served as the show's first host. The show also featured a variety of narrators across the six decades.

*To Tell the Truth* added a daytime five-day-per-week version in June 1962, which featured a different panel of celebrities (though the same host and narrator as the prime time version), less prize money, and only presented two games instead of three to allow time for a news break. In 1965, the prime time panelists replaced the daytime panelists and, toward the end of the daytime show's run, the studio audience voted as well as the panelists. The prime time show ended in 1967; the daytime version lasted until 1968.

The show's first syndicated run lasted from 1969 to 1978. Interestingly, this version debuted the same day original host Collyer died. Replacement host Garry Moore left the show in 1976

---

## To Tell the Truth

*To Tell the Truth* was one of the most successful American television shows of all time, with new episodes in each of the six decades between its 1956 debut and the cancellation of its most recent version in 2002. In the past 50 years, *To Tell the Truth* has offered American audiences an innovative game of deception, showcasing how difficult it can be to determine who is telling the truth and how easy it is to deceive others.

#### Playing the Game

At the beginning of the game, a panel of four blindfolded celebrities meets three individuals

after being diagnosed with throat cancer. A second syndicated version started in 1980. It lasted only one year, despite the addition of a new game called “One-On-One,” in which the celebrity panelists were given a fact about one of the four imposters and asked which former imposter was telling the truth.

The show’s least successful version aired on NBC for nine months, starting in 1990. It went through three hosts, including Alex Trebek, who was hosting *Classic Concentration* and *Jeopardy!* at the same time, making Trebek the most omnipresent TV game show host in American history.

In 2000, the show returned to syndication for two seasons. John O’Hurley hosted. This version brought back the audience vote that had only appeared in the CBS daytime version. Kitty Carlisle appeared as a celebrity panelist in one episode, making her the only person to appear on every version of the show across the six decades. If a new version of *To Tell the Truth* debuts before 2020, it will regain a tie with *The Price Is Right*, also created by Bob Stewart, which has aired new episodes across seven decades.

### Popular Culture

A show that has spanned six decades is certain to etch itself into mainstream popular culture. One of the most memorable instances of this appears early in the Oscar-nominated movie *Catch Me If You Can*. In the film, Leonardo DiCaprio portrayed Frank Abagnale Jr., a con man whose autobiography inspired the Steven Spielberg-directed film. The film places DiCaprio, as Abagnale, into the original footage of when Abagnale was the challenger on a 1977 episode of *To Tell the Truth*. In the episode, Abagnale is in the center, dressed as a pilot, while the imposters are dressed as a doctor and a prisoner. None of the four celebrities correctly identified Abagnale.

### Research Application

Throughout its many versions, *To Tell the Truth* offers support to empirical evidence that people are not effective at detecting deception. Further research could examine the thousands of episodes of *To Tell the Truth* to validate whether the imposters match empirical research demonstrating that deceivers tell less compelling stories, shy away from unordinary events, and are less likely

to provide direct eye contact with their questioners. While some research finds that deception cues are more obvious when the imposter is motivated to succeed, the great success of many imposters across six decades of *To Tell the Truth* might limit these findings in the TV game show context.

The views expressed represent those of the author alone and do not represent the Federal Judicial Center.

Jason A. Cantone  
Federal Justice Center

**See Also:** Bluffing; Deception, Definitions of; Deception Detection Accuracy; *Lie to Me*; Lying as Ability or Skill.

### Further Readings

- Archive of American Television. “To Tell the Truth.” <http://emmytvlegends.org/interviews/shows/to-tell-the-truth> (Accessed October 2012).
- Dean, J. P. and W. F. Whyte. “How Do You Know If the Informant Is Telling the Truth?” *Human Organization*, v.17/2 (1958).
- DePaulo, B. M., J. J. Lindsay, B. E. Malone, L. Muhlenbruck, K. Charlton, and H. Cooper. “Cues to Deception.” *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129/1 (2003).
- Driskell, J. E., E. Sales, and T. Driskell. “Social Indicators of Deception.” *Human Factors*, v.54/4 (2012).
- Hartwig, M., P. A. Granhag, L. Stromwall, A. G. Wolf, A. Vrij, and E. Roos af Hjelmsater. “Detecting Deception in Suspects: Verbal Cues as a Function of Interview Strategy.” *Psychology, Crime, and Law*, v.17/7 (2011).

---

## Tobacco Advertising

Over the last 60 years, major tobacco companies have responded to each new study, finding, and law regarding the dangers of tobacco by producing misleading advertising claims. Competition among tobacco companies drove the initial use of deception in advertisements. With the release of public information on the connection between tobacco use and lung cancer, however, companies’





### The Doctors behind the Doctor

● Magical penicillin... the amazing "sulfa"... and now the new streptomycin... Think the men of research medicine for these... and for all the other valuable aids they have placed in the doctor's "first aid kit."

● Biochemists and bacteriologists... pathologists and physiologists... whatever the field of research... they are first and foremost, doctors! And, like all doctors, they are tirelessly devoting their lives to the cause of human health and happiness.

*According to a recent Nationwide survey:*

## MORE DOCTORS SMOKE CAMELS THAN ANY OTHER CIGARETTE

● What cigarette do you smoke, Doctor?... that was the question put to 113,597 doctors from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border. Three independent research organizations did the asking... covered doctors in every branch of medicine.

*The brand named most was Camels!*

Like the rest of us, doctors smoke for pleasure. Their taste recognizes and appreciates the rich, full flavor and cool mildness of Camels' choice tobacco just as yours does.



OUR "T-ZONE" WILL TELL YOU...

T for Taste...  
T for Throat...  
that's your proving ground for any cigarette. See if Camels don't suit your "T-Zone" to a "T."



**CAMELS** Costlier Tobaccos

*This 1946 Camels cigarette magazine advertisement was typical of tactics that invoked science to make false claims about the health benefits of tobacco, designed to ease public concerns about the adverse effects of smoking.*

false advertising shifted toward counteracting negative publicity and stressing the benefits of tobacco products. Bans on the terminology, imagery, and spokespeople resulted from these false health advertisements.

Companies were forced to change their sales strategy to the development of new tobacco products rather than prove the health benefits of regular cigarettes through advertising. Although these new products were equally harmful to consumers, advertisements touting features such as "filtered," "light," "mild," and "natural" suggested the products to be healthier alternatives than regular cigarettes. In addition to creating new types of tobacco and cigarettes, companies released advertisements emphasizing cigarettes as a way to reduce stress and anxiety. New laws and regulations in response to each change in advertising strategy restricted the tobacco industry, driving

companies to more discreet and subliminal advertising to maintain brand presence.

### The Start of a Century-Long Campaign

Deceptive tobacco advertising first originated from competition within the tobacco industry. Different brands attempted to obtain market share through exaggerated and false claims about tobacco products. The introduction of menthol cigarettes in the mid-1920s led to deceptive advertisements about the refreshing, clean, and soothing feeling smokers would receive from menthol cigarettes, regardless of how much they smoked. These advertisements also claimed that menthol cigarettes were healthier than regular cigarettes, despite findings that menthol cigarettes could actually encourage consumers to smoke even more.

The false claims for menthol cigarettes began a century-long campaign to convince consumers of tobacco's healthiness. Morton Levin, the director of Cancer Control in the New York State Department of Health, published the first major study linking smoking to lung cancer in 1950. To combat such bad publicity, tobacco companies joined forces, creating the Tobacco Industry Research Committee to investigate the health issues surrounding tobacco. "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," was an advertisement featured in 448 newspapers across the United States. It announced the creation of the research committee and claimed that cigarettes were not harmful to smokers' health. The tobacco industry created the research committee and subsequent advertisements as parts of a public relations strategy to spin research findings as controversial rather than definitive. The committee was funded by the tobacco industry to conduct research projects that could deceptively reduce the impact of studies against tobacco.

Following the release of the new research findings, an advertising battle among tobacco companies ensued as different brands competed to appear as the healthiest option to consumers. Advertisements made false claims, including that specific brands could calm nerves and lead to happier and healthier lifestyles. These health appeals even included advertisements for Camel cigarettes that stated, "More Doctors Smoke Camels than any other cigarette." The Federal Trade Commission

(FTC) consequently banned advertisements featuring health references and words such as doctor, nerves, and energy. The new ban forced tobacco companies to reevaluate their marketing strategies and move toward creating new products that could be marketed as healthier without violating the FTC bans.

### **Filtered, Low-Tar, and Natural Cigarettes**

The first of these new products was the filtered cigarette, which companies advertised as lessening the amount of smoke users inhaled. Filtered cigarettes quickly took over the market in the late 1950s as smokers searched for alternatives to quitting. Advertisements focused on the positive-sounding traits of the filtered cigarettes and omitted the fact that they were just as harmful as regular cigarettes because of the stronger tobacco used. These advertisements stressed the purity and neatness of smoking filtered tip cigarettes over regular cigarettes. As a result, companies were able to bypass the FTC bans, yet still contradict health claims.

Tobacco companies continued to employ an advertising strategy focused on new product development and the manipulation of language to sidestep bans. Following filtered cigarettes, companies created “low-tar” cigarettes. These cigarettes were again advertised as healthier, though in reality they had the same dangerous health effects. Industry papers released to the public showed that tobacco companies knew of the dangers, yet intentionally deceived consumers. To insinuate the healthiness of “low-tar” cigarettes without violating the FTC bans against health terms, companies labeled cigarettes as “light” and “mild.” Some advertisements even suggested that smoking “light” and “mild” cigarettes was better than quitting smoking.

“Low-tar” cigarettes became the best-selling tobacco product, causing the advertising battle among companies, referred to as the “tar derby,” to continue. Each brand fought to advertise its cigarettes as having the least amount of tar. In 1960, the FTC told tobacco companies to end the tar derby and refrain from suggesting the improved health effects of filtered cigarettes.

However, this event was followed by the Surgeon General's first report on the link between tobacco and lung cancer in 1964. Companies

continued the tar derby in attempts to counter the report's findings. The development of new products continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as different companies produced cigarettes with even lower tar and nicotine. In the late 1990s, companies again tried to differentiate from competitors by releasing “natural” cigarettes. While just as dangerous, the terminology used in advertisements such as “unprocessed” and “additive-free” suggested that natural was equivalent to healthier. The FTC eventually forced Winston, one of the primary natural cigarette brands, to include the statement “No additives in our tobacco does not mean a safer cigarette” in its advertisements.

### **Covert Advertising and Health Imagery**

Tobacco companies also battled FTC bans and health research through covert advertising. Popular writers published articles expressing doubt over the tobacco-cancer link in major magazines and newspapers in return for compensation from tobacco companies. In 1968, a public relations company working for a tobacco company paid Stanley Frank, a sports writer, to write an article for *True Magazine* in which Frank said that the link was inaccurate. Frank also wrote a similar article for the *National Enquirer* under a fake name. Tobacco brands then referenced Frank's article and similar news stories in advertisements for products.

Tobacco companies also attempted to sidestep the bans on the language of advertisements by employing health imagery. Many tobacco advertisements featured people smoking while performing adventurous outdoor tasks. These advertisements tried to create a positive association with smoking and were not often seen as deceptive, just psychologically persuasive. However, the FTC found that the advertisements were deceptive, as the characters smoked during intense athletic activity, such as hiking or playing a sport. The activities shown require more than just normal respiratory strength, contradicting the link between tobacco and poor respiratory health. The FTC consequently banned advertisements in which characters smoked during activities that required “stamina or conditioning beyond those required in normal recreation.” Tobacco companies responded, however, by releasing advertisements in which characters smoked just after

finishing a difficult sport or activity, evading the FTC's ruling.

### Current Advertising Practices

Tobacco advertising is now much more limited than in previous years. Tobacco companies cannot advertise on television, radio, or in magazines whose readers are below the age of 21. In most states, smoking is banned in restaurants, bars, government buildings, hospitals, workplaces, and on mass transportation. Antitobacco campaigns work to create an environment in which there is social pressure to quit smoking and the public looks down on the act. As a response to these societal changes and the FTC rulings, tobacco companies have shifted advertising focus to status imagery. Despite the negative social views toward tobacco, companies market cigarettes as symbols of status, wealth, and "coolness." Images of attractive people dressed in expensive clothing and surrounded by friends adorn tobacco advertisements.

With the ban on broadcast advertisements, companies resort to product placement in movies to promote cigarettes as trendy. Such organizations pay millions of dollars to feature popular celebrities smoking while playing high-status characters, indicating that the FTC bans have driven tobacco companies to subliminal advertising to mislead consumers.

The FTC attempts to regulate the tobacco industry's manipulation of fact, especially when this information is unlawful and counteracts anti-tobacco campaigns. Although today's deceptive nonverbal advertising may be considered morally objectionable, the FTC has not yet found it illegal. Despite regulation and the definitive knowledge that tobacco is unhealthy, tobacco companies continue to deceive consumers about the value of cigarettes and other tobacco products in their lives. Tobacco advertising has been replaced by more subtle types of deception, which misleads through symbolism and nonverbal content. Regardless of the way messages are transmitted, companies continue to imply that smoking has some intangible benefit to consumers.

Patrice Lawless  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Consumer Protection Laws; Corporations; Drug Advertising; False Advertising; Federal Trade Commission; Marketing, Deceptive.

### Further Readings

- Borio, Gene. "Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century." [http://archive.tobacco.org/History/Tobacco\\_History.html](http://archive.tobacco.org/History/Tobacco_History.html) (Accessed October 2012).
- Glantz, Stanton. *The Cigarette Papers*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- National Cancer Institute. *The Role of Media in Promoting and Reducing Tobacco Use*. Bethesda, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008.

---

## Torture

Torture is any one of intense interrogation methods used to elicit involuntary information disclosure from another person. These methods have been historically sanctioned by states as justified by the end goals of national security and public safety, though they have also increasingly been challenged on legal, moral, and ethical grounds during the past half century. As such, torture's use is an issue that is globally under debate and in transition. False confessions occur when individuals lie to interrogators to stop the torture. The present discussion focuses solely on the relationship between torture as an interrogative technique and lying as a potential outcome and/or obstacle to be overcome by torture, as distinguished from acts performed for the torturer's pleasure. By most reports, professional interrogators using torture are neither sadistic nor do they perform torture for their pleasure. Many simply view torturous acts as tools of their trade, similar to other interactive methods, differing in intensity.

Historically, some confessions were only legally admissible if elicited under torture because other testimonies were deemed less reliable and valid. Torture continued to be viewed as a legitimate means of law enforcement inquiry through medieval and early modern times in Western cultures. One well-known period of torture use was during the medieval Inquisition, lasting nearly 600 years, and ending in the early 19th century. Torture was

also used ubiquitously during trials to elicit confessions of witchcraft. Often, torture was used to elicit the names of accomplices and conspirators of a suspect.

Napoleon Bonaparte felt that torture, as a method of interrogation, was useless. Torture is currently viewed as a violation of the Geneva Conventions, as well as those United Nations' guidelines articulated and ratified across nearly 150 countries, yet torture is still practiced by approximately 80 countries. However, these United Nations guidelines are not legally binding as part of international law, and many participating states are hesitant to frame their practices as torture, because of resulting negative domestic and international perceptions.

Modern torture techniques are often designed to leave no telltale marks on suspects, diminishing a suspect's credibility when claiming torture, and permitting plausible deniability for states and their interrogators. Psychological torture techniques are sometimes favored when the suspect will be freed; however, while not visible, these techniques' damages can be as severe and long-lasting. Thus, while psychological or physical pain and discomfort is frequently used in interrogations, actual harm can sometimes distinguish torture from other severe interrogation techniques. Though delineation between torture and other more "legitimate" interrogation techniques is not commonly agreed upon, torture usually involves some level of suffering beyond minimal levels, and that suffering can last well beyond the interrogative event. In many legal systems, as long as the pain and suffering inflicted on a prisoner or suspect is not "severe," it is permissible to use physical force to cause "discomfort."

As terrorism increases throughout the world, law enforcement and intelligence communities have increasingly turned to more intensive interrogation techniques to quickly elicit relevant information from suspects in order to prevent destructive acts. The "ticking time bomb" scenario is commonly invoked in defense of interrogative torture. In some cases, these techniques fall into legally grey areas, and in others they may even violate laws. Yet, the United Nations Convention Against Torture expressly reproaches any justification of torture, including states of war or threat of war, political instability, public

emergency, or on order from authorities. This agreement also forbids states from moving suspects to other states where they may be subjected to torture, thereby "outsourcing" torture, or providing "torture by proxy" in which information is elicited by one state, and then routed back to the original state. Both the Red Cross and Amnesty International help monitor situations to prevent the use of torture.

### **Is Torture an Effective Interrogation Technique?**

Torture is inherently a communicative activity, designed to elicit useful information from an individual who does not wish to disclose it. Though studies have shown that torture tactics are meant to lead to positive results, they can involve harsh physical, verbal, and psychological techniques, compelling suspects to even falsely confess. While police and other officials use methods that might seem negative, cruel, or unpleasant to some people, the use of these tactics is viewed as necessary at times, and can protect innocent civilians by helping close cases and identify dangerous individuals. However, many terrorists are trained in methods of resisting police and military interrogation, therefore reducing the effectiveness of these methods.

In the United States, skilled interrogators have concluded that these harsh techniques are less effective than psychologically oriented techniques in obtaining truthful statements from terrorists. Robert Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dismissed the effectiveness of such torture techniques as waterboarding, challenging reports that information from such techniques disrupted any domestic attacks. Although delayed from being released to the public, a report by the inspector general of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) similarly called into question the effectiveness of "enhanced interrogation" techniques used by CIA interrogators. Further, after coercive practices were banned in Iraq, military interrogators saw dramatic increases in "high-value" intelligence.

As such, torture may be an ineffective coercive technique. Once damage or severe suffering occurs, the threat of inflicting damage or suffering to the individual is removed, and it is this psychological pressure that makes other interrogation



techniques more effective. Once harm occurs, individuals may say anything to the interrogator to stop the torture, including lying.

### Is Torture Legal?

Reports on the misuse of interrogation of terrorists raise the question of whether limits on interrogation should be more strictly enforced. In the United States, the constitutional limits on police interrogators depend on the purpose of the interrogation. If there is an immediate concern for protecting the public, such as against terrorist actions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that agents may question the suspected terrorists without first warning them of their Miranda rights. The Miranda rights, mandated in the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Miranda v. Arizona*,

state that suspects can decide at any time to exercise their rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. Further, the Fifth, Sixth, and portions of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect the rights of people against false confessions, and of producing either an involuntary or untrustworthy confession, resulting from coercive tactics. The Fifth Amendment determines if a confession is to be considered valid based on its level of voluntariness.

Persuasion is based in the idea of gaining compliance. The main focus of interrogation is to facilitate and increase the suspect's compliance and subsequent self-disclosure. The vast majority of interrogation techniques are designed to elicit a confession voluntarily, whereas the use of torture elicits confessions involuntarily. Coercion can be used as an interrogative tactic to obtain confessions with two types of problematic coerced confessions: (1) coerced-compliant false confessions, when the suspect confesses in order to obtain a goal, or to relieve him or herself of a difficult position or situation; and (2) coerced-internalized false confessions, when a suspect becomes uncertain of her or his innocence after becoming confused and begins to doubt themselves because of manipulative and coercive interrogation tactics adjusting their perceptions of reality. Thus, for a confession to be considered valid, it must be voluntarily offered, without coercive pressure.

### Is the Information Valid?

There are numerous persuasive techniques that can be used in interrogation. Additionally, several coercive interrogation techniques may be used, with the most severe of these being considered torturous. The age, compliancy, susceptibility, and mental development of the suspect can greatly impact an interrogation. The tactics used in interrogation settings can affect the suggestibility of suspects, as well as their anxiety levels. While this can cause the suspect to provide the investigator with the sought-after information, it can also lead to false confessions.

Interrogators themselves are often in stressful situations in which the time to elicit information from a suspect is minimal, and negative impacts of not getting the desired information are not insignificant (for example, death and destruction).



Antonio Tempesta's woodcut depicts the torture and execution of Christians in Antonio Gallonio's *Tortures and Torments of the Christian Martyrs*, first published in 1591. Torture has been used throughout the centuries in an attempt to elicit false confessions from individuals, including false confession of a religious belief.

Thus, an “ends justify the means” mentality can emerge or prevail. Interrogations, which seek to determine the culpability of a suspect with regard to a crime, often result in false confessions. A false confession is when a suspect admits to being guilty of a crime that she or he is innocent of committing. Suspects often confess despite the fact they are innocent, in the hope of gaining notoriety or shelter, or controversially because they are pressured by interrogators.

Though detection of lies and false confessions can be aided by technology (e.g., polygraphs, functional magnetic resonance imaging), given the lack of deception detection accuracy shown by meta-analyses of lying and deception, measures should be taken to ascertain the validity of the information being given, if not to avoid situations in which false content/confessions might be elicited from individuals. It is difficult to consciously control all behavioral channels, and nonverbal communication “leaks out” through facial, vocal, and/or bodily expressions, providing interrogators with clues that a suspect may be withholding or providing false information. By analyzing eye movements, spoken predicates, and posturing, it is thought that interrogators can determine the validity of suspect statements. Even the use of time can lead to confusion and to a lessened sense of reality. By interrogating at night, interrupting sleep patterns and eliminating time for sleep, it is hoped that a truthful confession will be obtained from an overtired, stressed, guilty suspect.

Along with sleep deprivation, there are many other aspects of the interrogation process that cause stress and increase anxiety in the suspect. A suspect’s arousal level (that is, ability to withstand additional stimulation) can affect how anxious she or he is while being interrogated. A person with a high arousal level would become overstimulated during an interrogation and, therefore, may confess more easily in order to end an interrogation and return to a comfortable level of arousal. A person with a low arousal level (that is, a stimulation seeker) would be better able to withstand a lengthy interrogation, and more intensive interrogation techniques would have to be used in order to reach an arousal level causing her or him to confess. If the interrogator yells or varies her or his vocal patterns, the person being interrogated

becomes more stimulated, potentially leading to higher anxiety.

Juveniles, compliant personalities, and mentally handicapped people are the most prone to falsely confess to a crime; yet, without observable signs, identifying most mentally handicapped individuals prior to or during interrogations may be difficult. There are numerous measures that can be taken in order to prevent false confessions. The length of the interrogation can be limited. Some courts have allowed interrogations longer than five hours; however, lengthy interrogations signify to the suspect that the only way to end the interrogation is to give in and confess. Trickery is also likely to produce a false confession, such as deceiving a suspect in regard to the evidence that is held against her or him.

Another effective measure in preventing false confessions is videotaping or recording interrogations. Approximately one-third of all law enforcement agencies in the United States already take this measure, and it is required for police interrogations in England to be videotaped. Videotaping does not jeopardize legitimate law enforcement agencies, and when interrogations are fair, it produces powerful evidence for prosecution.

Many tortured individuals can experience signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); this experience may be further amplified if the individual divulged information leading to the torture or deaths of others, resulting in feelings of deep guilt. Some courts recently have concluded that while information gleaned under torture conditions might not be admissible in court, law enforcement agencies could still act upon the information to help ensure public safety (for example, time bombs).

## Conclusion

The persuasive methods used in the interrogation process are meant to help elicit valuable information, rather than harm suspects. Interrogators use powerful techniques to gather information from suspects. Use of harsh interrogation techniques creating severe distress in a suspect can constitute torture, often rendering information divulged during interrogation unreliable, and producing lasting harm in the mental and/or physical state of the suspect, making the process a problematic endeavor on multiple levels. A recurring theme

in research pertains to false confessions resulting from harsh interrogation. A problematic situation occurs when an individual confesses, but is not guilty, thereby derailing or even halting investigations of crimes or intelligence missions, and damaging an innocent individual. While torture has clearly been shown to be an effective technique in extracting confessions when the suspect is guilty, even more effective interrogation techniques seem to avoid the problematic aspects of torture.

Daniel Cochece Davis  
Illinois State University

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Bush, George W.; Confession; Deception Detection Accuracy; False Confessions; Iraq War; Korean War; Law and Law Enforcement; Morals and Ethics; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph; Stalin, Josef; Sun Tzu; Terrorism; Truth.

### Further Readings

- Arrigo, Jean Maria. "A Utilitarian Argument Against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists." *Science and Engineering Ethics*, v.10/3 (2004).
- Cassell, P. G. "The Guilty and the 'Innocent': An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confessions." *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy*, v.22 (1999).
- Gudjonsson, G. H. *The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook*. London: John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
- Hancock, L. "False Confessions: How They Happen." *Columbia Journalism Review*, v.41/5 (2003).
- Helsinki Commission Hearing. "Testimony: Dr. Christian Davenport. Hearing: 'Is It Torture Yet?'" (December 10, 2007). [http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord\\_id=907&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID=5892559&CFTOKEN=28254175](http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord_id=907&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID=5892559&CFTOKEN=28254175) (Accessed November 2012).
- Inbau, F. E., J. E. Reid, J. P. Buckley, and B. C. Jayne. *Criminal Interrogation and Confessions*. 4th ed. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2004.
- Macdonald, J. and D. Michaud. *The Confession*. Denver: Apache Press, 1987.
- Strömwall, L. A. and P. A. Granhag. "How to Detect Deception? Arresting the Beliefs of Police Officers, Prosecutors, and Judges." *Psychology, Crime, & Law*, v.9 (2003).

United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. [http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en](http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en) (Accessed January 2013).

Wakefield, H. and R. Underwager. "Coerced or Nonvoluntary Confessions." *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, v.16 (1998).

White, W. S. "What is an Involuntary Confession?" *Rutgers Law Review*, v.50 (1998).

## Transparent Liars

Transparency in general refers to the openness of liars in telling lies and the openness of truth-tellers in telling the truth. Transparent liars are disbelieved when they are lying, whereas nontransparent liars are believed when they are lying.

In the psychological literature on lying, transparency was identified with how leaky liars were when lying. Traditionally it was held that leakage was prevalent among liars, especially in the case of lies that were not sanctioned and when there was something important at stake for the liar (high-stakes lies). That is, traditionally it was held that most liars were transparent. Recent research on lie detection has cast doubt on this claim about the prevalence of leakage and has argued instead that leakage among liars is much more variable: leakage is the exception rather than the rule for liars. The conclusion is that there are far fewer transparent liars, and many more nontransparent liars, than studies originally held.

In the work of Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen in the late 1960s and 1970s it was determined that liars typically experience certain emotions, such as guilt (about telling lies) and fear (being detected when they tell lies). It was also determined that liars can experience delight in succeeding in duping people. Truth-tellers, by contrast, do not typically experience these emotions in telling the truth. Although liars may attempt to suppress these emotions and control the display of these emotions, by attempting to hide the emotions with a mask of neutrality (maintaining a "poker face"), or covering the truly felt emotion with a different, false emotion,



emotions are not normally under the conscious control of liars. In addition to verbal cues that signal lying, such emotions can be leaked to the recipients of lies, nonverbally, and hence are also cues that signal lying.

This idea of leakage was expanded upon by researchers in the 1980s such as Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo, and Robert Rosenthal, who advanced a four-factor internal state theory. Liars, as opposed to truth-tellers, are more likely to experience greater levels of arousal, emotions (such as guilt and fear), greater cognitive effort, and more effort to control their nonverbal displays of emotion. Each of these internal states was thought to be associated with certain nonverbal behaviors; for example, in the case of increased cognitive effort, lying was thought to lead to an increased number of speech errors and longer response latencies. Even if liars presented themselves as honest, therefore, they leak cues to their own lying, both verbally and nonverbally.

If liars typically leak cues to their own lying, then it follows that liars are typically transparent liars. Because this conclusion was at odds with lie detection experiments, in which subjects are, on average, only 54 percent accurate in detecting liars, or only slightly better than chance, researchers argued that people are poor at detecting leakage, at least without training. As it were, people are poor at detecting transparent liars.

More recently, researchers such as Bella M. DePaulo and Charles F. Bond have determined that there is much more variance in liars' transparency and much less variance in people's ability to detect lies, even if variance in transparency is not large in an absolute sense. The majority of people can lie without leaking, or without leaking very much, to the recipients of the lies they are telling. That is, the majority of people are not very transparent liars. A small proportion of people, however, have a tendency to give themselves away and to leak that they are lying. That is, a small proportion of people are transparent liars. Although not perfectly transparent, such transparent liars are detected by the recipients of their lies.

In traditional experiments with lie detection, which were set up so that subjects must rate people they view in videos as lying or not lying, subjects were not able to ask questions of the putative liar.

Also in such experiments, various kinds of information were excluded, such as whether or not the people had a reason to lie (in the experiments, it is normally the case that no reason is apparent, or that all people have the same reason). In addition, prior factual knowledge was excluded and access to physical evidence was precluded, along with information about the context, knowledge of confessions, and other data. In such artificial experiment conditions, there can be no strategic use of evidence, and no strategic questioning, among other things. The result is that the subjects in such lie detection experiments had to almost exclusively rely upon liars being transparent in order to detect them.

### **Few Transparent Liars Model**

It has been argued by researchers such as Timothy R. Levine that, as a consequence, the results of such lie detection experiments tell more about the transparency, and lack of transparency, of the liars than about people's general ability to detect lies. The results of such experiments, it is argued, are a function of the relatively small number of transparent liars and the large number of nontransparent liars. This has led to the Few Transparent Liars Model in order to explain the surprisingly poor results in such experiments with lie detection. It is not that people are, in general, poor at detecting lies. Rather, they are poor at detecting lies under such conditions, when relying almost entirely upon transparency, because there are few transparent liars and many nontransparent liars.

This raises the question of why so few liars are transparent liars. The most plausible explanation is that people become less transparent in lying through practice at lying. Although children's lies are highly transparent and, as a result, are discouraged and/or punished by adults, children gradually learn to avoid detection through trial and error and become less transparent over the years. By early adulthood, most people are nontransparent liars.

This explanation raises the further question of why, nevertheless, some people remain transparent liars. Various explanations have been offered for this. One explanation is that some people are simply more practiced at lying than others and become more nontransparent in lying. Those with



less practice at lying remain transparent liars. A second explanation is that there are differences in natural ability among people, such that some people benefit from practice at lying more than others. Those who lack the natural ability remain transparent liars, despite practice and, as a result, are discouraged from continuing to attempt to lie.

Finally, it is thought that transparency in lying can vary as a result of situational and chance factors and that transparency in lying should not be thought of as an invariable trait. Although some people may be transparent in almost all situations, others may exhibit transparency in one situation rather than another. Furthermore, even nontransparent liars could become more transparent as a result of strategic questioning.

The conclusion that most people are not transparent liars—that most people are relatively good at lying—does not necessarily run afoul of evolutionary theory. It may well be that human susceptibility to being duped by lies reflects a highly adaptive trade-off. A cognitive system that evaluated all information for veracity would be less efficient than one that presumed truthfulness and subsequently rejected what was discovered to be false. If this system is further combined with social systems that discourage lying, then it will be even more efficient. Such an explanation would predict that parents will teach their children that lying is wrong and that all human cultures will develop prohibitions against lying, at least within the in-group. All human cultures benefit if lying is condemned and if people are made to feel shame upon being discovered to be a liar.

James Edwin Mahon  
Washington & Lee University

**See Also:** Adolescence, Lying in; Childhood, Lying in; Deception Detection Accuracy; DePaulo, Bella; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; Evolution and Natural Selection; Leakage; Lying, Accusations of; Lying, Prevalence of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Nonverbal Cues.

#### Further Readings

Bond, C. F. and B. M. DePaulo. "Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.134 (2008).

Ekman, P. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage*. New York: Norton, 2001.

Ekman, P. and W. V. Friesen. "Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception." *Psychiatry*, v.32 (1969).

Levine, T. R. "A Few Transparent Liars: Explaining 54% Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments." *Communication Yearbook*, v.34 (2010).

Serota, K. B., T. R. Levine, and F. J. Boster. "Outliers: The Prevalence of Deception in American Life." *Human Communication Research*, v.36 (2010).

Zuckerman, M., B. M. DePaulo, and R. Rosenthal. "Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 14, L. Berkowitz, ed. New York: Academic Press, 1981.

## Trojan Horse

The Trojan Horse comes from the story of how the Greeks, by guile and deceit, won the Trojan War. The original Trojan Horse was a large wooden contraption in which a small group of Greeks hid in order to secretly enter Troy and thereby initiate its demise. The term *Trojan Horse* has subsequently come to be used for several different forms of deception.

The legendary Trojan Horse was a contrivance that allowed the ancient Greeks to finally end the 10-year siege of the city of Troy and conclude the Trojan War. In the 13th century B.C.E. a coalition of Greek city-states was formed to wage war on the powerful city of Troy in Asia Minor. The primary literary sources for the Trojan War are several ancient works of Greek and Roman literature, principally the *Iliad* of Homer, as well as Book IV of Homer's *Odyssey* and Book II of Virgil's *Aeneid*, which describes the sacking of Troy.

The Trojan Horse was a ruse to help the Greeks finally conquer Troy. The horse was actually regarded as a sacred animal by the Trojans. The wood used to make the horse was cut from trees in a grove sacred to the god Apollo. The crafty Greek hero Odysseus took credit for the idea of the ploy, said to have been given to him by the goddess Athena in a dream. The Trojan


Horse consisted of a large wooden figure of a horse built in just three days under the direction of Epeius, a talented boxer, with the guidance of Athena. The Trojan Horse was constructed with a hollow belly, in which Odysseus and a small contingent of elite soldiers could conceal themselves. An inscription was written on the side of the Trojan Horse that said the horse was an offering of gratitude to Athena for pleading for the safe return of the Greeks on their long journey home.

The Greek army broke camp and boarded its ships as if to return home to Greece. However, the fleet hid behind the island of Tenedos, off the Trojan coast. The Trojans then entered the remnants of the Greek encampment and saw the colossal Trojan Horse. They also found a lone Greek, Sinon, who had been coached by the wily Odysseus as what to say to the Trojans. Sinon told the Trojans he had deserted from the Greeks, whom he said wanted to sacrifice him, and he said the Trojan Horse was left as a peace offering to the gods. Sinon added that the Greeks had made the horse very large so that the Trojans could not bring it into their city. He also said that the Greeks hoped that the Trojans would desecrate

the Trojan Horse and thereby incur the divine wrath of Athena.

Most of the Trojans thought the Trojan Horse would make a great trophy and wanted to bring it into their city. However, at least two of the Trojans warned against accepting the Trojan Horse. One of these was Cassandra, the daughter of King Priam and Queen Hecuba of Troy; she had been given the gift of prophecy by Apollo, but he also cursed her, when she resisted his amorous advances, such that no one would believe her prophecies. She walked around and around the Trojan Horse, taunting the Greeks inside with insults, including remarks about them and their wives, but the Greeks, at the physical forcing of Odysseus, kept their silence.

The other Trojan who warned against accepting the Trojan Horse was Laocoon, a priest of Poseidon, who said the Trojans should not believe the Greeks, even if they were bearing gifts. Laocoon threw a spear at the Trojan Horse, but then two huge sea snakes were sent by the gods to silence him; the serpents strangled and killed him and his two sons. The Trojans interpreted this as an omen that the gods took displeasure with Laocoon and his warnings. Thus, they continued their plans to



*A small aryballos (vase), from the Corinthian style around 560 B.C.E., displays the story of the Trojan Horse. The legend, which has become nearly synonymous with deception and cunning, was a ruse to help the Greeks finally conquer Troy. A giant wooden horse was quickly constructed with a hollow belly for soldiers to hide in and inscribed with a plea to the goddess Athena for the Greeks' safe journey home. It was left behind as tempting spoils for the Trojans to haul into their city after the Greeks supposedly fled.*

drag the huge statue into their impregnable city, even dismantling some of the city wall as the horse was too big to fit inside the city gates.

The Trojans celebrated heartily, and after many of them became heavily intoxicated, they all fell asleep. That night Sinon went to the Trojan Horse and let Odysseus and his troops out. The troops opened the gates to the city; the rest of the Greek force had returned from their ships and entered the city, sacking and destroying it by fire. The Trojan men were slaughtered, while some of the women and children were taken captive as booty or were sold into slavery.

The sack of Troy by the Greeks was merciless. Temples were desecrated, which garnered additional wrath from the gods of Mount Olympus. King Priam had sought refuge at the altar of Zeus, but Neoptolemus slaughtered him there. Astyanax, Hector's infant son, as well as Priam's grandson and potential heir, was thrown from the city walls. Hecuba, the wife of Priam, was given as part of the spoils to Odysseus, and Andromache, Hector's wife, was given to Neoptolemus. Cassandra, Priam's daughter, was raped by Ajax the Lesser while she was holding on to the altar of Athena; she was later given to Agamemnon. The Trojan Horse had wrought the total destruction of Troy. Nevertheless, some of the Trojans managed to escape, and a few led by Aeneas made their way to Italy, where their descendants later founded the Roman Empire.

### Contemporary Meanings of "Trojan Horse"

"Trojan Horse" is now a term that has several different meanings with respect to lying and deception. In business parlance, a "Trojan Horse" is a deal that appears to be good but in fact is not. It typically consists of an advertised offer, usually of an amount of cash or something else of value, enticing someone to enter into a continuing relationship, such as opening a bank account, cell phone service, or membership in a book club or coffee service; the potential customers are only later informed, typically in fine print, that by accepting the offer, they will automatically be charged service fees in the future.

The term *Trojan Horse* is also used to refer to a computer program that appears to be a legitimate file, but is actually designed to be harmful. The computing Trojan Horse is a nonreplicating

malware program, designed to steal data or to destroy hardware or software, which looks like a harmless application. There are different types of these computer Trojan Horses depending on how they breach the system and the kind of damage they inflict; these include data sending Trojans, denial-of-service attack Trojans, destructive Trojans, FTP Trojans, proxy Trojans, remote access Trojans, and security software disabler Trojans.

Victor B. Stolberg  
Essex County College

**See Also:** Cooperation; Feigned Retreat; History of Deception: Ancient Civilizations; Internet: E-Mail Scams; Military Deception; Mimicry; Myth.

### Further Readings

- Anderson, J. K. "The Trojan Horse Again." *Classical Journal*, v.66/1 (1970).  
 Austin, R. G. "Virgil and the Wooden Horse." *Journal of Roman Studies*, v.49/1-2 (1959).  
 Jones, Julian Ward, Jr. "The Trojan Horse: Timeo Danaos et Dona Ferentis." *Classical Journal*, v.65/6 (1970).  
 Rouman, John C. and Warren H. Held. "More Still on the Trojan Horse." *Classical Journal*, v.67/4 (1972).

## Truth

Truth, in its most general definition, is accordance with reality. That which reflects what is really going on in the world is true; that which does not is false. Truth is the assumed default value of human experience; most people have a general feeling that the information they gain from their senses is what is true. They presume to experience reality and, thus, truth directly. This presumption is largely adaptive. People would not be able to function if they constantly doubted the validity and truth of their experience. Continuous truth judgments about everything one perceives and thinks would cripple one's cognitive capacity and ability to function in society. At the level of individual perception and experience, then, access to truth often is presumed.

Many fundamental institutions in society are structured around the concept of truth. Educational institutions seek to teach it and assume that those who perform well do so without falsehood. Legal systems are designed to discover the truth about crimes and to punish those who deliberately tell lies. Science seeks to discover fundamental truths about the universe, use this information to unravel more truth, and apply these truths practically through technology, medicine, and policy.

Thus, adaptive personal and societal functioning requires knowledge of the truth. But what is truth? This is a far more involved question than it may first seem. The nature of truth has long been a topic of study and debate. Philosophers debate its nature, theologians debate its source, and scientists seek to demonstrate it through study and experimentation. This long history of debate and discovery has led to dozens of theories of truth, each with its own definition of what can be considered truth and what makes it so.

### Philosophical Perspectives on Truth: Inflationary Theories

Inflationary theories are those that state that truth is an actual or substantive property that a statement or proposition possesses. For example, a statement that “the snow is white” can be true or false. Truth (or falsehood) is a property of that statement. Unlike deflationary and epistemic theories, inflationary theories focus on the very nature of truth itself. The three major inflationary theories are correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatist theory.

Correspondence theory states that a proposition is true if it is in correspondence with reality. An assertion that “the snow is white” is only true if it corresponds to the reality that snow is in fact white. The basic form of this theory can be traced as far back as the definitions of truth proposed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* and Plato in *Sophist*. This theoretical definition has been criticized because it requires a concrete and comprehensive understanding of reality in which to check for correspondence, a so-called god’s-eye view. Nevertheless, correspondence theory is the oldest and most generally accepted of the theories of truth, serving essentially as a default definition of truth for most people. The logic underlying correspondence

theory is very similar to the logic guiding modern scientific theory and its pursuit of truth.

Correspondence theory typically involves a distinction between truth-bearers and truth-makers. While the particulars of these two constructs may vary across different incarnations of correspondence theory, there is a general consensus as to their meaning and use. Truth-bearer is a title given to any entity that may have a truth value, either true or false. Possible truth-bearers include sentences, ideas, and propositions. Truth-maker is a title given to any entity that makes a truth-bearer true. Possible truth-makers include facts, events, and states of affairs that correspond with the truth-bearer. For example, the statement “snow is white” is a truth-bearer, the fact that snow is actually white is the truth-maker.

Coherence theory states that truth is a value placed on an entire system of facts and propositions. Individual facts and propositions are given a truth value only to the degree to which they fit into a broader system. That is, truth only exists within a system, not at the level of individual statements or propositions. The statement “the snow is white” is only true if it fits in with (is coherent with) all other facts that are known about color perception and cold weather precipitation.

This approach to defining truth has been criticized, most notably by Bertrand Russell, because both a given statement and its contradiction can be part of two different coherent systems, thus making both true. For example, contradicting beliefs held by different politicians will cohere to their parties’ systems of belief, but because they are contradictory with one another they both cannot be true. Another common criticism is that unproven and sometimes nonsense statements can cohere perfectly within a system, thus making them true without any evidence. For example, a person could state that there is an undetectable alien race that spies on humanity without affecting the Earth in any perceivable way. By its very premise this statement cannot be proven, yet it can be structured into a coherent set of statements and premises with no conflict among them, making the statement true according to coherence theory.

Coherence theory in some form has existed for hundreds of years. Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel were all adherents to



some form of coherence theory. A resurgence of the theory occurred among early-20th-century philosophers, especially within the British Idealist school.

Pragmatist theory states that something is true if it does not conflict with past experiences, is cognitively useful in the world, and/or is the end result of a self-correcting process of inquiry. The statement “The snow is white” is true only if its being true is cognitively useful in the real world, and/or if its belief is the end result of a systematic processes of inquiry and debate (scientific, philosophical, or cultural). Pragmatist theory is a more recent approach to defining truth that was made popular in the early 1900s by William James, Charles Pierce, and John Dewey. Different versions of the pragmatist approach often incorporate and do not contradict aspects of the earlier theories based on correspondence and coherence.

Criticism of the theory, notably Bertrand Russell’s, focuses on pragmatism’s emphasis on the epistemology of truth rather than the nature of truth, confusing signs and indicators of truth for the truth itself. A second criticism states that the pragmatist view of what is cognitively useful can differ depending on the person, culture, and time, making it possible for two contradictory ideas to be true.

There exists an alternate view of pragmatism put forth by William Hocking in the early 20th century, known as negative pragmatism. For a negative pragmatist, that which can be proven using the pragmatism criteria still may be either true or false, but something that is disproven is assuredly false. This basic logic underlies much contemporary thinking about scientific experimentation—hypotheses can never be proven, only disproven.

### Deflationary Theories

While inflationary theories hold that truth is a property that a proposition may have, deflationary theories deny this. That is, these theories deflate the importance of the nature and notion of truth. The common ground among all deflationary theories is that whatever entity proves a proposition true or false does not impart any sort of property to the proposition. Furthermore, the predicates “true” or “is true” are superfluous

linguistic constructs. Examples of deflationary theories include redundancy theory and performative theory.

Redundancy theory is the main deflationary theory and it posits that the concept of truth is superfluous, and that saying a proposition is true adds no new information beyond the proposition itself. For example, saying that “It is true that the snow is white” has the same information as saying “The snow is white.” Redundancy theory was popularized by philosophers and logicians in the 1910s and 1920s, including Frank Ramsey and Gottlob Frege. Critics of the theory point to the use of the predicate “is true” in open sentences such as “everything he says is true.” In such sentences the use of “is true” is not redundant and is necessary for the meaning of the sentence.

The performative theory of truth also holds that there is no separate property of truth in a proposition but that the words *true* or *is true* are not redundant because they are informative about the intentions or beliefs of the speaker. The statement “It is true that the snow is white” reveals that the speaker endorses the idea that the snow is white. Performative theory was conceived in the 1950s by Peter Strawson.

The theory’s critics question the shift in focus away from actually defining truth. Instead, the theory emphasizes a speaker’s beliefs, motivations, or intentions. The criticism is that the idea of true and false is a property of a proposition, and a property of a proposition cannot be an action or intention. Another criticism is that adding “is true” to a statement cannot be used to imply intention in other contexts. For example, the statement “please shut the door is true” is unusual and awkward and distracts from the ability to detect that the speaker endorses shutting the door. The simpler statement, “please shut the door,” is more informative about the speaker’s intention.

### Epistemic Theories

The third major group of theories regarding the nature of truth consists of the epistemic theories. These theories define the concept of truth using epistemic ideas such as belief and knowledge. They differ from inflationary theories in that they are antirealist. The concept of truth is not an innate property of objects independent of human

thought but only exists as a construct of humans in relation with the world. Two major epistemic theories are the verificationist and perspectivist perspectives.

The verification theory's major tenet is that for a proposition to have truth it must be verifiable by peoples' own sensory experiences. Anything that is not verified by experience or that cannot be verified is false. The statement "The snow is white" is verifiable, so the statement has the possibility of being true, and can be verified by observing a snowfall. In the verificationist view the statement "the snow is white on a planet on the other side of the universe" cannot be either true or false because it cannot be verified.

Verificationism has its roots with the original empiricists, such as John Locke, and came into its own during the late 1600s to 1800s with philosophers such as David Hume and Auguste Comte. Criticisms of the theory include its inability to deal with vague terms or terms that can have multiple or shifting definitions. For example, the truth of a statement that a given plant is a tree can be difficult to discern given that the definition of a tree is somewhat vague.

The perspectivist theories are a collection of theories based around a similar tenet: that a proposition can only be true according to a specific perspective. Different theories define different perspectives in which truth can be established. These range from the individual perspective, in which truth is only that which is accepted by the individual, to the consensus perspective, in which what is true is defined by the acceptance of all members of the relevant community. Forms of perspectivism have existed since the early Greek Sophists and have been used in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and the psychological theories of Wilhem Wundt. Critics of this perspective argue that some facts are true no matter what perspective is taken and that their results are nothing more than opinions about truths instead of truths themselves.

### Lay Understanding of Truth

While there has been considerable philosophical debate about the definition of truth (much of it degenerating into pointless semantics), most people know truth when they see it. When given a piece of information people tend to adopt a

correspondence perspective. (Tradition, authority, and consensus also are important sources of presumed truth among laypersons.) If the information matches reality, then it must be true. An explicit truth judgment does not have to be made; it follows automatically from experience. This automatic process only holds when people have prior knowledge of reality, which is occasionally not the case. In situations of ambiguity, when people are not sure of reality, or novelty, when people have no prior experience, explicit judgments of truth are more common. People may use a coherence approach if the information can be smoothly integrated with older information, or a consensus perspectivist approach if the group they belong to has an accepted answer to the truth judgment. The adoption of these alternate truth-seeking approaches, coherence and perspectivist, is driven by a cognitive mechanism known as processing fluency.

Processing fluency is defined as how easily and quickly information is cognitively processed once it is detected by people's senses and how quickly it can be retrieved from memory. Information that has greater processing fluency is judged to be more powerful and more truthful than information with lower processing fluency. When individuals use the correspondence approach, the processing fluency is irrelevant, because no judgment regarding new information has to be made if people have the information already stored. With ambiguous or novel information, processing fluency plays a large role in how much individuals assign truth to the information. Information that easily fits with prior held beliefs or easily fits into mental frameworks, such as with a coherence approach, is processed more fluently and is considered more true than is information that conflicts with prior knowledge. Information that is considered true by members of a group to which individuals belong, such as with the consensus perspectivist approach, is also processed more fluidly than information that is believed by a group to which individuals do not belong.

The source of the information can also have an effect on processing fluency. Sources that are considered credible require less judgment themselves, and the information is processed more fluently. Information that is obtained from an in-context

source also speeds up processing (for example, obtaining historical information from a history book rather than from a cartoon).

How the information is presented also affects truth judgments. Information given in concrete language is more easily processed than information in vague or abstract language. Simple repetition leads to what is known as the truth effect: the more times individuals hear a piece of information, the more they believe it to be true because the processing becomes more and more fluent with each repetition. This effect can be strong enough to override nonrepeated information from credible sources or that goes against group-held beliefs.

Finally, the judge's mood can also affect a truth judgment. Being in a bad mood signals the brain that something is wrong and that extra processing power should be devoted to the external world and incoming information. This extra focus on the external reduces reliance on internal information factors, such as processing fluency, and can negate its effects on judgment.

### Conclusion

While contemplating the definition of truth may fall primarily within the purview of philosophers, the application and belief in the concept is vitally important to every person individually and to the functioning of society at large. Many societal institutions, such as those focusing on educational, legal, and scientific pursuits, take it for granted that truth is discoverable. These institutions are predicated on the belief that truth can be revealed. On the level of the individual, truth is just as important to a normal and functional life. Without assuming some inherent truths, people's cognitive resources would be overwhelmed with constant truth judgments. Nevertheless, the idea of truth is so central to human experience (and, yet, so enigmatic) that it has been debated for millennia. Although there are many conflicting theories about the nature and definition of truth, none of the adherents of these theories can deny that the idea of truth is integral to the human condition. Truth is out there. But where?

Joseph R. Castro  
Richard H. Gramzow  
Syracuse University

**See Also:** Aristotle; Half-Truths; Honesty; Kant, Immanuel; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Plato; Source Credibility; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Cox, D. "Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth." *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, v.34 (2001).
- Dechene, A., C. Stahl, J. Hansen, and M. Wanke. "The Truth About the Truth: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Truth Effect." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.14 (2010).
- Dunwoody, P. T. "Theories of Truth as Assessment Criteria in Judgment and Decision Making." *Judgment and Decision Making*, v.4 (2009).
- Haig, D. H. and D. Borsboom. "Truth, Science and Psychology." *Theory & Psychology*, v.22/3 (2012).
- Lindstrom, S. "Horwich's Minimalist Conception of Truth: Some Logical Difficulties." *Logic and Logical Philosophy*, v.9 (2001).

## Truth Bias

Researchers have consistently found that people are poor at detecting deception. One reason for this poor performance is the reliance on heuristics or simple decision rules when processing social interactions. Heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb based on experiences that often result in a quick and satisfactory outcome with minimal cognitive effort. One of these heuristics is the truth bias. The truth bias is the presumption of truth in interpersonal interactions and the tendency to judge an interpersonal message as truthful rather than deceptive, irrespective of the actual truth of the message. Communicators are initially assumed to be truthful, and this assumption is possibly revised only if something in the situation evokes suspicion. The truth bias is important for maintaining relationships and increasing intimacy because accusations of deception are damaging to relationships.

The truth bias is robust and widely documented by research involving people interacting with both friends and strangers. Although researchers have consistently found a strong truth bias in laboratory experiments, they have argued that the truth bias is probably even stronger in

naturally occurring settings because simply asking people to make judgments about deception in a lab context may arouse suspicion and lower a person's natural truth bias. The truth bias also is stronger during face-to-face communication, when people are interacting with friends rather than strangers, and when people do not know that the experimental task involves detection of deception.

Cognitive heuristics like the truth bias are learned through experience or conventional beliefs. Relying on heuristics reduces cognitive effort and simplifies decision making; while heuristics can often lead to a correct decision or judgment, they can result in biases and faulty judgment. In the case of the truth bias, the large majority of naturally occurring interpersonal interactions are truthful, so reliance on the truth bias generally results in accurate judgment with minimal need to assess the interaction for deception.

### Research on Truth Bias

Research has consistently found most people's level of lies in everyday interaction is very small (one to two lies daily), so heuristic use of a truth bias should result in high accuracy in determining truth of interactions with little cognitive effort. However, reliance on the truth bias results in faulty judgment when one accepts deception as truth without appraisal and analysis, and the use of the truth bias results in low accuracy in experiments in which only half the interactions are truthful.

The truth bias has often been measured in experimental designs in which the receiver of messages judges messages that are created with a 50/50 probability base rate of truths and lies. In this context, the truth bias is the tendency to judge over half the interactions as truths, and some researchers have argued that any tendency to judge over half the interactions as truth is a truth bias. However, others have suggested that truth bias depends on base rate. Therefore, if actual truths within a sample occur at a rate of 80 percent, then the truth bias would be any tendency to judge over 80 percent of interactions as truthful.

This issue of the base rate of truths has implications for how the truth bias contributes to the veracity effect. Truthfulness of the message

predicts accuracy because people are more likely to judge a message as truthful. Because of the truth bias, truthfulness of the message is the best predictor of accuracy in detecting truths and lies. In research, people consistently are more accurate at judging truths than lies. Therefore, changes in the base rate of truths can change detection accuracy, and as the base rate of truths increase, so does accuracy in overall detection. For example, research with the 50/50 base rate of lies and truths has consistently found that people are accurate at detecting truths and lies at a rate of around 56 percent. However, increasing the base rate of truths to 75 percent increases accuracy to 60 percent. Conversely, reducing the base rate of truths reduces accuracy. With a 25 percent base rate of truths, accuracy declines to 40 percent.

Arousal of suspicion by telling people of the possibility of deception can lower the truth bias. Further, some researchers have documented that certain professions (police officers or interrogation professionals) or populations (the incarcerated) may actually have a lie bias and expect that people are lying to them. Others have speculated that certain situations (for example, Internet requests from strangers for money) may lower the truth bias. If a receiver perceives that a sender has a strong motive or monetary incentive to deceive, then the truth bias is decreased.

### Two Mental Systems

Research on the truth bias fits into the conceptualization of the mind being driven by two mental systems: System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates spontaneously and quickly with little or no effort or control; System 2 is effortful and systematic mental activity. System 1 accepts information and suggestions presented to it; it is biased toward belief and is gullible. This is based on Baruch Spinoza's theory of belief. People initially have to believe a statement before they can decide to doubt it, and belief is often spontaneous.

While System 1 effortlessly and involuntarily accepts information as true, System 2 must "unbelieve" the information through a conscious and effortful process of doubt and suspicion. Because System 2 is effortful and requires conscious attention and concentration, it cannot operate well when a person is distracted, tired, or has depleted his or her stores of mental energy. For example,



researchers have found that people are more likely to believe dubious persuasive messages when they are tired or accept false statements as true when distracted with another task.

Research on System 1 suggests that the truth bias is a spontaneous process and outside people's conscious control. Efforts to curb the truth bias require System 2 processing, but researchers have consistently found that people are cognitive misers and prefer to engage in less effortful processing. Therefore, the truth bias has a robust and powerful effect on people's perception of information and social interactions.

Lyn M. Van Swol  
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**See Also:** Aroused Suspicion; Bond, Charley; Cheating; Cognitive Heuristics; Courtship, Deception in; Deception Detection Accuracy; Generalized Communicative Suspicion; Infidelity; Lie Bias;

McCornack-Parks Model; Park-Levine Probability Model; Veracity Effect.

### Further Readings

Burgoon, J. K., J. P. Blair, and R. E. Strom. "Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception." *Human Communication Research*, v.34 (2008).

Kahneman, D. *Thinking Fast and Slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011.

Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).

McCornack, S. A. and T. R. Levine. "When Lovers Become Leery: The Relationship Between Suspicion and Accuracy in Detecting Deception." *Communication Monographs*, v.57 (1990).

Millar, M. G. and K. U. Millar. "The Effects of Cognitive Capacity and Suspicion on Truth Bias." *Communication Research*, v.24 (1997).

# U

## UFOs

Unidentified flying objects (UFOs) are mysterious objects seen in the sky, usually at night. Those who claim to have observed UFOs have said that they were seen landing, hovering near the ground, or flying away into the sky. In addition to reports of visual observations, UFOs have been photographed or recorded on radar.

In the 1940s and 1950s, UFOs were often referred to as “flying saucers” because to some people they seemed to be shaped like a saucer or a disk. The term *UFO* was created by the U.S. Air Force in 1953 because UFOs were also observed in other shapes. In addition, UFOs were observed as aerodynamic vehicles engaging in flight dynamics that were unlike those of known aircrafts or missiles.

UFO studies by the United States have included the Robertson Panel, Project Blue Book (previously Project Sign and Project Grudge), and Project Twinkle. The Robertson Panel (1953) was a scientific investigation that was conducted in response to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) review of the U.S. Air Force’s Project Blue Book.

The U.S. Air Force conducted a series of investigations in the 1940s and 1950s that were compiled as Project Blue Book from earlier investigations. These were Project Sign (official investigation of UFOs ca. 1948) and Project Grudge, conducted

mostly in 1949. After investigating thousands of UFO reports, the results were published in the Condon Report in 1969. Project Blue Book ended in January 1970 because the U.S. Air Force concluded that nothing substantial could be found to support claims that UFOs were anything other than visual anomalies.

In addition to investigations conducted by the United States, other countries have sought to explain UFOs. The countries that have investigated UFOs include: Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, West Germany, and the former Soviet Union. The Swedes conducted an investigation of “ghost rockets” between 1946 and 1947. Canadians researched UFOs in Project Magnet between 1952 and 1953, but the project has never been made public. The Brazilian Air Force conducted Operation Saucer in 1977. The French government has had an ongoing program since 1977, and Uruguay opened an ongoing search for UFOs in 1989.

### Private Investigations

Private individuals and groups, dissatisfied with government investigations, have also conducted investigations. One significant individual was Josef Allen Hynek (1910–86). Born to Czech parents in Chicago, he earned a doctorate in astrophysics. He taught physics and astronomy at Ohio

State University. He was recruited by the U.S. Air Force to help with the Blue Book Project and two other projects. Eventually, he became extremely dissatisfied with the manner of UFO research by both the government and the scientific community. As an alternative to the government's investigations, he founded the Center for UFO Studies. Under its auspices, he worked on UFO research for the remainder of his professional life. He at times complained of the mythology, cultism, and conspiracy theories that were often associated with UFO research.

Science fiction has been a popular genre in the post-World War II era. It has often been associated

with conspiracy theories that the government is hiding the truth about UFOs as the vehicles of extraterrestrial aliens.


In 1978, Hynek, along with Drs. Jacques Vallee and Claude Poher, gave a speech at the United Nations (UN) in which they sought to have the UN create a central UFO authority. The speech followed a showing of the very popular Steven Spielberg 1977 movie *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*, in which he had a brief nonspeaking part. The term *close encounters* was taken from Hynek's first book, in which he developed a scale for cataloguing UFO reports.

Other private UFO research organizations in the United States include the Mutual UFO Network, National UFO Reporting Center (NUFORC), Fund for UFO Research (FUFOR), and International UFO Congress. Hynek referred to the rise of an "invisible college" of UFO researchers. One such group is the Aerial Phenomena Enquiry Network (APEN). Its members are unknown to one another. They engage in regular research but keep their contacts with each other via letters or mailed tape recordings. Their contact information is never revealed.

Because it is the duty of the U.S. Air Force to protect the United States, UFOs are investigated. Most have an explanation. The cause or nature of some UFO sightings has never been fully explained. Cold War tensions made investigation important because of their security potentials. Both military and civilian studies of UFOs have sought explanations. Between 1952 and January 1970, the USAF systematically studied UFO sightings. It concluded that most could be explained as misinterpretation of weather phenomena, the results of mild forms of mass hysteria, publicity-seeking hoaxes perpetrated by persons either known or unknown, reports by people with psychological problems, or stemming from conventional objects such as a jetliner that reflected light in an unexpected manner.

### Conspiracy Theories

A variety of conclusions have been reached about UFOs. Some studies have concluded that UFOs do not pose a security threat and are not of scientific interest. Other studies reached different conclusions. The studies that have concluded that UFOs lack scientific interest or military



Unidentified flying object (UFO) shapes are catalogued in this 1969 UFO Sightings Chart from the Royal Air Force. Numerous countries have sought to explain UFO phenomena, most of which have a natural explanation.

significance reached this conclusion after extensively investigating eyewitness claims of sightings, photographs, and other information. The studies concluded that UFOs were not creditable as proof of extraterrestrial beings. However, others have seen UFOs as unsolved scientific mysteries that deserve further study.

Because UFOs have not been explained in a manner that removes all doubt that they are not vehicles from outer space, many people have concluded that the government, the United States in particular, is lying about UFOs. Many believe that their government is engaged in a conspiracy to hide the truth.

Feeding the conspiracy theories are claims that the government is hiding something. All evidence contradicting the conspiracy theory is interpreted as part of the government's denial—a denial that is really a lie on the part of some segment of the government. Supporting claims of a government cover-up are documents withheld on grounds of national security for decades until officials are forced to reveal them by the federal courts in Freedom of Information Act lawsuits. Even then, the documents were usually censored.

The released documents were censored to protect alleged sources and methods that cannot be revealed by law. However, instead of using a black marker to blot out the information, a white pen was used. When displayed on television (old black-and-white or modern color), the white censoring does not show up very well. Using the whiteout marker just fuels the suspicions of conspiracy theorists. In addition, the suspicion that the government is lying is also fueled by the question that if there are no UFOs, then why file reports of UFOs under UFOs?

UFO reports are also made by non-American pilots. Other reports of UFOs have been made by people in many foreign countries. Around the world, people who have spotted UFOs have often come to the same suspicion of their government—it is lying about UFOs and is therefore engaged in a UFO conspiracy.

Supporting the UFO conspiracy theorists are allegations by people in the U.S. space programs. Edgar Mitchell, the sixth man to walk on the moon, is reported to have issued a call for the federal government to end the silence on the existence of UFOs. Besides his astronaut accomplishments,

he holds a doctorate in aeronautics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Other people who have been reported to have made statements that support the claimed existence of UFOs are from the intelligence agencies and civilian and military security organizations.

Roswell, New Mexico, was the site of an alleged flying saucer crash in 1947. Newspapers carried the story. However, conspiracy theorists believe that a government cover-up operation was almost immediately deployed to hide the truth. The military claimed that the event involved weather balloons, but others believe that the extraterrestrials were hidden from the public by means of government lies because it has a secret agenda.

Another event occurred when an object alleged to have been a UFO-shaped object was found in the Baltic Sea. Reports claim that it was found at the end of a 1,000-foot runway. Another UFO event brought charges that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) lied in 2012, at a panel in Las Vegas composed of Charles Halt, a former U.S. Air Force Colonel, two other officers who were part of the Blue Book investigations, and a former investigator for the British Ministry of Defense. The panel, *Military UFOs: Secrets Revealed*, drew a crowd that heard Colonel Halt accuse the federal government of a UFO cover-up in which the federal government is hiding extraterrestrial visits by alien creatures.

Charges that governments around the world are hiding the truth about UFOs have been around since the beginning of UFO investigations. Aiding the suspicions and conspiracy theories are mass observations of UFO phenomena, such as a 1989 sighting in Belgium. That the government had nothing concrete to report about the sighting has led some to conclude that the denial of any definitive finding by the government is a lie or a cover-up. In the Cold War era, the tension between the West and communist governments was held up as the reason for the failure of governments to be forthcoming. However, since the end of communism as a dominant force, efforts to force government UFO secrets into the public light have not yet yielded proof of the existence of UFOs and extraterrestrial life.

Many conspiracy theorists believe that governments have been inept in their scientific investigations. Some UFO believers also claim that the



government is lying because it is afraid that if the public learns the truth about the existence of UFOs, there would be mass panic.

Andrew J. Waskey  
*Dalton State College*

**See Also:** Conspiracies; Department of Defense, U.S.; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Military Deception; Photographs, Altered; Urban Legends; *War of the Worlds*.

### Further Readings

- Bekkum, Gary S. *Spies, Lies, and Polygraph Tape: Knowing the Future: The UFO Spy Games*. Seattle: Amazon, 2010.
- Lobanoid, Cyrus. *The Lie in the Sky?* Seattle: Amazon, 2012.
- Meyer, Bonnie. *Unholy Alliance: A Global Deception*. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2007.
- Nally, Carl and Dermot Butler. *States of Denial: The Tuskar Rock Incident and Other Mysteries*. Cork, Ireland: Mercier Press, 2013.
- Weor, Samael Aun. *Cosmic Ships: Truth and Lies About UFOs, Other Humanities, and Our Future*. Brooklyn, NY: Glorian Publishing, 2010.

---

## Urban Legends

Urban legends may be deceptive but they are not lies. This odd claim results from the fact that those who transmit urban legends do so in the belief that they are telling the truth—usually to a friend. So if a lie is “an intentionally false statement,” then urban legends are not lies. On the other hand, urban legends may be deceptive because they assert that some event happened when, in the case of most legends, it did not. Some small percentage of urban legends recounts events that actually did happen at one time and place. What really happened once in one place becomes an urban legend when presented as happening at many times and locations. In that way urban legends do deceive; they promote a false picture of reality.

Not all deceptions presented in urban legends are harmful; some stories offer good advice, even if from false premises. For example, “The Kidney

Thieves Legend” tells of a young man who goes clubbing and ends up going home with a woman he met. In the morning, he wakes up in a bathtub packed in ice with a fresh incision in his side and a note advising, “CALL 911 OR YOU WILL DIE.” In this tale, one of his kidneys was removed for sale on the black market. While the story is not true, it does offer useful advice discouraging random sexual encounters.

Modern society uses the phrase “urban legend” often and quite loosely. The term originates from the field of anthropology with the work of folklorist Jan Harold Brunvand of the University of Utah. Brunvand’s popular books on urban legends, beginning with *The Vanishing Hitchhiker* (1981), brought the topic into public consciousness. More books, movies, and songs followed and further popularized these ideas. The rise of the Internet and Web sites such as Snopes.com and About.Com has made the subject of urban legends nearly ubiquitous.

It is important to recognize that the process of circulating and believing urban legends is entirely divorced from the public’s fascination with the topic. When people refer to a story as an “urban legend,” they have made it an object of study but not of belief. When people hear of a legend, they often say, “How could anyone believe that?” because in hindsight they think they would not fall for it. People often feel superior, but the fact is that there are other urban legends they do believe in; they just do not label them “urban legends” but rather see them as safety tips, words to the wise, and other guidelines.

### Definition of Urban Legends

What are urban legends? They are examples of folklore usually conveyed orally. Legends are memorable, repeatable, and appropriate in some common social settings. The content of an urban legend is believable, features actions of regular people, and takes place in the recent past. The sender and receiver of a legend usually come from the same locale and generation. The legend’s action that is recounted happened “around here” but to a friend of a friend, an unnamed, near-acquaintance folklorists call FOAF.

Legends are composed of central elements and peripheral details. The core of the story does not change; it contains the emotional power of the

legend. Around this core are details which may be adapted frequently to suit the story to the immediate locale. For example, in three classic urban legends—"Kentucky Fried Rat," "The Procter & Gamble Trademark," and "The Slasher Under the Car"—the core elements include a fast-food franchise and a rat, a demonic cult and a TV talk show, and a shopping mall and undercar slashers, respectively. Legends are localized and modified in the retelling, so the particular restaurant franchise, television talk show, or mall may change to present a locally significant landmark or popular talk show without changing the power or effect of the legend. Folklorist Brunvand recaps the appeal of urban legends: "Legends survive by being as lively and 'factual' as the television evening news, and, like the daily news broadcasts, they tend to concern deaths, injuries, kidnappings, tragedies, and scandals."

A common and perplexing question is: Where do urban legends come from? For all of the detailed folklore investigations, there are only conjectural answers. Folklorists specialize in tracing stories back through a chain of tellers in an attempt to find ground zero—the point of origin for a particular narrative. Rarely do they succeed; they usually find that the origins of the tale vanish in the mists as the researcher pursues, but never finds, the FOAF. The best theory about the origins of urban legends suggests that people may overhear and misunderstand someone who is speaking hypothetically: "What would happen if people tried to steal organs for the black market? How do you think they'd do it?" Then the overhearer recounts those conjectures as fact, and the story is out in circulation.

Not all stories that are picked up through urban-legend processes endure. Individuals know about a great many that become popular and circulate far and wide. There is no way of estimating how many less compelling stories are put into circulation only to sink because of popular indifference. This result is usually the fate of urban legends that someone tries to fabricate to prove a political point or harm a commercial rival.

### The Power of Urban Legends

The legends that attain the height of popularity have a narrative power that their unsuccessful cousins lack. Narrative theory points out

that individuals believe stories that have two qualities: they make sense internally, that is, they hang together as stories, and they make sense in people's world, that is, people can imagine them happening. Urban legends that capture the public imagination satisfy both of these tests. This fact means that analysts can track the public mood in a community by attending to which urban legends are circulating. Some legends highlight tensions in race relations, others reflect economic uncertainties; the point is that popular legends present a snapshot of the community's unconscious.

Insights from folklorists can help religious, government, and law enforcement figures understand the worries coursing through the community. Most stories in the legends are not factual, but telling these stories to their friends allows members of the community to give voice to their fears without having to admit to them. In this way, circulating these narratives through their social networks becomes a therapeutic process.

The fundamental power of urban legends is in their utter believability. The tales are told and retold as true with never a discouraging word. This persistent popularity is due to the fact that these are good stories; they have rising and falling action, they accurately depict the human condition, and there is an outcome which reinforces a moral value. If these events did not actually happen, one can say that they might have happened and, in some cases, even that they should have happened.

The function of urban legends is significant even though they are not literally true; legends are used by individuals and groups to explain their world to each other and to create social solidarity. The action of sharing an urban legend creates a larger, social form of truth which transcends the particular facts of the narrative—creating a practical moral for the story—and providing a social reward for telling the story. The social truth and the reward combine to explain why and how this phenomenon endures.

Legends tell people who the good and bad people are and what they did to earn those designations. The three urban legends mentioned at the outset have bad portents: tainted food, demonic influence, and felonious assault. However, there are many legends with a more positive spin: "The Obligatory Wait" (tolerance for tardy professors);

“The Mexican Pet,” (careful attention to imported goods); and, “Curses! Broiled Again!” (safe use of tanning beds).

Urban legends are popular because the story is compelling and delivers a subtle but useful message, and in this process no one actually suffers the injuries described in the story. Even the three initial stories offer useful moral guidance: “Kentucky Fried Rat” (people should pay more attention to who prepares their food and how); “The Procter & Gamble Trademark” (individuals need a way to understand the existence of evil in the world, and/or, beware of the actions of giant corporations); and “The Slasher Under the Car” (pay attention to the surroundings in public places, especially during the holiday season).

### Urban Legends in Film

Although urban legends move primarily through face-to-face encounters, the frequency with which they occur as elements in popular films is noteworthy. This phenomenon seems to reinforce the narrative power of the legend. The story is so good that it wants to be told. For example, in the film *The First Wives Club*, the urban legend known as “The Philanderer’s Porsche” is replayed. In the legend and the film a husband is leaving a wife of long-standing for a younger woman (his nurse, his secretary); he tells the wife to sell the car and forward the money. In the urban legend an advertisement offers to sell an “almost new” Porsche for \$50. An eager sports car buff answers the ad, inspects the car, and pays the \$50. He then begs to know the facts that produced this incredible bargain. That is when the “and send me the money” punch line is sprung.

In the film version, the car is a Lamborghini, the price is \$1, and the shunned wife keeps 50¢ as her part of the sale. She recounts the sale to her husband in person as she hands him two quarters as half of the proceeds. He is in anguished disbelief; she tells him that she feels his loss and hands him her two quarters to ease the pain. The tasty blend of justice and revenge that is the hallmark of several urban legends is clearly presented in this case.

The vacation film series from *National Lampoon* has made frequent use of urban legends, for example, *The Runaway Grandmother*, in which a grandmother dies on a trip and no one in the

family knows what to do, so they tie her body to the roof of the car. Then the car is stolen. In fact, a film—otherwise unremarkable—has been made on the premise that the main character is a sociologist investigating urban legends and stumbles into a world of evil beyond her grasp. The title for this shaky premise is *Candyman*. In summary, there is a mix of personal and mediated modes of distribution for urban legends.

### Subjects of Urban Legends

Urban legends touch upon many topics. In addition to business and industry, Brunvand’s categories include “classic automobile legends,” “dalliance, nudity, and nightmares,” “the hook and other teenage horrors,” “academic legends,” “sex and scandal,” “contaminations,” and “other legends of accidents and mishaps.” Legends that are directed at corporations are tales such as “The Red Velvet Cake” and its cookie recipe variations; their payoff is revenge against overbearing institutions. “The Procter & Gamble Trademark” legend with all of its devilish implications suggests that at least one corporation is in league with the devil. In “The Economical Car” listeners learn that an experimental, highly fuel-efficient car has gotten away from the factory by mistake. The manufacturer gets its unwitting owner to allow a switch so that the car’s revolutionary secrets are once again hidden by the automobile and petroleum industries.

The oldest urban legend in the United States is “Petition to Ban Religious Broadcasting.” The legend continues to stimulate public concern today. The premise is that the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has received a petition (Number 2493) that proposes to ban religious programming on television. The rumor has its roots in rumors about atheists, especially Madalyn Murray O’Hair, and generated 30 million letters of concern from 1975 to 1995.

Regarded as the second-oldest urban legend in the United States, “The Procter & Gamble Trademark” legend has enjoyed wide circulation. The story is that the chief executive officer (CEO) of Procter & Gamble (P&G) announced on a television talk show that his firm was giving a portion of its proceeds to Satan. The salient line from the CEO, repeated in the legend’s retelling, is: “There aren’t enough committed Christians now to make



Artist Tom Otterness created a tribute to the New York “alligator in the sewer” urban legend in his “Life Underground” sculptures, which are scattered throughout the subway platforms at 8th Avenue and 14th Street in New York City. In 1935, as legend has it, an alligator crawled out of a manhole in Harlem and was promptly beaten to death. Inflated by Robert Daley’s 1959 book *The World Beneath the City*, the story grew into a scientifically implausible legend about alligators swarming through New York’s sewer system.

any difference so I can tell you . . .” P&G has fought this legend for decades through public information efforts and even in court actions. Circulation through the Internet means that people read this legend for the first time every day, despite P&G’s efforts to eradicate it.

What follows is a current inventory of eight very popular urban legends; as would be expected, this listing will change over time, but these are all classics of popular culture. “The Kidney Heist,” explained above, is the most popular of current urban legends. The premise of the “Automatic 4.0 Legend” is the answer to the question: What happens to someone in college if their roommate dies? The fictional answer is that the bereavement policy of the college dictates that the student with the dead roommate receives a 4.0 grade point average, that is,

straight As. In some versions the policy applies to suicide, in others to any sort of death.

“Mr. Rogers was a Navy Seal” is a legend that feeds on the juxtaposition between the friendly figure of the Public Broadcasting System children’s show and the fierce commando. Supposedly, Mr. Rogers served in Vietnam as a sniper. Some versions of this baseless tale suggest that he wore tennis shoes on the TV program to hide tattoos from his service years.

A classic of the genre is the “Bloody Mary” urban legend. In this tale, the name is repeated three (or 13) times in a darkened room in order to conjure the ghost of a witch to appear in a wall mirror. The “JFK/Jelly Doughnut” legend asserts that the former president John F. Kennedy declared himself to be a pastry while addressing the citizens of Berlin in 1963. In fact, JFK said, “Ich bin ein



Berliner,” which translates to “I am a citizen of Berlin.” The noun “Berliner” is close to the name of a favorite local pastry, but the president was not laughed off the stage as the legend has it; in fact, Berliners understood and embraced his message.

Another popular subject of urban legends is the soft drink Coca-Cola. Stories about this beverage are known collectively as “Cokelore.” Perhaps the most famous legend in this genre regards the children’s candy Pop Rocks. The legend held that eating the candy and then drinking the carbonated beverage would cause damage to a child’s stomach.

The “Good Samaritan” urban legend has been applied to many celebrities. In essence, it tells of a person stopping to help another change a tire under difficult circumstances. The person helped asks for the Samaritan’s address in order to send a thank you note. What arrives instead of a note is a color television, a \$10,000 check, or the payoff on the Samaritan’s mortgage; it turns out that the person helped was a celebrity such as Bill Gates, Nat King Cole, or Donald Trump.

The “Alligators in the Sewers” urban legend tells of these predators lurking in the New York City sewers. They got there after being flushed from homes and apartments of individuals who bought small alligators on trips to Florida. As they grow, they become a problem, so people use

the handiest means available to rid themselves of the animals: They let the alligators live in city sewers, becoming more daunting as they grow.

John T. Llewellyn  
Wake Forest University

**See Also:** Anthropology, Cultural; Audience; Beatles Hoax; Communication; Conspiracies; Fairy Tales; Gossip; Historical Narratives, False; Movies, Lying in; Myth; Public Relations; Rumor; Tall Tales; UFOs; *War of the Worlds*.

### Further Readings

- Bennett, Gillian and Paul Smith, eds. *Urban Legends: A Collection of International Tall Tales and Terrors*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007.
- De Vos, Gail. *What Happens Next? Contemporary Urban Legends and Popular Culture*. Santa Barbara, CA: Libraries Unlimited, 2012.
- Dégh, Linda. *Legend and Belief: Dialectics of a Folklore Genre*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Jack, Albert. *Phantom Hitchhikers and Other Urban Legends: The Strange Stories Behind Tall Tales*. New York: Perigee, 2013.
- Roeper, Richard. *Debunked! Conspiracy Theories, Urban Legends, and Evil Plots of the 21st Century*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2008.

# V

## Veracity Effect

The Veracity Effect refers to the observation made by Timothy R. Levine, Hee Sun Park, and Steven McCornack that deception detection accuracy depends on the veracity, that is, the honesty, of the message being evaluated. Research shows that when deception detection accuracy is scored separately for truths and lies, people tend to get truths correct more often than lies. That is, people are probabilistically more likely to be correct in presuming honesty than they are in correctly identifying a lie as a lie. As a consequence, the honesty or dishonesty of a message affects the likelihood of the correctness of a perception of honesty.

The veracity effect results from truth bias, which is the tendency to believe someone more often than not regardless of whether or not a person is actually honest. Truth bias is a very typical finding in deception detection research. Because people tend to believe others, when others are honest people tend to be correct in presuming honesty. Lies, however, are more often mistaken for the truth. This creates the veracity effect.

A coin-flipping analogy helps explain the veracity effect. If someone trying to guess the outcome of a sequence of coin flips guesses heads more often than he or she guesses tails, they are more likely to be right on those occasions when heads is obtained. When tails comes up, however, they

tend to guess incorrectly. In this analogy, heads is like judging honest messages and tails is like judging lies. Because of probability and chance, truth-biased people are more likely to be right about truths than lies.

### Implications of the Veracity Effect

The veracity effect is very well documented in experimental research on deception detection. In meta-analysis, people are truth biased in more than 70 percent of research studies, and on average, 57 percent of all messages are believed in deception detection experiments. Deception detection accuracy averages 54 percent in terms of correct truth-lie discrimination, but accuracy for truths averages 61 percent compared with 47 percent for lies across prior studies. The veracity effect is the label for this typical difference in truth and lie accuracy.

A primary implication of the veracity effect is that because people are statistically better than 50/50 chance at truth-lie discrimination (54 percent overall), this does not mean that they are above 50 percent at detecting lies per se. Truth-lie discrimination is an average across truths and lies. The 61 percent for truths and 47 percent for lies, when averaged, yields 54 percent ( $61 + 47 = 108$ ;  $108 \div 2 = 54$ ). This makes average truth-lie discrimination potentially misleading. Consequently, following the discovery of the veracity effect,

many researchers report accuracy for truths and lies separately in addition to reporting average accuracy.

A second important implication of the veracity effect is that the truth-lie base rate matters. The truth-lie base rate refers to the proportion of truths and lies judged in a deception detection task. Most deception detection research uses an equal number of truths and lies. Such research yields the 54 percent accuracy result mentioned previously. However, because accuracy is typically higher for truths than lies, the greater the proportion of truths judged, the higher the accuracy. Conversely, as the number of lies exceeds the number of truths, accuracy decreases.

The effects of truth-lie base rates on accuracy can be predicted with the Park-Levine Probability Model. The model, which rests on the veracity effect, predicts a linear relationship between deception detection accuracy and the truth-lie base rate. As long as people are truth biased, the greater the proportion of messages that are honest, the higher the accuracy. Further, the more truth biased people are, the larger the base rate matters.

A third implication of the veracity effect is that variables in deception detection research that affect truth bias affect truth and lie accuracy but do not necessarily impact overall accuracy. A variable that increases skepticism and lowers truth bias will tend to reduce accuracy for truths and increase accuracy for lies. However, the increase in lie accuracy and the decrease in truth accuracy typically cancel out when overall accuracy is calculated. Thus, one type of error is traded for another. Consistent with this, meta-analysis reports that truth bias and correct truth-lie classifications (that is, overall accuracy) are not correlated.

For example, suspicion tends to reduce truth bias. When people are suspicious, they are less likely to believe others. Suspicious people are less likely to fall for lies, but they also are more likely to mistake honest messages for lies. The net result is that suspicion has little impact on overall accuracy.

A final implication of the veracity effect is that deception detection may underestimate overall accuracy. The base rate in most deception detection experiments is 50/50 truths and lies. But

outside research settings, truthful messages tend to be more prevalent than lies. If this is the case, then because people are typically truth biased, they may be more accurate than the 54 percent research average suggests.

Timothy R. Levine  
Korea University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; McCornack, Steven; Meta-Analysis; Park, Hee Sun; Park-Levine Probability Model; Truth Bias.


### Further Readings

- Bond, C. F. Jr. and B. M. DePaulo. "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, v.10 (2006).
- Kim, R. K. and T. R. Levine. "The Effect of Suspicion on Deception Detection Accuracy: Optimal Level or Opposing Effects?" *Communication Reports*, v.24 (2011).
- Levine, T. R., R. K. Kim, H. S. Park, and M. Hughes. "Deception Detection Accuracy Is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine's Probability Model." *Communication Monographs*, v.73 (2006).
- Levine, T. R., H. S. Park, and S. A. McCornack. "Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the 'Veracity Effect.'" *Communication Monographs*, v.66 (1999).
- Michaelian, K. "In Defense of Gullibility: The Epistemology of Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection." *Synthese*, v.176 (2009).
- Park, H. S. and T. R. Levine. "A Probability Model of Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments." *Communication Monographs*, v.68 (2001).

---

## Vietnam War

Many Americans will argue that the Vietnam War presents a classic example of lying and deception, in which citizens were told lies about the cause of the war, the occurrences during the war, and how the war concluded. During the war itself, military officials made clear, strategic choices that capitalized on the ability of American leaders to



*A South Vietnamese soldier beats a farmer with the end of a dagger for allegedly supplying government troops with inaccurate information about the movement of Viet Cong guerrillas in a village west of Saigon, Vietnam, January 9, 1964. The Vietnam war was rife with lies and deception from its inception to the atrocities committed to its conclusion.*

manipulate the truth in order to garner strategic advantages as they waged combat in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia between 1955 and 1975. It was fought between North Vietnam (who was supported by a series of communist allies) and South Vietnam (backed mainly by the United States and other anti-communist nations around the world). Most of the fighting occurred between the Viet Cong (a communist group located within South Vietnam) and the United States.

Given the lack of arms available to the Viet Cong, they typically participated in guerrilla tactics. The United States, on the other hand, depended on air superiority and firepower to wage its side of the war. The United States became involved as part of its larger containment strategy, aimed at limiting the spread of communism; the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, saw the war as a colonial conflict against France. By 1968, American involvement had peaked, and troop levels steadily decreased until August 1973, when U.S. military involvement came to an official end. The number of casualties across all sides is estimated to be between 1 million and 3.7 million.

### **American Deception During the War**

The Magic Eye was part of perhaps the strangest deception campaign during the Vietnam War. The Magic Eye was developed in 1967 and served as a device to help in detecting the presence of Viet Cong. Rudimentarily designed, it consisted of two boxes with an impressive number of lights, horns, antennae, dials, and gauges. Citizens were told that the device could tell who was a member of the Viet Cong and that anyone who confessed would be treated well. When someone who was known to be a member of the Viet Cong walked between the boxes, an American soldier would flip a switch and set off the horn and lights. While the Magic Eye did not work particularly well (or for very long), it did lead to some unknown Viet Cong members admitting to their allegiances when confronted with the box.

In a similar vein, American soldiers began utilizing people sniffers, which allowed machines to find organic smells (such as ammonia found in sweat and urine) to point out where the Viet Cong might be hiding. Helicopters were manufactured with two air scoops that would bring air into the machines and permit pilots to detect what smells were in the air. From a deception perspective, once enemies were allegedly located, the U.S. military would drop pamphlets that warned of an eminent artillery attack in the area. Loudspeakers would also be used to send the same message. Once an offensive action took place, more pamphlets were used to urge survivors to support the government of South Vietnam and leave the Viet Cong behind. In terms of success, the Viet Cong prevented people sniffers from having much impact. Once they realized that



the sniffers sought ammonia, they began leaving buckets of urine and other waste products in one area before moving away to a safe spot.

According to author Seth Jacobs, another unique deception effort was waged by General Edward Lansdale. He utilized rumor campaigns in Hanoi that attempted to convince locals that Chinese soldiers were raping Vietnamese women and that China was planning to take over all of Vietnam as soon as the war concluded. As part of this plan, Lansdale created pamphlets to be used in North Vietnam that talked about monetary changes, work camps, and confiscation of personal property under the impending Chinese rule. Even more brazenly, according to Jacobs, he designed materials telling the North that the United States was preparing to launch atom bombs in the region. In terms of success, around a million North Vietnamese fled to South Vietnam after hearing about Lansdale's "facts." Whether it helped the war effort in any meaningful way, however, is still up for debate.

### Media Deception

When looking at deception during the Vietnam War, no episode seems to have attracted more media attention than the creation and subsequent airing in 1982 of *The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception*. The program asserted that intelligence officers working under U.S. general William Westmoreland in 1967 intentionally manipulated intelligence estimates to show that there were far fewer communist personnel in South Vietnam than there actually were. By doing so, they hoped to show that the war was being won in order to instill faith among American citizens that the United States was pursuing the right course of action.

In response to the program, Westmoreland sued CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) and those involved with the program for libel to the tune of \$120 million. Before going to trial, however, Westmoreland dropped his suit, claiming he had interpreted a statement from the network as an apology. CBS, however, still lost its libel insurance and was forced to scale back the tone of its investigative reporting as a result. The lawsuit created a volume of literature, as well as critical discussion, about ethics, free speech protection, libel, and the politicization of news.

*The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception* declared that the 1968 Tet offensive came as a

shock to Americans because U.S. military officials in South Vietnam had previously, arbitrarily, and willingly reduced the number of enemy troops. In short, leaders decided that 300,000 would be the ceiling in terms of enemy troops reported in order to make it seem like the United States was doing better than it actually was. Perhaps most seriously, the 90-minute program directly charged that intelligence officers deleted databases to hide the deception.

From a network perspective, the producer, George Crile, violated CBS network policy and practices by intentionally avoiding interviews with anyone who would contest his argument, and then manipulated longer answers into sound bites to help convey his story. Looking at Westmoreland and Crile, it appears they were both at least marginally guilty of attempting to deceive the American public for their own reasons. Westmoreland was aware of growing tensions domestically and an antiwar fervor, while Crile wanted to bring out the negative aspects of the war and draw attention to citizen concerns.

However, it was not just this one episode that generated questions about the media's impact on Vietnam. With the media having no restrictions and being permitted on the front line of the battlefields, they were able to show Americans exactly what was going on every day—or at least what they wanted them to see. Again, the Tet offensive serves as a prime example. Tet began on January 21, 1968, when the North Vietnamese launched attacks on numerous major cities in South Vietnam. In the beginning, the offensive was blocked well by American and South Vietnamese forces, and there were minimal casualties.

Yet news coverage failed to mention this and instead focused on the shooting down of four American AC 130s gunships in Khe Sanh. The footage of the plane crashes showed fire, disaster, and death, which sparked protests throughout the United States. Why was the focus on Khe Sanh instead of Tet? Largely because it was far easier to access, and the drama around the plane crashes made for better television.

When it comes to media coverage, there are questions about what classifies as deception and what is nothing more than editorial decisions. But in the end, the American public was receiving a distorted view of what was occurring in Vietnam

during the war effort. In World War I, the military and government had total control over the press. They were able to prevent pictures of wounded soldiers or of death. If anything, the media worked as a propaganda arm for the military—helping spread a message of hope and support throughout the country. But during the Vietnam War, control and censorship were minimal. Instead, Americans saw exactly what the media wanted them to see (for better or worse).

A good example involves the events of the My Lai massacre in March 1968. American soldiers—led by Lt. William Calley—attacked a village supposedly full of Viet Cong soldiers. The particular soldiers had previously fallen victim to numerous guerrilla attacks and booby traps. As a result, they were mentally stressed. While they found no Viet Cong soldiers in My Lai, the Americans killed roughly 5,000 innocent villagers, including women and children. At first, the media reported the government's message that a large number of Viet Cong soldiers had been killed, while some citizens were lost as collateral damage. When the truth came out a year later, the American public turned even more sharply against the war efforts. In this case, the media prevented the government from deceiving the general public.

The media—as has been discussed earlier—was not always honest in their watchdog role, however. Consider a famous picture from Vietnam. The photo was shot by Eddie Adams and shows the execution of a Viet Cong guerrilla soldier. The picture was originally used to show that the South Vietnamese were no better than their Northern counterparts. But what the picture leaves out is the back story. It is not just a soldier being executed; it was a general of a small group of Vietnamese soldiers who had just killed the entire family of the man pulling the trigger. Again, editors directly stated that they wanted the picture to speak for itself and did not want the message to be subdued by any explanation or description—even if it ended up sending the wrong message.

### Pentagon Papers

The Pentagon Papers were the hallmark of deception during the Vietnam era. These papers—contained in a U.S. Defense Department study, “United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense”—demonstrate a

clear pattern of lies and deceit cutting across four presidencies regarding information about activities in southeast Asia. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was the mastermind behind the report, hoping to leave an encyclopedic volume about the war for individuals in the future.

Most troublesome is that the pattern of lies suggests a systematic effort across many years to intentionally deceive the American public about why the United States was in Vietnam, along with what the United States was doing there. The papers became publicly known in 1971 when published on the front page of the *New York Times*.

An initial finding of concern was that the United States had intentionally expanded the scope of the war by bombing Cambodia and Laos—facts that were never reported by American media. Other previously unknown truths exposed in the Pentagon Papers include that President John F. Kennedy planned to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam before Diem was assassinated in 1963. Likewise, President Lyndon Johnson had already initiated plans to bomb North Vietnam before winning his election, all while scaring Americans into believing that his opponent—Barry Goldwater—was the one who would utilize bombing campaigns. Further, Johnson sent combat troops into Vietnam on July 17. However, he never met with advisors regarding the decision until the period between July 21 and 27.

In perhaps one of the most embarrassing aspects of the Pentagon Papers, a memo from the Defense Department to the Johnson administration listed five reasons that the United States remained in southeast Asia. The first (accounting for 70 percent of the explanation according to the department) was to avoid a humiliating defeat if the United States were to withdraw. Second—at 20 percent—was to keep the South Vietnamese from falling into Chinese hands. Third, at only 10 percent of the reason, was to permit the citizens of South Vietnam to enjoy a freer, democratic way of life. The memo also goes on to remind the administration that the Defense Department wanted to emerge from the crisis without any unacceptable stigma caused by the methods used to win (in other words, the United States did not want to drop nuclear bombs).

Finally, the memo clearly delineates that the Defense Department did not want to be perceived

as simply helping a friend, which would lead to further calls for American intervention across the globe. Ultimately, the memo showed that the department did not care about the South Vietnamese and was only advocating intense bombing as a means to allow the United States to escape from the war without being humiliated.

The Vietnam War was perhaps the most deceitful military conflict in U.S. history. While World War II may have more directly utilized deceit tactics on the battlefield, the Vietnam War raised public concerns about government lies and deceit, along with issues regarding the presence of a free media to report on whatever they wished without regard to the truth.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Department of Defense, U.S.; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Government Propaganda; Korean War; Photographs, Altered; Smoke Screen; World War I; World War II.

### Further Readings

- Ford, Harold P. *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968*. Langley, VA: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.
- Jacobs, Seth. *Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Lawrence, Mark Atwood. *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Short, Anthony. *Origins of the Vietnam War*. New York: Longman, 1989.
- Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982.

---

## Vocal Stress Analysis

Vocal stress analysis refers to computer-aided technology and techniques for analyzing nonverbal speech in order to aid deception detection.

Modern vocal stress analysis is grounded in paralinguistics, digital signal processing, and machine learning. *Vocal stress analysis* is a term used most commonly in reference to software used by law enforcement as an alternative or complement to traditional polygraph tools for investigations.

To assess veracity using vocal stress analysis software, a speaker's voice is first recorded using a microphone and converted to a digital format on a computer. The vocal recording is then signal processed to extract acoustic features, such as pitch or intensity representations (for example, mean, variance) of each utterance. The utterances generally correspond with a fixed protocol comparable to the Comparison Question Test used in a polygraph. Based on the testing protocol the overall interview is scored and deviances or outliers are identified to assess veracity. This example is a simplification, but it provides the basic principles behind vocal stress analysis—record the voice digitally, extract vocal features, and submit these features to a statistical/computational model to assign a probability of deception.

Vocal stress is a term used almost ubiquitously in academic and professional settings when discussing software for assisting deception detection. However, vocal stress is actually a misnomer, as modern techniques for analyzing the voice analyze more than stress. Modern techniques and technologies for analyzing speech attempt to identify vocal indicators of stress, emotion, cognitions, and behavioral control. For example, paralinguistic indicators of cognitive effort are speech hesitations (that is, response latency) or dysfluencies (that is, the use of the sounds “um” or “er” and pauses).

Vocal analysis confined to stress has intuitive appeal. When a nervous or stressed speaker talks, there is a noticeable increase in the pitch or tremble of their voice. When stressed, individuals' muscles often tighten and clench in response. When the muscles about the vocal folds, which vibrate to affect the air and produce sound, become tense, they vibrate at a higher frequency. The frequency of the vibration or fundamental frequency is what people hear as vocal pitch. Because of the observable variation in speech in response to stress, and the belief that liars faced with consequences are more stressed, the initial focus of vocal analysis was on stress.

### Microtremors and Vocal Analysis

The term *vocal stress analysis* was coined during the initial wave of software marketed to law enforcement. Despite the richness of features present in the voice, this initial software focused on a very small frequency band of 8 to 12 hertz. This is because the human body exhibits periodic contractions of the muscles known as microtremors on this narrow and low frequency range. These early vocal analysis systems attempted, unsuccessfully, to measure this frequency produced by the larynx muscles.

Early vocal analysis systems assumed that a reduction in the power of the microtremor frequency implies deception because it is caused by a stress-induced drop in blood pressure. The microtremors do occur at the low frequency range; however, existing recording technologies may not have the sensitivity required to accurately measure and subsequently calculate this low frequency. Additionally, even if microtremors can be measured via the voice, the relationship between lower blood pressure and deception is tenuous.

The name and any controversy associated with vocal stress analysis software can be primarily attributed to the flawed initial software based on microtremors. The research has consistently failed to reliably detect deception in experimental or field settings using these software tools. It is unfortunate, but understandable that any mention of vocal stress analysis will conjure up memories of this early technology and be met with disdain or a polite grimace.

### Use of Modern Vocal Analysis Software

Despite a checkered history of vocal analysis software, the voice undeniably contains signals diagnostic to deception that people effortlessly decode in everyday conversation. Individuals can recognize when a loved one or friend is angry, sad, bored, or in any number of emotional and cognitive states by hearing them talk over the telephone or in person. The problem is not if the voice is diagnostic to deception but if computers can be taught to decode vocal signals. While some people take this ostensibly simple task for granted, computers have no ears or context and face an uphill battle making sense of speech. Bearing this in mind, one must remain rightfully incredulous of vocal analysis software but be

mindful not to conflate all software and tools as universally invalid, as the technology is steadily improving.

One challenge for deception research when utilizing vocal analysis software is its computational nature; this issue is occurring in all computational nonverbal behavior analysis as well. That is, advanced signal processing of speech signals are becoming black boxes either to proprietary software or esoteric algorithms. In the early days of vocal analysis, most analysis was performed on standard acoustic features, such as pitch, that have a direct physical correspondence to physical vibration of the vocal fold. However, modern vocal analysis applies advanced digital signal processing and machine learning techniques to identify deceptive speech, but it provides no intuitive or theoretical explanation.

A common approach to developing modern algorithms for detecting deceptive speech is to collect a corpus of experimentally manipulated truthful and deceptive recordings. These recordings are signal processed to extract advanced vocal features, understood mostly by mathematicians, and submitted to nonlinear and multidimensional classification algorithms (for example, support vector machines, neural networks). The end result is a black box that predicts deception using speech more accurately than traditional methods but contributes little to theory or understanding.

Two issues further complicate the use of modern vocal analysis software for deception detection. First, the specific lie scenario or situation used as ground truth to train the software cannot be generalized. Using software developed and trained on criminal interviews would not be very accurate for rapid screening or Concealed Information Tests. Second, much to the chagrin of vocal researchers, the voice is not Pinocchio's nose. Some people exhibit many emotional and cognitive indicators in their voice, while others actually improve their speech when lying (for example, politicians). One should not over-rely on any one behavioral indicator of deception nor assume the voice does not reveal cues to deception because it is unequally expressed by all people.

### Conclusion

The voice is very diagnostic of emotions and deception. Despite the checkered past of previous



technologies, vocal stress analysis is improving in accuracy of detection, but at the expense of intuition, generalizability, and universality of expression.

Aaron C. Elkins  
*Imperial College London*

**See Also:** Audience; Communication; Concealed Information Test; Linguistic Cues; Neurophysiology; Nonverbal Cues; Polygraph.

### Further Readings

- Bachorowski, Jo-Anne and Michael J. Owren. "Vocal Expression of Emotion: Acoustic Properties of Speech are Associated With Emotional Intensity and Context." *Psychological Science*, v.6/4 (1995).
- DePaulo, Bella. M., et al. "Cues to Deception." *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129/1 (2003).
- Elkins, Aaron C. and Judee K. Burgoon. "Validating Vocal Analysis Software to Assess Credibility in Interpersonal Interaction: A Multilevel Factor Analytic Approach." Paper presented at the National Communication Association 96th Annual Convention, San Francisco, November 14–17, 2010.
- Haddad, Darren, et al. *Investigation and Evaluation of Voice Stress Analysis Technology*. Rome, NY: Air Force Research Lab, Information Directorate, 2001.
- Juslin, Patrik. N. and Petri Laukka. "Communication of Emotions in Vocal Expression and Music Performance: Different Channels, Same Code?" *Psychological Bulletin*, v.129/5 (2003).

## Vrij, Aldert

Aldert Vrij is an internationally recognized expert in deception. He is a Dutch researcher, author, and since 2000, professor of applied social psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom (UK). He has written more than 350 publications, articles, and book chapters describing his research into nonverbal, verbal, and neurophysiological cues to deception and lie detection. Vrij's latest book, *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and*

*Opportunities* (2008), is a comprehensive summary of deception detection research.

In 1991, Vrij earned his Ph.D. at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam in the Netherlands. Four years later, he joined the Psychology Department at the University of Portsmouth and became a senior lecturer before being promoted to a professorship. Since his arrival at Portsmouth, he has coordinated the Psychology and Law Unit and the Social Psychology Unit at the university. He supervises dissertations at the undergraduate level, and he has supervised more than 20 Ph.D. students at the postgraduate level. His research is funded by the UK government, the U.S. government, and the British Academy.

Vrij is the editor of *Legal and Criminological Psychology* and serves on the editorial boards of several journals, including *Law and Human Behavior*, *Human Communication Research*, *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, and *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*. He is a member of the Board of Governors of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. In addition to holding academic responsibilities, Vrij consults with police forces, presents workshops on lie detection to practitioners and scholars, and serves as an expert witness in court. He is the point of contact for the European consortium of Psychological Research on Deception Detection (E-PRODD).

Vrij is recognized for his many contributions to the field of deception and the detection of lies. Most notably, his work has found only a weak association between nonverbal behaviors and deception, an increased need for understanding verbal communication and deception, and a call for additional empirical proof for lie detection tools that produce advances in detection accuracy. He has also called for more research that examines deception in real-world contexts. Unlike many other researchers, Vrij's experiments often involve collecting interview data from suspects in realistic high-stake situations.

Vrij has articulated a frequently cited definition of deception: "a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue." His definition differs from others because it does not imply that unconsciously misleading other people should be classified as

deception. The definition also emphasizes that attempts to lie that are unsuccessful should still be classified as deception. Vrij has also categorized several motivations for why people lie: (1) for one's own benefit (self-oriented) or for the benefit of others (other-oriented), (2) to gain advantage or to avoid costs, and (3) for materialistic reasons or for psychological reasons.

As a pioneer in the field of nonverbal behavior and deception, Vrij argues that a liar's behavior depends on factors such as interpersonal differences, age, personality traits, and idiosyncratic patterns. Vrij's perspective emphasizes that there is no single nonverbal behavior that is uniquely associated with lying. In a 2000 experiment, he found that at least 70 percent of truths and lies could be correctly classified if a combination of nonverbal cues was examined, rather than examining these clues individually. Identifying nonverbal cues to deceit is a two-step approach, including the recognition of behavior change and interpreting if such changes are meaningful.

Vrij proposes that speech content can reveal deception by reflecting changes in emotions, cognitive effort, attempted control, and psychological distancing. Previous work has asserted that liars are capable of controlling their speech, but Vrij has argued against this assumption. Instead, he maintains that individuals, including professional lie detectors, do not pay enough attention to verbal cues to deception. Vrij has researched a variety of language analysis approaches, including criteria-based content analysis, reality monitoring, and statement validity analysis.

The beliefs that people hold regarding deception and deception cues have also been of interest to Vrij. In addition to concluding that average

citizens are poor judges of veracity, Vrij adds that trained professionals also do not perform well on lie accuracy tasks. In a 1996 study, he concluded that police officers form the same stereotyped beliefs about nonverbal indicators of deception as inexperienced lie catchers. Relying on unproven deception cues indicated that work experience does not yield a better understanding of the nonverbal behavior-deception relationship.

In sum, Vrij contends people can improve their lie detection skills by observing nonverbal and verbal cues more flexibly, suspiciously, and simultaneously.

Ilana Sandler  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
Cornell University

**See Also:** Deception Detection Accuracy; Linguistic Cues; Nonverbal Cues; Reality Monitoring; Statement Validity Analysis.

### Further Readings

- University of Portsmouth. "Prof. Aldert Vrij." <http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/psychology/staff/title,50475,en.html> (Accessed January 2013).
- Vrij, A. "Deception: A Social Lubricant and a Selfish Act." In *Frontiers of Social Psychology: Social Communication*, K. Fiedler, ed. New York: Psychology Press, 2007.
- Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2d. ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- Vrij, A., K. Edward, K. P. Roberts, and R. Bull. "Detecting Deceit via Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior." *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, v.24 (2000).





## ***War of the Worlds***

*The War of the Worlds* is a science-fiction novel written by H. G. Wells and published in 1898. The novel focuses on the adventures of a single protagonist during a time in which Earth is being invaded by violent aliens from Mars. The novel gained significant success and was adapted for a radio broadcast in 1938.

The broadcast, directed by Orson Welles, was aired as an episode of *Mercury Theatre on the Air* (a drama series that aired on CBS's radio network) at 8:00 P.M. on October 30, 1938. The broadcast was formatted to run for 60 minutes, with the first 40 minutes being presented in the form of news reports. Approximately 12 million people listened to the broadcast. The realism of the news reports, coupled with the fact that about one million listeners did not hear any of the disclaimers that had been stated and displayed prior to the broadcast, led many people to believe that Martians were actually invading Earth.

In addition, approximately one month prior to the *War of the Worlds* broadcast, news reporters at radio stations across the country began interrupting programs to inform the American public of the increasing dangers in Europe, describing how Adolf Hitler was rising to power and threatening to invade many countries. In one month, interruptions for news bulletins became

increasingly frequent, adding eyewitness accounts and live interviews. These bulletins became so frequent that when the *War of the Worlds* broadcast occurred, many uninformed people believed that it was another actual news bulletin.

The broadcast began with a disclaimer describing the novel and story. Orchestral music then played for a while, followed by a news anchor's voice interrupting to describe explosions and meteors from Mars. The orchestral music then resumed but was later interrupted by another news bulletin. The story then developed as the Martians landed in Grover's Mill, New Jersey, and began vaporizing humans with their advanced and violent heat-ray technology and toxic hydrogen gas.

Orson Welles, acting as Professor Richard Piereson of Princeton University, discussed the Martian technology, while a news reporter discussed the horrors that the Martians were wreaking on New Jersey and New York. Many other interviews with actors pretending to be astronomy experts, military officials, and the secretary of the interior were played in the broadcast as well. The broadcast also used orchestral music, commercial breaks, and intermissions to add realism.

The broadcast was intended to be an entertaining story in the spirit of Halloween. In fact, after the story had finished, Welles reminded the audience that it was a work of fiction meant to



be a spooky tale for the Halloween season. However, the reaction from the public was one of terror. Many people who listened to the broadcast had failed to notice the many advertisements—including newspaper listings and radio announcements—regarding the upcoming broadcast, and missed the first few minutes of the broadcast introducing the *War of the Worlds* as a novel and fictional story.

This resulted in a mass panic. Trenton, New Jersey, police received 2,000 phone calls in less than two hours. The *New York Times*' switchboard received 875 calls from people asking what they should do to keep safe. At 9:00 P.M. that night, a woman walked into a New York police station with her two children saying she was ready to leave the city. Several Harlem residents rushed into police stations saying they were packed and

ready to evacuate. Many people had called police stations asking what they should do to avoid the poison hydrogen gas that the aliens were releasing on Earth. Instances like these were reported in several police stations across New York and New Jersey, and reaching as far as the west coast of the United States. Some of these people believed that the United States was actually being invaded by Germans, not Martians.

After learning it was a hoax, many people tried suing CBS for mental pain and suffering, but all of these suits were dismissed. The only plaintiff who won his lawsuit was a man who was suing for the money it cost to buy a new pair of men's shoes; he had spent his shoe money in an attempt to escape the Martians. Upon Welles's insistence, he was reimbursed.

### Subsequent Broadcasts

Decades later, similar broadcasts incited more panic. In 1949, Leonardo Paez produced a *War of the Worlds* broadcast that was translated, adapted, and aired on Radio Quito, a radio station in Quito, Ecuador. In this version, the Martians landed in Ecuador instead of New Jersey. To add to the realism, Paez had articles published in the local newspaper describing strange sightings in the sky above Quito. These articles were printed for a few days prior to the broadcast. No information had been released to the public or government notifying them that the broadcast was a work of fiction.

During the broadcast, mass panic ensued. People were filling Catholic churches for safety and absolution. Anecdotal reports stated that men were even confessing to adultery in front of their wives, attempting to gain forgiveness from God before they died. In addition, the Ecuadorian military assembled in order to battle the Martians. Once the broadcast had ended and the people were notified that it was a hoax, a mob of people stormed the radio station in a rage. After breaking windows and smashing printing presses, the angry mob set fire to the radio station, killing six people. Although Paez survived, his girlfriend and nephew were killed. Paez moved to Venezuela immediately after the incident.

Another broadcast of *War of the Worlds* was aired in 1968 on WKBW radio station in Buffalo, New York. This version had been updated



The August 1927 cover of *Amazing Stories* depicts H. G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds*, a science fiction novel later made into a 1938 radio broadcast directed by Orson Welles. The show, delivered in realistic fashion via intermittent "news" broadcasts, fooled many people into a state of panic.

to fit its time, using disco music and discussing “announcements” from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) regarding activity from Mars. Buffalo police received over 4,000 phone calls that night from citizens concerned about the Martian invasion. In addition, the Canadian National Guard released soldiers to the Peace Bridge, Rainbow Bridge, and Queenston Bridge to prevent the Martians from invading Canada.

The *War of the Worlds* broadcasts are prime examples of how deception can be used to create realistic entertainment. However, when the deception is not made abundantly clear, some people may miss the message and thus not realize they are being deceived. In the case of the Ecuadorian panic, the producers were purposefully deceptive—keeping the details of the broadcast’s falsehood to themselves as a means of playing a hoax on the Ecuadorian people. As one can see, the aftermath was horrendous.

Carey J. Fitzgerald  
Oakland University

**See Also:** Fiction; *New York Sun*’s Moon Series; Paltering; Tall Tales; UFOs; Urban Legends.

### Further Readings

Bradbury, R. and B. Bova. *The War of the Worlds: Mar’s Invasion of Earth, Inciting Panic and Inspiring Terror From H. G. Wells to Orson Welles and Beyond*. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2001.

“Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact.” *New York Times* (October 31, 1938). <http://mssv.net/realityart/wotwemails.html> (Accessed September 2012).

Radiolab. “War of the Worlds.” <http://www.radiolab.org/2008/mar/24> (Accessed September 2012).

Wells, H. G. *The War of the Worlds*. London: William Heinemann, 1898.

a mechanic, mill worker, farmer, and jack-of-all-trades who headed westward with his family from their first home near Rochester, New York, in the 1830s. This hardscrabble life of travel into and across the western frontier instilled in Ward both a love of nature and a competitive spirit toward those of privilege. Ward made up for his lack of access to a formal education by reading whatever he could get his hands on, prodded by his mother, Silence, who taught him from a very early age that “knowledge is power.”

By the time he was a young man, Ward had developed such distaste for slavery that he joined the Union Army in 1862. A year later Ward’s regiment fought in the Battle of Chancellorsville, where he was seriously wounded and taken hostage for 10 days before being rescued. After a period of convalescence, Ward was appointed to a clerkship in the U.S. Treasury Department and thereafter remained in employment in the Washington, D. C. area, including a long career at the U.S. Geological Survey as a botanist and paleontologist, until he accepted a teaching position in the Sociology Department at Brown University in 1906.

Ward’s natural science background informed his sociology, beginning with his first book, *Dynamic Sociology*, published in 1883, and on through to his final book, *Applied Sociology*, published in 1906. It was in *Dynamic Sociology* that Ward presented his theory of the social forces, and among the so-called preservative forces was the law of acquisition. This law incorporates both biology and sociology seamlessly, to the extent that the lower animals struggle to survive in a physical environment through the acquisition of food and other physical necessities, while human beings in advanced stages of development engage in economic activities to acquire valued resources.

### Principle of Deception

A major principle subsumed under this law of acquisition was the principle of deception. According to Ward, deception is the normal form of intellectual action, for it is through deception that human beings obtain everything. The lower animals, of course, engage in deception as well—for example, a mother bird feigning injury to lure a would-be predator away from the nest—yet with the upgrading of the intellect among humans, deception is upgraded as well, even to an art form.

## Ward, Lester F.

Lester F. Ward, a sociologist who developed a principle of deception, was born in Joliet, Illinois, on July 18, 1841. His father, Justus Ward, was

Ward argued that the method of art is artifice, and machines are machinations. Invention is deception to the extent that the forces of nature are ensnared and circumvented. This reflects Ward's argument of the advantages of the artificial over the natural, even as deception springs from the biological in its most rudimentary forms.

The high refinement of deception among humans reflects its evolutionary advantages: early humans who were most keenly deceptive survived and passed on their genes to later generations. Ward also was one of the first scholars—sociological or otherwise—to point out that deception is a fundamental principle which (c.1883) philosophers and political economists had failed to adequately address or conceptualize.

A decade later, in his book *Psychic Factors of Civilization* (1893), Ward had more to say concerning his principle of deception, and here he developed a rule: the greater the deception, the greater the success. For Ward, human society is honeycombed with deception. In the social state, there are many levels and forms of deception, each working in such a way as to secure advantages for the agent at the expense of others. For example, in societies that emphasize the amassing of personal wealth, persons will make displays of such markers of social standing to make others believe they have all they desire, even if they have little or nothing. This idea was the forerunner of Thorstein Veblen's "conspicuous consumption," which Ward originally called "conspicuous puffery."

### Creating a "Sociocracy"

Ward was sanguine about the growing importance of sham, artifice, quackery, imposture, humbug, and jugglery in modern society. He noted that since the beginning of civilized society there has been an effort to regulate muscle power, but now, in order to stem the tide of moral decadence welling up in the modern world, there should also be serious consideration given to regulating brain power. The great panacea, according to Ward, would be the provision of universal education so that all would become knowledgeable about the workings of the social and physical worlds, including, of course, knowledge of that most important principle, the principle of deception.

This would also have the benefit of shifting emphasis from individual intellect—through which

a few savvy operators are able to work the system for the enhancement of self—toward the "social intellect." By maximizing societal knowledge for all, the intellectual faculty could attain its highest purpose, namely, the realization of a "sociocracy" characterized by "attractive legislation," which is the proper end of applied sociology.

Ward asked, "How can society escape this last conquest of power by the egoistic intellect?" The "organized cunning" of charlatans, unscrupulous financiers and industrialists, and others seeking to use their brain power to secure advantages for themselves at the expense of others can be countered only by unleashing the power of society in and for itself. Society should gain consciousness and the indomitable will similar to those of individuals who successfully pursue their interests. A sociocracy fully realized would have individuals use their brain power for the benefit of society, and as all share in the fund of knowledge, all will contribute toward the realization of that end. This would not be a Marxist revolution, however, but a slow, steady, and incremental improvement of society by society.

James J. Chriss  
Cleveland State University

**See Also:** Deception Motives; Evolution and Natural Selection; Morals and Ethics.

### Further Readings

- Chriss, James J. "Lester F. Ward and World Sociology." In *Transatlantic Voyages and Sociology*, C. Schrecker, ed. Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2010.
- Chriss, James J. "The Place of Lester Ward Among the Sociological Classics." *Journal of Classical Sociology*, v.6 (2006).
- Rafferty, Edward C. *Apostle of Human Progress: Lester Frank Ward and American Political Thought, 1841–1913*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- Ward, Lester F. *Applied Sociology*. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906.
- Ward, Lester F. *Dynamic Sociolog*. 2 vols. New York: Appleton, 1883.
- Ward, Lester F. *Psychic Factors of Civilization*. Boston: Ginn, 1893.
- Ward, Lester F. *Pure Sociology*. New York: Macmillan, 1903.



## Washington, George

George Washington is remembered in American history for his acts of nobility. Much like Cincinnatus, who left his plow to serve his fellow man in battle before returning back to his previous life, Washington exemplified the noble qualities of leadership and direction in the American populace during an era where any lapses in judgment could have led to long-lasting ramifications for the young country. Washington's nobility, according to legend, has a biological root, given the infamous tale of his admission of guilt for cutting down his father's prized cherry tree with a hatchet as a young boy. The story recalls Washington stating: "I cannot tell a lie."

From this beginning, Washington proved to be an admired leader. At first, his prowess spread as a military leader, and he is the individual most often attributed with playing a key role in the success of the Revolutionary War. Despite fears of a new monarch forming, the American public thought so highly of Washington that it elected him the first president of the United States of America. Americans entrusted him with power and never set term limits. True to his character, Washington decided that two terms was the appropriate length for one individual to spend as head executive of the country (an unwritten expectation that was followed until Franklin Roosevelt's time as president during the Great Depression). On his way out of office, Washington warned his countrymen about the dangers of political parties and their potentially corrupting influence on the affairs of the nation.

### Recognition of the Value of Deception

Washington's noble nature did not, however, mean that he did not understand the value of utilizing deceit for strategic reasons and advantage against enemies. As commander of the Revolutionary Army, Washington employed a network of spies and informants to assure that the United States remained a step ahead of the British at every turn. Washington's system of deception included planting false information, denying important pieces of information, and causing an overwhelming sense of confusion. While the soldiers spent a terrifying winter in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, Washington was concerned with keeping the British away

because he was understaffed and unprepared for prolonged fighting. Washington wrote a series of reports that convinced British General William Howe that Valley Forge was fortified by strong numbers, preventing what would have been a horrible defeat.

Further, in his daily operating plans, Washington was able to mask actual plans and movements by using feints and ploys. When he suggested different potential attack targets, he succeeded in throwing the British off track. Deception played a significant role in the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. Washington made strong assertions that he was diverting all attention toward New York (Staten Island specifically), fully aware that Howe and the British would be listening. Then, he chose to instead head to Yorktown, producing a dramatic victory that started the process of concluding years of battle. To protect his country, even Washington—the most noble and honest of men—was willing to partake in some degree of lying.

Unlike other former presidents, it is difficult to find examples of personal acts of deceit executed by Washington. Many questioned Washington's religious beliefs during his lifetime. Unwilling to speak much about the topic, Washington faced serious questions about whether he believed in God and how his faith (or lack thereof) could impact the development of a largely Christian nation. While the majority of the colonists were members of a Christian denomination (e.g., Puritan, Congregationalist, or Anglican), including Washington's wife and family, the majority of those who rose to elite leadership positions, including the Founding Fathers, were Deists, which did not mix well with Christianity. Even though both religions contain common elements of morality, and they agree for the most part on what constitutes good deeds and proper behavior, the fundamental doctrines concerning which God they worship differs greatly and are incompatible. While scholars today still question Washington's theological beliefs, few have made any progress in proving that he ever concealed his true feelings.

What the case of Washington raises in terms of analyzing lying and deception is how individuals can bend their individual moral codes when called to do so by some higher order. Given the folklore surrounding Washington and the cherry



tree, it is surprising that he successfully executed an entire military offensive built around the idea of lying. Yet, Washington's nobility and honor pushed him to stand for the colonists in their effort to escape what was largely viewed as a demanding, undemocratic force from the Crown. Washington had a moral compass that permitted him to use lies and deceit only when necessary to overcome situations in which others were attempting to violate basic human rights. His decisions to lie were made for the betterment of all, not in self-interest.

William J. Miller  
*Flagler College*

**See Also:** Military Deception; Morals and Ethics; Secrecy.

#### Further Readings

Ferling, John. *The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009.

Higginbotham, Don. *George Washington: Uniting a Nation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. *First in Peace: How George Washington Set the Course for America*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009.

---

## Watergate

Few political scandals of the modern age have rivaled the complexity and, to some extent, the theatricality of those events that have collectively become known as simply "Watergate." In fact, so far-reaching were the consequences of both the initial events and their protracted cover-up that the scandal effectively became the model by which future political and public relations catastrophes were to be defined—not only in America, but also globally. The now common trend of branding a well-publicized cover-up with the seemingly requisite "gate" suffix speaks to the apparent timelessness of the Watergate scandal and how it remains seared into the collective memory, retaining the ability even decades later to connect all

acts of political or public disgrace with Watergate as their common progenitor.

While history has largely focused on the political circumstances of Watergate and its legal and legislative aftermaths, the events that led to the historically unprecedented resignation of President Richard Nixon in August 1974 remain a matter of interdisciplinary interest with respect to the group dynamics of deception and collusion among both elected and appointed officials. In most cases involving criminal acts of deception, the office held by a perpetrator is often considered an aggravating factor at sentencing, especially with respect to breaches of the public trust. Watergate is a remarkable exception, however, in terms of public trust apparently being a mitigating rather than aggravating circumstance, in turn raising questions about the psychopathology of group lying and condoning of antisocial behavior by senior elected officials.

Another reason for the ongoing intrigue surrounding the Watergate scandal is the apparent lack of a concrete motive for the crimes that set the president's downfall in motion and ruined countless careers. The scandal also lacked what might be described as a central or prevailing incentive when considering how quickly it seems to have lured in so many conspirators of such differing backgrounds, many of whom had little to gain during the plotting, commission, and eventual unraveling of the convoluted affair.

#### Burglarizing Democratic Headquarters

Having punctuated an era that remains defined by allegations of clandestine political pacts and far-reaching deceptions and conspiracies, Watergate essentially began as an unexceptional commercial burglary at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters located in the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C., on the Memorial Day weekend in 1972. The initial burglary, as with the second attempt in June 1972, was unquestionably an intelligence-gathering mission either ordered or condoned by senior Republican Party principals, including President Nixon, yet the precise nature of the information being sought remains unclear. Some involved in the burglary's planning and commission have cited the official objective as having been the identification and collection of evidence confirming



Members of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities consult during a hearing on Watergate in 1973. From left: Tennessee Senator Howard Baker, North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin (chair), chief counsel Sam Dash, and minority counsel Arthur Miller (rear). The 435 members of the 93rd Congress (right) were charged with considering the impeachment of President Richard Nixon in 1974, including Texas Congresswoman Barbara C. Jordan (center), who delivered an impassioned rationale for impeachment.

that the Cuban government was providing the DNC with covert funding; others have speculated that it might have been as simple as an overzealous attempt to gather dirt on senior DNC officials through the installation of illegal wiretaps and pilferage of sensitive documents, but with no specific endgame.

What is clear is that both burglaries were carried out by a cabal of undercover operatives, security advisors, and experts in espionage that had been handpicked by Nixon to serve as the White House Special Investigations Unit beginning in July 1971. This group, colloquially referred to as the White House “plumbers,” had the principal mandate—as their unofficial moniker suggested—of locating and fixing leaks, specifically, leaks relating to classified or sensitive information by White House staff and Republican Party members to the press. Representing an array of relevant skill sets and backgrounds, the plumbers’ ranks included not only garden-variety anticommunist politicians, but also former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field agents, including chief organizers and unit commanders E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

While ostensibly formed to “investigate” information security breaches, the White House

Plumbers quickly progressed to becoming break-and-enter artists in earnest. Their first target was the Los Angeles clinic of a psychiatrist treating Daniel Ellsberg, a Vietnam War policy critic and disillusioned military analyst, in August 1971, just a month after their official formation. Following the failure of that operation, the Memorial Day burglary at the DNC offices was similarly deemed an operational failure in terms of the information gathered—or rather not gathered. The plumbers therefore returned on June 17, 1972, to gather further intelligence, only to be thwarted by a Watergate night watchman and have five of its members arrested on site by police.

### The Scandal Exposed

Following the detection and swift arrest of the reputedly stealthy burglars, simultaneous investigations by the FBI and the press—mainly maverick reporters representing the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and *Time* magazine—soon exposed the office break-ins as being camouflaged cases of domestic espionage, effectively connecting the dots between the arrests made at the Watergate complex, the creation of the Special Investigations Unit, and a cache of hush money leading back to Nixon’s administration. After following the evidence up the food chain of the

Republican Party and Nixon's inner circle, when indictments were finally handed down in March 1974, the notoriety of the so-called Watergate Seven as the principal fall guys of the scandal tended to eclipse any attention paid to the other 62 officials indicated, including the original burglars. The selective naming of these usual suspects was in part because—unlike Hunt, Liddy, and the other White House plumbers convicted of carrying out the original breaks-ins—the Watergate Seven seemed to represent both political malfeasance and public deception at their highest, and thus, most publicly condemnable levels.

Forty-eight conspirators were ultimately convicted of various crimes. The conviction of U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell for perjury, as well as the convictions of a number of once-prominent lawyers serving as counsel to Nixon for crimes ranging from perjury and conspiracy to obstruction of justice, was perhaps the most injurious to not only the executive office of the president but also the White House and the democratic process as binary symbols of honesty and integrity in a more general sense. The fact that a number of the Watergate Seven were also lawyers once in good standing introduced an additional dimension to the scandal that brought the ethics surrounding the practice of law into question and the administration of American justice at all levels into disrepute. If the attorney general and other officers of the court at its highest levels were susceptible to political influence and lying under oath, many were rightfully led to question what such revelations said about those practicing law and running the courts at lower levels all across America.

The additional and symbolic arraignment of Nixon in private by the grand jury as an eighth but unindicted conspirator transcended the scrutiny faced by lawyers across the country and ultimately proved a decisive blow not only to the Republican Party but also to the White House as a symbol, undermining months of calculated spin doctoring in an attempt to diffuse the responsibility of the president and any knowledge he might have had of the burglaries and wiretaps. The grand jury's backroom admonishment also seemed to foreshadow the much more public death knell for Nixon's presidency that came just a few months later.

For instance, the sudden emergence of audio recordings dating to June 1972—first made available on August 5, 1974—depicted Nixon spitballing with his chief of staff, H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, about how to divert and mislead FBI investigators working the Watergate case and how to effectively distance himself from the escalating scandal, thereby confirming his having at the very least direct knowledge of the burglaries from the outset. Four days later, on August 9, 1974, amid impeachment proceedings in Congress, Nixon resigned from office. After ceding the presidency to Vice President Gerald Ford, within a matter of months Nixon was pardoned by the newly appointed president for any crimes he may or may not have committed while in office, largely if not exclusively in relation to the Watergate affair.

### Aftermath of the Scandal

While Washington officials and the Executive Office of the President were by 1974 no stranger to public hearings and federal investigations of varying severity and legitimacy, Watergate was a proverbial game changer in terms of the criminal culpability of senior politicians up to and including the president, and it would set the stage for prosecuting acts of perjury committed by officials prepared to lie under oath. The 13 indictments handed down following the Iran-Contra scandal just over a decade later—one of the first to invoke the requisite “gate” suffix in the wake of this scandal and often known as “Irangate”—was perhaps the most significant example to occur on the heels of Watergate. Not unlike its predecessor, Iran-Contra was defined by minimal, perfunctory sentences, and in most cases full presidential pardons issued immediately thereafter. Such gestures of judicial glad-handing suggest that offenses such as perjury that encompass lying, deception, and breaches of the public trust are not only deemed permissible but are also considered necessary transgressions that are to be tolerated once lying reaches certain “official” levels at the upper echelon of governmental power.

The prosecution of the Watergate Seven and their paltry sentences, if any, additionally points to a chasm between the expectations of truthfulness among the general public versus greatly diminished expectations among political officials; it to some extent also quantifies deception and collusion as

occupational necessities of political life. The lack of any tenable repercussions with respect to not only the original criminal acts in the Watergate affair but also the unrelenting lying under oath that followed suggests that holding public office, even by association, in effect socializes one to lie, deceive, and mislead as a matter of course.

Moreover, the timing of the Watergate prosecutions is remarkable in terms of the other priorities of American justice in the 1970s with respect to corruption and collusion. The rationale behind the Watergate sentences seems to stand in stark contrast to the prosecutions and litigations initiated under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, which went into effect in 1970, just four years prior to the indictment of the Watergate Seven and Nixon's resignation.

The prosecution of the Watergate Seven approximated the public dismantling of an organized crime syndicate under the guise of the newly minted RICO legislation, with roles and ranks in the criminal hierarchy being identified, marching orders fleshed out, and the intensity of the prosecution—and media attention—being commensurate with the prominence of an accused within the group. Unlike in the case of most organized crime groups prosecuted under the contemporaneous RICO legislation, however, the Watergate Seven lacked a common ideology or code that allowed them to close ranks and maintain any semblance of solidarity during the investigation, indictment, arraignment, and trial. In fact, one of Watergate's enduring contributions to the study of deceit is the demonstration that organized crime and criminal organizations are not necessarily one and the same and that collective lying and perjury by a group is not always indicative of a common end.

As the main players in the Watergate affair ultimately came to be part of a coalesced criminal syndicate largely by default, most were ultimately acting out of their own opportunistic interests from the outset—motives that ultimately came to the fore once names were named, and it became a matter of every man for himself. In the end it would seem that political affiliation is not the most effective of mortars in holding together an already dubious and unconvincing story over the long term.

Michael Arntfield  
University of Western Ontario

**See Also:** Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Cooperation; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Iran-Contra Affair; Lying as Exercise of Power; Nixon, Richard; White House Press Secretaries.

### Further Readings

- Bernstein, Carl and Bob Woodward. *All the President's Men*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974.
- Hunt, E. Howard. *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and Beyond*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
- Janis, Irving. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
- McQuaid, Kim. *The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam-Watergate Era*. New York: Basic Books, 1989.
- Reston, James. *The Conviction of Richard Nixon: The Untold Story of the Frost/Nixon Interviews*. New York: Harmony Books, 2007.
- Woodiwiss, Michael. *Organized Crime and American Power*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

## White House Press Secretaries

An entire genre of literature has developed consisting of former White House press secretaries penning autobiographies containing apologies or shifting blame for their deceptions of the American public. The standard refrain, as stated by Herbert Hoover's press secretary in his diary, is that the job limits its practitioner from ever being "able to tell the whole truth." Press Secretary Scott McClellan defended George W. Bush's Iraq War from the lectern, only to later write a book about the "culture of deception" he helped perpetuate in the White House.

The press secretary presents interpersonal contexts in which deceptiveness can be explicit, routine, and expected. The first president to have someone serve with the title *spokesman* was Calvin Coolidge. It was a deceptive ploy: the "spokesman" was Coolidge himself, but reporters were too scared of the president to report this. A variation of Coolidge's tactic reemerged in the



1990s. Bill Clinton's second press secretary, Mike McCurry, invented the term *psych-background* for the president giving background information to reporters, in which Clinton would answer reporters' questions aboard Air Force One, but reporters were only allowed to attribute the quotations to an unnamed "highest authority."

During the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), Stephen Early became the first White House staff member whose sole responsibilities were overseeing daily press briefings and speaking for the president. Early's handling of his job made him the first official White House press secretary both in terms of his title and duties.

Before FDR, presidents considered it beneath them to hire media handlers in the White House. However, some White House staff members acted as media liaisons in addition to performing other duties. These White House staffers were not always held in high regard. One of Andrew Jackson's critics in Congress referred to Jackson's media liaison as a "lying machine." Hoover's press secretary was considered a "cordon of duplicity" by journalists.

### Press Secretaries' Deception

A press secretary's job often requires him or her to deceive reporters. For example, after Gerald Ford's first press secretary resigned abruptly, Ron Nessen of NBC News was interviewed at the White House for the opening. When reporters asked him if he was under consideration for the job, he lied and replied, "Not that I know of." Neesen, however, was appointed Ford's press secretary, and he spent his first several days at the podium apologizing to journalists for the lie.

In 1980, the *Los Angeles Times* asked Jimmy Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell, if the White House was launching a mission to rescue hostages in Iran. Powell said no, even though less than a month earlier he had attended a meeting about a rescue plan. Later he called the reporters to confess: "I just lied to you."

Ronald Reagan's acting press secretary, Larry Speakes, distributed quotations to reporters, claiming they were excerpts from a closed-door meeting the president held with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Reporters printed them, not knowing that Speakes had invented the quotations himself, a feat he would disclose boastfully in his

published memoirs. In a White House briefing on October 12, 1982, Speakes admitted that his role was "to stage the news," and he proudly displayed this quotation on his desk. George H. W. Bush's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, was accused of lying about the White House's foreknowledge of a coup in Panama.

History probably considers Ron Ziegler to be the most deceptive press secretary. After all, he spent more than 10 months parroting the Nixon administration's evolving comments on Watergate. Ziegler first termed the scandal a "third-rate burglary" before shifting his comments and saying all his previous quotations were "inoperative." At briefings, reporters called him a liar to his face. However, in the 33 times that Ziegler testified before congressional hearings on Watergate, no evidence linked him to the cover-up. Two years after he left the job, Ziegler made a quasi-confession, saying that press secretaries lie because they repeat what their superiors tell them.

### Deceptive Health Communications

Communication about the president's health is a frequent theme of press secretary deceptions. The first recorded account of a White House spokesman lying to reporters at a press briefing was in 1893, when President Grover Cleveland's secretary of war told inquiring reporters that their speculations about the president having surgery were wrong. The nation was in a recession, and Cleveland feared his economic plan would be doomed if the public knew his doctor thought he could have cancer. During William McKinley's second term, his health plummeted. He had eye trouble, was bed-ridden with the flu, and near death from pneumonia. Yet his secretary tamped down media speculation, saying that reports of the president being ill were "foolish stories."

William Howard Taft's press spokesman became sickened from stress and fatigue, went to Rome to rest, and lied to reporters that his trip was to meet with the pope. When Woodrow Wilson became gravely ill of syphilis, his spokesman issued press statements that the president was recovering from fatigue. For the entirety of his service to FDR, Early tried to hide the president's health travails from the press. Even after FDR died, Early released a statement that "the president was given a thorough examination by seven or eight physicians" and "he

was pronounced organically sound in every way.” Dwight Eisenhower was hospitalized with a heart attack, but his press operation initially told reporters he had an upset stomach.

On the other side of the coin, when John F. Kennedy was holding secret meetings dealing with the Soviet Union and the Cuban Missile Crisis, his press secretary Pierre Salinger told reporters that the president’s schedule changes and lack of public appearances were due to a cold. He even released the president’s symptoms and temperature. Salinger also used the same cold excuse to explain Vice President Lyndon Johnson’s impromptu flight from Hawai‘i to the White House at the same time.

### Press Secretaries and Political Spin

Rather than calling out press secretaries’ tactics as lies perpetrated upon the Fourth Estate, academics often speak of the message being “mediated” or “framed.” Practitioners admit that their methods are “spin.” Spin ranges from euphemisms that emphasize the positive to falsehoods with dire consequences. Stephen Frantzich, a political science professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, conceptualized a press briefing exercise for instructors in order to help their students decipher the truth from bias and misinformation at the press secretary’s daily briefing. According to Frantzich, the daily briefing is a battle with reporters attempting to get the press secretary to divulge more than he or she wishes. Studies such as these help students examine ethical issues concerning the press secretary’s work.

From a government policy and legal standpoint, the press secretary, a federal employee, is put in a position of advocating partisan stances and campaign platforms. Also, most press secretaries come from journalism backgrounds. The fact that presidents will most likely pick their press secretary from an applicant pool whose job is to cover the president objectively raises concerns about source-reporter relations. After the job is over, the press secretary likely will return to journalism and pen an apologia for his or her White House job.

David E. Clementson  
Michael J. Beatty  
*University of Miami*

**See Also:** Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Eisenhower, Dwight; Government, Decline of Public Trust in; Kennedy, John F.; Nixon, Richard; Spin, Political; Watergate.

### Further Readings

Frantzich, Stephen. “Press Briefings Exercise.” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, v.28 (1995).

Klein, Woody. *All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News—White House Press Secretaries From Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush*. Westport CT: Praeger, 2008.

Nelson, W. Dale. *Who Speaks for the President? The White House Press Secretary From Cleveland to Clinton*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998.

---

## White Lies

A white lie is a form of deceit that is generally socially acceptable because it holds the potential to prevent or minimize another person’s emotional pain. Individuals report telling white lies with greater frequency than serious lies; however, they remember the white lies less than the serious lies.

### Social and Emotional Benefits

Deception, especially in the form of a white lie, probably has emotional benefits for both the listener and the liar. One possible benefit could be that listeners might not always want to hear the truth for adaptive reasons (for example, it might hurt one’s feelings to learn another person’s true views). Second, contrary to most forms of deception, white lies are less likely to elicit negative emotions from the liar because the individual who tells the white lie has less fear of being caught or feeling guilty for protecting another person’s feelings.

White lies help maintain social relationships but also aid in maintaining a sense of privacy. For example, an individual may not want to review his or her true condition and thus claims to be fine even when he or she is not. Another form of white lie is making excuses to protect one’s privacy or to avoid hurting another person’s

feelings. According to social etiquette, in some circumstances telling the truth is impolite. For instance, a white lie may be encouraged in the place of expressing true sentiments after having received a gift. In fact, individuals who continuously express all of their negative impressions and feelings and never tell any white lies may face difficulty fully integrating themselves into social settings and groups.

### **Self-Centered Lies and Other-Oriented Lies**

Distinctions have been made between self-centered lies (that is, ones that benefit the liar) and other-oriented lies (that is, ones that benefit the listener). Other-oriented lies are similar in nature, if not the same, as white lies. Diary studies, designed to record participants' everyday lying behaviors, have revealed that individuals engage in other-oriented lies to protect others from embarrassment, to avoid hurting their feelings, to protect a sense of privacy, to improve another's image, or to regulate another's emotions. Although the primary goal of other-oriented lies, or white lies, is to protect another individual, white lies also seem to help safeguard the liar's well-being by helping him or her avoid arguments and maintain strong relationships. Individuals report telling more self-centered lies to strangers and more other-oriented lies to their friends.

### **Gender Differences in White Versus Black Lies**

Two other types of white lies have been proposed: Altruistic white lies may harm the liar but are beneficial to another individual; whereas a *pareto* white lies lead to benefits for both the liar and another individual. Women are more likely to tell the former type of white lie than are men, who are more likely to tell the latter type of white lie. Black lies, in contrast, are lies that benefit the liar at the expense of another individual and can be divided into selfish black lies and spiteful black lies. Men are more likely to tell selfish black lies than women are.

### **White Lies in Childhood**

By age 3, children have developed the skills needed to control their nonverbal display rules, such as hiding disappointment from others. As early as age 4, children prefer white lies to nonwhite lies

and believe them to be an appropriate method for protecting the feelings of another individual. As children begin preschool and developing their higher order cognitive functions, they tell more white lies and become more equipped at maintaining their falsehoods. In lab settings, when parents give their child prosocial rationales for telling white lies, children are more likely to tell a white lie than are children who are not reminded of prosocial rationales. However, many children will engage in white lie telling in lab settings without being prompted, and older children are more likely than their younger counterparts to provide detailed rationales for their lies. Although children know that lying is considered to be wrong, they seem to understand at a young age that white lies can help spare another's feelings and that it is often considered a good thing to do.

### **White Lies in Adulthood**

Adults evaluate lies that benefit another person as less deplorable than lies that are told for personal reasons, such as avoiding harm to oneself or for personal gain. Thus, the underlying motivations of the lie are paramount in determining the severity and morality of the lie. Similarly, according to the Cultural Model of Lying, the motivations of the lie and its context determine the type of lie it is. Because the motivation behind a white lie is typically to protect another person's feelings, it is usually not considered immoral to tell a white lie. Even in the context of intimate relationships, adults evaluate white lies as the least immoral form of deception compared to other lies.

Individuals often experience two opposing thoughts when considering telling a white lie: the social rule that one should always be polite and the moral rule that one should be honest. The desire to be polite often outweighs the potential costs of being completely honest in intimate relationships. For adults, maintaining a harmonious relationship and protecting the feelings of one's partner or friend can often be preferable to being completely moral and truthful. Interestingly, white lies, unlike other types of deception, do not appear to have detrimental effects on relationship satisfaction. In many situations, adults prefer to hear a white lie from their partner than a blatant truth that will make them feel bad about themselves.

Individuals have a wide variety of reasons for telling a white lie, but predominately, white lies are told to protect another person from harm and are thus considered to be the least immoral form of deception. In fact, in many situations, an individual would likely choose to tell a white lie over the truth if only to protect another person's feelings.

Madeleine T. D'Agata  
Jill A. Jacobson  
*Queen's University*

**See Also:** Childhood, Lying in; Daily Life, Lying in; Lying as Norm in Social Interactions; Relationships: Family; Relationships: Friends; Relationships: Sexual.

### Further Readings

- Bussey, K. "Children's Categorization and Evaluation of Different Types of Lies and Truths." *Child Development*, v.70 (1999).
- DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy. "Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, v.74 (1998).
- Erat, S. and U. Gneezy. "White Lies." *Management Science*, v.58 (2012).
- Peterson, C. "Deception in Intimate Relationships." *International Journal of Psychology*, v.31 (1996).
- Sweetser, E. "The Definition of 'Lie': An Examination of the Folk Models Underlying a Semantic Prototype." In *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, D. Hollard and N. Quinn, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Talwar, V., S. M. Murphy, and K. Lee. "White Lie-Telling in Children for Politeness Purposes." *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, v.31 (2007).
- Vrij, A. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2nd ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.

convicted. Eyewitness research indicates that false witness evidence can result from errors in memory, suggestive investigation procedures, malingering, and inability to distinguish truth and lies. However, because of complexities in the charging and recording process, as well as difficulties in establishing the ground truth, the extent of witness error and deception within the criminal justice system is unknown. Whereas eyewitness evidence is overly relied upon by jurors, alibi witness evidence is generally presumed to be deceptive by jurors.

Relatively little research attention has focused upon deliberately deceptive witnesses, with a general focus instead upon eyewitness inaccuracy as an unintentional process. Memory is not perfect, with the potential for errors to occur in the information taken in at the time of an event, the storage of that information, and the later recall. Encoding can be affected by inattention to the event, poor visibility, and stress at the time of witnessing the event caused, for example, by violence or the presence of a weapon. If the crime is not thought about for a long period of time the details can be lost in a process of decay. Finally, interference at the time when the memory is retrieved can cause distortions and errors.

Much research has examined how suggestive police questioning, positive feedback, and repeated exposure to line-up procedures can cause eyewitnesses to have a vastly distorted memory of a crime despite honest intentions to recall the event accurately. The work of Elizabeth Loftus and John Palmer in particular highlighted that the terminology used in questioning could cause participants to overestimate the speed a car was travelling prior to an accident, falsely recall broken glass being present, and remember incorrect information on road signs.

### Witnesses' Motivations to Deceive

The focus upon witness error instead of deception may result from the fact that, generally speaking, witnesses have less motivation to lie than suspects. Suspects have nothing to lose by lying, as successful deception may help them evade conviction, and failed lies are unlikely to attract charges in addition to their index offense charges. In contrast to this, witnesses who would otherwise not be at risk of prosecution stand only to lose should

## Witness, False Testimony of

The false testimony of witnesses has the potential to allow guilty suspects to evade conviction and cause innocent individuals to be falsely





*Bobby Seale listens to testimony during the Black Panther Party trial in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1971, in which he was questioned about his involvement in the inside-job torture and murder of a Black Panther Party member. The case was a political hotbed that intensified hostilities between organized political dissent and the government. Seale had a strong motivation to provide false testimony, and his involvement was never proven.*

their lies be discovered. This lesser motivation to lie, and the consequent rarity of witness deception, is the likely reason that most of the deception research has examined detection of suspects rather than witness deception. However, there are two broad reasons why eyewitnesses may provide deliberately deceptive accounts: malingering and fear of offender retribution.

Malingering refers to the fabrication of information for some form of personal gain, whether that be financial, the desire to hurt someone, or the heightened levels of attention experienced as a result of the false claim. In extreme cases this can lead to the false accusations of a crime occurring. There are many documented cases of false allegations of rape, sexual assault, physical assault, and stalking in particular. These accounts can often be very convincing, although there is a suggestion that deceptive witnesses assert

more frequently that they are telling the truth. Moreover, comparisons of genuine accounts of rape with simulated accounts from nonvictims, show that false accounts tend to contain less unusual sexual behaviors and more references to verbal and physical violence. It is generally agreed that malingering is relatively rare and that a more common cause of witness deception is intimidation.

Fear of offender retribution seems to be valid, with approximately 50 percent of vulnerable witnesses reporting intimidation from the defendant and the defendant's family prior to trial. The effect of in-court witness intimidation can be overcome through safeguarding measures, such as the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) links and screens to hide the witness. However, intimidated witnesses may be more prone to deception in order to prevent the case reaching court. Research investigating deception in fearful witnesses has employed an experimental paradigm in which participant eyewitness to a mock crime are instructed to either attempt to correctly identify the offender (truthful), or to imagine that their family would be harmed should they fail to protect the offender (deceptive). This research demonstrates that witnesses tended to protect the offender by overestimating their height, age, and weight in descriptions given to the police. Interestingly, deceptive witnesses tend to state that the offender is not present in the suspect line-up and reach this decision much faster than truthful participants.

As jurors do not perceive impartial eyewitnesses as deliberately deceptive, they presume they must be accurate. This means that jurors place a disproportionately large amount of faith in the accuracy of eyewitnesses, potentially to the detriment of the case. Moreover, when evaluating eyewitness evidence jurors often rely on factors that are not reliable indicators of accuracy. For example, although jurors perceive witness confidence as indicative of accuracy, research shows that there is actually no correlation between confidence and accuracy. However, when participants are specifically instructed to detect which of several witness accounts are genuine and which are deceptive, deception detection abilities show the same truth bias found in studies examining suspect deception detection.

### Child and Elderly Adult Witnesses

The evidence of child witnesses is often treated with considerable suspicion. That is not to say that children are thought to frequently maliciously fabricate information; rather their incomplete cognitive development is seen as preventing them from differentiating between truths and lies. Several countries (such as the United States and Australia) actually insist upon an assessment of truth-lie understanding for child witnesses in an attempt to ascertain the validity of their in-court evidence. However, other countries only ask children to promise to tell the truth (Canada), or do not assess children's understanding of truth and lies at all (Scotland). As children have a tendency to agree to information presented to them and a desire to please adults, it is even more important that police avoid suggestive questioning with child witnesses than with adult witnesses.

It is intended that pointing to body parts on an anatomically detailed (AD) doll allows linguistic and developmental barriers to effective communication to be overcome when children are the victims of or witnesses to a sexual offense. However, more recently the use of AD dolls has proved controversial, with concern that the everyday use of dolls as a plaything may promote fantasy play rather than truth. In general, research into the use of AD dolls suggests that although they increase the quantity of information elicited, this is likely to be due to careful accompanying questioning, rather than the AD doll itself. Nonetheless, AD dolls may be useful in gathering children's terminology for various body parts when the anatomically correct terms used by adults may be unfamiliar to the child.

In general, their developing moral standards mean children may not appreciate the consequences of their false information and so fail to feel guilty. This means that there are significant barriers to the accuracy of child witness accounts, and accuracy rates at detecting children's deception are comparable to those of adult deception suspects, being at roughly chance levels.

Research into elderly adults' eyewitness accuracy in general and more specifically consideration of their deception is at present limited. It appears that older adults show decreased accuracy compared to younger adults; however, older adults appear to be overconfident in their memory and

identifications. This difference in ability seems to be recognized by jurors and police officers, who rate older adults as less capable of giving accurate information than younger adults. However, both of these groups recognize that older adults are not less honest than younger adults; in fact, they are perceived as more honest. Given the aging population of many developed countries enhancing the likelihood of crime witnesses being elderly, more research on this issue is needed.

### Weak Alibi Witness Evidence

The plethora of research examining suspect deception and eyewitness testimony means it is surprising that research into the second leading cause of false convictions—weak alibi witness evidence—is limited. Mock detectives provided with both eyewitness and alibi witness statements generally do not differ in their ratings of suspect guilt compared to mock detectives that receive only an eyewitness statement.

This shows that alibi evidence carries relatively little weight compared with eyewitness evidence. In fact, real-life cases have shown that the presence of up to 40 defense witnesses can be insufficient to deter jurors from believing the testimony of a single eyewitness. This led to the development of the alibi skepticism hypothesis, the idea that evaluators view alibi evidence with considerable suspicion.

Some mock juror research has found a higher frequency of guilty verdicts when defendants' alibis are corroborated by their family compared to corroboration from a stranger, or having no corroboration. It is suggested that this differential treatment of alibi witnesses is due to a presumption of deception among individuals with an existing relationship to the defendant. This has led the alibi witness research to categorize alibi witnesses as either motivated (that is, a parent, partner, or sibling) or unmotivated (that is, a stranger or colleague) to lie for the defendant. There is some basis for this evaluator skepticism as research utilizing a mock suspect and mock alibi witness paradigm shows that incriminating evidence is concealed less often for a comparative stranger than for a partner, parent, or friend. However, motivated witnesses are not consistently associated with either concealing or revealing implicating information about suspects, showing that there is a

complicated relationship between motivated alibi witnesses and alibi honesty. In fact, it appears that personality and individual differences are important factors in alibi witness deception.

### Conclusion

Witnesses may provide false testimony either deliberately or unintentionally. Unintentionally false accounts may result from poor event encoding and negative influences during memory storage and retrieval. Witnesses for the prosecution are generally thought by jurors to be accurate, with malingering and intimidation receiving relatively little research attention. In fact, with the exception of research into children's abilities to differentiate between truth and lies, the psychological literature generally focuses upon witness errors rather than deliberate deception. Research into alibi witness evidence is almost exclusively focused on deception, showing that there is considerable support for the alibi skepticism hypothesis and the enhanced suspicion directed toward motivated alibi witnesses.

Hannah E. Fawcett

*Manchester Metropolitan University*

**See Also:** Alibi; Bible; Book of Mormon; Childhood, Lying in; Dreyfus Affair; False Confessions; False Memories; Justice; Lying, Intentionality of; Law and Law Enforcement; Malingering; Perjury; Truth Bias.

### Further Readings

- Culhane, Scott and Harmon Hosch. "An Alibi Witness' Influence on Mock Jurors' Verdicts." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, v.34 (2004).
- Fawcett, Hannah. An Investigation Into Deceptive Alibi Witness Testimony. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University, 2012.
- Loftus, Elizabeth. *Eyewitness Testimony*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Olson, Elizabeth and Gary Wells. "What Makes a Good Alibi? A Proposed Taxonomy." *Law and Human Behavior*, v.28 (2004).
- Vrij, Aldert. *Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities*. 2d ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- Yarmey, Daniel. "The Effects of Deception on Eyewitness Reports." *Canadian Journal of Police & Security Services*, v.2 (2004).

## Wizards of Lie Detection

"Wizards" of lie detection, or "truth wizards," are people with an unusually high rate of accuracy in lie detection. As defined by the Wizards Project, wizards are at least 80 percent accurate in their identification of truths and lies, compared with the 50 percent rate in an average person (the same rate achieved by means of sheer chance, like flipping a coin). Out of 20,000 people tested by the project, only 50 were identified as wizards, indicating that lie detection talent is more sparsely distributed in the population than academic prowess or athletic ability. Initial criticism focused on the possibility that the discovery of such a small number of wizards could indicate sheer coincidence. A Winston Salem State University study, however, while using a smaller sample size (about 250 people), found similar results.

The Wizards Project was organized by psychologists Maureen O'Sullivan and Paul Ekman at the University of California, San Francisco, and was originally called the Diogenes Project, after the Greek philosopher Diogenes. One of the questions raised by the project's study is where lie detection ability comes from: whether it is learned, a side effect of other competencies, an innate talent, or whether there might even be a gene for it. Apart from Secret Service agents, in the initial study, law enforcement professionals and psychologists performed no better than undergraduate volunteers, which suggests that it is not an ability simply developed by working in a field in which lie detection is useful.

Ekman is one of the most widely cited researchers in psychology as a result of his work in the project, especially his study of the way that facial expressions reveal emotion, which are then detected by wizards. He has argued for biological correlates to emotions and emotional responses, a model that has become central to the field of evolutionary psychology and which restored the Darwinian view of emotional expression after a period in which it had fallen out of favor because of the dominance of the anthropological view that specificity of emotional expression was culturally determined. This difference between cultural and biological determination is key to the concept of truth wizards as understood by the project and research based on its findings.

## Universal Emotions

While movies and TV shows will often show a wife telling her husband that she knows he's lying because he always tugs on his beard when he lies, that is a "tell," which depends on the detector's intimate knowledge of the liar and is uniquely characteristic of the liar.

That sort of lie detection is of no real use to law enforcement professionals. Ekman's work instead proposes universal emotions—emotions that are expressed in significantly similar ways throughout the human race, regardless of culture—specifically, universals in the expressions that indicate deceit or distress on the part of the speaker. The existence of biologically determined universals does not mean that the husband might not also tug his beard while lying; it only means that other means of detecting his lie also exist. Some of Ekman's work has focused on showing that these universal expressions are present in tribal cultures that have had no contact with depictions of emotion, that their universality cannot be explained through a mechanism by which those expressions were learned.

Key to Ekman's work on the project is the idea of microexpressions. Microexpressions are facial expressions which occur very briefly, for a fraction of a second. They are involuntary, and because of this, they are most likely to be seen when a subject is consciously trying to restrain his facial expressions or emulate an emotion that he is not feeling. This is especially true in times of great stress. Ekman did not discover microexpressions, which were detailed in the 1960s by E. A. Haggard and K. S. Isaacs in a study of "micro-momentary" facial expressions in psychotherapy sessions. He pioneered in the relevance of microexpressions to lying and lie detection, theorizing that "natural-born liars" exhibit a degree of control over their microexpressions that is lacking in the general population, while truth wizards pick up on these microexpressions, along with other verbal and nonverbal cues, in making their estimation. Although microexpressions are easily observed on film or video, they are difficult to perceive otherwise, and because of their brevity and subtleness, most people do not even notice that they are occurring, especially if the face is in movement anyway because the subject is speaking.

Microexpressions have entered the popular imagination with the television series *Lie To Me* (Fox, 2009–11), to which Ekman served as consultant. *Lie to Me* takes the existence of truth wizards as its premise, with the protagonist, played by Tim Roth, lending his lie detection abilities to law enforcement investigations. Roth's partner, played by *The Practice*'s Kelli Williams, is loosely based on O'Sullivan. Before she passed away in 2010, O'Sullivan was critical of certain aspects of the series, particularly that it oversimplified microexpressions and other behaviors that indicate mood.

Ekman has contributed to work on developing a lie detection software program that detects microexpressions in much the same way that wizards do. His work has also been used to develop the Silent Talker, a lie detector developed at Manchester Metropolitan University in the early 2000s. The Silent Talker uses cameras to observe a subject in order to feed video information to a software program that analyzes nonverbal behavior, including microexpressions, cognitive load, and duping delight. The Wizards Project has led to a small cottage industry of services claiming to train people in lie detection by teaching the methods used by truth wizards. Apart from a handful of legitimate research endeavors like software lie detectors, there is little experimental data on these services, nor reason to trust their efficacy.

Bill Kte'pi  
*Independent Scholar*

**See Also:** Cognitive Load; Duping Delight; Ekman, Paul; Emotions; *Lie to Me*; Lying, Difficulty of; Lying as Ability or Skill; Meta-Analysis; Microfacial Expressions; Nonverbal Cues.

## Further Readings

- Appelbaum, P. S. "The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the Courts." *Psychiatric Services*, v.58 (2007).
- Bond, C. F., Jr. and A. Uysal. "On Lie Detection 'Wizards.'" *Law and Human Behavior*, v.31/1 (2007).
- Granhag, Par and Leid Stromwall. *The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.



## Women

Scholars in various fields have devoted significant attention to understanding the discrepancies in men and women's engagement in social deviance pertaining to lying and deception. Although biological sex is a known factor contributing to the use of deceptive communication, research to date has also demonstrated the relevance of social norms and contexts that shape the influence of both sexes in criminal activities and intimate relationships. Because of different life experiences and levels of self-regulation, women differ from their male counterparts with respect to the types of crime they are choosing to engage in. In the arena of a romantic relationship, both men and women are likely to use deception to attain their means, though in different ways.

Among the human impulses that enhance the ability for survival and shape modern lifestyles, human nature consists of a fair number of selfish drives and urges that often propel one to lie and deceive. Classic works as well as the most recent empirical findings have illuminated the intimate link between biological sex and social deviance. Research, which attempts to understand the discrepancies of deviant behaviors, such as each sex's tendencies for betrayal, cheating, and destructive behaviors, has considered a number of theoretical explanations. Specifically, behavioral distinctions are made to elucidate how females differ from their male counterparts from various perspectives, ranging from the biological aspects to the social domain. Further, cultural stereotypes also call upon the normative standards that women should be evaluated against, as the legacy of moral standards continues to shape contemporary gender ideologies and identity development.

But biological sex is not the only static attribute when it comes to deception; it is also crucial to pinpoint the environmental forces and multiple social contexts influencing the inherent capacities and predispositions of human nature. In general, social norms that encompass the established regulations and behavioral expectations not only provide rules of conduct for men and women but also are essential for society's survival. Moreover, social stigma in supporting the perpetuation of social inequality also has its most profound impact on social marginalization of women who

deceive. But a comprehensive examination of women's experience requires the exploration of their relationships with their male counterparts.

### Women and Crime

In the realm of criminal activity, most social research on adult criminality focuses on the understanding of male behaviors and neglects to consider the impact of gender discrepancies in life experience. Specifically, ample evidence suggests that women, unlike men, are less likely to undergo the same events that propel men to crimes involving lying and deception. Because men and women experience different forms of strain, they are likely to possess different interpretations and conceptualizations of the types of strain they encounter. Hence, men and women's emotional reactions to strain, propensity to react to strain with crime, and respective pathways to crime may differ.

Further, women also face additional problems conditioned by class and race. Minorities represent a disproportionate number of incarcerated women, and these women have depleted economic resources, poor educational attainment, minimal marketable skills, and job experiences. Many women also identify the abuses they experienced as the leading cause of their law-breaking. Their life experiences are likely to be accompanied by emotions such as depression, guilt, fear, and shame, which further decrease their likelihood of committing serious property crimes and violent crimes against others but increase the likelihood of self-destructive and noncriminal offenses motivated by substance abuse and poverty. These crimes are often used to finance their daily activities and meet the needs of others. As such, unlike their male counterparts, who are more likely to be involved in corporate crime, women are more likely to engage in petty thefts.

The functions of self-control and social control have been the primary focuses of men and women's lying and deceptive behaviors and, ultimately, their criminal activities. Differences in both internal and external mechanisms between sexes are strong predictors of the frequency as well as the types of deception in which men and women engage. Empirical research on the self-control theory postulates that individuals with higher self-control are in a better position to regulate their urges and impulses. Without an internalization of

the mechanisms and values that restrain propensity to social deviance, both men and women are equally likely to turn to deception at the expense of others.

Low self-control is associated with impulsivity and short sightedness; individuals with low internal control also have weaker ties that foster strong social control. Existing evidence generally supports the notion that women exhibit greater self-control compared with men in most cultures. The gendered socialization process, in particular, may account for the source of this variation as boys are socialized to be greater risk-takers, whereas girls are taught to be more reserved and conservative. Because of different social expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior for boys versus girls, parents may be quicker to recognize and punish impulsivity and deviant behaviors exhibited by daughters rather than sons.

Nevertheless, family socialization alone does not insure the acquisition of self-control and conformity to societal norms. Extra familial socialization within schools and community are also strong determinants of self-control and the motivation to deceive. Even though both men and women are generally concerned with how they are being perceived by others in order to be in line with the “good boy” and “good girl” orientation, social institutions and the general public typically place harsher punishment on women who deviate from the social norms when compared with their deviant male counterparts.

### **Deception in Romantic Relationships**

Lying and deception do not necessarily lead to criminal offenses. Many of the same motives that propel deceptive orientation also motivate non-criminal behaviors in everyday lives. Whereas self-control is essential to understanding the sex differences in criminal involvement, the frequency of deception and deception motivations are contingent upon the nature of the opportunities afforded to both sexes, as well as the rational calculation of potential benefits and risks of their deceptive behaviors. Deception is commonly used by both men and women who are seeking potential mates. Because each sex looks for potential partners with the most appealing characteristics, evolutionary and social psychologists contend that to increase the probability of successful mating, both genders

are likely to utilize lies and deception in order to conceal drawbacks and limitations to their real identities and resources. Stated simply, in finding and keeping a mate, women, just like men, are compelled to maximize the positive impressions they make and to display the possession of desirable characteristics or imply that these characteristics will be acquired in the near future.

Differing perceptions of attractive partners for men and women, as well as the need to compete with rivals for attractive partners, makes a certain degree of deception necessary in the mating and courtship process. Although the most sought-after traits are fairly consistent across cultures for both men and women, certain traits are given relative importance based on each sex. For example, women seek emotionally committed and financially stable men, whereas men opt for women with youth and beauty. Essentially, in order to maximize the chances of finding a mate, women are compelled to display the characteristic that is deemed important for men: physical attractiveness. To maximize the possibility of finding an attractive mate, some are reticent to disclose certain types of information to potential partners.

Specifically, a woman's deception can take many forms, ranging from changing her appearance to concealing body parts that are believed to be inadequate. Just as women are likely to deceive men with respect to their actual physical attractiveness, women anticipate that men will be less truthful when disclosing characteristics vital to women, such as financial position and level of dedication to the relationship. Nevertheless, successful mating is most likely when deception is least expected by either gender.

The decision to deceive is connected to perceived payoffs accrued from the deceitful behaviors. Women's deceptive behaviors in mate selection are intimately related to their reproductive experiences. From the evolutionary perspective, women have two dominant interests in men: genes and resources. Women bear increased costs from potential mating “mistakes,” and reap increased reproductive benefits from mating with someone possessing resources essential for their offspring. As a consequence, women are motivated to develop strategies that optimize the chances of obtaining men with superior genes and resources in order to insure the survival of the next generation.

Unlike men, who are generally more interested in multiple partners, women prefer men who are committed to helping raise offspring. Ultimately, the relative scarcity of high-quality genes makes it imperative for women to develop “deceitful” mating strategies in order to secure investment from men, which increases the chances that good genes for her offspring will be passed on.

Importantly, lying and deception do not end with a marriage license; infidelity is pervasive among some married couples, despite the fact that infidelity is socially and culturally frowned upon. With respect to the frequency of infidelity, early studies indicate that men are more likely to engage in infidelity than women. However, more recent studies demonstrate that the gap has narrowed. In other words, when other forms of infidelity (for example, emotional infidelity) are considered, women commit as much infidelity as men.

Many theoretical explanations have been advanced to explain the basis for infidelity. Empirical findings suggest that women may be more likely to be unfaithful to a partner if his genetic quality is low in order to increase the probability of gaining high-quality genes. Although infidelity can be caused by various situational factors, such as the availability of adequate opportunities, these factors alone cannot explain an individual's decision to stray in a committed relationship. Rather, gender differences in the rate of infidelity are also mediated by a person's ability to regulate their impulses and overcome their desires.

Men and women may have different conceptualizations of infidelity. Unlike men, women tend to perceive their affairs as emotional rather than sexual. Likewise, because emotional infidelity increases the chances that male partners will divert attention, time, and resources to a rival, women may become more wary of their partner's emotional infidelity than of their sexual infidelity. Perhaps one of the strongest personality predictors of infidelity is gender differences in regulating the feeling of guilt. Committed women are especially more sensitive to a partner's feelings. Further, unlike women, men experience less guilt following an infidelity, and are more likely to justify their behavior.

Most of the gender studies and findings reveal women's greater tendency to be more empathetic and sensitive about other people's needs

and less likely to use deception to attain their means. Alternatively, because women typically realize the potential damage to their relationship, they are less likely to use deception for fear of jeopardizing their relationship. Finally, personality scholars suggest that females also experience more anxiety when deceiving. With respect to the nature of their deception, men are prone to telling selfish lies, whereas women are more inclined to tell altruistic lies. Regardless of the motivation for infidelity and cheating, women who deceive are more likely to be stigmatized and encounter gender-based double standards.

Yok-Fong Paat  
University of Texas at El Paso

**See Also:** Cheating; Courtship, Deception in; Infidelity; Men; Relationships: Romantic; Relationships: Sexual; White Lies.

### Further Readings

- Agnew, Robert. *Pressured Into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2006.
- Benz, Joseph J., et al. “Attributions of Deception in Dating Situation.” *Psychological Record*, v.55/2 (2005).
- Ciarocco, Natalie, et al. “Hungry for Love: The Influence of Self-Regulation on Infidelity.” *Journal of Social Psychology*, v.152/1 (2012).
- Elmslie, Bruce and Edinaldo Tebaldi. “So, What Did You Do Last Night? The Economics of Infidelity.” *KYKLOS*, v.61/3 (2008).
- Gottfredson, Michael R. and Travis Hirschi. *A General Theory of Crime*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Mark, Kristen P., et al. “Infidelity in Heterosexual Couples: Demographic, Interpersonal, and Personality-Related Predictors of Extradyadic Sex.” *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, v.40/5 (2011).
- Miller, Saul L. “Coping With Romantic Betrayal: Sex Differences in Responses to Partner Infidelity.” *Evolutionary Psychology*, v.6/3 (2008).
- Peterson, Candida. “Deception in Intimate Relationships.” *International Journal of Psychology*, v.31/6 (1996).
- Singer, Kristi H. “Feminist Perspectives on Female Offending.” *Women & Criminal Justice*, v.12/1 (2000).

# World War I

World War I, also known as The Great War, took place between July 1914 and November 1918, and involved a complex web of motives, alliances, and accusations that led to several important forms and instances of deception. Before and during the war, countries involved in the conflict used propaganda to mislead their citizens about the status and reasons for fighting. Aided by new technology, World War I also brought about the creation of deadly weapons that relied on tactics of deception and subterfuge, such as the infamous U-boats. Additional notable examples of deception in the war were the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the Zimmerman Telegram, both of which influenced the United States' decision to enter the war. Further, the U.S. public supported the war because of intentional misinformation both about conditions on the front line and the character of the opposition.

## Alliances and Motivations

Alliances and motivations prior to World War I are important to understand key deceptions that led to the conflict and influenced the manner in which the war was waged. The war began when Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated on June 28, 1914, by the Black Hand, a Serbian secret nationalist society. Austria-Hungary blamed the Serbian government for Ferdinand's death and issued an ultimatum demanding the apprehension of the assassins. Austria-Hungary's goal was to undermine Serbian authority in order to incite a reaction that would give Austria-Hungary a reason to declare war. When the Serbian response to the ultimatum was not satisfactory, Austria-Hungary took the opportunity to declare war.

Alliances were formed and declarations were made in rapid succession. Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary in support of Russia's ally, Serbia. Germany joined the conflict using the nation's treaty with Austria-Hungary and Russia's mobilization against Germany as a reason to declare war against Russia. Because of an alliance with Russia, France found itself pitted against Germany and, by extension, Austria-Hungary. Germany invaded Belgium en route to Paris, bringing Great Britain and its colonies into the war based

on a long-standing agreement to defend Belgium. All of this occurred within two months of Austria-Hungary's initial declaration of war against Serbia. Austria-Hungary's ultimatum had been quickly converted from a limited war to a worldwide engagement.

The quick escalation of the war was caused not only by the tangle of alliances but also by underlying, and less public, nationalistic motives. Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the German Empire, played a large role in a critical deception prior to the war. In 1870, the Prussian army defeated France, prompted by well-timed suggestions and a fake telegram deceptively and intentionally crafted by Bismarck. The resulting alliances, created by Bismarck to protect his newly established German Empire, set the groundwork for World War I.

The hasty escalation of World War I was aided in part by some countries using treaties as a pretext to avenge losses from 19th-century skirmishes. Social distress brewed in the growing disconnect between the upper-class imperial mindset and middle- to lower-class socialist views. This tension also contributed to countries' desire to incite war. Some countries, including Germany and Britain, were hoping to unite restless populations behind a common, nationalistic goal, even if it had to be instigated indirectly. This deception involved the obstruction of motives, as countries tried to maintain an image that they were acting out of moral obligations to their allies, rather than to achieve their own ends.

## Propaganda

Propaganda was another key form of deception in World War I that was used to distribute information in support of a cause and manipulate public opinion. Leaders used it to evoke hatred against the enemy, enhance existing friendships with allies, create common ground with neutral countries, and demoralize the enemy. Used to mislead their own citizens as well as other countries, propaganda took on a variety of forms, from oral propaganda to newspapers and posters.

For example, while anti-German sentiment was on the rise in the United States at the outset of the war, public opinion was not unified. President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) in 1917 to promote the war



internally and make clear the United States' intentions abroad. Tapping into knowledge of psychology and advertising, the CPI launched what was then the largest modern propaganda campaign ever carried out. The CPI released guidelines for the media to report facts in a light that reflected positively on America's involvement. These guidelines were widely adopted by the media, largely because they wanted to stay in the information loop. The CPI monitored information dissemination and used various types of media, including photographs, leaflets, and films, to saturate information channels with propaganda.

One propaganda tactic was emotional appeal, which involved stirring up people's emotions and then manipulating those emotions into desired actions, such as donating to the war effort or enlisting in the military. Another propaganda method was demonization, which depicted the enemy as a ruthless aggressor. The goal of this technique in the United States was to fan the flame of anti-German sentiments. A common, and effective, execution of this type of propaganda was the use of atrocity stories, created by relying on the exaggeration of not necessarily substantiated material to arouse feelings of disgust and hatred. Another propaganda technique was the effort to appeal to niche intellectual groups, such as businessmen, teachers, and pacifists, with messages about the eventual benefit of the war. For instance, the War to End All Wars campaign came from this propaganda approach.

Typically, propaganda highlighted cultural differences. The scarcity of dual-language speakers was exploited because people could not readily access or understand propaganda from the opposition. Deceptive posters, articles, and photos left citizens with a false impression of their side's imminent success and the imperative role their actions would play in that success.

### Submarine Warfare and Deception

In Britain, World War I is considered the most popular war ever fought by that nation, and this opinion is attributed largely to effective propaganda. For example, the German decision to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare was used to develop propaganda. The Germans used submarines called U-boats, an abbreviation from the German *unterseeboot* meaning undersea boat,

to attack ships with the goal of cutting off Britain's communication and trade. Many British naval leaders likened this action to piracy, arguing that it was morally wrong to sink nonmilitary ships without warning, and this view was spread through the populace with various forms of propaganda.

The actual use of unrestricted submarine warfare was also a case of deception during the war. Civilian ships were led to believe they were safe because prior warfare conventions excluded civilian ships as possible targets and because there was no sure way of detecting or predicting an attack. The deception lay in the false sense of security created by traditional warfare that was undermined by surprise U-boat attacks. The nature of a surprise attack involves deception because the target is given no warning of the impending danger and the aggressor is intentionally focusing on nonmilitary ships. The use of unrestricted submarine warfare, employed both at the beginning and end of the war, with a brief respite in 1916 because of protests of its unjustifiable aggression, shattered wartime conventions of expected behavior between opponents and ultimately brought the United States into the war.


Both sides in the conflict engaged in deception regarding the RMS *Lusitania*. The *Lusitania*, a British ocean liner, set out from the United States to England on May 1, 1915. The fastest passenger liner at the time, travelers saw the *Lusitania* as the safest option for crossing the Atlantic. The Germans placed an advertisement in a newspaper the morning of the departure, warning passengers of the dangers of riding the boat: Germany suspected the *Lusitania* of transporting ammunition, making it a potential U-boat target. The captain of the *Lusitania*, William Turner, assured travelers that because it was a passenger ship, they would not be in danger. The *Lusitania* was sunk on May 7 by a German U-boat, resulting in the deaths of 1,195 people. The German suspicions of deception, however, were later confirmed: the *Lusitania* had in fact been carrying ammunition to the British. Turner's assurance that the ship was simply a passenger ship was false. Even so, the event ignited already growing anti-German sentiment in the United States and played a role in the eventual addition of America to the Allied forces.

### Zimmerman Telegram

New communication technologies also provided instances of deception. The Zimmerman Telegram (or Note) is one famous example and was another source of tension between the United States and Germany. President Wilson, in an effort to facilitate the peace process, granted Germany the use of a U.S. State Department cable between Berlin and the German embassy in Washington, with the stipulation that any cables sent over the cable must be related to the peace process. Choosing not to honor that condition, the German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, used the cable to send a message to be passed onto the German minister in Mexico. The telegraph offered U.S. territory to Mexico in exchange for that nation's assistance in keeping the United States out of the war. Zimmerman requested that Mexico attack the United States from the southwest with the

goal of obtaining Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Zimmerman's hope was that the United States would be too occupied to join the war in Europe. Additionally, Zimmerman urged the Mexican minister to persuade Japan to join the German side. Germany not only ignored its agreement to use the cable peacefully but used it in an effort to incite action against the United States.

However, British cryptanalysts intercepted and decoded the telegram in January 1917. They did not wish to reveal the existence of their code-breaking room, so instead they relied on espionage to acquire the full text of the telegram in order to present it to the United States. A man who worked in the Mexico City telegraph office owed a favor to the British chargé d'affaires in Mexico and was happy to provide a copy of the telegram. The British revealed the telegram's contents to the United States on February 24, 1917. Deceiving through



*A drawing made for the New York Herald and the London Sphere, circa 1915, shows the R.M.S. Lusitania as a second torpedo hits behind a gaping hole in the hull on May 7, 1915. The sinking revealed a crucial, and tragic, deception that occurred during World War I. The British ocean liner set out from the United States to England on May 1 with assurances to the passengers that because it was a passenger ship, it was not an enemy target. In fact, the Lusitania had been carrying ammunition to the British as the Germans suspected, leading to its destruction by a German U-boat torpedo and the deaths of 1,195 people. The event further ignited anti-German sentiment.*

omission, the British withheld information from the United States for weeks after the telegram's discovery to allow American anti-German sentiment to continue to grow, particularly after the recent re-election of Wilson on the premise of neutrality. Wilson received the telegraph only a few weeks after he had cut off diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States in response to U-boat warfare. The Zimmerman Telegram was the final incident that drew the United States into the war alongside the Allies in 1917.

World War I began with an alliance network that had been slowly established over many years through smaller wars, nationalistic pride, and deception. Propaganda helped garner support for the war effort, employing deception to mold public opinion. The introduction of U-boats added a new form of deception and tactics to warfare, forcing countries to re-evaluate techniques, trust, and in the case of the United States, involvement in the war. Finally, the Zimmerman Telegram brought together the deceptive nature of the war with devious behavior by all parties. World War I was unlike any war that had been waged before, and deception was fully entrenched in the entire conflict.

Holly Domke  
Jeffrey T. Hancock  
*Cornell University*

**See Also:** Camouflage; Deception Motives; Dreyfus Affair; Government Propaganda; Military Deception; Smoke Screen; World War II.

### Further Readings

Duffy, Michael. "The Causes of World War One." <http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm> (Accessed September 2012).

History Channel. "U-Boats Sink the Lusitania in 1915." <http://www.history.com/videos/u-boats-sink-the-lusitania-in-1915> (Accessed September 2012).

Kingsbury, Celia Malone. *For Home and Country: World War I Propaganda on the Home Front*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010.

Nicolas, David. "Lucky Break." *History Today*, v.57/9 (2007).

Yates, Richard E. "Zimmerman Telegram." In *Dictionary of American History*, 3d ed., Vol. 8., Stanley I. Kutler, ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003.

## World War II

When it comes to studying deception as a tactic of war, World War II has proven to be the most useful case study in history. Both the Axis and the Allied forces routinely turned to lying and deceit to attempt to better position their sides for victory. World War II took place between 1939 and 1945 and involved a majority of the nations of the world—especially the major powers. A widespread war, nations placed their entire domestic capabilities into the effort, hoping to assure victory. Overall, between 50 and 70 million individuals perished during the six years of battles.

World War II was largely fought in two main theaters. In the Pacific Theater, Japan was working to gain complete control over East Asia, while the European Theater saw the rise of Nazi Germany and subsequent attacks against France and the United Kingdom. Later, Italy joined sides with the German forces. While the war formally began when Germany invaded Poland, the United States did not get officially involved until after the Pearl Harbor attacks in December 1941. The war in the European Theater came to a close when Polish and Soviet troops captured Berlin, forcing Germany into surrender. Japan later surrendered after two atom bombs were dropped by the United States, and the Soviet Union formally declared war.

### The Allies' Deceptive Tactics

During the war, both sides employed numerous operations and missions aimed at deceiving the enemy. Operation Bodyguard was an Allied plan launched during the buildup to the 1944 D-Day invasion of Normandy. The actual goal was to mislead the German command about the location and date of the invasion. Axis leaders—especially Adolf Hitler—were well aware that some form of invasion was likely to happen as a result of their actions in the region. As a result, coastal defenses were not particularly strong as Hitler aimed to defend every part of Europe from a possible attack. By convincing Hitler that Normandy was just a diversion, it would deflect crucial manpower from that area and make the invasion far easier on Allied soldiers. The Allied forces were successful in convincing Axis leaders that the invasion would come later and that it would be far more likely to occur through the



Pas-de-Calais, Balkans, or Norway. Once the invasion began in Normandy, Hitler still refused to move all troops from Pas-de-Calais, thinking that the Normandy landing was just a diversion. This was one of the most—if not the most—successful missions of World War II.

Operation Copperhead was run by British forces and inspired by the 1943 movie *Five Graves to Cairo*. Its mission was to contribute to the success of Operation Bodyguard by misleading German intelligence about the whereabouts of General Bernard Montgomery. Because Montgomery was a field marshal and one of the more well-known Allied leaders, German intelligence expected him to play a key role in any invasion. So British troops arranged a body double and had him make a series of high-profile appearances in Gibraltar and Algiers leading up to the invasion. The British hoped that if the Germans saw someone they thought was Montgomery in those locations, they would assume an invasion must not be imminent. While there is no clear proof that the operation had any great impact, it is one of the more creative efforts to deceive the enemy witnessed in World War II.

Operation Quicksilver was a major element of the Allied victory in World War II and focused on deceiving Axis forces in the European Theater (particularly Hitler). Quicksilver was a subplot attached to Operation Fortitude South, which was launched in 1944 to help detract German attention from the beaches of Normandy. Ultimately, the goal was to convince Axis leaders that any American invasion would occur at the Pas-de-Calais near the Strait of Dover. By creating such deception, Allied forces hoped to ensure a greater chance of victory by limiting the presence of Axis forces in the area of Normandy. The plan was thought up by Colonel David Strangeways, who was actually a specialist in military deception.

The primary tactic of Quicksilver was the creation of a fake element of the U.S. Army. German leaders—including Hitler himself—were, over time, convinced that there was an American army group preparing to land in the Pas-de-Calais for the major invasion that had long been expected. The group, fictitiously called the First U.S. Army Group, was allegedly training under General George Patton in the United Kingdom while finalizing details of the invasion. The key player in the

scheme was Joan Pujol Garcia. He was a double agent loyal to the Allies who supplied the Germans with all of the detailed information created by the Allied forces to help steer the Axis leaders away from their actual plans.

Operation Fortitude was another Allied deception that contributed to the success of Operation Bodyguard. Fortitude involved a North and South section aimed at misleading Axis leaders about the precise location of the forthcoming invasion. Rather than using radio communications to deceive, Fortitude created fake field armies to threaten Norway and Pas-de-Calais. This was perhaps the most important deception employed during World War II, as it diverted attention away from Normandy both before and immediately after the D-Day invasion.

Operation Accumulator was a naval operation organized by Allied forces in June 1944 intended to further support the initial invasion of France. The mission centered on two destroyers making false radio transmissions that they knew would be intercepted. The message transmitted was that there were engine problems that would lead to a delay in the invasion. German military forces, however, never responded to the transmissions, and even an Allied pilot seemed perplexed by the presence of the destroyers.

Operations Big Drum, Glimmer, and Taxable were all deception techniques carried out by Allied naval forces to support Operation Neptune (a plan to deceive the Germans about the invasion at Normandy in 1944). The operations involved small boats and aircraft running fake invasions, created through decoys, radar jamming, and wireless traffic, of Cap d'Antifer, Pas-de-Calais, and Normandy. The goal was to either convince the Germans that the invasion was about to happen somewhere beyond Normandy or that the invasion was not overly large. Ultimately, the success of these three operations cannot be authoritatively judged. While they unquestionably contributed to more confusion among the Axis powers, there was little immediate response from German forces. Operation Titanic was another element of D-Day, orchestrated by Allied air forces to drop dummy parachutists into drop zones far away from the actual drop zones. The hope was that the Germans would think the invasion force was significantly larger than it actually was.



Operation Hardboiled was a 1942 deception plan created by the London Controlling Section aimed at tricking the Germans into thinking there was a strong invasion threat in Norway. It was one of the least useful deception plans undertaken by Allied forces, because of a lack of enthusiasm among leadership and troops alike. Because of the number of double agent threats, it had to be planned and prepared for as a real mission that would actually never come to be. Despite invasion never actually taking place, Hitler did opt to reinforce the Scandinavian region in the immediate aftermath of learning of Operation Hardboiled.

Operation Bertram was carried out by Allied forces in the Middle East in 1942. The goal—like many other World War II deception plans—was to confuse German military commander Erwin Rommel about the timing and location for an upcoming Allied attack. To do so, Allied troops created the appearance of army units in areas where there were none and also concealed armor and artillery in other areas. By selectively moving vehicles forward and disguising them, Rommel was led to believe that an attack was ready to be launched, causing him to be unprepared to defend. When the attack began, it was too late.

Operation Cascade occurred in 1942 while British forces in the Middle East were at their weakest point in the war. Given the limited strength of operations at the time, deception was used to convince Axis leaders to not attack. By using false troop formations, radio traffic, and a series of double agents, the British were able to confuse Axis leaders about how many troops they actually had, making an attack unlikely.

Operation Barclay worked to help the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943. The goal was to deceive German and Italian powers about where the invasion would come from. The Allies used fake troop movements, radio communications, and interpreter recruitment to point toward a Balkan invasion. Most important, the Allied forces created a fake army with 12 divisions. Hitler fell for the deception and increased Axis presence in the eastern Mediterranean, which made the invasion of Sicily a definite surprise for the nonexpecting enemy.

Operation Mincemeat was a British disinformation campaign carried on during the war in conjunction with Operation Barclay. With the

Allied forces planning to invade Sicily in 1943, Operation Mincemeat aimed to convince German commanders that the actual targets were Greece and Sardinia. In order to successfully do so, Allied leaders allowed the Germans to think they had found secret Allied documents that discussed details of war plans and tactics. In order to do so, the British pinned the documents to a corpse and had it wash ashore where Germans would be sure to find it. The hope was that such a tactic would come across as less likely to be undertaken by the enemy.

Operation Cockade involved a series of deceptions by the Allied forces to remove German pressures on Allied and Soviet troops. Strategically, this operation aimed to use fake attacks in western Europe to cause Axis leaders to move troops and supplies. The main objective, however, was to force the Luftwaffe into a large-scale air campaign against the British and American air forces that would lead to Allied air superiority over all of Europe.

Operation Scherhorn was a deception plan utilized against Nazi leaders between 1944 and 1945. It had originally been created by Josef Stalin. The objective was to give the illusion of a large German group plotting behind the front line in Russian territory. When Nazi intelligence resources came out to help the troops, Russians would capture them and in the process limit intelligence resources.

### **The Axis Powers' Use of Deception**

It was not just Allied forces that utilized deception as part of their war strategy; Axis forces used this tactic as well. For example, the Gleiwitz incident occurred on the evening before Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939. A series of Nazi soldiers posed as Polish citizens and staged an attack against a German radio station. The hope was to create the appearance of aggression being shown against Germany by Poland in the immediate time frame before Germany invaded. Nazi leadership pushed for numerous propaganda events, such as the one at Gleiwitz, to win the battle over public opinion.

Operation Harpune was a major German plan in 1941. At the time, Germany was putting all of its internal efforts into Operation Barbarossa (which was the invasion of the Soviet Union) and

needed a distractor so as to not give its strategy away. Operation Harpune was a propaganda push aimed at convincing Allied leaders that Operation Seelowe (the invasion of Great Britain by ground troops) was inevitable. The original intent was to run the fake invasion on multiple days (turning about each time) to cause great confusion among the British. Likewise, a German cruiser would use diversionary tactics near Iceland to add to the confusion, and another German cruiser would raid merchant shipping in the Atlantic. If the Germans had had the necessary manpower and air dominance needed for Operation Seelowe to work, Operation Harpune might have been a key ingredient for a potential German occupation of Great Britain.

Operation Kremlin was another successful German deception operation conducted in 1942 against Soviet forces. At the time of the operation, German forces were planning to begin staging a series of attacks to eliminate Soviet forces in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. But they knew focusing all of their energies on this tactic would tip off the Soviets to their plans. As a distraction, German leaders ordered troops at the earliest time possible to restart a series of large-scale attacks on Moscow. Despite there being no actual intention to move the focus toward Moscow, Soviet leaders were very concerned about the news. It aligned with what they thought Germany would do, and it also matched with previous German behavior. To really sell the threat as legitimate, Germany ordered the Luftwaffe to practice more reconnaissance flights, and Soviet prisoners-of-war were asked numerous questions about the possible defense of Moscow before being released. While the actual success of Operation Kremlin when considering the overall war can be questioned, it undoubtedly registered with Soviet leadership and caused them to alter their strategic plans.

Funkspiel was a counterespionage operation carried out by Nazi forces during the war. Operationally, Funkspiel involved capturing radio operators in France and forcing them to send false messages to Allied leaders. Further, the operators allowed Nazi troops to intercept valid Allied information. The plan was successful until May

1944, when the British discovered the plan and started feeding back incorrect information to confuse Axis leaders.

Operation Blumenpflucken was a major Axis deceit scheme carried out in late 1944 in Norway. Planned by Ernst Weiner, the aim was to break down the Norwegian resistance to Axis occupation. The goal was to capture and kill random Norwegians instead of attacking actual resistance leaders. By doing so, the Axis powers intended to place the blame on resistance leaders for the killings, causing a domestic backlash against them. Ultimately 11 Norwegians were killed, and many across the globe continued to incorrectly blame the resistance movement well into the 1990s.

What emerges from this brief overview is a clear picture of how widespread deception was a military tactic during World War II. With nearly equal bases of power and supplies, the outcome ultimately became a matter of psychological operations that pitted the Axis and Allied powers in a strategic battle unlike anything ever witnessed in the history of the world.

William J. Miller  
Flagler College

**See Also:** Authoritarian States; Battle of the Bulge; Big Lie Technique; Camouflage; Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Government Propaganda; Hitler, Adolf; Korean War; Military Deception; Nazi Propaganda; Normandy, Allied Invasion of; Operation Bodyguard; Operation Mincemeat; Operation Neptune; Operation Quicksilver; Smoke Screen; Stalin, Josef; Vietnam War; World War I.

### Further Readings

- Barbier, Mary. *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Crowdy, Terry. *Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II*. New York: Osprey, 2008.
- Holt, Thaddeus. *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War*. New York: Scribner, 2004.



# Glossary

---

**Absence of information:** A flaw in human reasoning in which people asked to make judgments based on specified information seldom think about the fact that other, important information might not be supplied to them.

***Ad hominen* attack:** A logical fallacy in which a person makes a personal attack on his or her opponent rather than addressing their argument.

**Advance fee scheme:** A type of fraud in which a person is induced to pay for access to an opportunity that is promised to provide even greater rewards, for example, paying for information to set up a work-from-home business, only to find that the real probability of earning money in the proposed manner is nonexistent or minimal.

**Affinity group fraud:** Fraud that targets members of a group that share characteristics with the person perpetrating the fraud, such as ethnicity or religion, with the implication that the perpetrator was a particularly trusted member of the group. Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme is often cited as an example of affinity fraud because he is Jewish, as are most of his victims.

**Anchoring:** A cognitive strategy that can lead to incorrect judgments by making estimates beginning with some starting point, then adjusting

that estimate upward or downward. The original starting point may exert a strong influence on the final estimate or judgment because the person is reluctant to abandon it, even if evidence suggests that they should.

**Argument from ignorance:** A logical fallacy in which something is asserted to be true because it has not been proven false.

***Art of War, The:*** A Chinese treatise, probably written between 500 and 300 B.C.E., attributed to the military official Sun Tzu; the treatise also includes commentary by 11 other writers, added over a period of centuries after the original writing. It includes one section on deception in military operations, which Sun Tzu says is a requirement of military strategy, and also discusses the usefulness of military deception in many other sections.

**Automatic writing:** A purported psychic phenomenon in which an individual touches a sheet of paper with a writing implement and the implement is said to write out messages of its own accord.

**Availability rule:** A type of bias in estimating the probability of some event, in which people judge as more common the events they can easily imagine or



for which they already have numerous memories. For instance, someone whose mother died of lung cancer is likely to judge the risk of smoking as higher than someone who does not know anyone with lung cancer, although the personal knowledge has no bearing on the actual risk.

**Base rate fallacy:** A fallacy in which a person ignores information about the base rate, or prior probability, of an event in making a judgment about a single event.

**Begging the question:** A type of fallacy in which the premise assumes the conclusion rather than proving it.

**Bias for causality:** The tendency of people to create causal explanations for random situations as a way of making sense out of their lives, a fact that makes it difficult to discard beliefs that are incorporated into such explanations, even if those beliefs are based on evidence that has been discredited.

**Big Lie:** A propaganda technique used in Germany in the Nazi era, traced back to 1925 when Adolf Hitler described a form of this technique in *Mein Kampf*. The concept of the Big Lie was popularized by Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, who said that it was possible to convince people of a lie if it was big enough and repeated often enough.

**Bilocation:** The ability of a person or object to be in two places at once, a power claimed by various magicians and religious figures.

**Boy-who-cried-wolf syndrome:** The tendency for someone who is known to lie or exaggerate to not be believed when he or she is telling the truth. The reference is to one of Aesop's fables, in which the people of a village ignore a shepherd boy's cries for help because in the past he repeatedly made false claims that his flock was being attacked by a wolf.

**Cambridge investigation:** An 1857 event in which several well-known mediums attempted to claim a \$500 prize offered by a newspaper, the *Boston Courier*, if they could produce evidence

of spiritualistic phenomena to the satisfaction of three Harvard professors: Louis S. Agassiz, E. N. Horsford, and Benjamin Pierce. No satisfactory evidence was produced, and the prize remained unclaimed. The event is named after the location of Harvard University, which is in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

**Cardiff giant:** A stone sculpture created by George Hull and buried in the ground near Cardiff, New York, in 1869. The "giant" was discovered by workmen and became a popular attraction, believed by some to be the petrified remains of a human giant. Upon closer examination, it was declared a fake, but the public continued to pay to see it.

**Chain referral scheme:** *See* pyramid scheme.

**Circular reasoning:** A type of logical fallacy in which the evidence for the validity of an assertion assumes that validity; in effect, it assumes what it claims to prove.

**Cognitive dissonance:** A psychological concept explaining the discomfort that a person experiences when one of their beliefs is contradicted by their experiences or other evidence. In order to reduce this discomfort, the person may change their beliefs to reflect reality, or may reject the evidence of reality in order to hold on to their beliefs.

**Concealed information test:** A method of questioning introduced in the 1950s to determine the truthfulness of someone's claim that they were involved in a crime; the test determined whether the person who was questioned had information that only someone involved with the crime would have.

**Cottingley fairies:** A famous hoax that fooled, among others, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who wrote an article about them in 1920. The basis of the hoax was a series of photographs of fairies, which were later shown to be paper cutouts from a children's book.

**Cramming:** A type of fraud in which small charges are added to a legitimate bill, such as for phone service, usually by a third party.

**Crop circles:** Geometric patterns created in grain fields that began appearing in the United Kingdom in 1979 and have appeared in many other countries since. Initially claimed by some as evidence of visitors from outer space, they were later revealed to be the work of two Englishmen and other people who imitated them.

**CSI-COP:** The Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, an organization founded in Buffalo, New York, in 1976.

**Eyewitness:** Someone who has direct knowledge of an event, such as by hearing or seeing it. In the law, eyewitness testimony has traditionally been considered strong evidence, although psychological experiments have demonstrated that eyewitnesses are far from infallible and the memory of events can be manipulated by questioning or by the later introduction of other information about the events.

**Fakelore:** Manufactured folklore presented as if it were traditional. The term was coined by Richard M. Dorson to describe American legends such as Pecos Bill and Paul Bunyan, which were known to have been created by particular writers rather than being characters in authentic traditional tales.

**False memory syndrome:** A condition in which a person strongly believes in memories that are in fact untrue; the term was popularized in the 1990s by Pamela and Peter Freyd, who were accused by an adult daughter of childhood sexual abuse. The Freyds' contention, shared by many psychologists, is that false memories can be created during the course of memory therapy, and the patient has no way to distinguish between false and true memories.

**Federal Trade Commission:** A U.S. regulatory agency established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act and charged with protecting consumers from deceptive advertising and ensuring fair and ethical competition among businesses.

**Flashbulb memory:** A detailed, vivid, and accurate memory of a moment in a person's life,

analogous to that which would be captured by a photograph, were a photograph able to prioritize certain details over others. Despite many claims of flashbulb memories, generally in connection with some major, emotionally arousing event (e.g., receiving news of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy), not all psychologists believe that they are different from other memories, or that they are particularly accurate or stable.

**FOAF:** An acronym for "friend of a friend," a source often cited in urban legends. The point of FOAF stories is that their veracity is automatically suspect, although possibly believed by the teller because the source of information is so distant from the teller—it didn't happen to them or to someone they knew, but rather to someone two connections removed from them.

**Forced feedback:** A technique to plant false memories in a person's mind by presenting the person with a fictional summary of an event that actually occurred. Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus developed this technique to demonstrate how false memories could be planted in individuals; often, her subjects accepted her false version of events as true and part of their actual experience, and some would make the false version of events more vivid in recalling them than they were as originally presented to them.

**419 fraud:** Also known as the Nigerian fraud, a scam operated by mail or e-mail in which an individual receives a message purportedly from a government official, asking them to send money or reveal confidential information (e.g., bank account number) in order to receive a percentage of a sum the author is trying to transfer out of their country. The name refers to section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code, which is violated by this type of fraud.

**Gambler's fallacy:** A mistaken belief that the laws of probability will hold true in the short run as well as the long run and/or the related belief that independent events are affected by previous events. For instance, if a fair coin is flipped five times and heads result each time, one may believe that the next flip is more likely to be tails, when in fact heads and tails are equally likely on each flip.

**Hindsight biases:** Biases that frequently emerge when evaluating intelligence reports, including overestimation of the accuracy of past judgments, underestimation of how much has been learned from intelligence reports, and the tendency to believe that events were more foreseeable than they really were.

**Identity theft:** A criminal act in which a thief obtains information (e.g., social security numbers or credit card numbers) that allows them to assume another person's identity; the information is then used for other criminal activities, such as stealing from the individual's bank account.

**Ignoranti elenchi:** A logical fallacy in which an argument is not relevant to the issue under discussion; the argument itself may or may not be valid.

**Illusory correlation:** Assigning causal explanations to observed covariation that may in fact be due to chance or other factors not considered.

**Lake Wobegon effect:** The result found in many standardized testing situations in schools, in which most or all the children are found to be performing above average. Since in the long run about half should be above average and about half below, if most or all are found to be above average, this suggests that the results are invalid due to teaching to the test, score inflation, teacher cheating, etc. The name refers to the fictional Lake Wobegon featured on Garrison Keillor's radio program *A Prairie Home Companion*, where "all the children are above average."

**Law of small numbers:** A humorous label applied to the common tendency to overvalue information gained from small samples of data without taking into account the high degree of variability in data points. The name reverses the law of large numbers, a true principle in statistics that a sufficiently large sample can provide a good estimate of the characteristics of a population.

**Letter of credit fraud:** A type of fraud in which an individual is offered the opportunity to invest in a letter of credit and is promised large investment

returns. However, it is impossible to invest in a letter of credit because it is simply a guarantee issued by a bank in connection with goods shipped internationally.

**Liar paradox:** A sentence of this type: "This sentence is a lie." This paradox has been discussed by philosophers since ancient times because it is at once true and false.

**Malingering:** Fabricating information for personal gain by drawing attention to oneself or by harming someone else.

**"Man-who" syndrome:** An example of the tendency for information with a personal connection to be overvalued in comparison with abstract information. For instance, statistical evidence of the dangers of tobacco consumption may be ignored because a person knows a man who smoked for years and never got sick.

**Medicare fraud:** Fraud that makes improper claims to be paid by the Medicare system, the U.S. system of health insurance for people over age 65 or those with disabilities. Examples include billing for medical equipment that is not needed, billing for unneeded tests, or billing for services never performed.

**Misinformation effect:** A concept developed by Elizabeth Loftus in 1978 and later, in which recall of an event may be adversely affected by other information presented between the time an event is encoded in memory and the time it is recalled. Hence, eyewitness recall of an event may be affected by irrelevant or false information received by the witness after the fact, such as hearing descriptions of the event by others.

**Nigerian fraud:** *See* 419 fraud.

**On the Witness Stand:** A book published in 1908 by the German American psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, detailing the results of psychological studies suggesting that eyewitness testimony was not as infallible as commonly believed.

**Online auction scam:** A financial fraud committed over the Internet, in which someone runs an

auction on a Web site, such as eBay, and accepts payment but never delivers the advertised goods or delivers goods less valuable than those that were advertised.

**Operation Dirty Play:** An investigation carried out in 2011 and 2012 by the Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department into betting on youth football games. The operation ended with the arrest of nine men and the allegation that young players had been bribed to affect the outcomes of games.

**Othello error:** Falsely accusing a truthful person of lying, based on a predetermined view that the person is lying and by discounting other explanations (e.g., stress) for their apparently suspicious behavior. The reference is to Shakespeare's play, *Othello*, in which the title character misjudges his wife's reaction to the death of another character and believes her to be unfaithful to him.

**Overestimation of predictability:** A cognitive bias in which people are likely to believe that the actions of other people or groups are intentional and result from centralized planning, failing to realize that chance and coincidence often play a large role in the outcome of real-life events.

**Persistence of discredited evidence:** The principle that impressions based on experiences or other evidence are difficult to discard, even if the evidence has been discredited. This is true even in experimental situations in which a test subject is informed that they took part in a manipulated situation, and it is even more persistent in the real world, in which truth and falsehood may be much more ambiguous.

**Phishing:** A type of fraud committed over the Internet, in which an e-mail appears to come from a legitimate company or financial institution and tells the recipient that he or she needs to supply confidential information in order to straighten out a problem with their bank account, credit card account, or other financial institution.

**Polygraph:** A machine that is used to detect whether a person is telling the truth or lying,

hence the popular name "lie detector." Attached to the person answering the questions, the device detects physiological changes such as pulse and blood pressure, which are believed to be beyond conscious control; however, scientific research does not support the accuracy of polygraph testing.

**Ponzi scheme:** A type of fraud in which high financial returns are promised for investment in a business, whereas in fact the only income is provided by new investors. A Ponzi scheme can work for some time, but generally falls apart when it runs out of new investors or the amount of money owed to investors becomes too great. One of the most famous Ponzi schemes of the 20th century was perpetrated by Bernard Madoff, a New York investment advisor who was convicted and sentenced to 150 years in prison in 2009.

**The Prince:** A 1532 treatise written by Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli that discusses how to achieve and maintain authority. Rather than endorsing an absolute set of ethical principles, Machiavelli advises that leaders suit their actions to the situation, giving rise to the term *Machiavellian* to describe ruthless, deceptive behavior.

**Psychic surgery:** A fraudulent practice in which a performer claims to perform surgery on a patient with her or her bare hands and without breaking the patient's skin, while in fact doing sleight-of-hand tricks and presenting blood or tissue from an animal. One well-known practitioner was Tony Agpaoa, who began his practice in the Philippines, and was arrested in 1968 in the United States on charges of medical fraud.

**Pump and dump:** A type of financial fraud in which the price of a security is artificially inflated (the "pump") through increased trading volume (often by inducing investors who are not a part of the scheme to buy the security), then sold before the price falls (the "dump").

**Pyramid scheme:** Also known as chain referral schemes, a type of fraud in which a person pays to distribute or franchise a product, but the only real money comes from the sale of the franchises or distributorships.



**Radiocarbon dating:** A method used to establish the approximate age of objects, often used when investigating suspected art or antiquities fraud. The technique is based on the fact that organic materials contain carbon-14, which decays at a steady rate; the amount of carbon-14 remaining in an object can therefore give an approximation of how old it is.

**Realism:** A philosophical point of view that states that the world exists independently of human descriptions of or thoughts about it and that people's thoughts refer to this actual world, so that they may be objectively judged true or false.

**Recovered memory therapy:** A type of psychotherapy aimed at helping a patient recover memories of abuse that were not previously accessible to their conscious mind. Recovered memory therapy is based in part on the finding that about 10 percent of abuse victims forget the abuse, but it is controversial because scientific studies have shown that it is possible to "plant" false memories that an individual cannot distinguish from memories of their actual experiences.

**Red herring:** A device used in speech and writing to distract people from the true subject of an argument.

**Scudder's American Museum:** An entertainment hall opened in 1842 in New York City by P. T. Barnum. The museum included a variety of exhibits, from live animals to freak shows; among the more famous attractions were the Fiji Mermaid and the Siamese Twins Cheng and Eng.

**Shattered Glass:** A 2003 film written and directed by Billy Ray, based on an *Atlantic Magazine* article by Buzz Bissinger, chronicling the career of *New Republic* journalist Stephen Glass, who was found to have fabricated many of the stories that he wrote while working for the magazine. The film details the lengths to which Glass—who had formerly worked as a fact checker—went to create a false trail of evidence that would make his stories appear genuine and the personal dynamics within the newsroom that facilitated his deceptions.

**Shifters:** A short-lived Ponzi scheme seen in the United States in 1922, in which college students became members of an organization called the Shifters, paid an initiation fee, and then sought other people to become members in order to make their money back. Various merchandise, such as pins and hats, was also marketed to members.

**Snopes.com:** A Web site run by Barbara and David Mikkelsen that collects urban legends and rates them as true, false, or undetermined, supplied with available evidence in support of their decision.

**Spectrographic analysis:** A method used to investigate suspected cases of art fraud. The technique involves removing a tiny sample of paint, burning it in a flame, and analyzing the resulting spectrum to determine if the paint includes materials not available at the time that the painting was claimed to be created or materials not known to be used by the supposed painter of the work.

**Strawman fraud:** A type of fraud based on the incorrect belief that the U.S. Treasury Department has bank accounts in the name of every U.S. citizen that can be accessed through a procedure known to the person perpetrating the scam. One feature of such scams is that the victim is told to specify their name in all capital letters.

**Telemarketing fraud:** A type of fraud in which someone is contacted by telephone and induced to send money or release confidential information, such as their bank account or credit card number, in order to collect a "free prize" or some other inducement.

**Thermoluminescence:** A method of dating pottery, often used to examine suspected forgeries. The technique is based on the principle that pottery loses its radioactivity when fired but gradually reabsorbs radioactivity from its surroundings. When heated to over 640 degrees Fahrenheit, pottery emits a glow that is brighter in older samples; hence, the glow emitted by a suspected fraud can be compared with that from another of known age.

***To Tell the Truth:*** An American television program aired from 1956 to 1968 on CBS and revived in 1991 by NBC. The concept of the show is that a celebrity panel tries to determine which of three contestants is telling the truth about their identity by asking them questions. The true contestant must give true answers, whereas the other two are allowed to lie to try to convince the panel of their identity.

**United Nations Convention against Corruption:** An international legal instrument adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003 and entered into force on December 14, 2005. Among other things, the convention requires countries to make corrupt acts illegal and to cooperate with other countries in the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of corruption.

**Urban legend:** A type of modern folklore common in industrialized societies in which stories are passed from person to person (often through e-mail). The original source may or may not be known, and the sender may or may not believe the story to be true. The term was popularized by Jan Harold Brunvand in a series of books, beginning with *The Vanishing Hitchhiker: American Urban Legends and Their Meanings*, in 1981.

**Vividness criterion:** A bias in the evaluation of evidence, in which human thinking and memory is more affected by information that is

vivid, concrete, and directly perceived, than by abstract information experienced secondhand (e.g., by reading about it) that may actually have more value and hence should be given greater consideration.

***War of the Worlds:*** A radio drama written by Orson Welles, adapted from H. G. Wells's novel of the same name and aired on CBS radio in 1938. The radio show, which tells of a Martian invasion, imitates a series of news bulletins. Many listeners did not realize that they were listening to a fictional program and panicked, believing the invasion to be real.

***When Prophecy Fails:*** A book published in 1956 by American psychologists Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, demonstrating cases of cognitive dissonance in members of a cult who believed that the world was about to end. When the world did not end on schedule, rather than discard their beliefs, the cult members were reinforced in them.

**White lie:** A lie that is unimportant and told with good intentions, for instance to spare someone's feelings or for the sake of politeness, rather than to maliciously deceive a person.

Sarah Boslaugh  
Kennesaw State University



# Resource Guide

---

## Books

- Alterman, Eric. *When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences*. New York: Penguin, 2004.
- Andrews, Edmund L. *Busted: Life Inside the Great Mortgage Meltdown*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2009.
- Ariely, Dan. *The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone—Especially Ourselves*. New York: Harper, 2012.
- Ayres, Ian and Gregory Klass. *Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
- Bierman, Harold, Jr. *Accounting/Finance Lessons of Enron: A Case Study*. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Press, 2008.
- Boldt-Irons, Leslie, Corrado Federici, and Ernesto Virgulti, eds. *Disguise, Deception, Trompe-l'oeil: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. New York: Peter Lang, 2009.
- Booth, Robin, Simon Farrell, Guy Bastable, and Nicholas Yeo. *Money Laundering Law and Regulation: A Practical Guide*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Bruhns, Karen O. and Nancy L. Kelker. *Faking the Ancient Andes*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2010.
- Busch, Rebecca S. *Healthcare Fraud Auditing and Detection Guide*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- Carson, Thomas L. *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Carter, Carolyn L., Jonathan A. Sheldon, and John W. Van Alst. *Automobile Fraud: Odometer, Salvage, and Lemon Laundering Fraud Abuses and Yo-Yo Sales*. Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2011.
- Clikeman, Paul M. *Called to Account: Fourteen Financial Frauds That Shaped the American Accounting Profession*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Cohan, William D. *House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street*. New York: Doubleday, 2009.
- Cover, Robert and Michael S. Goodman, eds. *Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Cowan, Rick and Douglas Century. *Takedown: The Fall of the Last Mafia Empire*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2002.
- Crivelli, Paolo. *Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Deneault, Alain and George Holoch, trans. *Offshore: Tax Havens and the Rule of Global Crime*. New York: Perseus, 2011.
- Dornscheidt-Berg, Daniel, Tina Klopp, and Jefferson Chase, trans. *Inside Wikileaks: My*



- Time With Julian Assange at the World's Most Dangerous Website*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2011.
- Edelman, Murray J. *The Politics of Misinformation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Eichenwald, Kurt. *Conspiracy of Fools: A True Story*. New York: Broadway Books, 2005.
- European Commission Anti-Fraud Office. *The Fight Against Fraud and Transnational Crime: OLAF and International Cooperation*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003.
- Flaxman, Gregory. *Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
- Foucault, Michel and Graham Burchell, trans., and Frédéric Gros, ed. *The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Frankel, Tamar. *The Ponzi Scheme Puzzle: A History and Analysis of Con Artists and Victims*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Gannon, James. *Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2001.
- Gerard, Philip. *Secret Soldiers: The Story of World War II's Heroic Army of Deception*. New York: Dutton, 2002.
- Gragido, Will, John Pirc, and Russ Rogers. *Cybercrime and Espionage: An Analysis of Subversive Multivector Threats*. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2011.
- Halligan, Peter W., Christopher Bas, and David A. Oakley. *Malingering and Illness Deception*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Harrington, Brook, ed. *Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Harris, Kaitlyn O., ed. *Seafood Fraud and Safety: Background and Issues*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.
- Hawken, Angela, Stephen J. Carroll, and Allan F. Abrahamse. *The Effects of Third-Party, Bad Faith Doctrine on Automobile Insurance Costs and Compensation*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.
- Heffernan, William C. and John Kleinig, eds. *Private and Public Corruption*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Henriques, Diana B. *The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust*. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2011.
- Hirstein, William. *Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
- Hirstein, William, ed. *Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Hitz, Frederick Porter. *The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
- Hitz, Frederick Porter. *Why Spy? Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008.
- Hopwood, William S., Jay J. Leiner, and George R. Young. *Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2012.
- Hoving, Thomas. *False Impressions: The Hunt for Big-Time Art Fakes*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- Javers, Eamon. *Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: Inside the Secret World of Corporate Espionage*. New York: Harper, 2010.
- Jay, Martin. *The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010.
- Jay, Ricky. *Jay's Journal of Anomalies: Conjurors, Cheats, Hustlers, Hoaxsters, Pranksters, Jokesters, Impostors, Pretenders, Sideshow Showmen, Armless Calligraphers, Mechanical Marvels, Popular Entertainments*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001.
- Johnson, Anthony L, ed. *Reducing Medicare Fraud, Waste, and Abuse*. New York: Nova Biomedical Books, 2011.
- Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O'Connell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 5th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012.
- Katz, Norman A. *Detecting and Reducing Supply Chain Fraud*. Burlington, VT: Gower, 2012.
- Kelly, Jan Seaman and Brian S. Lindblom, eds. *Scientific Examination of Questioned Documents*. 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC/Taylor & Francis, 2006.

- Keyes, Ralph. *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004.
- Koller, Synthia. *White Collar Crime in Housing: Mortgage Fraud in the United States*. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishers, 2012.
- Kroger, John. *Convictions: A Prosecutor's Battles Against Mafia Killers, Drug Kingpins, and Enron Thieves*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2008.
- Lewis, Lionel S. *Con Game: Bernard Madoff and His Victims*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012.
- Lingua Franca editors. *The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.
- Macintyre, Ben. *Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies*. New York: Crown, 2012.
- Markham, Jerry W. *A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals: From Enron to Reform*. Amonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006.
- Martin, Clancy, ed. *The Philosophy of Deception*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- May, Gary. *The Informant: The FBI, the Ku Kux Klan, and the Murder of Viola Liuzzo*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
- McGlone, Matthew S. and Mark L. Knapp, eds. *The Interplay of Truth and Deception: New Agendas in Communication*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Mendilow, Jonathan, ed. *Money, Corruption, and Political Competition in Established and Emerging Democracies*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012.
- Metzger, Miriam J. and Andrew J. Flanagin. *Digital Media, Youth, and Credibility*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008.
- Mihm, Stephen. *A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Montague, David A. *Essential of Online Payment Security and Fraud Prevention*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011.
- Munoz, Arturo. *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2012.
- Nasiri, Omar. *Inside the Jihad: My Life With Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*. New York: Basic Books, 2006.
- Neuwirth, Robert. *Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2011.
- Nguyen, Tomson H. *Fraud and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis*. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishers, 2011.
- Olsen, William P. *The Anti-Corruption Handbook: How to Protect Your Business in the Global Marketplace*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
- O'Shaughnessy, Nicholas J. *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.
- Palan, Ronen, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux. *Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Palda, K. Filip. *Tax Evasion and Firm Survival in Competitive Markets*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.
- Partnoy, Frank. *Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets*. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2003.
- Payne, Brian K. *Crime in the Home Health Care Field: Workplace Violence, Fraud, and Abuse*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2003.
- Randi, James. *An Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and the Supernatural*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Rapoport, Nancy B., Jeffrey D. Van Niel, and Bala G. Dharan, eds. *Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Thompson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009.
- Robin, Ron. *Scandals and Scoundrels: Seven Cases That Shook the Academy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
- Ronson, Jon. *The Psychopath Test: A Journey Through the Madness Industry*. New York: Riverhead Books, 2011.
- Rothstein, Bo. *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

- Salter, M. S. *Innovation Corrupted: The Origins and Legacy of Enron's Collapse*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Saul, Jennifer Mather. *Lying, Misleading, and What Is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Schilit, Howard M. and Jeremy Perler. *Financial Shenanigans*. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010.
- Schneider, Friedrich and Dominik H. Enste. *The Shadow Economy: An International Survey*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Shulan, David. *From Hire to Liar: The Role of Deception in the Workplace*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2007.
- Smith, David Livingston. *Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004.
- Sokal, Alan D. *Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy, and Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Spencer, Ronald D., ed. *The Expert Versus the Object: Judging Fakes and False Attributions in the Visual Arts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Steinmeyer, Jim. *The Glorious Deception: The Double Life of William Robinson, aka Chung Ling Soo, the "Marvelous Chinese Conjurer."* New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005.
- Stern, Rebecca. *Home Economics: Domestic Fraud in Victorian England*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2008.
- Sussman, Gerald, ed. *The Propaganda Society: Promotional Culture and Politics in Global Context*. New York: Peter Lang, 2011.
- Swartz, Mimi and Sherron Watkins. *Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron*. New York: Currency Doubleday, 2004.
- Tillman, Robert and Michael L. Indergaard. *Pump and Dump: The Rancid Rules of the New Economy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005.
- Transparency International. *Global Corruption Report: Climate Change*. Washington, DC: Earthscan, 2011.
- Tribble, Scott. *A Colossal Hoax: The Giant From Cardiff That Fooled America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
- Turner, Andrew, James H. Kim, On Chong-Gossard, and Frederik Juliaan Vervae, eds. *Private and Public Lies: The Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graceo-Roman World*. Boston: Brill, 2010.
- van der Does de Wilebois, Emile, et al. *The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011.
- Vian, Taryn, William D. Savedoff, and Harald Mathisen. *Anticorruption in the Health Sector: Strategies for Transparency and Accountability*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010.
- Wallace, Robert and H. Keith Melton. *Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, From Communism to Al-Qaeda*. New York: Dutton, 2008.
- Weisman, Stewart L. *Need and Greed: The Story of the Largest Ponzi Scheme in American History*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999.
- Wiener, Jon. *Historians in Trouble: Plagiarism, Fraud, and Politics in the Ivory Tower*. New York: New Press, 2005.
- Wolff, Robert V. *A Full Response to an Empty House: Public Safety Strategies for Addressing Mortgage Fraud and the Foreclosure Crisis*. New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2010.
- Zack, Gerard M. *Financial Statement Fraud: Strategies for Detection and Investigation*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
- Zuckoff, Mitchell. *Ponzi's Scheme: The True Story of a Financial Legend*. New York: Random House, 2005.

### Journals

*Accounting, Accountability & Performance*  
*Accounting and the Public Interest*  
*Acta Analytica: Philosophy and Psychology*  
*American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry*  
*American Journal of Sociology*  
*American Psychologist*  
*Auditing*  
*Behavioral Sciences & the Law*  
*British Journal of Social Psychology*  
*Business Ethics Quarterly*  
*Computer Fraud & Security*  
*Contemporary Accounting Research*  
*European Journal of Social Psychology*



*European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*  
*European Psychiatry*  
*International Journal of Business and Social Science*  
*International Sociology*  
*Journal of Business Ethics*  
*Journal of Economic Issues*  
*Journal of Economic Psychology*  
*Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology*  
*Journal of Individual Differences*  
*Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*  
*Law and Human Behavior*  
*MIS Quarterly*  
*Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology*  
*Philosophy & Public Affairs*  
*Psychology, Crime & Law*  
*Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*  
*Social Behavior & Personality*  
*Social Issues and Policy Review*  
*Social Psychology*  
*Social Sciences Research*

### Websites

African Development Bank Group: Integrity and Anti-Corruption  
<http://www.adb.org/site/integrity/main>  
 American Association for Social Psychiatry  
<http://www.socialpsychiatry.org>  
 American Psychiatric Association  
<http://www.psychiatry.org>  
 American Psychoanalytic Association  
<http://www.apsa.org>  
 American Psychological Association  
<http://www.apa.org>  
 American Sociological Association  
<http://www.asanet.org>  
 Asian Development Bank: Anticorruption and Integrity  
<http://www.adb.org/site/integrity/main>  
 British Psychological Society  
<http://www.bps.org.uk>  
 British Sociological Association  
<http://www.britisoc.co.uk>  
 FBI: Common Fraud Schemes  
<http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud>  
 Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force  
<http://www.stopfraud.gov>  
 George Mason University: Propaganda  
<http://mason.gmu.edu/~amcdonal/index.html>

INTERPOL: Cybercrime  
<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime>  
 INTERPOL: Financial Crime  
<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Financial-crime>  
 James Randi Educational Foundation  
<http://www.randi.org>  
 OLAF: European Commission European Anti-Fraud Office  
[http://ec.europa.eu/anti\\_fraud/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/index_en.htm)  
 Retraction Watch (scientific fraud)  
<http://www.Retractionwatch.wordpress.com>  
 Snopes.com: Urban Legend Reference Pages  
<http://www.snopes.com>  
 Transparency International  
<http://www.transparency.org>  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html>  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Convention Against Corruption  
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html#UNCACfulltext>  
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,  
 U.S. Department of Justice: Mortgage Fraud  
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/md/Mortgage-Fraud/index.htm>  
 U.S. Department of Justice: Stop Medicare Fraud  
<http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov>  
 U.S. Department of State: International Financial Scams  
[http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis\\_pa\\_tw/financial\\_scams/financial\\_scams\\_3155.html](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/financial_scams/financial_scams_3155.html)  
 U.S. Holocaust Museum: Propaganda Exhibit  
<http://www.ushmm.org/propaganda>  
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Division of Enforcement  
<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml>  
 World Bank: Financial Market Integrity  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK:22176523~menuPK:6110545~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282885,00.html>

Sarah Boslaugh  
 Kennesaw State University





# Appendix

---

## **The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies**

Kim B. Serota, Timothy R. Levine, and Franklin J. Boster  
*Department of Communication, Michigan State University*

International Communication Association

*Human Communication Research*

Volume 36, Issue 1 (January 2010)

## The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies

Kim B. Serota, Timothy R. Levine, & Franklin J. Boster

Department of Communication, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823, USA

*This study addresses the frequency and the distribution of reported lying in the adult population. A national survey asked 1,000 U.S. adults to report the number of lies told in a 24-hour period. Sixty percent of subjects report telling no lies at all, and almost half of all lies are told by only 5% of subjects; thus, prevalence varies widely and most reported lies are told by a few prolific liars. The pattern is replicated in a reanalysis of previously published research and with a student sample. Substantial individual differences in lying behavior have implications for the generality of truth–lie base rates in deception detection experiments. Explanations concerning the nature of lying and methods for detecting lies need to account for this variation.*

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x

Humans are ambivalent about deception. On one hand, virtually all human cultures have some prohibition against lying. On the other hand, the ability to deceive well may be essential for polite interaction and, at times, self-preservation. Considerable research exists on the topic of deception, yet surprisingly little is known about the base prevalence of deception. Instead, much of this research has relied on untested assumptions and anecdotal evidence or on a few studies with small and nonrepresentative samples.

The dearth of deception prevalence research is a symptom of a broader systemic concern regarding research in the social sciences. Asch (1952, reprinted 1987) observed that “before we inquire into origins and functional relations, it is necessary to know the thing we are trying to explain.” Influenced by Asch, Rozin (2001) argued that social scientific research often emphasizes experimental studies and formal hypothesis testing to the exclusion of more basic descriptive work. In line with Rozin’s critique, more than 30 years of experimental detection research has proceeded without much attention to the basic nature of the phenomena itself. We believe that inquiry into deception and related behaviors associated with deception detection requires basic descriptive research examining the extent and distribution of deceptive communication in the population. In the extensive literature on deception,

the question of prevalence remains without a clear, well-documented answer. Thus, our research investigates reports of how often people lie.

In order to study the prevalence of lying, it is necessary to consider what constitutes a lie. Simply and broadly put, lying occurs when a communicator seeks knowingly and intentionally to mislead others. Ford, King, and Hollender (1988) suggest the “consciousness of falsity” to distinguish “normal” lies from pathological ones. Thus, it is not sufficient that something is false for it to be a lie; it is the intent that distinguishes the lie. As Bok (1999) observes: “The moral question of whether you are lying or not is not *settled* by establishing the truth or falsity of what you say. In order to settle this question, we must know whether you *intend your statement to mislead*” (p. 6).

Bok (1999) argues for the principle of veracity that involves a moral asymmetry between honesty and lies. Lying requires justification, whereas truth telling does not. Given prohibitions against deceit, people may try to avoid situations in which there is pressure to lie. Research finds that this principle of veracity guides everyday communication and people consider using deception only when the truth is problematic (Levine, Kim, & Hamel, 2009). But this tells us about the situations in which people lie and not how often people lie.

Despite this moral asymmetry, most deception research has presumed the ubiquity of lying and moved past the question of frequency to focus on the behavioral correlates of lying or lie detection. The frequency question remains mostly unanswered. A notable exception, and the best and most cited prevalence research, however, is the 1996 diary study of lying in everyday life by DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996). Using two small samples, students and recruited members of the local community, DePaulo et al. reported the mean number of lies per day as 1.96 ( $SD = 1.63$ ,  $N = 77$ ) for the students and 0.97 ( $SD = 0.98$ ,  $N = 70$ ) for the subsequent nonstudent sample. Importantly, the aim of the second sample was to replicate findings regarding the nature and reasons for lying with a different but not necessarily representative sample of the population. Nonetheless, a brief synopsis of this study in *Psychology Today* (“The Real Truth About Lying,” 1996) reported that DePaulo conducted research to answer the question “how often do people lie . . . ?” and in many subsequent research reports the finding *that people tell one to two lies per day* has been reified.

More recently, two smaller and lesser-known studies have sought to replicate and extend elements of the DePaulo et al. (1996) diary study. Hancock, Thom-Santelli, and Ritchie (2004) examined differences between reports of face-to-face lies and reports of lying through computer-mediated communication. Results from a student sample yielded an average of 1.58 lies per day ( $SD = 1.02$ ,  $N = 28$ ) and a significant difference for the rates of lying (lies as a proportion of interactions) between face-to-face, telephone, instant message, and e-mail interactions; the highest rates occurred during phone conversations and the lowest rates with e-mail. George and Robb (2008) replaced the pencil-and-paper diary with a personal digital assistant (PDA). They report fewer lies per day;  $M = 0.59$  ( $SD = 0.37$ ,  $N = 25$ ) with the 10-minute



definition of interaction used by DePaulo et al. and  $M = 0.90$  ( $SD = 0.54$ ,  $N = 25$ ) in a second study shortening the interaction definition to 5 minutes (increasing the number of reporting opportunities). Thus, the current literature provides estimates ranging from 0.59 to 1.96 lies per day. Variation in estimates from study to study is expected due to small sample sizes and large standard deviations.

Other broad estimates of prevarication cited by deception researchers have come from nonacademic sources. In a poll conducted for the book *The Day America Told the Truth* (Patterson & Kim, 1991), 90% of the subjects admitted being deceitful about a list of subjects, the most common being true feelings, income, accomplishments, sex life, and age. In a *Reader's Digest* poll (Kalish, 2004) of 2,861 of the magazine's readers, 93% reported one or more kinds of dishonesty at work or school, 93% reported one or more dishonest acts in the market place, and 96% reported lying to or committing other dishonest acts toward family and friends.

Some studies report on various facets of prevalence but provide limited insight into the overall extent of lying because they deal with specific situations such as lying by job applicants, students lying to parents, or lying about spousal infidelity. Levashina and Campion (2007) found that 90% of undergraduate job candidates used some form of deception during job interviews; however, the distinction between impression management and outright lies is often blurred and their report notes that behaviors that are semantically close to lies are difficult to confirm. They estimate actual lies occur in the wide range of 28–75% of job interviews. Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, and Cauffman (2004) examined lying to parents by adolescents and young adults, and quantified the extent of lying by topic over the course of a year. This study found that 82% of all students reported lying to their parents on at least one of six topical issues (money, alcohol/drugs, friends, dating, parties, and sex) with the mean incidence of lying ranging from 0.6 to 2.4 lies depending on the issue. Much of the research that seeks to quantify lying behavior is concentrated in the area of relational communication. Cochran and Mays (1990) studied dating dishonesty among college students and found that 60% of women claimed to have been lied to in order to obtain sex, whereas 34% of the men in the study admitted lying to obtain sex. Knox, Schacht, Holt, and Turner (1993) found that 92% of students (when given the opportunity to report anonymously) admitted to lying to a current or potential sexual partner.

It is not difficult to understand why many scholars believe lying is a frequent event. Life experiences and anecdotal evidence encourage acceptance of the proposition. A typical research report discussion statement illustrates this view: "Lying is ubiquitous and comes in many forms, from cherished beliefs about Santa Claus to the self-deception commonly encountered in the treatment situation" (Tosone, 2006).

General acceptance of the ubiquity assumption has implications for studies on lying and deception detection. If everyone lies and lying is an everyday occurrence for most people, this would suggest that individual differences should not have much influence on the identification of lying behaviors. If this is the case, it should be possible to understand the nature of lying and deceptive behavior and find ways to

detect it by studying anyone telling lies. For example, this presumption is recurrent in studies that look for regularities in nonverbal cues, microexpressions, and the leakage of emotions. Individual differences are typically considered of less relevance than situational considerations such as whether the lie is a minor everyday lie or if the lie is a consequential, high-stakes lie. If, on the other hand, base rates for lying (the frequency with which one lies or the ratio of truths to lies) vary across groups of individuals or if the ubiquitous average masks variation that is not normally distributed in the population, researchers looking into the nature of the phenomenon need to take into account this variation. Research designs and sample selection procedures ought to control for this variation, or they should examine the nature of the variation itself. Consistent with this second possibility, recent meta-analysis suggests substantial individual differences in people's ability to lie convincingly (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).

### Study 1

Examination of the literature reveals few attempts to document the extent to which everyday lies occur. The few studies that offer behavioral rates have performed so as an adjunct to the main objectives of the research and the rates obtained are restricted to the specific conditions of the studies. This situation is exemplified by the DePaulo et al. (1996) studies. Although lie frequency is among the interests that prompted their research, most of the design and analysis is devoted to the topics of what people lie about, to whom they lie, and what motivates them to lie. DePaulo et al. noted that their observations of lying frequency are based on students and an adult sample that was chosen not for representativeness but, instead, to provide a dissimilar sample in order to determine whether or not the results from the student sample could be replicated. Still, DePaulo et al. reported: "Participants in the community study, on the average, told a lie everyday; participants in the college student study told two." So despite being based on data that were (correctly) noted by its authors as lacking generalizability, this research report has become the standard reference for the prevalence of everyday lies in the deception literature. The goal of Study 1 is to test this claim by obtaining data from a large cross-section of the adult population.

### Method

#### *Participants and design*

In order to examine the proposition that most people tell one to two lies per day with projectable data, an Internet survey of 1,000 American adults (18 years of age or older) was conducted using the Synovate *eNation* omnibus panel.<sup>1</sup> The omnibus panel is a commercial survey research tool used for daily, multiclient studies and approximates a nationally representative sample with some limitations. Panelists are recruited into a pool of more than 1 million subject households using banner advertisements, mailing lists, and related procedures to promote participation; subjects must formally opt-in to confirm awareness that they are participating in research and consent to participation. Each survey day, a new sample ( $N = 5,500$ ) is drawn from the pool.

Subjects are randomly selected within strata defined by population characteristics. The response rate is typically 19–20%, accounting for both nonresponse and incomplete surveys. Responses exceeding the 1,000 daily quota are deleted using systematic (random start,  $n$ th selection) sampling. The panel is matched on age, gender, income, and region to the U.S. Census Bureau's monthly *Current Population Survey* (CPS; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Results are poststratification weighted (Kish, 1965) to these CPS criteria. In addition, Synovate uses weighting in order to adjust partially for underrepresentation of Hispanics and ethnic minorities in the sample. Subjects were included in a prize drawing as the incentive to participate. Table 1 provides the unweighted and weighted sample demographics and compares them to recent U.S. Census data and to *eNation* weighting targets, which are based on U.S. Census data.

This study used a nonexperimental survey design in order to obtain descriptive measures for the incidence of lying in the population. Results from this survey are compared with the popular standard established by the DePaulo et al. (1996) studies.

#### *Procedure and measures*

Subjects received an invitation e-mail asking them to participate in an omnibus survey on the date of the study. The invitation was directed to a specific member of the household identified by age and gender. The invitation instructed that individual to click on a link to the survey website. When subjects accessed the site, they were provided with instructions, asked questions confirming participant identification, asked the omnibus survey questions for several unrelated topics, and asked a series of demographic questions. On the day of the lying study, subjects were asked about four topics (in order of presentation): packaged meals, cat litter products, lying behavior, and water softeners.

The DePaulo et al. (1996) diary study (and subsequent diary studies) used subject training to make the topic less sensitive and provide the subjects with a common definition of lying. Training of survey respondents was not possible, so to encourage accurate reporting, the self-report lying question was preceded by a definition of lying that incorporated the elements of foreknowledge and intent described at the beginning of this article. A brief description of types of lies was also included. Both were presented in a nonpejorative manner:

We are interested in truth and lies in people's everyday communication. Most people think a lie occurs any time you intentionally try to mislead someone. Some lies are big while others are small; some are completely false statements and others are truths with a few essential details made up or left out. Some lies are obvious, and some are very subtle. Some lies are told for a good reason. Some lies are selfish; other lies protect others. We are interested in all these different types of lies. To help us understand lying, we are asking many people to tell us how often they lie.

**Table 1** Comparison of the Unweighted and Weighted Demographics of the Study Sample to U.S. Census Data and eNation Demographic Targets

|                           | <i>CPS</i> <sup>a</sup><br>(January 2007) | <i>eNation</i><br>Target | Unweighted<br>Results | Weighted<br>Results | Weighted<br>± <i>CPS</i> |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| Gender (%)                |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| Male                      | 49.1                                      | 48.4                     | 48.4                  | 48.3                | −0.8                     |
| Female                    | 50.9                                      | 51.6                     | 51.6                  | 51.7                | 0.8                      |
| Region (%)                |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| Northeast                 | 18.2                                      | 18.7                     | 18.4                  | 18.8                | 0.5                      |
| MidWest                   | 22.1                                      | 22.2                     | 21.6                  | 22.3                | 0.2                      |
| South                     | 36.4                                      | 36.2                     | 35.9                  | 36.0                | −0.4                     |
| West                      | 23.3                                      | 22.9                     | 24.1                  | 23.0                | −0.3                     |
| Age (%)                   |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| Under 25                  | 12.8                                      | 12.7                     | 5.3                   | 12.5                | −0.3                     |
| 25–34                     | 17.9                                      | 17.9                     | 17.5                  | 18.0                | 0.1                      |
| 35–44                     | 19.2                                      | 19.2                     | 19.7                  | 19.3                | 0.1                      |
| 45–54                     | 19.5                                      | 19.5                     | 22.6                  | 19.6                | 0.1                      |
| 55–64                     | 14.5                                      | 14.5                     | 23.3                  | 14.5                | 0.0                      |
| 65+                       | 16.2                                      | 16.2                     | 11.6                  | 16.2                | 0.0                      |
| Income (%)                |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| Under \$25,000            | 18.8                                      | 18.7                     | 14.3                  | 18.5                | −0.3                     |
| \$25,000–\$49,999         | 24.4                                      | 24.5                     | 24.2                  | 24.6                | 0.2                      |
| \$50,000–\$74,999         | 19.7                                      | 19.6                     | 22.3                  | 19.7                | 0.0                      |
| \$75,000+                 | 37.1                                      | 37.2                     | 39.2                  | 37.3                | 0.2                      |
| Race (%) <sup>b</sup>     |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| White                     | 80.1                                      | 81.5                     | 91.0                  | 83.0                | 2.8                      |
| Black                     | 12.6                                      | 9.3                      | 3.3                   | 9.2                 | −3.4                     |
| Asian                     | 4.4                                       | 1.6                      | 2.8                   | 1.6                 | −2.8                     |
| Other                     | 2.9                                       | 6.1                      | 2.9                   | 6.2                 | 3.3                      |
| Refused/NA                |                                           | 1.5                      |                       |                     |                          |
| Hispanic (%) <sup>b</sup> |                                           |                          |                       |                     |                          |
| Yes                       | 15.1                                      | 7.5                      | 4.6                   | 7.6                 | −7.5                     |
| No                        | 84.9                                      | 92.5                     | 95.4                  | 92.4                | 7.5                      |

Note: *CPS* = Current Population Survey.

<sup>a</sup>Synovate weights are based on most current monthly *CPS* data at the time of study (March 2008).

<sup>b</sup>Race and Hispanic *eNation* targets are adjustments toward the U.S. Census data, not Census-based targets.

Subjects were then asked, using an open-ended format, how many times they had lied in the past 24 hours. They responded separately for lies to family members, friends, business contacts, acquaintances (“people you do not know but might see occasionally”), and total strangers; for each type of receiver, they were asked about lies in both face-to-face and mediated situations. Response categories were used as





**Figure 1** Screen shot of the Internet survey page giving a definition and description of lying.

a mnemonic device and to provide additional detail for the analysis. The results of the 10 receiver-mode combinations were aggregated. Specifically, the question was worded:

Think about where you were and what you were doing during the past 24 hours, from this time yesterday until right now. Listed below are the kinds of people you might have lied to and how you might have talked to them, either face-to-face or some other way such as in writing or by phone or over the Internet. In each of the boxes below, please write in the number of times you have lied in this type of situation. If you have not told any lies of a particular type, write in "0." In the past 24 hours, how many times have you lied?

The subjects were presented with a response grid showing the five types of people and two modes of communication. Subjects were instructed to enter a number in each box. The Internet questionnaire required a response in each of the 10 boxes before allowing the subject to continue to the next Web page. Figure 1 presents a screen shot of the lying description used in the Web survey; Figure 2 is a screen shot of the survey question. Based on the  $5 \times 2$  individual categories of responses, the row, column, and grand total frequencies (of lies per day) were aggregated for each subject.

## Results

The results of this national study are consistent with the oft-cited observation that *on average* Americans tell one to two lies per day ( $M = 1.65$  lies per day,  $SD = 4.45$ ,  $Mdn = 0$ ,  $Mode = 0$ ,  $N = 998$ ,  $Max = 53$  lies,  $95\% \text{ CI} = 1.37\text{--}1.93$ ).<sup>2</sup> But the most intriguing finding is the distribution of responses, not the mean. As Figure 3 illustrates the majority of people report telling no lies during the past 24 hours and most of the reported lies are told by few people. The 40.1% who reported lying told a total of

Think about where you were and what you were doing during the past 24 hours, from this time yesterday until right now. Listed below are the kinds of people you might have lied to and how you might have talked to them, either face-to-face or some other way such as in writing or by phone or over the internet. In each of the boxes below, please write in the number of times you have lied in this type of situation. If you have not told any lies of a particular type, write in "0".

In the past 24 hours, how many times have you lied?

Please enter a number for each person

| Who you lied to                                                           | Talked to them face-to-face | Talked to them in writing or by phone or over the internet |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Family members                                                            | 1                           | 0                                                          |
| Friends or other people you know socially                                 | 0                           | 1                                                          |
| People you work with or know as business contacts                         | 1                           | 2                                                          |
| People you do not know but might see occasionally (such as a store clerk) | 0                           | 0                                                          |
| Total strangers                                                           | 0                           | 0                                                          |

Figure 2 Screen shot of the Internet survey page with the question and response grid.





Figure 3 (A) The majority of Americans reported they did not lie in the past 24 hours (59.9%). (B) Percentage distribution by number of lies told; 32.2% told one to five lies and 7.9% reported telling six or more lies.

1,646 lies ( $M = 4.11$ ,  $SD = 6.26$ ,  $n = 400$ ). Of these, 22.7% of all reported lies were told by 1% of the national sample. Results indicate that one-half of all reported lies are told by just 5.3% of American adults ( $M = 15.61$ ,  $SD = 11.22$ ,  $n = 53$ ).

Figure 4 indicates that, among those who reported lying, the proportion of people who report a particular number of lies per day decreases as a function of the number of lies. Moreover, observation of this curve suggests that the decrease is a standard power function. Fitting a power function curve to these data produces




**Figure 4** Frequencies of total, face-to-face, and mediated lies are represented by similar standard power functions.

the equation  $y = 152.225 \times x^{-1.209}$  where  $x$  is the number of lies reported per day and  $y$  the frequency of people reporting a given number of lies. The function's sizeable intercept indicates that the majority of respondents who report lying do so in moderation, and the steep negative slope indicates the substantial decrease in frequency as the number of daily lies increases. Figure 4 also indicates that this pattern holds regardless of mode of communication. Although the slopes for both face-to-face lies and mediated lies are even steeper than that of the aggregated data, both retain the power law character of the total data set. Regardless of mode, most people report telling no lies and as the curve-fitting for number of lies reinforces, among those who report lying, most tell very few lies; but in each case, there are a few subjects who account for a large proportion of the lies being told.

Similarly, Figure 5 (among those telling face-to-face lies) and Figure 6 (among those telling mediated lies) indicate that lying behavior replicates the fractal character of power functions observed in other disciplines such as biological systems (Brown et al., 2002) and market segmentation (Anderson, 2008). Although each group of lies told to family members or friends or other types of message receivers represents only a small portion of the total lies, within each of the 10 mode-receiver combinations, the power function pattern is repeated. Most of the variation is among the intercepts and reflects that more lies are typically told to family members or friends than to acquaintances or total strangers.

These data do not include the number of interactions by type; therefore, it is possible that this variation is as much due to the number of opportunities for lying as it




**Figure 5** Standard power function curves fit the frequencies of face-to-face lies plotted by number of lies for all receiver types.

is that people are more likely to lie to others with whom they are familiar. Establishing the proportion of interactions involving lies may be more difficult than establishing the rate of lying for a prescribed time period. All of the diary studies to which these results are compared are flawed with regard to the interaction ratio. In order to capture as many lies as possible, DePaulo et al. (1996) specified that subjects were to record all interactions of 10 minutes or more. Subjects were told to record all lies that occurred during these interactions and, importantly, record lies occurring during shorter interactions as well. As a result, the ratio of total lies, regardless of interaction duration, to 10-minute interactions distorts the true relationship. If the number of 10-minute interactions varies across respondents or modes of communication, these comparisons may be more misleading than comparisons of the number of lies in each category during the fixed 24-hour time frame. Subsequent diary studies incorporate the lie per interaction distortion created by the DePaulo et al. methodology.

In order to consider more fully the possibility of individual differences in the propensity to lie, a multiple regression analysis was performed. Initially, a natural logarithm transformation was applied to the continuous lying measure as a means of reducing its nonnormality. Although not eliminating the nonnormality completely, this transformation had the effect of decreasing skewness by a factor of approximately 4 and kurtosis by a factor of approximately 18. To assess the impact of the demographic measures on lying, the natural logarithm transformed lying measure was regressed onto all demographic measures. Trivial predictors were dropped, the analysis was iterated, and two important, albeit modest in magnitude, predictors





**Figure 6** Standard power function curves fit the frequencies of mediated lies plotted by number of lies for all receiver types.

emerged ( $R = .21, F(2, 979) = 22.82, p < .001$ ). First, age was an important predictor ( $\beta = -.18, t(979) = -5.71, p < .001$ ), and the effect was such that a decrease in lying was associated with increasing age. Second, race (Caucasian vs. other) was an important predictor ( $\beta = -.09, t(979) = -2.99, p = .003$ ), and the effect was such that Caucasians reported lying less than other racial groups. This analysis was replicated with the dichotomous not lie/lie measure, with the same two important predictors emerging in the subsequent logistic regression analysis.

No sex differences were observed when controlling for other demographic predictors. Bivariate analysis showed that the overall rate of lying by men ( $M = 1.93, SD = 4.81, n = 482$ ) and women ( $M = 1.39, SD = 4.08, n = 516$ ) is directionally but not significantly different when using conventional criteria for statistical significance ( $t(996) = 1.89, p = .059/\text{ns}$ , two-tailed,  $d = 0.12$ ).<sup>3</sup> This apparent gender difference is in the opposite direction observed by DePaulo et al. (1996) but is consistent with the finding that women find lying less acceptable than men (Levine, McCornack, & Avery, 1992).

### Discussion

The results of this national study are consistent with the DePaulo et al. (1996) diary study and suggest that *on average* Americans lie once or twice a day. However, the important findings are that many people do not lie on a given day, the majority of lies are told by a few prolific liars, and because the distribution is highly skewed, the mean number of lies per day is misleading. This pattern is consistent across modes of

communication and varies little on the basis of who is being lied to. Examination of individual differences suggests some variation but in most cases the differences are small.

The representativeness of online panel data is debatable. Use of poststratification (such as employed by Synovate) and propensity (likelihood of response) weighting schemes are the usual solutions to matching panel samples to the population. In general, the use of a large number of small and internally homogeneous strata will enhance the proportional fit of the sample to the population. However, non-coverage and self-selection can create sampling problems in Web-based research that weighting does not solve (Loosveldt & Sonck, 2008). These representativeness issues are of particular concern when the measured values are correlated with the underlying reasons for the selection bias. However, when measuring socially undesirable behavior, assessment of representativeness is confounded. Loosveldt and Sonck obtained measures for validation of questions influenced by social desirability using face-to-face interviews; this introduces potential mode effects. Even with the selection problem, the social distance advantage of the Internet may actually produce better data. Birnbaum (2004) provides an argument for representativeness when the results are homogeneous across strata. Because selection bias tends to vary across the levels of a stratified sample, small individual differences for a measure across the stratification variables is evidence that the aggregate finding transcends the sampling issues and is indicative that the sample result is representative of the phenomenon in the population as a whole. In Study 1, confidence in representativeness is enhanced by the homogeneity of the results across strata, and convergent validity is subsequently established by consistency with the results in Studies 2 and 3, and by the advantage of the Internet for creating social distance in the measurement of a sensitive topic.

Although the findings were generally homogenous across the sample of adult Americans, some small demographic differences were apparent. Notably, age and race/ethnicity account for small but statistically significant variation. Further, the difference between reports of lying by men and women approached statistical significance. These findings may have theoretical, social, and cultural implications.

Perhaps the most interesting individual difference is the negative association between lying and age. Lying is acquired by children in early childhood and the ability to lie is correlated with the acquisition of perspective-taking, theory of mind, and communication skills (Vasek, 1986; see Knapp, 2008, pp. 91–116 for a summary discussion of lying and development). As the child reaches adolescence, lying skill is perfected, but lying declines in acceptance in early adulthood (Jensen et al., 2004). The difference between rates of lies reported by the DePaulo et al. (1996) student and (adult) community samples suggests that maturity tempers the usage of lying as a strategy for goal attainment, and the current findings of the national data in Study 1 are consistent with the claim that the lying declines with age.

With regard to the finding that Caucasians report fewer lies than those of other ethnic or racial groups, it would be irresponsible to simply conclude that White people are more honest in general than those of other races. Research on race and

deception is limited, and more research is required to make sense of this finding. The current study also found a marginally significant trend toward men reporting more lies than women. Some studies suggest men lie more than woman while others suggest the opposite (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1996; Levine et al., 1992). Other research finds that sex differences vary by the topic of the lie (Haselton, Buss, Oubaid, & Angleitner, 2005).

## Study 2

The results of Study 1 replicate, with a large and nationally representative sample, the often repeated conclusion that people lie, on average, once or twice per day. The results also document that the distribution of lies per day is substantially skewed. Most reported lies were told by a few prolific liars.

These findings have important implications. Most importantly, the nature of the distribution makes conclusions drawn from sample means misleading. Although the mean lies per day reported in the literature appear reflective of aggregate reality, the mean as a central tendency does not reflect the lying behavior of the typical person. Instead, most people reported telling no lies at all on a given day, with the median and mode both being zero. We are not the first to note this shape for the lie frequency distribution. A similar pattern, with many telling a few lies and a few telling most of the lies, was reported by Feldman, Forrest, and Happ (2002) in a laboratory study on self-presentation. But in their analysis of the data, the skew was treated as a methodological limitation rather than as a finding. The clarity of the results observed in the national study raises a question of whether or not this pattern existed in previous studies reporting lying frequency.

## Method

The raw data were obtained from the student phase of the DePaulo et al. (1996) study and from both phases of the George and Robb (2008) study. A distribution of lie frequency was partially reconstructed from the results reported by Feldman et al. (2002). The shape of each of the four distributions (excluding those reporting no lies) is examined, and the resulting distributions are compared with the overall results from the national survey. Data from the DePaulo et al. community sample and Hancock et al. (2004) studies were not available.

## Results

### *DePaulo et al. (1996)*

Of the 77 students sampled by DePaulo et al., 76 reported telling at least one lie over the period of 1 week ( $M_{\text{week}} = 13.74$ ,  $SD_{\text{week}} = 11.40$ ; this is equivalent to  $M_{\text{day}} = 1.96$ ,  $SD_{\text{day}} = 1.63$ ); the total number of lies told was 1,058; and the most lies told by one person was 46 (equivalent to 6.6 lies per day). Curve-fitting yields a power function for these data of  $y = 5.366 \times x^{-0.290}$  ( $n = 76$ ,  $r^2 = .289$ ). This function has a poor fit; however, no equation provided a fit better than  $r^2 = .350$ . Even so, the

data exhibit the overall distributional properties of a few lies told by most of the subjects and most of the lies told by a few liars. Of the total students in this study, 66.2% told the equivalent of two lies per day or less. Conversely, the seven most frequent liars (9.2% of the sample) told more than the equivalent of five lies per day, or 26.2% of all lies reported. Although raw data for the community sample are not available, DePaulo et al. reported 64 of 70 subjects told 477 lies with  $M_{\text{week}} = 6.79$  ( $SD_{\text{week}} = 6.86$ ) and  $Mdn_{\text{week}} = 4.5$ ; these measures suggest a positive skew similar to that observed with the student sample.

*George and Robb (2008)*

Two studies were conducted following the diary methodology used by DePaulo et al. (1996) and Hancock et al. (2004). The objective of the two studies was to examine variations in deceptive behavior by media use. A key difference between these studies and the prior diary studies was the use of PDAs instead of paper and pencil to record interactions and lies. In the first study, George and Robb used the 10-minute minimum time established in the prior diary studies to define an interaction; in the second study, the minimum interaction time was reduced to 5 minutes. In both studies, subjects were instructed to record lies even when the interaction was shorter than the prescribed time.

Results of this research are notably different from the prior diary studies. In each study, the mean number of lies was small. In the first study, 24 of 25 subjects reported lying over the period of a week ( $M_{\text{week}} = 4.16$ ,  $SD_{\text{week}} = 2.59$ ; this is equivalent to  $M_{\text{day}} = 0.59$ ,  $SD_{\text{day}} = 0.37$ ;  $Mdn = 4$ ); the total number of lies told was 104; and the most lies told by one individual was 11 (the equivalent of 1.6 lies per day). Despite the low average, only one subject who reported lying told fewer than two lies; consequently, a power function could not be fit to the distribution (if this individual is eliminated a power function with a modest  $r^2 = .758$  can be fit to the remaining data). Even with this poor fit, the distributional properties of the study demonstrated a positive skew similar to the national survey and the DePaulo et al. (1996) diary study. Half of the subjects (48% of the sample) told just 25% of the lies while the three subjects (12%) reporting the most lies told 26.9% of the lies.

In George and Robb's (2008) second study, the length of interaction was shortened in order to encourage more reporting. As a result, 23 of 24 subjects reported lying over the period of a week and the lying frequency increased from the first study ( $M_{\text{week}} = 6.33$ ,  $SD_{\text{week}} = 3.78$ ; this is equivalent to  $M_{\text{day}} = 0.90$ ,  $SD_{\text{day}} = 0.54$ ;  $Mdn = 5$ ). The total number of lies reported was 152 and the most lies told by one individual was 14 (the equivalent of two lies per day). Similar to the first study, and despite the overall low number of lies told, those reporting lies told a minimum of two lies; consequently, a power function could not be fit to the data. Nonetheless, the positive skew is again apparent in the pattern of responses. Just three subjects (12.5% of the sample) told 40 of 152 lies (26.3% of the total).



Although addressing a much shorter time frame in an experimental setting, Feldman et al. (2002) observe the same distinct skew pattern in their lying data as was observed in the daily national study and the weekly student diary studies. This study examined lying as a component of self-presentation; a sample of 121 students was divided into two induction groups and an experimental control. Across all subjects, a total of 211 lies were analyzed with a mean of 1.75 lies per subject and 2.92 lies per subject who lied.<sup>4</sup> Of the 121 subjects, 49 told no lies (40.5%), 23 told one lie (19.0%), and 18 told two lies (14.9%). The maximum number of lies was 12. Thus, 74.4% of the total sample accounted for only 28% of the lies told. The remaining 31 subjects (25.6%) told 3–12 lies, accounting for 72% of the lies ( $M = 4.9$  lies per subject).

When prior research reporting the frequency of lies is reexamined, results show the small diary samples, the experimental self-presentation study, and our large, national self-report survey have similarly skewed distributions. In all cases, the infrequent liars are a large part of the sample and account for a disproportionately small share of the lies reported. Conversely, each study includes a small number of individuals who account for a disproportionately large share of the lies.

### **Study 3**

Several issues are of concern despite the consistency of the findings across studies and the face validity obtained by reanalysis of prior studies reporting lie frequency. Primarily, these concerns have to do with the accuracy of the study findings using the survey approach to obtaining self-report data. Further, the apparent discrepancy between the numbers of nonliars when the time frame is 1 day versus the number when the time frame is 1 week needs to be resolved. For these reasons, the national survey was replicated using student samples and additional measures.

#### **Accuracy of reporting lies**

An obvious concern with self-report, mass survey research is accuracy of reporting. Bias in the national study data, if it exists, would likely manifest itself as underreporting. Given the pervasive cultural prohibitions against lying, self-presentation motives favor under- rather than overreporting. Methodological research on other sensitive topics such as drinking (Lemmens, Tan, & Knibbe, 1992) and sexual behavior (Ramjee, Weber, & Morar, 1999) indicates that diary studies produce higher mean scores than self-report questionnaires. The diary method used by DePaulo et al. (1996) is expected to be less susceptible to underreporting bias even though the study had the added limitations of a smaller and nonrepresentative sample. Because the mean number of lies per day in the national survey data was greater than the mean observed in the diary research, concern that the national study may be underreporting due to the use of the self-report questionnaire method is not consistent with results of most comparisons of survey research to an alternative diary method. Thus, the

observed frequency of lying reported is not likely attributable solely to the survey methodology used to collect the national study data.

Nonetheless, a survey of lying behavior invites the question: “How do you know the subjects are not lying?” One answer resides in the methods used to address sensitive questions. Tourangeau and Yan (2007) identify four techniques for asking sensitive questions that might contribute to improved prevalence measurement: Use of self-administered rather than interviewer-administered questions, forgiving wording, randomized response techniques (RRT), and use of the bogus pipeline (BPL) approach. The national survey of lying was conducted as a self-administered study and used a forgiving wording preamble. The meta-analysis by Tourangeau and Yan (2007) provides clear evidence that self-administration yields more behavioral reporting for sensitive topics than does interviewer-administration. There is limited evidence that forgiving wording may also be helpful. Catania et al. (1996) found increased reporting of sexual activity but a series of experiments by Holtgraves, Eck, and Lasky (1997) suggest that forgiving wording is more likely to improve attitudinal responses than behavioral reporting.

A second answer can be obtained through the use of additional measures in order to assess the social desirability bias (SDB) in the self-report measures (Fisher & Katz, 2000). This is sometimes done directly by obtaining measures of SDB using a scale of SDB traits (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Reynolds, 1982) and adjusting for the subjects’ level of bias. Alternatively, Fisher and Katz suggest the validity of reports of a socially undesirable behavior such as lying can be assessed indirectly, for example, by comparing the self-report of that behavior to subjects’ estimates of the extent of that behavior in others. Subjects in Study 3 were asked to report the total number of times others had lied to them in the past 24 hours.

#### **Minimum observable differences**

A second key issue raised by the results of the national study is the minimum observable difference of one lie per day. Those who lie but do so less than once a day may be recorded as having told no lies. Because the frequency of lies is typically reported as the rate of lying in a fixed interval of time (i.e., one to two lies per day), expanding the duration in which the behavior can be observed is likely to increase the overall reported incidence of the behavior; measures taken over a longer period and converted to a daily rate will also increase precision. In order to observe those who lie once a week or once a month or even less frequently, it is necessary to use a wider time aperture. In the student sample of the DePaulo et al. (1996) study, 30% of diaries recorded six or fewer lies per week (less than once per day). If the number of lies told in a week is evenly distributed across the days of the week (and there is no reason to believe an even distribution is a good assumption), we might expect that as many as 17% (those reporting four, five, or six lies in a week) have an above average likelihood of being included as liars in a 1-day study. But the other 13% (reporting one, two, or three lies in a week) would be more likely to report not lying on the survey day. Identifying infrequent liars by repeating the daily survey on 2 or

more days with the same sample, or by asking those who report no lies to identify other times when they had told a lie, we would expect to narrow substantially the gap between the national study observation that 40% told a lie on one given day and the DePaulo et al. result that 95% of subjects (both studies combined) reported at least one lie over the period of a week.

## **Method**

### *Participants and design*

Students were recruited from communication, advertising, and marketing classes at two large universities in the Midwestern United States. Of the 229 subjects, two failed to provide complete information regarding the number of lies told and two provided answers that were determined to be statistical outliers using a discordancy test. These subjects were excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining 225 respondents, 140 were female (62.2%) and 85 were male (37.8%). Participation was voluntary.

The primary purpose of this study was to cross-validate the results of the national study using a separate sample. A nonexperimental survey design similar to that of the national study was used in order to obtain comparable descriptive measures for the incidence of lying in the student sample. Results from this survey are compared with those of Study 1 and the reanalysis of prior studies in Study 2.

### *Procedures and measures*

The study was administered in five separate classroom settings using a paper questionnaire. The introduction and frequency of lies question were identical to that of the online survey used with the national sample except that students could leave parts of the  $5 \times 2$  grid blank (the online survey forced subjects to place zeroes in all cells for which no lies were told before they could continue with the questionnaire). Blank cells were coded as zero lies. In addition, those subjects who reported telling no lies in the past 24 hours were asked a follow-up closed-ended question regarding when they last told a lie. Response categories included, “more than 24 hours ago but within the last 2 days,” “more than 2 days ago but within the last week,” “more than a week ago but within the last month,” “more than a month ago,” and “never.” Subjects were asked how many lies they had been told by others in the past 24 hours and what percentage of the U.S. adult population lies on a given day. One group of subjects was asked about the difficulty of the lie reporting task.

## **Results**

The pattern of lie frequency for the total student sample is consistent with the distribution of lies for the national survey using the same frequency measure. The data fit a power function of  $y = 53.891 \times x^{-1.012}$  with a goodness-of-fit of  $r^2 = .894$ . The pattern of many telling few lies versus a few telling many lies is reproduced in the student sample frequencies. Of the total subjects in the student sample, 68.4% told one, two, or no lies (accounting for 24.5% of 526 total lies); conversely, the 13 most prolific liars (5.8% of the total sample) told 22.4% of the lies. On the basis of the relationship

of the means in the DePaulo et al. (1996) student and community diary studies, we expected the mean of the student survey to be higher than the mean of the national adult sample. Results from the student sample ( $M = 2.34$  lies per day,  $SD = 2.94$ ,  $Mdn = 1$ ,  $Mode = 0$ ,  $N = 225$ ,  $Max = 21$  lies, 95% CI = 1.95–2.72) indicate higher frequency than in the national survey (nonoverlapping 95% confidence intervals;  $t(1221) = 2.62$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = 0.18$ ).

Those subjects who reported telling no lies in the past 24 hours (28.9%) were asked the follow-up question regarding when they last told a lie. Combining those who indicated their most recent lie was within the past week (though not in the past 24 hours) with those who reported at least one lie in the past 24 hours, a total of 92.4% reported telling a lie in the past week (204 of 221 subjects; 4 did not answer the follow-up question). This result is reasonably consistent with the DePaulo et al. (1996) result of 95%.

Since there is a legitimate concern about SDB in the self-report of lying, a check on the subjects' reported rate of lying (lies per day) was obtained by asking subjects in the student sample how many times they believe they were lied to by others in the past 24 hours. Subjects reported that others told an average of 2.79 lies in the past 24 hours ( $SD = 2.82$ ,  $N = 198$ ). Although 28.9% reported telling no lies, 17.2% reported not being lied to by others. Own lies ( $M = 2.34$ ,  $SD = 2.94$ ) are significantly lower than others' lies; the paired sample  $t(197) = 2.18$ ,  $p < .05$ . Despite this significant difference, the distribution of others' lies is strikingly similar to that of own lies following the long-tail pattern observed in the self-report of lies (the power function for others' lies is  $y = 44.552 \times x^{-0.790}$  with a modest goodness-of-fit of  $r^2 = .700$ ). It is important to note that individual subject's reports of others' lies did not mimic their self-report of lying. The correlation of the two measures is a meager  $r = .073$  ( $p = .152$ , *ns*).

Participants were also asked what proportion of the U.S. adult population (18 years or older) told at least one lie on any given day. The mean estimate is 75.8% ( $SD = 21.7$ ). The proportion of students (who are a subsegment of the adult population) telling at least one lie in the past 24 hours is 71.1% (CI =  $\pm 5.9\%$  points). Although not directly comparable due to the different ways in which the proportions were derived, in both instances one percentage falls within the confidence interval of the other, suggesting that the two proportions would not be significantly different.

### Discussion

The results of Study 3 fit a power function similar to that of the national survey and further indicated that, based on self-reports of lying behavior, most people tell few or no lies in a given day but a few prolific liars tell a disproportionately large share of the daily lies. Survey results, diary studies, and the distribution of lies in an experimental setting share this pattern, and the consistency of results provides strong evidence that the frequency of lying has a strong positive skew. The similarity of subjects' estimates of others' lies and the distribution of number of lies told provides convergent validity for the self-report measure of lying.



With regard to the accuracy of mean prevalence figures, Study 3 provides mixed results. The mean reported by this student sample is 2.34 lies per day and expands the range of responses across all studies to 0.59–2.34 lies per day. The mean for the student survey is significantly higher than the mean of the national survey of American adults. This is similar to the relationship observed by DePaulo et al. (1996) for their student and community samples. Consistent with the Study 1 finding that younger people tend to lie more than older people, the predominantly young student sample has a higher frequency of lying. Two measures were obtained to assess the validity of the reported lying frequency. One measure estimated the proportion of the population that lies on a given day; the result of 75.8% is similar to the Study 3 result showing that 71.1% of the subjects told at least one lie in the past 24 hours. However, an estimate of others' lies to the subjects ( $M = 2.79$ ) is significantly higher than the average of the subjects' own lies. Either the subjects truly believe that other people lie more than they do or the subjects are slightly but systematically underestimating their own lying behavior.

Regardless, the difference is one of degree and not magnitude, and the relevant finding is the consistent skew of the distribution and not the average number of lies told. In fact, the mean of a long-tail (power) distribution is in part a function of sample size. As the sample size increases, the probability of rare but legitimate extreme values that are not statistical outliers being reported also increases. In Study 1, the maximum number of lies by one person was 46 ( $N = 998$ ). Study 3 consisted of five subsamples (separate classroom administrations of the survey) and the maximum number of lies told was closely associated with sample size. In the largest subgroup ( $n = 118$ ), the maximum number of lies was 21. In the next largest group ( $n = 31$ ), the most lies told was 12. In the three smallest subsamples ( $n = 26, 25$ , and  $25$ , respectively), the most lies told by one person were 10, 8, and 6.

A question related to accuracy may be raised with regard to the difficulty of the task (since it might be expected that a more difficult task would produce increased variance). We note that researchers familiar with the topic of deception tend to struggle more with the question asked in the self-administered survey than do naive subjects. Those familiar with the deception literature wrestle with the explication of lying and, perhaps because of this cognitive effort, their own ability to recall precisely over a 24-hour period. Naive subjects seem to have no such problem. As a check, 25 students in one Study 3 subsample completed the recall of lies task and were subsequently asked to rate the difficulty of answering the question. On a 1–10 scale (1 = not at all difficult; 10 = extremely difficult), the subjects reported  $M = 3.48$  ( $SD = 3.03$ ) with the  $Mdn = 2$  and the Mode = 1. Most subjects seemed to feel that they were able to complete the task with little difficulty. During a verbal debriefing of this subject group, subjects reiterated that most had made an earnest effort to estimate the number of times they had lied and most felt the task was not difficult.

Finally, Study 3 appears to have resolved the discrepancy in the proportion of nonliars reported in the daily survey and weekly diary results. All of the diary studies report that more than 90% of the subjects told at least one lie in the period of 1

week. However, many of those subjects lie at a rate that translates to less than one lie per day. When Study 3 subjects who did not report lying in the 24 hours preceding the survey were asked when they last told a lie, results indicate that most did lie in the previous week. Therefore, the apparent discrepancy is due to the precision of the question being asked. The daily questions do not allow for fractional responses, whereas the conversion of weekly data to daily data inherently creates fractional reporting. When the precision issue is accounted for by additional measurement, the discrepancy disappears.

### General discussion

The results of Study 1 reproduce with a large, national sample the conclusion that people lie, on average (arithmetic mean), once or twice per day. More importantly, the results document that the distribution of self-reported lies per day is substantially skewed. Most people report telling few or no lies on a given day and most reported lies are told by a few prolific liars. The reanalyses in Study 2 and the replication of the survey methodology in Study 3 provide strong evidence in support of this finding. All the data reported here are consistent with the claim that most lies are told by a few prolific liars.

The highly skewed, long-tail distribution that results from reports of lying may be emblematic of a larger class of behaviors. Although much of what we measure and observe relies on the principle of randomness and results in the well-known bell-shaped curve of observations distributed around a central tendency for a phenomenon, scientists continue to find new evidence for a self-organizing principle in nature that produces distributions that are scale-free, or lacking in a characteristic tendency (Barabási, 2003; Barabási & Albert, 1999). This principle is found in the examination of atomic structure, biological systems, economic theory (the Pereto Law or “80/20 Rule”), and the emergence of nodes on the Internet. The latter describes a pattern consisting of a few very large nodes that are connected with extremely high frequency (e.g., Google, eBay, and Amazon.com) that are surrounded by over 100 million smaller and, in many cases isolated, Websites. But it is the human tendency to search, use, and link to these few extreme large sites while ignoring so many others that creates this apparent scale-free pattern in the first place. It may be less the case that lying is some unique form of communicative behavior that divides people into those who do it (with vigor) and those who do not than an indicator that we need to reexamine a broad range of social and symbolic behaviors, look for scale-free distributions, and consider broadly the implications for all forms of communication research.

Our finding with regard to the distribution of reported lies has specific implications for the conclusions drawn from deception detection accuracy experiments. A meta-analysis shows that people do only slightly better than chance (54%) when distinguishing between truths and lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In the experiments

cited by Bond and DePaulo, the deception base rate is almost always 50% and subjects are typically truth-biased. Truth bias leads to the veracity effect, meaning that accuracy is higher for detecting honest messages than for detecting lies (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). As a consequence, honesty base rates impact accuracy such that people are increasingly accurate as the proportion of truthful to deceptive messages increases (Levine, Kim, Park, & Hughes, 2006). The finding that most people are honest most of the time suggests that experiments employing nonrepresentative base rates (i.e., a lower proportion of truths to lies than is typical of everyday interactions) will underestimate accuracy. Findings from this general population study indicate that truth bias may be functional. Since self-report data suggest most people do not lie or tell very few lies in the course of a typical day, it is reasonable for people to believe others (that is, to be truth-biased) most of time.

However, although laboratory deception detection experiments may underestimate overall accuracy due to nonrepresentative base rates, lie detection rates may be overestimated. The current findings suggest substantial individual differences for truth telling (or lying) with an honest majority and a few prolific liars. Bond and DePaulo (2008) report substantial variation in both people's demeanor and people's ability to lie. People's ability to lie successfully likely impacts how often they lie (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). We speculate that the prolific liars are likely those people with especially honest demeanor and that unusually transparent liars avoid lying. If most lies outside the laboratory are told by people who are usually believed, lie detection rates would be lower than those observed in randomized experiments.

One caution relates to Rozin's (2001) concern for achieving "context- and culture-sensitive scientific social psychology." The large sample of American adults used in the current research is more representative and allows greater generalizability than previous studies using students and other convenience samples. Nevertheless, caution should be taken before assuming that these results will hold for other cultures, individuals under 18 years of age, or subsets of the population with characteristics or beliefs that are sharply discrepant from the norm. Anecdotal evidence suggests that base rates may well vary across cultures and studies of lying involving young children and adolescents show considerable variation in the ways lying occurs (Knapp, 2008). Criminals, political extremists, and those at the far ends of the socioeconomic spectrum may well behave differently than the vast majority of the American population. The domain of deception research would benefit from cross-cultural, subcultural, and cross-generational examination of the prevalence and distribution of lying behavior.

## **Conclusion**

Over time, most Americans probably lie at least occasionally. But the inference of pervasive daily lying, drawn from the statistical average of one to two lies per day, and reinforced by media coverage of corporate deception and political malfeasance, as well as pop culture portrayals of deception detectors, belies the basic honesty

present in most people's everyday communication. Self-report data for the U.S. adult population show the average rate of lying is around 1.65 lies per day; but the data are not normally distributed. On any given day, the majority of lies are told by a small portion of the population, and nearly 6 out of 10 Americans claim to have told no lies at all. As researchers continue to examine the nature of lying and look for ways to detect deception effectively, both the theories of deception, and the methods used to test those theories, necessarily must take into account that veracity is not a constant across the population and that the propensity to lie can be an important moderator.

### Acknowledgments

The authors thank Deborah Kashy and Joey George for providing the original data from their studies for additional analysis.

### Notes

- 1 Synovate, Inc. (Chicago) conducts marketing research and strategic studies for business, industry, and government agencies. White papers on the omnibus methodology are available at [www.synovate.com](http://www.synovate.com). The omnibus panel was surveyed on April 30, 2008.
- 2 Two subjects, one with an extreme value of 134 lies (20.8 standard deviations above the mean of 1.80 lies) and a corresponding subject with no lies, were eliminated from the sample by  $\alpha$ -trimming. Using procedures outlined by Barnett and Lewis (1978), a discordancy test appropriate for gamma distributions was applied to the data. Even though the potential for extreme values is inherent in the tail of the power function, the most extreme value recorded in these data is well beyond the limits of statistical probability.
- 3 The application of a  $t$ -test for establishing the significance of differences for nonnormal distributions is problematic. Nonetheless, in those situations where the shapes of the distributions are similar, the sample sizes are similar, and the samples are sufficiently large the  $t$ -test will provide an acceptable test of significance even though the assumption of normality has been violated (Johnson, 1978). Although most of the small student sample studies fail to meet all of these conditions, the power distributions in this large-scale national study replicate for most subsamples and do so with large enough samples to allow for robust statistical testing. An alternative is to make the nonparametric assumption and apply difference testing accordingly. Calculating chi-square for age (under 45 years old vs. 45 years and older) and lying (did vs. did not lie) yields  $\chi^2(1, N = 998) = 36.59, p < .001$ ; this leads to a conclusion similar to the one reported in the text, specifically that younger people are more likely to lie than older people. Calculating chi-square for gender and lying yields  $\chi^2(1, N = 998) = 2.84, p < .092$ ; again the result is consistent with the reported  $t$ -test showing that men are directionally but not significantly more likely to lie than are women.
- 4 Despite including the induction groups, using a student sample, and being constrained to only those who told lies, the mean of 2.92 lies has been misinterpreted in the media (online program description, *About Lie to Me*, 2009, <http://www.fox.com/lietome/about>) and in scholarly work as claiming "in the course of a 10-minute interaction . . . the average person tells two to three lies" (Harrington, 2009, p. 4).



## References

- About *Lie to Me*. (2009). Online program description. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from <http://www.fox.com/lietome/about>.
- Anderson, C. (2008). *The long tail*. New York: Hyperion.
- Asch, S. E. (1987). *Social psychology* (Original work published 1952). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barabási, A.-L. (2003). *Linked*. New York: Plume.
- Barabási, A.-L., & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. *Science*, **286**, 509–512.
- Barnett, V., & Lewis, T. (1978). *Outliers in statistical data*. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
- Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Human research and data collection via the Internet. *Annual Review of Psychology*, **55**, 803–832.
- Bok, S. (1999). *Lying: Moral choice in public and private life*. New York: Vintage.
- Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, **10**, 214–234.
- Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2008). Individual differences in judging deception: Accuracy and bias. *Psychological Bulletin*, **134**, 477–492.
- Brown, J. H., Gupta, V. K., Li, B.-L., Milne, B. T., Restrepo, C., & West, G. B. (2002). The fractal nature of nature: Power laws, ecological complexity, and biodiversity. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, **357**, 619–626.
- Catania, J. A., Binson, D., Canchola, J., Pollack, L. M., Hauck, W., & Coates, T. J. (1996). Effects of interviewer gender, interviewer choice, and item wording on responses to questions concerning sexual behavior. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, **60**, 345–375.
- Cochran, S. D., & Mays, V. M. (1990). Sex, lies and HIV. *New England Journal of Medicine*, **322**(11), 774–775.
- Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathy. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, **24**, 349–354.
- DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in everyday life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **70**, 979–995.
- Feldman, R. S., Forrest, J. A., & Happ, B. R. (2002). Self-presentation and verbal deception: Do self-presenters lie more? *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, **24**(2), 163–170.
- Fisher, R. J., & Katz, J. E. (2000). Social desirability bias and the validity of self-reported values. *Psychology & Marketing*, **17**(2), 105–120.
- Ford, C. V., King, B. H., & Hollender, M. H. (1988). Lies and liars: Psychiatric aspects of prevarication. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, **145**, 554–562.
- George, J. F., & Robb, A. (2008). Deception and computer-mediated communication in daily life. *Communication Reports*, **21**, 92–103.
- Hancock, J. T., Thom-Santelli, J., & Ritchie, T. (2004). Deception and design: The impact of communication technology on lying behavior. *CHI Letters*, **6**(1), 129–134.
- Harrington, B. (Ed.). (2009). *Deception: From ancient empires to Internet dating*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Haselton, M. G., Buss, D. M., Oubaid, V., & Angleitner, A. (2005). Sex, lies, and strategic interference: The psychology of deception between the sexes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, **31**, 3–23.
- Holtgraves, T., Eck, J., & Lasky, B. (1997). Face management, question wording, and social desirability. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, **27**, 1650–1671.

- Jensen, L., Arnett, J., Feldman, S., & Cauffman, E. (2004). The right to do wrong: Lying to parents among adolescents and emerging adults. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *33*(2), 101–112.
- Johnson, N. J. (1978). Modified *t* tests and confidence intervals for asymmetric populations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, *73*, 536–544.
- Kalish, N. (2004, January). How honest are you? *Reader's Digest*, 114–119.
- Kish, L. (1965). *Survey sampling*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Kashy, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1996). Who lies? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*, 1037–1051.
- Knapp, M. L. (2008). *Lying and deception in human interaction*. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Knox, D., Schacht, C., Holt, J., & Turner, J. (1993). Sexual lies among university students. *College Student Journal*, *26*, 269–272.
- Lemmens, P., Tan, E. S., & Knibbe, R. A. (1992). Measuring quantity and frequency of drinking in a general population survey: A comparison of five indices. *Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, *53*, 476–486.
- Levashina, J., & Campion, M. (2007). Measuring faking in the employment interview: Development and validation of an interview faking behavior scale. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(6), 1638–1656.
- Levine, T. R., Kim, R. K., & Hamel, L. M. (2009). *People lie for a reason: An experimental test of the principle of veracity*. Unpublished manuscript, Michigan State University.
- Levine, T. R., Kim, R. K., Park, H. S., & Hughes, M. (2006). Deception detection accuracy is a predictable linear function of message veracity base-rate: A formal test of Park and Levine's probability model. *Communication Monographs*, *73*, 243–260.
- Levine, T. R., McCornack, S. A., & Avery, P. B. (1992). Sex differences in emotional reactions to discovered deception. *Communication Quarterly*, *40*, 289–296.
- Levine, T. R., Park, H. S., & McCornack, S. A. (1999). Accuracy in detecting truths and lies: Documenting the "veracity effect." *Communication Monographs*, *66*, 125–144.
- Loosveldt, G., & Sonck, N. (2008). An evaluation of the weighting procedures for an online access panel survey. *Survey Research Methods*, *2*(2), 93–105.
- Patterson, J., & Kim, P. (1991). *The day America told the truth*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Ramjee, G., Weber, A. E., & Morar, N. S. (1999). Recording sexual behavior: Comparison of recall questionnaires with a coital diary. *Sexually Transmitted Diseases*, *26*, 374–380.
- Reynolds, W. M. (1982). Development of reliable and valid short forms of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, *38*, 119–125.
- Rozin, P. (2001). Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *5*(1), 2–14.
- The Real Truth About Lying (1996, September/October). *Psychology Today*, *29*, 16.
- Tosone, C. (2006). Living everyday lies: The experience of self. *Clinical Social Work Journal*, *34*(3), 335–348.
- Tourangeau, R., & Yan, T. (2007). Sensitive questions in surveys. *Psychological Bulletin*, *133*(5), 859–883.
- U.S. Census Bureau (2008). *Current population survey*. Retrieved June 5, 2008, from <http://www.census.gov/cps/>.
- Vasek, M. E. (1986). Lying as a skill: The development of deception in children. In R. W. Mitchell & N. S. Thompson (Eds.), *Deception perspectives on human and nonhuman deceit* (pp. 271–292). Albany: State University of New York Press.



# Index

---

Index note: Article titles and their page numbers are in **boldface**.

## A

ABA. *See* American Bar Association (ABA)

Abagnale, Frank William, Jr., 1:189, 2:676, 2:889

*Abbey Road*, 1:69

Abominable Snowman, 2:555

absence of information, 2:953

absolute privilege, 2:594

Abu Ghraib prison, 2:547–548

**academia**, 1:1–4

academic dishonesty, 1:9–10

academic exaggeration, 1:350

academic integrity, 1:134

accounting ethics, 1:5

lying and deception for personal gain, 1:1–2

lying and deception to benefit academic  
institution, 1:2

prevention, 1:3–4

ramifications of lying and deception, 1:3

research, 1:1

acceptance, 2:598. *See also* **lie acceptability**

in attitudes toward deception, 1:245–246

lying in daily life, 1:241–242

need, 2:569

recommendation outcome, 2:591

in relationships, 2:807

self-deception and, 2:836

social, 2:604, 2:625

of truth, 2:769

**accounting**, 1:4–7. *See also* **financial markets**

academia ethics, 1:5

applied ethics, 1:4–5

Arthur Andersen accounting, 1:xxxv, 1:109

creative accounting, 1:5

double-entry system, 1:4

FASB, 1:7, 1:383

GAAP, 1:383

history of, 1:4

Inca Empire, 2:503–504

incentive, opportunity, rationalization, 1:7

KPMG scandal, 1:6–7

PCAOB, 1:381

scandals, 1:5–7

achievement, 1:10, 2:613, 2:812, 2:882

*ad hominen* attack, 2:953

Adair, Douglass, 2:874

Adams, Eddie, 2:919

Adams, John Quincy, 2:558

Adamski, George, 1:xxxii

adaptational model of malingering, 2:641

adaptive denial, 1:279–280

Adler, Jonathan, 1:475

**adolescence, lying in**, 1:7–10. *See also* **childhood, lying in**

academic dishonesty, 1:9–10

consequences, 1:10

means and reasons, 1:8

peer influence, 1:9

adultery, 1:347–348, 2:492, 2:504

adulthood

false testimony, 2:939

social interactions, 2:885–886

white lies in, 2:936–937



- advance fee scam, 2:526, 2:953  
*Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The* (Twain), 2:830  
*Adventures of Tom Sawyer, The* (Twain), 2:830–831  
**advertising, consumer products, 1:11–16.**  
*See also* consumer protection laws; drug advertising; false advertising; marketing, deceptive; tobacco advertising  
     advertising to children, 1:14  
     consumer bias and self-deception, 1:14–15  
     flattery, 1:13  
     FTC definition of deceptive advertising, 1:11  
     masked marketing, 1:12  
     nonverbal advertising, 2:790  
     puffery, 1:11–12  
     research on deceptive advertising, 1:13–14  
     subliminal advertising, 1:12  
**advertising filter, 1:420**  
**Aerial Phenomena Enquiry Network (APEN), 2:907**  
**Aesop's fables, 1:90, 1:100, 1:355, 2:689, 2:954**  
**affinity group fraud, 2:953**  
**African Americans, 1:16–19. *See also* Asian Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans**  
     Black Codes, 1:18  
     civil rights, 1:18–19  
     historical deceptions and slave trade, 1:16–18  
     Jim Crow segregation, 1:18  
     negative categorization, 1:19  
*Against Lying* (Augustine), 2:872  
*Against the Grain* (Huysmans), 1:377  
**Agassiz, Louis S., 1:xxx, 2:954**  
**age falsification, 1:141**  
*Age of Turbulence, The* (Greenspan), 1:425  
**aggressive mimicry, 2:512**  
**Agpaoa, Tony, 2:957**  
**Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 1:49**  
*Aids of Scouting* (Baden-Powell), 2:847  
**Al Qaeda, 1:104, 1:160, 1:421**  
**Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act of 1971, 2:699**  
**al-Assad, Bashar, 1:50**  
**Albert, Laura Victoria, 2:654**  
**alchemists, 1:461**  
**Al-Hasaba, 2:552**  
**alibi, 1:19–20**  
     agency, 1:20, 1:258  
     Alibi Network, 1:20, 1:111  
     clubs, 1:258  
     famous, 1:19–20  
     origins, 1:19  
**Alien Autopsy video, 1:488**  
**alliances, 1:31, 1:144, 1:478**  
     Evangelical Alliance, 1:120  
     false, 1:84  
     formation, 1:346  
     World War I, 2:945  
**“Alligators in the Sewers” legend, 2:914**  
**Allport, Gordon W., 2:823**  
**Almonte, Danny, 1:141**  
**Althusser, Louis, 1:181**  
**Alvarado, Pedro, 2:858**  
**AMA (American Medical Association), 2:650**  
*Amazing World of Kreskin, The, 1:xxxii*  
**ambiguity, 2:647, 2:822, 2:903**  
     manipulation and, 2:642  
     rumor and, 2:823  
**Ambrose, Stephen, 1:446**  
**ambulance fraud, 1:xxxvii**  
**American Bar Association (ABA)**  
     Center for Professional Responsibility, 1:44  
     criminal justice standards, 1:42  
     model rules of professional conduct, 1:42, 1:44  
**American Cable, 1:308**  
**American Express, 1:381**  
**American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1:7**  
**American Medical Association (AMA), 2:650**  
*American President, The, 2:687*  
**American Psychological Association (APA), 1:269–270**  
**Amnesty International, 2:548, 2:893**  
**Anabasis (Xenophon), 2:653**  
*Analysing Police Interviews: Laughter, Confessions, and the Tape* (Carter, E.), 1:267  
**anchoring, 1:156, 2:953**  
**Anderson, Anna (Anastasia), 1:20–22**  
     DNA evidence and, 1:21  
     forensic evidence, 1:21–22  
     Grand Duchess claims, 1:20–21  
**Anderson, J. A., 1:179**  
**Anderson, Mark, 1:289**  
**Anderson, Sherwood, 1:94, 1:378**  
*Angel at the Fence* (Rosenblat), 2:654–655  
*Animal Camouflage* (Portman), 1:23  
**animals, 1:22–27. *See also* insects; plants; primates**  
     Batesian mimicry, 1:22  
     birds, 1:25–26  
     deception examples, 1:22–23

- fish, 1:24–25  
 frogmouths, 1:26  
 hawk moth, 1:23  
 insect deception, 1:23–24  
 Kallima butterfly, 1:23  
 mammals, 1:26–27  
 mimicry, 2:675–676  
 Pierid butterflies, 1:22  
 snakes, 1:24  
*Anna Karenina* (Tolstoy), 1:377  
 Annan, Kofi, 1:50  
 ant mimics, 1:23–24  
 Antar, Sam, 1:6  
**anthropology, cultural, 1:27–30**  
   ethnographies and deception, 1:27  
   deception functions and strategies, 1:28–29  
   research, 1:29  
   understanding deception, 1:29–30  
 anti-Catholicism, 1:119–121, 1:132.  
   *See also* **Catholic Church**  
*Anti-Christ, The* (Nietzsche), 2:717  
 anticomunism filter, 1:421  
 antisocial lies, 1:138–139  
 antisocial personality disorder, 2:633  
 antiutilitarian argument, 1:465  
 APA (American Psychological Association),  
   1:269–270  
 APEN (Aerial Phenomena Enquiry Network),  
   2:907  
 Appert, Ernest Eugene, 2:757  
*Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 2:922  
*Applied Sociology* (Ward), 2:927  
**April Fool's Day, 1:30–31**  
   celebrations, 1:30–31  
   origins, 1:30  
**Aquinas, Thomas, 1:31–33, 1:35, 1:123, 1:247**  
   current relevance of teachings, 1:33  
   on lying, 1:31–32  
   lying in non-European cultures, 1:451–452  
   morals and ethics, 2:678–679  
   view of lying, 1:451  
 Arab Spring, 1:50  
*arcana imperii*, 1:184  
 Archimedes, 1:xxix  
*Areaceae*, 2:765, 2:767  
*Areopagitica* (Milton), 1:184  
*Argrope argentata*, 2:512  
 arguments  
   antiutilitarian, 1:465  
   argument from ignorance, 2:953  
   Kant and, 2:680–681  
   Saint Augustine, 2:828  
   two-sided, 1:12  
 Ariely, Dan, 2:613–614, 2:799, 2:843  
**Aristotle, 1:33, 1:34–35, 1:93, 1:232, 1:451**  
   on golden mean, 1:485  
   influence, 1:35  
   on truth and deception, 1:34–35, 2:901  
   on virtue, 1:485  
*Arkansas Democrat Gazette*, 2:709  
*Arming America* (Bellesiles), 1:446  
 Armstrong, Lance, 1:xxvii, 1:438, 2:661  
 Aronson, Elliot, 1:155, 2:842  
**aroused suspicion, 1:35–37**  
   individual-level variables, 1:36–37  
   McCornack and, 2:648  
   research, 1:36  
*Art of War, The* (Sun Tzu), 1:43, 2:875–876,  
   2:880, 2:953  
 Arthur Andersen accounting, 1:xxxv, 1:109  
 Ash, Mary Kay, 2:888  
 Ashcroft, John, 2:547  
**Asian Americans, 1:37–40. *See also* African  
 Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native  
 Americans**  
   environment, 1:39  
   language and cultural identity, 1:38–39  
   reaction time, 1:39  
**assassin bugs, 1:40–41. *See also* butterflies; fireflies;  
 insects**  
   nymphs, 1:40  
   reducing with pesticides, 1:41  
   using deception to lure prey, 1:40–41  
**assessment. *See also* Defense Academy for  
 Credibility Assessment; statement validity  
 assessment**  
   of lying as ability or skill, 2:623–624  
   NCCA, 1:274–275  
**assumptions**  
   interpersonal deception theory, 2:532–534  
   motivational impairment effect, 2:682–683  
*Asteraceae*, 2:765  
 astroturfing, 2:854  
 Atahualpa, 2:502–503  
 Athanasius, Saint, 1:301  
*Atlanta Constitution*, 1:100  
*Atlantic Magazine*, 2:958  
 Atlantis, 1:xxxii  
 attachment, 1:240–241  
 attitudes  
   in history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:463  
   lie acceptability as, 2:597

- attorneys, 1:41–45. *See also* Department of Justice; judges; law and law enforcement  
 ethical and legal consequences, 1:45  
 legal regulations for, 1:44–45  
 role of advocate, 1:41–42  
 self-deception and self-justification, 1:44  
 standards for truth in evidence, 1:42  
 strategic obfuscation, managed interpretation, misdirection, 1:43–44
- attributive projection, 2:781–782
- Aubrey, John, 1:30
- audience, 1:45–47. *See also* targets  
 behaviorist social scientific tradition, 1:46  
 consultation media, 1:46  
 of consultation media, 1:46  
 conversational media, 1:46  
 of conversational media, 1:46  
 deception and audience theories, 1:46–47  
 encoding and decoding model, 1:47  
 limited defects tradition, 1:46–47  
 mediated communication, 1:46  
 TA, 2:864–867  
 of transmission, 1:46  
 transmission media, 1:46  
 of transmission media, 1:46  
 two-step flow model, 1:47  
 uses-and-gratification tradition, 1:47
- Austen, Jane, 1:376, 1:378, 1:411
- Austin, J. L., 1:471, 1:472
- author invariant stylometry, 2:874
- authoritarian states, 1:47–51  
 control of media, 1:50  
 defining, 1:47–48  
 neoauthoritarian state deceptions, 1:50–51  
 propaganda, validation, denial, 1:48–50
- Authors, 1:402
- autism, 1:xxxiv
- automatic lying, 2:618
- automatic writing, 2:954
- autonomy, 1:10
- availability rule, 2:953–954
- Averroes, 1:33
- Avicenna, 1:33
- B**
- Baars, Bernard, 2:509
- Bacanovic, Peter, 2:872–873
- Back, M. D., 2:528
- Bacon, Francis, 1:456
- Baden-Powell, Robert, 2:847
- BAE (behavioral adaptation explanation), 2:779
- Bailey, Frederick George, 1:53–54  
 human deceit work, 1:53  
 methodological holism, 1:54  
 methodological individualism, 1:54
- bait-and-switch, 1:372
- Balboa, Vasco Núñez de, 1:17, 2:857
- Balcetis, Emily, 2:497
- bald-faced lies, 1:475, 2:508
- “Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive,” 1:475
- bald-faced truths, 2:508
- Band of Brothers*, 1:446
- Bandura, Albert, 2:669, 2:851
- bankruptcy, 1:54–57  
 BAPCPA, 1:56  
 Chapter 7, 1:55  
 corporate culture of deceit, 1:333–334  
 Enron, 1:xxxv, 1:6, 1:333  
 fraud, 1:56–57  
 history, 1:55  
 Lehman Brothers, 1:xxxv  
 modern, 1:55–56  
 Title 11, 1:55  
 WorldCom, 1:xxxv, 1:6, 1:110, 2:543
- Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), 1:56
- Banks, Nathaniel P., 1:146
- BAPCPA (Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act), 1:56
- Barings Bank, 1:xxxiv
- Barker, Bernard, 2:718
- Barnes, Annette, 1:249
- Barnicle, Mike, 2:762
- Barnum, P. T., 1:57–59, 1:119, 2:958  
 Barnumism, 1:58  
 press agents and handbills, 1:58  
 public attention, 1:58
- Barruel, Abbe, 1:201
- Barthes, Roland, 2:499
- base rate fallacy, 2:954
- baseball, 1:59–61. *See also* Rose, Pete  
 Albert Belle and, 1:60  
 altered bats, 1:60  
 banned substances, 1:60–61  
 black sox scandal, 1:59  
 Chicago White Sox, 1:59, 1:219  
 Cincinnati Reds, 1:60  
 Little League, 1:141  
 MLB, 1:142, 1:171  
 Nippon Professional Baseball, 1:171

- Sammy Sosa and, 1:60  
 Shoeless Joe Jackson, 1:59
- basketball, 1:61–63**  
 flopping, 1:62  
 Los Angeles Lakers, 1:62  
 off court, 1:63  
 offensive and defensive deceptions, 1:61–62  
 pump fake, 1:62  
 referees, 1:62–63  
 Sacramento Kings, 1:62  
 Utah Jazz, 1:62
- Baskin, Roberta, 2:713
- Bates, Henry Walter, 1:22–23, 1:113, 2:512, 2:675
- Batesian mimicry, 1:22, 1:113, 2:675, 2:766
- Bateson, Gregory, 1:219
- Batista, Fulgencio, 1:128
- Batman*, 2:685
- Battista, Giovanni, 1:390
- Battle of Fishguard, 1:64–65**  
 change of strategy, 1:64–65  
 invasion plan, 1:64
- Battle of the Bulge, 1:65–67**  
 allied deception, 1:66–67  
 preparations, 1:66
- Baumrind, Diana, 1:269
- Bay of Pigs, 1:129
- BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 1:335
- Beach Boys, 2:762
- Beatles hoax, 1:67–69**  
 Beatles' history, 1:67–68  
 Paul is dead rumor, 1:68–69
- Beauregard, P. G. T., 1:145, 1:147
- Becker, Gary, 2:612–614, 2:798
- begging the question, 2:954
- behavior. *See also* **honest baseline behaviors; Machiavellianism**  
 attitudes toward deception and, 1:246  
 behavioral confirmation bias, 2:599  
 behaviorist perspectives of consciousness, 1:196–197  
 behaviorist social scientific tradition, 1:46  
 chimpanzees, deceptive, 1:xxxiii  
 government and presidential, 1:276–277  
 nonverbal, 1:157, 1:285, 1:340  
 presidential, 1:276–277
- behavioral adaptation explanation (BAE), 2:779
- behavioral analysis interview, 1:69–72**  
 behavioral differences, 1:70  
 defined, 1:70  
 employment applications, 1:71  
 interrogation, 1:70–71  
 questions, 1:70
- behavioral cues, 1:393. *See also* **linguistic cues; microfacial expressions**  
 DePaulo and, 2:687  
 effect sizes, 2:665  
 Ekman and, 2:687  
 eye contact, 2:664  
 lying in movies and, 2:687  
 meta-analysis and, 2:664–665  
 torso shifts, 2:664  
 Zuckerman and, 2:687
- Belichick, Bill, 1:388, 1:389
- belief reasoning, 2:884
- belief-forming agency, 1:247–248
- Belle, Albert, 1:60
- Bellesiles, Michael, 1:446
- Bellinger, John, 2:547
- Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine, 1:48
- Benedict XVI, 1:33
- beneficence, 1:106
- Benjamin, Judah, 1:145
- Bennett, James Gordon, 2:708
- Bennett W. Lance, 1:419–421
- Benning, Annette, 2:687
- Bentham, Jeremy, 1:464, 2:676
- Berenson, Bernard, 1:390
- Berger, Charles R., 1:292
- Berlitz, Charles, 1:xxxii–xxxiii
- Berlyne, D. E., 1:487
- Bermuda Triangle, The* (Berlitz), 1:xxxii–xxxiii
- Bernays, Edward, 1:184, 2:861–862
- Berscheid, Ellen, 1:292, 2:811
- Best, Pete, 1:67
- best practices, 1:224–225
- betrayal, 1:72–74**  
 expectations and cooperation, 1:72–73  
 occurrence, 1:73–74
- Better Business Bureau, 2:495
- Between People* (Steinberg, Miller, G), 2:674
- Beyond Good and Evil* (Nietzsche), 2:716–717
- bias, 1:223. *See also* **investigator bias; lie bias; truth bias**  
 availability rule, 2:954  
 deniability and, 1:277  
 hindsight biases, 2:955–956  
 soccer fans, 2:852  
 vividness criterion, 2:959
- bias for causality, 2:954



- Bible**, 1:74–77  
    evasion, manipulation, self-deception, 1:76–77  
    influence, 1:74  
    law, 1:75  
    parables and stories, 1:75–76  
    principles, 1:75  
**Big Bank Hank**, 1:93  
*Big Con, The* (Maurer), 1:xxxix  
**Big Lie technique**, 1:77–79, 2:954  
    defined, 1:78  
    effectiveness, 1:78–79  
    Nazi propaganda, 1:78  
**Bigfoot**, 2:555  
**Billion Coupons, Inc.**, 1:xxxvi  
bilocation, 2:954  
Bindrich, Falko, 1:xxxvii  
biological warfare, 2:578–580  
Birchmeier, Zachary, 1:293  
**birds**, 1:25–26, 1:79–81  
    calling and caching, 1:81  
    mimicry, 1:79–80  
    reproductive-related deceptions, 1:80–81  
**Bismarck, Otto von**, 2:945  
**Bissinger, Buzz**, 2:958  
**Black Arts**, 2:637  
*Black Beauty* (Sewell), 1:376  
black board model of problem solving, 2:509  
**Black Codes**, 1:18  
**Black Eyed Peas**, 2:762  
black lies, 2:936  
black propaganda, 1:183, 1:419  
black sham, 2:501–502  
**Blackburn, Douglas**, 1:xxx  
**Blair, J. P.**, 1:214, 2:539  
**Blair, Jayson**, 1:xxxv, 1:81–83, 1:300, 2:712  
    charging ahead, 1:82–83  
    fabrications, 1:82  
    scandal, 1:83  
**Blix, Hans**, 1:50  
**Blodget, Henry**, 1:308  
blogs, 1:69  
*Blood Runs Through My Dreams, The* (Nasdiij), 2:654  
blood-doping, 1:xxxvii  
“Bloody Mary” legend, 2:913  
**bluffing**, 1:83–85  
    in games of chance, 1:84  
    lying and, 1:83  
    poker, 2:772–773  
    for police interrogation, 1:83  
        research, 1:85  
        in sports, 1:84  
boardroom leaks, 1:111  
body language, 2:590  
**Bogen, David**, 1:276  
*Boiler Room*, 1:xxxv  
**Bok, Sissela**, 1:85–86, 1:291, 1:292, 1:472  
    Golden Rule and, 1:475  
    impact on history of deception: 1950 to present, 1:474–475  
    initial negative weight coined by, 2:608  
    moral viewpoint, 2:628  
    Principle of Veracity, 1:85–86  
    Publicity Test, 1:86  
**Bolton, Michael**, 2:762  
**Bona Fide Pipeline**, 2:795–796  
**Bond, Charles**, 1:86–88, 1:285, 2:897  
    cultural similarities and differences in deception research, 1:88  
    gaze aversion and, 1:88  
    meta-analyses of deception, 1:87–88  
**Bonds, Barry**, 1:61, 1:438  
**Book of Mormon**, 1:88–90  
    doubts about origin of, 1:89–90  
    teachings on lying, 1:88–89  
“Boom, I Got Your Boyfriend!,” 1:94  
**Boon, Susan**, 2:810  
**Boone, Daniel**, 2:877  
**Booth-Butterfield, Melanie**, 2:805  
**Booth-Butterfield, Steve**, 2:805  
borderline personality disorder, 2:633, 2:751  
**Bordewijk, Jan**, 1:46  
**Borley Rectory**, 1:xxxii  
**Boster, F. J.**, 1:252, 2:627, 2:674  
**Boston Celtics**, 1:62  
*Boston Courier*, 2:954  
*Boston Globe*, 1:82  
**Boswell, James**, 2:561  
bounded rationality, 2:496, 2:798  
*Boy and His Dog Are Sleeping, The* (Nasdiij), 2:654  
“Boy Who Cried Wolf,” 1:90–91, 1:355–356, 2:954  
    as moral example, 1:90  
    in theory, 1:90–91  
**Boyd, Gerald**, 1:xxxv, 1:83  
**Boynton, John F.**, 1:118  
**Bradley, Omar**, 1:66  
**Bradley, Tom**, 2:793  
**Brady, Tom**, 1:388  
*Brag! The Art of Tooting Your Own Horn Without Blowing It*, 1:94

- Bragg, Braxton, 1:147  
**bragging and grandiosity**, 1:91–96. *See also* **exaggeration**  
     braggadocio, 1:94  
     bragger's paradox, 1:92–93  
     bragging rights, 1:92  
     lie-bragging, 1:94–95  
     status and, 1:91–92  
**brain**, 1:96–99. *See also* **electroencephalography**;  
**functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging**;  
**neurophysiology**; **reaction time**  
     fMRI analysis of lying, 1:97–99  
     prefrontal cortex and deception, 1:96–97  
     skin conductance studies, 1:191–192  
     TDCS, 1:97  
     types of lies and activity, 1:99  
     universal brain signature, 1:99  
 Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, 2:705  
 Brandsford, John D., 1:xxxii  
 Braque, Georges, 1:390  
 Braun, Eva, 1:479  
 breeding, 2:770  
 Breitbart, Andrew, 2:710  
 Brennan Center for Justice, 1:xxxvi  
**Brer Rabbit**, 1:99–101  
     clever trickster, 1:100–101  
     Disney musical, 1:101  
 Breuer, Josef, 1:395  
 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 1:335  
*British Journal of Photography*, 1:227  
*Broadcast News*, 1:237  
 Brothers Grimm, 1:378–379  
 Brown, Dartanyan, 1:68  
 Brown, Lorraine O., 1:xxxvii  
*Brown v. Board of Education*, 1:18  
 Brunvand, Jan Harold, 2:910–911, 2:959  
 Bryant, Kobe, 1:62  
 Buell, Don Carlos, 1:147  
 Buffet, Jimmy, 2:660  
 Bugs Bunny, 1:364  
 Buller, D. B., 1:352–353, 2:532, 2:536, 2:601  
 bullying, 2:522  
 Bunyan, Paul, 2:878–879, 2:955  
 Burchett, Wilfred, 2:578  
 Bureau of Intelligence Research, 1:104  
 Burgess, Anthony, 2:853  
**Burgoon, Judee**, 1:101–103. *See also* **interpersonal deception theory**  
     awards and honors, 1:101  
     on deception detection, 1:182  
     EVT, 1:101–102  
     IAT, 1:102  
     IDT, 1:102, 2:532, 2:536, 2:601, 2:683  
     interpersonal deception theory, 1:352–353  
 Burke, Edmund, 1:175, 2:562  
 Burke, Kenneth, 1:376  
 Burkell, Jacquelyn, 1:233  
 Burkhardt, Edward, 1:118  
*Burning Down My Master's House* (Blair), 1:82  
 Bush, George H. W., 1:237, 1:282, 2:934  
**Bush, George W.**, 1:79, 1:103–105  
     deceptive statements, 2:607, 2:661  
     Downing Street Memo, 1:104  
     Hussein and, 2:745  
     National Guard records, 2:710  
     out of politics, 1:105  
     President's Task Force on Identity Theft, 2:495  
     Rumsfeld and, 1:283–284  
     WMDs and, 1:103–104  
**business**, 1:105–112. *See also* **collusion**; **corporate fraud**; **corporations**; **insider trading**; **investment fraud**; **spin, corporate**  
     boardroom leaks, 1:111  
     of deception, 1:111  
     corruption, 1:111  
     dentology, 1:106  
     exaggeration, 1:350  
     greater good, 1:106  
     individual-level deception in organizations, 1:107–108  
     job satisfaction, 1:107  
     reducing deception, 1:111  
     research of deception, 1:108–109  
     scandals, 1:109–111  
     theories of ethics, 1:105–107  
*Business Week*, 2:541–542  
**butterflies**, 1:112–114. *See also* **assassin bugs**; **fireflies**; **insects**  
     camouflage, 1:113–114  
     chemical protection, 1:112  
     Kallima butterfly, 1:23  
     mimicry, 1:113–114  
     Pierid butterflies, 1:22  
 buzz marketing, 2:854  
 Bybee, Jay, 2:547
- C**  
 Cable News Network (CNN), 1:111  
 Cacciopo, John, 2:856, 2:866  
 Cagliostro, Alessandro, 1:461–462  
 Calabrese, Richard J., 1:292  
 Calamity Jane, 2:877–878

- Calhoun, John, 1:256  
Callahan, Daniel, 1:5  
Calley, William, 2:919  
Cambridge investigation, 2:954  
Cameron, Carl, 2:713  
Caminiti, Ken, 1:60  
Camire, L., 2:529  
**camouflage**, 1:115–117. *See also* mimicry  
    butterflies, 1:113–114  
    dazzle style camouflage, 1:115, 1:117  
    disruptive, 1:115  
    insects, 2:512  
    methods, 1:115  
    in military history, 1:115–117  
    modern, 1:117  
Campbell, John, 1:64  
Campbell, Joseph, 2:498  
Camus, Albert, 1:377  
*Candyman*, 2:912  
Cannae, Battle of, 1:373  
Cannel, John Jacob, 1:xxxiii–xxxiv  
Canseco, Jose, 1:60  
*Canterbury Tales* (Chaucer), 1:30, 1:410  
Cantril, H., 1:163, 2:497  
Capone, Al, 1:20  
**Cardiff Giant**, 1:118–119, 2:954  
**Cardinal Newman**, 1:119–121  
    background, 1:119–120  
    libel action, 1:120–121  
    schools named for, 1:121  
careerbuilder.com, 1:108  
Carey, J. W., 1:181  
Carhill, Louisa, 2:788  
Carlin, George, 1:299, 2:762  
Carlisle, Kitty, 2:889  
Carlsmith, James, 1:154, 1:155  
**Carnegie, Dale**, 1:121–123  
    books and writing, 1:122  
    charm use, 1:122  
    world-fame, 1:121  
Carrey, Jim, 2:684–686  
Carson, T. L., 1:248, 1:475, 2:677  
Carter, E., 1:267  
Carter, Jimmy, 2:786, 2:934  
Caruso, Eugene, 2:497  
Casanova, Giovanni Giacomo, 1:463  
Casey, William, 1:130  
Case-Zablocki Act, 2:545  
*Casino Royale*, 2:687  
“Cask of Amontillado, The,” 1:94  
Castro, Fidel, 1:128–129  
*Catch Me If You Can* (Abagnale), 1:189, 2:676  
*Catch Me If You Can* (film), 2:889  
*Cathedra serrate*, 2:512  
Catherine of Braganza, 1:131  
**Catholic Church**, 1:123–124. *See also* anti-Catholicism  
    Charles II plot and, 1:131–132  
    Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1:124  
    sex abuse scandals, 1:124  
    teachings on lies and deception, 1:123–124  
Catholic Relief Act, 1:132  
**caveat emptor**, 1:125–126, 1:360, 2:645  
    caveat emptor light, 1:125–126  
    defined, 1:125  
Cawdor, Lord, 1:64–65  
CBCA (criteria-based content analysis), 2:869–870  
CCTV (closed-circuit television camera), 1:344–345  
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 1:209, 1:442  
CEA (Computer Employment Application), 1:71  
censorship, 2:711  
Center for Identification Technology Research, 1:101  
Center for Public Integrity (CPI), 1:104  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1:209, 1:442  
**Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.**, 1:126–130.  
    *See also* Department of Defense, U.S.; Department of Justice  
    attempts to curb, 1:130  
    authority, 1:127  
    background, 1:126–128  
    during Cold War, 1:128  
    controversies and disagreements, 1:128–129  
    creation, 1:126  
    Cuba overthrow and, 1:128–129  
    Family Jewels reports, 1:129  
    Iran Contra affair, 1:129–130  
    LSD experiments, 1:129  
    plausible deniability, 1:276, 2:771  
    Project Dragon Lady, 1:128  
    response to past deceptions, 1:129–130  
    on torture, 2:893  
    during Vietnam War, 1:129  
    Watergate scandal and, 1:129  
Cephos Corp., 2:705  
Chagall, Marc, 1:390, 1:391  
Chaiken, Shelly, 2:866  
chain referral scheme. *See* pyramid schemes  
Chalone, William, 1:xxix  
Chambers, Whittaker, 2:755

- chameleon, 1:188  
 Chang, Franklin, 2:509  
 change blindness, 2:638–639  
*Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 2:608  
*Chariots of the Gods: Unsolved Mysteries of the Past* (von Däniken), 1:xxxii  
 charlatans, 1:188, 1:455–456  
 Charles I, 1:235  
**Charles II plot**, 1:131–132. *See also* Popich Plot  
   campaign against plotters, 1:132  
   Catholic Church scapegoats, 1:131–132  
 Charlton, William, 1:xxix  
 charm, 1:122, 1:221, 1:319, 1:463, 2:634  
 Charness, Gary, 2:799  
 Chatterton, Tom, 1:463  
 Chaucer, Geoffrey, 1:30, 1:410  
**cheating**, 1:9, 1:133–135. *See also* infidelity  
   prevalence and reasons for, 1:133–134  
   research, 1:134  
   school test, 1:xxxv, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii  
   in sports, 1:133  
   truth bias and, 1:134  
   wrongful accusation, 1:134  
 Cheng and Eng, 2:958  
*Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia*, 2:558  
 chess game fraud, 1:xxxvii  
*Chiarella v. United States*, 2:514, 2:516  
*Chicago Sun Times*, 2:712, 2:713  
 Chicago White Sox, 1:59, 1:219  
**childhood, lying in**, 1:xxxiii, 1:135–137. *See also*  
   adolescence, lying in; lying as ability or skill  
   early and middle childhood, 1:135–136  
   parents' response, 1:137  
   preadolescent and teen lying, 1:136–137  
 children. *See also* games, children's  
   advertising to, 1:14  
   Children's Food and Beverage Advertising  
     Initiative, 1:14  
   COPPA, 1:372  
   crying, 1:236  
   distrust in, 1:302–303  
   false testimony, 2:939  
   parents teaching about lying, 2:804–805  
   spontaneous deception, 1:xxx  
   white lies, 2:936  
**children, development of deception in**, 1:138–140  
   first lies, 1:138  
   prosocial and antisocial lies, 1:138–139  
   theory of mind and executive functioning, 1:139  
 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),  
   1:372  
**children's sports teams**, 1:140–142. *See also* college  
   sports; high school sports  
     age falsification, 1:141  
     game play deceptions and confidence scams,  
       1:141–142  
*Chiloglottis trapeziformis*, 2:767  
 chimpanzees, 1:xxxiii  
*China Syndrome, The*, 2:786  
 Chinese Checkers, 1:402  
 Chiquita Banana scandal, 1:109  
 Chisholm, R. M., 1:247–248, 1:473–474, 2:677  
 Choate, Angelica, 1:408  
 Cholmondeley, Charles, 2:734  
 Chomsky, Noam, 1:420–421  
 Chou, Neil, 2:494  
*Christ Healing a Lamé Man*, 1:390  
*Christmas Carol, A* (Dickens), 1:376  
 Chronis, Helen, 2:810  
 Chuck E. Cheese Pizza, 1:14  
 Church Committee, 1:276  
 Churchill, Ward, 2:699  
**Churchill, Winston**, 1:142–144, 1:325, 2:731,  
   2:868. *See also* Normandy, Allied invasion of;  
   World War II  
   Double-Cross Committee, 1:144  
   Hitler deceived by, 1:144  
   Iron Curtain coined by, 2:869  
   Operation Mincemeat and, 2:733–734  
   in Second Boer War, 1:142  
   World War II strategy of deception, 1:142–144  
 churning, 2:541  
 CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.  
 Cicotte, Eddie, 1:59  
 cigarettes, 2:891. *See also* tobacco advertising  
 Cincinnati Reds, 1:60  
 “Cinderella,” 1:355, 1:357  
 circular reasoning, 2:954  
 CIT. *See* concealed information test  
 Citigroup, 1:xxxvii  
 civil rights  
   African Americans, 1:18–19  
   Civil Rights Act of 1875, 1:18  
 civil suits, 1:372  
**Civil War, U.S.**, 1:xxx, 1:145–148  
   Confederate actions, 1:145–146  
   intelligence after war, 1:148  
   Reconstruction, 1:18  
   Union deceptions, 1:146–147  
*Civilization and its Discontents* (Freud), 1:396  
 Clarke, Arthur C., 2:637  
*Classic Concentration*, 2:889



- classic defensive projection, 2:780–781
- classical theory of insider trading, 2:514
- Clausewitz, Carl von, 1:149–150**
  - military background, 1:149
  - philosophical treatise, 1:149–150
- Clay, Henry, 2:558
- Clayton Antitrust Act, 1:371, 2:645
- Cleckley, Hervey, 1:368
- Clemenceau, Georges, 1:309–310
- Clemens, Roger, 2:756
- Cleveland, Grover, 2:934
- Clever Hans, 1:xxx, 1:150–151**
- Clinton, Bill, 1:xxxv, 1:104, 1:152–153, 2:756**
  - crying and, 1:237
  - denials, 2:589, 2:746, 2:856
  - impeachment, 1:152
  - Lewinsky scandal, 1:152–153, 1:411, 2:661
- Close Encounters of the Third Kind*, 2:908
- closed-circuit television camera (CCTV), 1:344–345
- Clue, 1:402
- CMC (computer-mediated communication), 2:529–530, 2:683
- CME (Continuing Medical Education), 2:651
- CNN (Cable News Network), 1:111
- cocktail party phenomenon, 1:192
- Cocteau, Jean, 1:391
- codependence, 1:231–232
- coercion
  - confession and, 1:193
  - torture and, 2:894
- cognition
  - cognitive correlates of lying, 2:622–623
  - cognitive process for magic tricks, 2:636
  - cognitive situation, 1:472
  - conspiracies and, 1:202–204
- cognitive dissonance, 1:153–156, 2:954, 2:959**
  - implications for deception, 1:155
  - research paradigms, 1:154
  - self-justification and, 2:841
  - self-perception theory, 1:155
  - theory of, 1:153–154
- cognitive heuristics, 1:156–158**
  - anchoring adjustment heuristic, 1:156
  - examples, 1:156–157
  - facial appearance heuristic, 1:156
  - falsifiability heuristic, 1:157
  - nonverbal behavior, 1:157
  - Othello effect, 1:156
  - police officers and, 1:157–158
  - probing heuristic, 1:157
  - truth bias, 1:156
- cognitive load, 1:158–160, 2:612**
  - devil’s-advocate approach, 1:160
  - difficulty of lying and, 2:615
  - imposing-cognitive-load approach, 1:158–159
  - lying in movies and, 2:685
  - strategic-questioning approach, 1:159–160
- Cohen-Charash, Yochi, 1:107
- coherence and correspondence, 1:161–162**
- Coh-Matrix, 2:606
- COINTELPRO (counterintelligence program), 2:699–700
- “Cokelore” legends, 2:914
- Colby, William, 1:129
- cold fusion, 1:162–163**
  - detection of nuclear reactions, 1:162
  - flawed research, 1:162–163
  - negative connotations, 1:163
- Cold War, 1:301
  - Central Intelligence Agency during, 1:128
  - disinformation coined, 1:299
  - end of, 2:869
  - International History Project, 2:579
  - UFOs and, 2:908
- Cole, Nat King, 2:914
- Cole, Tim, 1:293, 2:811
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 1:289–290
- Coles, Robert, 1:375
- collective guilt, 1:428
- college sports, 1:164–167. *See also* baseball; basketball; children’s sports teams; football; high school sports; hockey**
  - background, 1:164–165
  - criminal acts, 1:166–167
  - lying and deception, 1:165
  - performance-enhancing drugs, 1:165–166
  - recruiting violations, 1:165
- colleges and universities, for-profit, 1:167–169**
  - growth of, 1:169
  - Harkin report, 1:168–169
- Collins, Randall, 1:238, 1:410
- Collodi, Carlo, 2:661
- collusion, 1:169–171**
  - detection and prevention, 1:171–172
  - dissolving, 1:171
  - explicit, 1:170
  - internal, 1:170
  - interpersonal, 1:170
  - with liars, 2:611
  - markers, 1:171
  - in marketplace, 1:170–171
- Collyer, Bud, 2:888

- Colman, Edward, 1:131–132
- colonialism**, 1:172–176
- decolonization and neocolonialism, 1:175–176
  - justifications and criticisms, 1:173–175
  - settler and exploration, 1:172
- Columbus, Christopher**, 1:176–179, 2:699, 2:857
- deciphering unknown world, 1:178
  - need to lie, 1:177
  - new language and new world, 1:177–178
- commission
- deception, 1:247
  - lies of, 2:602–603
- Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSI-COP), 1:xxxiii, 1:227, 2:955
- Committee on Public Information, 1:xxxi
- communication**, 1:179–185. *See also*
- disinformation**; **generalized communicative suspicion**; **information**; **language**; **White House press secretaries**
  - CMC, 2:529–530, 2:683
  - critical approach, 1:181–182
  - critical rhetoric, 1:180
  - defining, 1:179
  - detecting deceptive, 1:182
  - dramaturgical perspective, 1:183
  - examples of deceptive, 1:182–183
  - FTF, 2:529–530
  - interpersonal, 2:673–674
  - mediated, 1:46, 1:183
  - miscommunication and misinformation, 1:182
  - National Communication Association, 2:509
  - phenomenology and cybernetics, 1:180–181
  - propaganda and journalism, 1:183–184
  - research, 1:185, 2:674, 2:922
  - rhetorical tradition, 1:179–180
  - SCA, 2:507
  - semiotics, 1:180
  - sociocultural approach, 1:181
  - sociopsychological approach, 1:181
  - spirit, 1:xxx
  - terrorism as, 2:880–881
- Comparison Question Test, 2:920
- compliant false confessions, 1:361–362
- Computer Employment Application (CEA), 1:71
- computer-generated images**, 1:185–188
- fantasy, politics, propaganda, 1:186–188
  - Gore and, 1:187
  - photoshopping motion pictures and virtual worlds, 1:185–186
- computer-mediated communication (CMC), 2:529–530, 2:683
- Comte, Auguste, 2:903
- con man**, 1:xxix, 1:xxxi, 1:188–190. *See also*
- fraud; hoaxes; scams
  - cooling the mark, 1:189–190
  - long con, 1:189
  - manipulating social expectations, 1:189
  - short con, 1:188–189
- concealed information test**, 1:190–192, 2:801, 2:931, 2:954
- how it works, 1:190–191
  - research on, 1:191
  - skin conductance and brain studies, 1:191–192
  - validity, 1:192
- concealment, 1:85–86, 2:685–686
- Concept of Mind, The* (Ryle), 1:471, 1:473
- conditio sine qua non*, 2:880
- Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1:124
- confession**, 1:192–195, 1:267. *See also* **false confessions**; **witness, false testimony of**
- coercion and, 1:193
  - Criminal Interrogation and Confessions*, 1:70, 1:193
  - evolution of U.S. methods, 1:193–195
  - internalized false confession, 1:194
  - interrogation techniques, 1:193
  - reforms, 1:195
  - Reid method, 1:194
  - volunteer, 1:193
- Confessions* (Augustine), 2:653
- Confidence Man, The* (Melville), 1:189
- confidence scams, 1:141–142
- conformity, 2:797
- Confucius, 1:450
- Congar, Yves, 1:33
- Congress, U.S., 1:xxx, 2:515, 2:545–546
- conjuring, 1:xxxi
- cons, 1:487–488
- consciousness**, 1:195–198
- behaviorist perspectives, 1:196–197
  - false consciousness, 2:499
  - philosophical and psychological perspectives, 1:195–196
  - recent research, 1:197–198
- consensual reality**, 1:198–200
- establishing false reality, 1:199–200
  - in social background, 1:200
  - successful deception and, 1:198–199
  - World War II, 1:199
- consequentialist theory, 1:106

- consistency
  - rationality, 2:797
  - statement-evidence consistency, 1:344
- conspiracies**, 1:xxxvi, 1:200–205
  - cognition and, 1:202–204
  - contagious disease outbreaks and, 1:210–211
  - control of information and technology, 1:201–202
  - environmental factors, 1:204
  - face-saving and social support, 1:204
  - harm, suppression, population control, 1:202
  - John F. Kennedy and, 1:202, 1:219
  - personality and, 1:204
  - real and unreal, 1:204–205
  - September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and, 1:204, 1:218
  - single perpetrator or single event, 1:202
  - UFO theories, 2:908–910
  - world domination, 1:201
- Constable, John, 1:xxxiii
- Constantine I, 2:873
- Constitution, U.S., 1:55, 2:894. *See also specific amendments*
- consultation media, 1:46
- consumer bias, 1:14–15
- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 1:205, 1:207
- Consumer Product Safety Commission, 1:207
- consumer protection laws**, 1:205–208.  
*See also advertising, consumer products; tobacco advertising*
  - financial, 1:206–208
  - food and drug, 1:205–206
  - FTC and, 1:206
- consumer rights, 2:645–646
- Consumer Safety Product Commission, 1:205
- Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN), 1:372, 2:495
- contagious disease outbreaks**, 1:208–211. *See also medical and pharmaceutical industry; medicine*
  - debates and conspiracy theories, 1:210–211
  - deception by individuals, 1:210
  - E. coli*, 1:209
  - emergence and spread, 1:209
  - government propaganda, 1:209
  - HIV/AIDS and, 1:209
  - SARS, 1:209–210
- content bias, 1:420
- content in context**, 1:211–214
  - lying and deception, 1:213
  - meaning and, 1:212–213
  - seven layers of context, 1:211–212
- context**, 1:214–216. *See also content in context*
  - consequences of problematic situations, 1:215–216
  - contextual information, 1:xxxii
  - difficulty of lying and, 2:616
  - nonverbal cues, 2:721–722
  - political spin, 2:864
  - social situation and, 1:214–215
- contextomy, 2:584
- Continuing Medical Education (CME), 2:651
- controversies, 1:128–129
- Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2:699
- conversational media, 1:46
- Cooke, Janet, 1:83, 1:300, 2:712, 2:713
- Coolidge, Calvin, 2:933
- Cooper, Duff, 2:734
- cooperation**, 1:216–220
  - betrayal, 1:72–73
  - cooperating to lie and deceive, 1:218–219
  - false signaling and exploitation, 1:216–218
  - lying to access and exploit cooperative systems, 1:218
  - shamming and the family, 1:219
  - sports, 1:219
- COPPA (Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act), 1:372
- Copperfield, David, 2:636–637
- coral fish, 1:25
- Córdoba, Francisco Hernández de, 2:858
- corporate fraud**, 1:220–221, 2:543–544. *See also Enron; insider trading; investment fraud; Madoff, Bernard; Ponzi schemes; Stewart, Martha*
  - FBI indictments, 1:220
  - occurrence, 1:220–221
  - research, 1:221
- corporations**, 1:222–225. *See also business; spin, corporate; specific corporations*
  - best practices, 1:224–225
  - deceptive bias, 1:223
  - discrimination, 1:223
  - nepotism, 1:223
  - research, 1:223–224
  - types of deception in, 1:222–223
- correlation
  - cognitive correlates of lying, 2:622–623
  - illusory, 2:956
- corruption
  - business, 1:111
  - Convention Against Corruption, 2:959
  - Middle East, 2:669–670

- Cortés, Hernán, 1:17, 1:174, 2:857, 2:859–861  
 Cosmo, Nicholas, 2:543  
 cosmological function of myth, 2:688  
 Cotrugli, Benedetto, 1:4  
**Cottingley fairies**, 1:xxxi, 1:225–228  
   deception and technology, 1:256  
   famed hoax, 2:954–955  
 counterfeit, 1:xxix, 1:xxxi, 1:390. *See also* **forgery**,  
   **art**  
     checks, 2:494  
     drugs, 1:313  
     forgers and, 1:453, 1:460  
     sale of documents, 1:440  
     websites, 2:525  
 counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO),  
   2:699–700  
 counterinterrogation strategies, 1:343  
 countermotives, 2:612–613  
 counter-narrative, 2:700  
**courtship, deception in**, 1:229–232  
   detecting deception, 1:229–230  
   impact, 1:230  
   joint lies, 1:229  
   lies during initial courtship, 1:229–230  
   lies once courtship has begun, 1:229  
 Couwenberg, Patrick, 2:752  
 covert action, 1:337  
 coward, 2:608, 2:609  
**coyote**, 1:230–232  
   codependence in deception, 1:231–232  
   human smugglers, 1:230  
   illegal immigrant crossings, 1:231  
 CPI (Center for Public Integrity), 1:104  
 Craig, Daniel, 2:687  
 Craig, Robert T., 1:179  
 cramming, 2:954  
 Crawford, William H., 2:558  
 Crawley, Geoffrey, 1:227  
 Crazy Eddie Company, 1:6  
 creative accounting, 1:5  
**credibility**, 1:232–234. *See also* **Defense Academy**  
   **for Credibility Assessment**; **source credibility**  
     calibration of, 1:233  
     Internet and, 1:233  
     journalistic, 1:233–234  
     media, 1:233  
     NCCA, 1:274–275  
     origins, 1:232  
     reputed, 1:233–234  
     source, 1:233  
     standards of news, 2:715  
   Creole societies, 1:29  
   Crescendo charter schools, 1:xxxvi  
   Crile, George, 2:918  
 crime. *See also* **confession**; **false confessions**;  
   **identity theft**; **law and law enforcement**; **perjury**;  
   **police officers**; **witness, false testimony of**  
     Convention on Prevention and Punishment of  
       the Crime of Genocide, 2:699  
     criminal acts in college sports, 1:166–167  
     Internet Crime Compliant Center, 2:522  
     news and deception, 2:715  
     SMORC, 2:612–614, 2:798–799  
     women and, 2:942–943  
*Crime and Punishment* (Dostoevsky), 1:377  
*Criminal Interrogation and Confessions*, 1:70, 1:193  
 criminological model of malingering, 2:641  
 Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA),  
   2:869–870  
 critical approach, 1:181–182  
 critical rhetoric, 1:180  
**Cromwell, Oliver**, 1:234–235  
   Puritans and, 1:235  
   religious enthusiasm, 1:234–235  
 Cronkite, Walter, 1:236–237  
 Crookes, William, 1:xxx  
 crop circles, 1:xxxiii, 2:955  
 cross-cultural experiments, 1:340  
 cruelty, 1:485, 2:608  
 crusades, 1:xxix, 1:16, 1:174, 1:434  
**crying**, 1:235–238  
   as artifice, 1:236–237  
   children, 1:236  
   politics and, 1:237–238  
 CSI effect, 1:265  
 CSI-COP (Committee for Scientific Investigation of  
   Claims of the Paranormal), 1:xxxiii, 1:227,  
   2:955  
 CSN (Consumer Sentinel Network), 1:372,  
   2:495  
 Cuban Missile Crisis, 2:935  
*Cucurbitaceae*, 2:765–768  
 cultural genocide, 2:699  
 culture. *See also* **anthropology**, **cultural**  
   corporate culture of deceit, 1:333–334  
   lie acceptability, 2:598  
   lying in non-European, 1:451–452  
   of police officers, 2:585–587  
   truthfulness in Hispanic American, 1:442  
 cups and balls demonstration, 2:637  
 Curtis, P., 2:527  
 cybernetics, 1:180–181



**D**

*Da Vinci Code, The*, 1:201

Daffy's Elixir, 1:461

Dailey, Janet, 2:762

**daily life, lying in**, 1:239–242

attachment style, personality theory,  
demographics, 1:240–241

DePaulo on, 1:285–286, 2:619

form, function personality, emotions, 1:239

mental effort in lying, 2:663

motives, 1:239–240

social and personal acceptance of,  
1:241–242

Dallas Cowboys, 1:388

d'Amerval, Eloy, 1:30

Danby, Lord, 1:132

*Dangerous Liaisons*, 2:687

dangle, 1:338

“Dangling Conversation, The,” 1:218

Danowski, James, 2:528

Dante, 1:33

*Danzig Trilogy, The* (Grass), 1:375

*Dark Side of Camelot, The* (Hersh), 2:573

Dark Triad, 2:634

Darnell, Cornelius, 2:877

**Darwin, Charles**, 1:26, 1:242–243. *See also*

**evolution and natural selection**

challenging, 1:243–244

on deception detection, 2:619

influence and insights, 1:244

on internal states, 2:590

dateline integrity, 1:82

*David Copperfield* (Dickens), 1:378, 2:501

Davis, Bette, 2:550

Davis, T., 2:682

Davis, Viola, 2:686

*Dawks's News-Letter*, 1:31

Dawson, Charles, 1:xxxi, 2:759

*Day After Tomorrow, The*, 1:187

dazzling, 1:115, 1:117, 1:258

D-Day invasion, 1:300

*De anima* (Aristotle), 1:34

de Dene, Eduard, 1:30

De Havilland, Olivia, 2:550

De Hooch, Pieter, 1:390

de Hory, Elmyr, 1:390

de Waal, Frans, 1:xxxi

Dead Sea Scrolls, 1:74, 2:855

*Dead Souls* (Gogol), 1:94

debtor's prison, 1:55

*Decay of Lying, The* (Wilde), 1:467

**deception, attitudes toward**, 1:244–246

behavior and, 1:246

factors affecting acceptability of lying,  
1:245–246

in history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:463

repressed memories and, 2:816–817

research, 1:245

**deception, characteristics of**, 1:246–250

belief-forming agency, 1:247–248

omission and commission, 1:247

positive and negative, 1:247

self-deception and other-deception, 1:249

**deception, definitions of**, 1:250–251

self-deception, 1:250–251

verbal and nonverbal, 1:250

Vrij defining, 2:922–923

deception, general. *See specific topics*

**deception, research on**, 1:251–255

consequences of deception, 1:254–255

cues and detection, 1:253–254

job interviews, 1:253

tendency to deceive, 1:252–253

**deception and technology**, 1:255–260

Cottingley Fairies, 1:256

doctored photographs, 1:256

identity-based digital deception, 1:257–258

medium, 1:258–259

phishing, 1:257

photography and technology, 1:256–257

telephone deception, 1:259

**deception and trust**, 1:260–262

deceiver's distrust, 1:260–261

detection and discovery, 1:261

frequency and focus in relationships, 1:260

impact, 1:260

outside intimate relationships, 1:261–262

perspective differences, 1:261

restoring trust, 1:262

**deception detection accuracy**, 1:262–264

use of evidence or prior knowledge,  
1:263–264

variables and accuracy, 1:263

deception detection model, 1:261

**deception in different contexts**, 1:264–268

Aristotle on, 1:34–35

assassin bugs and, 1:40–41

audience and, 1:46–47

Bond's cultural similarities and differences,  
1:88

Bond's meta-analyses, 1:87–88

Catholic Church teachings, 1:123–124

- college sports, 1:165
- consensual reality and, 1:198–199
- CSI effect, 1:265
- examples with animals, 1:22–23
- IDT, 1:102
- insects, 1:23–24
- leakages, 1:265
- neauthoritarian state, 1:50–51
- political, medical, educational contexts, 1:266
- prefrontal cortex and, 1:96–97
- reproductive-related, 1:80–81
- social, moral, legal spectrums, 1:266–267
- uncontrollable or purposeful, 1:267–268
- deception in research design, 1:268–271**
  - medical research and placebos, 1:268–269
  - psychological research, 1:269–270
- deception motives, 1:271–274. *See also* food deception**
  - deliberately hurting others, 1:273–274
  - polite lies, 1:271
  - promoting self, 1:273
  - protecting others, 1:271–272
  - protecting relationships, 1:272–273
  - protecting self, 1:272
- Deceptive Communication* (Stiff, Miller, G.), 2:674
- deceptive pleaders, 2:590
- decision-making, 2:592. *See also* problem solving
- Declaration of Independence, 2:559
- decoding, 1:47
- decolonization, 1:175–176
- decoying, 1:258
- defamation per quod, 2:593
- defamation per se, 2:593
- Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment, 1:274–276**
  - future, 1:275
  - mission, 1:274–275
- defensive driving, 1:304
- defensive self-esteem, 2:839–840
- “Definition of Lying, The,” 1:475
- deflationary theories of truth, 2:902
- Defonseca, Misha, 2:655
- deke, 1:480
- Delanoy, D. L., 1:xxxiv
- Delia Mercatura et del Mercanted Perfetto* (Cotrugil), 1:4
- Dell, Gary, 2:509
- demand characteristics, 1:482
- “Demeter and Persephone,” 1:375
- demographics, 1:240–241, 1:443
- dendrochronology, 1:392
- deniability, 1:276–278**
  - definitions, 1:276
  - future research, 1:277
  - government and presidential behavior, 1:276–277
  - indirect speech, 1:277
  - plausible, 1:276
  - racism and bias, 1:277, 2:793–795
- denial, 1:278–280**
  - adaptive, 1:279–280
  - authoritarian states, 1:48–50
  - Bill Clinton, 2:589, 2:746, 2:856
  - Freud and Kübler-Ross concepts of, 1:278–279
  - modern concepts, 1:279
  - research, 1:280
- DeNiro, Robert, 2:685, 2:745
- Dennet, Daniel, 1:197
- dentology, 1:106, 1:472
- “Deontology and the Ethics of Lying,” 1:472
- Department of Defense, U.S., 1:117, 1:280–284**
  - abuse of secrecy and Pentagon Papers, 1:282–283, 2:919–920
  - classified documents, 2:547
  - creation in 1947, 1:281
  - deception in budget process, 1:281–282
  - Iran-Contra affair, 1:282
  - Pentagon, 1:281
  - war on terror, 1:283–284
- Department of Energy, 1:xxxiv, 1:104
- Department of Justice, 1:172
  - insider trading enforcement, 2:515
  - USTP, 1:57
- DePaulo, Bella M., 1:xxxiii, 1:87, 1:220–221, 1:243, 1:284–286**
  - behavioral cues and, 2:687
  - four factor theory of emotion and nonverbal behavior, 2:601, 2:897
  - lying frequency, 1:476, 2:627
  - on lying in daily life, 1:285–286, 2:619
  - motivational impairment effect, 1:352, 2:682
  - on negativity, 1:253
  - on nonverbal behavior, 1:285
  - on sparing feelings, 1:286
  - work on lying, 1:472
- Der Stern*, 1:xxxiii
- Derrida, Jacques, 1:180
- Descartes, René, 1:458–459
- Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, The* (Darwin), 1:243–244
- design theory, 2:509
- Dessoir, Max, 1:xxx

- Detecting Lies and Deceit* (Vrij), 2:685, 2:922  
defining deception, 2:922–923  
works, 2:922
- detection. *See also* **deception detection accuracy**  
art forgery, 1:391–392  
Burgood on, 1:182  
collusion, 1:171–172  
deception detection model, 1:261  
deception in courtship, 1:229–230  
deception research, 1:253–254  
deceptive communication, 1:182  
duping delight, 1:320–321  
electroencephalography as, 1:329–330  
fMRI for, 1:263–264  
fraud on résumés, 2:820  
half-truths, 1:432  
lies from friends, 2:807–809  
malingered, 2:641  
meta-analysis and, 2:665–666  
of nuclear reactions, 1:162  
PDD, 1:274–275  
plagiarism, 2:764  
in romantic relationships, 2:810  
thermal imaging for, 2:886–888  
trust and, 1:261
- deTurck, Mark, 2:674
- devil's-advocate approach, 1:160
- Dewey, John, 2:902
- Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 1:368, 2:641, 2:696
- Diallo, Amidou, 2:657
- Diamond Necklace Affair, 1:461
- Diana, Princess, 1:202
- DiCaprio, Leonardo, 2:889
- Dickens, Charles, 1:94, 1:376, 1:378, 2:501, 2:729
- Dictionary of the English Language*, 2:561
- Diderot, Denis, 1:174
- Dietz-Uhler, Beth, 1:293
- differance*, 1:180
- diffuse support, 1:415
- DiMaggio, Joe, 2:866
- Dimitry, Tsarevich, 1:454
- Dingell, John, 1:281
- Diogenes the Cynic, 1:449
- Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 1:128
- direct-to-consumer (DTC), 1:311
- Dirks v. SEC*, 2:516
- disasters**, 1:286–289  
Dominican Republic, 1:288–289  
Fukushima Danchi nuclear disaster, 2:786  
hazards and, 1:287  
social processes and, 1:287–288  
Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, 2:786  
vulnerability and, 1:286–287
- disbelief, suspension of**, 1:289–291  
in daily life, 1:290  
social roles and situations, 1:290–291
- discentives, 2:612–613
- disclosure. *See also* **secrecy**  
benefits and pitfalls, 2:836  
duty to disclose mandate, 1:125  
self-disclosure, 1:259
- Discourses of Livy, The* (Machiavelli), 2:632–633
- discovered deception, reactions to**, 1:291–294  
deception and trust, 1:261  
empirical attention, 1:292  
McCornack and Levine studies, 1:292–293  
methods of discovery, 1:293  
online discovery, 1:293
- discrimination, 1:18, 1:223, 1:309. *See also* **racism**
- dishonesty**, 1:294–299. *See also* **distrust; honest baseline behaviors; honesty**  
academic, 1:9–10  
characteristics, 1:294  
in complex social systems, 1:297–298  
injustice and, 1:296  
intimacy and, 1:296  
managing failures, 1:297  
in persons, 1:295  
power of, 1:298  
price of, 1:298–299  
recognizing and performing, 1:296–297  
regularity and, 1:296  
relevance and, 1:296  
secrecy and, 1:295–296  
significance and, 1:296  
in statements, 1:294–295  
weight of, 1:296
- disinformation**, 1:299–302. *See also* **communication; information**  
Cold War coining, 1:299  
formats, 1:301  
mental state of source, 1:301–302  
in military deception, 2:671–672  
sources, 1:299–300  
targets and, 1:300–301
- disruptive camouflage, 1:115
- distributive justice, 2:568
- distrust**, 1:302–304. *See also* **dishonesty**  
in childhood, 1:302–303  
impact, 1:304

- in intimate relationships, 1:303
  - at societal level, 1:303–304
  - Divide and Conquer*, 2:702
  - Divina Commedia* (Dante), 1:33
  - diving, 1:480–481
  - DNA evidence, 1:xxxiv
    - Anderson and, 1:21
    - exoneration by, 1:44
    - false confessions and, 1:361
  - DNI (Director of National Intelligence), 1:128
  - DocX, 1:xxxvii
  - Dodd, S. C., 2:824
  - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 1:205, 1:207, 1:383
  - dog–human deception**, 1:304–306
    - displaying, 1:305
    - in play, 1:305–306
    - research, 1:306
  - Dombey and Son* (Dickens), 2:729
  - Dominican Republic, 1:288–289
  - Donagan, Alan, 1:473
  - Donaghy, Tim, 1:62
  - Donation of Constantine, 1:xxix
  - Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, 1:372
  - Dorsett, Sybil, 2:854
  - Dorsey, Tommy, 2:745
  - Dorson, Richard M., 2:878–879, 2:955
  - Dossena, Alceo, 1:390
  - Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 1:376–377
  - dot-com bubble**, 1:306–309. *See also* Internet; Internet: chat rooms; Internet: e-mail; Internet: e-mail scams; Internet: Facebook and social media sites; Internet: online dating
    - after bubble burst, 1:308
    - investor fraud, 1:307
    - lazy susan deals, 1:308
    - market bubbles, 1:306–307
    - risky revenue models, 1:307
    - self-deception and stock options, 1:307
    - Wall Street speculations, 1:308
  - double curse of incompetence, 2:742
  - double play, 1:258
  - Double-Cross Committee, 1:144
  - double-entry system, 1:4
  - Douglas, Michael, 2:687
  - Dowd, John, 1:60, 2:821
  - Downing Street Memo, 1:104
  - down-low, 1:441–442
  - Doyle, Arthur Conan, 1:xxxi, 1:227, 2:760, 2:954–955
  - Drabinsky, Garth, 1:xxxiv
  - dramaturgical perspective, 1:183
  - Dreier, Marc S., 1:xxxvi, 2:543
  - Drewe, John, 1:391
  - Dreyfus, Alfred, 1:309–310
  - Dreyfus Affair**, 1:309–311
    - background, 1:309
    - discovery of dishonesty, 1:309–310
    - resolution, 1:310
  - Driver, Minnie, 2:686
  - Drudge, Matt, 2:710
  - Drudge Report, 2:710
  - drug advertising**, 1:311–313. *See also* advertising, consumer products; marketing, deceptive; tobacco advertising
    - deception aimed at consumers, 1:311–313
    - deception aimed at doctors, 1:311
    - DTC, 1:311
    - FDA and, 1:311–313
  - drugs**, 1:313–317
    - counterfeit, 1:313
    - illicit, 1:315–316
    - licit, 1:314–315
    - White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1:316
    - zero tolerance, 1:316
  - Drunkard, The*, 1:58
  - DTC (direct-to-consumer), 1:311
  - Duchenne, Guillaume-Benjamin Amand, 1:318
  - Duchenne smile**, 1:317–319
    - distinguishing, 1:318
    - non-Duchenne smile, 1:318
    - real and fake smiles, 1:318–319
  - Duchovny, David, 2:686
  - Dulles, John Foster, 1:128, 1:326
  - Dungeons & Dragons, 1:402
  - Dunning, David, 2:497
  - duping delight**, 1:319–321
    - detection risk, 1:320–321
    - research, 1:321
    - when most likely, 1:320
    - who experiences, 1:320
  - Durkheim, Émile, 1:238
  - Dutwenberg, Martin, 2:799
  - duty to disclose mandate, 1:125
  - Dyadic deception, 2:689–690
  - Dykema-Engblade, Amada, 1:109
  - Dyson, Kevin, 1:388
- E**
- E. coli*, 1:209
  - earnings management, 1:5



- Easter Bunny, 2:689  
Ebbers, Bernie, 1:xxxv  
Eco, Umberto, 1:33  
“Economical Car” legend, 2:912  
*Edge of the Unknown, The* (Doyle), 1:227  
Edison, Thomas, 1:417  
education  
    *Brown v. Board of Education*, 1:18  
    CME, 2:651  
    deception in different contexts, 1:266  
    Higher Education Act, 1:168  
Edward IV, 1:454  
Edwards, Elizabeth, 1:324  
**Edwards, John**, 1:323–325  
    lies and politics, 1:324–325  
    media frenzy, 1:323–324  
EEG (electroencephalogram), 1:191, 1:263–264  
Eenkhoor, Piet, 1:108  
ego-defense mechanism, 2:780  
EI (emotional intelligence), 2:518–519  
**Eisenhower, Dwight**, 1:66–67, 1:128, 1:325–327, 1:446. *See also* World War II  
    hospitalization, 2:935  
    Operation Fortitude, 1:326  
    as president, 1:326–327  
**Ekman, Paul**, 1:243, 1:318, 1:319, 1:327–329  
    behavioral cues and, 2:687  
    defining lying and deception, 1:327–328, 1:472, 1:476  
    emotional approach, 2:721, 2:896  
    on internal states, 2:590  
    leakage theory, 2:601  
    on lying accusations, 2:608–611  
    microexpressions and emotions, 1:328  
    microfacial expressions and, 2:667  
    research, 1:327  
    scientific consultant, 1:328  
    Wizards of Lie Detection and, 2:940–941  
electroencephalogram (EEG), 1:191, 1:263–264  
**electroencephalography**, 1:329–330, 2:704  
    defining, 1:329  
    as lie detection, 1:329–330  
    MERMER, 1:329–330  
*Elements of Morality, The* (Whewell), 1:465  
Eliot, T. S., 1:20  
Elizalde, Manuel, Jr., 1:xxxiii  
Elliott, Deni, 2:711  
Ellsberg, Daniel, 1:282, 2:931  
Emancipation Proclamation, 1:18  
embezzlement, 1:xxxiv  
*Emma* (Austen), 1:411  
Emmons, Gideon, 1:118  
emotional intelligence (EI), 2:518–519  
**emotions**, 1:242, 1:328, 1:330–332  
    daily life, 1:239  
    Ekman and, 1:328, 1:331  
    on emotional reactions, 2:688  
    F.A.C.E., 1:328  
    four-factor theory of emotion and nonverbal behavior, 2:601, 2:897  
    nonverbal displays, 1:331–332  
    sparing feelings, 1:286  
    stress and lying, 1:331  
    when lying, 1:330–331  
Emulex Corporation, 1:301  
encoding, 1:xxxii, 1:47  
Engels, Friedrich, 2:498–499  
enhanced interrogation, 2:893  
Enlightenment, 1:174  
    Freud’s impact, 1:395  
    modern press emergence, 1:184  
    Thomas Jefferson and, 2:559  
Ennis, Edel, 2:658  
**Enron**, 1:332–335, 2:543. *See also* corporate fraud  
    bankruptcy, 1:xxxv, 1:6, 1:333  
    collapse, 1:110  
    financial market scandal, 1:381  
    formation, 1:332  
    Machiavellian strategies, 1:334  
    scandal, 1:109–110  
enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EV/EBIDDA), 1:307  
entrainment, 1:410  
environment  
    Asian Americans, 1:39  
    conspiracies and, 1:204  
*Envy*, 1:92  
Epimenides of Knossos, 1:449  
epistemic theories of truth, 2:902–903  
E-PRODD (European Psychological Research on Deception Detection), 2:922  
**equivocation**, 1:335–336  
    psychological conflicts and, 1:335  
    strategic use of, 1:335–336  
era of consumerism, 2:645  
Erat, Sanjiv, 2:613  
E-Rates, 1:220  
ERPs (event-related potentials), 2:704  
Ertaczo, 1:312  
escape velocity, 1:376

- espionage and counterespionage, 1:336–339  
 analysis, 1:338–339  
 collection, 1:337–338  
 covert action, 1:337  
 dissemination, 1:339  
 feedback, 1:339  
 requirements, 1:337  
 Esterhazy, Ferdinand, 1:309  
*Ethics* (Aristotle), 1:451  
*Ethics, The* (Spinoza), 1:459  
**ethnic differences**, 1:339–343  
 beliefs about deception, 1:340–341  
 cross-cultural experiments, 1:340  
 differences in nonverbal behavior and language, 1:340  
 views of foreigners, 1:341  
 ethnographies, 1:27  
 ethos, 1:232  
*Eudemian Ethics* (Aristotle), 1:34  
 euphemism, 2:583–584  
 European Psychological Research on Deception Detection (E-PRODD), 2:922  
 Europol, 1:xxxvii  
 Evangelical Alliance, 1:120  
 evasion, 1:76–77, 1:425  
 EV/EBIDDA (enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization), 1:307  
*Even Cowgirls Get the Blues* (Robbins), 1:377  
 event-related potentials (ERPs), 2:704  
*Every Man Dies Alone* (Fallada), 1:478  
 everyday liars, 2:620–621  
**evidence, strategic use of**, 1:343–345. *See also*  
 DNA evidence; witness, false testimony of  
 counterinterrogation strategies, 1:343  
 in deception detection accuracy, 1:263–264  
 difficulty of lying and, 2:616  
 first test of, 1:344  
 forensic, 1:21–22  
 persistence of discredited evidence, 2:957  
 research, 1:344–345  
 standards for truth in evidence, 1:42  
 statement-evidence consistency, 1:344  
**evolution and natural selection**, 1:345–349.  
*See also* animals; assassin bugs; butterflies;  
 Darwin, Charles; fish; insects; mimicry  
 mate poaching infidelity, adultery, 1:347–348  
 mating and deception, 1:346–347  
 self-deception and, 1:348  
 EVT (expectancy violations theory), 1:101–102  
**exaggeration**, 1:349–351, 1:472. *See also* bragging  
 and grandiosity  
 academic and business, 1:350  
 grandiose infallibility, 1:349  
 jackalope attributes, 2:556  
 positive, 1:350–351  
 psychological disorder and, 1:349  
 puffery and, 2:788  
 tall tales, 2:877  
 executive functioning, 1:139  
 exhibitionism, 1:369  
 expectancy violations theory (EVT), 1:101–102  
 expectations  
 betrayal, 1:72–73  
 con man manipulating social, 1:189  
 explanatory fictions, 1:197  
 explicit collusion, 1:170  
 exploitation, 1:216–218  
 exploration colonialism, 1:172  
 exposure threat, 2:813  
*Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, The* (Darwin), 1:242  
*Extraordinary Popular Delusion and the Madness of Crowds* (Mackay), 1:xxx  
 extraterrestrials, 1:xxxii. *See also* UFOs  
 extraversion, 2:697  
 Exxon Valdez oil spill, 2:786  
**eye contact**, 1:351–353, 2:664  
 four-factor model of deception, 1:351–352  
 interpersonal deception theory, 1:352–353  
 motivational impairment effect, 1:352  
 eyewitness testimony, 1:xxxi, 1:xxxii, 1:xxxiii, 2:955. *See also* witness, false testimony of  
 DNA evidence and, 1:xxxiv  
 false memories and, 1:364–365
- F**  
 fabrication, 1:435–436  
 of Blair, 1:82  
 false memories, 1:365  
 Hearst and, 1:435–436  
 law and law enforcement and, 2:588  
 Santa Claus as, 1:375  
 F.A.C.E. (facial expression, awareness, compassion, emotions), 1:328  
 Facebook. *See* Internet: Facebook and social media sites  
 face-saving, 1:204  
 face-to-face communication (FTF), 2:529–530

- facial action coding system (FACS), 1:318, 1:328, 2:668
- facial expression, awareness, compassion emotions (F.A.C.E.), 1:328
- facial expressions, 2:590. *See also* behavioral cues; **linguistic cues; microfacial expressions**
- F.A.C.E., 1:328
- facial appearance heuristic, 1:156
- FACS, 1:328
- leakage and, 2:590
- micro-momentary, 2:941
- FACS (facial action coding system), 1:318, 1:328, 2:668
- Fact and Fable in Psychology* (Jastrow), 1:xxx
- FAE (fundamental attribution error), 1:90–91
- Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, 2:645
- fairies, 1:xxxi, 1:227. *See also* **Cottingley Fairies**
- Fairies: A Book of Real Fairies* (Doyle), 1:227
- fairy tales**, 1:355–358. *See also* folklore; myth; **Santa Claus; tall tales; urban legends**
- bad characters telling lies, 1:355–356
- Brothers Grimm, 1:378–379
- “Cinderella,” 1:355
- “Hansel and Gretel,” 1:355–357
- “Little Red Riding Hood,” 1:355
- lying for good and bad reasons, 1:356–357
- “Snow White,” 1:356–357
- “Three Little Pigs,” 1:355–356
- fakelore, 2:562, 2:878–879, 2:955
- faking death, 1:xxxvi
- fallacies
- base rate, 2:954
- begging the question, 2:954
- gambler’s, 2:955
- Fallada, Hans, 1:478
- Fallis, Don, 1:475
- false advertising**, 1:358–361. *See also* advertising, consumer products; drug advertising; tobacco advertising
- characteristics, 1:359–360
- federal and state regulation, 1:358–359
- FTC and, 1:358–359, 1:371
- omission and implied, 1:360
- false alliances, 1:84
- false billing, 1:xxxvii
- False Claims Act, 1:xxx, 1:313, 1:314
- false confessions**, 1:361–363. *See also* confession; eyewitness testimony; witness, false testimony of
- compliant, 1:361–362
- DNA evidence and, 1:361
- internalized, 1:194, 1:361–362
- PEACE interrogation model, 1:362–363
- Reid Technique and, 1:362
- torture and, 2:894–895
- voluntary, 1:361–362
- false consciousness, 2:499
- false consensus, 2:497–498, 2:782
- false consensus effect (FCE), 2:782
- false coral snakes, 1:24
- False Dimitry I, 1:455
- False Dimitry II, 1:455
- false identities, 2:853
- false impression, 2:500–501
- false memories**, 1:363–366, 2:657–658, 2:955. *See also* **memory; repressed memories**
- creation of, 1:363–364
- eyewitness testimony, 1:364–365
- forced feedback, 2:955
- hypnosis and, 1:364
- reality *versus* fabrication, 1:365
- recovered memory therapy, 1:364
- sexual abuse, 1:xxxiv, 1:365
- false Messiahs, 1:454
- false reality, 1:199–200
- false signals**, 1:216–218, 1:366–368
- nonverbal signals, 1:366
- sent near-simultaneously, 1:366–367
- verbal, 1:367–368
- falsehoods, 1:449, 1:464, 1:475, 2:769–770
- falsifiability heuristic, 1:157
- family. *See also* **relationships: family**
- secrecy, 2:805–806
- shamming and, 1:219
- Family Jewels reports, 1:129
- fantasy and imagination**, 1:219, 1:368–371. *See also* **Cottingley Fairies; fairy tales; UFOs**
- computer-generated images and, 1:186–188
- Dennis Rader and, 1:369–370
- John Edwards Robinson and, 1:370
- technological determinism, 1:370
- Farid, Hany, 1:256
- Farwell, Lawrence, 1:329
- FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), 1:7, 1:383
- Faulkner, William, 1:376
- favoritism, 1:223
- FBI. *See* Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- FCE (false consensus effect), 2:782
- FCFF (free cash flows to the firm), 1:307
- FDA. *See* Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
- FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 1:206–207, 1:381

- fear grin, 1:317  
 fear rumors, 2:824  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  
   COINTELPRO, 2:699–700  
   corporate fraud indictments, 1:220  
   on fraud, 1:xxxv  
   KPMG Accounting scandal and, 1:6–7  
   Martin Luther King, Jr., and, 2:823  
   Mind Hunter Program, 1:369  
   referee investigations, 1:62  
   responsibilities, 1:127  
   on torture, 2:893  
 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 1:359  
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 1:206–207, 1:381  
 Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 2:705  
 federal regulation  
   false advertising, 1:358–359  
   financial markets, 1:382–383  
 Federal Reserve System, 1:382, 1:424  
**Federal Trade Commission, 1:371–373, 2:955**  
   authority, 1:11  
   civil suits, 1:372  
   consumer protection laws and, 1:206  
   Consumer Sentinel, 1:372  
   CSN, 2:495  
   in deception cases, 1:371–372  
   deceptive marketing and, 2:643–645  
   definition of deceptive advertising, 1:11  
   duty to disclose mandate, 1:125  
   false advertising and, 1:358–359, 1:371  
   formation and beginnings, 1:371  
   members, 1:371  
   regulation, 1:205  
   Supreme Court on authority, 1:371  
   technology and, 1:372  
   tobacco advertising and, 2:890–892  
 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 1:358  
 Feehan, T. D., 1:247–248, 2:677  
**feigned retreat, 1:373–375**  
   accidental, 1:374  
   in battles, 1:373–374  
   history, 1:374  
 Feldman, R. S., 2:527  
 fellowship, 1:484  
 Felsch, Happy, 1:59  
 Felsman, Robert, 1:108  
 Ferdinand, Franz, 2:945  
 Ferguson, Charles, 1:xxxvi  
 Festinger, Leon, 1:153, 1:154, 1:163, 2:841–843, 2:959  
 Fetzer, James, 1:301  
 Few Transparent Liars Model, 2:897–898  
**fiction, 1:375–380. See also memoirs; movies, lying in**  
   forms and values, 1:375–375  
   latitudinarianism, 1:376  
   plot structure, 1:378–380  
   published fiction, 1:376  
   pulp fiction, 1:376  
   pure fiction, 1:375  
   role of lying in, 1:378  
   stretching, 1:376–378  
   transvalued, 1:377  
   vibrant elasticity, 1:377  
 fidelity, 1:106, 2:810, 2:839. *See also infidelity*  
 Fiennes, Ralph, 2:685  
 FIFA (International Federation of Association Football), 2:851  
 Fifth Amendment, 2:705  
 fighting words, 2:608  
 Fiji Mermaid, 2:958  
*File on the Tsar, The* (Summers, Mangold), 1:21  
 Filene, Edward, 1:xxxix  
 films. *See also movies, lying in; specific films*  
   Nazi propaganda, 2:701  
   urban legends in, 2:912  
 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 1:7, 1:383  
**financial markets, 1:380–383. See also accounting**  
   American Express settlement, 1:381  
   Enron scandal, 1:381  
   history of regulatory reform, 1:382–383  
   Lehman Brothers scandal, 1:380–381  
   LIBOR scandal, 1:382  
   Ponzi schemes, 1:381–382  
   repo transactions, 1:381  
 Financial Services Roundtable, 2:495  
 Fincher David, 1:33  
*Finnegan's Wake* (Joyce), 1:376  
**fireflies, 1:383–385. See also assassin bugs; butterflies; insects; mimicry**  
   defense, 1:384  
   lucibufagin, 1:384  
   mating battle, 1:384  
   *Photius*, 1:384  
   producing light, 1:383  
 First Amendment, 1:358, 1:359, 2:560, 2:608, 2:788, 2:790  
 First Anglo-Boer War, 2:845



- First Wives Club, The*, 2:912
- fish**, 1:385–387. *See also* animals; camouflage; evolution and natural selection; mimicry
- altering physical appearance, 1:385
  - animals, 1:24–25, 1:25
  - deception for false reputation, 1:386
  - increasing survival, 1:386–387
  - manipulating preferences, 1:385–386
- Fishbein's theory of belief, 1:13
- FitzClarence, Charles, 2:846
- Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 1:376, 1:422–423
- Fitzwater, Marlin, 2:934
- flashbulb memory, 2:955
- flattery, 1:13
- flea flicker play, 1:388
- Fleischmann, Martin, 1:162–163
- flopping, 1:62
- Floridi, Luciano, 1:301
- Floyd, K., 2:683–684
- Flying Saucers Have Landed* (Orwell), 1:xxxii
- fMRI. *See* functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
- FOAF (friend of a friend), 1:68, 2:910–911, 2:955
- Fogarty, William, 1:132
- Fogg, B. J., 1:233
- folklore, 2:614, 2:823. *See also* fairy tales; myth; urban legends
- folk healers, 1:29
  - surrounding George Washington, 2:929–930
- Fonda, Jane, 2:757
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
- approvals, 1:206, 1:315
  - drug advertising and, 1:311–313
  - jurisdiction, 1:359
  - medical and pharmaceutical industry and, 2:650–651
  - regulation, 1:205
- food deception
- in plants, 2:765–766
  - primates, 2:776–777
- football**, 1:387–389. *See also* soccer (football)
- Dallas Cowboys, 1:388
  - deception during play, 1:387–388
  - deceptive interviews and concussion reports, 1:388
  - flea flicker play, 1:388
  - half-back pass, 1:387
  - Miami Dolphins, 1:388
  - misrepresenting players' injuries, 1:388
  - New England Patriots, 1:388, 1:389
  - New York Jets, 1:389
  - NFL, 1:387–388
  - performance-enhancing drugs in, 1:389
- Forbes*, 1:446
- forced feedback, 2:955
- Ford, Gerald R., 1:129, 2:932, 2:934
- Ford, Henry, 1:201
- forgery, art**, 1:xxix, 1:xxxii, 1:xxxiii, 1:xxxiv, 1:389–392. *See also* counterfeit; radiocarbon dating
- art museums and, 1:390
  - dating techniques, 1:392
  - dendrochronology for, 1:392
  - detection, 1:391–392
  - history of, 1:389–390
  - notorious forgers, 1:390–391
  - Renaissance, 1:390
  - during Renaissance, 1:454
  - techniques, 1:391–392
- Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 1:147
- Forrest Gump*, 1:186
- Fort Ticonderoga*, 1:186
- fortitude, 1:106
- Fortune* magazine, 1:333
- fortune telling, 1:xxx
- fossils, 1:xxxiv
- Foucault, Michel, 1:181
- 419 fraud. *See* Nigerian 419 scam
- four-factor model of deception, 1:351–352
- four-factor theory of emotion and nonverbal behavior, 2:601, 2:897
- Fourteenth Amendment, 2:894
- Fourth Amendment, 2:705
- Fox, Katherine, 1:xxx
- Fox, Margaret, 1:xxx
- Fox, Michael J., 2:685
- fragmentation, 1:420
- Fragments of Ancient Poetry Collected in the Highlands*, 1:xxix
- Frank, Mark**, 1:392–394
- background, 1:392
  - behavioral observation authority, 1:393
  - publications, 1:393
  - research, 1:393
- Frank, Stanley, 2:891
- Frankfurt, Harry G.**, 1:394–395
- On Bullshit*, 1:394
  - Frankfurt Style Cases, 1:395
  - free will study, 1:394
- Frankfurt Style Cases, 1:395
- Franklin, Benjamin, 2:853

- Franny and Zooey* (Salinger), 1:377  
 Frantzich, Stephen, 2:935  
 Fraser, Brendan, 2:686  
 fraud, 1:xxxiv. *See also* con man; corporate fraud; hoaxes; investment fraud; Madoff, Bernard; Ponzi schemes; scams  
   affinity group, 2:953  
   ambulance, 1:xxxvii  
   bankruptcy, 1:56–57  
   chess game, 1:xxxvii  
   cramming, 2:955  
   detecting on résumés, 2:820  
   FBI on, 1:xxxv  
   health care claim, 1:xxxvi  
   in history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:460–461  
   home health care, 1:xxxvii  
   inventory fraud, 1:6  
   investor, 1:307  
   letter of credit, 2:956  
   Medicare, 2:956  
   Miyagi Prefecture, 1:xxxv  
   mortgage, 1:xxxvii  
   National Fraud Information Center, 2:495  
   ProQusest fraud, 1:6  
   psychic surgery, 2:957  
   stock, 1:xxxv, 1:307  
   straw men, 2:854, 2:958  
   telemarketing, 2:958  
   voter, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii  
 Frederick II, 1:454  
 free cash flows to the firm (FCFF), 1:307  
 Freedom of Information Act, 2:574  
 Freehan, Thomas D., 1:473–474  
 Freeman, Joanne B., 2:609  
 Freeman, Morgan, 2:710  
 freemasonry, 1:462  
 Frege, Gottlob, 2:902  
 Fremont, John C., 1:146  
 French Revolution, 2:693–694  
 Freud, Sigmund, 1:197, 1:395–397, 1:411, 2:784.  
   *See also* psychoanalysis  
     criticism of, 1:396  
     denial concept, 1:278–279  
     ego-defense mechanism, 2:780  
     Enlightenment conceptions, 1:395  
     on eyes, 1:351  
     Gestapo and, 1:486  
     repressed memories and, 2:814  
 Frey, James, 1:300, 1:397–398, 2:654  
 Freyd, Pamela, 2:955  
 Freyd, Peter, 2:955  
 Fried, Charles, 1:473–474, 2:677  
 friend of a friend (FOAF), 1:68, 2:910–911, 2:955  
 friends. *See* relationships: friends  
 Friesen, Wallace V., 2:896  
 “Frog Prince, The,” 1:375, 1:378  
 frogmouths, 1:26  
 Frye, Northrop, 1:376  
 FTC. *See* Federal Trade Commission  
*FTC v. Raladam Co.*, 1:11  
 FTF (face-to-face communication), 2:529–530  
 FUFOR (Fund for UFO Research), 2:907  
 Fuhrman, Mark, 2:755  
 Fujimura, Shinichi, 1:xxxv  
 Fukushima Danchi nuclear disaster, 2:786  
 Fuller, Gary, 1:248  
**functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging**, 1:398–400. *See also* thermal imaging  
   analysis of lying, 1:97–99  
   current and future uses, 1:399–400  
   deception experiments, 1:399  
   experiments, 1:97  
   for improved detection, 1:263–264  
   research techniques, 1:400  
 Fund for UFO Research (FUFOR), 2:907  
 fundamental attribution error (FAE), 1:90–91  
 Funkspiel, 2:951
- G**  
 GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles), 1:383  
 Gabriel, 1:30, 2:551  
 Gaddafi, Muammar, 1:48  
 Galen, 2:640  
 Galleon Group, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii  
 Gallo, Robert, 1:211  
 gambler’s fallacy, 2:955  
 Game of Life, The, 1:402  
 game play deceptions, 1:141–142  
**games, children’s**, 1:401–404  
   background, 1:401–402  
   deception as strategy, 1:402–403  
   effects of engaging in games, 1:403–404  
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 2:880  
 Gandil, Chick, 1:59  
 Ganis, Giorgio, 2:615  
 Garby-Czerniawski, Roman, 2:724  
 Garcia, Pujol, 2:724, 2:738, 2:949  
 Gardner, Ava, 2:550  
 Gardner, Edward L., 1:226–227

- Garfield, James, 1:58  
*Garner v. Board of Public Works*, 2:730  
Garrick, David, 2:562  
Gasol, Pau, 1:62  
gatekeeping, 1:233, 1:419–421  
Gates, Bill, 2:914  
*Gay Science, The* (Nietzsche), 2:717  
gaze aversion, 1:88  
GCS. *See* **generalized communicative suspicion**  
Geller, Uri, 1:xxxiii  
General Electric Corporation, 2:862  
general intelligence, 2:517–518  
**generalized communicative suspicion**, 1:36–37, 1:404–406, 2:648  
    first defined, 1:404  
    studies of prisoners and police officers, 1:405–406  
generalized other, 1:183  
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 1:383  
genetic algorithms stylometry, 2:874  
Geneva Conventions, 1:193  
    applicability, 2:548  
    Iraq War and, 2:547  
    torture as violation, 2:893  
*Gentle Taday, The* (Nance), 1:xxxiii  
Gentry, Bobby, 1:412  
genuine pleaders, 2:590  
Geoffrey, Edmund, 1:131  
*George*, 1:407  
George, Alexander, 1:199  
George, J. F., 1:185  
George III, 2:562  
Gere, Richard, 2:551  
German Red Army Faction, 2:881  
*Geronimo's Bones* (Nasdijj), 2:654  
*Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 2:595  
Gervais, Ricky, 2:536, 2:537  
Gesner, Konrad, 2:555  
Ghiberto, Lorenzo, 1:390  
Ghorbanifar, Mancher, 2:545  
Giamatti, Bart, 2:821  
Gibb, Russell, 1:68  
Gibbon, Edward, 2:562  
Gibson, Mel, 2:687–688  
Gilmore, Leigh, 1:398  
Gilson, Etienne, 1:33  
Giordano, Luca, 1:390  
GKT (guilty knowledge test), 1:329, 1:330, 2:801  
Glass, Jackie, 1:237  
Glass, Stephen, 1:xxxiv, 1:83, 1:407–408, 2:958  
    new start, 1:408  
    Operation Broken Glass, 1:407–408  
    primary liar, 1:407  
Glenny, William, 2:677  
global financial crisis, 1:xxxvi  
global workspace theory, 2:509  
Glorious Revolution, 1:132  
Gneezy, Uri, 2:613, 2:798  
Godunov, Boris, 1:455  
Goebbels, Joseph, 2:954  
Goel, Vinrod, 2:509  
Goethals, George, 2:864  
**Goffman, Erving**, 1:182–183, 1:189, 1:367, 1:408–410  
    publications, 1:409  
    on self-presentation, 1:408–409  
Goffman, Tom, 1:408  
Gogol, Nikolai, 1:94, 1:376  
Golb, Raphael H., 2:855  
Golden Rule, 1:475  
Goldman Sachs, 1:xxxvii  
Goldsmith, Oliver, 1:379  
Gómora, Francisco López de, 2:857–858  
Gonzalez, Virgilio, 2:718  
“Good Samaritan” legend, 2:914  
Goodall, Jane, 1:26–27, 2:776  
Google, 1:372  
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 2:934  
Gordon Riots, 1:132  
Gordy, Berry, Jr., 2:888  
Gore, Al, 1:94, 1:103, 1:187  
**gossip**, 1:410–414. *See also* **rumor**  
    benevolent and harmful, 1:412–413  
    characteristics, 1:410–411  
    entrainment, 1:410  
    impact, 1:414  
    lie gossip, 1:413–414  
    motivation, 1:411–412  
    as performative art, 1:413  
    research, 1:414  
    topics, 1:410  
    types, 1:412–413  
Gottlieb, Myron, 1:xxxiv  
**government, decline in public trust**, 1:414–417  
    diffuse support, 1:415  
    mass media and, 1:416  
    perceptions of trust, 1:415  
    performance and, 1:416  
    propaganda, 1:415–416

- government propaganda**, 1:417–422  
   advertising filter, 1:420  
   anticommunism filter, 1:421  
   black, 1:419  
   content bias, 1:420  
   defining propaganda, 1:417–418  
   fragmentation, 1:420  
   gatekeepers, 1:419–421  
   ownership filter, 1:420  
   personalization, 1:420  
   recipients, 1:421–422  
   sender, 1:418–419  
   source filter, 1:420–421  
   standard propaganda and, 1:418  
   success of, 1:422  
 GPA. *See* grade point average (GPA)  
 Graafland, Johan, 1:108  
 Grace, Mark, 1:142  
 grade point average (GPA)  
   falsifying, 1:2  
   inflation, 1:350  
   low performance, 1:1  
 Gramsci, Antonio, 2:498  
 grandiose infallibility, 1:349  
 grandiosity. *See* bragging and grandiosity  
 Granhag, P. A., 1:161  
 Grant, Andrew, 2:706  
 Grass, Gunter, 1:375  
 gratitude, 1:106  
 Graziano, W. G., 2:530  
*Great Expectations* (Dickens), 1:94  
 Great Fire of 1666, Great Britain, 1:131  
*Great Gatsby, The*, 1:422–424  
   Tom Buchanan, 1:423  
   Nick Carraway, narrator, 1:422–423  
   Jay Gatsby, self-made man, 1:423–424  
 Great Recession, 1:110, 1:383  
 Greek Orthodox faith, 1:29  
 Greene, John O., 2:509, 2:648  
 Greenhalgh, Shaun, 1:391  
 Greenhow, Rose, 1:145  
 Greenhow Group, 1:145  
**Greenspan, Alan**, 1:424–426  
   contributing to economic malaise, 1:425  
   evasion by, 1:425  
   Federal Reserve chairman, 1:424  
 Grice, Paul, 2:507–508  
 Griffin, Zenzi, 2:509  
 Griffith, Melanie, 2:685  
 Griffiths, Frances, 1:xxx, 1:225–227  
 grifter, 1:188  
 Grotius, Hugo, 1:456–458  
 group deception, 2:691  
 groupthink, 1:78  
 Grover, Steven, 1:108  
 Guadagno, R. L., 2:530  
 Guardi, Francesco, 1:391  
 Guerra, Giuseppe, 1:390  
**guilt**, 1:426–428  
   collective, 1:428  
   guilt-presumptive questions, 2:538–539  
   proneness, 1:427–428  
   shame and, 1:426–427  
 guilty knowledge test (GKT), 1:329, 1:330, 2:801  
*Guinea Pig Diaries, The* (Jacobs), 2:628  
 Guirand de Scévola, Lucien-Vincent, 1:116  
 Gulf War, 2:547  
**gullibility**, 1:428–430  
   benefits to, 1:430  
   characteristics, 1:429  
   history, 1:429  
   research, 1:429–430  
 Gundy, Van, 1:63  
 Gupta, Rajat K., 1:xxxvii, 2:515
- H**  
 Habermas, Jürgen, 1:184, 1:485  
 hacking, 1:257  
 Hackman, Gene, 2:687  
 Hadith, 2:552, 2:567  
 Haggard, E. A., 2:941  
 Haldeman, H. R., 2:932  
 Haley, Alex, 2:762  
 half-back pass, 1:387  
**half-truths**, 1:431–433. *See also* truth; white lies  
   Judaism and, 2:566  
   maintenance and detection, 1:432  
   meta-analysis and, 2:665–666  
   modulating whole truths, 1:431–432  
 Halleck, Henry, 1:146  
 Hallstrom, Lasse, 2:551  
 halo effect, 1:14  
 Halt, Charles, 2:909  
 Hampel, Otto, 1:478  
 Hample, Dale, 1:292  
 Hancock, Jeffrey T., 1:256–257, 1:259  
 Hanks, Tom, 2:687  
 Hannibal, 1:373  
 “Hansel and Gretel,” 1:355–357  
 Hardaway, Tim, 1:61  
 Hardy, Thomas, 1:376, 1:376–377  
 Hare, Robert, 1:368



- Harkin, Tom, 1:168–169  
HARO (Help a Reporter Out), 2:786  
*Harold's End* (LeRoy), 2:654  
Harper, Tim, 1:68  
*Harper's*, 1:407  
Harrington, Brooke, 2:611, 2:677–678  
Harrington, Terry, 1:330  
Harris, Chandler, 1:99–100  
Harris, Duriel, 1:388  
Harrison, George, 1:67–69, 2:762. *See also*  
    Beatles hoax  
Hartwig, Maria, 1:88  
**Hartzell, Oscar, 1:433–435**  
    Drake scam, 1:433–434  
    prosecution and conviction, 1:434  
    success of scam, 1:434  
Hastings, Battle of, 1:374  
Hastorf, Albert, 2:497  
haunted houses, 1:xxxii  
hawk moth, 1:23  
Hawn, Goldie, 2:687  
hazards, 1:287  
Heade, Martin John, 1:391  
health care claim fraud, 1:xxxvi  
**Hearst, William Randolph, 1:435–437**  
    fabrication and, 1:435–436  
    sensationalism and, 1:435  
*Heart is Deceitful Above All Things, The* (LeRoy),  
    2:654  
Hebborn, Eric, 1:390  
hedge funds, 1:xxxvi  
Hegel, Georg, 2:902  
*Heliconius*, 2:675–676  
*Help, The*, 2:686  
Help a Reporter Out (HARO), 2:786  
Hemingway, Ernest, 1:377  
Henry, Hubert, 1:309–310  
Henry, John, 2:879  
Henry, Jules, 1:219  
Henry the Navigator, 1:17  
Henry VII, 1:454  
Hepburn, Katherine, 2:550  
Herman, Edward S., 1:420–421  
Hermann, Theo, 2:509  
Hernandez, Macarena, 1:82  
Herrick, Douglas, 2:555–556  
Herrick, Ralph, 2:555–556  
Herschel, John, 2:706–707  
Hersh, Seymour, 2:573  
Hestod, 1:458  
Hewitt, Kenneth, 1:287–288  
Hewlett-Packard (HP), 1:111  
HGH (human growth hormones), 1:61  
**high school sports, 1:437–439. *See also* baseball;  
basketball; cheating; children's sports teams;  
college sports**  
    eligibility, 1:438  
    goals of, 1:437–438  
    lying and deceptive practices, 1:438–439  
    Operation Dirty Play, 2:957  
    outcomes, 1:438  
    research, 1:439  
Higher Education Act, 1:168  
high-stake lies, 2:627  
hindsight biases, 2:955–956  
Hippocratic Oath, 1:4  
Hirsh, Scott, 1:6  
**Hispanic Americans. 1:439–442. *See also* African  
Americans; Asian Americans; Native Americans**  
    frauds targeting, 1:440–441  
    men on the down-low, 1:441–442  
    truthfulness in culture, 1:442  
Hiss, Alger, 2:755  
**historical narratives, false, 1:443–447**  
    background, 1:443–444  
    consequences of, 1:446  
    levels of deception, 1:445–446  
    misconstruing history, 1:444–445  
**history of deception: ancient civilizations,  
1:447–450**  
    Biblical discussions, 1:447–449  
    lying in ancient cultures, 1:449–450  
**history of deception: medieval period, 1:450–453**  
    lying in literature and philosophy, 1:452  
    ordeals to determine truth, 1:451  
    Saint Augustine's view of lying, 1:450–451  
    Thomas Aquinas on lying, 1:451  
**history of deception: Renaissance, 1:453–456**  
    art forgeries and false Messiahs, 1:454  
    charlatans, 1:455–456  
    pretenders to throne, 1:454–455  
    Renaissance politics, 1:453–454  
**history of deception: 1600 to 1700, 1:456–460**  
    Baruch Spinoza, 1:459  
    Hugo Grotius, 1:456–458  
    René Descartes, 1:458–459  
**history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:460–464**  
    attitudes, 1:463  
    Diamond Necklace Affair, 1:461  
    Mississippi Bubble, 1:460  
    political and economic fraud, 1:460–461  
    popular culture, entertainment, arts, 1:462–463

- science and medicine, 1:461–462  
 South Sea bubble, 1:460  
**history of deception: 1800 to 1900, 1:464–468**  
   antiutilitarian argument, 1:465  
   Henry Sidgwick, 1:466–467  
   John Stuart Mill, 1:465–366  
   Leslie Stephen, 1:466  
   William Whewell, 1:465  
**history of deception: 1900 to 1950, 1:468–472**  
   G. E. Moore, 1:468–469  
   Gilbert Ryle, 1:471  
   Hastings Rashdall, 1:469  
   J. L. Austin, 1:471  
   W. D. Ross, 1:469–471  
**history of deception: 1950 to present, 1:472–477**  
   Roderick M. Chisholm, 1:473–474  
   Sissela Bok, 1:474–475  
   Thomas D. Freehan, 1:473–474  
   why lies are morally wrong, 1:474  
   writing in psychology, 1:476  
   writings since 1970s, 1:475–476  
*History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, The* (Johnson, S.), 2:562  
 Hitchcock, Alfred, 1:xxxvii  
**Hitler, Adolf, 1:xxxi, 1:xxxiii, 1:65–67, 1:77–78, 1:477–479. See also Nazi propaganda; World War II**  
   Big Lie, 2:954  
   campaign against Jews, 1:478–479  
   Churchill deceiving, 1:144  
   cult of personality, 1:421  
   Normandy invasion and, 2:724  
   *Operation Valkyrie* assassination attempt, 1:218  
   Special Wartime Penal Code, 1:478  
   suicide, 1:479  
   weaknesses, 1:142  
   world domination and, 1:201  
 Hitsch, G. J., 2:530  
 HIV/AIDS, 1:209  
*Hoax, The* (Irving), 2:551  
 hoaxes, 1:xxxiii, 1:487–488. *See also* Beatles hoax; Cardiff Giant; con man; Cottingley Fairies; fraud; Piltown Man; scams  
   memoirs of 2003, 2:654  
   *New York Sun's* Moon Series, 2:706–709  
   *War of the Worlds* broadcast, 2:926  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 1:458–459, 2:874  
 Hoche, Lazare, 1:64  
**hockey, 1:479–481**  
   deception in media interviews, 1:481  
   deke, 1:480  
   diving, 1:480–481  
   NHL, 1:481  
 Hodson, Geoffrey, 1:227  
 Hoffman, Dustin, 2:685  
 Hoffman, Susanna M., 1:286–287  
 Hogan, Hulk, 1:93  
 Hogarth, William, 1:463  
 Holiday, Ryan, 2:785–786  
 Homburger, Theodor, 1:375  
 home health care fraud, 1:xxxvii  
 Homer, 1:373, 1:458, 2:688–690, 2:898  
*Homo economicus*, 2:797  
**honest baseline behaviors, 1:481–484**  
   demand characteristics, 1:482  
   observation effects, 1:482–484  
*Honest Truth About Dishonesty, The* (Ariely), 2:799  
**honesty, 1:259, 1:484–487. See also dishonesty; truth**  
   fellowship and, 1:484  
   Judaism and, 2:563–564  
   limits of, 1:485–486  
   Machiavelli's appeal to, 2:633  
   managing failures, 1:486  
   radical, 2:628  
   as value and virtue, 1:485  
   withholding, 1:486  
 Honeycutt, Jim, 1:292  
 honor codes, 2:764  
 Hooker, Joe, 1:147  
 Hoover, Herbert, 2:933  
 Horsford, E. N., 1:xxx, 2:954  
*Hotel New Hampshire, The* (Irving), 1:377  
 Hotton, Mark, 1:xxxvii  
 Houdini, Harry, 2:636  
 House UnAmerican Activities Committee, 2:755  
 Hovland, Carl, 1:232, 2:855  
 “How People Really Detect Lies,” 2:748–749  
*How to Do Things With Words* (Austin), 1:471  
*How to Stop Worrying and Start Living* (Carnegie), 1:122  
*How to Win Friends and Influence People* (Carnegie), 1:121–123  
 Howard, Dwight, 1:63  
 Howe, Sarah, 1:xxx  
 HP (Hewlett-Packard), 1:111  
 Hubert, Robert, 1:131–132  
 Hughes, Howard, 2:550–551  
 Hughes, Jobie, 1:398  
 Hull, George, 1:118–119, 2:954  
*Human, All Too Human* (Nietzsche), 2:717

*Human Communication Research*, 2:674, 2:922  
human growth hormones (HGH), 1:61  
human mimicry, 2:676  
Human Rights Watch, 1:50, 2:548  
Hume, David, 2:903  
*humilitas*, 1:92  
**humor**, 1:487–489  
    deception and, 1:487–488  
    as mask, 1:488  
Hunt, E. Howard, 2:718, 2:931–932  
Hunt, Helen, 2:687  
Hunter, Holly, 1:237  
Hunter, Rielle, 1:323–324  
Hunt-the-Gowk Day, 1:31  
Hurricane Katrina, 1:288  
Hurst, William Randolph, 2:709  
Hurt, William, 1:237  
hurting others, 2:605  
Hussein, Saddam, 1:51, 1:201, 1:421, 2:745  
hustler, 1:188  
Huysmans, Joris-Karl, 1:377  
Hynek, Josef Allen, 2:907  
hypnosis, 1:364

**I**

IAAUS (Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States), 1:164  
**Iago** (Shakespeare's *Othello*), 1:94, 1:237, 2:491–493  
    Iago's deception, 2:492–493  
    plot of *Othello*, 2:491–492  
IAT (Implicit Association Test), 2:795–796, 2:841  
IAT (interaction adaptation theory), 1:102  
Ibn Rusd, 1:452  
*Idea of a University, The*, 1:121  
idealism  
    idealized virtual-identity, 2:527  
    Middle East, 2:670  
Identify Theft Assistance Center (ITAC), 2:495  
identity, 1:409  
    Asian Americans, 1:38–39  
    idealized virtual-identity, 2:527  
    identity-based digital deception, 1:257–258  
**identity theft**, 2:493–496, 2:956  
    CSN and, 2:495  
    method of, 2:493–494  
    nongovernmental assistance, 2:495–496  
    phishing, 2:494  
    president's task force, 2:495  
    use of personal information, 2:494–495

**ideology**, 2:496–499

    false consciousness, 2:499  
    false consensus, 2:497–498  
    mass deception, 2:498–499  
    pluralistic ignorance, 2:498  
    self-deception, 2:496–498  
    sports and, 2:497  
    terrorism and, 2:882  
ideomotor effect, 1:xxx  
IDT. *See* **interpersonal deception theory**  
ignorance. *See also* **intelligence**; **knowledge**  
    argument from ignorance, 2:953  
    pluralistic, 2:498  
*ignoranti elenchi*, 2:956  
*Iliad, The* (Homer), 1:373, 2:689, 2:898  
illicit drugs, 1:315–316  
illusion of personal invulnerability, 1:xxxiii  
illusory correlation, 2:956  
*Illustrations of Lying in All Its Branches* (Opie), 1:464  
“I’m a Fool!,” 1:94, 1:378  
Imbert, Anderson, 1:177  
ImClone Systems, 1:xxxv, 1:111, 2:515, 2:872–873  
Implicit Association Test (IAT), 2:795–796, 2:841  
implied false advertising, 1:360  
imposing-cognitive-load approach, 1:158–159  
**impression**, 2:499–502  
    black sham, 2:501–502  
    false, 2:500–501  
    sham, 2:501  
    success and, 2:500  
*In Our Time* (Hemingway), 1:377  
**Inca Empire**, 2:502–504  
    accounting records, 2:503–504  
    mistrust after conquest, 2:503  
    Pizarro's deception, 2:502–503  
incarceration, 2:852–853  
*Inconvenient Truth, An*, 1:187  
*Incredibles, The*, 2:685  
*Independence Day*, 2:498  
*Indianola*, 1:147  
indirect speech, 1:277  
individual-level variables, 1:36–37  
Industrial Revolution, 1:125, 1:361  
**infidelity**, 1:347–348, 2:504–507. *See also* **cheating**  
    adultery, 1:347–348  
    aftermath of discovery, 2:506  
    in evolution and natural selection, 1:347–348  
    lies of cheaters, 2:504–505  
    trauma, 2:506  
    unmasking, 2:505–506

- inflationary truth theories, 2:901–902
- information. *See also* **concealed information test; disinformation**
- absence of information, 2:953
  - Committee on Public Information, 1:xxxii
  - contextual, 1:xxxii
  - control of, 1:201–202
  - “man-who” syndrome, 2:956
  - misinformation, 1:182
  - Supreme Court on information sellers, 1:125
  - torture and, 2:894–895
- information manipulation theory 1**, 2:507–509.
- See also* **language; linguistic cues**
- critiques of, 2:508
  - dimensions of, 2:507
  - McCornack and, 2:507–508, 2:615, 2:647–648
  - violations of conversation maxims, 2:507–508
- information manipulation theory 2**, 2:509–511, 2:615
- multistage architecture, 2:509–510
  - propositions of, 2:520
  - sources, 2:509
  - truthtelling and, 2:520
- InfoSpace, 1:307, 1:308
- Ingram, Paul, 1:365
- initial negative weight, 2:608
- Innocence Project, 1:xxxiv
- Inquisition, 2:892
- insects**, 2:511–514. *See also* **assassin bugs; butterflies; camouflage; fireflies; mimicry; specific insects**
- Argrope argentata*, 2:512
  - camouflage, 2:512
  - Cathedra serrate*, 2:512
  - deception in different contexts, 1:23–24
  - mimicry, 2:512–513
  - Photuris*, 2:512
  - Phylluon giganteum*, 2:513
  - Tiger moths, 2:513
- Inside Job*, 1:xxxvi
- insider trading**, 1:xxxv, 1:110, 2:514–517.
- See also* **business; corporate fraud; investment fraud; Stewart, Martha; stock fraud**
- classical theory, 2:514
  - enforcement, 2:515
  - ImClone Systems, 1:111
  - law and legal theories, 2:514–515
  - Martha Stewart, 2:872–873
  - misappropriation theory, 2:515
  - regulation pros and cons, 2:515–517
- Institute of Propaganda and Analysis, 1:xxxii
- integrity
- academic, 1:134
  - CPI, 1:104
  - dateline, 1:82
- intelligence**, 2:517–520. *See also* **Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.; ignorance; knowledge**
- Bureau of Intelligence Research, 1:104
  - EI, 2:518–519
  - general intelligence, 2:517–518
  - post Civil War, 1:148
  - social, 2:519–520
- Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, 1:130
- Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1:128, 1:130
- Intentional Association of Democratic Lawyers, 2:578
- intentional deception, 2:778
- interaction adaptation theory (IAT), 1:102
- interactions. *See also* **lying as norm in social interactions; social interactions**
- IAT, 1:102
  - interactional justice, 2:569
  - theory of mind and, 2:885–886
- Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS), 1:164
- internal collusion, 1:170
- Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 2:746
- internalized false confessions, 1:194, 1:361–362
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), 1:xxxii
- International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), 2:851
- International Red Cross, 2:578, 2:893
- International UFO Congress, 2:907
- Internet. *See also* **dot-com bubble; sock puppetry**
- credibility and, 1:233
  - Crime Compliant Center, 2:522
  - Gore claims, 1:94
  - reputation and, 2:818
  - vandalism, 2:854
- Internet: chat rooms**, 2:520–522
- bullying, 2:522
  - criminal activity, 2:522
  - mild lying, 2:521–522
  - security, lying, deception in, 2:521
- Internet: e-mail**, 2:523–524
- deception in, 2:523–524
  - spam, 2:523
- Internet: e-mail scams**, 2:525–526
- advance fee scam, 2:526
  - lottery scams, 2:526



- Nigerian 419 scam, 2:526, 2:955  
 phishing, 2:525  
**Internet: Facebook and social media sites**, 1:69, 1:186, 2:527–529. *See also* **news media: Internet**  
   online deception, 2:527  
   public relations and, 2:786–787  
   research, 2:527–528  
   self-presentational manipulation, 2:527–528  
**Internet: online dating**, 2:529–531  
   deceptive self-presentation, 2:529–530  
   online deception, 2:529–530  
 interpersonal collusion, 1:170  
**interpersonal deception theory**, 1:102, 1:352–353, 2:532–536. *See also* **Burgoon, Judee**  
   assumptions, 2:532–534  
   context and relationship, 2:534  
   critiques, 2:536  
   development, 2:532  
   motivational impairment effect and, 2:683–684  
   propositions, 2:533–536  
 interpersonal lying, 2:602  
 Interpersonal Perception Task, 2:519  
 INTERPOL. *See* International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)  
*Interpretation of Dreams, The* (Freud), 1:396  
 interrogation, 1:70  
   behavioral analysis interview, 1:70–71  
   bluffing for, 1:83  
   enhanced, 2:893  
   practices, 2:587–588  
   techniques, 1:193  
   torture as technique, 2:893–894  
 interview paradigm, 1:254  
 intimacy  
   dishonesty and, 1:296  
   distrust in relationships, 1:303  
   outside relationships, 1:261–262  
 intrapersonal lying, 2:602  
*Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, An* (Bentham), 1:464  
 inventing, 1:258  
***Invention of Lying, The***, 1:251, 1:379, 2:536–538, 2:684  
   commercial and critical reception, 2:537  
   plot, 2:537  
   research application, 2:537–538  
 inventory fraud, 1:6  
**investigator bias**, 2:538–540  
   alleviating, 2:539–540  
   guilt-presumptive questions, 2:538–539  
   possible reasons for, 2:538  
**investment fraud**, 1:xxxvi, 1:307, 2:540–544.  
   *See also* **corporate fraud**; **insider trading**  
   churning, 2:541  
   corporate fraud, 2:543–544  
   illegal market manipulation, 2:540–541  
   insider trading, 2:541–542  
   Ponzi schemes, 2:542–543  
   pump and dump, 1:xxxv, 1:257, 2:541, 2:957  
   short and distort, 2:541  
**Iran-Contra affair**, 1:129–130, 2:544–546  
   alternative funding methods, 2:545  
   deception and security policy, 2:545–546  
   Department of Defense and, 1:282  
   plausible deniability, 1:276  
   Reagan and, 2:545–546  
**Iraq War**, 1:104, 2:546–550  
   Abu Ghraib prison, 2:547–548  
   defiance of Geneva Conventions, 2:547  
   JPRA, 2:547  
   pressure for humane treatment, 2:548  
   WMDs and, 2:548–550  
 Ireland, William Henry, 1:462  
 Iron Curtain, 2:869  
 IRS (Internal Revenue Service), 2:746  
**Irving, Clifford**, 2:550–551  
   accomplices, 2:551  
   Howard Hughes fictional autobiography, 2:550–551  
 Irving, Edith, 2:551  
 Irving, John, 1:377  
 Isaacs, K. S., 2:941  
 Isenberg, Arnold, 1:472  
**Islam**, 2:551–553  
   levels of lying, 2:552–553  
   teachings on lying and deception, 2:552  
   truth-telling, 2:552  
 ITAC (Identify Theft Assistance Center), 2:495  
 Italian Red Brigades, 2:881  
 Italian Renaissance, 1:4  
 Ivan the Terrible, 1:454  
 Iverson, Allen, 1:61  
*Izlamophobia*, 1:415  
**J**  
**jackalope**, 2:555–557. *See also* **myth**; **urban legends**  
   exaggerated attributes, 2:556  
   origins and hypotheses, 2:555  
   stories and claims, 2:556–557

- Jackson, Andrew, 2:557–559**  
     national hero, 2:557–558  
     Native American removal, 2:558–559  
     Nullification Crisis, 2:558  
     presidency, 2:558  
**Jackson, Claiborne, 1:147**  
**Jackson, Joe (“Shoeless”), 1:59**  
**Jackson, Rachel, 2:558**  
**Jackson, Thomas (“Stonewall”), 1:147**  
**Jacobs, A. J., 2:628**  
**Jakobsson, Markus, 1:257**  
**James, Edgerrin, 1:388**  
**James, William, 2:902**  
**Janis, Irving, 1:78**  
**Jarvik, Robert, 1:312**  
**Jastrow Joseph, 1:xxx**  
**Jay, John, 2:874–875**  
**Jefferson, Thomas, 2:559–561**  
     deceptive paradox, 2:559–560  
     Declaration of Independence architect, 2:559  
     Enlightenment and, 2:559  
     free thinker, 2:560  
     religion and, 2:559–560  
     slavery contradictions, 2:560  
**Jensen-Campbell, L. A., 2:530**  
**Jeopardy!, 2:889**  
**Jerry Maguire, 2:785**  
**Jewish state, 1:310**  
     “JFK/Jelly Doughnut” legend, 2:913–914  
**Jim Crow segregation, 1:18**  
**job interviews, 1:253**  
**job satisfaction, 1:107**  
**Jodl, Alfred, 1:65, 2:724**  
**John Paul II, 1:33**  
**John XXII, 1:33**  
**Johnson, Andrew, 2:661**  
**Johnson, Lyndon, 2:574**  
     Pentagon Papers and, 2:919  
     Vice President activities, 2:935  
**Johnson, Marcia K., 1:xxxii**  
**Johnson, Samuel, 2:561–563**  
     *Dictionary of the English Language*, 2:561  
     early life, 2:561  
     fame, 2:561–562  
     truth and, 2:562  
**Johnson & Johnson, 1:111, 1:312**  
**Joinson, Adam, 1:293**  
**Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), 2:547**  
***Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious***  
     (Freud), 2:784  
**Jonason, P. K., 2:634**  
**Jones, Edward, 2:794**  
**Jones, Julius, 1:388**  
**Jones, Marion, 1:438**  
**Jones, Paula, 1:152**  
**Jordan, Michael, 1:61–62**  
**Jordan, Thomas, 1:145**  
**Jordan, Vernon, 1:407**  
***Journal of Investigative Psychology*, 2:922**  
***Journal of Substance Abuse*, 2:619**  
***Journal-Constitution*, 1:xxxvi**  
**journalism. *See also* media; news media: print**  
     credibility, 1:233–234  
     propaganda and, 1:183–184  
***Journey to the Western Lands of Scotland, A***  
     (Johnson, S.), 2:562  
**Joyce, James, 1:376**  
**Joyce, William, 2:702**  
**Jozefowicz, Chris, 1:407**  
**J.P. Morgan, 2:544**  
**JPRA (Joint Personnel Recovery Agency), 2:547**  
**Judaism, 2:563–566**  
     half-truths and, 2:566  
     honesty and, 2:563–564  
     situations allowing deception, 2:564–567  
**judges. *See also* attorneys; law and law**  
     **enforcement**  
         situational familiarity and, 2:848  
         truth and, 2:904  
***Jungle, The* (Sinclair), 1:205**  
***jus in bello*, 1:456**  
**justice, 1:106, 2:566–570. *See also* Department of**  
     **Justice**  
         Brennan Center for Justice, 1:xxxvi  
         concepts and religion, 2:567–568  
         criminal justice standards, 1:42  
         disagreements over unjust, 2:569  
         distributive, 2:568  
         interactional, 2:569  
         obstruction of, 1:xxxv  
         procedural, 2:568–569  
         restorative, 2:567–568  
         retributive, 2:567, 2:938  
**K**  
**Kahneman, Daniel, 2:866**  
**Kalka River, Battle of, 1:373–374**  
**Kallima butterfly, 1:23**  
**Kammerer, Paul, 1:xxxii**  
***Kampf um Norvegan*, 2:701**  
**Kane, Big Daddy, 1:94**  
**Kanjilal, Debasis, 1:308**

- Kant, Immanuel**, 1:106, 1:174, 1:245, 1:469, 1:473, 2:571–573  
on accusations of lying, 2:608  
coherence theory, 2:902  
critics, 2:572  
formulas, 2:571–573  
moral viewpoint, 2:573, 2:628  
morals and ethics, 2:678–679  
objections to arguments, 2:680–681
- Kashy, Deborah, 1:476
- Kassin, Saul, 2:539
- Keating, Tom, 1:xxxiii, 1:390
- Keeler, Leonarde, 1:xxxii
- Keene, Morris Lamar, 1:xxxiii
- Keillor, Garrison, 2:956
- Keitel, Wilhelm, 2:724
- Kekua, Lennay, 2:710
- Kennedy, Jacqueline, 2:574
- Kennedy, John F.**, 1:327, 2:573–575  
Bay of Pigs and, 1:129  
conspiracy, 1:202  
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2:935  
deception about assassination, 1:237, 1:375, 1:378, 1:446, 2:574–575  
deception about life, 2:573–574  
era of consumerism, 2:645  
“JFK/Jelly Doughnut” legend, 2:913–914  
Pentagon Papers and, 2:919
- Kennedy, John F., Jr., 1:407
- Kennedy, Robert F., 2:574
- “Kentucky Fried Rat” legend, 2:911–912
- Kerr, John Graham, 1:117
- Kerry, John, 1:323, 2:757
- Kesey, Ken, 1:95
- Keyes, Erasmus, 1:146
- Khan, Genghis, 1:373
- “Kidney Thieves Legend” legend, 2:910, 2:913
- Killian, Jerry B., 2:710
- King, Martin Luther, Jr., 1:202, 2:741, 2:762, 2:823  
“King Arthur and His Knights,” 1:375
- Kirby, Christopher, 1:131
- Kirkendol, S. E., 1:352
- KKK (Ku Klux Klan), 1:18, 2:823
- Klee, Paul, 1:391
- Knapp, Mark**, 2:575–577, 2:823–824  
awards, 2:576  
distinguishing liars from truth-tellers, 2:575  
Knapp’s Staircase, 2:576
- Knapp’s Staircase, 2:576
- Knights of the White Camelia, 1:18
- Knoop, Geoffrey, 2:654
- knowledge. *See also* ignorance; intelligence  
GKT, 1:329, 1:330, 2:801  
prior, 1:263–264  
STOCK, 2:515
- Knox, Thomas, 1:64
- Koenig, Frederick, 2:824
- Korean War**, 2:577–580  
claims of biological warfare, 2:578–580  
deception to enhance strategy, 2:580  
justifying U.S. participation, 2:577–578  
smoke screen during, 2:850  
thermal imaging development, 2:886
- Korihor, 1:89
- Koufax, Sandy, 2:635
- KPMG Accounting scandal, 1:6–7
- Krebs, John, 1:26
- Kresge George Joseph, 1:xxxii
- Kruse, S., 2:530
- Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 1:18, 2:823
- Kübler-Ross, Elisabeth, 1:278–279
- Kuhn, Thomas, 1:200
- Kujau, Konrad, 1:xxxiii
- L**
- “La Disputa del Sacramento,” 1:33
- La Malinche, 2:858–859
- La Russa, Tony, 2:888
- Labour* (LeRoy), 2:654
- Lacan, Jacques, 2:783–784
- Lackey, J., 1:476
- Ladies’ Deposit Bank, 1:xxx
- Laing, R. D., 1:219
- Lake Wobegon Effect, 1:xxxiv, 2:956
- Lakoff, George, 1:419
- Lamarckian genetics, 1:xxx
- Lammlein, Asher, 1:454
- Landman, Jonathan, 1:82
- Lane, Charles, 1:407
- language**, 2:581–585. *See also* communication; information manipulation theory 1; information manipulation theory 2; linguistic cues; speech  
Asian Americans, 1:38–39  
constructions, 2:583–584  
contextomy, 2:584  
deciphering linguistic clues, 2:581–583  
ethnic differences, 1:340  
euphemism, 2:583–584  
Lenape, 1:xxix  
LIWC, 2:606  
nature of, 2:678

- Language Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), 2:606  
 Lanham Act of 1947, 2:645  
 Lanier, K., 2:682  
 Lansdale, Edward, 2:918  
 Larkin, Barry, 2:822  
 Larson, John August, 1:xxx  
 Las Casas, Bartolomé de, 1:174, 1:177  
 Lasswell, Harold, 1:184  
*Last Kiss, The*, 2:687  
 latent semantic analysis (LSA), 2:607  
 latitudinarianism, 1:376  
 Law, John, 1:460–461  
*Law and Human Behavior*, 2:922  
 law and law enforcement, 2:585–589. *See also*  
   attorneys; consumer protection laws; crime;  
   judges; police officers; *specific laws and acts*  
     Bible, 1:75  
     culture of law enforcement officers, 2:585–587  
     fabrication and misrepresentation of evidence,  
       2:588  
     insider trading, 2:514–515  
     interrogation practices, 2:587–588  
     Laws of Manu, 1:450  
     Lincoln Law, 1:xxx  
     snitches, 2:586–587  
     undercover operations, 2:586  
 law of small numbers, 2:956  
*Law of War and Peace, The* (Grotius),  
   1:456–458  
 Laws of Manu, 1:450  
 Lay, Kenneth, 1:332–333  
 lazy susan deals, 1:308  
 leafhopper, 1:40  
 leakage, 1:265, 2:589–591, 2:687  
   body language and, 2:590  
   channels of, 2:590  
   Ekman theory, 2:601  
   facial expressions and, 2:590  
   *Lie to Me* and, 2:601  
   lying as ability or skill and, 2:623  
   reasons for, 2:590–591  
   transparent liars and, 2:896  
   verbal statements, 2:590  
   verbal style and, 2:590  
   voice and, 2:590  
 Lebed, Jonathan, 1:xxxv  
 Lee, Fitzhugh, 1:147  
 Lee, Ivy Ledbetter, 2:861–862  
 Lee, James J., 1:277  
 Lee, Robert E., 1:145, 1:146, 1:148  
 Lee, Spike, 1:100  
 Lee, Stan, 2:888  
*Legal and Criminological Psychology*,  
   2:922  
 Lehman Brothers, 1:xxxv, 1:380–381  
 Lemkin, Raphael, 2:699  
 Lennon, John, 1:67–69, 1:93. *See also* Beatles  
   hoax  
 Leo XIII, 1:33  
 Leopold I, 1:31  
*Leptalis*, 2:675–676  
 LeRoy, J. T., 2:654  
 Lesson, Nicholas, 1:xxxiv  
 letter of credit fraud, 2:956  
 letters of recommendation, 2:591–593. *See also*  
   résumés  
     in decision-making, 2:592  
     detecting and preventing deception, 2:592  
     pressure of obligation, 2:592  
 Levesque, Rene, 2:501  
 Levin, Morton, 2:890  
 Levine, T. R., 1:182, 1:252, 1:292–293,  
   1:404–405, 1:476, 2:627. *See also* Park-Levine  
   Probability Model  
     on emotional reactions, 2:688  
     Few Transparent Liars Model, 2:897–898  
     on intimacy, 2:811  
     on third-party information, 2:811  
     truth default theory, 2:601  
     veracity effect, 2:915  
 Levinson, Barry, 1:92  
 Levitt, Stephen, 1:xxxv  
 Lewin, Kurt, 1:269  
 Lewinsky, Monica, 1:152–153, 1:411, 2:589,  
   2:661, 2:756  
 Lewinsky, Richard, 1:142–143  
 Lewis, John Paul, Jr., 1:xxxvi  
 Lewis, Milo F., 1:433  
 Lewis and Clark Expedition, 2:555  
*Liar Liar*, 2:684–685  
 liar paradox, 2:956  
 liars. *See also* transparent liars  
   accusing, 2:608  
   collusion with, 2:611  
   listeners and, 2:597–598  
   male, 2:660–662  
   mental state, 2:720–721  
   Pinocchio, 2:661  
   primary, 1:407  
   prolific and everyday, 2:620–621  
   speech of, 2:607  
   truth-tellers and, 2:575



- libel and slander**, 1:413, 2:593–596. *See also* plagiarism
- absolute privilege, 2:594
  - common forms, 2:593–594
  - defamation per quod, 2:593
  - defamation per se, 2:593
  - defenses against claims, 2:594
  - famous cases, 2:595
  - protecting against, 2:595–596
  - U.S. *versus* international law, 2:594–595
- liberty**, 1:184
- LIBOR** (London Interbank Offered Rate), 1:382
- licit drugs**, 1:314–315
- Liddy, G. Gordon**, 2:718, 2:931–932
- lie acceptability**, 2:596–598
- as attitude, 2:597
  - characteristics of lie as factor, 2:597–598
  - culture, 2:598
  - personality, 2:598
  - as personality trait, 2:597
  - relationship between liar and listener, 2:597–598
  - severity of consequence, 2:597
  - studying, 2:597
- lie bias**, 2:598–600
- behavioral confirmation bias, 2:599
  - offenders and, 2:599–600
  - police officers and, 2:598–599
- lie detectors**, 1:xxxi, 1:134, 1:229, 2:705, 2:722. *See also* **polygraph**; **reaction time**
- accuracy, 2:740
  - interpretation, 2:771
  - professional, 2:923
- Lie to Me***, 1:293, 1:328, 2:600–602
- criticisms of, 2:601–602
  - episodes, 2:600–601
  - grounded in leakage theory, 2:601
  - leakage theory and, 2:601
  - principle character, 2:600
  - truth wizards and, 2:941
- lie-bragging**, 1:94–95
- lies, types of**, 2:602–606
- of commission and omission, 2:602–603
  - goals of lying, 2:603–605
  - hurting others, 2:605
  - interpersonal and intrapersonal lying, 2:602
  - promoting self, 2:604–605
  - protecting others, 2:603–604
  - protecting self, 2:604
  - stakes of getting caught, 2:605
- life expectancy**, 1:304
- Life of Johnson, The* (Boswell), 2:561
- limited defects tradition**, 1:46–47
- Lincoln, Abraham**, 1:xxx, 1:18, 1:484
- Lincoln Law**, 1:xxx
- Lincoln: The Unknown* (Carnegie), 1:122
- Lind, Jenny**, 1:58
- linguistic cues**, 2:606–608. *See also* **behavioral cues**; **information manipulation theory 1**; **information manipulation theory 2**; **language**; **nonverbal cues**; **speech**
- Coh-Matrix, 2:606
  - less complex speech and redundancy, 2:607–608
  - LIWC, 2:606
  - LSA, 2:607
  - Newman-Pennebaker Model, 2:606–607
- Linnaeus, Carl**, 1:xxix
- Lipitor**, 1:312
- Lippmann, Walter**, 1:184
- listeners**
- liars and, 2:597–598
  - mentality, 1:472
- Little Known Facts About Well Known People* (Carnegie), 1:122
- Little League**, 1:141
- “Little Red Riding Hood,”** 1:355
- Liu, James H.**, 1:277
- Live Entertainment Corporation, Canada**, 1:xxxiv
- LIWC** (Language Inquiry Word Count), 2:606
- Lloyd’s of London**, 1:xxxi
- Loch, Jacques**, 1:196
- Loch Ness Monster**, 1:488, 2:555
- Locke, Richard Adams**, 2:706
- locus of control**, 1:204
- Loftus, Elizabeth**, 1:xxxii, 1:xxxiii, 1:362, 2:657, 2:955, 2:956
- “Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View,”** 1:120
- London Interbank Offered Rate (BIBOR)**, 1:382
- London Society for Psychical Research**, 1:xxxii
- long con**, 1:189
- Lopez, Jennifer**, 2:685
- Lorenzini, Carlo**, 2:760
- Los Angeles Lakers**, 1:62
- Los Angeles Times*, 1:163, 2:934
- lottery scams**, 2:526
- Louis XIV**, 1:92
- Louis XVI**, 1:461
- Louvre**, 1:390

- Lovell, James, 1:21  
 low-stake lies, 2:627  
 loyalty oaths, 2:730  
 LSA (latent semantic analysis), 2:607  
 LSD experiments, 1:129  
 lucibufagin, 1:384  
 Lundquist, Tobias, 2:613  
*Lusitania*, 2:945–946  
*Lying* (Augustine), 2:872  
**lying, accusations of**, 2:608–612  
   collusion with liars, 2:611  
   Ekman on, 2:608–611  
   fighting words, 2:608  
   Kant on, 2:608  
   reluctance, 2:608  
**lying, costs of**, 2:612–614  
   cognitive load, 2:612  
   discentives and countermotives, 2:612–613  
   distance from commitment, 2:614  
   lying aversion, 2:613  
   others' loss, 2:613  
   size of lying, 2:613–614  
**lying, difficulty of**, 2:614–616  
   cognitive load and, 2:615  
   context and strategic evidence, 2:616  
 lying, general. *See also* adolescence, lying in; childhood, lying in; *Invention of Lying, The*; mental effort in lying; movies, lying in; pathological lying; *specific topics*  
   bluffing and, 1:83  
   Book of Mormon teachings, 1:88–89  
   Catholic Church teachings, 1:123–124  
   children, 1:xxxiii  
   college sports, 1:165  
   ethnographies and, 1:27  
   fMRI analysis, 1:97–99  
   functions and strategies, 1:28–29  
   Islam and, 2:552–553  
   lies to friends, 2:807  
   minor, 1:469  
   motives, 1:239–240  
   Saint Augustine on, 2:827–828  
   stress and, 1:331  
   Thomas Aquinas on, 1:31–32  
   understanding, 1:29–30  
**lying, intentionality of**, 2:616–619  
   automatic lying, 2:618  
   defining, 2:617  
   unintentional lying, 2:618  
*Lying, Misleading and the Role of What is Said* (Saul), 1:475  
**lying, prevalence of**, 2:619–621  
   incidence, 2:619–620  
   prolific and everyday liars, 2:620–621  
   studies, 2:619–620  
 “Lying and Asserting,” 1:475  
**lying as ability or skill**, 2:621–624. *See also* childhood, lying in  
   assessment of, 2:623–624  
   cognitive and neurological correlates of lying, 2:622–623  
   development, 2:621–622  
   individual differences, 2:623  
   leakage and, 2:623  
   verbal and nonverbal indicators, 2:623  
**lying as exercise of power**, 2:624–626  
   deception as empowering act, 2:625–626  
   high-power *versus* low-power, 2:625  
**lying as norm in social interactions**, 2:626–629  
   high- and low-stake lies, 2:627  
   motives for lying, 2:627  
   protection, 2:628–629  
   social lubricant, 2:627–628  
*Lying: Moral Choice in Private and Public Life* (Bok), 1:85–86, 1:291, 1:292, 1:472  
 Lynch, Michael, 1:276
- M**  
 M. C. Luscious, 1:94  
 MacArthur, Douglas, 2:577  
 “Macavity—The Mystery Cat,” 1:20  
 MacGillivray, James, 2:879  
**Machiavelli, Niccolò**, 1:453–454, 2:631–633, 2:957  
   appeal to honesty, 2:633  
   defenders of, 2:633  
   works, 2:631–633  
**Machiavellianism**, 1:96, 1:243, 2:633–635, 2:957  
   Dark Triad, 2:634  
   Enron, 1:334  
   Josef Stalin, 2:868  
   MACH-IV test, 2:634  
   measures, 2:696  
   personality traits, 2:634  
   in social behavior science, 2:633–634  
 MACH-IV test, 2:634  
 Macho Man, 1:93  
 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1:475, 2:681  
 Macintyre, Ben, 2:735  
 Mackay, Charles, 1:xxx  
 Mackey, John, 2:854  
 MacLeod, R. M., 2:732  
 MacPherson, James, 1:xxix, 1:463, 2:562

- Madison, James, 2:874  
**Madoff, Bernard**, 1:xxxvi, 1:111, 1:382, 2:543, 2:611, 2:635–636  
    clients, 2:635  
    downfall and suicide, 2:636  
    fraud architect, 2:856  
    Ponzi scheme, 2:635, 2:747, 2:953, 2:957  
Maelzel, Johann, 1:462  
Mafia, 2:823  
Magellan, Ferdinand, 2:857  
Magic Eye, 2:917  
**magic tricks**, 2:636–640  
    attention and misdirection, 2:637–638  
    bilocation, 2:954  
    Black Arts, 2:637  
    change blindness, 2:638–639  
    as cognitive process, 2:636  
    cups and balls demonstration, 2:637  
    managed misinterpretation, 2:638  
    as social interaction, 2:636  
    using the imperceptible, 2:637  
*Magical Mystery Tour*, 1:69  
*Magna Moralia* (Aristotle), 1:34  
*magnanimitas*, 1:92  
magnification, 2:800–802  
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 1:11, 1:359  
Magruder, John B., 1:146  
Maguire, Tobey, 2:685  
Mahon, J. F., 1:248, 1:476, 2:681  
Mahoney, John, 2:686  
Mahurin, Walter, 2:580  
*Maid in Manhattan*, 2:685  
Maimonides, 1:33  
*Maine*, U.S.S., 1:436–437  
Major League Baseball (MLB), 1:142, 1:171  
Malcolm X, 1:202  
**malinger**, 2:640–642, 2:938, 2:956  
    adaptational model, 2:641  
    criminological model, 2:641  
    guidelines for detecting, 2:641  
    motivations, 2:640–641  
    pathogenic model, 2:641  
Malkovich, John, 2:687  
Mallon, Mary, 1:210  
Malskart, Lothar, 1:390  
mammals, 1:26–27  
*Man Who Never Was, The* (Montagu), 2:734  
managed interpretation, 1:43–44  
Mandela, Nelson, 1:307  
Mangold, Tom, 1:21  
Manichean confrontation, 2:882  
**manipulation**, 1:76–77, 2:632–643  
    ambiguity and, 2:642  
    con man and, 1:189  
    debate over, 2:632  
    failed attempts, 2:633  
    illegal market, 2:540–541  
    self-presentational, 2:527–528  
    for social positions, 1:96  
    successful, 2:633  
Manne, Henry, 2:515  
Mannheim model of speech production, 2:509  
Mannison, Don, 1:472  
Mansion of Happiness, 1:402  
Manson, Shirley Ardell, 2:854  
*Manufacturing Consent* (Herman, Chomsky), 1:420  
“man-who” syndrome, 2:956  
Maradona, Diego, 2:852  
Marcos, Ferdinand, 1:xxxiii  
Maritain, Jacques, 1:33  
**marketing, deceptive**, 2:643–647. *See also*  
    advertising, consumer products; consumer protection laws; public relations; tobacco advertising  
    consumer rights and, 2:645–646  
    foreign laws regulating, 2:646  
    FTC and, 2:643–645  
    legal approach to, 2:645  
    masked marketing, 1:12  
Markopolos, Harry, 1:xxxvi, 2:543  
marks, 1:189–190. *See also* targets  
Marsh, Elizabeth J., 1:xxxv  
Marsh, Othniel C., 1:118  
Martin, William, 2:734  
Martineau, Horace, 2:846  
Martinez, Eugenio, 2:718  
Martino, Rocco, 2:550  
Martson, William M., 2:799  
Marx, Karl, 2:498–499  
Marxist theory, 1:198  
Mary II, 1:132  
Márquez, Gabriel Garcia, 1:376  
masking, 1:258  
mass deception, 2:498–499  
mass media, 1:46–47, 1:69, 1:416, 1:490  
mate poaching, 1:347–348  
materiality, 1:372  
mating, 1:346–347  
Matisse, Henri, 1:390, 1:391  
*Matrix, The*, 1:198, 2:499

- Mau Zedong, 1:301, 2:578  
 Maurer, David W., 1:xxxi  
 Maxine Waters School Reform and Student Protection Act, 1:168  
*Mayflower*, 1:17  
 McCarthy, Cormac, 1:379  
 McCarthy, Joseph, 2:730  
 McCartney, Paul, 1:67–69. *See also* Beatles hoax  
 McClellan, George B., 1:146  
 McClellan, Scott, 1:104, 2:933  
 McCord, James W., Jr., 2:718  
**McCornack, Steven**, 1:261, 1:292–293, 1:404–405, 2:612, 2:647–649  
     aroused suspicion and, 2:648  
     cognitive load and, 2:615  
     elaborating theories, 2:509  
     on emotional reactions, 2:688  
     information manipulation theory, 2:507–508, 2:615, 2:647–648  
     McCornack-Parks Model, 2:649–650, 2:810  
     predictions, 2:811  
     veracity effect, 2:915  
**McCornack-Parks Model**, 2:649–650, 2:810  
 McCurry, Mike, 2:934  
 McDowell, Irvin, 1:146  
 McGrail, Anne, 1:420  
 McGrath, Melanie, 2:655  
 McGwire, Mark, 1:60  
 McKinley, William, 1:436–437, 2:934  
 McLean, Bethany, 1:333  
 McLeod, Beverly, 2:810  
 McMullin, Fred, 1:59  
 McNamara, Robert, 1:282, 2:919  
 Mead, George Herbert, 1:295  
 measurement. *See also* meta-analysis; research; statement validity assessment  
     Machiavellianism, 2:696  
     microfacial expressions, 2:668  
     reaction time, 2:800–802  
     self-esteem, 2:840–841  
 Meat Inspection Act of 1906, 1:205  
 meat puppeteering, 2:854  
 Mechanical Turk, 1:462  
 media. *See also* mass media; news media: Internet; news media: print; news media: television and radio  
     authoritarian state control, 1:50  
     consultation, 1:46  
     conversational, 1:46  
     credibility, 1:233  
     deception in interviews, 1:481  
     Rapid Reaction Media Team, 1:284  
     representations of deception, 2:785–786  
     terrorism and, 2:881–882  
     transmission, 1:46  
     Vietnam War deception, 2:918–919  
 mediated communication, 1:46, 1:183  
 Medicaid, 1:313  
**medical and pharmaceutical industry**, 2:650–653.  
     *See also* contagious disease outbreaks; medicine  
     CME programs, 2:651  
     deception aimed at customers, 2:652  
     deception by health-care professionals, 2:652  
     deception in, 2:650–652  
     FDA and, 2:650–651  
     off-label promotion, 2:651  
     patient deception, 2:652  
     seeding trials, 2:651  
     sponsored clinical trials, 2:651  
 Medicare, 1:313  
     fee-for-service claims, 1:xxxvi  
     fraud, 2:956  
     Fraud Strike Task Force, 1:xxxvii  
 medicine. *See also* contagious disease outbreaks  
     deception aimed at doctors, 1:311  
     deception in different contexts, 1:266  
     deception in research design, 1:268–269  
     in history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:461–462  
     Medicare fee-for-service claims, 1:xxxvi  
     Medicare Fraud Strike Task Force, 1:xxxvii  
*Meditations on First Philosophy* (Descartes), 1:458–459  
 mediums, 1:xxx  
 Medrano, Luis Sáinz de, 2:860  
*Mein Kampf* (Hitler), 1:xxxi, 1:77–78, 2:954  
 Melville, Herman, 1:189  
**memoirs**, 2:653–656. *See also* fiction  
     creative nonfiction, 2:655  
     hoaxes of 2003, 2:654  
     use of deception, 2:654–655  
**memory**, 2:656–658. *See also* false memories; repressed memories  
     characteristics and components, 2:657  
     false memories, 2:657–658  
     flashbulb, 2:955  
     memory recovery therapy, 1:364  
     processing and encoding, 2:656–657  
     wars in repressed memories, 2:814–816  
**men**, 2:658–662  
     lies men tell men, 2:660  
     lies men tell women, 2:659–660  
     male liars, 2:660–662



- Men in Black*, 1:202  
**mental effort in lying**, 2:662–664  
    in daily life, 2:663  
    experimental and forensic settings, 2:663–664  
    interview settings, 2:663  
*Mercury Theater on the Air*, 2:925  
Meriam, Eve, 1:297  
MERMER (multifaceted encephalographic response), 1:329–330  
Merrilaita, S., 2:511  
Merrill Lynch, 1:308, 2:542  
Mersenne, Marin, 1:458–459  
Mertens, Robert, 1:24  
*Message Production*, 2:509, 2:648  
**meta-analysis**, 2:664–667. *See also* measurement; research  
    behavioral cues and, 2:664–665  
    half truths and, 2:665–666  
    lie detection ability and, 2:665–666  
    quantitative conclusions, 2:666  
    view of research, 2:666  
*Metaphysics of Morals, The* (Kant), 2:678–679  
meteors, 1:xxx  
methodological holism, 1:54  
methodological individualism, 1:54  
*Methods of Ethics, The* (Sidgwick), 1:466–467  
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1:390  
METT (micro expression training tool), 1:328, 2:668  
Metts, Sandra, 2:810  
“Mexican Pet” legend, 2:912  
Meyers, Mike, 2:686  
Miami Dolphins, 1:388  
Michelangelo, 1:454  
micro expression training tool (METT), 1:328, 2:668  
microexpressions, 1:328, 2:941  
**microfacial expressions**, 2:667–668  
    Ekman and, 2:667  
    FACS for, 2:668  
    METT for, 2:668  
    micro-momentary facial expressions, 2:941  
    research, 2:667  
    SETT for, 2:668  
    SPOT for, 2:668  
    tools to measure, 2:668  
micrometers, 2:921  
**Middle East**, 2:668–670  
    corruption, war, radicalization, 2:669–670  
    effect of modernization, 2:669  
    idealism, 2:670  
    Middle Passage, 1:17  
    *Midsummer Night’s Dream*, A, 1:379  
    Midwife Toad, 1:xxxi  
    Mignolo, Walter, 1:177–178  
    Mikkelsen, Barbara, 2:958  
    Mikkelsen, David, 2:958  
    Milburn, Michael, 1:420  
    Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (MTBI), 1:388  
    Milgram, Stanley, 1:18, 1:269–270  
**military deception**, 2:670–673  
    disinformation, 2:671–672  
    Operation Mincemeat, 2:672–673, 2:733–735  
    strategies, 2:671  
    Mill, John Stewart, 1:106, 1:175, 1:465–366  
**Miller, Gerald**, 2:673–674, 2:810–811  
    father of interpersonal communication research, 2:673–674  
    studies and legacy, 2:674  
    Miller, James, III, 2:646  
*Million Little Pieces*, A (Frey), 1:300, 1:397–398, 2:654  
Mills, Duncan, 1:277  
Mills, Judson, 2:842  
Milton, John, 1:184  
*Milwaukee Journal*, 2:713  
**mimicry**, 1:258, 2:674–676. *See also* camouflage  
    aggressive, 2:512  
    animal, 2:675–676  
    Batesian, 1:22, 1:113, 2:675, 2:766  
    birds, 1:79–80  
    butterflies, 1:113–114  
    human, 2:676  
    insects, 2:512–513  
    Mullerian, 1:113–114, 2:512  
    plants, 2:766–767  
    Trojan Horse, 2:676, 2:898–900  
Mind Hunter Program, 1:369  
mind reading, 2:638–639  
Minizech, Jerzy, 1:455  
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2), 2:641  
Minnesota Timberwolves, 1:63  
minor lying, 1:469  
Mirken, Alan, 2:871  
Miró, Joan, 1:391  
misappropriation theory, 2:515  
miscommunication, 1:182  
misdirection, 1:43–44, 1:200  
*Misha: A Memoire of the Holocaust Years* (Defonseca), 2:655

- misinformation, 1:182. *See also* information  
communication and, 1:182  
effect, 2:956  
Internet news media, 2:710–711
- misinterpretation, 2:638
- misleading, 1:475, 2:681
- misrepresentation  
football injuries, 1:388  
law and law enforcement and, 2:588
- missing link, 1:xxxi
- Mississippi Bubble, 1:460–461
- Mitchell, John, 2:932
- Mitchell, Robert, 1:22–27
- Miyagi Prefecture fraud, 1:xxxv
- MLB (Major League Baseball), 1:142, 1:171
- MMPI-2 (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality  
Inventory), 2:641
- Moctezuma, 2:858–859
- Model, Marshal Walter, 1:65, 1:67
- modernization, 2:669
- Modigliani, Amedeo, 1:390
- Molcho, Solomon, 1:454
- Mollering, Guido, 2:681
- MOMA (Museum of Modern Art), 1:58
- Mona Lisa Smile*, 2:685
- Monet, Claude, 1:xxxiii
- money laundering, 1:xxxvi
- Monopoly, 1:402
- Monroe, Marilyn, 1:202
- Montagu, Ewen, 2:734
- Montaigne, Michel de, 2:608
- Montgomery, Bernard, 1:66, 2:736, 2:949
- Moore, G. E., 1:468–469
- Moore, Gary, 2:888–889
- morals and ethics**, 1:34, 1:107, 1:466, 2:676–682  
Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, 2:678–679  
effect of lying on others, 2:679–680  
lying *versus* misleading, 2:681  
moral obligation, 1:5  
moral viewpoint, 2:573, 2:628  
nonconsequentialist view of lying, 2:677  
objections to Kant's arguments, 2:680–681  
public relations and, 2:787–788  
teleological, 1:106  
theories of, 1:105–107  
undermining trust in society, 2:677–678
- Morris, Ivan, 2:654
- Morrison, Samuel Eliot, 1:177
- mortgage fraud, 1:xxxvii
- Moses and Monotheism* (Freud), 1:396
- Mother Night* (Vonnegut), 1:378, 2:502
- motivational impairment effect**, 2:682–684  
assumptions, 2:682–683  
computer-mediated communication and, 2:683  
DePaulo and, 1:352, 2:682  
interpersonal deception theory and,  
2:683–684
- motives. *See also* **deception motives**  
false testimony, 2:937–938  
gossip, 1:411–412  
for lying, 2:627  
lying in daily life, 1:239–240  
malinger, 2:640–641  
World War I, 2:945
- Motte, Comtesse, 1:461
- movies, lying in**, 2:684–688. *See also* **fiction**  
behavioral cues to lying, 2:687  
cognitive load for deception, 2:685  
deception concealment, 2:685–686  
reaction to discovered deception,  
2:687–688  
social necessity for deception, 2:684–685  
“Mr. Rogers Was a Navy Seal” legend, 2:913
- Mrs. Doubtfire*, 2:685
- MTBI (Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee),  
1:388
- Much Ado About Nothing*, 1:301
- Mueller, Fritz, 1:113, 2:512
- Mueller, Robert, 2:893
- Mugage, Robert, 1:50
- Muhammad, 2:551, 2:567
- Mulan*, 2:685
- Muller, Fritz, 2:675
- Mullerian mimicry, 1:113–114, 2:512
- multifaceted encephalographic response  
(MERMER), 1:329–330
- Mumler, William H., 1:xxx
- Münsterberg, Hugo, 1:xxxi, 2:956
- Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), 1:58
- Muskie, Edmund, 1:130
- Muslims, 2:552
- Mussolini, Benito, 2:734
- Mutual UFO Network, 2:907
- My Friend Leonard* (Frey), 1:397
- My Prison Without Bars* (Rose), 1:60
- Myatt, John, 1:391
- Myers, Steven, 1:257
- Myers-Briggs test, 1:368
- Myrdal, Alva, 1:85
- Myrdal, Gunnar, 1:85
- mystical function of myth, 2:688
- mystification, 1:219

myth, 2:688–692. *See also* fairy tales; jackalope; Santa Claus; Spanish-American Conquests; tall tales; urban legends

cosmological function, 2:688  
Dyadic deception and, 2:689–690  
Easter Bunny, 2:689  
group deception, 2:691  
mystical function, 2:688  
pedagogical function, 2:688  
Santa Claus, 1:375, 2:689, 2:829–830  
self-deception and, 2:689  
sociological function, 2:688  
universality of themes, 2:691–692

## N

Nagaya, Maria, 1:455

NAIA (National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics), 1:164–165, 1:167

*Name of the Rose, The* (Eco), 1:33

Name-Letter Test (NLT), 2:841

Nance, John, 1:xxxiii

Napoleon Bonaparte, 2:498, 2:693–695

exile, 2:694–695  
fame, 2:694  
in French Revolution, 2:693–694  
spies and secret codes, 2:695  
torture used by, 2:893

narcissism, 2:695–698

other-directed deception and, 2:696  
research, 2:696  
self-directed deception and, 2:696–697

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), 2:909, 2:927

NASDAQ, 1:306, 1:382, 2:543

Nasdijj, 2:654

Nathan, Tony, 1:388

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 2:909, 2:927

National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), 1:164–165, 1:167

National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA), 1:274–275

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 1:164, 1:387

National Communication Association, 2:509

National Conference of Bar Presidents, 1:45

*National Enquirer*, 1:323, 2:891

National Football League (NFL), 1:387–388

National Fraud Information Center, 2:495

*National Geographic*, 1:xxxiv, 1:187

National Hockey League (NHL), 1:481

National Labor Relations Board, 1:xxxii

*National Lampoon*, 2:912

National Security Act of 1947, 1:281

National UFO Reporting Center (NUFORC), 2:907

Native Americans, 1:302, 1:339, 2:698–700.

*See also* African Americans; Asian Americans; Hispanic Americans

Andrew Jackson removing, 2:558–559

COINTELPRO and, 2:699–700

counter-narrative, 2:700

cultural genocide, 2:699

Delaware Indians, 1:xxix

holocaust, 2:698

Trail of Tears, 2:699

warrior tall tales, 2:877

Wounded Knee, 2:698–699

nature

of language, 2:678

of political spin, 2:864–865

*Nature*, 1:xxxvi–xxxvii, 2:886

Nazi propaganda, 1:49, 2:700–703. *See also* Hitler, Adolf

Big Lie technique, 1:78

films, 2:701

propaganda against Jews, 1:209

radio, 2:701–702

reaction to, 2:702

NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association), 1:164, 1:387

NCCA (National Center for Credibility Assessment), 1:274–275

necrophilia, 1:369

Neeson, Liam, 2:686

Nelson, Scott Reynolds, 2:879

neocolonialism, 1:175–176

nepotism, 1:223

Nero, 1:201

Nessen, Ron, 2:934

neural imaging, 1:196

neural networks stylometry, 2:874

neurophysiology, 2:703–706. *See also* brain; electroencephalography; functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; reaction time

concerns about lying and deception, 2:705

legal issues, 2:705

market aspects, 2:705

neurological correlates of lying, 2:622–623

telling lies, 2:703–705

New England Patriots, 1:388, 1:389

New Orleans Saints, 1:389

- New Republic*, 1:xxxiv, 1:83, 1:407, 2:713  
*New World Order*, 1:201  
*New York Herald*, 2:708  
*New York Jets*, 1:389  
*New York Morning Journal*, 1:435–436  
*New York Post*, 1:62  
***New York Sun's Moon Series***, 2:706–709  
     articles, 2:706–707  
     as hoax, 2:706–709  
     reaction to, 2:707–709  
*New York Times*, 1:82, 1:163, 1:300–301, 1:407, 2:712, 2:919  
*New York Times v. Sullivan*, 2:595  
*New York v. Raphael Golb*, 2:855  
*New York World*, 1:435  
*New Yorker*, 1:407  
 Newell, William C. (“Stub”), 1:118  
 Newman, Leonard, 2:781  
 Newman-Pennebaker Model, 2:606–607  
**news media: Internet**, 2:709–711. *See also* **Internet:**  
     **Facebook and social media sites**  
         censorship, 2:711  
         misinformation, 2:710–711  
         objectivity, 2:709–710  
**news media: print**, 2:711–714  
     consequences and reasons for deception, 2:713  
     investigative and informative deception, 2:712–713  
**news media: television and radio**, 2:714–716  
     crime news and deception, 2:715  
     role in deception, 2:714–715  
     standards of news credibility, 2:715  
     VNRs, 2:715  
*Newsweek* magazine, 2:710  
 Newton, Isaac, 1:xxix  
 NFL (National Football League), 1:387–388  
 Ngo Dinh Diem, 2:919  
 NHL (National Hockey League), 1:481  
 Nicholas II, 1:20–21  
 Nichols, Henry, 1:118  
 Nicholson, Benjamin, 1:390  
*Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle), 1:34  
**Nietzsche, Friedrich**, 1:377, 2:716–718, 2:903  
     critics of, 2:716  
     scientist or allegorist, 2:716  
     works of, 2:716–717  
 Nigerian 419 scam, 2:526, 2:955  
 Nii, H. Penny, 2:509  
 Nippon Professional Baseball, 1:171  
 Nivea skin cream, 1:11  
**Nixon, Richard**, 1:129, 1:327, 2:545, 2:661, 2:718–720. *See also* **Watergate**  
     lying, 2:747  
     phone taps, 2:718  
     Smoking Gun tape, 2:719  
     staff removal, 2:719  
 NLT (Name-Letter Test), 2:841  
 No Lie MRI, 2:705  
*No One Would Listen* (Markopolos), 1:xxxvi  
 Noble Lie, 1:106  
 NOC (nonofficial cover), 1:338  
 nonconsequentialist view of lying, 2:677  
 nonofficial cover (NOC), 1:338  
 nonverbal behavior, 1:157  
     DePaulo on, 1:285  
     ethnic differences, 1:340  
     four-factor theory of emotion and nonverbal behavior, 2:601, 2:897  
     of lying as ability or skill, 2:623  
     nonverbal deception, 1:250  
**nonverbal cues**, 1:366, 2:720–723. *See also*  
     behavioral cues; **linguistic cues**  
     benefits of seeking, 2:722–723  
     deception in context, 2:721–722  
     interactions with individual differences, 2:722  
     mental state of liar, 2:720–721  
     Othello effect, 2:722  
     situational familiarity and, 2:848  
**Normandy, Allied invasion of**, 2:723–725. *See also*  
     **Churchill, Winston; World War II**  
     Operation Fortitude, 2:724  
     Operation Quicksilver, 2:724, 2:737–739  
     successful ruse, 2:724–725  
 North, Oliver, 1:130, 2:545–546  
 Norton, Michael, 2:864  
**Nostradamus**, 2:725–727  
     current interest, 2:727  
     life of, 2:725–726  
     works, 2:726–727  
 NUFORC (National UFO Reporting Center), 2:907  
 Nullification Crisis, 2:558  
 Nunes, Mark, 1:398  
**O**  
 Oates, Titus, 1:131–132  
**oaths**, 2:729–730  
     gold standard of truth, 2:729  
     loyalty, 2:730  
     origins, 2:730



- Obama, Barack, 1:18, 1:324, 2:497  
  crying and, 1:237  
  world domination and, 1:201  
obfuscation, 1:200  
objectivity, 2:709–710  
“Obligatory Wait” legend, 2:911  
O’Brien, Barbara, 2:539  
observation effects, 1:482–484  
obstruction of justice, 1:xxxv  
Occam’s Razor, 1:205  
oddball paradigm, 1:329  
“Ode to Billy Joe,” 1:412  
*Odyssey* (Homer), 2:690, 2:898  
*Offender Profiling*, 2:922  
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1:127  
off-label promotion, 2:651  
Ognianova, E., 1:233  
O’Hair, Madalyn Murray, 2:912  
O’Hurley, John, 2:889  
Okdie, B. M., 2:530  
Oklahoma City bombings, 1:219  
*Old Man and the Sea, The* (Hemingway), 1:377  
*Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats* (Eliot), 1:20  
Oliver-Smith, Anthony, 1:286–287  
omission, 1:360  
  deception, 1:247  
  lies of, 2:602–603  
*On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy* (Kant), 2:680  
*On Bullshit* (Frankfurt), 1:394–395  
*On Nature* (Mill), 1:466  
*On the Harmony Between Religion and Philosophy* (Ibn Rusd), 1:452  
*On the Origin of Species* (Darwin), 1:242  
*On the Witness Stand* (Münsterberg), 2:956  
“On Truth,” 1:456  
“On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” 2:716  
*On War* (Clausewitz), 1:149–150  
*One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (Kesey), 1:95  
online auction scam, 2:956–957  
online dating. *See* **Internet: online dating**  
online deception, 2:527, 2:529–530  
“Open Window, The,” 1:378  
Operation Accumulator, 2:949  
Operation Barclay, 2:950  
Operation Bertram, 2:950  
Operation Big Drum, 2:949  
Operation Blumenpflucken, 2:951  
Operation Bodyguard, 1:300, 1:301, 2:730–733, 2:949  
  double-cross system, 2:731–732  
  dummy military operations, 2:732–733  
Operation Cascade, 2:950  
Operation Cockade, 2:950  
Operation Copperhead, 2:949  
Operation Dirty Play, 2:957  
Operation Fortitude, 1:326, 2:724, 2:949  
Operation Glimmer, 2:949  
Operation Hardboiled, 2:950  
Operation Harpune, 2:950–951  
*Operation Heartbreak* (Cooper), 2:734  
Operation Kremlin, 2:951  
Operation Mincemeat, 1:199–200, 2:672–673, 2:733–735, 2:950  
  Churchill and, 2:733–734  
  later accounts, 2:734–735  
  organizers behind, 2:734  
*Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis* (Macintyre), 2:735  
Operation Neptune, 2:735–737, 2:949  
  phases of invasion, 2:736  
  use of deception, 2:736–737  
Operation Quicksilver, 2:724, 2:737–739, 2:949  
  strategy and tactics, 2:737–738  
  subprograms, 2:738–739  
Operation Saucer, 2:907  
Operation Scherhorn, 2:950  
Operation Seelowe, 2:951  
Operation Strategic Services (OSS), 1:325  
Operation Taxable, 2:949  
Operation Titanic, 2:949  
*Operation Valkyrie* assassination attempt, 1:218  
Operation Zeppelin, 2:733  
Opie, Amelia, 1:464  
opportunity, 1:7, 1:333, 1:366, 1:437  
optimality, 2:797  
oral traditions, 2:877  
*Orchidaceae*, 2:765–768  
Oreck vacuum cleaners, 1:11  
Orlando Magic, 1:63  
Orwell, George, 1:xxxii  
Osborne, Thomas, 1:131  
*Oscoda Press*, 2:879  
Ossian, 1:xxix  
O’Sullivan, Maureen, 2:608, 2:940  
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 2:574  
Othello effect, 1:156, 2:722, 2:739–741  
  false accusations, 2:957  
  thermal imaging and, 2:887–888

- other-centered lies, 2:936  
 other-deception, 1:249  
 Ouija Board, 1:xxx  
*Overboard*, 2:687  
**overconfidence**, 2:741–743  
     benefits, 2:742  
     causes, 2:741–742  
     decision failures, 2:742  
 overestimation of predictability, 2:957  
 Ovid, 2:688  
 ownership filter, 1:420  
 Oxford Movement, 1:119–120
- Pacioli, Luca Bartolomea de, 1:4  
 Pajein, Davi, 2:541  
 Palestine, 1:310  
 Paley, William, 1:464  
 Palmeiro, Rafael, 1:60  
**paltering**, 2:745–747  
 Panama pump, 1:6  
 Papa John's Pizza, 1:11  
 papal supremacy, 1:xxix  
 paparazzi, 1:323  
 paradoxes  
     bragger's paradox, 1:92–93  
     dynamic or strategic, 1:249  
     liar paradox, 2:956  
 paranoia, 1:349  
 paranormal activity, 1:xxxii  
     poltergeists, 1:xxxiii  
     psychic phenomenon, 2:954  
     psychic surgery, 2:957  
     psychics, 1:xxxiii  
     spirit communications, 1:xxx  
     telepathic powers, 1:xxx  
 paraphilia, 1:369  
 Parcels, Bill, 1:388  
 Parcheesi, 1:402  
 parents  
     childhood lying and, 1:137  
     teaching about lying, 2:804–805  
*Paris Match*, 2:499  
**Park, Hee Sun**, 1:161, 1:293, 2:747–749  
     publications, 2:748–749  
     on third-party information, 2:811  
     veracity effect, 2:747–748, 2:915  
 Park, Malcom R., 2:647  
**Park-Levine Probability Model**, 2:749–751  
     predictions, 2:749–750  
     research, 2:750  
     veracity effect and, 2:916
- Parks, M. R., 1:261, 2:649–650, 2:810  
 Parsons, Rehtach, 1:411  
 Pasternak, Mariana, 2:873  
 Paterno, Joe, 1:167  
 pathogenic model of malingering, 2:641  
**pathological lying**, 1:320, 2:751–753  
     awareness of, 2:752–753  
     neurological traits, 2:752  
     related disorders, 2:751–752  
*Pathways to Madness* (Henry), 1:219  
 Patraeus, David, 2:524  
 Patrick, Edward, 2:545  
 Pattinson, Robert, 2:685  
 Patton, George S., 1:66, 1:325–326, 2:724, 2:732, 2:949  
 Pavlov, Ivan, 1:236, 2:886  
 PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), 1:381  
 PDD (psychophysiological detection of deception), 1:274–275  
 PE (price-to-earnings), 1:307  
 PEACE (Preparation and Planning, Engage and Explain Account and Clarification), 1:362–363  
 PEACE interrogation model, 1:362–363  
 Pearlman, Lou, 1:xxxvi  
*peccatum derisionis*, 1:413  
 Pecocke, Reginald, 2:873  
 Pecos Bill, 2:878–879, 2:955  
 pedagogical function of myth, 2:688  
 peer influence, 1:9  
 Peltzer, Armand, 1:19–20  
 Peltzer, Leon, 1:19–20  
 Pemsel, Max-Josef, 2:724  
 pen names, 2:853  
 penny black, 1:xxix  
 Pentagon Papers, 1:282–283, 2:919–920  
 people sniffers, 2:917  
 Perenyi, Ken, 1:391  
 performance-enhancing drugs, 1:xxxvii  
     college sports, 1:165–166  
     in football, 1:389  
 performative theory, 2:902  
**perjury**, 2:588, 2:753–756. *See also* witness, false testimony of  
     prosecuting, 2:754  
     well-known cases, 2:754–756  
 persistence of discredited evidence, 2:957  
 personal gain, 1:1–2  
 personality  
     borderline personality disorder, 2:633  
     conspiracies and, 1:204

- lie acceptability, 2:598
- lie acceptability as trait, 2:597
- lying in daily life and, 1:239
- Machiavellianism, 2:634
- MMPI-2, 2:641
- theory, 1:240–241
- Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 1:87
- personalization, 1:420
- persuasion
  - literature, 1:15, 1:232
  - source credibility and, 2:856–857
  - torture and, 2:894
- PET (positron emission tomography), 2:704
- Peter Laidlaw and Company v. Hector M. Organ*, 1:125
- “Petition to Ban Religious Broadcasting” legend, 2:912
- Petro, John, 1:391
- Petty, Richard, 2:856, 2:866
- Pfeiffer, Michelle, 2:687
- Pfizer scandal, 1:110
- Phaedrus* (Plato), 2:500
- Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), 2:650
- phenomenology, 1:180–181
- “Philanderer’s Porsche” legend, 2:912
- philosophical perspectives of consciousness, 1:195–196
- phishing, 1:257, 2:494, 2:525, 2:957
- PhoneBusters, 2:495
- Photius*, 1:384
- photographs, altered**, 2:756–758. *See also* Cottingley Fairies
  - doctored photographs, 1:256
  - influence of, 2:757–758
  - Loch Ness Monster photograph, 1:488
  - participating in lies, 2:758
  - surgeon’s photograph, 1:488
  - technology and, 1:256–257
- Photuris*, 2:512
- PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America), 2:650
- Phylluon giganteum*, 2:513
- Picasso, Pablo, 1:390, 1:391
- Pickover, Clifford, 2:638–639
- Pieper, Josef, 1:33
- Pierce, Benjamin, 1:xxx, 2:954
- Pierce, Charles Sanders, 1:457, 2:902
- Pierce, Paul, 1:62
- Pierid butterflies, 1:22
- Pike, Otis, 1:129
- Piltown Man**, 1:xxxi, 2:758–760
  - alleged discovery, 2:759
  - investigating, 2:760
  - perpetuation of fraud, 2:759
- Pinker, Steven, 1:277
- Pinocchio**, 1:379, 2:760–762
  - animated movie, 2:761
  - liar, 2:661
  - stories of, 2:760–761
- pipe dream rumors, 2:823–824
- Piquart, Georges, 1:309–310
- Pirolli, Peter, 2:509
- Pius V, 1:33
- Pizarro, Francisco, 2:502–503, 2:857
- placebos, 1:268–269
- plagiarism**, 1:xxxv, 1:xxxvii, 2:762–765. *See also* libel and slander
  - check-in points, 2:764
  - by college undergraduates, 2:762–763
  - honor codes, 2:764
  - prevention, 1:3–4, 2:764
  - reasons for, 2:763–764
- Planalp, Sally, 1:292
- plants**, 2:765–768. *See also* animals; insects
  - Arecaceae*, 2:765, 2:767
  - Asteraceae*, 2:765
  - Chiloglottis trapeziformis*, 2:767
  - costs of deception, 2:767–768
  - Cucurbitaceae*, 2:765–768
  - food deception, 2:765–766
  - general deception, 2:765
  - mimicry, 2:766–767
  - Orchidaceae*, 2:765–768
  - rendezvous attraction, 2:767
  - sexual deception, 2:767
- Plato**, 1:43, 1:77, 1:106, 1:458, 2:500, 2:768–770
  - breeding and, 2:770
  - on falsehood, 2:769–770
  - on truth, 2:769–770, 2:901
- plausibility**, 2:770–772
  - CIA and, 1:276, 2:771
  - plausible deniability, 1:276, 2:771
  - subjective cue, 2:771
- Pleasantville*, 2:685
- Pliocene Age, 1:xxx
- Plotkin, Eugene, 2:541
- pluralistic ignorance, 2:498
- Poe, Edgar Allan, 1:94, 1:376–377, 2:708
- Poher, Claude, 2:908
- Poindexter, John, 1:276, 2:546

- poker**, 2:772–773. *See also* gambler's fallacy  
 bluffing, 2:772–773  
 research, 2:772–773
- police officers.** *See also* crime; interrogation;  
 judges; **law and law enforcement**  
 cognitive heuristics and, 1:157–158  
 culture of, 2:585–587  
 generalized communicative suspicion studies,  
 1:405–406  
 INTERPOL, 1:xxxi  
 interrogation, 1:83  
 lie bias and, 2:598–599  
 value, 1:406  
 Vrij on, 2:923
- polite lies**, 1:271, 1:472
- Politician, The* (Young), 1:324
- politics.** *See also* **Iran-Contra affair**; **spin**, **political**  
 computer-generated images and, 1:186–188  
 crying and, 1:237–238  
 deception in different contexts, 1:266  
 fraud in history of deception: 1700 to 1800,  
 1:460–461  
 lies and, 1:324–325  
 “Politics and the English Language,” 1:xxxii  
 Renaissance, 1:453–454  
 terrorism and, 2:879
- Polo, Marco**, 1:402
- poltergeists**, 1:xxxiii
- polygraph**, 1:xxxi, 2:773–775, 2:957. *See also* lie  
 detectors  
 Department of Energy requirement, 1:xxxiv  
 development and workings of, 2:774–775  
 as employment requirement, 1:xxxii  
 Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of  
 1988, 2:705  
 legality, 2:775  
 for Nazi sympathizers, 1:xxxii  
 reliability, 1:182  
 for Soviet spies, 1:xxxii  
 thermal imaging and, 2:887
- Ponce de León, Juan**, 1:17, 2:857
- Pons, Stanley**, 1:162–163
- Ponzi, Charles**, 1:xxxi, 1:111, 2:542
- Ponzi schemes**, 1:xxxi, 1:xxxvi, 1:111, 1:370,  
 2:747, 2:957. *See also* **Madoff, Bernard**  
 affinity fraud, 2:953  
 in financial markets, 1:381–382  
 investment fraud, 2:542–543  
 as long con, 1:189  
 reply coupons, 2:542–543  
 shifters, 2:958
- Pope, Alexander**, 1:410
- Pope, John**, 1:146
- Popich Plot**, 1:131–132. *See also* **Charles II plot**
- Popov, Dusko**, 2:724
- Popper, Karl**, 1:396
- Porter, David**, 1:147
- Portmann, Adolf**, 1:23–25
- positive deception**, 1:457
- positive exaggeration**, 1:350–351
- positron emission tomography (PET)**, 2:704
- postage stamps**, 1:xxix
- Postman, Leo**, 2:823
- PostSecret**, 1:259
- post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)**, 2:640,  
 2:895
- Poussin, Nicolas**, 1:390
- Powell Colin**, 1:104, 2:549
- power.** *See also* **lying as exercise of power**  
 of dishonesty, 1:298  
 of source credibility, 2:855  
 telepathic, 1:xxx  
 of urban legends, 2:911–912
- Practice, The*, 2:941
- pragmatist theory**, 2:902
- “Prairie Home Companion, A,”** 2:956
- pranks**, 1:487–488
- PRAs (product recommendation agents)**, 1:14
- predictions**  
 McCornack, 2:811  
 overestimation of predictability, 2:957  
 Park-Levine Probability Model,  
 2:749–750
- prefix investing**, 1:306
- Preparation and Planning, Engage and Explain  
 Account and Clarification (PEACE)**, 1:362–363
- Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987**, 1:311,  
 1:313
- Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992**,  
 1:314
- Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, The*  
 (Goffman), 1:182, 1:409
- President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (Reeves),  
 2:573
- pretenders to throne**, 1:454–455
- prevention**  
 in academia, 1:3–4  
 BAPCPA, 1:56  
 CDC, 1:209, 1:442  
 collusion, 1:171–172  
 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of  
 the Crime of Genocide, 2:699



- Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1:128, 1:130
- plagiarism, 1:3–4, 2:764
- torture, 2:893
- PRI (Professional Reform Initiative), 1:45
- Price Is Right, The*, 2:889
- price-to-earnings (P/E), 1:307
- Pride and Prejudice* (Austen), 1:378
- prima facie*, 1:470–471, 2:681
- primary liar, 1:407
- primates**, 2:775–779. *See also* **animals**
- food deception, 2:776–777
  - intentional deception, 2:778
  - tactical deception, 2:777–778
- Prince, The* (Machiavelli), 1:453–454, 2:632–633, 2:957
- Prince and the Pauper, The* (Twain), 1:378
- Princeton Review*, 1:2
- Principia Ethica* (Moore), 1:468–469
- principle of deception, 2:927–928
- Principle of Veracity, 1:85–86
- Principles of Ethics, The* (Spencer), 1:466
- Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (Paley), 1:464
- prior knowledge, 1:263–264
- pro tanto*, 1:470
- probing effect**, 1:157, 2:779–780
- BAE debate, 2:779–780
  - implications for deception, 2:780
  - probing heuristic explanation, 2:780
- problem solving. *See also* **decision-making**
- black board model, 2:509
  - context, 1:215–216
- procedural justice, 2:568–569
- processing fluency, 2:903
- “Proctor & Gamble Trademark” legend, 2:911–913
- product recommendation agents (PRAs), 1:14
- Professional Reform Initiative (PRI), 1:45
- Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity, 2:519
- Project Blue Book, 2:907
- Project Dragon Lady, 1:128
- Project Magnet, 2:907
- Project Twinkle, 2:907
- projection**, 2:780–783
- attributive, 2:781–782
  - classic defensive, 2:780–781
  - ego-defense mechanism, 2:780
  - FCE, 2:782
  - research, 2:781
- prolific liars, 2:620–621
- promotion
- deception motives, 1:273
  - off-label, 2:651
  - types of lies, 2:604–605
- propaganda, 1:209. *See also* **government propaganda**; **Nazi propaganda**
- authoritarian states, 1:48–50
  - Big Lie, 2:954
  - black, 1:183
  - computer-generated images and, 1:186–188
  - contagious disease outbreaks and, 1:209
  - government, 1:415–416
  - Institute of Propaganda and Analysis, 1:xxxi
  - journalism and, 1:183–184
  - political spin, 2:865
  - white, 1:183
  - World War I, 1:xxxi, 2:945–946
- prophecies, 1:xxx, 1:154, 2:726–727, 2:959. *See also* **Nostradamus**
- Prophecies, The* (Nostradamus), 2:726–727
- ProQuest fraud, 1:6
- prosocial lies, 1:138–139
- protection. *See also* **consumer protection laws**
- lying as norm in social interactions, 2:628–629
  - protecting others, 1:271–272, 2:603–604
  - protecting relationships, 1:272–273
  - protecting self, 1:272, 2:604
- Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, 1:201
- protosmile, 1:317
- Proust, Marcel, 1:376
- PRSA (Public Relations Society of America), 2:787–788, 2:863
- prudence, 1:106
- Psychic Mafia, The* (Keene), 1:xxxiii
- psychic phenomenon, 2:954
- psychic surgery, 2:957
- psychics, 1:xxxiii, 1:xxxiv
- psychoanalysis**, 2:783–784. *See also* **Freud, Sigmund**
- Lacan on lying and deception, 2:783–784
  - truths and, 2:784
- psychological conflicts, 1:335
- psychological disorder, 1:349, 1:362
- psychological operations division (PSYOP), 1:79
- psychological perspectives of consciousness, 1:195–196
- psychological research, 1:269–270
- “Psychology of Ledgerdemain, The,” 1:xxx
- Psychology of Rumor, The* (Allport, Postman), 2:823
- Psychology Today*, 1:xxxii

*Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The* (Freud), 1:396, 1:411  
 psychopathy, 2:633  
 psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD), 1:274–275  
 psychoticism, 1:204  
 PSYOP (psychological operations division), 1:79  
 PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), 2:640, 2:895  
 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 1:381  
**public relations**, 2:784–788. *See also* advertising, consumer products; marketing, deceptive; media; news media: Internet; news media: print  
   corporate spin and, 2:863  
   ethics, 2:787–788  
   *Exxon Valdez* oil spill and, 2:786  
   Fukushima Danchi nuclear disaster and, 2:786  
   HARO, 2:786  
   legal issues, 2:787  
   lying as attraction, 2:787  
   media representations of deception, 2:785–786  
   PRSA and, 2:787–788, 2:863  
   social media and, 2:786–787  
   spin *versus* lying, 2:785  
   Three Mile Island nuclear disaster and, 2:786  
 Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), 2:787–788, 2:863  
 Publicity Test, 1:86  
 published fiction, 1:376  
*Puddin’head Wilson* (Twain), 2:830  
**puffery**, 1:11–12, 2:788–791  
   in advertising, 2:789  
   exaggeration and, 2:788  
   First Amendment and, 2:788, 2:790  
   nonverbal advertising, 2:790  
   standards, 2:789–790  
   Supreme Court on, 2:790  
 Pulitzer, Joseph, 1:435  
 pulp fiction, 1:376  
 pump and dump operation, 1:xxxv, 1:257, 2:541, 2:957  
 pump fake, 1:62  
 puppy, 2:609  
 pure fiction, 1:375  
 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 1:205–206, 1:359  
 Puritans, 1:235  
 purposeful deception, 1:267–268  
 Purser, B. H., 2:512–513  
 pyramid schemes, 1:372, 2:957  
 pyromania, 1:369

## Q

Quality Assurance Program (QAP), 1:275  
 quantitative conclusions, 2:666  
 Qur’an, 2:551–553, 2:567

## R

**racism**, 1:18, 2:793–797. *See also* discrimination  
   Bona Fide Pipeline, 2:795–796  
   deniability and, 1:277, 2:793–795  
   Implicit Association Test, 2:795–796  
   Modern Racism Scale, 2:795  
   research, 2:795–796  
 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 2:933  
 Rader, Dennis, 1:369–370  
 radical honesty, 2:628  
 radicalization, Middle East, 2:669–670  
 radiocarbon dating, 2:958  
 Raffles, Constantine S., 1:xxix  
 Raines, Howell, 1:xxxv, 1:83  
 Rajaratnam, Raj, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii, 2:515, 2:541  
*Rake’s Progress*, A, 1:463  
 Ramona, Gary, 1:xxxiv  
*Ramona v. Isabella*, 1:xxxiv  
 Ramsden, Horace, 2:846  
 Ramsey, Frank, 2:902  
 Randi, James, 1:xxxii, 1:227  
*Rape of the Lock*, 1:410  
 Raphael, 1:33, 1:390  
 Rapid Reaction Media Team, 1:284  
 “Rapper’s Delight,” 1:94  
 rare pairs stylometry, 2:874  
 rascal, 2:609  
 Rashdall, Hastings, 1:469  
**rationality**, 2:797–799  
   bounded, 2:496, 2:798  
   conformity, 2:797  
   consistency, 2:797  
   *Homo economicus* and, 2:797  
   optimality, 2:797  
   reasoned justification, 2:797  
   in research, 2:797–798  
   SMORC, 2:612–614, 2:798–799  
 Raute pastoralists, 1:28  
**reaction time**, 1:39, 1:192, 2:799–802. *See also* lie detectors; measurement; neurophysiology;  
**polygraph**  
   concealed information test for, 2:801  
   GKT for, 2:801

- measurement, magnification, manufacture, modification detection techniques, 2:800–802
- rationale for use, 2:800
- TARA, 2:800–801
- Reagan, Ronald
  - Iran Contra affair, 1:129–130, 2:545–546
  - world domination and, 1:201
- realism, 2:925, 2:958
- reality monitoring, 2:802–804**
  - criteria, 2:803
  - lie detection and, 2:802–803
  - research, 2:802
  - restrictions, 2:803
- reasonability, 1:372
- reasoned justification, 2:797
- Reaves, Sheila, 1:188
- Rebecca*, 1:xxxvii
- “Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness,” 1:xxxii
- recovered memory therapy, 1:364, 2:958
- recruiting violations, 1:165
- red herring, 2:958
- Redenbacher, Orville, 2:888
- redundancy
  - linguistic cues, 2:607–608
  - theory, 2:902
- Reebok shoes, 1:11
- Reeves, Richard, 2:573
- referees, 1:62–63
- Reid, John E., 1:70
- Reid Technique, 1:70–71, 1:194, 1:362
- relabeling, 1:258
- relationships, general
  - deception and trust, 1:260
  - interpersonal deception theory and, 2:534
  - between liar and listener, 2:597–598
  - protecting, 1:272–273
- relationships: family, 2:804–806**
  - family secrecy, 2:805–806
  - parents teaching children about lying, 2:804–805
- relationships: friends, 1:121–123, 2:806–810**
  - detecting lies, 2:807–809
  - FOAF, 1:68, 2:910–911, 2:955
  - lies to friends, 2:807
  - social acceptability of lies to friends, 2:807
- relationships: romantic, 2:810–811**
  - lie detection, 2:810
  - research, 2:810
  - women’s deception in, 2:943–944
- relationships: sexual, 2:811–814**
  - deception during sex, 2:812–813
  - distrust in intimate, 1:303
  - exposure threat, 2:813
  - outside intimate, 1:261–262
  - politicians and celebrities, 2:813
  - scientific context, 2:813
- religion, 1:452. *See also* Bible; Qur’an; Torah; *specific religions*
  - Cromwell enthusiasm, 1:234–235
  - George Washington, 2:929
  - justice concepts and, 2:567–568
  - Thomas Jefferson and, 2:559–560
- Remains of Gentilism and Judaism* (Aubrey), 1:30
- Remembrance of Things Past* (Proust), 1:376
- Renaissance, 2:873. *See also* history of deception:
  - Renaissance**
    - art forgery, 1:390, 1:454
    - politics, 1:453–454
- rendezvous attraction, 2:767
- reparation, 1:106
- repo transactions, 1:381
- repressed memories, 2:814–817. See also false memories; memory**
  - deception and, 2:816–817
  - Freud and, 2:814
  - memory wars, 2:814–816
  - sexual abuse, 1:xxxiv, 2:814–815
- reproductive-related deceptions, 1:80–81
- Republic, The* (Plato), 1:77, 1:458, 2:769
- reputation, 2:817–819**
  - as dignity, 2:818
  - fish deception and, 1:386
  - health consequences and, 2:818
  - as honor, 2:818
  - Internet and, 2:818
  - as property, 2:818
  - research, 2:817
  - types, 2:818
- reputed credibility, 1:233–234
- Resch, Tina, 1:xxxiii
- research. *See also* deception, research on; deception in research design; investigator bias; Miller, Gerald; theories
  - academia, 1:1
  - aroused suspicion, 1:36
  - attitudes toward deception, 1:245
  - on bluffing, 1:85
  - business, 1:108–109

- Center for Identification Technology Research, 1:101
- on cheating, 1:134
- cognitive dissonance, 1:154
- cold fusion, 1:162–163
- communication, 1:185, 2:674, 2:922
- on concealed information test, 1:191
- consciousness, 1:197–198
- corporate fraud, 1:221
- on corporations, 1:223–224
- cultural anthropology, 1:29
- on deceptive advertizing, 1:13–14
- deniability, 1:277
- denial, 1:280
- dog-human deception, 1:306
- duping delight, 1:321
- Ekman, 1:327
- Facebook and social media sites, 2:527–528
- fMRI techniques, 1:400
- of Frank, 1:393
- gender studies, 2:944
- generalized communicative suspicion, 1:405–406
- gossip, 1:414
- gullibility, 1:429–430
- high school sports, 1:439
- microfacial expressions, 2:667
- narcissism, 2:696
- Park-Levine Probability Model, 2:750
- poker, 2:772–773
- prevalence of lying, 2:619–620
- projection, 2:781
- racism, 2:795–796
- rationality in, 2:797–798
- reality monitoring, 2:802
- reputation, 2:817
- romantic relationships, 2:810
- rumor, 2:823–824
- scientific content analysis, 2:833–834
- self-justification, 2:841–843
- sex, 2:813
- situational familiarity, 2:848
- soccer (football), 2:853
- statement validity assessment, 2:870–871
- To Tell the Truth* applications, 2:889
- torture, 2:895–896
- truth bias, 2:904–905
- two-sided arguments, 1:12
- veracity effect, 2:915
- restorative justice, 2:567–568
- résumés, 2:819–821. *See also* letters of recommendation
- detecting fraud on, 2:820
- lying on, 2:819–820
- reasons for lying, 2:820
- retelling, 1:xxxv
- retributive justice, 2:567, 2:938
- Return to Me*, 2:686
- Revolutionary War, 2:929
- Rhetoric* (Aristotle), 1:232
- rhetorical tradition, 1:179–180
- Ricardi, Alfonso, 1:390
- Ricardi, Pio, 1:390
- Rice, Condoleezza, 2:547
- Richard II, 1:30
- RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), 2:933
- Riecken, Henry W., 2:959
- Riefenstahl, Leni, 2:701
- Right and the Good, The* (Ross), 1:469–471
- Right and Wrong* (Fried), 1:473
- Risberg, Swede, 1:59
- Risk, 1:402–403
- risky revenue models, 1:307
- roach marketing, 2:854
- Robb, A., 1:185
- Robbins, Apollo, 2:638
- Robbins, Tom, 1:377
- Roberts, Frederick, 2:846
- Roberts, Julia, 2:685
- Roberts, Nora, 2:762
- Robertson Panel, 2:907
- Robinson, John, 1:201
- Robinson, John Edwards, 1:370
- Rockefeller, Nelson A., 1:129
- Rodriguez, Alex, 1:60
- Rogers, Ginger, 2:550
- Rohan, Louis de, 1:461
- Rolling Stone*, 1:407
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 1:127, 1:144, 1:326, 2:869, 2:934–935
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 1:371
- Roots* (Haley), 2:762
- Rose, Pete**, 1:59–60, 2:821–822
- Rosecrans, William, 1:147
- Rosenberg, Alfred, 2:702
- Rosenblat, Herman, 2:654
- Rosenthal, Robert, 1:285, 2:601, 2:897
- Rosnow, R. L., 2:824
- Ross, Lee, 1:199
- Ross, W. D., 1:106, 1:469–471, 2:677



Roth, Tim, 2:941  
Rotunda, R. J., 2:527  
Rouault, Georges, 1:391  
Rubens, Peter Paul, 1:390  
Ruesch, Juergen, 1:219  
**rumor**, 1:302, 2:822–825. *See also* gossip  
    ambiguity and, 2:823  
    believability, 2:824  
    fear, 2:824  
    historical perspective, 2:823  
    Paul is dead rumor, 1:68–69  
    pipe dream, 2:823–824  
    research, 2:823–824  
    transmission, 2:823  
    Vietnam War campaigns, 2:918  
    wedge-driving, 2:824  
Rumsfeld, Donald, 1:283–284, 2:547–548  
run off, 2:532  
“Runaway Grandmother” legend, 2:912  
*Runaway Jury*, 2:687  
Russell, Bertrand, 2:901  
Russell, Bryon, 1:62  
Russell, John, 1:120  
Russell, Kurt, 2:687  
Russell, Miles, 2:759  
Ryan, Meg, 2:687  
Ryle, Gilbert, 1:471, 1:473  
  
**S**  
Sacramento Kings, 1:62  
sadism, 1:369  
**Saint Augustine**, 1:123, 1:247, 1:450–451, 2:653, 2:827–829  
    ethical arguments, 2:828  
    morals and ethics, 2:678–679  
    treatises on lying, 2:827–828  
Saki, 1:378  
Salinas, David, 1:141–142  
Salinger, J. D., 1:377  
Salinger, Pierre, 2:935  
*San Francisco Examiner*, 1:435  
Sandherr, Jean Conrad, 1:309  
Sands, George, 2:853  
*Sanity, Madness, and the Family* (Laing), 1:219  
**Santa Claus**, 1:375, 2:689, 2:829–830. *See also* fairy tales; myth; urban legends  
    discovery of fabrication, 1:375  
    origins of character, 1:375  
*Sara* (LeRoy), 2:654  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2:544

SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), 1:209–210  
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 2:628  
*Saturday Evening Post*, 2:702  
Saul, Jennifer, 1:475, 2:681  
**Sawyer, Tom**, 2:830–832  
    chapters and characters, 2:830–831  
    good and bad lies, 2:831  
*Say Anything*, 2:686  
SCA (Speech Communication Association), 2:507  
scams. *See also* con man; fraud; hoaxes; **Internet**: e-mail scams  
    advance fee, 2:526, 2:953  
    confidence, 1:141–142  
    Drake, 1:433–434  
    lottery, 2:526  
    Nigerian 419, 2:526, 2:955  
    online auction, 2:956–957  
    scammer, 1:188  
    Scareware Scammer, 1:372  
scandals  
    accounting, 1:5–7  
    in business, 1:109–111  
    Catholic Church sex abuse, 1:124  
    Chiquita Banana, 1:109  
    Enron, 1:109–110  
    Great Recession, 1:383  
    Lehman Brothers, 1:380–381  
    Lewinsky, 1:411  
    LIBOR, 1:382  
    Pfizer, 1:110  
    sex abuse, 1:124  
    Watergate, 1:129, 2:661, 2:718–719, 2:930–933  
    Xerox, 1:110  
Scareware Scammer, 1:372  
Schachter, Stanley, 2:959  
Schauer, Frederick, 1:475, 2:608, 2:681  
Schurer-Kestner, Auguste, 1:309  
Schecroun, Jean-Pierre, 1:391  
Schermer, Michael, 1:202  
*Schindler's List*, 2:686  
Schlesinger, James, 1:129  
school test cheating, 1:xxxv, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii  
*School Ties*, 2:686  
Schrenker, Marcus J., 1:xxxvi  
Schwandt, Barbara, 2:687  
science, 1:466  
    in history of deception: 1700 to 1800, 1:461–462  
    Nietzsche and, 2:717  
    scientific misconduct, 1:xxxvi  
    sexual relationships and, 2:813

- Science of Ethics, The* (Stephen), 1:466
- scientific content analysis**, 2:832–834
- criteria, 2:832–833
  - emotions, 2:833
  - lack of conviction, 2:833
  - research, 2:833–834
  - social introductions, 2:832
  - spontaneous corrections, 2:832
  - structure of statement, 2:833
  - working of, 2:832
- scoundrel, 2:609
- Scouting for Boys* (Baden-Powell), 2:847
- Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), 1:328, 2:668
- Scrota, K. B., 1:185
- Scudder's American Museum, 2:958
- Searle, John R., 1:195, 1:197
- SEC. *See* Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- Second Boer War, 1:142, 2:845. *See also* **Siege of Mafeking**
- secrecy**, 2:834–836. *See also* disclosure
- benefits and pitfalls of disclosure, 2:836
  - conditions of revealing, 2:835
  - consequences of, 2:835
  - dishonesty and, 1:295–296
  - family, 2:805–806
  - Pentagon Papers, 1:282–283, 2:919–920
  - secret codes, 2:695
- Secret of My Success, The*, 2:685
- Secret Service, U.S., 1:xxxix, 2:494
- Secrets: On the Ethics and Concealment and Revelation* (Bok), 1:85–86
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1:xxxvi
- establishment, 1:382
  - insider trading enforcement, 2:515
  - investigations, 1:6
  - Rule 10b-5, 2:514–515
- Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2:514
- seeding trials, 2:651
- Seinfeld*, 1:95, 1:379, 1:411, 2:746
- self-centered lies, 2:936
- self-deception**, 1:14–15, 1:44, 1:249, 1:250–251, 1:307, 2:836–839
- acceptance and, 2:836
  - Bible, 1:76–77
  - evolution and natural selection and, 1:348
  - experimental demonstration, 2:837–838
  - ideology and, 2:496–498
  - myth and, 2:689
  - reasons for, 2:838–839
  - terrorism and, 2:882
  - underlying mechanism, 2:837
- self-disclosure, 1:259
- self-esteem**, 2:839–841
- defensive, 2:839–840
  - measuring, 2:840–841
- self-improvement, 1:106
- self-justification**, 1:44, 2:841–843
- cognitive dissonance and, 2:841
  - research, 2:841–843
- self-perception theory, 1:155
- self-presentation, 1:408–409
- online deception, 2:529–530
  - self-presentational manipulation, 2:527–528
- self-reflection, 1:182
- Selig, Bud, 2:822
- semiotics, 1:180
- sender demeanor**, 2:843–845
- individual differences, 2:844–845
  - research, 2:844
- sensationalism, 1:435
- September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 1:204, 1:218
- Serota, K. B., 1:252, 2:627
- Serres, Michael, 2:860
- SETT (subtle expression training tool), 1:328, 2:668
- settler colonialism, 1:172
- severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 1:209–210
- Sewell, Anna, 1:376
- sex, 1:243–244. *See also* **relationships: sexual**
- deception during, 2:812–813
  - research, 2:813
  - sexual deception in plants, 2:767
  - STIs, 2:812
- sexual abuse
- Catholic Church, 1:124
  - false memories, 1:xxxiv, 1:365
  - repressed, 1:xxxiv, 2:814–815
  - scandals, 1:124
- sexually transmitted infections (STIs), 2:812
- Shakespeare, William, 1:94, 1:237, 1:301, 1:378–379, 2:491–493, 2:562. *See also* **Iago (Shakespeare's Othello)**
- Shakur, Tupac, 1:94
- sham, 1:219, 2:501
- shamans, 2:877
- shame, 1:426–427
- Sharia law, 2:567

- Shattered Glass*, 2:958  
Shaw, Clay, 2:574  
*She Stoops to Conquer*, 1:379  
Sherif, M., 1:163  
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 2:645  
Shiffrin, Richard, 2:547  
shifters, 2:958  
short and distort, 2:541  
short con, 1:188–189  
*Shrek*, 2:686  
Sidgwick, Henry, 1:466–467  
**Siege of Mafeking**, 2:845–847  
    deception during, 2:846  
    victory celebrations, 2:846–847  
Siegler, Frederick, 1:472  
Sigall, Harold, 2:794  
Siki, Sweet Daddy, 1:93  
Sikorski, Wladyslaw, 2:869  
Silent Talker, 2:941  
Silverstein, Kevin, 2:713  
Simon, Herbert, 2:798  
Simon, Richard, 1:454  
Simple Model of Rational Crime (SMORC), 2:612–614, 2:798–799  
Simpson, O. J., 1:237, 1:411, 2:755  
Sinclair, Upton, 1:205  
Singer, Marcus, 2:677  
**situational familiarity**, 2:847–849  
    influence on verbal and nonverbal cues, 2:848  
    judges and, 2:848  
    research, 2:848  
*Skeptical Inquirer*, 1:xxxiii  
Skilling, Jeffrey, 1:333–334, 2:543  
skin conductance studies, 1:191–192  
Skinner, B. F., 1:196–197, 1:236  
skulls, 1:xxx, 1:xxxi  
Skye, Ione, 2:686  
slander. *See* **libel and slander**  
“Slasher Under the Car” legend, 2:911–912  
slavery  
    historical deceptions, 1:16–18  
    Jefferson contradictions, 2:560  
    Middle Passage, 1:17  
    resistance, 1:18  
sleep deprivation, 2:895  
sleep effect, 2:855–856  
*Sleeping Eros*, 1:390  
sleight-of-hand, 1:200  
smartphones, 1:xxxvii  
Smith, Adam, 2:562  
Smith, G. A., 1:xxx  
Smith, Joseph, 1:89  
Smith, Zay, 2:712, 2:713  
**smoke screen**, 2:849–851  
    figurative, 2:850–851  
    historical use of, 2:849–850  
    during Korean War, 2:850  
    modern uses, 2:850  
    synchronized, 2:850  
    during World War II, 2:849–850  
smoking. *See* **tobacco advertising**  
Smoking Gun tape, 2:719  
Smoking Gun website, 1:397  
SMORC (Simple Model of Rational Crime), 2:612–614, 2:798–799  
snakes, 1:24  
Snakes-and-Ladders, 1:402–403  
snitches, 2:586–587  
Snopes.com, 2:958  
“Snow White,” 1:356–357  
Snowden, Edward, 2:711  
**soccer (football)**, 2:851–853  
    fan bias, 2:852  
    FIFA, 2:851  
    during incarceration, 2:852–853  
    research, 2:853  
    soccer match fixing, 1:xxxvii, 2:852  
    winning by deception, 2:851, 2:852  
social brain hypothesis, 1:243  
social cognitive theory, 2:851  
social history, 1:444  
social intelligence, 2:519–520  
social interactions. *See also* **lying as norm in social interactions**  
    adult, in theory of mind, 2:885–886  
    magic tricks as, 2:636  
social loafers, 1:304  
social media. *See* **Internet: Facebook and social media sites**  
social processes, 1:287–288  
social roles, 1:290–291  
social support, 1:204  
social systems, 1:297–298  
*Social Text*, 1:xxxiv  
society, 2:677–678  
    Creole, 1:29  
    distrust, 1:303–304  
sociocracy, 2:927  
sociocultural theory, 1:181, 2:851  
sociological function of myth, 2:688  
sociopsychological approach, 1:181

- sock puppetry, 2:853–855  
     false identities, 2:853  
     Internet, 2:854  
     modern, 2:854–855  
     origins, 2:854  
     pen names, 2:853  
     straw men and, 2:854  
 Socrates, 1:43, 2:500, 2:768  
 Sokal, Alan, 1:xxxiv  
 Solid Muldoon, 1:119  
 Solomon, Solomon J., 1:116  
 somnophilia, 1:369  
*Song of the South*, 1:101  
*Sophisticated Refutations* (Aristotle), 1:451  
 Sorensen, Roy, 1:475  
 Sosa, Sammy, 1:60  
**source credibility**, 1:233, 2:855–857  
     impact, 2:855  
     persuasion and, 2:856–857  
     power of, 2:855  
     sleeping effect, 2:855–856  
 source filter, 1:420–421  
 South Sea bubble, 1:xxix, 1:460  
*Southern Literary Messenger*, 2:708  
 spam, 2:523  
**Spanish-American Conquests**, 2:857–861  
     Age of Discovery and Exploration, 2:857  
     Cortés the Picaro, 2:859–861  
     La Malinche, 2:858–859  
     Moctezuma, 2:858–859  
     myth of conquerors, 2:858  
     true history of conquest of Mexico, 2:857–858  
 sparing feelings, 1:286  
 Speakes, Larry, 2:934  
 spectograph analysis, 2:958  
 Spector, Paul, 1:107  
*specula principum*, 1:454  
 speech. *See also* **language**; **linguistic cues**  
     George W. Bush deceptive statements, 2:607  
     indirect, 1:277  
     less complex, 2:607–608  
     of liars, 2:607  
     Mannheim model of speech production, 2:509  
     SCA, 2:507  
 Speech Communication Association (SCA), 2:507  
 Speidel, Hans, 2:724  
 Spencer, Herbert, 1:466  
 Spencer, Octavia, 2:686  
 Spencer, Sandra Kay, 2:574  
*Spider Man*, 2:685  
 Spielberg, Steven, 2:635, 2:889, 2:908  
 spies, 2:695  
**spin, corporate**, 2:861–864. *See also* **corporate fraud**; **corporations**  
     in defense of public relations, 2:863  
     Lee and Bernays, 2:861–862  
     modern use, 2:862–863  
**spin, political**, 2:864–868. *See also* **government propaganda**  
     contemporary, 2:867  
     context, 2:864  
     nature of, 2:864–865  
     propaganda, 2:865  
     psychology of, 2:866–867  
     spin doctor, 2:866  
     TA, 2:864–867  
     White House press secretaries, 2:935  
 Spinoza, Baruch, 1:459, 2:874, 2:901–902  
 spirit communications, 1:xxx  
*Spokesman Review*, 2:712  
 sponsored clinical trials, 2:651  
 spontaneous deception, 1:xxxi  
 Sporer, Siegfried, 2:687  
 sports. *See also* **baseball**; **basketball**; **children's sports teams**; **college sports**; **football**; **high school sports**; **hockey**; **Rose, Pete**; **soccer (football)**  
     bluffing in, 1:84  
     cheating in, 1:133  
     cooperation, 1:219  
     ideology and, 2:497  
*Sports Illustrated*, 1:60  
 SPOT (screening passengers by observation technique), 1:328, 2:668  
 Spygate, 1:389  
 St. Valentine's Day Massacre, 1:20  
**Stalin, Josef**, 1:301, 2:579, 2:868–869. *See also* **World War II**  
     duplicity in international relationships, 2:868–869  
     Machiavellianism, 2:868  
 Stannard, David, 2:699  
 Stanton, Edwin M., 1:145, 1:146  
 Stapel, Diederik, 1:xxxvi  
 Stark, E. M., 2:864  
 Starr, Kenneth, 1:152  
 Starr, Ringo, 1:67–69. *See also* **Beatles hoax**  
 State Department, U.S., 1:127  
 state regulation, 1:358–359  
**statement validity assessment**, 2:869–871  
     research, 2:870–871  
     stage 1 case-file analysis, 2:869  
     stage 2 interview, 2:869



stage 3 CBCA, 2:869–870  
stage 4 validity checklist, 2:870  
statement-evidence consistency, 1:344  
status, 1:91–92  
Stawaiski, Sarah, 1:109  
stealing, 1:xxxi  
Steele, Richard, 2:608  
Stein, David, 1:391  
Steinbeck, John, 1:376  
Steinberg, Mark, 2:674  
Stephen, Leslie, 1:466  
Stern, Howard, 1:237  
Stevens, M., 2:511  
Stewart, Bob, 2:889  
Stewart, Kristin, 2:685  
**Stewart, Martha**, 1:xxxv, 2:515, 2:541, 2:871–873  
    background, 2:871–872  
    imprisonment, 2:873  
    insider trading, 2:872–873  
    after scandal, 2:873  
Stiff, James, 2:674  
*Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Goffman), 1:367, 1:409  
*Sting, The*, 1:18, 1:189  
STIs (sexually transmitted infections), 2:812  
STOCK (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act), 2:515  
stock fraud, 1:xxxv, 1:307. *See also* **insider trading; investment fraud**  
Stokke, Andreas, 1:475  
Stone, Emma, 2:686  
Stone, Irving, 1:376  
Stone, Oliver, 2:574  
Stoneman, George, 1:147  
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK), 2:515  
Storch, Eric, 1:155  
Storch, Jason, 1:155  
Stormalong, Alfred Bulltop, 2:878  
Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 1:58  
*Strand Magazine*, 1:227  
*Stranger, The* (Camus), 1:377  
Strangeways, David, 2:949  
strategic obfuscation, 1:43–44  
strategic-questioning approach, 1:159–160  
straw men, 2:854, 2:958  
Strawson, Peter, 2:902  
Streisand, Barbra, 2:685  
stress  
    lying and, 1:331  
    PTSD, 2:640

Stromwall, I. A., 1:161  
Stuart, J. E. B., 1:145  
*Studies on Hysteria* (Freud), 1:395  
Sturgis, Frank, 2:718  
Stuyvesant High School, 1:xxxvii  
**stylometry**, 2:873–875  
    applications, 2:874–875  
    author invariant, 2:874  
    genetic algorithms, 2:874  
    neural networks, 2:874  
    rare pairs, 2:874  
    techniques of, 2:874  
subliminal advertising, 1:12  
submarine warfare, 2:946  
subtle expression training tool (SETT), 1:328, 2:668  
success  
    consensual reality and, 1:198–199  
    of government propaganda, 1:422  
    impression and, 2:500  
Sugarhill Gang, 1:93–94  
*Summa de Arthmetica* (Pacioli), 1:4  
*Summa Theologica* (Aquinas), 1:31, 1:451  
Summerlin, William T., 1:xxxiii  
Summers, Anthony, 1:21  
**Sun Tzu**, 1:43, 1:198, 2:875–876, 2:880, 2:953  
    impact, 2:876  
    on war, 2:875–876  
*Superman*, 2:685  
Supreme Court, U.S., 1:xxxv, 2:608–608, 2:645.  
    *See also specific cases*  
    on competition, 1:11  
    on FTC authority, 1:371  
    on information sellers, 1:125  
    on puffery, 2:790  
surgeon's photograph, 1:488  
Suskind, Richard, 2:551  
Swaggart, Jimmy, 2:660  
swindler, 1:188  
Sybil attack, 2:854  
Sykes, William, 1:390  
Sylvester I, 2:873  
synchronicity, 1:259  
syndromes, 2:786  
    “man-who,” 2:956  
    SARS, 1:209–210  
*Systema Naturae* (Linnaeus), 1:xxix

## T

TA (target audience), 2:864–867  
Tabarin, 1:455–456  
tactical deception, 2:777–778

- tactile mimicry, 1:24  
 Taft, William Howard, 2:934  
 Taguba, Antonio, 2:548  
 “Tale of Truth and Falsehood, The,” 1:449  
 Talese, Nan A., 2:654  
 Taliban, 1:160  
**tall tales**, 2:877–879. *See also* fairy tales; myth;  
   **urban legends**  
     characters, 2:877–878  
     exaggeration, 2:877  
     in oral traditions, 2:877  
     whoppers, 2:877  
 Talmud, 2:563–566  
 TARA (Timed Antagonistic Response  
   Alethiometer), 2:800–801  
 target audience (TA), 2:864–867  
 targets. *See also* audience; marks  
   disinformation and, 1:300–301  
   Hispanic Americans as, 1:440–441  
   TA, 2:864–867  
 TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program), 1:207  
 Tate, William, 1:64–65  
 tattlers, 1:8  
 TDCS (transcranial direct current stimulation),  
   1:97  
 technology. *See also* deception and technology  
   control of, 1:201–202  
   FTC and, 1:372  
   photography and, 1:256–257  
   technological determinism, 1:370  
 telemarketing fraud, 2:958  
 teleological ethics, 1:106  
 telepathic powers, 1:xxx  
 telephone deception, 1:259  
 “Tell Tale Heart, The,” 1:376–377  
 Te’o, Manti, 2:710  
 temperance, 1:38, 1:54, 1:106  
**terrorism**, 2:879–883. *See also* torture  
   as communication, 2:880–881  
   defining, 2:879–880  
   Gandhi on, 2:880  
   German Red Army Faction, 2:881  
   ideology and, 2:882  
   Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  
     Act of 2004, 1:128  
   Italian Red Brigades, 2:881  
   mainstream media and, 2:881–882  
   Manichean confrontation, 2:882  
   politics and, 2:879  
   private and public spheres, 2:882  
   self-deception and, 2:882  
   September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 1:204  
   UN on, 2:879  
   Uruguayan Tupamaros, 2:881  
   war on terror, 1:283–284  
   Weather Man Underground, 2:881  
*Thank You for Smoking*, 2:785  
 theories. *See also* cognitive dissonance; information  
   manipulation theory 1; information manipulation  
   theory 2; interpersonal deception theory; leakage;  
   motivational impairment effect; research  
   classical theory of insider trading, 2:514  
   consequentialist, 1:106  
   deception and audience, 1:46–47  
   deflationary truth, 2:902  
   design theory, 2:509  
   epistemic truth, 2:902–903  
   of ethics, 1:105–107  
   EVT, 1:101–102  
   Fishbein’s theory of belief, 1:13  
   global workspace, 2:509  
   IAT, 1:102  
   inflationary truth, 2:901–902  
   Marxist, 1:198  
   misappropriation, 2:515  
   performative, 2:902  
   personality, 1:240–241  
   pragmatist, 2:902  
   redundancy, 2:902  
   self-perception, 1:155  
   social cognitive theory, 2:851  
   sociocultural, 1:181, 2:851  
   theory of mind, 1:139  
   TOM, 1:243, 1:487, 2:520, 2:883–886  
   truth default theory, 2:601  
   UFO conspiracy, 2:908–910  
   verification, 2:903  
*Theory of Good and Evil, The* (Rashdall),  
   1:469  
**theory of mind**, 1:243, 1:487, 2:520, 2:883–886  
   adult social interactions, 2:885–886  
   developmental considerations, 2:884–885  
   evolutionary emergence, 2:883–884  
*Theory of Morality, A* (Donagan), 1:473  
**thermal imaging**, 2:886–888. *See also* functional  
   Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
   Korean War development, 2:886  
   for lie detection, 2:886–888  
   Othello effect and, 2:887–888  
   polygraph and, 2:887  
 thermoluminescence, 2:958  
 Thermopylae, Battle of, 1:373

- Thierbuch* (Gesner), 2:555  
Think Tools AG, 1:307, 1:308  
third-party negligence suits, 1:xxxiv  
Thirteenth Amendment, 1:18  
Thomas, Candice E., 2:805  
Thomas, W. I., 1:236  
Thompson, Hunter S., 2:888  
Thompson, William, 1:189  
Thornburgh, Dick, 2:786  
Thorne, Andrew, 2:732  
Thrall, Henry, 2:562  
Thrall, Hester, 2:562  
“Three Little Pigs,” 1:355–356  
Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, 2:786  
Tiger moths, 2:513  
*Time* magazine, 2:710  
Time Warner, 1:308  
Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA), 2:800–801  
*Times Delphic*, 1:68  
Tindale, R. Scott, 1:109  
*To Tell the Truth*, 2:888–889, 2:959  
    broadcast history, 2:888–889  
    playing the game, 2:888  
    as popular culture, 2:889  
    research applications, 2:889  
**tobacco advertising**, 2:889–892. *See also*  
    **advertising, consumer products; consumer protection laws; drug advertising; marketing, deceptive**  
    century-long campaign, 2:890–891  
    covert and health imagery, 2:891–892  
    current practices, 2:892  
    filtered, low-tar, natural cigarettes, 2:891  
    FTC and, 2:890–892  
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1:175  
Todorov, Tzvetan, 1:177  
Tolstoy, Leo, 1:218, 1:376–377  
TOM. *See* **theory of mind**  
Tom Sawyer. *See* Sawyer, Tom  
*Tom Sawyer, Detective* (Twain), 2:830  
*Tom Sawyer Abroad* (Twain), 2:830  
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 1:282  
Took, W., 2:529  
*Tootsie*, 2:685  
Torah, 2:565, 2:874  
Tormala, Zakary, 2:856  
**torture**, 2:892–896. *See also* **terrorism**  
    CIA on, 2:893  
    coercion and, 2:894  
    false confessions and, 2:894–895  
    FBI on, 2:893  
    as Geneva Conventions violation, 2:893  
    history, 2:892–893  
    during Inquisition, 2:892  
    as interrogation technique, 2:893–894  
    legality, 2:894  
    modern, 2:893  
    monitoring and preventing, 2:893  
    Napoleon Bonaparte using, 2:893  
    persuasion and, 2:894  
    PTSD and, 2:895  
    research, 2:895–896  
    sleep deprivation, 2:895  
    UN on, 2:893  
    valid information and, 2:894–895  
    waterboarding, 2:893  
*Totem and Tabu* (Freud), 1:396  
Toulouse-Lautrec, Henri di, 1:390  
Tower, John, 1:130  
*Tracts for the Times*, 1:120  
Trademark Revision Law of 1988, 2:645  
Trail of Tears, 2:699  
*Transactions of the Linnean Society*, 1:22  
transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS), 1:97  
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” 1:xxxiv  
transmission media, 1:46  
Transparency International, 1:340  
**transparent liars**, 2:896–898  
    Few Transparent Liars Model, 2:897–898  
    leakage and, 2:896  
    variance due to situation and chance, 2:898  
transvalued fiction, 1:377  
Travell, Janet, 2:574  
Travis, Carol, 2:842  
Trebek, Alex, 2:889  
Tressel, Jim, 1:167  
Trevathan, Jeremy, 2:854  
Triana, Rodrigo de, 1:177  
Triplett, Norman, 1:xxx–xxxi  
Tripp, Linda, 1:152  
*Triumph of the Will*, 2:701  
**Trojan Horse**, 2:676, 2:898–900  
    legend, 2:898–900  
    malware program, 2:900  
trolling, 1:259  
Trotsky, Leon, 2:868  
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), 1:207  
*True Magazine*, 2:891  
Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas, 1:289

- Truman, Harry S., 1:127, 2:577, 2:730  
*Truman Show*, 2:685–686  
 Trump, Donald, 2:914  
 trust, 1:108. *See also* deception and trust; distrust  
   mass media and, 1:416  
   undermining in society, 2:677–678  
*Trust Me, I'm Lying* (Holiday), 2:785  
**truth**, 2:900–904. *See also* half-truths; honesty  
   acceptance of, 2:769  
   application and belief, 2:904  
   Aristotle on, 1:34–35, 2:901  
   attorney standards for truth in evidence, 1:42  
   Bacon on, 1:456  
   bald-faced truths, 2:508  
   deflationary theories, 2:902  
   distinguishing truth-tellers from liars, 2:575  
   epistemic theories, 2:902–903  
   inflationary theories, 2:901–902  
   in Islam, 2:552  
   judges and, 2:904  
   lay understanding, 2:903–904  
   oaths as gold standard, 2:729  
   Plato on, 2:769–770, 2:901  
   processing fluency, 2:903  
   psychoanalysis and, 2:784  
   Samuel Johnson and, 2:562  
   triumph of, 1:184  
   truth wizards, 1:476  
   truth-bearer, 2:901  
   truthtelling and, 2:520  
   untruthful address, 1:458  
*Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*  
   (Williams), 1:475  
**truth bias**, 1:134, 1:156, 2:810, 2:904–906  
   mental systems, 2:905–906  
   research, 2:904–905  
   veracity effect and, 2:916  
 truth default theory, 2:601  
 Truth in Lending Act of 1969, 2:645  
 truthfulness, 1:442, 1:458, 1:475  
 Tseng, Shawn, 1:233  
*Turbo*, 1:186  
 Turner, J. M. W., 1:xxxiii  
 Turner, Patricia, 2:823  
 Turner, Ronnie, 2:684–685, 2:810  
 Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1931, 1:269  
 Tversky, Amos, 2:866  
 Tversky, Barbara, 1:xxxv  
 Twain, Mark, 1:301, 1:378, 2:830–831  
*Twilight*, 2:685  
 two-sided arguments, 1:12  
 two-step flow model, 1:47  
 Tyco, 1:6, 1:109  
 Typhoid Mary, 1:210
- U**  
 UFOs, 1:154, 2:907–910  
   APEN, 2:907  
   Cold War and, 2:908  
   conspiracy theories, 2:908–910  
   FUFOR, 2:907  
   International UFO Congress, 2:907  
   Mutual UFO Newark, 2:907  
   NUFORC, 2:907  
   Operation Saucer, 2:907  
   private investigations, 2:907–908  
   Project Blue Book, 2:907  
   Project Magnet, 2:907  
   Project Twinkle, 2:907  
   reports of, 2:907  
   Robertson Panel, 2:907  
   worldwide scientific studies, 2:907  
 UN. *See* United Nations (UN)  
*Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings* (Harris),  
   1:100  
*Uncle Tom's Cabin* (Stowe), 1:58  
 uncontrollable deception, 1:267–268  
 undercover marketing, 2:854  
 undercover operations, 2:586  
*Undocumented Enemy, The*, 2:918  
 Uniform Commercial Code, 2:645  
 unintentional lying, 2:618  
 United Nations (UN)  
   Convention Against Corruption, 2:959  
   Iraq and, 1:104  
   raising awareness in neoauthoritarian states, 1:51  
   on terrorism, 2:879  
   on torture, 2:893  
*United States and Biological Warfare Secrets From  
   the Early Cold War and Korea, The*, 2:579  
 universal brain signature, 1:99  
 Universal Service Administration Company  
   (USAC), 1:220  
 untruthful address, 1:458  
*Upasakadasanga Sutra*, 1:450  
*Upstairs Downstairs*, 1:95  
**urban legends**, 1:68, 2:910–914, 2:959. *See also*  
   exaggeration; fairy tales; folklore; jackalope;  
   myth; Santa Claus; tall tales  
   “Alligators in the Sewers,” 2:914  
   “Bloody Mary,” 2:913  
   circulating and believing, 2:910



“Cokelore,” 2:914  
defining, 2:910–911  
“Economical Car,” 2:912  
in film, 2:912  
FOAF, 2:910–911  
“Good Samaritan,” 2:914  
“JFK/Jelly Doughnut,” 2:913–914  
“Kentucky Fried Rat,” 2:911–912  
“Kidney Thieves Legend,” 2:910, 2:913  
“Mexican Pet,” 2:912  
“Mr. Rogers was a Navy Seal,” 2:913  
“Obligatory Wait,” 2:911  
origins, 2:910  
“Petition to Ban Religious Broadcasting,”  
2:912  
“Philanderer’s Porsche,” 2:912  
power of, 2:911–912  
“Proctor & Gamble Trademark,”  
2:911–913  
“Runaway Grandmother,” 2:912  
“Slasher Under the Car,” 2:911–912  
subjects of, 2:912–914  
Uruguayan Tupamaros, 2:881  
*U.S. News & World Report*, 1:2, 2:854  
U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 2:495  
U.S. Postal Service (USPS), 1:359  
U.S. Trustee Program (USTP), 1:57  
USAC (Universal Service Administration  
Company), 1:220  
uses-and-gratification tradition, 1:47  
USPS (U.S. Postal Service), 1:359  
USTP (U.S. Trustee Program), 1:57  
*Usual Suspects, The*, 1:379  
Utah Jazz, 1:62  
utilitarian thinkers, 1:139  
*Utilitarianism* (Mill), 1:465

## V

vaccines, 1:xxxiv  
*Vafþrúðnismál*, 2:690  
“Valiant Little Tailor, The,” 1:95  
validation, 1:48–50  
Valla, Lorenzo, 2:873, 2:875  
Vallee, Jacques, 2:908  
value  
EV/EBIDDA, 1:307  
fiction, 1:375–375  
George Washington and, 2:929–930  
honesty as, 1:485  
police officers, 1:406  
van Dyck, Anthony, 1:390

van Eyck, Jan, 1:390  
van Frassen, Bas, 1:249  
van Gogh, Vincent, 1:xxxiii, 1:390  
Van Kaam, Ben, 1:46  
van Meegeren, Hans, 1:xxxii  
Van Osten, William, 1:xxx  
van Wijngaaren, Theo, 1:390  
*Vanishing Hitchhiker, The* (Brunvand), 2:910,  
2:959  
*Vanity Fair*, 1:407  
Vasari, Giorgio, 1:390  
Velasquez, Diego, 2:858, 2:860  
veracity effect, 2:747–748, 2:915–916  
implications of, 2:915–916  
Park-Levine Probability Model and, 2:916  
research, 2:915  
truth bias and, 2:916  
truth-lie base rate, 2:916  
verbal cues, 2:848  
verbal deception, 1:250  
verbal false signals, 1:367–368  
verbal indicators of lying, 2:623  
verbal statements, 2:590  
verbal style, 2:590  
verification theory, 2:903  
Vermeer, Johannes, 1:390, 1:462  
Vespucci, Amerigo, 2:857  
vibrant elasticity, 1:377  
Victoria and Albert Museum, 1:390  
video malaise, 1:416  
video news releases (VNRs), 2:715  
Vietnam War, 2:545, 2:916–920  
American deception, 2:917–918  
Central Intelligence Agency during, 1:129  
history, 2:916–917  
Magic Eye, 2:917  
media deception, 2:918–919  
Pentagon Papers, 1:282–283, 2:919–920  
people sniffers, 2:917  
rumor campaigns, 2:918  
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 1:282  
Villard, Garrison, 1:479  
Virgin Mary, 1:30  
virtue, 1:485  
vividness criterion, 2:959  
VNRs (video news releases), 2:715  
vocal stress analysis, 2:920–922  
detection software, 2:920  
micrometers and, 2:921  
modern uses, 2:921  
voice, 2:590

voluntary false confessions, 1:361–362  
 von Däniken, Erich, 1:xxxii  
 von Kemplelen, Wolfgang, 1:462  
 von Osten, Wilhelm, 1:150–151  
 von Rundsted, Gerd, 2:724, 2:732  
 Vonnegut, Kurt, 1:378, 2:502  
 Vontobel, 1:308  
*Vortigern and Rowena*, 1:462  
 voter fraud, 1:xxxvi, 1:xxxvii  
 voyeurism, 1:369  
**Vrij, Albert**, 2:612, 2:922–923  
   defining deception, 2:922–923  
   on police officers, 2:923  
   works, 2:922  
 vulnerability, 1:286–287  
 Vygotsky, Lev, 2:851

## W

WACC (weight average cost of capital), 1:307  
 Wacker, Otto, 1:390  
 Wade, Dwayne, 1:61, 1:62  
*Wag the Dog*, 2:685, 2:785  
 Wakefield, Andrew, 1:xxxiv  
 Wakeman, George, 1:131–132  
 Waksal, Samuel, 1:xxxv, 2:541, 2:872  
 Walam Olum, 1:xxix  
 Walczyk, Jeff, 2:612  
 Wallace, Irving, 1:376  
 Walsh, Lawrence, 1:282  
 Walton, Douglas, 1:276  
 war, 1:43, 1:149–150. *See also* Cold War; **military deception**; Normandy, Allied invasion of; **terrorism**; *specific wars*  
   biological warfare, 2:578–580  
   Middle East, 2:669–670  
   submarine warfare, 2:946  
   Sun Tzu on, 2:875–876  
   war on terror, 1:283–284  
 War Department, U.S., 1:127  
 War of the First Coalition, 1:64  
*War of the Worlds*, 2:747, 2:925–927, 2:959  
   broadcast as assumed news bulletin, 2:925  
   hoax, 2:926  
   subsequent broadcasts, 2:926–927  
 Warbeck, Perkin, 1:454  
**Ward, Lester F.**, 2:927–929  
   background, 2:927  
   creating sociocracy, 2:927  
   principle of deception, 2:927–928  
   social forces theory, 2:927  
 Warner, Kurt, 1:388

Warren Commission, 1:375  
**Washington, George**, 1:484, 2:929–930  
   folklore surrounding, 2:929–930  
   recognition of value of deception, 2:929–930  
   religion, 2:929  
*Washington Post*, 1:83, 1:300, 2:931  
 waterboarding, 2:893  
**Watergate**, 2:718–719, 2:930–933. *See also* Nixon, Richard  
   aftermath, 2:932–933  
   burglarizing Democratic headquarters, 2:930–931  
   Central Intelligence Agency and, 1:129  
   coverup, 2:661  
   prosecution of Watergate Seven, 2:932–933  
   scandal exposed, 2:931–932  
   White House Plumbers, 2:931–932  
 Wathen, C. Nadine, 1:233  
 Watson, John, 1:196  
 Watzlawick, Paul, 1:219  
 weapons false alarm, 2:657  
 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 1:103–104, 2:547, 2:548–550, 2:661  
 Weather Man Underground, 2:881  
 Weaver, Buck, 1:59  
 Web pages, 1:69  
 Webster, G. D., 2:634  
 wedge-driving rumors, 2:824  
 weight average cost of capital (WACC), 1:307  
 Weinberger, Caspar, 1:130, 1:282  
 Weis, Brent, 1:108  
 Weitz, Shirley, 2:793  
 Welles, Orson, 1:375, 2:747, 2:925, 2:959  
 Wells, David, 1:60  
 Wells, H. G., 2:925, 2:959  
 West, S. G., 2:530  
 Westmoreland, William, 2:918  
 Weyler, Valeriano, 1:435  
 Whaley, Barton, 2:671  
 “What Is Lying,” 1:475  
*What Women Want*, 2:687–688  
 wheel bug, 1:40  
 Wheeler-Lee Amendment, 1:11, 2:645  
*When Prophecy Fails* (Festinger, Riecken, Schachter), 1:154, 2:959  
 Whewell, William, 1:465  
 White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1:316, 1:416  
 White House Plumbers, 2:931–932

- White House press secretaries, 2:933–935  
    deception, 2:934  
    health communications, 2:934–935  
    lying machine, 2:934  
    political spin, 2:935  
    psych-background, 2:934  
white lies, 1:320, 2:532, 2:935–937, 2:959.  
    *See also* half-truths  
        in adulthood, 2:936–937  
        black lies and, 2:936  
        in childhood, 2:936  
        social and emotional benefits, 2:935–936  
white propaganda, 1:183  
Whiteaker, Sudie, 1:433  
Whitman, Walt, 2:853  
WHO (World Health Organization), 2:578  
Whole Foods Market, 2:854–855  
whoppers, 2:877  
Wickler, Wolfgang, 1:22–25  
Wiesel, Elie, 2:635  
Wikipedia, 1:301–302, 2:854  
Wilber, Cornelia, 2:854  
Wild Oats Market, 2:855  
Wilde, Oscar, 1:467  
Wilkinson, Norman, 1:117  
William III, 1:132  
William the Conqueror, 1:374  
Williams, Bernard, 1:475, 2:608  
Williams, Lefty, 1:59  
Williams, Linda M., 1:xxxiv  
Williams, Robin, 2:685  
Willis, Frank, 2:718  
Wilson, Frank, 1:xxxi  
Wilson, Joseph C., 1:103  
Wilson, Robert, 1:488  
Wilson, Woodrow, 1:xxxi, 1:382, 2:934, 2:945, 2:947  
Winfrey, Oprah, 1:397–398, 2:654–655, 2:661  
*Winning through Intimidation*, 1:94  
Wiseman, Nicholas, 1:120  
witch hunts, 1:xxx  
witchcraft, 1:29  
Witherspoon, Reese, 2:685  
witness, false testimony of, 2:937–940. *See also*  
    evidence, strategic use of; eyewitness testimony;  
    false confessions; perjury  
        child and elder adult witnesses, 2:939  
        motivations, 2:937–938  
        weak alibi witness evidence, 2:939–940  
*Witness Stand, The* (Münsterberg), 1:xxxi  
*Wizard of Oz, The*, 1:379  
Wizards of Lie Detection, 2:940–941  
    Ekman and, 2:940–941  
    project organization, 2:940  
    universal emotions and, 2:941  
WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), 1:103–104, 2:548–550  
women, 2:687–688, 2:942–945  
    crime and, 2:942–943  
    deception in romantic relationships, 2:943–944  
    gender studies, 2:944  
    lies men tell women, 2:659–660  
Woodward, Arthur, 2:759  
*Working Girl*, 2:685  
World Columbian Exposition, 1:58  
world domination conspiracies, 1:201  
World Health Organization (WHO), 2:578  
World War I, 2:945–948  
    alliances and motivations, 2:945  
    propaganda, 1:xxxi, 2:945–946  
    submarine warfare and deception, 2:946  
    Zimmerman Telegram, 2:945, 2:947–948  
World War II, 2:948–951. *See also* Churchill, Winston; Eisenhower, Dwight; Hitler, Adolf; Normandy, Allied invasion of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Josef  
    Allies' deception, 2:948–950  
    Axis deception, 2:950–951  
    Churchill strategy of deception, 1:142–144  
    consensual realities, 1:199  
    D-Day invasion, 1:300  
    Eisenhower in, 1:325–326  
    Funkspiel, 2:951  
    Operation Barclay, 2:950  
    Operation Bertram, 2:950  
    Operation Big Drum, 2:949  
    Operation Blumenpflucken, 2:951  
    Operation Bodyguard, 1:300, 1:301, 2:730–733, 2:949  
    Operation Cascade, 2:950  
    Operation Cockade, 2:950  
    Operation Copperhead, 2:949  
    Operation Fortitude, 1:326, 2:724, 2:949  
    Operation Glimmer, 2:949  
    Operation Hardboiled, 2:950  
    Operation Harpune, 2:950–951  
    Operation Kremlin, 2:951  
    Operation Mincemeat, 1:199–200, 2:733–735, 2:950  
    Operation Neptune, 2:735–737, 2:949  
    Operation Quicksilver, 2:724, 2:737–739, 2:949  
    Operation Scherhorn, 2:950

Operation Seelowe, 2:951  
 Operation Taxable, 2:949  
 Operation Titanic, 2:949  
   smoke screen during, 2:849–850  
 World Zionist Organization, 1:310  
 WorldCom bankruptcy, 1:xxxv, 1:6, 1:110,  
   2:543  
 Wouk, Herman, 1:376  
 Wounded Knee, 2:698–699  
 Wright, Arthur, 1:225–226  
 Wright, Elsie, 1:xxxi, 1:225–227  
 Wundt, Wilhem, 2:903  
 Wyatt, Francis, 1:116  
 Wycheck, Frank, 1:388

## X

*X Files, The*, 1:202  
 Xenophanes, 1:458  
 Xenophon, 2:653  
 Xerox scandal, 1:110

## Y

Yahoo! News, 1:301  
 Yates, Ronald, 1:281  
*Yentl*, 2:685

*Yes Minister*, 1:335  
 Yezhov, Nikolai, 2:868  
 Yonge, Roby, 1:68  
 Young, Andrew, 1:323, 1:324  
 Young, Brigham, 1:90  
*You've Got Mail*, 2:687  
 Yurovsky, Yakov, 1:21

## Z

Zakaria, Fareed, 2:762  
 Zamansky, Jacob, 1:308  
 Zeckhasuer, Richard, 1:475, 2:608, 2:681  
 Zekman, Pamela, 2:712, 2:713  
 zero tolerance, 1:316  
 Ziegler, Ron, 2:934  
 Zimbardo, Philip, 1:xxxiii  
 Zimmerman, Arthur, 2:947  
 Zimmerman Telegram, 2:945, 2:947–948  
 Zipf, George, 2:509  
 Zola, Émile, 1:310  
 Zuckerman, M., 1:351–352, 2:685  
   behavioral cues and, 2:687  
   four-factor theory of emotion and nonverbal  
     behavior, 2:601, 2:897  
 Zywica, Jolene, 2:528



## Photo Credits

VOLUME 1 U.S. Navy: 2 (Elliott Fabrizio), 116 (right, Amber K. Whittington), 127, 288 (Jeremy L. Grisham); National Archives and Records: 9, 152, 194; Boston Public Library: 18; Wikimedia: 25, 32, 41, 49 (Kok Leng Yeo), 55, 75, 84 (Matt Waldron), 93, 180, 187, 203 (Damon D'Amato), 217; 247, 265, 295, 347 (Frank Kovalchek), 357, 367 (Jay Tamboli), 374, 379, 391, 405 (West Midlands Police), 419, 440 (Arasmus Photo), 448 (Walters Art Museum), 455, 462, 467, 483; Flickr: 62 (Keith Allison), 68, 166 (Bill Humason), 226, 324 (Peter A. Smith), 352 (Dan Silvers), 386 (Tanaka Juuyoh), 474 (Anneli Salo); National Institutes of Health: 98; Department of Defense: 103, 159, 283, 303, 317 (bottom), 338 (Kevin J. Wastler); U.S. Department of Justice: 110; Library of Congress: 116 (left), 143, 173, 412, 436; MorgueFile: 136, 237, 240, 272; 305, 331, 426; National Museum of Health and Medicine: 210; Photo Booth: 258; DES Daughters: 312; U.S. Marines Corps: 317 (top); Food and Drug Administration: 360; ©Duke University Photography/Jim Wallace: 400.

VOLUME 2 Library of Congress: 492, 712, 878, 947; Flickr: 497, 594 (Matthew Hayles), 639 (Ed Schipul), 686 (Government Press Office), 701, 789, 865 (Charlie Neibergall); ThinkStock: 506, 582, 603; Wikimedia: 513 (left), 513 (right, Jay Joslin), 526, 556, 572, 587 (West Midlands Police), 632, 651, 694, 708, 726, 761, 766, 773 (David Bethune, Limestone Technologies), 782 (Keith Allison), 815, 822, 837 (Ulrich Bendele), 846, 851, 859, 872 (David Shankbone); MorgueFile: 519, 617, 622, 661, 801, 808, 885, 894, 899, 913, 917, 926, 938; White House Photo/Lawrence Jackson: 542; Department of Defense: 549, 579; U.S. Navy: 565 (Timothy Walter); © Yann Caradec: 610; Food and Drug Administration: 644, 890; U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 667 (Barry Bahler); U.S. Marines Corps: 672 (Jeremy Fasci); Yorck Project: 679; National Archives and Records: 719, 746, 755, 908; U.S. Air Force: 731; U.S. Coast Guard/Photo courtesy of Helge Fykse, Norway: 738; Orange County Archives: 794; Photo courtesy of Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr. Library and Museum: 931 (left); North Carolina Museum of History: 931 (right).